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jq: Use Git to fetch the code

PATCH In review [email protected] 2 participants 21 messages Apr 23 – Apr 24

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/19 jq: Use Git to fetch the code

From: Peter Kjellerstedt <[email protected]>

There is a bug (see https://github.com/jqlang/jq/issues/434), which results in an empty version being used if autoreconf is run on the jq sources when using a release tar ball. The incorrect assumption is that autoreconf is only used when fetching the code using Git.

The empty version results in an incorrect libjq.pc file being created where the version is not set, which results in, e.g., pkgconf --libs 'libjq > 1.6' failing even if version 1.8.1 of jq is actually installed.

Switch to fetching the code using Git to workaround the bug.

(cherry picked from commit ed33569f822a3a8d41f82f6980a046d17aca37d5)
---
 ...-with-disable-maintainer-mode-and-so.patch | 44 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta-oe/recipes-devtools/jq/jq_1.8.1.bb       | 14 +++---
 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-devtools/jq/jq/0001-Support-building-with-disable-maintainer-mode-and-so.patch
meta-oe/recipes-devtools/jq/jq/0001-Support-building-with-disable-maintainer-mode-and-so.patch new file +44 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..12a64a75ed
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From 27f417f4812e688a59fc5186b7768cec004cd6e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Kjellerstedt <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2026 05:58:49 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Support building with --disable-maintainer-mode and source !=
+ build dir (#3518)
+
+If --disable-maintainer-mode is enabled, then the rules for generating
+parser.[ch] and lexer.[ch] did nothing. This worked fine if the source
+and build directories are the same as the pre-generated parser.c and
+lexer.c files would suffice. However, if the build directory is not the
+same as the source directory, then the rest of the Make rules expect
+parser.[ch] and lexer.[ch] to have been created in the build directory
+if their source files (parser.y and lexer.l) are newer than the target
+files, which can happen in case the source is fetched using Git.
+
+Avoid the problem by copying the files to the build directory if needed.
+
+Co-authored-by: Peter Kjellerstedt <[email protected]>
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/jqlang/jq/commit/27f417f4812e688a59fc5186b7768cec004cd6e5]
+---
+ Makefile.am | 9 +++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Makefile.am b/Makefile.am
+index 96d6038..acb9443 100644
+--- a/Makefile.am
++++ b/Makefile.am
+@@ -41,9 +41,14 @@ src/lexer.h: src/lexer.c
+ else
+ BUILT_SOURCES = src/builtin.inc src/config_opts.inc src/version.h
+ .y.c:
+-	$(AM_V_YACC) echo "NOT building parser.c!"
++	$(AM_V_YACC) [ "$(<D)" = "$(@D)" ] || cp $(<D)/$(@F) $@
++	$(AM_V_YACC) [ "$(<D)" = "$(@D)" ] || cp $(<D)/$(*F).h $*.h
++	$(AM_V_YACC) touch $@ $*.h
++
+ .l.c:
+-	$(AM_V_LEX) echo "NOT building lexer.c!"
++	$(AM_V_LEX) [ "$(<D)" = "$(@D)" ] || cp $(<D)/$(@F) $@
++	$(AM_V_LEX) [ "$(<D)" = "$(@D)" ] || cp $(<D)/$(*F).h $*.h
++	$(AM_V_LEX) touch $@ $*.h
+ endif
+ 
+ # Tell YACC (Bison) autoconf macros that you want a header file created.
meta-oe/recipes-devtools/jq/jq_1.8.1.bb +8 -6
index b9383c76f7..6eaa2de6df 100644
@@ -8,15 +8,17 @@ SECTION = "utils"
 LICENSE = "MIT & BSD-2-Clause"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=cf7fcb0a1def4a7ad62c028f7d0dca47"
 
-GITHUB_BASE_URI = "https://github.com/jqlang/${BPN}/releases/"
-SRC_URI = "${GITHUB_BASE_URI}/download/${BPN}-${PV}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \
+SRCREV = "4467af7068b1bcd7f882defff6e7ea674c5357f4"
+
+SRC_URI = " \
+    git://github.com/jqlang/jq.git;protocol=https;branch=master;tag=jq-${PV} \
     file://run-ptest \
-    "
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "2be64e7129cecb11d5906290eba10af694fb9e3e7f9fc208a311dc33ca837eb0"
+    file://0001-Support-building-with-disable-maintainer-mode-and-so.patch \
+"
 
-inherit autotools github-releases ptest
+inherit autotools ptest
 
-UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "releases/tag/${BPN}-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)"
+UPSTREAM_CHECK_GITTAGREGEX = "${BPN}-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)"
 
 PACKAGECONFIG ?= "oniguruma"
 
#1 lore raw

PATCH 2/19 jq: patch CVE-2026-32316

From: Gyorgy Sarvari <[email protected]>

Details: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32316

Backport the patch that is referenced by the NVD advisory.

(cherry picked from commit e94ab85126f12d77253107084dc8463c79b3e776)
---
 .../jq/jq/CVE-2026-32316.patch                | 53 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta-oe/recipes-devtools/jq/jq_1.8.1.bb       | 10 ++--
 2 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-devtools/jq/jq/CVE-2026-32316.patch
meta-oe/recipes-devtools/jq/jq/CVE-2026-32316.patch new file +53 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1277b356d8
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+From 321e62b356df2d4ed47aba4f3818e447ec4d77fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: itchyny <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2026 20:28:43 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix heap buffer overflow in `jvp_string_append` and
+ `jvp_string_copy_replace_bad`
+
+In `jvp_string_append`, the allocation size `(currlen + len) * 2` could
+overflow `uint32_t` when `currlen + len` exceeds `INT_MAX`, causing a small
+allocation followed by a large `memcpy`.
+
+In `jvp_string_copy_replace_bad`, the output buffer size calculation
+`length * 3 + 1` could overflow `uint32_t`, again resulting in a small
+allocation followed by a large write.
+
+Add overflow checks to both functions to return an error for strings
+that would exceed `INT_MAX` in length. Fixes CVE-2026-32316.
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-32316
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/jqlang/jq/commit/e47e56d226519635768e6aab2f38f0ab037c09e5]
+Signed-off-by: Gyorgy Sarvari <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/jv.c | 11 ++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/jv.c b/src/jv.c
+index e4529a4..74be05a 100644
+--- a/src/jv.c
++++ b/src/jv.c
+@@ -1114,7 +1114,12 @@ static jv jvp_string_copy_replace_bad(const char* data, uint32_t length) {
+   const char* end = data + length;
+   const char* i = data;
+ 
+-  uint32_t maxlength = length * 3 + 1; // worst case: all bad bytes, each becomes a 3-byte U+FFFD
++  // worst case: all bad bytes, each becomes a 3-byte U+FFFD
++  uint64_t maxlength = (uint64_t)length * 3 + 1;
++  if (maxlength >= INT_MAX) {
++    return jv_invalid_with_msg(jv_string("String too long"));
++  }
++
+   jvp_string* s = jvp_string_alloc(maxlength);
+   char* out = s->data;
+   int c = 0;
+@@ -1174,6 +1179,10 @@ static uint32_t jvp_string_remaining_space(jvp_string* s) {
+ static jv jvp_string_append(jv string, const char* data, uint32_t len) {
+   jvp_string* s = jvp_string_ptr(string);
+   uint32_t currlen = jvp_string_length(s);
++  if ((uint64_t)currlen + len >= INT_MAX) {
++    jv_free(string);
++    return jv_invalid_with_msg(jv_string("String too long"));
++  }
+ 
+   if (jvp_refcnt_unshared(string.u.ptr) &&
+       jvp_string_remaining_space(s) >= len) {
meta-oe/recipes-devtools/jq/jq_1.8.1.bb +5 -5
index 6eaa2de6df..71d7387bf8 100644
@@ -10,11 +10,11 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=cf7fcb0a1def4a7ad62c028f7d0dca47"
 
 SRCREV = "4467af7068b1bcd7f882defff6e7ea674c5357f4"
 
-SRC_URI = " \
-    git://github.com/jqlang/jq.git;protocol=https;branch=master;tag=jq-${PV} \
-    file://run-ptest \
-    file://0001-Support-building-with-disable-maintainer-mode-and-so.patch \
-"
+SRC_URI = "git://github.com/jqlang/jq.git;protocol=https;branch=master;tag=jq-${PV} \
+           file://run-ptest \
+           file://0001-Support-building-with-disable-maintainer-mode-and-so.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-32316.patch \
+           "
 
 inherit autotools ptest
 
#2 lore raw

PATCH 3/19 jq: patch CVE-2026-33947

In reply to [email protected]

From: Gyorgy Sarvari <[email protected]>

Details: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33947

Backport the patch that is referenced by the NVD report.

(cherry picked from commit 525e18ce214213193d9a280de3bfd2deb847110e)
---
 .../jq/jq/CVE-2026-33947.patch                | 104 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta-oe/recipes-devtools/jq/jq_1.8.1.bb       |   1 +
 2 files changed, 105 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-devtools/jq/jq/CVE-2026-33947.patch
meta-oe/recipes-devtools/jq/jq/CVE-2026-33947.patch new file +104 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..69a8381f06
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+From 5fd935884a6f5b3d8ecdcacfc5d3982140f3a478 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: itchyny <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 13 Apr 2026 11:23:40 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH] Limit path depth to prevent stack overflow
+
+Deeply nested path arrays can cause unbounded recursion in
+`jv_setpath`, `jv_getpath`, and `jv_delpaths`, leading to
+stack overflow. Add a depth limit of 10000 to match the
+existing `tojson` depth limit. This fixes CVE-2026-33947.
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-33947
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/jqlang/jq/commit/fb59f1491058d58bdc3e8dd28f1773d1ac690a1f]
+Signed-off-by: Gyorgy Sarvari <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/jv_aux.c  | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
+ tests/jq.test | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 46 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/jv_aux.c b/src/jv_aux.c
+index bc1405f..594a21f 100644
+--- a/src/jv_aux.c
++++ b/src/jv_aux.c
+@@ -375,6 +375,10 @@ static jv jv_dels(jv t, jv keys) {
+   return t;
+ }
+ 
++#ifndef MAX_PATH_DEPTH
++#define MAX_PATH_DEPTH (10000)
++#endif
++
+ jv jv_setpath(jv root, jv path, jv value) {
+   if (jv_get_kind(path) != JV_KIND_ARRAY) {
+     jv_free(value);
+@@ -382,6 +386,12 @@ jv jv_setpath(jv root, jv path, jv value) {
+     jv_free(path);
+     return jv_invalid_with_msg(jv_string("Path must be specified as an array"));
+   }
++  if (jv_array_length(jv_copy(path)) > MAX_PATH_DEPTH) {
++    jv_free(value);
++    jv_free(root);
++    jv_free(path);
++    return jv_invalid_with_msg(jv_string("Path too deep"));
++  }
+   if (!jv_is_valid(root)){
+     jv_free(value);
+     jv_free(path);
+@@ -434,6 +444,11 @@ jv jv_getpath(jv root, jv path) {
+     jv_free(path);
+     return jv_invalid_with_msg(jv_string("Path must be specified as an array"));
+   }
++  if (jv_array_length(jv_copy(path)) > MAX_PATH_DEPTH) {
++    jv_free(root);
++    jv_free(path);
++    return jv_invalid_with_msg(jv_string("Path too deep"));
++  }
+   if (!jv_is_valid(root)) {
+     jv_free(path);
+     return root;
+@@ -511,6 +526,12 @@ jv jv_delpaths(jv object, jv paths) {
+       jv_free(elem);
+       return err;
+     }
++    if (jv_array_length(jv_copy(elem)) > MAX_PATH_DEPTH) {
++      jv_free(object);
++      jv_free(paths);
++      jv_free(elem);
++      return jv_invalid_with_msg(jv_string("Path too deep"));
++    }
+     jv_free(elem);
+   }
+   if (jv_array_length(jv_copy(paths)) == 0) {
+diff --git a/tests/jq.test b/tests/jq.test
+index 4ecf72f..6186d8b 100644
+--- a/tests/jq.test
++++ b/tests/jq.test
+@@ -2507,3 +2507,28 @@ strflocaltime("" | ., @uri)
+ 0
+ ""
+ ""
++
++# regression test for CVE-2026-33947
++setpath([range(10000) | 0]; 0) | flatten
++null
++[0]
++
++try setpath([range(10001) | 0]; 0) catch .
++null
++"Path too deep"
++
++getpath([range(10000) | 0])
++null
++null
++
++try getpath([range(10001) | 0]) catch .
++null
++"Path too deep"
++
++delpaths([[range(10000) | 0]])
++null
++null
++
++try delpaths([[range(10001) | 0]]) catch .
++null
++"Path too deep"
meta-oe/recipes-devtools/jq/jq_1.8.1.bb +1 -0
index 71d7387bf8..6df1d46f48 100644
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/jqlang/jq.git;protocol=https;branch=master;tag=jq-${
            file://run-ptest \
            file://0001-Support-building-with-disable-maintainer-mode-and-so.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-32316.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-33947.patch \
            "
 
 inherit autotools ptest
#3 lore raw

PATCH 4/19 jq: patch CVE-2026-33948

In reply to [email protected]

From: Gyorgy Sarvari <[email protected]>

Details: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33948

Backport the patch that is referenced by the NVD advisory.

(cherry picked from commit 8d399af3337b25d71f8cd4308b9788ac4e88b730)
---
 .../jq/jq/CVE-2026-33948.patch                | 49 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta-oe/recipes-devtools/jq/jq_1.8.1.bb       |  1 +
 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-devtools/jq/jq/CVE-2026-33948.patch
meta-oe/recipes-devtools/jq/jq/CVE-2026-33948.patch new file +49 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8625429c74
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From 19a792c4cdb6b91c056eac033ac3367af6e67755 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: itchyny <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 13 Apr 2026 08:46:11 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix NUL truncation in the JSON parser
+
+This fixes CVE-2026-33948.
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-33948
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/jqlang/jq/commit/6374ae0bcdfe33a18eb0ae6db28493b1f34a0a5b]
+Signed-off-by: Gyorgy Sarvari <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/util.c   | 8 +-------
+ tests/shtest | 6 ++++++
+ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/util.c b/src/util.c
+index bcb86da..60ec4d5 100644
+--- a/src/util.c
++++ b/src/util.c
+@@ -309,13 +309,7 @@ static int jq_util_input_read_more(jq_util_input_state *state) {
+       if (p != NULL)
+         state->current_line++;
+ 
+-      if (p == NULL && state->parser != NULL) {
+-        /*
+-         * There should be no NULs in JSON texts (but JSON text
+-         * sequences are another story).
+-         */
+-        state->buf_valid_len = strlen(state->buf);
+-      } else if (p == NULL && feof(state->current_input)) {
++      if (p == NULL && feof(state->current_input)) {
+         size_t i;
+ 
+         /*
+diff --git a/tests/shtest b/tests/shtest
+index 887a6bb..a046afe 100755
+--- a/tests/shtest
++++ b/tests/shtest
+@@ -842,4 +842,10 @@ if ! $msys && ! $mingw; then
+   fi
+ fi
+ 
++# CVE-2026-33948: No NUL truncation in the JSON parser
++if printf '{}\x00{}' | $JQ >/dev/null 2> /dev/null; then
++  printf 'Error expected but jq exited successfully\n' 1>&2
++  exit 1
++fi
++
+ exit 0
meta-oe/recipes-devtools/jq/jq_1.8.1.bb +1 -0
index 6df1d46f48..acea1e4b27 100644
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/jqlang/jq.git;protocol=https;branch=master;tag=jq-${
            file://0001-Support-building-with-disable-maintainer-mode-and-so.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-32316.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-33947.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-33948.patch \
            "
 
 inherit autotools ptest
#4 lore raw

PATCH 5/19 jq: patch CVE-2026-39979

In reply to [email protected]

From: Gyorgy Sarvari <[email protected]>

Details: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39979

Backport the patch that is referenced by the NVD advisory.y

(cherry picked from commit 2b1e34f0f51b103fa37f163cdccdeebf821ac7c1)
---
 .../jq/jq/CVE-2026-39979.patch                | 31 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta-oe/recipes-devtools/jq/jq_1.8.1.bb       |  1 +
 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-devtools/jq/jq/CVE-2026-39979.patch
meta-oe/recipes-devtools/jq/jq/CVE-2026-39979.patch new file +31 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..40c57a46a0
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From ac09f274b6c029a23e3dffc38afac819b5daacc4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: itchyny <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 13 Apr 2026 11:04:52 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix out-of-bounds read in jv_parse_sized()
+
+This fixes CVE-2026-39979.
+
+Co-authored-by: Mattias Wadman <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-39979
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/jqlang/jq/commit/2f09060afab23fe9390cce7cb860b10416e1bf5f]
+Signed-off-by: Gyorgy Sarvari <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/jv_parse.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/jv_parse.c b/src/jv_parse.c
+index ffcf51f..e6b8aa9 100644
+--- a/src/jv_parse.c
++++ b/src/jv_parse.c
+@@ -892,8 +892,9 @@ jv jv_parse_sized_custom_flags(const char* string, int length, int flags) {
+ 
+   if (!jv_is_valid(value) && jv_invalid_has_msg(jv_copy(value))) {
+     jv msg = jv_invalid_get_msg(value);
+-    value = jv_invalid_with_msg(jv_string_fmt("%s (while parsing '%s')",
++    value = jv_invalid_with_msg(jv_string_fmt("%s (while parsing '%.*s')",
+                                               jv_string_value(msg),
++                                              length,
+                                               string));
+     jv_free(msg);
+   }
meta-oe/recipes-devtools/jq/jq_1.8.1.bb +1 -0
index acea1e4b27..026f6bfa71 100644
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/jqlang/jq.git;protocol=https;branch=master;tag=jq-${
            file://CVE-2026-32316.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-33947.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-33948.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-39979.patch \
            "
 
 inherit autotools ptest
#5 lore raw

PATCH 6/19 lcms: patch CVE-2026-41254

In reply to [email protected]

From: Ankur Tyagi <[email protected]>

Details: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41254

Backport the patches referenced by the NVD advisory.

---
 .../lcms/lcms/CVE-2026-41254_1.patch          | 30 ++++++++++++++++
 .../lcms/lcms/CVE-2026-41254_2.patch          | 36 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta-oe/recipes-support/lcms/lcms_2.16.bb     |  5 ++-
 3 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-support/lcms/lcms/CVE-2026-41254_1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-support/lcms/lcms/CVE-2026-41254_2.patch
meta-oe/recipes-support/lcms/lcms/CVE-2026-41254_1.patch new file +30 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7bf46706e5
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From 524f3df7511b49543a65a7de2a08640777c1b29c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Marti Maria <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 19 Feb 2026 09:07:20 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix integer overflow in CubeSize()
+
+Thanks to @zerojackyi for reporting
+
+(cherry picked from commit da6110b1d14abc394633a388209abd5ebedd7ab0)
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-41254
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/mm2/Little-CMS/commit/da6110b1d14abc394633a388209abd5ebedd7ab0]
+Signed-off-by: Ankur Tyagi <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/cmslut.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/cmslut.c b/src/cmslut.c
+index 1ea61a8..3488d0c 100644
+--- a/src/cmslut.c
++++ b/src/cmslut.c
+@@ -460,7 +460,8 @@ void EvaluateCLUTfloatIn16(const cmsFloat32Number In[], cmsFloat32Number Out[],
+ static
+ cmsUInt32Number CubeSize(const cmsUInt32Number Dims[], cmsUInt32Number b)
+ {
+-    cmsUInt32Number rv, dim;
++    cmsUInt32Number dim;
++    cmsUInt64Number rv;
+ 
+     _cmsAssert(Dims != NULL);
+ 
meta-oe/recipes-support/lcms/lcms/CVE-2026-41254_2.patch new file +36 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0602258ef5
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+From 73ffd45705d368c159bb819ab0b1a033638c3ffe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Marti Maria <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2026 22:57:35 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] check for overflow
+
+Thanks to Guanni Qu for detecting & reporting the issue
+
+(cherry picked from commit e0641b1828d0a1af5ecb1b11fe22f24fceefd4bc)
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-41254
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/mm2/Little-CMS/commit/e0641b1828d0a1af5ecb1b11fe22f24fceefd4bc]
+Signed-off-by: Ankur Tyagi <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/cmslut.c | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/cmslut.c b/src/cmslut.c
+index 3488d0c..f2d0ec4 100644
+--- a/src/cmslut.c
++++ b/src/cmslut.c
+@@ -468,12 +468,12 @@ cmsUInt32Number CubeSize(const cmsUInt32Number Dims[], cmsUInt32Number b)
+     for (rv = 1; b > 0; b--) {
+ 
+         dim = Dims[b-1];
+-        if (dim <= 1) return 0;  // Error
+-
+-        rv *= dim;
++        if (dim <= 1) return 0;  
+ 
+         // Check for overflow
+         if (rv > UINT_MAX / dim) return 0;
++
++        rv *= dim;
+     }
+ 
+     // Again, prevent overflow
meta-oe/recipes-support/lcms/lcms_2.16.bb +4 -1
index 9422c7330b..c67653757f 100644
@@ -3,7 +3,10 @@ SECTION = "libs"
 LICENSE = "MIT"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=e9ce323c4b71c943a785db90142b228a"
 
-SRC_URI = "${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/lcms/lcms2-${PV}.tar.gz"
+SRC_URI = "${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/lcms/lcms2-${PV}.tar.gz \
+        file://CVE-2026-41254_1.patch \
+        file://CVE-2026-41254_2.patch \
+"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "d873d34ad8b9b4cea010631f1a6228d2087475e4dc5e763eb81acc23d9d45a51"
 
 DEPENDS = "tiff"
#6 lore raw

PATCH 7/19 libcoap: patch CVE-2026-29013

In reply to [email protected]

From: Ankur Tyagi <[email protected]>

Details: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29013

Debian[1] also identified this as a fix.
[1] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-29013

---
 .../libcoap/libcoap/CVE-2026-29013.patch      | 86 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../libcoap/libcoap_4.3.5a.bb                 |  1 +
 2 files changed, 87 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta-networking/recipes-devtools/libcoap/libcoap/CVE-2026-29013.patch
meta-networking/recipes-devtools/libcoap/libcoap/CVE-2026-29013.patch new file +86 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..87d4016af9
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+From 9e830709e98b0213c8806157ccae13df9d3fed74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jon Shallow <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 24 Mar 2026 14:15:09 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] sanitizer: Fix reported issues
+
+coap_new_cache_entry() does not correctly check for no PDU data when called
+with COAP_CACHE_RECORD_PDU. No current libcoap code (examples and library)
+call coap_new_cache_entry() with COAP_CACHE_RECORD_PDU set.
+
+Internal function coap_pdu_resize() can be used to reduce a PDU size,
+creating current options confusion.  Fix is not to reduce PDU if new
+size is smaller than the current used size. No current libcoap code calls
+coap_pdu_resize() to reduce the size.
+
+If there is an issue with the PDU options where the maximum used option
+value is larger than the last defined option value, an assert() is triggered.
+
+All of the coap_*_option() functions correctly manage pdu->max_opt, but
+this issue could occur if coap_pdu_resize() was called to reduce the PDU size
+below that of pdu->used_size.
+
+(cherry picked from commit b7847c4dbb0dbee7c90b09a673d4cae256f03718)
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-29013
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/obgm/libcoap/commit/b7847c4dbb0dbee7c90b09a673d4cae256f03718]
+Signed-off-by: Ankur Tyagi <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/coap_cache.c |  3 ++-
+ src/coap_pdu.c   | 11 +++++++++--
+ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/coap_cache.c b/src/coap_cache.c
+index 16931f56..e018604d 100644
+--- a/src/coap_cache.c
++++ b/src/coap_cache.c
+@@ -203,7 +203,8 @@ coap_new_cache_entry_lkd(coap_session_t *session, const coap_pdu_t *pdu,
+       memcpy(entry->pdu, pdu, offsetof(coap_pdu_t, token));
+       memcpy(entry->pdu->token, pdu->token, pdu->used_size);
+       /* And adjust all the pointers etc. */
+-      entry->pdu->data = entry->pdu->token + (pdu->data - pdu->token);
++      if (pdu->data)
++        entry->pdu->data = entry->pdu->token + (pdu->data - pdu->token);
+     }
+   }
+   entry->cache_key = coap_cache_derive_key(session, pdu, session_based);
+diff --git a/src/coap_pdu.c b/src/coap_pdu.c
+index 9394e6fe..2e06ccbc 100644
+--- a/src/coap_pdu.c
++++ b/src/coap_pdu.c
+@@ -280,10 +280,12 @@ fail:
+ int
+ coap_pdu_resize(coap_pdu_t *pdu, size_t new_size) {
+   if (new_size > pdu->alloc_size) {
++    /* Expanding the PDU usage */
+ #if !defined(WITH_LWIP)
+     uint8_t *new_hdr;
+     size_t offset;
+ #endif
++
+     if (pdu->max_size && new_size > pdu->max_size) {
+       coap_log_warn("coap_pdu_resize: pdu too big\n");
+       return 0;
+@@ -314,8 +316,8 @@ coap_pdu_resize(coap_pdu_t *pdu, size_t new_size) {
+     else
+       pdu->actual_token.s = &pdu->token[2];
+ #endif
++    pdu->alloc_size = new_size;
+   }
+-  pdu->alloc_size = new_size;
+   return 1;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -629,7 +631,12 @@ coap_insert_option(coap_pdu_t *pdu, coap_option_num_t number, size_t len,
+     }
+     prev_number = opt_iter.number;
+   }
+-  assert(option != NULL);
++  if (option == NULL) {
++    /* Code is broken somewhere */
++    coap_log_warn("coap_insert_option: Broken max_opt\n");
++    return 0;
++  }
++
+   /* size of option inc header to insert */
+   shift = coap_opt_encode_size(number - prev_number, len);
+ 
meta-networking/recipes-devtools/libcoap/libcoap_4.3.5a.bb +1 -0
index 611795e17d..eaece6f1f0 100644
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=05d17535846895e23ea4c79b16a9e904"
 
 SRC_URI = "git://github.com/obgm/libcoap.git;branch=release-4.3.5-patches;protocol=https;tag=v${PV} \
            file://run-ptest \
+           file://CVE-2026-29013.patch \
            "
 SRCREV = "e3fdcdcfbd1588754fe9dd4b754ac9397260f0f9"
 
#7 lore raw

PATCH 8/19 libgphoto2: patch CVE-2026-40333

In reply to [email protected]

From: Gyorgy Sarvari <[email protected]>

Details: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40333

Backport the patch referenced by the NVD advisory.

---
 .../gphoto2/libgphoto2/CVE-2026-40333.patch   | 150 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../gphoto2/libgphoto2_2.5.33.bb              |   3 +-
 2 files changed, 152 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-graphics/gphoto2/libgphoto2/CVE-2026-40333.patch
meta-oe/recipes-graphics/gphoto2/libgphoto2/CVE-2026-40333.patch new file +150 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..77c307e88d
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+From 8fefd2da7b9e2c7c448086cd251b108c0ebf1262 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Marcus Meissner <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2026 15:18:42 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fixed EOS ImageFormat/CustomFuncEx Parsers Lack Length
+ Parameter
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+ptp_unpack_EOS_ImageFormat() and ptp_unpack_EOS_CustomFuncEx() accept
+const unsigned char** data but no length/size parameter. They perform
+unbounded reads via dtoh32o calls (up to 36 bytes for ImageFormat,
+up to 1024 bytes for CustomFuncEx). Callers in ptp_unpack_EOS_events()
+have xsize available but never pass it.
+
+ CVE-2026-40333
+
+Reported-By: Sebastián Alba <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-40333
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/gphoto/libgphoto2/commit/1817ecead20c2aafa7549dac9619fe38f47b2f53]
+Signed-off-by: Gyorgy Sarvari <[email protected]>
+---
+ camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c b/camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c
+index 09421b7..09dcc24 100644
+--- a/camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c
++++ b/camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c
+@@ -1448,7 +1448,7 @@ ptp_unpack_Canon_EOS_FE (PTPParams *params, const unsigned char* data, unsigned
+ 
+ 
+ static inline uint16_t
+-ptp_unpack_EOS_ImageFormat (PTPParams* params, const unsigned char** data )
++ptp_unpack_EOS_ImageFormat (PTPParams* params, const unsigned char** data, unsigned int *size )
+ {
+ 	/*
+ 	  EOS ImageFormat entries look are a sequence of u32 values:
+@@ -1492,30 +1492,57 @@ ptp_unpack_EOS_ImageFormat (PTPParams* params, const unsigned char** data )
+ 
+ 	const uint8_t* d = *data;
+ 	uint32_t offset = 0;
+-	uint32_t n = dtoh32o (d, offset);
++	uint32_t n;
+ 	uint32_t l, t1, s1, c1, t2 = 0, s2 = 0, c2 = 0;
+ 
++	if (*size < sizeof(uint32_t)) {
++		ptp_debug (params, "parsing EOS ImageFormat property failed 1 (size %d)", *size);
++		return 0;
++	}
++	n = dtoh32o (d, offset);
++	*size -= sizeof(uint32_t);
++
+ 	if (n != 1 && n !=2) {
+ 		ptp_debug (params, "parsing EOS ImageFormat property failed (n != 1 && n != 2: %d)", n);
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+-
++	if (*size < sizeof(uint32_t)) {
++		ptp_debug (params, "parsing EOS ImageFormat property failed 2 (size %d)", *size);
++		return 0;
++	}
+ 	l = dtoh32o (d, offset);
++	*size -= sizeof(uint32_t);
++
+ 	if (l != 0x10) {
+ 		ptp_debug (params, "parsing EOS ImageFormat property failed (l != 0x10: 0x%x)", l);
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (*size < 3*sizeof(uint32_t)) {
++		ptp_debug (params, "parsing EOS ImageFormat property failed 3 (size %d)", *size);
++		return 0;
++	}
+ 	t1 = dtoh32o (d, offset);
+ 	s1 = dtoh32o (d, offset);
+ 	c1 = dtoh32o (d, offset);
++	*size -= 3*sizeof(uint32_t);
+ 
+ 	if (n == 2) {
++		if (*size < sizeof(uint32_t)) {
++			ptp_debug (params, "parsing EOS ImageFormat property failed 4 (size %d)", *size);
++			return 0;
++		}
+ 		l = dtoh32o (d, offset);
++		*size -= sizeof(uint32_t);
++
+ 		if (l != 0x10) {
+ 			ptp_debug (params, "parsing EOS ImageFormat property failed (l != 0x10: 0x%x)", l);
+ 			return 0;
+ 		}
++		if (*size < 3*sizeof(uint32_t)) {
++			ptp_debug (params, "parsing EOS ImageFormat property failed 5 (size %d)", *size);
++			return 0;
++		}
+ 		t2 = dtoh32o (d, offset);
+ 		s2 = dtoh32o (d, offset);
+ 		c2 = dtoh32o (d, offset);
+@@ -1668,12 +1695,20 @@ ptp_unpack_EOS_FocusInfoEx (PTPParams* params, const unsigned char** data, uint3
+ 
+ 
+ static inline char*
+-ptp_unpack_EOS_CustomFuncEx (PTPParams* params, const unsigned char** data )
++ptp_unpack_EOS_CustomFuncEx (PTPParams* params, const unsigned char** data, unsigned int *size )
+ {
+-	uint32_t s = dtoh32a( *data );
+-	uint32_t n = s/4, i;
++	uint32_t s, n, i;
+ 	char	*str, *p;
+ 
++	if (*size < sizeof(uint32_t))
++		return strdup("bad length");
++
++	s = dtoh32a( *data );
++	n = s/4;
++
++	if (*size < 4+s)
++		return strdup("bad length");
++
+ 	if (s > 1024) {
+ 		ptp_debug (params, "customfuncex data is larger than 1k / %d... unexpected?", s);
+ 		return strdup("bad length");
+@@ -1962,7 +1997,7 @@ ptp_unpack_EOS_events (PTPParams *params, const unsigned char* data, unsigned in
+ 			case PTP_DPC_CANON_EOS_ImageFormatExtHD:
+ 				/* special handling of ImageFormat properties */
+ 				for (j=0;j<dpd_count;j++) {
+-					dpd->FORM.Enum.SupportedValue[j].u16 = ptp_unpack_EOS_ImageFormat( params, &xdata );
++					dpd->FORM.Enum.SupportedValue[j].u16 = ptp_unpack_EOS_ImageFormat( params, &xdata, &xsize );
+ 					ptp_debug (params, INDENT "prop %x option[%2d] == 0x%04x", dpc, j, dpd->FORM.Enum.SupportedValue[j].u16);
+ 				}
+ 				break;
+@@ -2267,7 +2302,7 @@ ptp_unpack_EOS_events (PTPParams *params, const unsigned char* data, unsigned in
+ 			case PTP_DPC_CANON_EOS_ImageFormatSD:
+ 			case PTP_DPC_CANON_EOS_ImageFormatExtHD:
+ 				dpd->DataType = PTP_DTC_UINT16;
+-				dpd->DefaultValue.u16 = ptp_unpack_EOS_ImageFormat( params, &xdata );
++				dpd->DefaultValue.u16 = ptp_unpack_EOS_ImageFormat( params, &xdata, &xsize );
+ 				dpd->CurrentValue.u16 = dpd->DefaultValue.u16;
+ 				ptp_debug (params, INDENT "prop %x value == 0x%04x (u16)", dpc, dpd->CurrentValue.u16);
+ 				break;
+@@ -2275,7 +2310,7 @@ ptp_unpack_EOS_events (PTPParams *params, const unsigned char* data, unsigned in
+ 				dpd->DataType = PTP_DTC_STR;
+ 				free (dpd->DefaultValue.str);
+ 				free (dpd->CurrentValue.str);
+-				dpd->DefaultValue.str = ptp_unpack_EOS_CustomFuncEx( params, &xdata );
++				dpd->DefaultValue.str = ptp_unpack_EOS_CustomFuncEx( params, &xdata, &xsize );
+ 				dpd->CurrentValue.str = strdup( (char*)dpd->DefaultValue.str );
+ 				ptp_debug (params, INDENT "prop %x value == %s", dpc, dpd->CurrentValue.str);
+ 				break;
meta-oe/recipes-graphics/gphoto2/libgphoto2_2.5.33.bb +2 -1
index 6b5e6c21b9..e5a64c504a 100644
@@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ DEPENDS = "libtool jpeg virtual/libusb0 libexif zlib libxml2"
 SRC_URI = "${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/gphoto/${BP}.tar.xz;name=libgphoto2 \
            file://40-libgphoto2.rules \
            file://0001-configure-Filter-out-buildpaths-from-CC.patch \
-"
+           file://CVE-2026-40333.patch \
+           "
 SRC_URI[libgphoto2.sha256sum] = "28825f767a85544cb58f6e15028f8e53a5bb37a62148b3f1708b524781c3bef2"
 
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://sourceforge.net/projects/gphoto/files/libgphoto/"
#8 lore raw

PATCH 9/19 libgphoto2: patch CVE-2026-40334

In reply to [email protected]

From: Gyorgy Sarvari <[email protected]>

Details: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40334

Backport the patch that is referenced by the NVD advisory.

(cherry picked from commit ce3fa8ad2a403c0c9bfcbcc9f4fc877c6ffb9fab)
---
 .../gphoto2/libgphoto2/CVE-2026-40334.patch   | 37 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../gphoto2/libgphoto2_2.5.33.bb              |  1 +
 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-graphics/gphoto2/libgphoto2/CVE-2026-40334.patch
meta-oe/recipes-graphics/gphoto2/libgphoto2/CVE-2026-40334.patch new file +37 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..883582dff0
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From 20b33a26b2efdbf2c35c5cacc54a041855ec764b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Marcus Meissner <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2026 15:15:54 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fixed Canon FolderEntry Missing Null Termination
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+ptp_unpack_Canon_FE() copies filename with strncpy into a 13-byte
+buffer without explicit null termination. The EOS variant at line
+1451–1452 correctly adds fe->Filename[PTP_CANON_FilenameBufferLen-1]
+= 0; confirming this was recognized as necessary but not applied to the
+original Canon path.
+
+ CVE-2026-40334
+
+Reported-By: Sebastián Alba <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-40334
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/gphoto/libgphoto2/commit/259fc7d3bfe534ce4b114c464f55b448670ab873]
+Signed-off-by: Gyorgy Sarvari <[email protected]>
+---
+ camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c b/camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c
+index 09dcc24..982b4f4 100644
+--- a/camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c
++++ b/camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c
+@@ -1369,6 +1369,7 @@ ptp_unpack_Canon_FE (PTPParams *params, const unsigned char* data, PTPCANONFolde
+ 	fe->ObjectSize       = dtoh32a(data + PTP_cfe_ObjectSize);
+ 	fe->Time     = (time_t)dtoh32a(data + PTP_cfe_Time);
+ 	strncpy(fe->Filename, (char*)data + PTP_cfe_Filename, PTP_CANON_FilenameBufferLen);
++	fe->Filename[PTP_CANON_FilenameBufferLen-1] = '\0';
+ }
+ 
+ /*
meta-oe/recipes-graphics/gphoto2/libgphoto2_2.5.33.bb +1 -0
index e5a64c504a..9e4726d8e9 100644
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/gphoto/${BP}.tar.xz;name=libgphoto2 \
            file://40-libgphoto2.rules \
            file://0001-configure-Filter-out-buildpaths-from-CC.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-40333.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-40334.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[libgphoto2.sha256sum] = "28825f767a85544cb58f6e15028f8e53a5bb37a62148b3f1708b524781c3bef2"
 
#9 lore raw

PATCH 10/19 libgphoto2: patch CVE-2026-40335

In reply to [email protected]

From: Gyorgy Sarvari <[email protected]>

Details: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40335

Backport the patch that is referenced by the NVD advisory.

(cherry picked from commit f735ea20b176591b65deaa456e93ebf7ecbead3f)
---
 .../gphoto2/libgphoto2/CVE-2026-40335.patch   | 43 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../gphoto2/libgphoto2_2.5.33.bb              |  1 +
 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-graphics/gphoto2/libgphoto2/CVE-2026-40335.patch
meta-oe/recipes-graphics/gphoto2/libgphoto2/CVE-2026-40335.patch new file +43 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dfe832e6c8
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From edcdf804662eb4340fdc371af4853d6579e969ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Marcus Meissner <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2026 15:07:38 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] =?UTF-8?q?Fixed=20UINT128/INT128=20Unchecked=20Offset=20A?=
+ =?UTF-8?q?dvance=20(CWE-125)=20=E2=80=94=20MEDIUM?=
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Finding 5: UINT128/INT128 Unchecked Offset Advance (CWE-125) — MEDIUM
+
+In ptp_unpack_DPV(), the PTP_DTC_UINT128 and PTP_DTC_INT128 cases advance *offset += 16 without verifying 16 bytes remain. The entry check at line 609 only guarantees *offset < total (at least 1 byte available). After the unchecked advance, *offset can exceed total, and the CTVAL macro's bounds check (total - *offset < sizeof(target)) wraps due to unsigned arithmetic.
+
+CVE-2026-40335
+
+Reported-By: Sebastián Alba <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-40335
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/gphoto/libgphoto2/commit/433bde9888d70aa726e32744cd751d7dbe94379a]
+Signed-off-by: Gyorgy Sarvari <[email protected]>
+---
+ camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c b/camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c
+index 982b4f4..7fc120d 100644
+--- a/camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c
++++ b/camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c
+@@ -614,10 +614,14 @@ ptp_unpack_DPV (
+ 	case PTP_DTC_UINT64: CTVAL(value->u64,dtoh64a); break;
+ 
+ 	case PTP_DTC_UINT128:
++		if (total - *offset < 16)
++			return 0;
+ 		*offset += 16;
+ 		/*fprintf(stderr,"unhandled unpack of uint128n");*/
+ 		break;
+ 	case PTP_DTC_INT128:
++		if (total - *offset < 16)
++			return 0;
+ 		*offset += 16;
+ 		/*fprintf(stderr,"unhandled unpack of int128n");*/
+ 		break;
meta-oe/recipes-graphics/gphoto2/libgphoto2_2.5.33.bb +1 -0
index 9e4726d8e9..84ce802ea4 100644
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/gphoto/${BP}.tar.xz;name=libgphoto2 \
            file://0001-configure-Filter-out-buildpaths-from-CC.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-40333.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-40334.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-40335.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[libgphoto2.sha256sum] = "28825f767a85544cb58f6e15028f8e53a5bb37a62148b3f1708b524781c3bef2"
 
#10 lore raw

PATCH 11/19 libgphoto2: patch CVE-2026-40336

In reply to [email protected]

From: Gyorgy Sarvari <[email protected]>

Details: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40336

Backport the patch referenced by the NVD advisory.

(cherry picked from commit 078f26b084d7a7e4ac61521f73188249b9bdd39a)
---
 .../gphoto2/libgphoto2/CVE-2026-40336.patch   | 44 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../gphoto2/libgphoto2_2.5.33.bb              |  1 +
 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-graphics/gphoto2/libgphoto2/CVE-2026-40336.patch
meta-oe/recipes-graphics/gphoto2/libgphoto2/CVE-2026-40336.patch new file +44 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1a809b4f25
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From e19c45d3530f1585805711e14aa4ea788e499f46 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Marcus Meissner <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2026 15:13:51 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fixed Sony DPD Secondary Enum List Memory Leak
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Finding 4: Sony DPD Secondary Enum List Memory Leak (CWE-401) — LOW
+
+File: ptp-pack.c:884-885
+
+When processing a secondary enumeration list (2024+ Sony cameras), line
+884–885 overwrites dpd->FORM.Enum.SupportedValue with a new calloc()
+without freeing the previous allocation from line 857. The original
+array and any string values it contains are leaked.
+
+CVE-2026-40336
+
+Reported-By: Sebastián Alba <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-40336
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/gphoto/libgphoto2/commit/404ff02c75f3cb280196fc260a63c4d26cf1a8f6]
+Signed-off-by: Gyorgy Sarvari <[email protected]>
+---
+ camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c b/camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c
+index 7fc120d..fc51d77 100644
+--- a/camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c
++++ b/camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c
+@@ -879,6 +879,11 @@ ptp_unpack_Sony_DPD (PTPParams *params, const unsigned char* data, PTPDeviceProp
+ 		/* check if we have a secondary list of items, this is for newer Sonys (2024) */
+ 		if (val < 0x200) {	/* if a secondary list is not provided, this will be the next property code - 0x5XXX or 0xDxxx */
+ 			if (dpd->FormFlag == PTP_DPFF_Enumeration) {
++				/* free old enum variables */
++				for (i=0;i<dpd->FORM.Enum.NumberOfValues;i++)
++					ptp_free_propvalue (dpd->DataType, dpd->FORM.Enum.SupportedValue+i);
++				free (dpd->FORM.Enum.SupportedValue);
++
+ 				N = dtoh16o(data, *poffset);
+ 				dpd->FORM.Enum.SupportedValue = calloc(N,sizeof(dpd->FORM.Enum.SupportedValue[0]));
+ 				if (!dpd->FORM.Enum.SupportedValue)
meta-oe/recipes-graphics/gphoto2/libgphoto2_2.5.33.bb +1 -0
index 84ce802ea4..85c86a03a6 100644
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/gphoto/${BP}.tar.xz;name=libgphoto2 \
            file://CVE-2026-40333.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-40334.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-40335.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-40336.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[libgphoto2.sha256sum] = "28825f767a85544cb58f6e15028f8e53a5bb37a62148b3f1708b524781c3bef2"
 
#11 lore raw

PATCH 12/19 libgphoto2: patch CVE-2026-40338

In reply to [email protected]

From: Gyorgy Sarvari <[email protected]>

Details: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40338

Backport the patch referenced by the NVD advisory.

(cherry picked from commit f22e17508e89cf8bbb98e3cbe186bb99e379c456)
---
 .../gphoto2/libgphoto2/CVE-2026-40338.patch   | 34 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../gphoto2/libgphoto2_2.5.33.bb              |  1 +
 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-graphics/gphoto2/libgphoto2/CVE-2026-40338.patch
meta-oe/recipes-graphics/gphoto2/libgphoto2/CVE-2026-40338.patch new file +34 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9f233f2ec9
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 43cc20e807cd2935869617a7d8b9488070712c0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Marcus Meissner <[email protected]>
+Date: Sat, 11 Apr 2026 10:47:52 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] =?UTF-8?q?Fixed=20Sony=20DPD=20Enum=20Count=20OOB=20Read?=
+ =?UTF-8?q?=20(CWE-125)=20=E2=80=94=20MEDIUM?=
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+In the PTP_DPFF_Enumeration case of ptp_unpack_Sony_DPD(), dtoh16o(data, *poffset) reads 2 bytes for enumeration count N without verifying 2 bytes remain. The standard parser at line 704 has this check.
+
+CVE-2026-40338
+
+Reported-By: Sebastián Alba <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-40338
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/gphoto/libgphoto2/commit/3b9f9696be76ae51dca983d9dd8ce586a2561845]
+Signed-off-by: Gyorgy Sarvari <[email protected]>
+---
+ camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c b/camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c
+index fc51d77..f90d2a5 100644
+--- a/camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c
++++ b/camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c
+@@ -851,6 +851,7 @@ ptp_unpack_Sony_DPD (PTPParams *params, const unsigned char* data, PTPDeviceProp
+ 		break;
+ 	case PTP_DPFF_Enumeration: {
+ #define N	dpd->FORM.Enum.NumberOfValues
++		if (*poffset + sizeof(uint16_t) > dpdlen) goto outofmemory;
+ 		N = dtoh16o(data, *poffset);
+ 		dpd->FORM.Enum.SupportedValue = calloc(N,sizeof(dpd->FORM.Enum.SupportedValue[0]));
+ 		if (!dpd->FORM.Enum.SupportedValue)
meta-oe/recipes-graphics/gphoto2/libgphoto2_2.5.33.bb +1 -0
index 85c86a03a6..440b78dffb 100644
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/gphoto/${BP}.tar.xz;name=libgphoto2 \
            file://CVE-2026-40334.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-40335.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-40336.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-40338.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[libgphoto2.sha256sum] = "28825f767a85544cb58f6e15028f8e53a5bb37a62148b3f1708b524781c3bef2"
 
#12 lore raw

PATCH 13/19 libgphoto2: patch CVE-2026-40339

In reply to [email protected]

From: Gyorgy Sarvari <[email protected]>

Details: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40339

Backport the patch referenced by the NVD advisory.

(cherry picked from commit 2e3be1dddc215192ff277740271d65cdceaa0b18)
---
 .../gphoto2/libgphoto2/CVE-2026-40339.patch   | 41 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../gphoto2/libgphoto2_2.5.33.bb              |  1 +
 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-graphics/gphoto2/libgphoto2/CVE-2026-40339.patch
meta-oe/recipes-graphics/gphoto2/libgphoto2/CVE-2026-40339.patch new file +41 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b00ac72772
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From 585e8113b541469347d09c341c2e8b468b431adb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Marcus Meissner <[email protected]>
+Date: Sat, 11 Apr 2026 10:50:47 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] =?UTF-8?q?Fixed=20Sony=20DPD=20FormFlag=20OOB=20Read=20(C?=
+ =?UTF-8?q?WE-125)=20=E2=80=94=20MEDIUM?=
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+ptp_unpack_Sony_DPD() reads the FormFlag byte via dtoh8o(data, *poffset)
+without a prior bounds check. The standard ptp_unpack_DPD() at line
+686–687 correctly validates *offset + sizeof(uint8_t) > dpdlen before
+this same read, but the Sony variant omits this check.
+
+CVE-2026-40339
+
+Reported-By: Sebastián Alba <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-40339
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/gphoto/libgphoto2/commit/09f8a940b1e418b5693f5c11e3016a1ad2cea62d]
+Signed-off-by: Gyorgy Sarvari <[email protected]>
+---
+ camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c b/camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c
+index f90d2a5..28648a5 100644
+--- a/camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c
++++ b/camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c
+@@ -833,9 +833,10 @@ ptp_unpack_Sony_DPD (PTPParams *params, const unsigned char* data, PTPDeviceProp
+ 	   code or the Data Type is a string (with two empty strings as
+ 	   values). In both cases Form Flag should be set to 0x00 and FORM is
+ 	   not present. */
+-
+ 	if (*poffset==PTP_dpd_Sony_DefaultValue)
+ 		return 1;
++	if (*poffset + sizeof(uint8_t) > dpdlen)
++		return 1;
+ 
+ 	dpd->FormFlag = dtoh8o(data, *poffset);
+ 	ptp_debug (params, "formflag 0x%04x", dpd->FormFlag);
meta-oe/recipes-graphics/gphoto2/libgphoto2_2.5.33.bb +1 -0
index 440b78dffb..b8d6aee3c1 100644
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/gphoto/${BP}.tar.xz;name=libgphoto2 \
            file://CVE-2026-40335.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-40336.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-40338.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-40339.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[libgphoto2.sha256sum] = "28825f767a85544cb58f6e15028f8e53a5bb37a62148b3f1708b524781c3bef2"
 
#13 lore raw

PATCH 14/19 libgphoto2: patch CVE-2026-40340

In reply to [email protected]

From: Gyorgy Sarvari <[email protected]>

Details: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40340

Backport the patch referenced by the NVD advisory.

(cherry picked from commit 420e5aec46b8e9344c4d9e692f2e05236b9c89e5)
---
 .../gphoto2/libgphoto2/CVE-2026-40340.patch   | 40 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../gphoto2/libgphoto2_2.5.33.bb              |  1 +
 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-graphics/gphoto2/libgphoto2/CVE-2026-40340.patch
meta-oe/recipes-graphics/gphoto2/libgphoto2/CVE-2026-40340.patch new file +40 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a0852692b0
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From fd9f234df894caec6c65144b5a4f0264aadf0989 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Marcus Meissner <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2026 16:01:48 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fixed ObjectInfo Parser OOB Read
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+ptp_unpack_OI() validates len < PTP_oi_SequenceNumber (i.e., len < 48) but then accesses:
+
+    Offsets 48–51: dtoh32a(data + PTP_oi_SequenceNumber) at line 563 (4 bytes OOB)
+    Offset 52: data[PTP_oi_filenamelen] at line 547 (5 bytes OOB)
+    Offset 56: data[PTP_oi_filenamelen+4] at line 547 (9 bytes OOB)
+
+The Samsung Galaxy 64-bit objectsize detection heuristic reads up to 9 bytes beyond the validated boundary.
+
+ CVE-2026-40340
+
+Reported-By: Sebastián Alba <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-40340
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/gphoto/libgphoto2/commit/7c7f515bc88c3d0c4098ac965d313518e0ccbe33]
+Signed-off-by: Gyorgy Sarvari <[email protected]>
+---
+ camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c b/camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c
+index 28648a5..9eba06f 100644
+--- a/camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c
++++ b/camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c
+@@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ ptp_unpack_OI (PTPParams *params, const unsigned char* data, PTPObjectInfo *oi,
+ {
+ 	char *capture_date;
+ 
+-	if (!data || len < PTP_oi_SequenceNumber)
++	if (!data || len < PTP_oi_filenamelen + 5)
+ 		return;
+ 
+ 	oi->Filename = oi->Keywords = NULL;
meta-oe/recipes-graphics/gphoto2/libgphoto2_2.5.33.bb +1 -0
index b8d6aee3c1..40ada8dd20 100644
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/gphoto/${BP}.tar.xz;name=libgphoto2 \
            file://CVE-2026-40336.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-40338.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-40339.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-40340.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[libgphoto2.sha256sum] = "28825f767a85544cb58f6e15028f8e53a5bb37a62148b3f1708b524781c3bef2"
 
#14 lore raw

PATCH 15/19 libgphoto2: patch CVE-2026-40341

In reply to [email protected]

From: Gyorgy Sarvari <[email protected]>

Details: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40341

Backport the patch referenced by the NVD advisory.

(cherry picked from commit de5f93f95d420447043cedbedf798560925c44e1)
---
 .../gphoto2/libgphoto2/CVE-2026-40341.patch   | 69 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../gphoto2/libgphoto2_2.5.33.bb              |  1 +
 2 files changed, 70 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-graphics/gphoto2/libgphoto2/CVE-2026-40341.patch
meta-oe/recipes-graphics/gphoto2/libgphoto2/CVE-2026-40341.patch new file +69 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b71792c185
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+From 3674dbeafa5157a264ca5e562ffdbef159a2185f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Marcus Meissner <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2026 15:28:52 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fixed OOB read in ptp_unpack_EOS_FocusInfoEx
+
+Do not read out values before checking there is sufficient size
+
+CVE-2026-40341
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-40341
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/gphoto/libgphoto2/commit/c385b34af260595dfbb5f9329526be5158985987]
+Signed-off-by: Gyorgy Sarvari <[email protected]>
+---
+ camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c b/camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c
+index 9eba06f..11428ab 100644
+--- a/camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c
++++ b/camlibs/ptp2/ptp-pack.c
+@@ -1629,23 +1629,39 @@ ptp_pack_EOS_ImageFormat (PTPParams* params, unsigned char* data, uint16_t value
+ static inline char*
+ ptp_unpack_EOS_FocusInfoEx (PTPParams* params, const unsigned char** data, uint32_t datasize)
+ {
+-	uint32_t size 			= dtoh32a( *data );
+-	uint32_t halfsize		= dtoh16a( (*data) + 4);
+-	uint32_t version		= dtoh16a( (*data) + 6);
+-	uint32_t focus_points_in_struct	= dtoh16a( (*data) + 8);
+-	uint32_t focus_points_in_use	= dtoh16a( (*data) + 10);
+-	uint32_t sizeX			= dtoh16a( (*data) + 12);
+-	uint32_t sizeY			= dtoh16a( (*data) + 14);
+-	uint32_t size2X			= dtoh16a( (*data) + 16);
+-	uint32_t size2Y			= dtoh16a( (*data) + 18);
++	uint32_t size;
++	uint32_t halfsize;
++	uint32_t version;
++	uint32_t focus_points_in_struct;
++	uint32_t focus_points_in_use;
++	uint32_t sizeX;
++	uint32_t sizeY;
++	uint32_t size2X;
++	uint32_t size2Y;
+ 	uint32_t i;
+ 	uint32_t maxlen;
+ 	char	*str, *p;
+ 
++	if (datasize<4) {
++		ptp_error(params, "FocusInfoEx has invalid size (%d)", datasize);
++		return strdup("bad size 0");
++	}
++
++	size 			= dtoh32a( *data );
+ 	if ((size > datasize) || (size < 20)) {
+ 		ptp_error(params, "FocusInfoEx has invalid size (%d) vs datasize (%d)", size, datasize);
+ 		return strdup("bad size 1");
+ 	}
++
++	halfsize		= dtoh16a( (*data) + 4);
++	version			= dtoh16a( (*data) + 6);
++	focus_points_in_struct	= dtoh16a( (*data) + 8);
++	focus_points_in_use	= dtoh16a( (*data) + 10);
++	sizeX			= dtoh16a( (*data) + 12);
++	sizeY			= dtoh16a( (*data) + 14);
++	size2X			= dtoh16a( (*data) + 16);
++	size2Y			= dtoh16a( (*data) + 18);
++
+ 	/* If data is zero-filled, then it is just a placeholder, so nothing
+ 	   useful, but also not an error */
+ 	if (!focus_points_in_struct || !focus_points_in_use) {
meta-oe/recipes-graphics/gphoto2/libgphoto2_2.5.33.bb +1 -0
index 40ada8dd20..4ef9bf4272 100644
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/gphoto/${BP}.tar.xz;name=libgphoto2 \
            file://CVE-2026-40338.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-40339.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-40340.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-40341.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[libgphoto2.sha256sum] = "28825f767a85544cb58f6e15028f8e53a5bb37a62148b3f1708b524781c3bef2"
 
#15 lore raw

PATCH 16/19 openjpeg: patch CVE-2026-6192

In reply to [email protected]

From: Gyorgy Sarvari <[email protected]>

Details: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-6192

Backport the patch referenced by the NVD advisory.

(cherry picked from commit 09050325e6e0736beccc40d125e56430054b7cb8)
---
 .../openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2026-6192.patch     | 35 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../openjpeg/openjpeg_2.5.4.bb                |  1 +
 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2026-6192.patch
meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2026-6192.patch new file +35 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..49be9bd0a6
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 776b00ff792a3c54b65f3bd92dbe7476a5a54106 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Even Rouault <[email protected]>
+Date: Sun, 5 Apr 2026 13:25:27 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] opj_pi_initialise_encode() (write code path): avoid potential
+ integer overflow leading to insufficient memory allocation
+
+Fixes #1619
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-6192
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/839936aa33eb8899bbbd80fda02796bb65068951]
+Signed-off-by: Gyorgy Sarvari <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/lib/openjp2/pi.c | 9 ++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/lib/openjp2/pi.c b/src/lib/openjp2/pi.c
+index 15ac3314..4abb87af 100644
+--- a/src/lib/openjp2/pi.c
++++ b/src/lib/openjp2/pi.c
+@@ -1694,9 +1694,12 @@ opj_pi_iterator_t *opj_pi_initialise_encode(const opj_image_t *p_image,
+     l_current_pi = l_pi;
+ 
+     /* memory allocation for include*/
+-    l_current_pi->include_size = l_tcp->numlayers * l_step_l;
+-    l_current_pi->include = (OPJ_INT16*) opj_calloc(l_current_pi->include_size,
+-                            sizeof(OPJ_INT16));
++    l_current_pi->include = NULL;
++    if (l_step_l <= UINT_MAX / l_tcp->numlayers) {
++        l_current_pi->include_size = l_tcp->numlayers * l_step_l;
++        l_current_pi->include = (OPJ_INT16*) opj_calloc(l_current_pi->include_size,
++                                sizeof(OPJ_INT16));
++    }
+     if (!l_current_pi->include) {
+         opj_free(l_tmp_data);
+         opj_free(l_tmp_ptr);
meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg_2.5.4.bb +1 -0
index 971cdb2ff9..6f89551a21 100644
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ DEPENDS = "libpng tiff lcms zlib"
 SRC_URI = "git://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg.git;branch=master;protocol=https \
            file://0001-Do-not-ask-cmake-to-export-binaries-they-don-t-make-.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-39327.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-6192.patch \
            "
 SRCREV = "6c4a29b00211eb0430fa0e5e890f1ce5c80f409f"
 
#16 lore raw

PATCH 17/19 protobuf, python3-protobuf: ignore CVE-2026-6409

In reply to [email protected]

From: Gyorgy Sarvari <[email protected]>

Details: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-6409

The vulnerability impacts only the PHP library component, not the cpp/python one. Ignore this CVE due to this.

(cherry picked from commit aef8bc34225cd0a56057749d0db1dfac773b17cb)
---
 meta-oe/recipes-devtools/protobuf/protobuf_6.31.1.bb           | 1 +
 meta-python/recipes-devtools/python/python3-protobuf_6.33.5.bb | 1 +
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
meta-oe/recipes-devtools/protobuf/protobuf_6.31.1.bb +1 -0
index 4356ebeecf..cce2ad11f4 100644
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ UPSTREAM_CHECK_GITTAGREGEX = "v(?P<pver>\d\.\d+\.\d+)"
 CVE_PRODUCT = "google:protobuf protobuf:protobuf google-protobuf protobuf-cpp"
 
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-0994] = "cpe-incorrect: the vulnerability affects only python3-protobuf recipe"
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-6409] = "cpe-incorrect: the vulnerability affects only the php library"
 
 inherit cmake pkgconfig ptest
 
meta-python/recipes-devtools/python/python3-protobuf_6.33.5.bb +1 -0
index af9ff85f20..3abee615d5 100644
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "6ddcac2a081f8b7b9642c09406bc6a4290128fce5f471cddd165960bb9
 
 CVE_PRODUCT += "google:protobuf protobuf:protobuf google-protobuf protobuf-python"
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-0994] = "fixed-version: it is fixed in 6.33.5"
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-6409] = "cpe-incorrect: the vulnerability affects only the php library"
 
 # http://errors.yoctoproject.org/Errors/Details/184715/
 # Can't find required file: ../src/google/protobuf/descriptor.proto
#17 lore raw

PATCH 18/19 python3-grpcio: ignore CVE-2026-33186

In reply to [email protected]

From: Gyorgy Sarvari <[email protected]>

Details: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33186

The vulnerability only affects the Go implememtation of the library, not the Python one. Ignore this CVE due to this.

(cherry picked from commit 468ee626f88272eedf275efe6f68640ee643c3f4)
---
 meta-python/recipes-devtools/python/python3-grpcio_1.76.0.bb | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
meta-python/recipes-devtools/python/python3-grpcio_1.76.0.bb +1 -0
index 037614da3e..6dbffaf7b9 100644
@@ -44,3 +44,4 @@ BBCLASSEXTEND = "native nativesdk"
 CCACHE_DISABLE = "1"
 
 CVE_PRODUCT += "grpc:grpc"
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-33186] = "cpe-incorrect: the vulnerabilty affects only the go implementation"
#18 lore raw

PATCH 19/19 libsoup-2.4: fix several CVEs

In reply to [email protected]

From: Changqing Li <[email protected]>

Fix CVE-2026-1539,CVE-2026-1761,CVE-2026-1801,CVE-2026-2443, CVE-2026-2369,CVE-2026-1760,CVE-2025-14523,CVE-2025-32049,CVE-2026-1467

Refer:
CVE-2026-1801 https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/issues/481
CVE-2026-1761 https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/issues/493
CVE-2026-2443 https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/issues/487
CVE-2026-1539 https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/issues/489
CVE-2026-2369 https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/issues/498
CVE-2026-1760 https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/issues/475
CVE-2025-14523 https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/issues/472
CVE-2025-32049 https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/issues/390
CVE-2026-1467 https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/issues/488

(cherry picked from commit 07d67228162018f5f619dce7183f85e79293378d)
---
 .../libsoup/libsoup-2.4/CVE-2025-14523.patch  |  52 ++++
 .../libsoup-2.4/CVE-2025-32049-1.patch        | 229 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../libsoup-2.4/CVE-2025-32049-2.patch        | 131 ++++++++++
 .../libsoup/libsoup-2.4/CVE-2026-1467.patch   | 151 ++++++++++++
 .../libsoup/libsoup-2.4/CVE-2026-1539.patch   |  31 +++
 .../libsoup/libsoup-2.4/CVE-2026-1760.patch   | 153 ++++++++++++
 .../libsoup/libsoup-2.4/CVE-2026-1761.patch   |  36 +++
 .../libsoup/libsoup-2.4/CVE-2026-1801.patch   | 126 ++++++++++
 .../libsoup/libsoup-2.4/CVE-2026-2369.patch   |  33 +++
 .../libsoup/libsoup-2.4/CVE-2026-2443.patch   | 135 +++++++++++
 .../libsoup/libsoup-2.4_2.74.3.bb             |  10 +
 11 files changed, 1087 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-2.4/CVE-2025-14523.patch
 create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-2.4/CVE-2025-32049-1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-2.4/CVE-2025-32049-2.patch
 create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-2.4/CVE-2026-1467.patch
 create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-2.4/CVE-2026-1539.patch
 create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-2.4/CVE-2026-1760.patch
 create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-2.4/CVE-2026-1761.patch
 create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-2.4/CVE-2026-1801.patch
 create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-2.4/CVE-2026-2369.patch
 create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-2.4/CVE-2026-2443.patch
meta-oe/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-2.4/CVE-2025-14523.patch new file +52 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7815dba55a
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From d6028a6e6a8417b7fb6c89f6c10fb94781435ee6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Changqing Li <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 4 Feb 2026 15:08:50 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] Reject duplicate Host headers (for libsoup 2)
+
+This is a simplified version of my patch for libsoup 3:
+
+!491
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/commit/d3db5a6f8f03e1f0133754872877c92c0284c472]
+CVE: CVE-2025-14523
+
+This patch is a MR for branch 2-74, but not merged yet, maybe it will
+not be merged.
+
+Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <[email protected]>
+---
+ libsoup/soup-headers.c         | 3 +++
+ libsoup/soup-message-headers.c | 3 +++
+ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/libsoup/soup-headers.c b/libsoup/soup-headers.c
+index ea2f986..6cd3dad 100644
+--- a/libsoup/soup-headers.c
++++ b/libsoup/soup-headers.c
+@@ -138,6 +138,9 @@ soup_headers_parse (const char *str, int len, SoupMessageHeaders *dest)
+ 		for (p = strchr (value, '\r'); p; p = strchr (p, '\r'))
+ 			*p = ' ';
+ 
++		if (g_ascii_strcasecmp (name, "Host") == 0 && soup_message_headers_get_one (dest, "Host"))
++			goto done;
++
+ 		soup_message_headers_append (dest, name, value);
+         }
+ 	success = TRUE;
+diff --git a/libsoup/soup-message-headers.c b/libsoup/soup-message-headers.c
+index f612bff..bb20bbb 100644
+--- a/libsoup/soup-message-headers.c
++++ b/libsoup/soup-message-headers.c
+@@ -220,6 +220,9 @@ soup_message_headers_append (SoupMessageHeaders *hdrs,
+ 	}
+ #endif
+ 
++	if (g_ascii_strcasecmp (name, "Host") == 0 && soup_message_headers_get_one (hdrs, "Host"))
++		return;
++
+ 	header.name = intern_header_name (name, &setter);
+ 	header.value = g_strdup (value);
+ 	g_array_append_val (hdrs->array, header);
+-- 
+2.34.1
+
meta-oe/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-2.4/CVE-2025-32049-1.patch new file +229 -0

229 lines not on this page · raw message

meta-oe/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-2.4/CVE-2025-32049-2.patch new file +131 -0

131 lines not on this page · raw message

meta-oe/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-2.4/CVE-2026-1467.patch new file +151 -0

151 lines not on this page · raw message

meta-oe/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-2.4/CVE-2026-1539.patch new file +31 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c6b813a98f
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From 285faea567e1e2a95226201175dbf745a64a2439 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Changqing Li <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2026 15:04:22 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 4/4] Also remove Proxy-Authorization header on cross origin
+ redirect
+
+Closes #489
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/commit/98c1285d9d78662c38bf14b4a128af01ccfdb446]
+CVE: CVE-2026-1539
+
+Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <[email protected]>
+---
+ libsoup/soup-session.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/libsoup/soup-session.c b/libsoup/soup-session.c
+index cc0d04c..0361856 100644
+--- a/libsoup/soup-session.c
++++ b/libsoup/soup-session.c
+@@ -1190,6 +1190,7 @@ soup_session_redirect_message (SoupSession *session, SoupMessage *msg)
+ 	/* Strip all credentials on cross-origin redirect. */
+ 	if (!soup_uri_host_equal (soup_message_get_uri (msg), new_uri)) {
+ 		soup_message_headers_remove (msg->request_headers, "Authorization");
++		soup_message_headers_remove (msg->request_headers, "Proxy-Authorization");
+ 		soup_message_set_auth (msg, NULL);
+ 	}
+ 
+-- 
+2.34.1
+
meta-oe/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-2.4/CVE-2026-1760.patch new file +153 -0

153 lines not on this page · raw message

meta-oe/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-2.4/CVE-2026-1761.patch new file +36 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..573e3e1dd0
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+From 07757b7feacfc660c6c463ff2b773c13bc42d2c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Changqing Li <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2026 17:21:32 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 3/4] multipart: check length of bytes read
+ soup_filter_input_stream_read_until()
+
+We do make sure the read length is smaller than the buffer length when
+the boundary is not found, but we should do the same when the boundary
+is found.
+
+Spotted in #YWH-PGM9867-149
+Closes #493
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/commit/cfa9d90d1a5c274233554a264c56551c13d6a6f0]
+CVE: CVE-2026-1761
+
+Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <[email protected]>
+---
+ libsoup/soup-filter-input-stream.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/libsoup/soup-filter-input-stream.c b/libsoup/soup-filter-input-stream.c
+index 2c30bf9..c34510b 100644
+--- a/libsoup/soup-filter-input-stream.c
++++ b/libsoup/soup-filter-input-stream.c
+@@ -272,6 +272,6 @@ soup_filter_input_stream_read_until (SoupFilterInputStream  *fstream,
+ 	if (eof && !*got_boundary)
+ 		read_length = MIN (fstream->priv->buf->len, length);
+ 	else
+-		read_length = p - buf;
++		read_length = MIN ((gsize)(p - buf), length);
+ 	return read_from_buf (fstream, buffer, read_length);
+ }
+-- 
+2.34.1
+
meta-oe/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-2.4/CVE-2026-1801.patch new file +126 -0

126 lines not on this page · raw message

meta-oe/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-2.4/CVE-2026-2369.patch new file +33 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..814672caca
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 5c4e65fd99ff4e3ae76c7985c5e160bb07ea0f92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Changqing Li <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2026 11:24:36 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] sniffer: Handle potential underflow
+
+Closes #498
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/commit/b91bbd7d7888c85b17a8b33173caa806dff51681]
+CVE: CVE-2026-2369
+
+Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <[email protected]>
+---
+ libsoup/soup-content-sniffer.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/libsoup/soup-content-sniffer.c b/libsoup/soup-content-sniffer.c
+index 3edc568..b091bca 100644
+--- a/libsoup/soup-content-sniffer.c
++++ b/libsoup/soup-content-sniffer.c
+@@ -504,6 +504,10 @@ sniff_unknown (SoupContentSniffer *sniffer, SoupBuffer *buffer,
+ 		if (!sniff_scriptable && type_row->scriptable)
+ 			continue;
+ 
++		/* Ensure we have data to sniff - prevents underflow in resource_length - 1 */
++		if (resource_length == 0)
++			continue;
++
+ 		if (type_row->has_ws) {
+ 			guint index_stream = 0;
+ 			guint index_pattern = 0;
+-- 
+2.34.1
+
meta-oe/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-2.4/CVE-2026-2443.patch new file +135 -0

135 lines not on this page · raw message

meta-oe/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-2.4_2.74.3.bb +10 -0
index 68ec576d9b..e588e60cd5 100644
@@ -40,6 +40,16 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNOME_MIRROR}/libsoup/${SHRT_VER}/libsoup-${PV}.tar.xz \
            file://CVE-2025-4948.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-4969.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-4945.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-14523.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-32049-1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-32049-2.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-2443.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-1801.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-1761.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-1539.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-2369.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-1760.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-1467.patch \
 "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "e4b77c41cfc4c8c5a035fcdc320c7bc6cfb75ef7c5a034153df1413fa1d92f13"
 
#19 lore raw
In reply to [email protected]

Hi Ankur,

Thank you for sending these. I had already picked a lot of these in my branch for pull request I'd like to send today. I will take the rest in next and final series for whinlatter.

Quoted 112 lines · Ankur Tyagi via lists.openembedded.org

From: Peter Kjellerstedt <[email protected]>

There is a bug (see https://github.com/jqlang/jq/issues/434), which results in an empty version being used if autoreconf is run on the jq sources when using a release tar ball. The incorrect assumption is that autoreconf is only used when fetching the code using Git.

The empty version results in an incorrect libjq.pc file being created where the version is not set, which results in, e.g., pkgconf --libs 'libjq > 1.6' failing even if version 1.8.1 of jq is actually installed.

Switch to fetching the code using Git to workaround the bug.

(cherry picked from commit ed33569f822a3a8d41f82f6980a046d17aca37d5)
---
 ...-with-disable-maintainer-mode-and-so.patch | 44 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta-oe/recipes-devtools/jq/jq_1.8.1.bb       | 14 +++---
 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-devtools/jq/jq/0001-Support-building-with-disable-maintainer-mode-and-so.patch
meta-oe/recipes-devtools/jq/jq/0001-Support-building-with-disable-maintainer-mode-and-so.patch new file +44 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..12a64a75ed
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From 27f417f4812e688a59fc5186b7768cec004cd6e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Kjellerstedt <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2026 05:58:49 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Support building with --disable-maintainer-mode and source !=
+ build dir (#3518)
+
+If --disable-maintainer-mode is enabled, then the rules for generating
+parser.[ch] and lexer.[ch] did nothing. This worked fine if the source
+and build directories are the same as the pre-generated parser.c and
+lexer.c files would suffice. However, if the build directory is not the
+same as the source directory, then the rest of the Make rules expect
+parser.[ch] and lexer.[ch] to have been created in the build directory
+if their source files (parser.y and lexer.l) are newer than the target
+files, which can happen in case the source is fetched using Git.
+
+Avoid the problem by copying the files to the build directory if needed.
+
+Co-authored-by: Peter Kjellerstedt <[email protected]>
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/jqlang/jq/commit/27f417f4812e688a59fc5186b7768cec004cd6e5]
+---
+ Makefile.am | 9 +++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Makefile.am b/Makefile.am
+index 96d6038..acb9443 100644
+--- a/Makefile.am
++++ b/Makefile.am
+@@ -41,9 +41,14 @@ src/lexer.h: src/lexer.c
+ else
+ BUILT_SOURCES = src/builtin.inc src/config_opts.inc src/version.h
+ .y.c:
+-      $(AM_V_YACC) echo "NOT building parser.c!"
++      $(AM_V_YACC) [ "$(<D)" = "$(@D)" ] || cp $(<D)/$(@F) $@
++      $(AM_V_YACC) [ "$(<D)" = "$(@D)" ] || cp $(<D)/$(*F).h $*.h
++      $(AM_V_YACC) touch $@ $*.h
++
+ .l.c:
+-      $(AM_V_LEX) echo "NOT building lexer.c!"
++      $(AM_V_LEX) [ "$(<D)" = "$(@D)" ] || cp $(<D)/$(@F) $@
++      $(AM_V_LEX) [ "$(<D)" = "$(@D)" ] || cp $(<D)/$(*F).h $*.h
++      $(AM_V_LEX) touch $@ $*.h
+ endif
+
+ # Tell YACC (Bison) autoconf macros that you want a header file created.
meta-oe/recipes-devtools/jq/jq_1.8.1.bb +8 -7
index b9383c76f7..6eaa2de6df 100644
@@ -8,15 +8,17 @@ SECTION = "utils"
 LICENSE = "MIT & BSD-2-Clause"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=cf7fcb0a1def4a7ad62c028f7d0dca47"
 
-GITHUB_BASE_URI = "https://github.com/jqlang/${BPN}/releases/"
-SRC_URI = "${GITHUB_BASE_URI}/download/${BPN}-${PV}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \
+SRCREV = "4467af7068b1bcd7f882defff6e7ea674c5357f4"
+
+SRC_URI = " \
+    git://github.com/jqlang/jq.git;protocol=https;branch=master;tag=jq-${PV} \
     file://run-ptest \
-    "
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "2be64e7129cecb11d5906290eba10af694fb9e3e7f9fc208a311dc33ca837eb0"
+    file://0001-Support-building-with-disable-maintainer-mode-and-so.patch \
+"
 
-inherit autotools github-releases ptest
+inherit autotools ptest
 
-UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "releases/tag/${BPN}-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)"
+UPSTREAM_CHECK_GITTAGREGEX = "${BPN}-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)"
 
 PACKAGECONFIG ?= "oniguruma"
 
 
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#20 lore raw
Quoted 6 lines · Anuj Mittal

Hi Ankur,

Thank you for sending these. I had already picked a lot of these in my branch for pull request I'd like to send today. I will take the rest in next and final series for whinlatter.

Sounds good. What's your plan for the final cut-off to accept patches for whinlatter?

Quoted 115 lines
Quoted 112 lines · Ankur Tyagi via lists.openembedded.org

From: Peter Kjellerstedt <[email protected]>

There is a bug (see https://github.com/jqlang/jq/issues/434), which results in an empty version being used if autoreconf is run on the jq sources when using a release tar ball. The incorrect assumption is that autoreconf is only used when fetching the code using Git.

The empty version results in an incorrect libjq.pc file being created where the version is not set, which results in, e.g., pkgconf --libs 'libjq > 1.6' failing even if version 1.8.1 of jq is actually installed.

Switch to fetching the code using Git to workaround the bug.

(cherry picked from commit ed33569f822a3a8d41f82f6980a046d17aca37d5)
---
 ...-with-disable-maintainer-mode-and-so.patch | 44 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta-oe/recipes-devtools/jq/jq_1.8.1.bb       | 14 +++---
 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-devtools/jq/jq/0001-Support-building-with-disable-maintainer-mode-and-so.patch
meta-oe/recipes-devtools/jq/jq/0001-Support-building-with-disable-maintainer-mode-and-so.patch new file +44 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..12a64a75ed
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From 27f417f4812e688a59fc5186b7768cec004cd6e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Kjellerstedt <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2026 05:58:49 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Support building with --disable-maintainer-mode and source !=
+ build dir (#3518)
+
+If --disable-maintainer-mode is enabled, then the rules for generating
+parser.[ch] and lexer.[ch] did nothing. This worked fine if the source
+and build directories are the same as the pre-generated parser.c and
+lexer.c files would suffice. However, if the build directory is not the
+same as the source directory, then the rest of the Make rules expect
+parser.[ch] and lexer.[ch] to have been created in the build directory
+if their source files (parser.y and lexer.l) are newer than the target
+files, which can happen in case the source is fetched using Git.
+
+Avoid the problem by copying the files to the build directory if needed.
+
+Co-authored-by: Peter Kjellerstedt <[email protected]>
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/jqlang/jq/commit/27f417f4812e688a59fc5186b7768cec004cd6e5]
+---
+ Makefile.am | 9 +++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Makefile.am b/Makefile.am
+index 96d6038..acb9443 100644
+--- a/Makefile.am
++++ b/Makefile.am
+@@ -41,9 +41,14 @@ src/lexer.h: src/lexer.c
+ else
+ BUILT_SOURCES = src/builtin.inc src/config_opts.inc src/version.h
+ .y.c:
+-      $(AM_V_YACC) echo "NOT building parser.c!"
++      $(AM_V_YACC) [ "$(<D)" = "$(@D)" ] || cp $(<D)/$(@F) $@
++      $(AM_V_YACC) [ "$(<D)" = "$(@D)" ] || cp $(<D)/$(*F).h $*.h
++      $(AM_V_YACC) touch $@ $*.h
++
+ .l.c:
+-      $(AM_V_LEX) echo "NOT building lexer.c!"
++      $(AM_V_LEX) [ "$(<D)" = "$(@D)" ] || cp $(<D)/$(@F) $@
++      $(AM_V_LEX) [ "$(<D)" = "$(@D)" ] || cp $(<D)/$(*F).h $*.h
++      $(AM_V_LEX) touch $@ $*.h
+ endif
+
+ # Tell YACC (Bison) autoconf macros that you want a header file created.
meta-oe/recipes-devtools/jq/jq_1.8.1.bb +8 -7
index b9383c76f7..6eaa2de6df 100644
@@ -8,15 +8,17 @@ SECTION = "utils"
 LICENSE = "MIT & BSD-2-Clause"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=cf7fcb0a1def4a7ad62c028f7d0dca47"
 
-GITHUB_BASE_URI = "https://github.com/jqlang/${BPN}/releases/"
-SRC_URI = "${GITHUB_BASE_URI}/download/${BPN}-${PV}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \
+SRCREV = "4467af7068b1bcd7f882defff6e7ea674c5357f4"
+
+SRC_URI = " \
+    git://github.com/jqlang/jq.git;protocol=https;branch=master;tag=jq-${PV} \
     file://run-ptest \
-    "
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "2be64e7129cecb11d5906290eba10af694fb9e3e7f9fc208a311dc33ca837eb0"
+    file://0001-Support-building-with-disable-maintainer-mode-and-so.patch \
+"
 
-inherit autotools github-releases ptest
+inherit autotools ptest
 
-UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "releases/tag/${BPN}-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)"
+UPSTREAM_CHECK_GITTAGREGEX = "${BPN}-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)"
 
 PACKAGECONFIG ?= "oniguruma"
 
 
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