Allow storing referenced struct file kptrs in BPF maps
Subsystems (3)
v2 cover Allow storing referenced struct file kptrs in BPF maps
Hello,
This series adds a destructor for struct file, enabling it to be used as a referenced kptr in BPF maps.
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
The destructor mirrors bpf_put_file() semantics and releases the reference via fput(). This allows pointers returned from kfuncs such as bpf_get_task_exe_file() to be safely stored and later reused with helpers and kfuncs that operate on struct file.
This fills a gap compared to bpf_dynptr_from_file(), where the resulting dynptr can be stored in a map, but cannot be passed to kfuncs expecting a struct file *.
Use cases include caching file references across events and deferring processing while keeping the underlying file alive.
Patch 1 adds the struct file kptr destructor and wires it into the BTF kfunc sets.
Patch 2 adds selftests covering successful use and verifier rejection of unreferenced pointers and success cases.
Changes for v2:
- Fix comment formatting based on sashiko feedback.
- Fix typo in commit based on sashiko feedback.
- Remove close_fd helper based on Song Liu's feedback.
- Expand selftests to include success and failure verifier tests.
Note on NMI safety:
An existing bug in NMI safety after further investigation from this sashiko report [1] was found and reported here, with reproducer. [2]
Basically it is possible to invoke map dtors from within an nmi context by attaching to specific tracepoints. Because the existing dtors rely on rcu and/or locks, you can cause deadlocks. The fput added by this patch is unsafe in nmi context and affected by this bug.
However, the solution requires deeper investigation into verifier safety in NMI contexts, and is outside the scope of this patch.
[1] : https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
[2] : https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
Justin Suess (2):
bpf: Implement dtor for struct file BTF ID selftests/bpf: Add test for map-stored struct file kptrs
kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 16 +- .../bpf/prog_tests/refcounted_kptr_file.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++ .../bpf/progs/refcounted_kptr_file.c | 158 +++++++++++ .../bpf/progs/refcounted_kptr_file_fail.c | 141 ++++++++++ .../bpf/progs/refcounted_kptr_file_success.c | 61 +++++ 5 files changed, 624 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/refcounted_kptr_file.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/refcounted_kptr_file.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/refcounted_kptr_file_fail.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/refcounted_kptr_file_success.c
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH v2 1/2 bpf: Implement dtor for struct file BTF ID
Implement a destructor for struct file allowing it to be stored in a map as a referenced kptr.
This dtor is analogous to bpf_put_file, and calls fput to release the reference.
---
Changes in v2:
- None
kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 16 +++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +15 -1
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@#include <linux/proc_ns.h> #include <linux/sched/task.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/btf_ids.h> #include <linux/bpf_mem_alloc.h> #include <linux/kasan.h>
@@ -2752,6 +2753,13 @@ __bpf_kfunc void bpf_task_release_dtor(void *p) }CFI_NOSEAL (bpf_task_release_dtor); +__bpf_kfunc void bpf_file_release_dtor(void *file) +{ +fput ((struct file *)file); +} + +CFI_NOSEAL (bpf_file_release_dtor); +#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS /** * bpf_cgroup_acquire - Acquire a reference to a cgroup. A cgroup acquired by
@@ -4763,6 +4771,8 @@ static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set generic_kfunc_set = { BTF_ID_LIST(generic_dtor_ids) BTF_ID(struct, task_struct) BTF_ID(func, bpf_task_release_dtor) +BTF_ID(struct, file) +BTF_ID(func, bpf_file_release_dtor) #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS BTF_ID(struct, cgroup) BTF_ID(func, bpf_cgroup_release_dtor)
@@ -4874,11 +4884,15 @@ static int __init kfunc_init(void) .btf_id = generic_dtor_ids[0], .kfunc_btf_id = generic_dtor_ids[1] }, -#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS { .btf_id = generic_dtor_ids[2], .kfunc_btf_id = generic_dtor_ids[3] }, +#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS + { + .btf_id = generic_dtor_ids[4], + .kfunc_btf_id = generic_dtor_ids[5] + }, #endif };
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/2] bpf: Implement dtor for struct file BTF ID
Is bpf_file_release_dtor() safe to call from NMI context? BPF programs can delete map elements from NMI context (for example, in BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT programs), which will synchronously invoke…
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +0
-0
[ ... ]
kernel/bpf/helpers.c __bpf_kfunc void bpf_task_release_dtor(void *p) · line 2762
Quoted 11 lines
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +7
-0@@ -2752,6 +2753,13 @@ __bpf_kfunc void bpf_task_release_dtor(void *p) }CFI_NOSEAL (bpf_task_release_dtor); +__bpf_kfunc void bpf_file_release_dtor(void *file) +{ +fput ((struct file *)file); +} + +CFI_NOSEAL (bpf_file_release_dtor); +
Is bpf_file_release_dtor() safe to call from NMI context? BPF programs can delete map elements from NMI context (for example, in BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT programs), which will synchronously invoke this destructor.
When fput() is called in an interrupt context, it adds the file to the delayed_fput_list and calls schedule_delayed_work():
kernel/bpf/helpers.c:bpf_file_release_dtor() {
fput((struct file *)file);
}fs/file_table.c:fput() {
...
if (!atomic_long_dec_and_test(&file->f_count))
return;
...
if (likely(!in_interrupt() && !(task->flags & PF_KTHREAD))) {
...
} else {
fput_many(file, 1);
}
}fs/file_table.c:fput_many() {
...
if (llist_add_batch(&head, &tail, &delayed_fput_list))
schedule_delayed_work(&delayed_fput_work, 1);
}However, schedule_delayed_work() is not NMI-safe, as it attempts to acquire spinlocks such as the workqueue pool lock and timer_base->lock. If the NMI interrupted a context that already held one of these locks, won't this result in a hard deadlock?
Would it be better to defer releasing the struct file using an NMI-safe mechanism, similar to how other BPF destructors handle this?
This issue was raised by sashiko-bot in v1:
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
The author acknowledged this as a real bug with a reproducible deadlock, but v2 still uses the same fput() call without any NMI-safe deferral mechanism.
[ ... ]
---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md
CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/24844511587
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/2] bpf: Implement dtor for struct file BTF ID
In reply to Justin SuessSashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s): - [High] bpf_file_release_dtor calls fput(), which is not NMI-safe and can cause a system deadlock when a struct file kptr is dropped from NMI context. --
Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s):
- [High] bpf_file_release_dtor calls fput(), which is not NMI-safe and can cause a system deadlock when a struct file kptr is dropped from NMI context. --
commit 37dfae0a149d4a18858208a4dfafb133d94b8e0d
Author: Justin Suess <[email protected]>
bpf: Implement dtor for struct file BTF ID
This commit implements a destructor for struct file, allowing it to be stored in a map as a referenced kptr. The destructor relies on fput() to release the file reference.
kernel/bpf/helpers.c __bpf_kfunc void bpf_task_release_dtor(void *p) · line 2758
Quoted 11 lines
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +3
-0@@ -2752,6 +2753,13 @@ __bpf_kfunc void bpf_task_release_dtor(void *p) }CFI_NOSEAL (bpf_task_release_dtor); +__bpf_kfunc void bpf_file_release_dtor(void *file) +{ +fput ((struct file *)file);
Can calling fput() here lead to a system deadlock if the destructor is invoked from NMI context?
When a map element containing a struct file kptr is replaced or deleted, BPF synchronously calls the destructor on the old pointer. BPF map updates can be performed by programs executing in NMI context, such as perf event programs or fentry programs attached to NMI handlers.
If the file's refcount reaches 0, fput() invokes __fput_deferred(). In NMI context, __fput_deferred() skips task_work_add() and falls back to calling schedule_delayed_work().
The schedule_delayed_work() function queues the work using add_timer_global() or add_timer_on(), which acquire the timer_base raw spinlock. If the NMI preempted code that was already holding this spinlock, the system will deadlock.
Does dropping file references from BPF map destructors need to be deferred using an NMI-safe mechanism, such as irq_work?
Quoted 3 lines
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +3
-0+} + +CFI_NOSEAL (bpf_file_release_dtor);
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
PATCH v2 2/2 selftests/bpf: Add test for map-stored struct file kptrs
In reply to Justin SuessAdd tests for map-stored struct file referenced kptrs.
Add a test storing a referenced kptr in a map. The referenced pointer is acquired by get_task_exe_file in this case.
Add a test that verifies that the struct file reference remains valid when the original file descriptor is closed, by checking the extended attributes on it after completion. Trigger this validation manually by hooking file_open and opening dev null.
Validation is done with xattrs.
Add a test verifying that attempting to insert unreferenced struct file pointers into the map is rejected by the verifier.
Add fail tests for reference counting with the struct file objects.
---
Changes in v2:
- Add success verifier tests per Song Liu's suggestion.
- Remove close_fd per Song Liu's suggestion.
- Fix typos in commit per Sashiko.
- Fix subtest ordering per Sashiko.
- Fix comments per Sashiko.
.../bpf/prog_tests/refcounted_kptr_file.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++ .../bpf/progs/refcounted_kptr_file.c | 158 +++++++++++ .../bpf/progs/refcounted_kptr_file_fail.c | 141 ++++++++++ .../bpf/progs/refcounted_kptr_file_success.c | 61 +++++ 4 files changed, 609 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/refcounted_kptr_file.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/refcounted_kptr_file.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/refcounted_kptr_file_fail.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/refcounted_kptr_file_success.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/refcounted_kptr_file.c new file +249 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +#define _GNU_SOURCE + +#include <errno.h> +#include <test_progs.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <limits.h> +#include <stdbool.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <sys/wait.h> +#include <sys/xattr.h> +#include <unistd.h> + +#include "refcounted_kptr_file_fail.skel.h" +#include "refcounted_kptr_file.skel.h" +#include "refcounted_kptr_file_success.skel.h" + +static const char shell_path[] ="/bin/sh" ; +static const char xattr_name[] ="user.kptr_ref" ; +static const char xattr_value[] ="kptr-live" ; + +static int write_full (int fd,const void *buf,size_t len) +{ +const char *pos = buf; + +while (len) { +ssize_t written; + + written =write (fd, pos, len); +if (written <0 ) { +if (errno ==EINTR ) +continue ; +return -errno; + } + + pos += written; + len -= written; + } + +return 0 ; +} + +static int copy_file (const char *src_path,const char *dst_path,mode_t mode) +{ +char buf[4096 ]; +int src_fd =-1 , dst_fd =-1 ; +int err =0 ; + + src_fd =open (src_path,O_RDONLY |O_CLOEXEC ); +if (src_fd <0 ) +return -errno; + + dst_fd =open (dst_path,O_WRONLY |O_CREAT |O_EXCL |O_CLOEXEC , + mode &0777 ); +if (dst_fd <0 ) { + err = -errno; + goto out; + } + +while (1 ) { +ssize_t bytes_read; + + bytes_read =read (src_fd, buf,sizeof (buf)); +if (bytes_read <0 ) { +if (errno ==EINTR ) +continue ; + err = -errno; + goto out; + } + +if (!bytes_read) +break ; + + err =write_full (dst_fd, buf, bytes_read); +if (err) { +unlink (dst_path); + goto out; + } + } + +out: + err =close (src_fd) ?: err; + err =close (dst_fd) ?: err; +return err; +} + +static bool prepare_tagged_shell (char *temp_dir,size_t temp_dir_sz, +char *shell_copy,size_t shell_copy_sz) +{ +struct stat st; +int err; + +if (!ASSERT_LT (snprintf (temp_dir, temp_dir_sz, +"./refcounted_kptr_file.XXXXXX" ), + (int )temp_dir_sz,"temp_dir_template" )) +return false; + +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (mkdtemp (temp_dir),"mkdtemp" )) +return false; + +if (!ASSERT_LT (snprintf (shell_copy, shell_copy_sz,"%s/sh" , temp_dir), + (int )shell_copy_sz,"shell_copy_path" )) + goto err_rmdir; + +if (!ASSERT_OK (stat (shell_path, &st),"stat_shell" )) + goto err_rmdir; + + err =copy_file (shell_path, shell_copy, st.st_mode); +if (!ASSERT_OK (err,"copy_shell" )) + goto err_unlink; + + err =setxattr (shell_copy, xattr_name, xattr_value,sizeof (xattr_value),0 ); +if (err && errno ==EOPNOTSUPP ) { +printf ("%s:SKIP:filesystem does not support user xattr (%d)\n" , + __func__, errno); +test__skip (); + goto err_unlink; + } + +if (!ASSERT_OK (err,"setxattr_shell" )) + goto err_unlink; + +return true; + +err_unlink: +unlink (shell_copy); +err_rmdir: +rmdir (temp_dir); +return false; +} + +static void run_refcounted_file_kptr_success (void ) +{ +struct refcounted_kptr_file *skel; +char shell_copy[PATH_MAX ] = {}; +char temp_dir[PATH_MAX ] = {}; +int pipefd[2 ] = {-1 ,-1 }; +int status; +pid_t child_pid =-1 ; +int err, fd =-1 ; + + skel =refcounted_kptr_file__open (); +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (skel,"refcounted_kptr_file__open" )) +return ; + + err =refcounted_kptr_file__load (skel); +if (!ASSERT_OK (err,"refcounted_kptr_file__load" )) + goto out; + + err =refcounted_kptr_file__attach (skel); +if (!ASSERT_OK (err,"refcounted_kptr_file__attach" )) + goto out; + +if (!prepare_tagged_shell (temp_dir,sizeof (temp_dir), shell_copy, +sizeof (shell_copy))) + goto out; + +if (!ASSERT_OK (pipe2 (pipefd,O_CLOEXEC ),"pipe2" )) + goto out; + + child_pid =fork (); +if (!ASSERT_GT (child_pid,-1 ,"fork" )) + goto out; + +if (child_pid ==0 ) { +char sync; + +close (pipefd[1 ]); +if (read (pipefd[0 ], &sync,1 ) !=1 ) +_exit (127 ); +close (pipefd[0 ]); +execl (shell_copy, shell_copy,"-c" ,": </dev/null" ,NULL ); +_exit (127 ); + } + +close (pipefd[0 ]); + pipefd[0 ] =-1 ; + +/* +* Set the PID *before* unblocking the child so that the BPF program's +* file_open hook can filter on it from the very first file opened during +* exec. If the write happened first, early file_open events during +* exec could be missed. +*/ + skel->bss->file_kptr_insert_pid = child_pid; + err =write_full (pipefd[1 ],"1" ,1 ); +if (!ASSERT_OK (err,"start_child" )) + goto out; +close (pipefd[1 ]); + pipefd[1 ] =-1 ; + +if (!ASSERT_EQ (waitpid (child_pid, &status,0 ), child_pid,"waitpid" )) + goto out; + child_pid =-1 ; +if (!ASSERT_TRUE (WIFEXITED (status),"child_exited" )) + goto out; +if (!ASSERT_EQ (WEXITSTATUS (status),0 ,"child_status" )) + goto out; + + skel->bss->file_kptr_verify_pid =getpid (); +/* +* The child is gone at this point. Reopening an unrelated file triggers a +* second file_open hook where the BPF program validates the stashed ref. +* Our test op for the ref validity is reading the xattrs we set earlier. +*/ + fd =open ("/dev/null" ,O_RDONLY |O_CLOEXEC ); +if (!ASSERT_GE (fd,0 ,"open_dev_null" )) + goto out; +close (fd); + fd =-1 ; + +ASSERT_EQ (skel->bss->file_kptr_err,0 ,"file_kptr_err" ); +ASSERT_EQ (skel->bss->file_kptr_inserted,1 ,"file_kptr_inserted" ); +ASSERT_EQ (skel->bss->file_kptr_verified,1 ,"file_kptr_verified" ); +ASSERT_EQ (skel->bss->file_kptr_xattr_ret,sizeof (xattr_value), +"file_kptr_xattr_ret" ); +ASSERT_EQ (strcmp (skel->bss->file_kptr_value, xattr_value),0 , +"file_kptr_value" ); + +out: +close (fd); +close (pipefd[0 ]); +close (pipefd[1 ]); +if (child_pid >0 ) + (void )waitpid (child_pid,NULL ,0 ); +if (shell_copy[0 ]) +unlink (shell_copy); +if (temp_dir[0 ]) +rmdir (temp_dir); +refcounted_kptr_file__destroy (skel); +} + +void test_refcounted_kptr_file_runtime (void ) +{ +if (test__start_subtest ("holds_ref_after_close" )) +run_refcounted_file_kptr_success (); +} + +void test_refcounted_kptr_file (void ) +{ +RUN_TESTS (refcounted_kptr_file_success); + +RUN_TESTS (refcounted_kptr_file_fail); + +RUN_TESTS (refcounted_kptr_file); +}
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/refcounted_kptr_file.c new file +158 -0
158 lines not on this page · raw message
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/refcounted_kptr_file_fail.c new file +141 -0
141 lines not on this page · raw message
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/refcounted_kptr_file_success.c new file +61 -0
61 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH bpf-next v2 2/2] selftests/bpf: Add test for map-stored struct file kptrs
Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s): - [Medium] In `copy_file`, closing an invalid file descriptor overwrites the original error code. --
Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s):
- [Medium] In copy_file, closing an invalid file descriptor overwrites the original error code. --
commit 975d24d408cdf10dcbd5bc80513a92bbedd7dc6f
Author: Justin Suess <[email protected]>
selftests/bpf: Add test for map-stored struct file kptrs
This commit adds tests for map-stored struct file referenced kptrs. It validates that the struct file reference remains valid when the original file descriptor is closed, and checks that unreferenced struct file pointers are rejected by the verifier.
Quoted 5 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/refcounted_kptr_file.c new file +0
-0
[ ... ]
Quoted 16 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/refcounted_kptr_file.c new file +16
-0+static int copy_file (const char *src_path,const char *dst_path,mode_t mode) +{ +char buf[4096 ]; +int src_fd =-1 , dst_fd =-1 ; +int err =0 ; + + src_fd =open (src_path,O_RDONLY |O_CLOEXEC ); +if (src_fd <0 ) +return -errno; + + dst_fd =open (dst_path,O_WRONLY |O_CREAT |O_EXCL |O_CLOEXEC , + mode &0777 ); +if (dst_fd <0 ) { + err = -errno; + goto out; + }
[ ... ]
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/refcounted_kptr_file.c line 86
Quoted 3 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/refcounted_kptr_file.c new file +3
-0+out: + err =close (src_fd) ?: err; + err =close (dst_fd) ?: err;
If opening the destination file fails, dst_fd is left as -1, and the code jumps here with err set to -errno. Would calling close(-1) here fail and return -1, causing the ?: operator to overwrite the meaningful error code in err with -1?
Should the file descriptors be guarded with a >= 0 check before calling close() to prevent masking the true cause of the failure?
Quoted 2 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/refcounted_kptr_file.c new file +2
-0+return err; +}
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=2