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wifi: carl9170: fix stack-out-of-bounds in carl9170_cmd_callback

PATCH In review Deepanshu Kartikey 3 participants 3 messages Apr 24 – Jul 1 CARL9170 Linux community wireless driver

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PATCH 1/1 wifi: carl9170: fix stack-out-of-bounds in carl9170_cmd_callback

carl9170_cmd_callback() does not return after calling carl9170_restart() when an invalid command response is detected. This causes a fall-through into the memcpy block below, where ar->readbuf is written with a device-controlled length (len - 4) instead of the expected ar->readlen bytes.

A malicious or fuzzing USB device can send an oversized response (e.g. 60 bytes) causing a stack-out-of-bounds write into ar->readbuf, as detected by KASAN.

Fix this by adding a return after carl9170_restart() to match the original intent stated in the comment ("Do not complete"). Also cap the memcpy with min_t() as defense-in-depth to prevent overflow even if the control flow changes in future.

The bug has been present since the initial driver submission in 2010.

Fixes a84fab3cbfdc ("carl9170: 802.11 rx/tx processing and usb backend")
Reported-by [email protected]
---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/rx.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/rx.c +3 -1
index 6833430130f4..6a5923495a01 100644
@@ -145,12 +145,14 @@ static void carl9170_cmd_callback(struct ar9170 *ar, u32 len, void *buffer)
 		 * and we get a stack trace from there.
 		 */
 		carl9170_restart(ar, CARL9170_RR_INVALID_RSP);
+		return;
 	}
 
 	spin_lock(&ar->cmd_lock);
 	if (ar->readbuf) {
 		if (len >= 4)
-			memcpy(ar->readbuf, buffer + 4, len - 4);
+			memcpy(ar->readbuf, buffer + 4,
+			       min_t(u32, len - 4, ar->readlen));
 
 		ar->readbuf = NULL;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#1 lore raw

Hi,

Quoted 10 lines · Deepanshu Kartikey

carl9170_cmd_callback() does not return after calling carl9170_restart() when an invalid command response is detected. This causes a fall-through into the memcpy block below, where ar->readbuf is written with a device-controlled length (len - 4) instead of the expected ar->readlen bytes.

A malicious or fuzzing USB device can send an oversized response (e.g. 60 bytes) causing a stack-out-of-bounds write into ar->readbuf, as detected by KASAN.

Quoted 6 lines

Fix this by adding a return after carl9170_restart() to match the original intent stated in the comment ("Do not complete"). Also cap the memcpy with min_t() as defense-in-depth to prevent overflow even if the control flow changes in future.

The bug has been present since the initial driver submission in 2010.

I've seen this before in a mail from Tristan Madani (CC'd) on the 13th of April 2026. Unfortunately, he didn't post this to the linux-wireless mailing-list. Instead
he went for the Security Officers <[email protected]> , so I can't provide any link to it. That said, he since changed it because of the notes I had about the driver actually want to process further so only the memcpy that caused the overflow was modified with the same "min_t(u32, len - 4, ar->readlen)" instead of "len -4" as the length:
"[PATCH v3 1/3] wifi: carl9170: bound memcpy length in cmd callback to prevent OOB read"

https://lore.kernel.org/linux-wireless/[email protected]/

So, who should get the credit? Maybe another person will post a patch soon too? Who knows.

Note: if you used any assistents. Please also check out the (new) guide-lines:
https://docs.kernel.org/process/coding-assistants.html and give proper attributions to the used tools.

Quoted 16 lines
Fixes a84fab3cbfdc ("carl9170: 802.11 rx/tx processing and usb backend")
Reported-by [email protected]
---
  drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/rx.c | 4 +++-
  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/rx.c +0 -0
index 6833430130f4..6a5923495a01 100644

drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/rx.c static void carl9170_cmd_callback(struct ar9170 *ar, u32 len, void *buffer) · line 148

Quoted 4 lines
drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/rx.c +1 -0
@@ -145,12 +145,14 @@ static void carl9170_cmd_callback(struct ar9170 *ar, u32 len, void *buffer)
  		 * and we get a stack trace from there.
  		 */
  		carl9170_restart(ar, CARL9170_RR_INVALID_RSP);
+		return;

It does happen that the driver receives garbage from the device. To remain bug-to-bug compatible with the rest of the driver should just handle it gracefully. (It's more like the comment above the carl9170_restart outdated and could be removed. Because carl9170_restart can start an async process that nukes the whole driver with a full usb_reset which will unbind the device... And if its too far gone it won't be able to rebind - then it requires the user to either physically unplugged and reinserted the wifi stick or reboot (only if it helps) or shutdown the machine)

drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/rx.c static void carl9170_cmd_callback(struct ar9170 *ar, u32 len, void *buffer) · line 155

Quoted 8 lines
drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/rx.c +2 -1
  	}
 
  	spin_lock(&ar->cmd_lock);
  	if (ar->readbuf) {
  		if (len >= 4)
-			memcpy(ar->readbuf, buffer + 4, len - 4);
+			memcpy(ar->readbuf, buffer + 4,
+			       min_t(u32, len - 4, ar->readlen));

yes.

drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/rx.c static void carl9170_cmd_callback(struct ar9170 *ar, u32 len, void *buffer) · line 158

Quoted 3 lines
drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/rx.c +0 -0
  		ar->readbuf = NULL;
  	}

Cheers,
Christian

#2 lore raw
Quoted 29 lines · Christian Lamparter

Hi,

Quoted 10 lines · Deepanshu Kartikey

carl9170_cmd_callback() does not return after calling carl9170_restart() when an invalid command response is detected. This causes a fall-through into the memcpy block below, where ar->readbuf is written with a device-controlled length (len - 4) instead of the expected ar->readlen bytes.

A malicious or fuzzing USB device can send an oversized response (e.g. 60 bytes) causing a stack-out-of-bounds write into ar->readbuf, as detected by KASAN.

Quoted 6 lines

Fix this by adding a return after carl9170_restart() to match the original intent stated in the comment ("Do not complete"). Also cap the memcpy with min_t() as defense-in-depth to prevent overflow even if the control flow changes in future.

The bug has been present since the initial driver submission in 2010.

I've seen this before in a mail from Tristan Madani (CC'd) on the 13th of April 2026. Unfortunately, he didn't post this to the linux-wireless mailing-list. Instead
he went for the Security Officers <[email protected]> , so I can't provide any link to it. That said, he since changed it because of the notes I had about the driver actually want to process further so only the memcpy that caused the overflow was modified with the same "min_t(u32, len - 4, ar->readlen)" instead of "len -4" as the length:
"[PATCH v3 1/3] wifi: carl9170: bound memcpy length in cmd callback to prevent OOB read"

Quoted 3 lines

https://lore.kernel.org/linux-wireless/[email protected]/

So, who should get the credit? Maybe another person will post a patch soon too? Who knows.

My plan is to take Tristan's series once I get ACKs. Any other contributions that conflict with his will be dropped.

/jeff