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ima: Fix sigv3 signature handling for EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG

PATCH In review Kamlesh Kumar 2 participants 2 messages Apr 24

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 ima: Fix sigv3 signature handling for EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG

ima_get_hash_algo() only recognizes version 2 signatures when the xattr type is EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG. Since sigv3 signatures also use EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG as the xattr type, version 3 must be accepted as well to correctly determine the hash algorithm.

Additionally, ima_validate_rule() does not include IMA_SIGV3_REQUIRED in the allowed flags bitmask for MODULE_CHECK, KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, and KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK hook functions. As a result, policy rules with "appraise_type=sigv3" are rejected for these functions.

Add version 3 to the accepted versions in ima_get_hash_algo() for EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG, and add IMA_SIGV3_REQUIRED to the allowed flags for MODULE_CHECK, KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, and KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK in ima_validate_rule().

---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 5 +++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c   | 3 ++-
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +3 -2
index de963b9f3634..2dd231567710 100644
@@ -195,8 +195,9 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
 		return sig->hash_algo;
 	case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
 		sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value;
-		if (sig->version != 2 || xattr_len <= sizeof(*sig)
-		    || sig->hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+		if ((sig->version != 2 && sig->version != 3) ||
+		    xattr_len <= sizeof(*sig) ||
+		    sig->hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
 			return ima_hash_algo;
 		return sig->hash_algo;
 	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +2 -1
index f7f940a76922..b1c010e8eb13 100644
@@ -1313,7 +1313,8 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 				     IMA_GID | IMA_EGID |
 				     IMA_FGROUP | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED |
 				     IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO | IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED |
-				     IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST | IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS))
+				     IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST | IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS |
+				     IMA_SIGV3_REQUIRED))
 			return false;
 
 		break;

base-commit: 82bbd447199ff1441031d2eaf9afe041550cf525

Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Tested-by on v1 1/1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 4 lines · Kamlesh Kumar

ima_get_hash_algo() only recognizes version 2 signatures when the xattr type is EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG. Since sigv3 signatures also use EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG as the xattr type, version 3 must be accepted as well to correctly determine the hash algorithm.

Thanks. I tested this with your patch. I can sign now with evmctl ima_sign --v3 -a sha512 ... even if sha256 is the IMA default and IMA verifies it now. Before I had to use evmctl ima_sign --v3 -a sha256 ...

Quoted 5 lines

Additionally, ima_validate_rule() does not include IMA_SIGV3_REQUIRED in the allowed flags bitmask for MODULE_CHECK, KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, and KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK hook functions. As a result, policy rules with "appraise_type=sigv3" are rejected for these functions.

# echo "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=sigv3" > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
-bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument

This rule is now accepted with your patch.

Quoted 7 lines

Add version 3 to the accepted versions in ima_get_hash_algo() for EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG, and add IMA_SIGV3_REQUIRED to the allowed flags for MODULE_CHECK, KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, and KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK in ima_validate_rule().

Quoted 37 lines
---
  security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 5 +++--
  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c   | 3 ++-
  2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +3 -2
index de963b9f3634..2dd231567710 100644
@@ -195,8 +195,9 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
  		return sig->hash_algo;
  	case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
  		sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value;
-		if (sig->version != 2 || xattr_len <= sizeof(*sig)
-		    || sig->hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+		if ((sig->version != 2 && sig->version != 3) ||
+		    xattr_len <= sizeof(*sig) ||
+		    sig->hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
  			return ima_hash_algo;
  		return sig->hash_algo;
  	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +2 -1
index f7f940a76922..b1c010e8eb13 100644
@@ -1313,7 +1313,8 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
  				     IMA_GID | IMA_EGID |
  				     IMA_FGROUP | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED |
  				     IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO | IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED |
-				     IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST | IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS))
+				     IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST | IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS |
+				     IMA_SIGV3_REQUIRED))
  			return false;
 
  		break;

base-commit: 82bbd447199ff1441031d2eaf9afe041550cf525