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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] smb: client: validate the whole DACL before rewriting it in" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

PATCH New [email protected] 3 participants 5 messages Apr 24 – Jun 3

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Stable branch SMB client (CIFS)
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[email protected]

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <[email protected]>.

To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:

git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 0a8cf165566ba55a39fd0f4de172119dd646d39a
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<[email protected]>' --in-reply-to '2026042446-omen-saddling-ddde@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^..

Possible dependencies:

thanks,

greg k-h

------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------

From 0a8cf165566ba55a39fd0f4de172119dd646d39a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>
Date: Sun, 19 Apr 2026 20:11:31 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] smb: client: validate the whole DACL before rewriting it in
cifsacl

build_sec_desc() and id_mode_to_cifs_acl() derive a DACL pointer from a server-supplied dacloffset and then use the incoming ACL to rebuild the chmod/chown security descriptor.

The original fix only checked that the struct smb_acl header fits before reading dacl_ptr->size or dacl_ptr->num_aces. That avoids the immediate header-field OOB read, but the rewrite helpers still walk ACEs based on pdacl->num_aces with no structural validation of the incoming DACL body.

A malicious server can return a truncated DACL that still contains a header, claims one or more ACEs, and then drive replace_sids_and_copy_aces() or set_chmod_dacl() past the validated extent while they compare or copy attacker-controlled ACEs.

Factor the DACL structural checks into validate_dacl(), extend them to validate each ACE against the DACL bounds, and use the shared validator before the chmod/chown rebuild paths. parse_dacl() reuses the same validator so the read-side parser and write-side rewrite paths agree on what constitutes a well-formed incoming DACL.

Fixes bc3e9dd9d104 ("cifs: Change SIDs in ACEs while transferring file ownership.")
Cc [email protected]
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-6
Assisted-by Codex:gpt-5-4
Signed-off-by Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Steve French <[email protected]>
fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c +85 -31
index c920039d733c..cb4060ba5e31 100644
@@ -758,6 +758,77 @@ static void dump_ace(struct smb_ace *pace, char *end_of_acl)
 }
 #endif
 
+static int validate_dacl(struct smb_acl *pdacl, char *end_of_acl)
+{
+	int i, ace_hdr_size, ace_size, min_ace_size;
+	u16 dacl_size, num_aces;
+	char *acl_base, *end_of_dacl;
+	struct smb_ace *pace;
+
+	if (!pdacl)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (end_of_acl < (char *)pdacl + sizeof(struct smb_acl)) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse DACL\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	dacl_size = le16_to_cpu(pdacl->size);
+	if (dacl_size < sizeof(struct smb_acl) ||
+	    end_of_acl < (char *)pdacl + dacl_size) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse DACL\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	num_aces = le16_to_cpu(pdacl->num_aces);
+	if (!num_aces)
+		return 0;
+
+	ace_hdr_size = offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) +
+		offsetof(struct smb_sid, sub_auth);
+	min_ace_size = ace_hdr_size + sizeof(__le32);
+	if (num_aces > (dacl_size - sizeof(struct smb_acl)) / min_ace_size) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse DACL\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	end_of_dacl = (char *)pdacl + dacl_size;
+	acl_base = (char *)pdacl;
+	ace_size = sizeof(struct smb_acl);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < num_aces; ++i) {
+		if (end_of_dacl - acl_base < ace_size) {
+			cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse ACE\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		pace = (struct smb_ace *)(acl_base + ace_size);
+		acl_base = (char *)pace;
+
+		if (end_of_dacl - acl_base < ace_hdr_size ||
+		    pace->sid.num_subauth == 0 ||
+		    pace->sid.num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES) {
+			cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse ACE\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		ace_size = ace_hdr_size + sizeof(__le32) * pace->sid.num_subauth;
+		if (end_of_dacl - acl_base < ace_size ||
+		    le16_to_cpu(pace->size) < ace_size) {
+			cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse ACE\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		ace_size = le16_to_cpu(pace->size);
+		if (end_of_dacl - acl_base < ace_size) {
+			cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse ACE\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static void parse_dacl(struct smb_acl *pdacl, char *end_of_acl,
 		       struct smb_sid *pownersid, struct smb_sid *pgrpsid,
 		       struct cifs_fattr *fattr, bool mode_from_special_sid)

@@ -765,7 +836,7 @@ static void parse_dacl(struct smb_acl *pdacl, char *end_of_acl,
 	int i;
 	u16 num_aces = 0;
 	int acl_size;
-	char *acl_base;
+	char *acl_base, *end_of_dacl;
 	struct smb_ace **ppace;
 
 	/* BB need to add parm so we can store the SID BB */

@@ -777,12 +848,8 @@ static void parse_dacl(struct smb_acl *pdacl, char *end_of_acl,
 		return;
 	}
 
-	/* validate that we do not go past end of acl */
-	if (end_of_acl < (char *)pdacl + sizeof(struct smb_acl) ||
-	    end_of_acl < (char *)pdacl + le16_to_cpu(pdacl->size)) {
-		cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse DACL\n");
+	if (validate_dacl(pdacl, end_of_acl))
 		return;
-	}
 
 	cifs_dbg(NOISY, "DACL revision %d size %d num aces %d\n",
 		 le16_to_cpu(pdacl->revision), le16_to_cpu(pdacl->size),

@@ -793,6 +860,7 @@ static void parse_dacl(struct smb_acl *pdacl, char *end_of_acl,
 	   user/group/other have no permissions */
 	fattr->cf_mode &= ~(0777);
 
+	end_of_dacl = (char *)pdacl + le16_to_cpu(pdacl->size);
 	acl_base = (char *)pdacl;
 	acl_size = sizeof(struct smb_acl);
 

@@ -800,35 +868,15 @@ static void parse_dacl(struct smb_acl *pdacl, char *end_of_acl,
 	if (num_aces > 0) {
 		umode_t denied_mode = 0;
 
-		if (num_aces > (le16_to_cpu(pdacl->size) - sizeof(struct smb_acl)) /
-				(offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) +
-				 offsetof(struct smb_sid, sub_auth) + sizeof(__le16)))
-			return;
-
 		ppace = kmalloc_objs(struct smb_ace *, num_aces);
 		if (!ppace)
 			return;
 
 		for (i = 0; i < num_aces; ++i) {
-			if (end_of_acl - acl_base < acl_size)
-				break;
-
 			ppace[i] = (struct smb_ace *) (acl_base + acl_size);
-			acl_base = (char *)ppace[i];
-			acl_size = offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) +
-				offsetof(struct smb_sid, sub_auth);
-
-			if (end_of_acl - acl_base < acl_size ||
-			    ppace[i]->sid.num_subauth == 0 ||
-			    ppace[i]->sid.num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES ||
-			    (end_of_acl - acl_base <
-			     acl_size + sizeof(__le32) * ppace[i]->sid.num_subauth) ||
-			    (le16_to_cpu(ppace[i]->size) <
-			     acl_size + sizeof(__le32) * ppace[i]->sid.num_subauth))
-				break;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_DEBUG2
-			dump_ace(ppace[i], end_of_acl);
+			dump_ace(ppace[i], end_of_dacl);
 #endif
 			if (mode_from_special_sid &&
 			    (compare_sids(&(ppace[i]->sid),

@@ -870,6 +918,7 @@ static void parse_dacl(struct smb_acl *pdacl, char *end_of_acl,
 				(void *)ppace[i],
 				sizeof(struct smb_ace)); */
 
+			acl_base = (char *)ppace[i];
 			acl_size = le16_to_cpu(ppace[i]->size);
 		}
 

@@ -1293,10 +1342,9 @@ static int build_sec_desc(struct smb_ntsd *pntsd, struct smb_ntsd *pnntsd,
 	dacloffset = le32_to_cpu(pntsd->dacloffset);
 	if (dacloffset) {
 		dacl_ptr = (struct smb_acl *)((char *)pntsd + dacloffset);
-		if (end_of_acl < (char *)dacl_ptr + le16_to_cpu(dacl_ptr->size)) {
-			cifs_dbg(VFS, "Server returned illegal ACL size\n");
-			return -EINVAL;
-		}
+		rc = validate_dacl(dacl_ptr, end_of_acl);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
 	}
 
 	owner_sid_ptr = (struct smb_sid *)((char *)pntsd +

@@ -1662,6 +1710,12 @@ id_mode_to_cifs_acl(struct inode *inode, const char *path, __u64 *pnmode,
 		dacloffset = le32_to_cpu(pntsd->dacloffset);
 		if (dacloffset) {
 			dacl_ptr = (struct smb_acl *)((char *)pntsd + dacloffset);
+			rc = validate_dacl(dacl_ptr, (char *)pntsd + secdesclen);
+			if (rc) {
+				kfree(pntsd);
+				cifs_put_tlink(tlink);
+				return rc;
+			}
 			if (mode_from_sid)
 				nsecdesclen +=
 					le16_to_cpu(dacl_ptr->num_aces) * sizeof(struct smb_ace);
maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 smb: client: validate the whole DACL before rewriting it in cifsacl

From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0a8cf165566ba55a39fd0f4de172119dd646d39a ]

build_sec_desc() and id_mode_to_cifs_acl() derive a DACL pointer from a server-supplied dacloffset and then use the incoming ACL to rebuild the chmod/chown security descriptor.

The original fix only checked that the struct smb_acl header fits before reading dacl_ptr->size or dacl_ptr->num_aces. That avoids the immediate header-field OOB read, but the rewrite helpers still walk ACEs based on pdacl->num_aces with no structural validation of the incoming DACL body.

A malicious server can return a truncated DACL that still contains a header, claims one or more ACEs, and then drive replace_sids_and_copy_aces() or set_chmod_dacl() past the validated extent while they compare or copy attacker-controlled ACEs.

Factor the DACL structural checks into validate_dacl(), extend them to validate each ACE against the DACL bounds, and use the shared validator before the chmod/chown rebuild paths. parse_dacl() reuses the same validator so the read-side parser and write-side rewrite paths agree on what constitutes a well-formed incoming DACL.

Fixes bc3e9dd9d104 ("cifs: Change SIDs in ACEs while transferring file ownership.")
Cc [email protected]
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-6
Assisted-by Codex:gpt-5-4
Signed-off-by Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Steve French <[email protected]>
[ renamed smb_acl/smb_ace/smb_sid/smb_ntsd to cifs_* and widened num_aces from u16 to u32 for 6.1's __le32 field ]
Signed-off-by Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
 fs/cifs/cifsacl.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 85 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
fs/cifs/cifsacl.c +85 -10
index bf861fef2f0c3..b6dc3543a40f8 100644
@@ -753,6 +753,78 @@ static void dump_ace(struct cifs_ace *pace, char *end_of_acl)
 }
 #endif
 
+static int validate_dacl(struct cifs_acl *pdacl, char *end_of_acl)
+{
+	int i, ace_hdr_size, ace_size, min_ace_size;
+	u16 dacl_size;
+	u32 num_aces;
+	char *acl_base, *end_of_dacl;
+	struct cifs_ace *pace;
+
+	if (!pdacl)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (end_of_acl < (char *)pdacl + sizeof(struct cifs_acl)) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse DACL\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	dacl_size = le16_to_cpu(pdacl->size);
+	if (dacl_size < sizeof(struct cifs_acl) ||
+	    end_of_acl < (char *)pdacl + dacl_size) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse DACL\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	num_aces = le32_to_cpu(pdacl->num_aces);
+	if (!num_aces)
+		return 0;
+
+	ace_hdr_size = offsetof(struct cifs_ace, sid) +
+		offsetof(struct cifs_sid, sub_auth);
+	min_ace_size = ace_hdr_size + sizeof(__le32);
+	if (num_aces > (dacl_size - sizeof(struct cifs_acl)) / min_ace_size) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse DACL\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	end_of_dacl = (char *)pdacl + dacl_size;
+	acl_base = (char *)pdacl;
+	ace_size = sizeof(struct cifs_acl);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < num_aces; ++i) {
+		if (end_of_dacl - acl_base < ace_size) {
+			cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse ACE\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		pace = (struct cifs_ace *)(acl_base + ace_size);
+		acl_base = (char *)pace;
+
+		if (end_of_dacl - acl_base < ace_hdr_size ||
+		    pace->sid.num_subauth == 0 ||
+		    pace->sid.num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES) {
+			cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse ACE\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		ace_size = ace_hdr_size + sizeof(__le32) * pace->sid.num_subauth;
+		if (end_of_dacl - acl_base < ace_size ||
+		    le16_to_cpu(pace->size) < ace_size) {
+			cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse ACE\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		ace_size = le16_to_cpu(pace->size);
+		if (end_of_dacl - acl_base < ace_size) {
+			cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse ACE\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static void parse_dacl(struct cifs_acl *pdacl, char *end_of_acl,
 		       struct cifs_sid *pownersid, struct cifs_sid *pgrpsid,
 		       struct cifs_fattr *fattr, bool mode_from_special_sid)

@@ -760,7 +832,7 @@ static void parse_dacl(struct cifs_acl *pdacl, char *end_of_acl,
 	int i;
 	int num_aces = 0;
 	int acl_size;
-	char *acl_base;
+	char *acl_base, *end_of_dacl;
 	struct cifs_ace **ppace;
 
 	/* BB need to add parm so we can store the SID BB */

@@ -772,11 +844,8 @@ static void parse_dacl(struct cifs_acl *pdacl, char *end_of_acl,
 		return;
 	}
 
-	/* validate that we do not go past end of acl */
-	if (end_of_acl < (char *)pdacl + le16_to_cpu(pdacl->size)) {
-		cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse DACL\n");
+	if (validate_dacl(pdacl, end_of_acl))
 		return;
-	}
 
 	cifs_dbg(NOISY, "DACL revision %d size %d num aces %d\n",
 		 le16_to_cpu(pdacl->revision), le16_to_cpu(pdacl->size),

@@ -787,6 +856,7 @@ static void parse_dacl(struct cifs_acl *pdacl, char *end_of_acl,
 	   user/group/other have no permissions */
 	fattr->cf_mode &= ~(0777);
 
+	end_of_dacl = (char *)pdacl + le16_to_cpu(pdacl->size);
 	acl_base = (char *)pdacl;
 	acl_size = sizeof(struct cifs_acl);
 

@@ -804,7 +874,7 @@ static void parse_dacl(struct cifs_acl *pdacl, char *end_of_acl,
 		for (i = 0; i < num_aces; ++i) {
 			ppace[i] = (struct cifs_ace *) (acl_base + acl_size);
 #ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_DEBUG2
-			dump_ace(ppace[i], end_of_acl);
+			dump_ace(ppace[i], end_of_dacl);
 #endif
 			if (mode_from_special_sid &&
 			    (compare_sids(&(ppace[i]->sid),

@@ -1262,10 +1332,9 @@ static int build_sec_desc(struct cifs_ntsd *pntsd, struct cifs_ntsd *pnntsd,
 	dacloffset = le32_to_cpu(pntsd->dacloffset);
 	if (dacloffset) {
 		dacl_ptr = (struct cifs_acl *)((char *)pntsd + dacloffset);
-		if (end_of_acl < (char *)dacl_ptr + le16_to_cpu(dacl_ptr->size)) {
-			cifs_dbg(VFS, "Server returned illegal ACL size\n");
-			return -EINVAL;
-		}
+		rc = validate_dacl(dacl_ptr, end_of_acl);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
 	}
 
 	owner_sid_ptr = (struct cifs_sid *)((char *)pntsd +

@@ -1625,6 +1694,12 @@ id_mode_to_cifs_acl(struct inode *inode, const char *path, __u64 *pnmode,
 		dacloffset = le32_to_cpu(pntsd->dacloffset);
 		if (dacloffset) {
 			dacl_ptr = (struct cifs_acl *)((char *)pntsd + dacloffset);
+			rc = validate_dacl(dacl_ptr, (char *)pntsd + secdesclen);
+			if (rc) {
+				kfree(pntsd);
+				cifs_put_tlink(tlink);
+				return rc;
+			}
 			if (mode_from_sid)
 				nsecdesclen +=
 					le32_to_cpu(dacl_ptr->num_aces) * sizeof(struct cifs_ace);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 5.15.y] smb: client: validate the whole DACL before rewriting it in cifsacl

Quoted 4 lines · Jiping Ma

Hi,

I can not find this patch in queue-5.15 and queue-6.1 of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git,
Do you know what happened to this patch for Linux 5.15 and Linux 6.1?

What is the git id of the commit you are looking for?

thanks,

greg k-h

maintainer Applied
#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 5.15.y] smb: client: validate the whole DACL before rewriting it in cifsacl

In reply to Jiping Ma

Queued for 6.18.y, thanks.

Signature · 2 lines
Thanks,
Sasha