bpf: Fix off-by-one boundary validation in arena direct-value access
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): 2026042614-scowling-hankie-f84b@gregkh
PATCH 1/1 bpf: Fix off-by-one boundary validation in arena direct-value access
BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARENA accepts BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE offsets at exactly the end of the arena mapping (off == arena_size). The boundary check in arena_map_direct_value_addr() uses > instead of >=, which incorrectly allows a one-past-end pointer to be accepted.
Change the condition to >= to correctly reject offsets that fall outside the valid arena user_vm range.
--- kernel/bpf/arena.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/bpf/arena.c +1 -1
@@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ static int arena_map_direct_value_addr(const struct bpf_map *map, u64 *imm, u32 { struct bpf_arena *arena = container_of(map, struct bpf_arena, map); -if ((u64 )off > arena->user_vm_end - arena->user_vm_start) +if ((u64 )off >= arena->user_vm_end - arena->user_vm_start)return -ERANGE ; *imm = (unsigned long )arena->user_vm_start;return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
[email protected]
AI reviewThis commit fixes a bug but lacks a Fixes: tag. The commit being fixed appears to be:
Quoted 1 line
= to correctly reject offsets outside the valid arena
user_vmrange.
This commit fixes a bug but lacks a Fixes: tag. The commit being fixed appears to be:
Should this tag be added to help with backporting and tracking the original issue?
---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md
CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/24960599139
PATCH v2 1/1 bpf: Fix off-by-one boundary validation in arena direct-value access
In reply to a message not in the archiveBPF_MAP_TYPE_ARENA accepts BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE offsets at exactly the end of the arena mapping (off == arena_size). The boundary check in arena_map_direct_value_addr() uses > instead of >=, which incorrectly allows a one-past-end pointer to be accepted.
Change the condition to >= to correctly reject offsets that fall outside the valid arena user_vm range.
--- kernel/bpf/arena.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/bpf/arena.c +1 -1
@@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ static int arena_map_direct_value_addr(const struct bpf_map *map, u64 *imm, u32 { struct bpf_arena *arena = container_of(map, struct bpf_arena, map); -if ((u64 )off > arena->user_vm_end - arena->user_vm_start) +if ((u64 )off >= arena->user_vm_end - arena->user_vm_start)return -ERANGE ; *imm = (unsigned long )arena->user_vm_start;return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
[email protected]
AI reviewSashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s): - [Medium] Data race and bounds check bypass in arena_map_direct_value_addr() due to lockless reads --
Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s):
- [Medium] Data race and bounds check bypass in arena_map_direct_value_addr() due to lockless reads --
commit a9b5d3016475abf10be02a320dc627c95b306d92
Author: Junyoung Jang <[email protected]>
bpf: Fix off-by-one boundary validation in arena direct-value access
This commit fixes an off-by-one error in the arena map boundary check where offsets exactly at the end of the mapping were incorrectly accepted.
kernel/bpf/arena.c static int arena_map_direct_value_addr(const struct bpf_map *map, u64 *imm, u32 · line 514
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/arena.c +1
-1@@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ static int arena_map_direct_value_addr(const struct bpf_map *map, u64 *imm, u32 { struct bpf_arena *arena = container_of(map, struct bpf_arena, map); -if ((u64 )off > arena->user_vm_end - arena->user_vm_start) +if ((u64 )off >= arena->user_vm_end - arena->user_vm_start)
Could this evaluation be vulnerable to a data race?
This function reads arena->user_vm_end and arena->user_vm_start without holding arena->lock or using READ_ONCE().
Concurrently, a user-space process calling mmap() on the arena map FD can invoke arena_map_mmap(), which updates these fields under arena->lock. Because user_vm_start is updated first, a concurrent reader here might observe the new user_vm_start (a high address) and the old user_vm_end (which might be 0).
In that scenario, arena->user_vm_end - arena->user_vm_start would underflow to a large 64-bit value, which would allow arbitrary offsets to bypass this bounds check.
Does this logic require synchronization or READ_ONCE() annotations to ensure the verifier's boundary validation remains effective?
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/bpf/arena.c +0
-0return -ERANGE ; *imm = (unsigned long )arena->user_vm_start;return 0 ;}
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
Emil Tsalapatis
reviewerQuoted 34 lines · sashiko-bot
Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s):
- [Medium] Data race and bounds check bypass inarena_map_direct_value_addr()due to lockless reads --commit
a9b5d3016475abf10be02a320dc627c95b306d92
Author: Junyoung Jang <[email protected]>bpf: Fix off-by-one boundary validation in arena direct-value access
This commit fixes an off-by-one error in the arena map boundary check where offsets exactly at the end of the mapping were incorrectly accepted.
kernel/bpf/arena.c static int arena_map_direct_value_addr(const struct bpf_map *map, u64 *imm, u32 · line 514
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/arena.c +1
-1@@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ static int arena_map_direct_value_addr(const struct bpf_map *map, u64 *imm, u32 { struct bpf_arena *arena = container_of(map, struct bpf_arena, map); -if ((u64 )off > arena->user_vm_end - arena->user_vm_start) +if ((u64 )off >= arena->user_vm_end - arena->user_vm_start)Could this evaluation be vulnerable to a data race?
This function reads
arena->user_vm_endandarena->user_vm_startwithout holdingarena->lockor usingREAD_ONCE().Concurrently, a user-space process calling
mmap()on the arena map FD can invokearena_map_mmap(), which updates these fields underarena->lock. Becauseuser_vm_startis updated first, a concurrent reader here might observe the newuser_vm_start(a high address) and the olduser_vm_end(which might be 0).
Quoted 3 lines
In that scenario,
arena->user_vm_end-arena->user_vm_startwould underflow to a large 64-bit value, which would allow arbitrary offsets to bypass this bounds check.
This seems like a valid concern, though it is unrelated to the fix here which seems correct. Can you sent a followup patch using an arena lock guard in map_direct_value_addr? I don't see any issues with taking the lock since the method is only used at verification time.
Quoted 8 lines
Does this logic require synchronization or
READ_ONCE()annotations to ensure the verifier's boundary validation remains effective?Quoted 4 lines
kernel/bpf/arena.c +0
-0return -ERANGE ; *imm = (unsigned long )arena->user_vm_start;return 0 ;}
Quoted 36 lines · Emil Tsalapatis
Quoted 34 lines · sashiko-bot
Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s):
- [Medium] Data race and bounds check bypass inarena_map_direct_value_addr()due to lockless reads --commit
a9b5d3016475abf10be02a320dc627c95b306d92
Author: Junyoung Jang <[email protected]>bpf: Fix off-by-one boundary validation in arena direct-value access
This commit fixes an off-by-one error in the arena map boundary check where offsets exactly at the end of the mapping were incorrectly accepted.
kernel/bpf/arena.c static int arena_map_direct_value_addr(const struct bpf_map *map, u64 *imm, u32 · line 514
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/arena.c +1
-1@@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ static int arena_map_direct_value_addr(const struct bpf_map *map, u64 *imm, u32 { struct bpf_arena *arena = container_of(map, struct bpf_arena, map); -if ((u64 )off > arena->user_vm_end - arena->user_vm_start) +if ((u64 )off >= arena->user_vm_end - arena->user_vm_start)Could this evaluation be vulnerable to a data race?
This function reads
arena->user_vm_endandarena->user_vm_startwithout holdingarena->lockor usingREAD_ONCE().Concurrently, a user-space process calling
mmap()on the arena map FD can invokearena_map_mmap(), which updates these fields underarena->lock. Becauseuser_vm_startis updated first, a concurrent reader here might observe the newuser_vm_start(a high address) and the olduser_vm_end(which might be 0).
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
In that scenario,
arena->user_vm_end-arena->user_vm_startwould underflow to a large 64-bit value, which would allow arbitrary offsets to bypass this bounds check.This seems like a valid concern, though it is unrelated to the fix here which seems correct. Can you sent a followup patch using an arena lock guard in
map_direct_value_addr? I don't see any issues with taking the lock since the method is only used at verification time.
No. sashk is wrong here.
In general I suggest to ignore sashk's medium and low suggestions. 'critical' are often correct.
'high' should be considered, but acting on them needs thought.
Quoted 11 lines · Junyoung Jang
BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARENAacceptsBPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUEoffsets at exactly the end of the arena mapping (off ==arena_size). The boundary check inarena_map_direct_value_addr()uses>instead of>=, which incorrectly allows a one-past-end pointer to be accepted.Change the condition to
>=to correctly reject offsets that fall outside the valid arenauser_vmrange.Fixes 317460317a02 ("bpf: Introduce bpf_arena.")Signed-off-by Junyoung Jang <[email protected]>---
Quoted 16 lines
kernel/bpf/arena.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)kernel/bpf/arena.c +1
-1@@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ static int arena_map_direct_value_addr(const struct bpf_map *map, u64 *imm, u32 { struct bpf_arena *arena = container_of(map, struct bpf_arena, map); -if ((u64 )off > arena->user_vm_end - arena->user_vm_start) +if ((u64 )off >= arena->user_vm_end - arena->user_vm_start)return -ERANGE ; *imm = (unsigned long )arena->user_vm_start;return 0 ;
This patch was applied to bpf/bpf.git (master) by Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>:
Hello:
This patch was applied to bpf/bpf.git (master)
by Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>:
Quoted 9 lines · On Mon, 27 Apr 2026 02:25:05 +0900 you wrote:
BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARENAacceptsBPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUEoffsets at exactly the end of the arena mapping (off ==arena_size). The boundary check inarena_map_direct_value_addr()uses>instead of>=, which incorrectly allows a one-past-end pointer to be accepted.Change the condition to
>=to correctly reject offsets that fall outside the valid arenauser_vmrange.[...]
Here is the summary with links:
- [bpf,v2] bpf: Fix off-by-one boundary validation in arena direct-value access
https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf/c/3ac1a467e376
You are awesome, thank you!
Signature · 2 lines
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