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scsi: ufs: remove ucd_rsp_dma_addr and ucd_prdt_dma_addr from ufshcd_lrb

PATCH In review [email protected] 3 participants 3 messages Apr 27

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 scsi: ufs: remove ucd_rsp_dma_addr and ucd_prdt_dma_addr from ufshcd_lrb

From: Ed Tsai <[email protected]>

The offsets stored in utp_transfer_req_desc are in double words on hosts without UFSHCD_QUIRK_PRDT_BYTE_GRAN, using them directly to compute ucd_rsp_dma_addr and ucd_prdt_dma_addr results in incorrect DMA addresses.

Since these fields are only used for error logging, remove them from struct ufshcd_lrb and compute directly in ufshcd_print_tr() using offsetof(struct utp_transfer_cmd_desc, ...) instead.

Fixes d5130c5a0932 ("scsi: ufs: Use pre-calculated offsets in ufshcd_init_lrb()")
---
 drivers/ufs/core/ufshcd.c | 10 ++++------
 include/ufs/ufshcd.h      |  4 ----
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
drivers/ufs/core/ufshcd.c +4 -6
index 4805e40ed4d7..02fa61322e77 100644
@@ -621,7 +621,8 @@ static void ufshcd_print_tr(struct ufs_hba *hba, struct scsi_cmnd *cmd,
 	ufshcd_hex_dump("UPIU REQ: ", lrbp->ucd_req_ptr,
 			sizeof(struct utp_upiu_req));
 	dev_err(hba->dev, "UPIU[%d] - Response UPIU phys@0x%llx\n", tag,
-		(u64)lrbp->ucd_rsp_dma_addr);
+		(u64)(lrbp->ucd_req_dma_addr +
+		offsetof(struct utp_transfer_cmd_desc, response_upiu)));
 	ufshcd_hex_dump("UPIU RSP: ", lrbp->ucd_rsp_ptr,
 			sizeof(struct utp_upiu_rsp));
 
@@ -633,7 +634,8 @@ static void ufshcd_print_tr(struct ufs_hba *hba, struct scsi_cmnd *cmd,
 	dev_err(hba->dev,
 		"UPIU[%d] - PRDT - %d entries  phys@0x%llx\n",
 		tag, prdt_length,
-		(u64)lrbp->ucd_prdt_dma_addr);
+		(u64)(lrbp->ucd_req_dma_addr +
+		offsetof(struct utp_transfer_cmd_desc, prd_table)));
 
 	if (pr_prdt)
 		ufshcd_hex_dump("UPIU PRDT: ", lrbp->ucd_prdt_ptr,
@@ -2971,8 +2973,6 @@ static void ufshcd_init_lrb(struct ufs_hba *hba, struct scsi_cmnd *cmd)
 	struct utp_transfer_req_desc *utrdlp = hba->utrdl_base_addr;
 	dma_addr_t cmd_desc_element_addr =
 		hba->ucdl_dma_addr + i * ufshcd_get_ucd_size(hba);
-	u16 response_offset = le16_to_cpu(utrdlp[i].response_upiu_offset);
-	u16 prdt_offset = le16_to_cpu(utrdlp[i].prd_table_offset);
 	struct ufshcd_lrb *lrb = scsi_cmd_priv(cmd);
 
 	lrb->utr_descriptor_ptr = utrdlp + i;
@@ -2981,9 +2981,7 @@ static void ufshcd_init_lrb(struct ufs_hba *hba, struct scsi_cmnd *cmd)
 	lrb->ucd_req_ptr = (struct utp_upiu_req *)cmd_descp->command_upiu;
 	lrb->ucd_req_dma_addr = cmd_desc_element_addr;
 	lrb->ucd_rsp_ptr = (struct utp_upiu_rsp *)cmd_descp->response_upiu;
-	lrb->ucd_rsp_dma_addr = cmd_desc_element_addr + response_offset;
 	lrb->ucd_prdt_ptr = (struct ufshcd_sg_entry *)cmd_descp->prd_table;
-	lrb->ucd_prdt_dma_addr = cmd_desc_element_addr + prdt_offset;
 }
 
 static void __ufshcd_setup_cmd(struct ufs_hba *hba, struct scsi_cmnd *cmd,
include/ufs/ufshcd.h +0 -4
index cfbc75d8df83..8cb845534e63 100644
@@ -158,8 +158,6 @@ struct ufs_pm_lvl_states {
  * @ucd_rsp_ptr: Response UPIU address for this command
  * @ucd_prdt_ptr: PRDT address of the command
  * @utrd_dma_addr: UTRD dma address for debug
- * @ucd_prdt_dma_addr: PRDT dma address for debug
- * @ucd_rsp_dma_addr: UPIU response dma address for debug
  * @ucd_req_dma_addr: UPIU request dma address for debug
  * @scsi_status: SCSI status of the command
  * @command_type: SCSI, UFS, Query.
@@ -182,8 +180,6 @@ struct ufshcd_lrb {
 
 	dma_addr_t utrd_dma_addr;
 	dma_addr_t ucd_req_dma_addr;
-	dma_addr_t ucd_rsp_dma_addr;
-	dma_addr_t ucd_prdt_dma_addr;
 
 	int scsi_status;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.45.2
Reviewed-by on v1 1/1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · On Mon, 2026-04-27 at 11:58 +0800, [email protected] wrote:

The offsets stored in utp_transfer_req_desc are in double words on hosts without UFSHCD_QUIRK_PRDT_BYTE_GRAN, using them directly to compute ucd_rsp_dma_addr and ucd_prdt_dma_addr results in incorrect DMA addresses.

Since these fields are only used for error logging, remove them from struct ufshcd_lrb and compute directly in ufshcd_print_tr() using offsetof(struct utp_transfer_cmd_desc, ...) instead.

Quoted 7 lines
Fixes d5130c5a0932 ("scsi: ufs: Use pre-calculated offsets in

ufshcd_init_lrb()")
Cc: [email protected]
Link:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

---

#2 lore raw
In reply to [email protected]
Quoted 15 lines · On 4/26/26 8:58 PM, [email protected] wrote:
drivers/ufs/core/ufshcd.c +2 -1
index 4805e40ed4d7..02fa61322e77 100644
@@ -621,7 +621,8 @@ static void ufshcd_print_tr(struct ufs_hba *hba, struct scsi_cmnd *cmd,
  	ufshcd_hex_dump("UPIU REQ: ", lrbp->ucd_req_ptr,
  			sizeof(struct utp_upiu_req));
  	dev_err(hba->dev, "UPIU[%d] - Response UPIU phys@0x%llx\n", tag,
-		(u64)lrbp->ucd_rsp_dma_addr);
+		(u64)(lrbp->ucd_req_dma_addr +
+		offsetof(struct utp_transfer_cmd_desc, response_upiu)));
  	ufshcd_hex_dump("UPIU RSP: ", lrbp->ucd_rsp_ptr,
  			sizeof(struct utp_upiu_rsp));
 

drivers/ufs/core/ufshcd.c static void ufshcd_print_tr(struct ufs_hba *hba, struct scsi_cmnd *cmd, · line 638

Quoted 6 lines
drivers/ufs/core/ufshcd.c +2 -1
@@ -633,7 +634,8 @@ static void ufshcd_print_tr(struct ufs_hba *hba, struct scsi_cmnd *cmd,
  	dev_err(hba->dev,
  		"UPIU[%d] - PRDT - %d entries  phys@0x%llx\n",
  		tag, prdt_length,
-		(u64)lrbp->ucd_prdt_dma_addr);
+		(u64)(lrbp->ucd_req_dma_addr +
+		offsetof(struct utp_transfer_cmd_desc, prd_table)));

I don't think that it is useful to log DMA addresses and I prefer that this information would not be logged at all. Logging this information might even involve a security risk. Here is some information about this
topic that comes from an LLM:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Why is logging pointer addresses from kernel code considered a security risk?

Exposing kernel pointer addresses—a practice often referred to as pointer leaking—is considered a major security risk because it bypasses a fundamental defense mechanism called KASLR (Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization). [ ... ]
2. Facilitating Exploit Chains

A pointer leak is rarely an exploit on its own, but it is almost always the first step in a sophisticated attack.

* Return-Oriented Programming (ROP): To hijack execution flow, an attacker needs "gadgets" (small snippets of existing code). Without knowing the exact addresses of these gadgets, their exploit will simply crash the system (a Denial of Service).

* Targeted Corruption: If an attacker wants to overwrite a specific security structure (like a process's UID to gain root access), they need the pointer to that specific object in kernel memory. [ ... ]
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Thanks,

Bart.