adding check to prevent overflow in sqfs_find_inode
PATCH 1/1 adding check to prevent overflow in sqfs_find_inode
While fuzzing attributes of the squashfs_reg_inode structure, if the file_size attribute is a large value, &base->inode_number within the sqfs_find_inode function will jump to an arbitrary location in memory resulting in a invalid memory access and crash.
This bug is similar to CVE-2024-57254 in that memory operations are occurring based on inode values. I applied a similar fixed via the commmit c8e929e5758999933f9e905049ef2bf3fe6b140d.
Prior to the fix, the bug was triggered via the following commands from the U-Boot shell:
```
=> host bind 0 random3.sqfs
=> ls host 0 /
AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL
=================================================================
==122741==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x0000670e4716 (pc 0x55a504b86ea6 bp 0x000019af1280 sp 0x7fff04b3b740 T0)
==122741==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
#0 0x55a504b86ea6 in sqfs_find_inode fs/squashfs/sqfs_inode.c:131
#1 0x55a504b7f17e in sqfs_search_dir fs/squashfs/sqfs.c:489
#2 0x55a504b80ffb in sqfs_opendir_nest fs/squashfs/sqfs.c:977
#3 0x55a504b426e9 in fs_opendir fs/fs.c:669
#4 0x55a504b42a6d in fs_ls_generic fs/fs.c:66
#5 0x55a504b42dc8 in fs_ls fs/fs.c:537
#6 0x55a504b42dc8 in do_ls fs/fs.c:881
#7 0x55a504b42dc8 in do_ls.isra.0 fs/fs.c:870
#8 0x55a504a0eb40 in cmd_call common/command.c:582
#9 0x55a504a0eb40 in cmd_process common/command.c:637
#10 0x55a5049f00c4 in run_pipe_real common/cli_hush.c:1672
#11 0x55a5049f00c4 in run_list_real common/cli_hush.c:1868
#12 0x55a5049f0800 in run_list common/cli_hush.c:2017
#13 0x55a5049f0800 in parse_stream_outer common/cli_hush.c:3207
#14 0x55a50492efcc in parse_file_outer common/cli_hush.c:3299
#15 0x55a50492efcc in cli_loop common/cli.c:306
#16 0x55a50492efcc in main_loop common/main.c:86
#17 0x55a50492efcc in run_main_loop common/board_r.c:584
#18 0x55a50492efcc in initcall_run_r common/board_r.c:776
#19 0x55a50492efcc in board_init_r common/board_r.c:806
#20 0x55a50492efcc in sandbox_main arch/sandbox/cpu/start.c:584
#21 0x7f60aa6276c0 (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x276c0) (BuildId: ca0db5ab57a36507d61bbcf4988d344974331f19)
#22 0x7f60aa6277f8 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x277f8) (BuildId: ca0db5ab57a36507d61bbcf4988d344974331f19)
#23 0x55a50491e414 in _start (/usr/src/u-boot/u-boot+0x285414) (BuildId: 964ae5120238bc46d7af63402fa25331ca86b3b4)
==122741==Register values:
rax = 0x00000000670e470a rbx = 0x000055a504ef7100 rcx = 0x0000000000020000 rdx = 0x0000000000000000
rdi = 0x0000000000006fd5 rsi = 0x0000000000007abd rbp = 0x0000000019af1280 rsp = 0x00007fff04b3b740
r8 = 0x000000004d5f348a r9 = 0x00000000670e4716 r10 = 0x0000000000000501 r11 = 0x0000000000000001
r12 = 0x0000000000000002 r13 = 0x0000000000000001 r14 = 0x00000000199caa00 r15 = 0x0000000000000001
AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info.
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV fs/squashfs/sqfs_inode.c:131 in sqfs_find_inode
```Post-patch, the following behavior is observed:
=> host bind 0 random3.sqfs
=> ls host 0 /
Error while searching inode: unknown type.
--- fs/squashfs/sqfs_inode.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/squashfs/sqfs_inode.c +3 -0
@@ -135,6 +135,9 @@ void *sqfs_find_inode(void *inode_table, int inode_number, __le32 inode_count,if (sz <0 )return NULL ; +if (__builtin_add_overflow (offset, sz, &offset)) +return NULL ; + offset += sz; }
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
Hi Jared,
Le 28/04/2026 à 02:31, Jared Stroud a écrit :
Quoted 5 lines
While fuzzing attributes of the
squashfs_reg_inodestructure, if thefile_sizeattribute is a large value,&base->inode_numberwithin thesqfs_find_inodefunction will jump to an arbitrary location in memory resulting in a invalid memory access and crash.
This bug is similar to CVE-2024-57254 in that memory operations are occurring based on inode values. I applied a similar fixed via the commmitc8e929e5758999933f9e905049ef2bf3fe6b140d.
The commit message should be wrapped between at 75 characters (the rule can be bent for log messages like the one bellow, but for the description, it's the preferred way) You can use scripts/checkpatch.pl to help you with.
Quoted 62 lines
Prior to the fix, the bug was triggered via the following commands from the U-Boot shell:
``` => host bind 0 random3.sqfs => ls host 0 / AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==122741==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x0000670e4716 (pc 0x55a504b86ea6 bp 0x000019af1280 sp 0x7fff04b3b740 T0) ==122741==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x55a504b86ea6 in sqfs_find_inode fs/squashfs/sqfs_inode.c:131 #1 0x55a504b7f17e in sqfs_search_dir fs/squashfs/sqfs.c:489 #2 0x55a504b80ffb in sqfs_opendir_nest fs/squashfs/sqfs.c:977 #3 0x55a504b426e9 in fs_opendir fs/fs.c:669 #4 0x55a504b42a6d in fs_ls_generic fs/fs.c:66 #5 0x55a504b42dc8 in fs_ls fs/fs.c:537 #6 0x55a504b42dc8 in do_ls fs/fs.c:881 #7 0x55a504b42dc8 in do_ls.isra.0 fs/fs.c:870 #8 0x55a504a0eb40 in cmd_call common/command.c:582 #9 0x55a504a0eb40 in cmd_process common/command.c:637 #10 0x55a5049f00c4 in run_pipe_real common/cli_hush.c:1672 #11 0x55a5049f00c4 in run_list_real common/cli_hush.c:1868 #12 0x55a5049f0800 in run_list common/cli_hush.c:2017 #13 0x55a5049f0800 in parse_stream_outer common/cli_hush.c:3207 #14 0x55a50492efcc in parse_file_outer common/cli_hush.c:3299 #15 0x55a50492efcc in cli_loop common/cli.c:306 #16 0x55a50492efcc in main_loop common/main.c:86 #17 0x55a50492efcc in run_main_loop common/board_r.c:584 #18 0x55a50492efcc in initcall_run_r common/board_r.c:776 #19 0x55a50492efcc in board_init_r common/board_r.c:806 #20 0x55a50492efcc in sandbox_main arch/sandbox/cpu/start.c:584 #21 0x7f60aa6276c0 (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x276c0) (BuildId: ca0db5ab57a36507d61bbcf4988d344974331f19) #22 0x7f60aa6277f8 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x277f8) (BuildId: ca0db5ab57a36507d61bbcf4988d344974331f19) #23 0x55a50491e414 in _start (/usr/src/u-boot/u-boot+0x285414) (BuildId: 964ae5120238bc46d7af63402fa25331ca86b3b4) ==122741==Register values: rax = 0x00000000670e470a rbx = 0x000055a504ef7100 rcx = 0x0000000000020000 rdx = 0x0000000000000000 rdi = 0x0000000000006fd5 rsi = 0x0000000000007abd rbp = 0x0000000019af1280 rsp = 0x00007fff04b3b740 r8 = 0x000000004d5f348a r9 = 0x00000000670e4716 r10 = 0x0000000000000501 r11 = 0x0000000000000001 r12 = 0x0000000000000002 r13 = 0x0000000000000001 r14 = 0x00000000199caa00 r15 = 0x0000000000000001 AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV fs/squashfs/sqfs_inode.c:131 in sqfs_find_inode ```Post-patch, the following behavior is observed:
=> host bind 0 random3.sqfs
=> ls host 0 /
Error while searching inode: unknown type.Signed-off-by Jared Stroud <[email protected]>--- fs/squashfs/sqfs_inode.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)fs/squashfs/sqfs_inode.c +0
-0
fs/squashfs/sqfs_inode.c void *sqfs_find_inode(void *inode_table, int inode_number, __le32 inode_count, · line 140
Quoted 6 lines
fs/squashfs/sqfs_inode.c +3
-0@@ -135,6 +135,9 @@ void *sqfs_find_inode(void *inode_table, int inode_number, __le32 inode_count,if (sz <0 )return NULL ; +if (__builtin_add_overflow (offset, sz, &offset)) +return NULL ; +
I'm a little confused by the fix.
If there's no overflow, we will have offset += sz above (in the __builtin_add_overflow)
fs/squashfs/sqfs_inode.c void *sqfs_find_inode(void *inode_table, int inode_number, __le32 inode_count, · line 141
Quoted 1 line
fs/squashfs/sqfs_inode.c +0
-0offset += sz;
...and again here ^^
So, sz will be added 2 times instead of one.
fs/squashfs/sqfs_inode.c void *sqfs_find_inode(void *inode_table, int inode_number, __le32 inode_count, · line 143
Quoted 2 lines
fs/squashfs/sqfs_inode.c +0
-0}
Regards,
Richard
Hi Richard,
Quoted 5 lines
The commit message should be wrapped between at 75 characters (
the rule can be bent for log messages like the one bellow, but for the description, it's the preferred way) You can usescripts/checkpatch.plto help you with.
Understood!
Quoted 10 lines
I'm a little confused by the fix.
If there's no overflow, we will have offset += sz above (in the__builtin_add_overflow)Quoted 3 lines
offset += sz;
...and again here ^^
So, sz will be added 2 times instead of one.
I mistakenly thought __builtin_add_overflow just performed the check. Upon fixing this on my end, I'm still crashing.
I'll dig into this and follow up in a day or so.
Quoted 91 lines · Richard GENOUD
Hi Jared,
Le 28/04/2026 à 02:31, Jared Stroud a écrit :
Quoted 7 lines
While fuzzing attributes of the
squashfs_reg_inodestructure, if thefile_sizeattribute is a large value,
&base->inode_numberwithin thesqfs_find_inodefunction will jump to an arbitrary location in memory resulting in a invalid memory access and crash.
This bug is similar to CVE-2024-57254 in that memory operations are occurring based on inode values. I applied a similar fixed via the commmitc8e929e5758999933f9e905049ef2bf3fe6b140d.The commit message should be wrapped between at 75 characters (the rule can be bent for log messages like the one bellow, but for the description, it's the preferred way) You can use
scripts/checkpatch.plto help you with.Quoted 57 lines
Prior to the fix, the bug was triggered via the following commands from
the U-Boot shell:``` => host bind 0 random3.sqfs => ls host 0 / AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==122741==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x0000670e4716 (pc 0x55a504b86ea6 bp 0x000019af1280 sp 0x7fff04b3b740 T0) ==122741==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x55a504b86ea6 in sqfs_find_inode fs/squashfs/sqfs_inode.c:131 #1 0x55a504b7f17e in sqfs_search_dir fs/squashfs/sqfs.c:489 #2 0x55a504b80ffb in sqfs_opendir_nest fs/squashfs/sqfs.c:977 #3 0x55a504b426e9 in fs_opendir fs/fs.c:669 #4 0x55a504b42a6d in fs_ls_generic fs/fs.c:66 #5 0x55a504b42dc8 in fs_ls fs/fs.c:537 #6 0x55a504b42dc8 in do_ls fs/fs.c:881 #7 0x55a504b42dc8 in do_ls.isra.0 fs/fs.c:870 #8 0x55a504a0eb40 in cmd_call common/command.c:582 #9 0x55a504a0eb40 in cmd_process common/command.c:637 #10 0x55a5049f00c4 in run_pipe_real common/cli_hush.c:1672 #11 0x55a5049f00c4 in run_list_real common/cli_hush.c:1868 #12 0x55a5049f0800 in run_list common/cli_hush.c:2017 #13 0x55a5049f0800 in parse_stream_outer common/cli_hush.c:3207 #14 0x55a50492efcc in parse_file_outer common/cli_hush.c:3299 #15 0x55a50492efcc in cli_loop common/cli.c:306 #16 0x55a50492efcc in main_loop common/main.c:86 #17 0x55a50492efcc in run_main_loop common/board_r.c:584 #18 0x55a50492efcc in initcall_run_r common/board_r.c:776 #19 0x55a50492efcc in board_init_r common/board_r.c:806 #20 0x55a50492efcc in sandbox_main arch/sandbox/cpu/start.c:584 #21 0x7f60aa6276c0 (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x276c0) (BuildId: ca0db5ab57a36507d61bbcf4988d344974331f19) #22 0x7f60aa6277f8 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x277f8) (BuildId: ca0db5ab57a36507d61bbcf4988d344974331f19) #23 0x55a50491e414 in _start (/usr/src/u-boot/u-boot+0x285414) (BuildId: 964ae5120238bc46d7af63402fa25331ca86b3b4) ==122741==Register values: rax = 0x00000000670e470a rbx = 0x000055a504ef7100 rcx = 0x0000000000020000 rdx = 0x0000000000000000 rdi = 0x0000000000006fd5 rsi = 0x0000000000007abd rbp = 0x0000000019af1280 rsp = 0x00007fff04b3b740 r8 = 0x000000004d5f348a r9 = 0x00000000670e4716 r10 = 0x0000000000000501 r11 = 0x0000000000000001 r12 = 0x0000000000000002 r13 = 0x0000000000000001 r14 = 0x00000000199caa00 r15 = 0x0000000000000001 AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV fs/squashfs/sqfs_inode.c:131 in sqfs_find_inode ```Quoted 1 line
Post-patch, the following behavior is observed:
=> host bind 0 random3.sqfs
=> ls host 0 /
Error while searching inode: unknown type.Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by Jared Stroud <[email protected]>---
fs/squashfs/sqfs_inode.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)diff --git
a/fs/squashfs/sqfs_inode.cb/fs/squashfs/sqfs_inode.c
indexce9a8ff8e2a..d2efc07c78e100644
---a/fs/squashfs/sqfs_inode.c
+++b/fs/squashfs/sqfs_inode.c
@@ -135,6 +135,9 @@ void *sqfs_find_inode(void*inode_table, intinode_number,__le32inode_count, if (sz < 0)
return NULL;Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
+ if (
__builtin_add_overflow(offset, sz, &offset))+ return NULL;
+I'm a little confused by the fix.
If there's no overflow, we will have offset += sz above (in the__builtin_add_overflow)Quoted 3 lines
offset += sz;
...and again here ^^
So, sz will be added 2 times instead of one.Quoted 3 lines
}
Regards,
Richard