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net: phonet: fix BUG_ON() in pn_socket_autobind()

PATCH In review Deepanshu Kartikey 3 participants 4 messages Apr 22 – Apr 28

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 net: phonet: fix BUG_ON() in pn_socket_autobind()

pn_socket_autobind() calls pn_socket_bind() and treats -EINVAL as a signal that the socket was already bound, then uses BUG_ON() to verify it:

    if (err != -EINVAL)
        return err;
    BUG_ON(!pn_port(pn_sk(sock->sk)->sobject));

However, pn_socket_bind() returns -EINVAL in multiple cases:

1. address length too short
2. socket not in TCP_CLOSE state
3. socket already bound <- only intended case

When -EINVAL comes from cases 1 or 2, sobject is still zero (never assigned), causing BUG_ON to fire and crash the kernel.

Fix this by checking the bound state directly via pn_port(sobject) BEFORE calling pn_socket_bind(), eliminating the ambiguous -EINVAL interpretation entirely.

---
 net/phonet/socket.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/phonet/socket.c +4 -4
index c4af26357144..5a55e7d14e85 100644
@@ -204,14 +204,14 @@ static int pn_socket_autobind(struct socket *sock)
 	struct sockaddr_pn sa;
 	int err;
 
+	if (pn_port(pn_sk(sock->sk)->sobject))
+		return 0; /* socket was already bound */
+
 	memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
 	sa.spn_family = AF_PHONET;
 	err = pn_socket_bind(sock, (struct sockaddr_unsized *)&sa,
 			     sizeof(struct sockaddr_pn));
-	if (err != -EINVAL)
-		return err;
-	BUG_ON(!pn_port(pn_sk(sock->sk)->sobject));
-	return 0; /* socket was already bound */
+	return err;
 }
 
 static int pn_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_unsized *addr,
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#1 lore raw

Hi,

Quoted 36 lines · Le keskiviikkona 22. huhtikuuta 2026, 5.15.33 Itä-Euroopan kesäaika Deepanshu…

pn_socket_autobind() calls pn_socket_bind() and treats -EINVAL as a signal that the socket was already bound, then uses BUG_ON() to verify it:

    if (err != -EINVAL)
        return err;
    BUG_ON(!pn_port(pn_sk(sock->sk)->sobject));

However, pn_socket_bind() returns -EINVAL in multiple cases:

1. address length too short
2. socket not in TCP_CLOSE state
3. socket already bound <- only intended case

When -EINVAL comes from cases 1 or 2, sobject is still zero (never assigned), causing BUG_ON to fire and crash the kernel.

Fix this by checking the bound state directly via pn_port(sobject) BEFORE calling pn_socket_bind(), eliminating the ambiguous -EINVAL interpretation entirely.

---
 net/phonet/socket.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/phonet/socket.c +0 -0
index c4af26357144..5a55e7d14e85 100644

net/phonet/socket.c static int pn_socket_autobind(struct socket *sock) · line 209

Quoted 6 lines
net/phonet/socket.c +3 -0
@@ -204,14 +204,14 @@ static int pn_socket_autobind(struct socket *sock)
 	struct sockaddr_pn sa;
 	int err;
 
+	if (pn_port(pn_sk(sock->sk)->sobject))
+		return 0; /* socket was already bound */
+

This was almost 20 years ago, but IIRC, we did not do it that way back then because it results in a data race on sobject if another task binds the socket in parallel.

Quoted 13 lines
net/phonet/socket.c +1 -4
 	memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
 	sa.spn_family = AF_PHONET;
 	err = pn_socket_bind(sock, (struct sockaddr_unsized *)&sa,
 			     sizeof(struct sockaddr_pn));
-	if (err != -EINVAL)
-		return err;
-	BUG_ON(!pn_port(pn_sk(sock->sk)->sobject));
-	return 0; /* socket was already bound */
+	return err;
 }
 
 static int pn_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_unsized

*addr,

Signature · 2 lines
德尼-库尔蒙‧雷米
https://www.remlab.net/
maintainer
#2 lore raw
In reply to Deepanshu Kartikey

This is an AI-generated review of your patch. The human sending this email has considered the AI review valid, or at least plausible.

For local reproduction steps see https://netdev-ai.bots.linux.dev/ai-local.html
---
net: phonet: fix BUG_ON() in pn_socket_autobind()

This commit fixes a kernel crash in pn_socket_autobind() by checking the socket's bound state directly before calling pn_socket_bind(), eliminating ambiguous -EINVAL interpretation.

Quoted 4 lines

pn_socket_autobind() calls pn_socket_bind() and treats -EINVAL as a signal that the socket was already bound, then uses BUG_ON() to verify it:

Quoted 8 lines
    if (err != -EINVAL)
        return err;
    BUG_ON(!pn_port(pn_sk(sock->sk)->sobject));

However, pn_socket_bind() returns -EINVAL in multiple cases:

1. address length too short

The commit message lists "address length too short" as a cause of the BUG_ON crash, but is this accurate?

Looking at pn_socket_autobind(), it always passes len=sizeof(struct sockaddr_pn) to pn_socket_bind():

err = pn_socket_bind(sock, (struct sockaddr_unsized *)&sa,
sizeof(struct sockaddr_pn));

While pn_socket_bind() does have this check:

if (len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_pn))
return -EINVAL;

This case cannot be triggered through pn_socket_autobind() since it always passes the correct length. The BUG_ON is only reachable through pn_socket_autobind(), so listing this as a cause seems misleading.

Should the commit message be updated to remove case 1, or clarify that it's describing pn_socket_bind() in general rather than paths that can trigger the BUG_ON?

Quoted 1 line

2. socket not in TCP_CLOSE state

Can case 2 (socket not in TCP_CLOSE state) actually trigger the BUG_ON crash with sobject still zero?

The combined check in pn_socket_bind() is:

    if (sk->sk_state != TCP_CLOSE || pn_port(pn->sobject)) {
        err = -EINVAL;
        goto out;
    }

For the BUG_ON to fire, we need sk_state != TCP_CLOSE while sobject remains zero (unbound). Looking at phonet state transitions:

- pn_socket_connect() binds the socket before changing state
- pn_socket_listen() binds the socket before changing state
- pep_sock_accept() creates sockets with state=TCP_SYN_RECV but also sets sobject
- pep_ioctl(SIOCPNENABLEPIPE) checks sobject before changing state

Is there a code path that changes sk_state to non-TCP_CLOSE without first binding the socket? The syzbot crash is real, but the mechanism described couldn't be verified. Could this involve a race condition or a different code path?

Quoted 5 lines

3. socket already bound <- only intended case

When -EINVAL comes from cases 1 or 2, sobject is still zero (never assigned), causing BUG_ON to fire and crash the kernel.

Given the issues with cases 1 and 2 above, is the explanation of the crash mechanism accurate? Case 1 cannot happen from pn_socket_autobind(), and case 2's ability to leave sobject at zero while triggering -EINVAL could not be verified.

The syzbot crash is confirmed (RIP at pn_socket_autobind net/phonet/socket.c:213 via pn_socket_sendmsg), but could the commit message more accurately describe how the crash actually occurs?

Quoted 11 lines
net/phonet/socket.c +3 -0
index c4af26357144..5a55e7d14e85 100644
@@ -204,14 +204,14 @@ static int pn_socket_autobind(struct socket *sock)
 	struct sockaddr_pn sa;
 	int err;
 
+	if (pn_port(pn_sk(sock->sk)->sobject))
+		return 0; /* socket was already bound */
+

net/phonet/socket.c static int pn_socket_autobind(struct socket *sock) · line 215

Quoted 10 lines
net/phonet/socket.c +1 -4
 	memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
 	sa.spn_family = AF_PHONET;
 	err = pn_socket_bind(sock, (struct sockaddr_unsized *)&sa,
 			     sizeof(struct sockaddr_pn));
-	if (err != -EINVAL)
-		return err;
-	BUG_ON(!pn_port(pn_sk(sock->sk)->sobject));
-	return 0; /* socket was already bound */
+	return err;
 }

The fix itself is correct and removes the dangerous BUG_ON(). However, the pn_port(sobject) check is performed without holding any lock. Could a concurrent pn_socket_bind() race with this check? This is likely benign since pn_socket_bind() re-checks under lock_sock(), but is this the intended behavior?

Signature · 1 line
pw-bot: cr
#3 lore raw
Quoted 112 lines · Jakub Kicinski

This is an AI-generated review of your patch. The human sending this email has considered the AI review valid, or at least plausible.

For local reproduction steps see https://netdev-ai.bots.linux.dev/ai-local.html
---
net: phonet: fix BUG_ON() in pn_socket_autobind()

This commit fixes a kernel crash in pn_socket_autobind() by checking the socket's bound state directly before calling pn_socket_bind(), eliminating ambiguous -EINVAL interpretation.

Quoted 4 lines

pn_socket_autobind() calls pn_socket_bind() and treats -EINVAL as a signal that the socket was already bound, then uses BUG_ON() to verify it:

Quoted 8 lines
    if (err != -EINVAL)
        return err;
    BUG_ON(!pn_port(pn_sk(sock->sk)->sobject));

However, pn_socket_bind() returns -EINVAL in multiple cases:

1. address length too short

The commit message lists "address length too short" as a cause of the BUG_ON crash, but is this accurate?

Looking at pn_socket_autobind(), it always passes len=sizeof(struct sockaddr_pn) to pn_socket_bind():

err = pn_socket_bind(sock, (struct sockaddr_unsized *)&sa,
sizeof(struct sockaddr_pn));

While pn_socket_bind() does have this check:

if (len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_pn))
return -EINVAL;

This case cannot be triggered through pn_socket_autobind() since it always passes the correct length. The BUG_ON is only reachable through pn_socket_autobind(), so listing this as a cause seems misleading.

Should the commit message be updated to remove case 1, or clarify that it's describing pn_socket_bind() in general rather than paths that can trigger the BUG_ON?

Quoted 1 line

2. socket not in TCP_CLOSE state

Can case 2 (socket not in TCP_CLOSE state) actually trigger the BUG_ON crash with sobject still zero?

The combined check in pn_socket_bind() is:

    if (sk->sk_state != TCP_CLOSE || pn_port(pn->sobject)) {
        err = -EINVAL;
        goto out;
    }

For the BUG_ON to fire, we need sk_state != TCP_CLOSE while sobject remains zero (unbound). Looking at phonet state transitions:

- pn_socket_connect() binds the socket before changing state
- pn_socket_listen() binds the socket before changing state
- pep_sock_accept() creates sockets with state=TCP_SYN_RECV but also sets sobject
- pep_ioctl(SIOCPNENABLEPIPE) checks sobject before changing state

Is there a code path that changes sk_state to non-TCP_CLOSE without first binding the socket? The syzbot crash is real, but the mechanism described couldn't be verified. Could this involve a race condition or a different code path?

Quoted 5 lines

3. socket already bound <- only intended case

When -EINVAL comes from cases 1 or 2, sobject is still zero (never assigned), causing BUG_ON to fire and crash the kernel.

Given the issues with cases 1 and 2 above, is the explanation of the crash mechanism accurate? Case 1 cannot happen from pn_socket_autobind(), and case 2's ability to leave sobject at zero while triggering -EINVAL could not be verified.

The syzbot crash is confirmed (RIP at pn_socket_autobind net/phonet/socket.c:213 via pn_socket_sendmsg), but could the commit message more accurately describe how the crash actually occurs?

Quoted 11 lines
net/phonet/socket.c +3 -0
index c4af26357144..5a55e7d14e85 100644
@@ -204,14 +204,14 @@ static int pn_socket_autobind(struct socket *sock)
      struct sockaddr_pn sa;
      int err;
 
+     if (pn_port(pn_sk(sock->sk)->sobject))
+             return 0; /* socket was already bound */
+

net/phonet/socket.c static int pn_socket_autobind(struct socket *sock) · line 215

Quoted 10 lines
net/phonet/socket.c +1 -4
      memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
      sa.spn_family = AF_PHONET;
      err = pn_socket_bind(sock, (struct sockaddr_unsized *)&sa,
                           sizeof(struct sockaddr_pn));
-     if (err != -EINVAL)
-             return err;
-     BUG_ON(!pn_port(pn_sk(sock->sk)->sobject));
-     return 0; /* socket was already bound */
+     return err;
 }
Quoted 7 lines

The fix itself is correct and removes the dangerous BUG_ON(). However, the pn_port(sobject) check is performed without holding any lock. Could a concurrent pn_socket_bind() race with this check? This is likely benign since pn_socket_bind() re-checks under lock_sock(), but is this the intended behavior?
--
pw-bot: cr

Hi Jakub,

Thank you for the detailed review!

You are correct on all three points. Let me address each one:

1. Case 1 ("address length too short") is indeed impossible from pn_socket_autobind() since it always passes sizeof(struct sockaddr_pn). I will remove this from the commit message in v2.

2. Regarding case 2 (sk_state != TCP_CLOSE with sobject == 0), I verified this using the syzbot C reproducer. The exact path is:

r0 = socket$kcm(AF_KCM, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0)
listen(r0, ...)
→ sk_state = TCP_LISTEN, sobject = 0

r3 = accept4(r0, ...)
→ creates NEW socket r3
→ sk_state = TCP_SYN_RECV (not TCP_CLOSE!)
→ sobject = 0 (never bound!)

sendmsg(r3)
→ pn_socket_autobind(r3)
→ pn_socket_bind() sees sk_state != TCP_CLOSE
while sobject is still 0
→ returns -EINVAL
→ BUG_ON fires!

sobject is only set in two places:
a. successful pn_socket_bind() → get_port() assigns port
b. pep_sock_accept() → copied from request

Since r3 comes from accept4() on a KCM socket (not a PEP phonet socket), pep_sock_accept() is never called and sobject stays zero. So sk_state != TCP_CLOSE and sobject == 0 can indeed be true simultaneously.

3. Regarding the missing lock: the check:

     if (pn_port(pn_sk(sock->sk)->sobject))
             return 0;

is performed without lock_sock(). A concurrent
pn_socket_bind() could race with this read.
However since pn_socket_bind() re-checks
pn_port(sobject) under lock_sock(), any racing
bind would be caught there. So the race is
benign. I can add a comment clarifying this
if desired.

I will send a v2 with an updated commit message
reflecting the above.

Thanks,
Deepanshu Kartikey