ocfs2: validate inline xattr header before listxattr walks it
PATCH 1/1 ocfs2: validate inline xattr header before listxattr walks it
[BUG]listxattr() can walk off the end of a dinode block when the inode-body xattr header is corrupted:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_xattr_list_entry+0x1bd/0x370 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:918 Read of size 13 at addr ffff88800ab5c0c0 by task syz.0.1231/3756 Call Trace: ... ocfs2_xattr_list_entry+0x1bd/0x370 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:918 ocfs2_xattr_list_entries+0x1e1/0x320 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:938 ocfs2_xattr_ibody_list fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:982 [inline] ocfs2_listxattr+0x4fb/0x980 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:1044 vfs_listxattr+0xb4/0x120 fs/xattr.c:493 listxattr+0x76/0x170 fs/xattr.c:924 filename_listxattr fs/xattr.c:958 [inline] path_listxattrat+0x137/0x320 fs/xattr.c:988 __do_sys_listxattr fs/xattr.c:1001 [inline] ...
[CAUSE]ocfs2_xattr_ibody_list() computes the inline xattr header from di->i_xattr_inline_size and passes it straight to ocfs2_xattr_list_entries(). If corruption inflates xh_count, the list walk steps past the inline xattr area and eventually past the end of the 4K dinode block. The xe_type load in ocfs2_xattr_get_type() then reads poisoned memory.
[FIX]
Validate di->i_xattr_inline_size before locating the header, then bound xh_count by the number of ocfs2_xattr_entry records that fit inside the claimed inline area. Reject corrupted metadata with ocfs2_error() and -EFSCORRUPTED instead of iterating past the dinode block.
--- fs/ocfs2/xattr.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
fs/ocfs2/xattr.c +0 -0
@@static int ocfs2_xattr_ibody_list (struct inode *inode,struct ocfs2_dinode *di,char *buffer,size_t buffer_size) {struct ocfs2_xattr_header *header =NULL ;struct ocfs2_inode_info *oi =OCFS2_I (inode);int ret =0 ; +u16 xattr_count; +size_t max_entries; +u16 inline_size;if (!(oi->ip_dyn_features &OCFS2_INLINE_XATTR_FL ))return ret; + inline_size =le16_to_cpu (di->i_xattr_inline_size); + +if (inline_size > inode->i_sb->s_blocksize || + inline_size <sizeof (struct ocfs2_xattr_header )) { +ocfs2_error (inode->i_sb, +"Invalid xattr inline size %u in inode %llu\n" , + inline_size, + (unsigned long long )OCFS2_I (inode)->ip_blkno); +return -EFSCORRUPTED ; + } + header = (struct ocfs2_xattr_header *) ((void *)di + inode->i_sb->s_blocksize - -le16_to_cpu (di->i_xattr_inline_size)); + inline_size); + + xattr_count =le16_to_cpu (header->xh_count); + max_entries = (inline_size -sizeof (struct ocfs2_xattr_header )) / +sizeof (struct ocfs2_xattr_entry ); +if (xattr_count > max_entries) { +ocfs2_error (inode->i_sb, +"Invalid xattr entry count %u (max %zu) in inode %llu\n" , + xattr_count, max_entries, + (unsigned long long )OCFS2_I (inode)->ip_blkno); +return -EFSCORRUPTED ; + } ret =ocfs2_xattr_list_entries (inode, header, buffer, buffer_size);return ret; } --
2.43.0
Quoted 91 lines · ZhengYuan Huang
[BUG]
listxattr()can walk off the end of a dinode block when the inode-body xattr header is corrupted:BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_xattr_list_entry+0x1bd/0x370 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:918 Read of size 13 at addr ffff88800ab5c0c0 by task syz.0.1231/3756 Call Trace: ... ocfs2_xattr_list_entry+0x1bd/0x370 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:918 ocfs2_xattr_list_entries+0x1e1/0x320 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:938 ocfs2_xattr_ibody_list fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:982 [inline] ocfs2_listxattr+0x4fb/0x980 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:1044 vfs_listxattr+0xb4/0x120 fs/xattr.c:493 listxattr+0x76/0x170 fs/xattr.c:924 filename_listxattr fs/xattr.c:958 [inline] path_listxattrat+0x137/0x320 fs/xattr.c:988 __do_sys_listxattr fs/xattr.c:1001 [inline] ...[CAUSE]
ocfs2_xattr_ibody_list()computes the inline xattr header fromdi->i_xattr_inline_sizeand passes it straight toocfs2_xattr_list_entries(). If corruption inflatesxh_count, the list walk steps past the inline xattr area and eventually past the end of the 4K dinode block. Thexe_typeload inocfs2_xattr_get_type()then reads poisoned memory.[FIX]
Validatedi->i_xattr_inline_sizebefore locating the header, then boundxh_countby the number ofocfs2_xattr_entryrecords that fit inside the claimed inline area. Reject corrupted metadata withocfs2_error()and-EFSCORRUPTEDinstead of iterating past the dinode block.Signed-off-by ZhengYuan Huang <[email protected]>--- fs/ocfs2/xattr.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)fs/ocfs2/xattr.c +0
-0@@
static int ocfs2_xattr_ibody_list(struct inode *inode,
structocfs2_dinode*di, char *buffer,size_tbuffer_size){ struct ocfs2_xattr_header *header = NULL; struct ocfs2_inode_info *oi = OCFS2_I(inode); int ret = 0;fs/ocfs2/xattr.c +26
-2+u16 xattr_count; +size_t max_entries; +u16 inline_size;if (!(oi->ip_dyn_features &OCFS2_INLINE_XATTR_FL ))return ret; + inline_size =le16_to_cpu (di->i_xattr_inline_size); + +if (inline_size > inode->i_sb->s_blocksize || + inline_size <sizeof (struct ocfs2_xattr_header )) { +ocfs2_error (inode->i_sb, +"Invalid xattr inline size %u in inode %llu\n" , + inline_size, + (unsigned long long )OCFS2_I (inode)->ip_blkno); +return -EFSCORRUPTED ; + } + header = (struct ocfs2_xattr_header *) ((void *)di + inode->i_sb->s_blocksize - -le16_to_cpu (di->i_xattr_inline_size)); + inline_size); + + xattr_count =le16_to_cpu (header->xh_count); + max_entries = (inline_size -sizeof (struct ocfs2_xattr_header )) / +sizeof (struct ocfs2_xattr_entry ); +if (xattr_count > max_entries) { +ocfs2_error (inode->i_sb, +"Invalid xattr entry count %u (max %zu) in inode %llu\n" , + xattr_count, max_entries, + (unsigned long long )OCFS2_I (inode)->ip_blkno); +return -EFSCORRUPTED ; + } ret =ocfs2_xattr_list_entries (inode, header, buffer, buffer_size);return ret; } --
Quoted 1 line
2.43.0
This bug has already been fixed by commit 2a4f33430e96. Sorry for the noise.
Thanks,
ZhengYuan Huang