audit: fix potential integer overflow in audit_log_n_hex()
PATCH 1/1 audit: fix potential integer overflow in audit_log_n_hex()
The function audit_log_n_hex() calculates new_len as len << 1 to account for hex encoding, where each byte becomes two characters. However, when len is passed as size_t but new_len was declared as int, this could lead to integer overflow for large values of len.
Additionally, the bit shift operation itself could overflow if len exceeds SIZE_MAX / 2, leading to incorrect buffer size calculations and potential memory corruption.
Fix this by changing new_len and loop counter i from int to size_t to match the len parameter type, preventing signed/unsigned mismatches, and by adding an overflow check before the bit shift operation that calculates len << 1.
--- kernel/audit.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/audit.c +8 -2
@@ -2076,7 +2076,8 @@ void audit_log_format(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt, ...)void audit_log_n_hex (struct audit_buffer *ab,const unsigned char *buf,size_t len) { -int i, avail, new_len; +int avail; +size_t i, new_len;unsigned char *ptr;struct sk_buff *skb;
@@ -2084,9 +2085,14 @@ void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf,return ;BUG_ON (!ab->skb); + +/* prevent new_len overflow */ +if (len >SIZE_MAX /2 ) +return ; + skb = ab->skb; avail =skb_tailroom (skb); - new_len = len<<1 ; + new_len = len <<1 ;if (new_len >= avail) {/* Round the buffer request up to the next multiple */ new_len =AUDIT_BUFSIZ *(((new_len-avail)/AUDIT_BUFSIZ ) +1 );
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Paul Moore
maintainerQuoted 41 lines · On May 13, 2026 Ricardo Robaina <[email protected]> wrote:
The function
audit_log_n_hex()calculatesnew_lenas len << 1 to account for hex encoding, where each byte becomes two characters. However, when len is passed assize_tbutnew_lenwas declared as int, this could lead to integer overflow for large values of len.Additionally, the bit shift operation itself could overflow if len exceeds
SIZE_MAX/ 2, leading to incorrect buffer size calculations and potential memory corruption.Fix this by changing
new_lenand loop counter i from int tosize_tto match the len parameter type, preventing signed/unsigned mismatches, and by adding an overflow check before the bit shift operation that calculates len << 1.Fixes 168b7173959f ("AUDIT: Clean up logging of untrusted strings")Signed-off-by Ricardo Robaina <[email protected]>--- kernel/audit.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)kernel/audit.c +4
-1@@ -2076,7 +2076,8 @@ void audit_log_format(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt, ...)void audit_log_n_hex (struct audit_buffer *ab,const unsigned char *buf,size_t len) { -int i, avail, new_len; +int avail; +size_t i, new_len;unsigned char *ptr;struct sk_buff *skb;@@ -2084,9 +2085,14 @@ void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf,return ;BUG_ON (!ab->skb); + +/* prevent new_len overflow */
kernel/audit.c void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf, · line 2098
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/audit.c +4
-1+if (len >SIZE_MAX /2 ) +return ; + skb = ab->skb; avail =skb_tailroom (skb); - new_len = len<<1 ; + new_len = len <<1 ;if (new_len >= avail) {/* Round the buffer request up to the next multiple */ new_len =AUDIT_BUFSIZ *(((new_len-avail)/AUDIT_BUFSIZ ) +1 );
I might suggest using check_shl_overflow() instead, mostly because it helps document a shift that could potentially overflow.
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paul-moore.com
Quoted 57 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 41 lines · On May 13, 2026 Ricardo Robaina <[email protected]> wrote:
The function
audit_log_n_hex()calculatesnew_lenas len << 1 to account for hex encoding, where each byte becomes two characters. However, when len is passed assize_tbutnew_lenwas declared as int, this could lead to integer overflow for large values of len.Additionally, the bit shift operation itself could overflow if len exceeds
SIZE_MAX/ 2, leading to incorrect buffer size calculations and potential memory corruption.Fix this by changing
new_lenand loop counter i from int tosize_tto match the len parameter type, preventing signed/unsigned mismatches, and by adding an overflow check before the bit shift operation that calculates len << 1.Fixes 168b7173959f ("AUDIT: Clean up logging of untrusted strings")Signed-off-by Ricardo Robaina <[email protected]>--- kernel/audit.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)kernel/audit.c +4
-1@@ -2076,7 +2076,8 @@ void audit_log_format(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt, ...)void audit_log_n_hex (struct audit_buffer *ab,const unsigned char *buf,size_t len) { -int i, avail, new_len; +int avail; +size_t i, new_len;unsigned char *ptr;struct sk_buff *skb;@@ -2084,9 +2085,14 @@ void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf,return ;BUG_ON (!ab->skb); + +/* prevent new_len overflow */ kernel/audit.c void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf, · line 2098
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/audit.c +4
-1+if (len >SIZE_MAX /2 ) +return ; + skb = ab->skb; avail =skb_tailroom (skb); - new_len = len<<1 ; + new_len = len <<1 ;if (new_len >= avail) {/* Round the buffer request up to the next multiple */ new_len =AUDIT_BUFSIZ *(((new_len-avail)/AUDIT_BUFSIZ ) +1 );I might suggest using
check_shl_overflow()instead, mostly because it helps document a shift that could potentially overflow.
Quoted 3 lines
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paul-moore.com
Thanks for reviewing this patch, Paul. Sounds like a good idea, I'll work on a v2 shortly.
-Ricardo