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6.12.91-rc1 review

PATCH In review Greg Kroah-Hartman 14 participants 691 messages May 20 – May 27 Page 5 of 6

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#482 lore raw

PATCH 469/666 netfilter: conntrack: remove sprintf usage

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6e7066bdb481a87fe88c4fa563e348c03b2d373d ]

Replace it with scnprintf, the buffer sizes are expected to be large enough to hold the result, no need for snprintf+overflow check.

Increase buffer size in mangle_content_len() while at it.

BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in vsnprintf+0xea5/0x1270
Write of size 1 at addr [..]
 vsnprintf+0xea5/0x1270
 sprintf+0xb1/0xe0
 mangle_content_len+0x1ac/0x280
 nf_nat_sdp_session+0x1cc/0x240
 process_sdp+0x8f8/0xb80
 process_invite_request+0x108/0x2b0
 process_sip_msg+0x5da/0xf50
 sip_help_tcp+0x45e/0x780
 nf_confirm+0x34d/0x990
 [..]
Fixes 9fafcd7b2032 ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack/nf_nat: add SIP helper port")
---
 net/netfilter/nf_nat_amanda.c |  2 +-
 net/netfilter/nf_nat_sip.c    | 33 ++++++++++++++++++---------------
 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nf_nat_amanda.c +1 -1
index 98deef6cde694..8f1054920a857 100644
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static unsigned int help(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		return NF_DROP;
 	}
 
-	sprintf(buffer, "%u", port);
+	snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%u", port);
 	if (!nf_nat_mangle_udp_packet(skb, exp->master, ctinfo,
 				      protoff, matchoff, matchlen,
 				      buffer, strlen(buffer))) {
net/netfilter/nf_nat_sip.c +18 -15
index cf4aeb299bdef..c845b6d1a2bdf 100644
@@ -68,25 +68,27 @@ static unsigned int mangle_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff,
 }
 
 static int sip_sprintf_addr(const struct nf_conn *ct, char *buffer,
+			    size_t size,
 			    const union nf_inet_addr *addr, bool delim)
 {
 	if (nf_ct_l3num(ct) == NFPROTO_IPV4)
-		return sprintf(buffer, "%pI4", &addr->ip);
+		return scnprintf(buffer, size, "%pI4", &addr->ip);
 	else {
 		if (delim)
-			return sprintf(buffer, "[%pI6c]", &addr->ip6);
+			return scnprintf(buffer, size, "[%pI6c]", &addr->ip6);
 		else
-			return sprintf(buffer, "%pI6c", &addr->ip6);
+			return scnprintf(buffer, size, "%pI6c", &addr->ip6);
 	}
 }
 
 static int sip_sprintf_addr_port(const struct nf_conn *ct, char *buffer,
+				 size_t size,
 				 const union nf_inet_addr *addr, u16 port)
 {
 	if (nf_ct_l3num(ct) == NFPROTO_IPV4)
-		return sprintf(buffer, "%pI4:%u", &addr->ip, port);
+		return scnprintf(buffer, size, "%pI4:%u", &addr->ip, port);
 	else
-		return sprintf(buffer, "[%pI6c]:%u", &addr->ip6, port);
+		return scnprintf(buffer, size, "[%pI6c]:%u", &addr->ip6, port);
 }
 
 static int map_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff,
@@ -119,7 +121,7 @@ static int map_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff,
 	if (nf_inet_addr_cmp(&newaddr, addr) && newport == port)
 		return 1;
 
-	buflen = sip_sprintf_addr_port(ct, buffer, &newaddr, ntohs(newport));
+	buflen = sip_sprintf_addr_port(ct, buffer, sizeof(buffer), &newaddr, ntohs(newport));
 	return mangle_packet(skb, protoff, dataoff, dptr, datalen,
 			     matchoff, matchlen, buffer, buflen);
 }
@@ -212,7 +214,7 @@ static unsigned int nf_nat_sip(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff,
 					       &addr, true) > 0 &&
 		    nf_inet_addr_cmp(&addr, &ct->tuplehash[dir].tuple.src.u3) &&
 		    !nf_inet_addr_cmp(&addr, &ct->tuplehash[!dir].tuple.dst.u3)) {
-			buflen = sip_sprintf_addr(ct, buffer,
+			buflen = sip_sprintf_addr(ct, buffer, sizeof(buffer),
 					&ct->tuplehash[!dir].tuple.dst.u3,
 					true);
 			if (!mangle_packet(skb, protoff, dataoff, dptr, datalen,
@@ -229,7 +231,7 @@ static unsigned int nf_nat_sip(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff,
 					       &addr, false) > 0 &&
 		    nf_inet_addr_cmp(&addr, &ct->tuplehash[dir].tuple.dst.u3) &&
 		    !nf_inet_addr_cmp(&addr, &ct->tuplehash[!dir].tuple.src.u3)) {
-			buflen = sip_sprintf_addr(ct, buffer,
+			buflen = sip_sprintf_addr(ct, buffer, sizeof(buffer),
 					&ct->tuplehash[!dir].tuple.src.u3,
 					false);
 			if (!mangle_packet(skb, protoff, dataoff, dptr, datalen,
@@ -247,7 +249,7 @@ static unsigned int nf_nat_sip(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff,
 		    htons(n) == ct->tuplehash[dir].tuple.dst.u.udp.port &&
 		    htons(n) != ct->tuplehash[!dir].tuple.src.u.udp.port) {
 			__be16 p = ct->tuplehash[!dir].tuple.src.u.udp.port;
-			buflen = sprintf(buffer, "%u", ntohs(p));
+			buflen = scnprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%u", ntohs(p));
 			if (!mangle_packet(skb, protoff, dataoff, dptr, datalen,
 					   poff, plen, buffer, buflen)) {
 				nf_ct_helper_log(skb, ct, "cannot mangle rport");
@@ -418,7 +420,8 @@ static unsigned int nf_nat_sip_expect(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff,
 
 	if (!nf_inet_addr_cmp(&exp->tuple.dst.u3, &exp->saved_addr) ||
 	    exp->tuple.dst.u.udp.port != exp->saved_proto.udp.port) {
-		buflen = sip_sprintf_addr_port(ct, buffer, &newaddr, port);
+		buflen = sip_sprintf_addr_port(ct, buffer, sizeof(buffer),
+					       &newaddr, port);
 		if (!mangle_packet(skb, protoff, dataoff, dptr, datalen,
 				   matchoff, matchlen, buffer, buflen)) {
 			nf_ct_helper_log(skb, ct, "cannot mangle packet");
@@ -438,8 +441,8 @@ static int mangle_content_len(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff,
 {
 	enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo;
 	struct nf_conn *ct = nf_ct_get(skb, &ctinfo);
+	char buffer[sizeof("4294967295")];
 	unsigned int matchoff, matchlen;
-	char buffer[sizeof("65536")];
 	int buflen, c_len;
 
 	/* Get actual SDP length */
@@ -454,7 +457,7 @@ static int mangle_content_len(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff,
 			      &matchoff, &matchlen) <= 0)
 		return 0;
 
-	buflen = sprintf(buffer, "%u", c_len);
+	buflen = scnprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%u", c_len);
 	return mangle_packet(skb, protoff, dataoff, dptr, datalen,
 			     matchoff, matchlen, buffer, buflen);
 }
@@ -491,7 +494,7 @@ static unsigned int nf_nat_sdp_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff,
 	char buffer[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
 	unsigned int buflen;
 
-	buflen = sip_sprintf_addr(ct, buffer, addr, false);
+	buflen = sip_sprintf_addr(ct, buffer, sizeof(buffer), addr, false);
 	if (mangle_sdp_packet(skb, protoff, dataoff, dptr, datalen,
 			      sdpoff, type, term, buffer, buflen))
 		return 0;
@@ -509,7 +512,7 @@ static unsigned int nf_nat_sdp_port(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff,
 	char buffer[sizeof("nnnnn")];
 	unsigned int buflen;
 
-	buflen = sprintf(buffer, "%u", port);
+	buflen = scnprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%u", port);
 	if (!mangle_packet(skb, protoff, dataoff, dptr, datalen,
 			   matchoff, matchlen, buffer, buflen))
 		return 0;
@@ -529,7 +532,7 @@ static unsigned int nf_nat_sdp_session(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff
 	unsigned int buflen;
 
 	/* Mangle session description owner and contact addresses */
-	buflen = sip_sprintf_addr(ct, buffer, addr, false);
+	buflen = sip_sprintf_addr(ct, buffer, sizeof(buffer), addr, false);
 	if (mangle_sdp_packet(skb, protoff, dataoff, dptr, datalen, sdpoff,
 			      SDP_HDR_OWNER, SDP_HDR_MEDIA, buffer, buflen))
 		return 0;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#483 lore raw

PATCH 470/666 netfilter: xtables: restrict several matches to inet family

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b6fe26f86a1649f84e057f3f15605b08eda15497 ]

This is a partial revert of:

commit ab4f21e6fb1c ("netfilter: xtables: use NFPROTO_UNSPEC in more extensions")

to allow ipv4 and ipv6 only.

- xt_mac
- xt_owner
- xt_physdev

These extensions are not used by ebtables in userspace.

Moreover, xt_realm is only for ipv4, since dst->tclassid is ipv4 specific.

Fixes ab4f21e6fb1c ("netfilter: xtables: use NFPROTO_UNSPEC in more extensions")
---
 net/netfilter/xt_mac.c     | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 net/netfilter/xt_owner.c   | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 net/netfilter/xt_physdev.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++----------
 net/netfilter/xt_realm.c   |  2 +-
 4 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/xt_mac.c +23 -11
index 81649da57ba5d..bd2354760895d 100644
@@ -38,25 +38,37 @@ static bool mac_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par)
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static struct xt_match mac_mt_reg __read_mostly = {
-	.name      = "mac",
-	.revision  = 0,
-	.family    = NFPROTO_UNSPEC,
-	.match     = mac_mt,
-	.matchsize = sizeof(struct xt_mac_info),
-	.hooks     = (1 << NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING) | (1 << NF_INET_LOCAL_IN) |
-	             (1 << NF_INET_FORWARD),
-	.me        = THIS_MODULE,
+static struct xt_match mac_mt_reg[] __read_mostly = {
+	{
+		.name		= "mac",
+		.family		= NFPROTO_IPV4,
+		.match		= mac_mt,
+		.matchsize	= sizeof(struct xt_mac_info),
+		.hooks		= (1 << NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING) |
+				  (1 << NF_INET_LOCAL_IN) |
+				  (1 << NF_INET_FORWARD),
+		.me		= THIS_MODULE,
+	},
+	{
+		.name		= "mac",
+		.family		= NFPROTO_IPV6,
+		.match		= mac_mt,
+		.matchsize	= sizeof(struct xt_mac_info),
+		.hooks		= (1 << NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING) |
+				  (1 << NF_INET_LOCAL_IN) |
+				  (1 << NF_INET_FORWARD),
+		.me		= THIS_MODULE,
+	},
 };
 
 static int __init mac_mt_init(void)
 {
-	return xt_register_match(&mac_mt_reg);
+	return xt_register_matches(mac_mt_reg, ARRAY_SIZE(mac_mt_reg));
 }
 
 static void __exit mac_mt_exit(void)
 {
-	xt_unregister_match(&mac_mt_reg);
+	xt_unregister_matches(mac_mt_reg, ARRAY_SIZE(mac_mt_reg));
 }
 
 module_init(mac_mt_init);
net/netfilter/xt_owner.c +25 -12
index 50332888c8d23..7be2fe22b067e 100644
@@ -127,26 +127,39 @@ owner_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par)
 	return true;
 }
 
-static struct xt_match owner_mt_reg __read_mostly = {
-	.name       = "owner",
-	.revision   = 1,
-	.family     = NFPROTO_UNSPEC,
-	.checkentry = owner_check,
-	.match      = owner_mt,
-	.matchsize  = sizeof(struct xt_owner_match_info),
-	.hooks      = (1 << NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT) |
-	              (1 << NF_INET_POST_ROUTING),
-	.me         = THIS_MODULE,
+static struct xt_match owner_mt_reg[] __read_mostly = {
+	{
+		.name       = "owner",
+		.revision   = 1,
+		.family     = NFPROTO_IPV4,
+		.checkentry = owner_check,
+		.match      = owner_mt,
+		.matchsize  = sizeof(struct xt_owner_match_info),
+		.hooks      = (1 << NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT) |
+			      (1 << NF_INET_POST_ROUTING),
+		.me         = THIS_MODULE,
+	},
+	{
+		.name       = "owner",
+		.revision   = 1,
+		.family     = NFPROTO_IPV6,
+		.checkentry = owner_check,
+		.match      = owner_mt,
+		.matchsize  = sizeof(struct xt_owner_match_info),
+		.hooks      = (1 << NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT) |
+			      (1 << NF_INET_POST_ROUTING),
+		.me         = THIS_MODULE,
+	}
 };
 
 static int __init owner_mt_init(void)
 {
-	return xt_register_match(&owner_mt_reg);
+	return xt_register_matches(owner_mt_reg, ARRAY_SIZE(owner_mt_reg));
 }
 
 static void __exit owner_mt_exit(void)
 {
-	xt_unregister_match(&owner_mt_reg);
+	xt_unregister_matches(owner_mt_reg, ARRAY_SIZE(owner_mt_reg));
 }
 
 module_init(owner_mt_init);
net/netfilter/xt_physdev.c +19 -10
index 343e65f377d44..130842c35c6fa 100644
@@ -115,24 +115,33 @@ static int physdev_mt_check(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static struct xt_match physdev_mt_reg __read_mostly = {
-	.name       = "physdev",
-	.revision   = 0,
-	.family     = NFPROTO_UNSPEC,
-	.checkentry = physdev_mt_check,
-	.match      = physdev_mt,
-	.matchsize  = sizeof(struct xt_physdev_info),
-	.me         = THIS_MODULE,
+static struct xt_match physdev_mt_reg[] __read_mostly = {
+	{
+		.name		= "physdev",
+		.family		= NFPROTO_IPV4,
+		.checkentry	= physdev_mt_check,
+		.match		= physdev_mt,
+		.matchsize	= sizeof(struct xt_physdev_info),
+		.me		= THIS_MODULE,
+	},
+	{
+		.name		= "physdev",
+		.family		= NFPROTO_IPV6,
+		.checkentry	= physdev_mt_check,
+		.match		= physdev_mt,
+		.matchsize	= sizeof(struct xt_physdev_info),
+		.me		= THIS_MODULE,
+	},
 };
 
 static int __init physdev_mt_init(void)
 {
-	return xt_register_match(&physdev_mt_reg);
+	return xt_register_matches(physdev_mt_reg, ARRAY_SIZE(physdev_mt_reg));
 }
 
 static void __exit physdev_mt_exit(void)
 {
-	xt_unregister_match(&physdev_mt_reg);
+	xt_unregister_matches(physdev_mt_reg, ARRAY_SIZE(physdev_mt_reg));
 }
 
 module_init(physdev_mt_init);
net/netfilter/xt_realm.c +1 -1
index 6df485f4403d0..61b2f1e58d150 100644
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ static struct xt_match realm_mt_reg __read_mostly = {
 	.matchsize	= sizeof(struct xt_realm_info),
 	.hooks		= (1 << NF_INET_POST_ROUTING) | (1 << NF_INET_FORWARD) |
 			  (1 << NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT) | (1 << NF_INET_LOCAL_IN),
-	.family		= NFPROTO_UNSPEC,
+	.family		= NFPROTO_IPV4,
 	.me		= THIS_MODULE
 };
 
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#484 lore raw

PATCH 471/666 ipvs: fix MTU check for GSO packets in tunnel mode

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yingnan Zhang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 67bf42cae41d847fd6e5749eb68278ca5d748b25 ]

Currently, IPVS skips MTU checks for GSO packets by excluding them with the !skb_is_gso(skb) condition. This creates problems when IPVS tunnel mode encapsulates GSO packets with IPIP headers.

The issue manifests in two ways:

1. MTU violation after encapsulation:
When a GSO packet passes through IPVS tunnel mode, the original MTU check is bypassed. After adding the IPIP tunnel header, the packet size may exceed the outgoing interface MTU, leading to unexpected fragmentation at the IP layer.

2. Fragmentation with problematic IP IDs:
When net.ipv4.vs.pmtu_disc=1 and a GSO packet with multiple segments is fragmented after encapsulation, each segment gets a sequentially incremented IP ID (0, 1, 2, ...). This happens because:

a) The GSO packet bypasses MTU check and gets encapsulated
b) At __ip_finish_output, the oversized GSO packet is split into separate SKBs (one per segment), with IP IDs incrementing
c) Each SKB is then fragmented again based on the actual MTU

This sequential IP ID allocation differs from the expected behavior and can cause issues with fragment reassembly and packet tracking.

Fix this by properly validating GSO packets using skb_gso_validate_network_len(). This function correctly validates whether the GSO segments will fit within the MTU after segmentation. If validation fails, send an ICMP Fragmentation Needed message to enable proper PMTU discovery.

Fixes 4cdd34084d53 ("netfilter: nf_conntrack_ipv6: improve fragmentation handling")
---
 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c | 19 +++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c +15 -4
index 8892f261451e9..ed8b2616cf178 100644
@@ -103,6 +103,18 @@ __ip_vs_dst_check(struct ip_vs_dest *dest)
 	return dest_dst;
 }
 
+/* Based on ip_exceeds_mtu(). */
+static bool ip_vs_exceeds_mtu(const struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int mtu)
+{
+	if (skb->len <= mtu)
+		return false;
+
+	if (skb_is_gso(skb) && skb_gso_validate_network_len(skb, mtu))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
 static inline bool
 __mtu_check_toobig_v6(const struct sk_buff *skb, u32 mtu)
 {
@@ -112,10 +124,9 @@ __mtu_check_toobig_v6(const struct sk_buff *skb, u32 mtu)
 		 */
 		if (IP6CB(skb)->frag_max_size > mtu)
 			return true; /* largest fragment violate MTU */
-	}
-	else if (skb->len > mtu && !skb_is_gso(skb)) {
+	} else if (ip_vs_exceeds_mtu(skb, mtu))
 		return true; /* Packet size violate MTU size */
-	}
+
 	return false;
 }
 
@@ -233,7 +244,7 @@ static inline bool ensure_mtu_is_adequate(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, int skb_af,
 			return true;
 
 		if (unlikely(ip_hdr(skb)->frag_off & htons(IP_DF) &&
-			     skb->len > mtu && !skb_is_gso(skb) &&
+			     ip_vs_exceeds_mtu(skb, mtu) &&
 			     !ip_vs_iph_icmp(ipvsh))) {
 			icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED,
 				  htonl(mtu));
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#485 lore raw

PATCH 472/666 netfilter: nfnetlink_osf: fix out-of-bounds read on option matching

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f5ca450087c3baf3651055e7a6de92600f827af3 ]

In nf_osf_match(), the nf_osf_hdr_ctx structure is initialized once and passed by reference to nf_osf_match_one() for each fingerprint checked. During TCP option parsing, nf_osf_match_one() advances the shared ctx->optp pointer.

If a fingerprint perfectly matches, the function returns early without restoring ctx->optp to its initial state. If the user has configured NF_OSF_LOGLEVEL_ALL, the loop continues to the next fingerprint. However, because ctx->optp was not restored, the next call to nf_osf_match_one() starts parsing from the end of the options buffer. This causes subsequent matches to read garbage data and fail immediately, making it impossible to log more than one match or logging incorrect matches.

Instead of using a shared ctx->optp pointer, pass the context as a constant pointer and use a local pointer (optp) for TCP option traversal. This makes nf_osf_match_one() strictly stateless from the caller's perspective, ensuring every fingerprint check starts at the correct option offset.

Fixes 1a6a0951fc00 ("netfilter: nfnetlink_osf: add missing fmatch check")
---
 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c | 19 ++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c +8 -11
index 2305c7d9761eb..832a973c41777 100644
@@ -64,9 +64,9 @@ struct nf_osf_hdr_ctx {
 static bool nf_osf_match_one(const struct sk_buff *skb,
 			     const struct nf_osf_user_finger *f,
 			     int ttl_check,
-			     struct nf_osf_hdr_ctx *ctx)
+			     const struct nf_osf_hdr_ctx *ctx)
 {
-	const __u8 *optpinit = ctx->optp;
+	const __u8 *optp = ctx->optp;
 	unsigned int check_WSS = 0;
 	int fmatch = FMATCH_WRONG;
 	int foptsize, optnum;
@@ -95,17 +95,17 @@ static bool nf_osf_match_one(const struct sk_buff *skb,
 	check_WSS = f->wss.wc;
 
 	for (optnum = 0; optnum < f->opt_num; ++optnum) {
-		if (f->opt[optnum].kind == *ctx->optp) {
+		if (f->opt[optnum].kind == *optp) {
 			__u32 len = f->opt[optnum].length;
-			const __u8 *optend = ctx->optp + len;
+			const __u8 *optend = optp + len;
 
 			fmatch = FMATCH_OK;
 
-			switch (*ctx->optp) {
+			switch (*optp) {
 			case OSFOPT_MSS:
-				mss = ctx->optp[3];
+				mss = optp[3];
 				mss <<= 8;
-				mss |= ctx->optp[2];
+				mss |= optp[2];
 
 				mss = ntohs((__force __be16)mss);
 				break;
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static bool nf_osf_match_one(const struct sk_buff *skb,
 				break;
 			}
 
-			ctx->optp = optend;
+			optp = optend;
 		} else
 			fmatch = FMATCH_OPT_WRONG;
 
@@ -156,9 +156,6 @@ static bool nf_osf_match_one(const struct sk_buff *skb,
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (fmatch != FMATCH_OK)
-		ctx->optp = optpinit;
-
 	return fmatch == FMATCH_OK;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#486 lore raw

PATCH 473/666 netfilter: nfnetlink_osf: fix potential NULL dereference in ttl check

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 711987ba281fd806322a7cd244e98e2a81903114 ]

The nf_osf_ttl() function accessed skb->dev to perform a local interface address lookup without verifying that the device pointer was valid.

Additionally, the implementation utilized an in_dev_for_each_ifa_rcu loop to match the packet source address against local interface addresses. It assumed that packets from the same subnet should not see a decrement on the initial TTL. A packet might appear it is from the same subnet but it actually isn't especially in modern environments with containers and virtual switching.

Remove the device dereference and interface loop. Replace the logic with a switch statement that evaluates the TTL according to the ttl_check.

---
 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c | 22 +++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c +7 -15
index 832a973c41777..c89efb951994a 100644
@@ -31,26 +31,18 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nf_osf_fingers);
 static inline int nf_osf_ttl(const struct sk_buff *skb,
 			     int ttl_check, unsigned char f_ttl)
 {
-	struct in_device *in_dev = __in_dev_get_rcu(skb->dev);
 	const struct iphdr *ip = ip_hdr(skb);
-	const struct in_ifaddr *ifa;
-	int ret = 0;
 
-	if (ttl_check == NF_OSF_TTL_TRUE)
+	switch (ttl_check) {
+	case NF_OSF_TTL_TRUE:
 		return ip->ttl == f_ttl;
-	if (ttl_check == NF_OSF_TTL_NOCHECK)
-		return 1;
-	else if (ip->ttl <= f_ttl)
+		break;
+	case NF_OSF_TTL_NOCHECK:
 		return 1;
-
-	in_dev_for_each_ifa_rcu(ifa, in_dev) {
-		if (inet_ifa_match(ip->saddr, ifa)) {
-			ret = (ip->ttl == f_ttl);
-			break;
-		}
+	case NF_OSF_TTL_LESS:
+	default:
+		return ip->ttl <= f_ttl;
 	}
-
-	return ret;
 }
 
 struct nf_osf_hdr_ctx {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#487 lore raw

PATCH 474/666 slip: reject VJ receive packets on instances with no rstate array

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Weiming Shi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e76607442d5b73e1ba6768f501ef815bb58c2c0e ]

slhc_init() accepts rslots == 0 as a valid configuration, with the documented meaning of 'no receive compression'. In that case the allocation loop in slhc_init() is skipped, so comp->rstate stays NULL and comp->rslot_limit stays 0 (from the kzalloc of struct slcompress).

The receive helpers do not defend against that configuration. slhc_uncompress() dereferences comp->rstate[x] when the VJ header carries an explicit connection ID, and slhc_remember() later assigns cs = &comp->rstate[...] after only comparing the packet's slot number to comp->rslot_limit. Because rslot_limit is 0, slot 0 passes the range check, and the code dereferences a NULL rstate.

The configuration is reachable in-tree through PPP. PPPIOCSMAXCID stores its argument in a signed int, and (val >> 16) uses arithmetic shift. Passing 0xffff0000 therefore sign-extends to -1, so val2 + 1 is 0 and ppp_generic.c ends up calling slhc_init(0, 1). Because /dev/ppp open is gated by ns_capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN), the whole path is reachable from an unprivileged user namespace. Once the malformed VJ state is installed, any inbound VJ-compressed or VJ-uncompressed frame that selects slot 0 crashes the kernel in softirq context:

 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical
       address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
 KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
 RIP: 0010:slhc_uncompress (drivers/net/slip/slhc.c:519)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ppp_receive_nonmp_frame (drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2466)
  ppp_input (drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2359)
  ppp_async_process (drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:492)
  tasklet_action_common (kernel/softirq.c:926)
  handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:623)
  run_ksoftirqd (kernel/softirq.c:1055)
  smpboot_thread_fn (kernel/smpboot.c:160)
  kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
  ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:164)
  </TASK>

Reject the receive side on such instances instead of touching rstate. slhc_uncompress() falls through to its existing 'bad' label, which bumps sls_i_error and enters the toss state. slhc_remember() mirrors that with an explicit sls_i_error increment followed by slhc_toss(); the sls_i_runt counter is not used here because a missing rstate is an internal configuration state, not a runt packet.

The transmit path is unaffected: the only in-tree caller that picks rslots from userspace (ppp_generic.c) still supplies tslots >= 1, and slip.c always calls slhc_init(16, 16), so comp->tstate remains valid and slhc_compress() continues to work.

Fixes 4ab42d78e37a ("ppp, slip: Validate VJ compression slot parameters completely")
---
 drivers/net/slip/slhc.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/net/slip/slhc.c +6 -0
index ee9fd3a94b96f..fcb3eebe7311c 100644
@@ -506,6 +506,8 @@ slhc_uncompress(struct slcompress *comp, unsigned char *icp, int isize)
 		comp->sls_i_error++;
 		return 0;
 	}
+	if (!comp->rstate)
+		goto bad;
 	changes = *cp++;
 	if(changes & NEW_C){
 		/* Make sure the state index is in range, then grab the state.
@@ -649,6 +651,10 @@ slhc_remember(struct slcompress *comp, unsigned char *icp, int isize)
 	struct cstate *cs;
 	unsigned int ihl;
 
+	if (!comp->rstate) {
+		comp->sls_i_error++;
+		return slhc_toss(comp);
+	}
 	/* The packet is shorter than a legal IP header.
 	 * Also make sure isize is positive.
 	 */
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#488 lore raw

PATCH 475/666 slip: bound decode() reads against the compressed packet length

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Weiming Shi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4c1367a2d7aad643a6f87c6931b13cc1a25e8ca7 ]

slhc_uncompress() parses a VJ-compressed TCP header by advancing a pointer through the packet via decode() and pull16(). Neither helper bounds-checks against isize, and decode() masks its return with & 0xffff so it can never return the -1 that callers test for -- those error paths are dead code.

A short compressed frame whose change byte requests optional fields lets decode() read past the end of the packet. The over-read bytes are folded into the cached cstate and reflected into subsequent reconstructed packets.

Make decode() and pull16() take the packet end pointer and return -1 when exhausted. Add a bounds check before the TCP-checksum read. The existing == -1 tests now do what they were always meant to.

---
 drivers/net/slip/slhc.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
drivers/net/slip/slhc.c +25 -18
index fcb3eebe7311c..daf086c283423 100644
@@ -80,9 +80,9 @@
 #include <linux/unaligned.h>
 
 static unsigned char *encode(unsigned char *cp, unsigned short n);
-static long decode(unsigned char **cpp);
+static long decode(unsigned char **cpp, const unsigned char *end);
 static unsigned char * put16(unsigned char *cp, unsigned short x);
-static unsigned short pull16(unsigned char **cpp);
+static long pull16(unsigned char **cpp, const unsigned char *end);
 
 /* Allocate compression data structure
  *	slots must be in range 0 to 255 (zero meaning no compression)
@@ -190,30 +190,34 @@ encode(unsigned char *cp, unsigned short n)
 	return cp;
 }
 
-/* Pull a 16-bit integer in host order from buffer in network byte order */
-static unsigned short
-pull16(unsigned char **cpp)
+/* Pull a 16-bit integer in host order from buffer in network byte order.
+ * Returns -1 if the buffer is exhausted, otherwise the 16-bit value.
+ */
+static long
+pull16(unsigned char **cpp, const unsigned char *end)
 {
-	short rval;
+	long rval;
 
+	if (*cpp + 2 > end)
+		return -1;
 	rval = *(*cpp)++;
 	rval <<= 8;
 	rval |= *(*cpp)++;
 	return rval;
 }
 
-/* Decode a number */
+/* Decode a number. Returns -1 if the buffer is exhausted. */
 static long
-decode(unsigned char **cpp)
+decode(unsigned char **cpp, const unsigned char *end)
 {
 	int x;
 
+	if (*cpp >= end)
+		return -1;
 	x = *(*cpp)++;
-	if(x == 0){
-		return pull16(cpp) & 0xffff;	/* pull16 returns -1 on error */
-	} else {
-		return x & 0xff;		/* -1 if PULLCHAR returned error */
-	}
+	if (x == 0)
+		return pull16(cpp, end);
+	return x & 0xff;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -499,6 +503,7 @@ slhc_uncompress(struct slcompress *comp, unsigned char *icp, int isize)
 	struct cstate *cs;
 	int len, hdrlen;
 	unsigned char *cp = icp;
+	const unsigned char *end = icp + isize;
 
 	/* We've got a compressed packet; read the change byte */
 	comp->sls_i_compressed++;
@@ -536,6 +541,8 @@ slhc_uncompress(struct slcompress *comp, unsigned char *icp, int isize)
 	thp = &cs->cs_tcp;
 	ip = &cs->cs_ip;
 
+	if (cp + 2 > end)
+		goto bad;
 	thp->check = *(__sum16 *)cp;
 	cp += 2;
 
@@ -566,26 +573,26 @@ slhc_uncompress(struct slcompress *comp, unsigned char *icp, int isize)
 	default:
 		if(changes & NEW_U){
 			thp->urg = 1;
-			if((x = decode(&cp)) == -1) {
+			if((x = decode(&cp, end)) == -1) {
 				goto bad;
 			}
 			thp->urg_ptr = htons(x);
 		} else
 			thp->urg = 0;
 		if(changes & NEW_W){
-			if((x = decode(&cp)) == -1) {
+			if((x = decode(&cp, end)) == -1) {
 				goto bad;
 			}
 			thp->window = htons( ntohs(thp->window) + x);
 		}
 		if(changes & NEW_A){
-			if((x = decode(&cp)) == -1) {
+			if((x = decode(&cp, end)) == -1) {
 				goto bad;
 			}
 			thp->ack_seq = htonl( ntohl(thp->ack_seq) + x);
 		}
 		if(changes & NEW_S){
-			if((x = decode(&cp)) == -1) {
+			if((x = decode(&cp, end)) == -1) {
 				goto bad;
 			}
 			thp->seq = htonl( ntohl(thp->seq) + x);
@@ -593,7 +600,7 @@ slhc_uncompress(struct slcompress *comp, unsigned char *icp, int isize)
 		break;
 	}
 	if(changes & NEW_I){
-		if((x = decode(&cp)) == -1) {
+		if((x = decode(&cp, end)) == -1) {
 			goto bad;
 		}
 		ip->id = htons (ntohs (ip->id) + x);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#489 lore raw

PATCH 476/666 arm64: dts: meson-gxl-p230: fix ethernet PHY interrupt number

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jun Yan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 174a0ef3b33434f475c87e66f37980e39b73805a ]

Correct the interrupt number assigned to the Realtek PHY in the p230

following the same logic as commit 3106507e1004 ("ARM64: dts: meson-gxm:
fix q200 interrupt number"),as reported in [PATCH 0/2] Ethernet PHY interrupt improvements [1].

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

Fixes b94d22d94ad2 ("ARM64: dts: meson-gx: add external PHY interrupt on some platforms")
---
 arch/arm64/boot/dts/amlogic/meson-gxl-s905d-p230.dts | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/boot/dts/amlogic/meson-gxl-s905d-p230.dts +2 -1
index c1470416faade..36e97ed585ae7 100644
@@ -84,7 +84,8 @@ external_phy: ethernet-phy@0 {
 		reset-gpios = <&gpio GPIOZ_14 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
 
 		interrupt-parent = <&gpio_intc>;
-		interrupts = <29 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_LOW>;
+		/* MAC_INTR on GPIOZ_15 */
+		interrupts = <25 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_LOW>;
 		eee-broken-1000t;
 	};
 };
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#490 lore raw

PATCH 477/666 pwm: atmel-tcb: Cache clock rates and mark chip as atomic

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sangyun Kim <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 68637b68afcc3cb4d56aca14a3a1d1b47b879369 ]

atmel_tcb_pwm_apply() holds tcbpwmc->lock as a spinlock via guard(spinlock)() and then calls atmel_tcb_pwm_config(), which calls clk_get_rate() twice. clk_get_rate() acquires clk_prepare_lock (a mutex), so this is a sleep-in-atomic-context violation.

On CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP kernels every pwm_apply_state() that enables or reconfigures the PWM triggers a "BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context" warning.

Acquire exclusive control over the clock rates with clk_rate_exclusive_get() at probe time and cache the rates in struct atmel_tcb_pwm_chip, then read the cached rates from atmel_tcb_pwm_config(). This keeps the spinlock-based mutual exclusion introduced in commit 37f7707077f5 ("pwm: atmel-tcb: Fix race condition and convert to guards") and removes the sleeping calls from the atomic section.

With no sleeping calls left in .apply() and the regmap-mmio bus already running with fast_io=true, also mark the chip as atomic so consumers can use pwm_apply_atomic() from atomic context.

Fixes 37f7707077f5 ("pwm: atmel-tcb: Fix race condition and convert to guards")
[ukleinek: Ensure .clk is enabled before calling clk_get_rate on it.]
---
 drivers/pwm/pwm-atmel-tcb.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/pwm/pwm-atmel-tcb.c +34 -4
index 5ee4254d1e487..9554deb413ab3 100644
@@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ struct atmel_tcb_pwm_chip {
 	spinlock_t lock;
 	u8 channel;
 	u8 width;
+	unsigned long rate;
+	unsigned long slow_rate;
 	struct regmap *regmap;
 	struct clk *clk;
 	struct clk *gclk;
@@ -266,7 +268,7 @@ static int atmel_tcb_pwm_config(struct pwm_chip *chip, struct pwm_device *pwm,
 	int slowclk = 0;
 	unsigned period;
 	unsigned duty;
-	unsigned rate = clk_get_rate(tcbpwmc->clk);
+	unsigned long rate = tcbpwmc->rate;
 	unsigned long long min;
 	unsigned long long max;
 
@@ -294,7 +296,7 @@ static int atmel_tcb_pwm_config(struct pwm_chip *chip, struct pwm_device *pwm,
 	 */
 	if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(atmel_tcb_divisors)) {
 		i = slowclk;
-		rate = clk_get_rate(tcbpwmc->slow_clk);
+		rate = tcbpwmc->slow_rate;
 		min = div_u64(NSEC_PER_SEC, rate);
 		max = min << tcbpwmc->width;
 
@@ -431,24 +433,49 @@ static int atmel_tcb_pwm_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	}
 
 	chip->ops = &atmel_tcb_pwm_ops;
+	chip->atomic = true;
 	tcbpwmc->channel = channel;
 	tcbpwmc->width = config->counter_width;
 
-	err = clk_prepare_enable(tcbpwmc->slow_clk);
+	err = clk_prepare_enable(tcbpwmc->clk);
 	if (err)
 		goto err_gclk;
 
+	err = clk_prepare_enable(tcbpwmc->slow_clk);
+	if (err)
+		goto err_disable_clk;;
+
+	err = clk_rate_exclusive_get(tcbpwmc->clk);
+	if (err)
+		goto err_disable_slow_clk;
+
+	err = clk_rate_exclusive_get(tcbpwmc->slow_clk);
+	if (err)
+		goto err_clk_unlock;
+
+	tcbpwmc->rate = clk_get_rate(tcbpwmc->clk);
+	tcbpwmc->slow_rate = clk_get_rate(tcbpwmc->slow_clk);
+
 	spin_lock_init(&tcbpwmc->lock);
 
 	err = pwmchip_add(chip);
 	if (err < 0)
-		goto err_disable_clk;
+		goto err_slow_clk_unlock;
 
 	platform_set_drvdata(pdev, chip);
 
 	return 0;
 
+err_slow_clk_unlock:
+	clk_rate_exclusive_put(tcbpwmc->slow_clk);
+
+err_clk_unlock:
+	clk_rate_exclusive_put(tcbpwmc->clk);
+
 err_disable_clk:
+	clk_disable_unprepare(tcbpwmc->clk);
+
+err_disable_slow_clk:
 	clk_disable_unprepare(tcbpwmc->slow_clk);
 
 err_gclk:
@@ -470,6 +497,9 @@ static void atmel_tcb_pwm_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	pwmchip_remove(chip);
 
+	clk_rate_exclusive_put(tcbpwmc->slow_clk);
+	clk_rate_exclusive_put(tcbpwmc->clk);
+	clk_disable_unprepare(tcbpwmc->clk);
 	clk_disable_unprepare(tcbpwmc->slow_clk);
 	clk_put(tcbpwmc->gclk);
 	clk_put(tcbpwmc->clk);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#491 lore raw

PATCH 478/666 ksmbd: destroy tree_conn_ida in ksmbd_session_destroy()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: DaeMyung Kang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c049ee14eb4343b69b6f7755563f961f5e153423 ]

When per-session tree_conn_ida was converted from a dynamically allocated ksmbd_ida to an embedded struct ida, ksmbd_ida_free() was removed from ksmbd_session_destroy() but no matching ida_destroy() was added. The session is therefore freed with the IDA's backing xarray still intact.

The kernel IDA API expects ida_init() and ida_destroy() to be paired over an object's lifetime, so add the missing cleanup before the enclosing session is freed.

Also move ida_init() to right after the session is allocated so that it is always paired with the destroy call even on the early error paths of __session_create() (ksmbd_init_file_table() or __init_smb2_session() failures), both of which jump to the error label and invoke ksmbd_session_destroy() on a partially initialised session.

No leak has been observed in testing; this is a pairing fix to match the IDA lifetime rules, not a response to a reproduced regression.

Fixes d40012a83f87 ("cifsd: declare ida statically")
---
 fs/smb/server/mgmt/user_session.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/smb/server/mgmt/user_session.c +3 -2
index 352cf9e47ebeb..faba7a502c0b7 100644
@@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ void ksmbd_session_destroy(struct ksmbd_session *sess)
 	free_channel_list(sess);
 	kfree(sess->Preauth_HashValue);
 	ksmbd_release_id(&session_ida, sess->id);
+	ida_destroy(&sess->tree_conn_ida);
 	kfree(sess);
 }
 
@@ -445,6 +446,8 @@ static struct ksmbd_session *__session_create(int protocol)
 	if (!sess)
 		return NULL;
 
+	ida_init(&sess->tree_conn_ida);
+
 	if (ksmbd_init_file_table(&sess->file_table))
 		goto error;
 
@@ -464,8 +467,6 @@ static struct ksmbd_session *__session_create(int protocol)
 	if (ret)
 		goto error;
 
-	ida_init(&sess->tree_conn_ida);
-
 	down_write(&sessions_table_lock);
 	hash_add(sessions_table, &sess->hlist, sess->id);
 	up_write(&sessions_table_lock);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#492 lore raw

PATCH 479/666 ksmbd: destroy async_ida in ksmbd_conn_free()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: DaeMyung Kang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b32c8db48212a34998c36d0bbc05b29d5c407ef5 ]

When per-connection async_ida was converted from a dynamically allocated ksmbd_ida to an embedded struct ida, ksmbd_ida_free() was removed from the connection teardown path but no matching ida_destroy() was added. The connection is therefore freed with the IDA's backing xarray still intact.

The kernel IDA API expects ida_init() and ida_destroy() to be paired over an object's lifetime, so add the missing cleanup before the connection is freed.

No leak has been observed in testing; this is a pairing fix to match the IDA lifetime rules, not a response to a reproduced regression.

Fixes d40012a83f87 ("cifsd: declare ida statically")
---
 fs/smb/server/connection.c | 9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
fs/smb/server/connection.c +9 -0
index 8470aba1233a9..1610b4d2fd414 100644
@@ -41,6 +41,15 @@ void ksmbd_conn_free(struct ksmbd_conn *conn)
 	kfree(conn->preauth_info);
 	kfree(conn->mechToken);
 	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&conn->refcnt)) {
+		/*
+		 * async_ida is embedded in struct ksmbd_conn, so pair
+		 * ida_destroy() with the final kfree() rather than with
+		 * the unconditional field teardown above.  This keeps
+		 * the IDA valid for the entire lifetime of the struct,
+		 * even while other refcount holders (oplock / vfs
+		 * durable handles) still reference the connection.
+		 */
+		ida_destroy(&conn->async_ida);
 		conn->transport->ops->free_transport(conn->transport);
 		kfree(conn);
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#493 lore raw

PATCH 480/666 ksmbd: fix durable fd leak on ClientGUID mismatch in durable v2 open

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: DaeMyung Kang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 804054d19886ac6628883d82410f6ee42a818664 ]

ksmbd_lookup_fd_cguid() returns a ksmbd_file with its refcount incremented via ksmbd_fp_get(). parse_durable_handle_context() in the DURABLE_REQ_V2 case properly releases this reference on every path inside the ClientGUID-match branch, either by calling ksmbd_put_durable_fd() or by transferring ownership to dh_info->fp for a successful reconnect. However, when an entry exists in the global file table with the same CreateGuid but a different ClientGUID, the code simply falls through to the new-open path without dropping the reference obtained from ksmbd_lookup_fd_cguid().

Per MS-SMB2 section 3.3.5.9.10 ("Handling the SMB2_CREATE_DURABLE_HANDLE_REQUEST_V2 Create Context"), the server MUST locate an Open whose Open.CreateGuid matches the request's CreateGuid AND whose Open.ClientGuid matches the ClientGuid of the connection that received the request. If no such Open is found, the server MUST continue with the normal open execution phase. A CreateGuid hit with a ClientGUID mismatch is therefore the "Open not found" case: proceeding with a new open is correct, but the reference obtained purely as a side effect of the lookup must not be leaked.

Repeated requests that hit this mismatch pin global_ft entries, prevent __ksmbd_close_fd() from ever running for the corresponding files, and defeat the durable scavenger, leading to long-lived resource leaks.

Release the reference in the mismatch path and clear dh_info->fp so subsequent logic does not mistake a non-matching lookup result for a reconnect target.

Fixes c8efcc786146 ("ksmbd: add support for durable handles v1/v2")
---
 fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +2 -0
index 29fbdada7259a..700d9da3c65a9 100644
@@ -2849,6 +2849,8 @@ static int parse_durable_handle_context(struct ksmbd_work *work,
 					dh_info->reconnected = true;
 					goto out;
 				}
+				ksmbd_put_durable_fd(dh_info->fp);
+				dh_info->fp = NULL;
 			}
 
 			if ((lc && (lc->req_state & SMB2_LEASE_HANDLE_CACHING_LE)) ||
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#494 lore raw

PATCH 481/666 ksmbd: scope conn->binding slowpath to bound sessions only

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hyunwoo Kim <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b0da97c034b6107d14e537e212d4ce8b22109a58 ]

When the binding SESSION_SETUP sets conn->binding = true, the flag stays set after the call so that the global session lookup in ksmbd_session_lookup_all() can find the session, which was not added to conn->sessions. Because the flag is connection-wide, the global lookup path will also resolve any other session by id if asked.

Tighten the global lookup so that the returned session must have this connection registered in its channel xarray (sess->ksmbd_chann_list). The channel entry is installed by the existing binding_session path in ntlm_authenticate()/krb5_authenticate() when a SESSION_SETUP completes successfully, so this condition is a strict equivalent of "this connection has been accepted as a channel of this session". Connections that have not bound to a given session cannot reach it via the global table.

The existing conn->binding gate for entering the slowpath is preserved so that non-binding connections keep the fast-path-only behavior, and the session->state check is unchanged.

Fixes f5a544e3bab7 ("ksmbd: add support for SMB3 multichannel")
---
 fs/smb/server/mgmt/user_session.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/smb/server/mgmt/user_session.c +6 -1
index faba7a502c0b7..151248e02e9eb 100644
@@ -328,8 +328,13 @@ struct ksmbd_session *ksmbd_session_lookup_all(struct ksmbd_conn *conn,
 	struct ksmbd_session *sess;
 
 	sess = ksmbd_session_lookup(conn, id);
-	if (!sess && conn->binding)
+	if (!sess && conn->binding) {
 		sess = ksmbd_session_lookup_slowpath(id);
+		if (sess && !xa_load(&sess->ksmbd_chann_list, (long)conn)) {
+			ksmbd_user_session_put(sess);
+			sess = NULL;
+		}
+	}
 	if (sess && sess->state != SMB2_SESSION_VALID) {
 		ksmbd_user_session_put(sess);
 		sess = NULL;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#495 lore raw

PATCH 482/666 net/rds: zero per-item info buffer before handing it to visitors

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c88eb7e8d8397a8c1db59c425332c5a30b2a1682 ]

rds_for_each_conn_info() and rds_walk_conn_path_info() both hand a caller-allocated on-stack u64 buffer to a per-connection visitor and then copy the full item_len bytes back to user space via rds_info_copy() regardless of how much of the buffer the visitor actually wrote.

rds_ib_conn_info_visitor() and rds6_ib_conn_info_visitor() only write a subset of their output struct when the underlying rds_connection is not in state RDS_CONN_UP (src/dst addr, tos, sl and the two GIDs via explicit memsets). Several u32 fields (max_send_wr, max_recv_wr, max_send_sge, rdma_mr_max, rdma_mr_size, cache_allocs) and the 2-byte alignment hole between sl and cache_allocs remain as whatever stack contents preceded the visitor call and are then memcpy_to_user()'d out to user space.

struct rds_info_rdma_connection and struct rds6_info_rdma_connection are the only rds_info_* structs in include/uapi/linux/rds.h that are not marked __attribute__((packed)), so they have a real alignment hole. The other info visitors (rds_conn_info_visitor, rds6_conn_info_visitor, rds_tcp_tc_info, ...) write all fields of their packed output struct today and are not known to be vulnerable, but a future visitor that adds a conditional write-path would have the same bug.

Reproduction on a kernel built without CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO=y:
a local unprivileged user opens AF_RDS, sets SO_RDS_TRANSPORT=IB, binds to a local address on an RDMA-capable netdev (rxe soft-RoCE on any netdev is sufficient), sendto()'s any peer on the same subnet (fails cleanly but installs an rds_connection in the global hash in RDS_CONN_CONNECTING), then calls getsockopt(SOL_RDS, RDS_INFO_IB_CONNECTIONS). The returned 68-byte item contains 26 bytes of stack garbage including kernel text/data pointers:

    0..7   0a 63 00 01 0a 63 00 02     src=10.99.0.1 dst=10.99.0.2
    8..39  00 ...                      gids (memset-zeroed)
    40..47 e0 92 a3 81 ff ff ff ff     kernel pointer (max_send_wr)
    48..55 7f 37 b5 81 ff ff ff ff     kernel pointer (rdma_mr_max)
    56..59 01 00 08 00                 rdma_mr_size (garbage)
    60..61 00 00                       tos, sl
    62..63 00 00                       alignment padding
    64..67 18 00 00 00                 cache_allocs (garbage)

Fix by zeroing the per-item buffer in both rds_for_each_conn_info() and rds_walk_conn_path_info() before invoking the visitor. This covers the IPv4/IPv6 IB visitors and hardens all current and future visitors against the same class of bug.

No functional change for visitors that fully populate their output.

Changes in v2:
- retarget at the net tree (subject prefix "[PATCH net v2]", net/rds: prefix in the title)
- pick up Reviewed-by tags from Sharath Srinivasan and Allison Henderson

Fixes ec16227e1414 ("RDS/IB: Infiniband transport")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-7
---
 net/rds/connection.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
net/rds/connection.c +14 -0
index 3a1b548dcdcb2..d6ee386fd820e 100644
@@ -673,6 +673,13 @@ void rds_for_each_conn_info(struct socket *sock, unsigned int len,
 	     i++, head++) {
 		hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(conn, head, c_hash_node) {
 
+			/* Zero the per-item buffer before handing it to the
+			 * visitor so any field the visitor does not write -
+			 * including implicit alignment padding - cannot leak
+			 * stack contents to user space via rds_info_copy().
+			 */
+			memset(buffer, 0, item_len);
+
 			/* XXX no c_lock usage.. */
 			if (!visitor(conn, buffer))
 				continue;
@@ -722,6 +729,13 @@ static void rds_walk_conn_path_info(struct socket *sock, unsigned int len,
 			 */
 			cp = conn->c_path;
 
+			/* Zero the per-item buffer for the same reason as
+			 * rds_for_each_conn_info(): any byte the visitor
+			 * does not write (including alignment padding) must
+			 * not leak stack contents via rds_info_copy().
+			 */
+			memset(buffer, 0, item_len);
+
 			/* XXX no cp_lock usage.. */
 			if (!visitor(cp, buffer))
 				continue;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#496 lore raw

PATCH 483/666 ice: fix timestamp interrupt configuration for E825C

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Grzegorz Nitka <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c0a575a801a2040eb1e0db54b488f8c548c8458a ]

The E825C ice_phy_cfg_intr_eth56g() function is responsible for programming the PHY interrupt for a given port. This function writes to the PHY_REG_TS_INT_CONFIG register of the port. The register is responsible for configuring whether the port interrupt logic is enabled, as well as programming the threshold of waiting timestamps that will trigger an interrupt from this port.

This threshold value must not be programmed to zero while the interrupt is enabled. Doing so puts the port in a misconfigured state where the PHY timestamp interrupt for the quad of connected ports will become stuck.

This occurs, because a threshold of zero results in the timestamp interrupt status for the port becoming stuck high. The four ports in the connected quad have their timestamp status indicators muxed together. A new interrupt cannot be generated until the timestamp status indicators return low for all four ports.

Normally, the timestamp status for a port will clear once there are fewer timestamps in that ports timestamp memory bank than the threshold. A threshold of zero makes this impossible, so the timestamp status for the port does not clear.

The ice driver never intentionally programs the threshold to zero, indeed the driver always programs it to a value of 1, intending to get an interrupt immediately as soon as even a single packet is waiting for a timestamp.

However, there is a subtle flaw in the programming logic in the ice_phy_cfg_intr_eth56g() function. Due to the way that the hardware handles enabling the PHY interrupt. If the threshold value is modified at the same time as the interrupt is enabled, the HW PHY state machine might enable the interrupt before the new threshold value is actually updated. This leaves a potential race condition caused by the hardware logic where a PHY timestamp interrupt might be triggered before the non-zero threshold is written, resulting in the PHY timestamp logic becoming stuck.

Once the PHY timestamp status is stuck high, it will remain stuck even after attempting to reprogram the PHY block by changing its threshold or disabling the interrupt. Even a typical PF or CORE reset will not reset the particular block of the PHY that becomes stuck. Even a warm power cycle is not guaranteed to cause the PHY block to reset, and a cold power cycle is required.

Prevent this by always writing the PHY_REG_TS_INT_CONFIG in two stages. First write the threshold value with the interrupt disabled, and only write the enable bit after the threshold has been programmed. When disabling the interrupt, leave the threshold unchanged. Additionally, re-read the register after writing it to guarantee that the write to the PHY has been flushed upon exit of the function.

While we're modifying this function implementation, explicitly reject programming a threshold of 0 when enabling the interrupt. No caller does this today, but the consequences of doing so are significant. An explicit rejection in the code makes this clear.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ptp_hw.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ptp_hw.c +32 -4
index 7190fde16c868..dc97bee4fd2ea 100644
@@ -2340,6 +2340,8 @@ static int ice_phy_cfg_mac_eth56g(struct ice_hw *hw, u8 port)
  * @ena: enable or disable interrupt
  * @threshold: interrupt threshold
  *
+ * The threshold cannot be 0 while the interrupt is enabled.
+ *
  * Configure TX timestamp interrupt for the specified port
  *
  * Return:
@@ -2351,19 +2353,45 @@ int ice_phy_cfg_intr_eth56g(struct ice_hw *hw, u8 port, bool ena, u8 threshold)
 	int err;
 	u32 val;
 
+	if (ena && !threshold)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	err = ice_read_ptp_reg_eth56g(hw, port, PHY_REG_TS_INT_CONFIG, &val);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
+	val &= ~PHY_TS_INT_CONFIG_ENA_M;
 	if (ena) {
-		val |= PHY_TS_INT_CONFIG_ENA_M;
 		val &= ~PHY_TS_INT_CONFIG_THRESHOLD_M;
 		val |= FIELD_PREP(PHY_TS_INT_CONFIG_THRESHOLD_M, threshold);
-	} else {
-		val &= ~PHY_TS_INT_CONFIG_ENA_M;
+		err = ice_write_ptp_reg_eth56g(hw, port, PHY_REG_TS_INT_CONFIG,
+					       val);
+		if (err) {
+			ice_debug(hw, ICE_DBG_PTP,
+				  "Failed to update 'threshold' PHY_REG_TS_INT_CONFIG port=%u ena=%u threshold=%u\n",
+				  port, !!ena, threshold);
+			return err;
+		}
+		val |= PHY_TS_INT_CONFIG_ENA_M;
 	}
 
-	return ice_write_ptp_reg_eth56g(hw, port, PHY_REG_TS_INT_CONFIG, val);
+	err = ice_write_ptp_reg_eth56g(hw, port, PHY_REG_TS_INT_CONFIG, val);
+	if (err) {
+		ice_debug(hw, ICE_DBG_PTP,
+			  "Failed to update 'ena' PHY_REG_TS_INT_CONFIG port=%u ena=%u threshold=%u\n",
+			  port, !!ena, threshold);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	err = ice_read_ptp_reg_eth56g(hw, port, PHY_REG_TS_INT_CONFIG, &val);
+	if (err) {
+		ice_debug(hw, ICE_DBG_PTP,
+			  "Failed to read PHY_REG_TS_INT_CONFIG port=%u ena=%u threshold=%u\n",
+			  port, !!ena, threshold);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /**
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#497 lore raw

PATCH 484/666 ice: fix ice_ptp_read_tx_hwtstamp_status_eth56g

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jacob Keller <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1f75dbc53f68f0fb2acd99f92315e426a3d0b446 ]

The ice_ptp_read_tx_hwtstamp_status_eth56g function calls ice_read_phy_eth56g with a PHY index. However the function actually expects a port index. This causes the function to read the wrong PHY_PTP_INT_STATUS registers, and effectively makes the status wrong for the second set of ports from 4 to 7.

The ice_read_phy_eth56g function uses the provided port index to determine which PHY device to read. We could refactor the entire chain to take a PHY index, but this would impact many code sites. Instead, multiply the PHY index by the number of ports, so that we read from the first port of each PHY.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ptp_hw.c | 10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ptp_hw.c +8 -2
index dc97bee4fd2ea..478ee1c540142 100644
@@ -2682,13 +2682,19 @@ int ice_ptp_read_tx_hwtstamp_status_eth56g(struct ice_hw *hw, u32 *ts_status)
 	*ts_status = 0;
 
 	for (phy = 0; phy < params->num_phys; phy++) {
+		u8 port;
 		int err;
 
-		err = ice_read_phy_eth56g(hw, phy, PHY_PTP_INT_STATUS, &status);
+		/* ice_read_phy_eth56g expects a port index, so use the first
+		 * port of the PHY
+		 */
+		port = phy * hw->ptp.ports_per_phy;
+
+		err = ice_read_phy_eth56g(hw, port, PHY_PTP_INT_STATUS, &status);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
 
-		*ts_status |= (status & mask) << (phy * hw->ptp.ports_per_phy);
+		*ts_status |= (status & mask) << port;
 	}
 
 	ice_debug(hw, ICE_DBG_PTP, "PHY interrupt err: %x\n", *ts_status);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#498 lore raw

PATCH 485/666 net_sched: sch_hhf: annotate data-races in hhf_dump_stats()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a6edf2cd4156b71e07258876b7626692e158f7e8 ]

hhf_dump_stats() only runs with RTNL held, reading fields that can be changed in qdisc fast path.

Add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations.

Fixes edb09eb17ed8 ("net: sched: do not acquire qdisc spinlock in qdisc/class stats dump")
---
 net/sched/sch_hhf.c | 19 ++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
net/sched/sch_hhf.c +10 -9
index 5aa434b467073..914e985427744 100644
@@ -198,7 +198,8 @@ static struct hh_flow_state *seek_list(const u32 hash,
 				return NULL;
 			list_del(&flow->flowchain);
 			kfree(flow);
-			q->hh_flows_current_cnt--;
+			WRITE_ONCE(q->hh_flows_current_cnt,
+				   q->hh_flows_current_cnt - 1);
 		} else if (flow->hash_id == hash) {
 			return flow;
 		}
@@ -226,7 +227,7 @@ static struct hh_flow_state *alloc_new_hh(struct list_head *head,
 	}
 
 	if (q->hh_flows_current_cnt >= q->hh_flows_limit) {
-		q->hh_flows_overlimit++;
+		WRITE_ONCE(q->hh_flows_overlimit, q->hh_flows_overlimit + 1);
 		return NULL;
 	}
 	/* Create new entry. */
@@ -234,7 +235,7 @@ static struct hh_flow_state *alloc_new_hh(struct list_head *head,
 	if (!flow)
 		return NULL;
 
-	q->hh_flows_current_cnt++;
+	WRITE_ONCE(q->hh_flows_current_cnt, q->hh_flows_current_cnt + 1);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&flow->flowchain);
 	list_add_tail(&flow->flowchain, head);
 
@@ -309,7 +310,7 @@ static enum wdrr_bucket_idx hhf_classify(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch)
 			return WDRR_BUCKET_FOR_NON_HH;
 		flow->hash_id = hash;
 		flow->hit_timestamp = now;
-		q->hh_flows_total_cnt++;
+		WRITE_ONCE(q->hh_flows_total_cnt, q->hh_flows_total_cnt + 1);
 
 		/* By returning without updating counters in q->hhf_arrays,
 		 * we implicitly implement "shielding" (see Optimization O1).
@@ -403,7 +404,7 @@ static int hhf_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch,
 		return NET_XMIT_SUCCESS;
 
 	prev_backlog = sch->qstats.backlog;
-	q->drop_overlimit++;
+	WRITE_ONCE(q->drop_overlimit, q->drop_overlimit + 1);
 	/* Return Congestion Notification only if we dropped a packet from this
 	 * bucket.
 	 */
@@ -685,10 +686,10 @@ static int hhf_dump_stats(struct Qdisc *sch, struct gnet_dump *d)
 {
 	struct hhf_sched_data *q = qdisc_priv(sch);
 	struct tc_hhf_xstats st = {
-		.drop_overlimit = q->drop_overlimit,
-		.hh_overlimit	= q->hh_flows_overlimit,
-		.hh_tot_count	= q->hh_flows_total_cnt,
-		.hh_cur_count	= q->hh_flows_current_cnt,
+		.drop_overlimit = READ_ONCE(q->drop_overlimit),
+		.hh_overlimit	= READ_ONCE(q->hh_flows_overlimit),
+		.hh_tot_count	= READ_ONCE(q->hh_flows_total_cnt),
+		.hh_cur_count	= READ_ONCE(q->hh_flows_current_cnt),
 	};
 
 	return gnet_stats_copy_app(d, &st, sizeof(st));
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#499 lore raw

PATCH 486/666 net/sched: sch_pie: annotate data-races in pie_dump_stats()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5154561d9b119f781249f8e845fecf059b38b483 ]

pie_dump_stats() only runs with RTNL held, reading fields that can be changed in qdisc fast path.

Add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations.

Alternative would be to acquire the qdisc spinlock, but our long-term goal is to make qdisc dump operations lockless as much as we can.

tc_pie_xstats fields don't need to be latched atomically, otherwise this bug would have been caught earlier.

Fixes edb09eb17ed8 ("net: sched: do not acquire qdisc spinlock in qdisc/class stats dump")
---
 include/net/pie.h   |  2 +-
 net/sched/sch_pie.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
include/net/pie.h +1 -1
index 01cbc66825a40..1f3db0c355149 100644
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ static inline void pie_vars_init(struct pie_vars *vars)
 	vars->dq_tstamp = DTIME_INVALID;
 	vars->accu_prob = 0;
 	vars->dq_count = DQCOUNT_INVALID;
-	vars->avg_dq_rate = 0;
+	WRITE_ONCE(vars->avg_dq_rate, 0);
 }
 
 static inline struct pie_skb_cb *get_pie_cb(const struct sk_buff *skb)
net/sched/sch_pie.c +19 -19
index db61cbc21b138..abb8cdb409c48 100644
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ static int pie_qdisc_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch,
 	bool enqueue = false;
 
 	if (unlikely(qdisc_qlen(sch) >= sch->limit)) {
-		q->stats.overlimit++;
+		WRITE_ONCE(q->stats.overlimit, q->stats.overlimit + 1);
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static int pie_qdisc_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch,
 		/* If packet is ecn capable, mark it if drop probability
 		 * is lower than 10%, else drop it.
 		 */
-		q->stats.ecn_mark++;
+		WRITE_ONCE(q->stats.ecn_mark, q->stats.ecn_mark + 1);
 		enqueue = true;
 	}
 
@@ -111,15 +111,15 @@ static int pie_qdisc_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch,
 		if (!q->params.dq_rate_estimator)
 			pie_set_enqueue_time(skb);
 
-		q->stats.packets_in++;
+		WRITE_ONCE(q->stats.packets_in, q->stats.packets_in + 1);
 		if (qdisc_qlen(sch) > q->stats.maxq)
-			q->stats.maxq = qdisc_qlen(sch);
+			WRITE_ONCE(q->stats.maxq, qdisc_qlen(sch));
 
 		return qdisc_enqueue_tail(skb, sch);
 	}
 
 out:
-	q->stats.dropped++;
+	WRITE_ONCE(q->stats.dropped, q->stats.dropped + 1);
 	q->vars.accu_prob = 0;
 	return qdisc_drop(skb, sch, to_free);
 }
@@ -262,11 +262,11 @@ void pie_process_dequeue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct pie_params *params,
 			count = count / dtime;
 
 			if (vars->avg_dq_rate == 0)
-				vars->avg_dq_rate = count;
+				WRITE_ONCE(vars->avg_dq_rate, count);
 			else
-				vars->avg_dq_rate =
+				WRITE_ONCE(vars->avg_dq_rate,
 				    (vars->avg_dq_rate -
-				     (vars->avg_dq_rate >> 3)) + (count >> 3);
+				     (vars->avg_dq_rate >> 3)) + (count >> 3));
 
 			/* If the queue has receded below the threshold, we hold
 			 * on to the last drain rate calculated, else we reset
@@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ void pie_calculate_probability(struct pie_params *params, struct pie_vars *vars,
 	if (delta > 0) {
 		/* prevent overflow */
 		if (vars->prob < oldprob) {
-			vars->prob = MAX_PROB;
+			WRITE_ONCE(vars->prob, MAX_PROB);
 			/* Prevent normalization error. If probability is at
 			 * maximum value already, we normalize it here, and
 			 * skip the check to do a non-linear drop in the next
@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ void pie_calculate_probability(struct pie_params *params, struct pie_vars *vars,
 	} else {
 		/* prevent underflow */
 		if (vars->prob > oldprob)
-			vars->prob = 0;
+			WRITE_ONCE(vars->prob, 0);
 	}
 
 	/* Non-linear drop in probability: Reduce drop probability quickly if
@@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ void pie_calculate_probability(struct pie_params *params, struct pie_vars *vars,
 		/* Reduce drop probability to 98.4% */
 		vars->prob -= vars->prob / 64;
 
-	vars->qdelay = qdelay;
+	WRITE_ONCE(vars->qdelay, qdelay);
 	vars->backlog_old = backlog;
 
 	/* We restart the measurement cycle if the following conditions are met
@@ -497,21 +497,21 @@ static int pie_dump_stats(struct Qdisc *sch, struct gnet_dump *d)
 	struct pie_sched_data *q = qdisc_priv(sch);
 	struct tc_pie_xstats st = {
 		.prob		= q->vars.prob << BITS_PER_BYTE,
-		.delay		= ((u32)PSCHED_TICKS2NS(q->vars.qdelay)) /
+		.delay		= ((u32)PSCHED_TICKS2NS(READ_ONCE(q->vars.qdelay))) /
 				   NSEC_PER_USEC,
-		.packets_in	= q->stats.packets_in,
-		.overlimit	= q->stats.overlimit,
-		.maxq		= q->stats.maxq,
-		.dropped	= q->stats.dropped,
-		.ecn_mark	= q->stats.ecn_mark,
+		.packets_in	= READ_ONCE(q->stats.packets_in),
+		.overlimit	= READ_ONCE(q->stats.overlimit),
+		.maxq		= READ_ONCE(q->stats.maxq),
+		.dropped	= READ_ONCE(q->stats.dropped),
+		.ecn_mark	= READ_ONCE(q->stats.ecn_mark),
 	};
 
 	/* avg_dq_rate is only valid if dq_rate_estimator is enabled */
 	st.dq_rate_estimating = q->params.dq_rate_estimator;
 
 	/* unscale and return dq_rate in bytes per sec */
-	if (q->params.dq_rate_estimator)
-		st.avg_dq_rate = q->vars.avg_dq_rate *
+	if (st.dq_rate_estimating)
+		st.avg_dq_rate = READ_ONCE(q->vars.avg_dq_rate) *
 				 (PSCHED_TICKS_PER_SEC) >> PIE_SCALE;
 
 	return gnet_stats_copy_app(d, &st, sizeof(st));
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#500 lore raw

PATCH 487/666 net/sched: sch_fq_codel: remove data-races from fq_codel_dump_stats()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bbfaa73ea6871db03dc05d7f05f00557a8981f25 ]

fq_codel_dump_stats() acquires the qdisc spinlock a bit too late.

Move this acquisition before we fill st.qdisc_stats with live data.

Fixes edb09eb17ed8 ("net: sched: do not acquire qdisc spinlock in qdisc/class stats dump")
---
 net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c +2 -1
index 551b7cbdae90c..3f797ec4b0c2f 100644
@@ -581,6 +581,8 @@ static int fq_codel_dump_stats(struct Qdisc *sch, struct gnet_dump *d)
 	};
 	struct list_head *pos;
 
+	sch_tree_lock(sch);
+
 	st.qdisc_stats.maxpacket = q->cstats.maxpacket;
 	st.qdisc_stats.drop_overlimit = q->drop_overlimit;
 	st.qdisc_stats.ecn_mark = q->cstats.ecn_mark;
@@ -589,7 +591,6 @@ static int fq_codel_dump_stats(struct Qdisc *sch, struct gnet_dump *d)
 	st.qdisc_stats.memory_usage  = q->memory_usage;
 	st.qdisc_stats.drop_overmemory = q->drop_overmemory;
 
-	sch_tree_lock(sch);
 	list_for_each(pos, &q->new_flows)
 		st.qdisc_stats.new_flows_len++;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#501 lore raw

PATCH 488/666 net/sched: sch_red: annotate data-races in red_dump_stats()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a8f5192809caf636d05ba47c144f282cfd0e3839 ]

red_dump_stats() only runs with RTNL held, reading fields that can be changed in qdisc fast path.

Add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations.

Alternative would be to acquire the qdisc spinlock, but our long-term goal is to make qdisc dump operations lockless as much as we can.

tc_red_xstats fields don't need to be latched atomically, otherwise this bug would have been caught earlier.

Fixes edb09eb17ed8 ("net: sched: do not acquire qdisc spinlock in qdisc/class stats dump")
---
 net/sched/sch_red.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
net/sched/sch_red.c +21 -10
index a745d429a8141..6f53a0dbd0572 100644
@@ -89,17 +89,20 @@ static int red_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch,
 	case RED_PROB_MARK:
 		qdisc_qstats_overlimit(sch);
 		if (!red_use_ecn(q)) {
-			q->stats.prob_drop++;
+			WRITE_ONCE(q->stats.prob_drop,
+				   q->stats.prob_drop + 1);
 			goto congestion_drop;
 		}
 
 		if (INET_ECN_set_ce(skb)) {
-			q->stats.prob_mark++;
+			WRITE_ONCE(q->stats.prob_mark,
+				   q->stats.prob_mark + 1);
 			skb = tcf_qevent_handle(&q->qe_mark, sch, skb, to_free, &ret);
 			if (!skb)
 				return NET_XMIT_CN | ret;
 		} else if (!red_use_nodrop(q)) {
-			q->stats.prob_drop++;
+			WRITE_ONCE(q->stats.prob_drop,
+				   q->stats.prob_drop + 1);
 			goto congestion_drop;
 		}
 
@@ -109,17 +112,20 @@ static int red_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch,
 	case RED_HARD_MARK:
 		qdisc_qstats_overlimit(sch);
 		if (red_use_harddrop(q) || !red_use_ecn(q)) {
-			q->stats.forced_drop++;
+			WRITE_ONCE(q->stats.forced_drop,
+				   q->stats.forced_drop + 1);
 			goto congestion_drop;
 		}
 
 		if (INET_ECN_set_ce(skb)) {
-			q->stats.forced_mark++;
+			WRITE_ONCE(q->stats.forced_mark,
+				   q->stats.forced_mark + 1);
 			skb = tcf_qevent_handle(&q->qe_mark, sch, skb, to_free, &ret);
 			if (!skb)
 				return NET_XMIT_CN | ret;
 		} else if (!red_use_nodrop(q)) {
-			q->stats.forced_drop++;
+			WRITE_ONCE(q->stats.forced_drop,
+				   q->stats.forced_drop + 1);
 			goto congestion_drop;
 		}
 
@@ -133,7 +139,8 @@ static int red_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch,
 		sch->qstats.backlog += len;
 		sch->q.qlen++;
 	} else if (net_xmit_drop_count(ret)) {
-		q->stats.pdrop++;
+		WRITE_ONCE(q->stats.pdrop,
+			   q->stats.pdrop + 1);
 		qdisc_qstats_drop(sch);
 	}
 	return ret;
@@ -461,9 +468,13 @@ static int red_dump_stats(struct Qdisc *sch, struct gnet_dump *d)
 		dev->netdev_ops->ndo_setup_tc(dev, TC_SETUP_QDISC_RED,
 					      &hw_stats_request);
 	}
-	st.early = q->stats.prob_drop + q->stats.forced_drop;
-	st.pdrop = q->stats.pdrop;
-	st.marked = q->stats.prob_mark + q->stats.forced_mark;
+	st.early = READ_ONCE(q->stats.prob_drop) +
+		   READ_ONCE(q->stats.forced_drop);
+
+	st.pdrop = READ_ONCE(q->stats.pdrop);
+
+	st.marked = READ_ONCE(q->stats.prob_mark) +
+		    READ_ONCE(q->stats.forced_mark);
 
 	return gnet_stats_copy_app(d, &st, sizeof(st));
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#502 lore raw

PATCH 489/666 net/sched: sch_sfb: annotate data-races in sfb_dump_stats()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1ada03fdef82d3d7d2edb9dcd3acc91917675e48 ]

sfb_dump_stats() only runs with RTNL held, reading fields that can be changed in qdisc fast path.

Add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations.

Alternative would be to acquire the qdisc spinlock, but our long-term goal is to make qdisc dump operations lockless as much as we can.

tc_sfb_xstats fields don't need to be latched atomically, otherwise this bug would have been caught earlier.

Fixes edb09eb17ed8 ("net: sched: do not acquire qdisc spinlock in qdisc/class stats dump")
---
 net/sched/sch_sfb.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
net/sched/sch_sfb.c +32 -22
index b717e15a3a17b..c36725f0870d4 100644
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ static void increment_one_qlen(u32 sfbhash, u32 slot, struct sfb_sched_data *q)
 
 		sfbhash >>= SFB_BUCKET_SHIFT;
 		if (b[hash].qlen < 0xFFFF)
-			b[hash].qlen++;
+			WRITE_ONCE(b[hash].qlen, b[hash].qlen + 1);
 		b += SFB_NUMBUCKETS; /* next level */
 	}
 }
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ static void decrement_one_qlen(u32 sfbhash, u32 slot,
 
 		sfbhash >>= SFB_BUCKET_SHIFT;
 		if (b[hash].qlen > 0)
-			b[hash].qlen--;
+			WRITE_ONCE(b[hash].qlen, b[hash].qlen - 1);
 		b += SFB_NUMBUCKETS; /* next level */
 	}
 }
@@ -179,12 +179,12 @@ static void decrement_qlen(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct sfb_sched_data *q)
 
 static void decrement_prob(struct sfb_bucket *b, struct sfb_sched_data *q)
 {
-	b->p_mark = prob_minus(b->p_mark, q->decrement);
+	WRITE_ONCE(b->p_mark, prob_minus(b->p_mark, q->decrement));
 }
 
 static void increment_prob(struct sfb_bucket *b, struct sfb_sched_data *q)
 {
-	b->p_mark = prob_plus(b->p_mark, q->increment);
+	WRITE_ONCE(b->p_mark, prob_plus(b->p_mark, q->increment));
 }
 
 static void sfb_zero_all_buckets(struct sfb_sched_data *q)
@@ -202,11 +202,14 @@ static u32 sfb_compute_qlen(u32 *prob_r, u32 *avgpm_r, const struct sfb_sched_da
 	const struct sfb_bucket *b = &q->bins[q->slot].bins[0][0];
 
 	for (i = 0; i < SFB_LEVELS * SFB_NUMBUCKETS; i++) {
-		if (qlen < b->qlen)
-			qlen = b->qlen;
-		totalpm += b->p_mark;
-		if (prob < b->p_mark)
-			prob = b->p_mark;
+		u32 b_qlen = READ_ONCE(b->qlen);
+		u32 b_mark = READ_ONCE(b->p_mark);
+
+		if (qlen < b_qlen)
+			qlen = b_qlen;
+		totalpm += b_mark;
+		if (prob < b_mark)
+			prob = b_mark;
 		b++;
 	}
 	*prob_r = prob;
@@ -294,7 +297,8 @@ static int sfb_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch,
 
 	if (unlikely(sch->q.qlen >= q->limit)) {
 		qdisc_qstats_overlimit(sch);
-		q->stats.queuedrop++;
+		WRITE_ONCE(q->stats.queuedrop,
+			   q->stats.queuedrop + 1);
 		goto drop;
 	}
 
@@ -347,7 +351,8 @@ static int sfb_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch,
 
 	if (unlikely(minqlen >= q->max)) {
 		qdisc_qstats_overlimit(sch);
-		q->stats.bucketdrop++;
+		WRITE_ONCE(q->stats.bucketdrop,
+			   q->stats.bucketdrop + 1);
 		goto drop;
 	}
 
@@ -373,7 +378,8 @@ static int sfb_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch,
 		}
 		if (sfb_rate_limit(skb, q)) {
 			qdisc_qstats_overlimit(sch);
-			q->stats.penaltydrop++;
+			WRITE_ONCE(q->stats.penaltydrop,
+				   q->stats.penaltydrop + 1);
 			goto drop;
 		}
 		goto enqueue;
@@ -388,14 +394,17 @@ static int sfb_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch,
 			 * In either case, we want to start dropping packets.
 			 */
 			if (r < (p_min - SFB_MAX_PROB / 2) * 2) {
-				q->stats.earlydrop++;
+				WRITE_ONCE(q->stats.earlydrop,
+					   q->stats.earlydrop + 1);
 				goto drop;
 			}
 		}
 		if (INET_ECN_set_ce(skb)) {
-			q->stats.marked++;
+			WRITE_ONCE(q->stats.marked,
+				   q->stats.marked + 1);
 		} else {
-			q->stats.earlydrop++;
+			WRITE_ONCE(q->stats.earlydrop,
+				   q->stats.earlydrop + 1);
 			goto drop;
 		}
 	}
@@ -408,7 +417,8 @@ static int sfb_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch,
 		sch->q.qlen++;
 		increment_qlen(&cb, q);
 	} else if (net_xmit_drop_count(ret)) {
-		q->stats.childdrop++;
+		WRITE_ONCE(q->stats.childdrop,
+			   q->stats.childdrop + 1);
 		qdisc_qstats_drop(sch);
 	}
 	return ret;
@@ -597,12 +607,12 @@ static int sfb_dump_stats(struct Qdisc *sch, struct gnet_dump *d)
 {
 	struct sfb_sched_data *q = qdisc_priv(sch);
 	struct tc_sfb_xstats st = {
-		.earlydrop = q->stats.earlydrop,
-		.penaltydrop = q->stats.penaltydrop,
-		.bucketdrop = q->stats.bucketdrop,
-		.queuedrop = q->stats.queuedrop,
-		.childdrop = q->stats.childdrop,
-		.marked = q->stats.marked,
+		.earlydrop = READ_ONCE(q->stats.earlydrop),
+		.penaltydrop = READ_ONCE(q->stats.penaltydrop),
+		.bucketdrop = READ_ONCE(q->stats.bucketdrop),
+		.queuedrop = READ_ONCE(q->stats.queuedrop),
+		.childdrop = READ_ONCE(q->stats.childdrop),
+		.marked = READ_ONCE(q->stats.marked),
 	};
 
 	st.maxqlen = sfb_compute_qlen(&st.maxprob, &st.avgprob, q);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#503 lore raw

PATCH 490/666 net: dsa: realtek: rtl8365mb: fix mode mask calculation

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mieczyslaw Nalewaj <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0c078021d3861966614d5e594ee03587f0c9e74d ]

The RTL8365MB_DIGITAL_INTERFACE_SELECT_MODE_MASK macro was shifting the 4-bit mask (0xF) by only (_extint % 2) bits instead of (_extint % 2) * 4. This caused the mask to overlap with the adjacent nibble when configuring odd-numbered external interfaces, selecting the wrong bits entirely.

Align the shift calculation with the existing ...MODE_OFFSET macro.

Fixes 4af2950c50c8 ("net: dsa: realtek-smi: add rtl8365mb subdriver for RTL8365MB-VC")
---
 drivers/net/dsa/realtek/rtl8365mb.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/dsa/realtek/rtl8365mb.c +1 -1
index 4cb986988f1ad..9621fa4052f84 100644
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@
 		 (_extint) == 2 ? RTL8365MB_DIGITAL_INTERFACE_SELECT_REG1 : \
 		 0x0)
 #define   RTL8365MB_DIGITAL_INTERFACE_SELECT_MODE_MASK(_extint) \
-		(0xF << (((_extint) % 2)))
+		(0xF << (((_extint) % 2) * 4))
 #define   RTL8365MB_DIGITAL_INTERFACE_SELECT_MODE_OFFSET(_extint) \
 		(((_extint) % 2) * 4)
 
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#504 lore raw

PATCH 491/666 net: airoha: Move ndesc initialization at end of airoha_qdma_init_rx_queue()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lorenzo Bianconi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 379050947a1828826ad7ea50c95245a56929b35a ]

If queue entry or DMA descriptor list allocation fails in airoha_qdma_init_rx_queue routine, airoha_qdma_cleanup() will trigger a NULL pointer dereference running netif_napi_del() for RX queue NAPIs since netif_napi_add() has never been executed to this particular RX NAPI. The issue is due to the early ndesc initialization in airoha_qdma_init_rx_queue() since airoha_qdma_cleanup() relies on ndesc value to check if the queue is properly initialized. Fix the issue moving ndesc initialization at end of airoha_qdma_init_tx routine. Move page_pool allocation after descriptor list allocation in order to avoid memory leaks if desc allocation fails.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/airoha_eth.c | 14 +++++++-------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/airoha_eth.c +7 -7
index d8af267f64f71..7b929b20fe64b 100644
@@ -1574,14 +1574,18 @@ static int airoha_qdma_init_rx_queue(struct airoha_queue *q,
 	dma_addr_t dma_addr;
 
 	q->buf_size = PAGE_SIZE / 2;
-	q->ndesc = ndesc;
 	q->qdma = qdma;
 
-	q->entry = devm_kzalloc(eth->dev, q->ndesc * sizeof(*q->entry),
+	q->entry = devm_kzalloc(eth->dev, ndesc * sizeof(*q->entry),
 				GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!q->entry)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	q->desc = dmam_alloc_coherent(eth->dev, ndesc * sizeof(*q->desc),
+				      &dma_addr, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!q->desc)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
 	q->page_pool = page_pool_create(&pp_params);
 	if (IS_ERR(q->page_pool)) {
 		int err = PTR_ERR(q->page_pool);
@@ -1590,11 +1594,7 @@ static int airoha_qdma_init_rx_queue(struct airoha_queue *q,
 		return err;
 	}
 
-	q->desc = dmam_alloc_coherent(eth->dev, q->ndesc * sizeof(*q->desc),
-				      &dma_addr, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!q->desc)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
+	q->ndesc = ndesc;
 	netif_napi_add(eth->napi_dev, &q->napi, airoha_qdma_rx_napi_poll);
 
 	airoha_qdma_wr(qdma, REG_RX_RING_BASE(qid), dma_addr);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#505 lore raw

PATCH 492/666 virtio_net: Split struct virtio_net_rss_config

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Akihiko Odaki <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 976c2696b71da376d42e63ca3802eb2aafc164eb ]

struct virtio_net_rss_config was less useful in actual code because of a flexible array placed in the middle. Add new structures that split it into two to avoid having a flexible array in the middle.

Stable-dep-of: 3bc06da858ef ("virtio_net: sync rss_trailer.max_tx_vq on queue_pairs change via VQ_PAIRS_SET")

---
 include/uapi/linux/virtio_net.h | 13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
include/uapi/linux/virtio_net.h +13 -0
index ac9174717ef13..963540deae66a 100644
@@ -327,6 +327,19 @@ struct virtio_net_rss_config {
 	__u8 hash_key_data[/* hash_key_length */];
 };
 
+struct virtio_net_rss_config_hdr {
+	__le32 hash_types;
+	__le16 indirection_table_mask;
+	__le16 unclassified_queue;
+	__le16 indirection_table[/* 1 + indirection_table_mask */];
+};
+
+struct virtio_net_rss_config_trailer {
+	__le16 max_tx_vq;
+	__u8 hash_key_length;
+	__u8 hash_key_data[/* hash_key_length */];
+};
+
  #define VIRTIO_NET_CTRL_MQ_RSS_CONFIG          1
 
 /*
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#506 lore raw

PATCH 493/666 virtio_net: Fix endian with virtio_net_ctrl_rss

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Akihiko Odaki <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 97841341e302eac13d54eb5e968570b5626196a7 ]

Mark the fields of struct virtio_net_ctrl_rss as little endian as they are in struct virtio_net_rss_config, which it follows.

Stable-dep-of: 3bc06da858ef ("virtio_net: sync rss_trailer.max_tx_vq on queue_pairs change via VQ_PAIRS_SET")

---
 drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 30 +++++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
drivers/net/virtio_net.c +15 -15
index 5c83983f0eb3f..05b50a4626b85 100644
@@ -373,15 +373,15 @@ struct receive_queue {
  */
 #define VIRTIO_NET_RSS_MAX_KEY_SIZE     40
 struct virtio_net_ctrl_rss {
-	u32 hash_types;
-	u16 indirection_table_mask;
-	u16 unclassified_queue;
-	u16 hash_cfg_reserved; /* for HASH_CONFIG (see virtio_net_hash_config for details) */
-	u16 max_tx_vq;
+	__le32 hash_types;
+	__le16 indirection_table_mask;
+	__le16 unclassified_queue;
+	__le16 hash_cfg_reserved; /* for HASH_CONFIG (see virtio_net_hash_config for details) */
+	__le16 max_tx_vq;
 	u8 hash_key_length;
 	u8 key[VIRTIO_NET_RSS_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
 
-	u16 *indirection_table;
+	__le16 *indirection_table;
 };
 
 /* Control VQ buffers: protected by the rtnl lock */
@@ -3477,9 +3477,9 @@ static void virtnet_rss_update_by_qpairs(struct virtnet_info *vi, u16 queue_pair
 
 	for (; i < vi->rss_indir_table_size; ++i) {
 		indir_val = ethtool_rxfh_indir_default(i, queue_pairs);
-		vi->rss.indirection_table[i] = indir_val;
+		vi->rss.indirection_table[i] = cpu_to_le16(indir_val);
 	}
-	vi->rss.max_tx_vq = queue_pairs;
+	vi->rss.max_tx_vq = cpu_to_le16(queue_pairs);
 }
 
 static int virtnet_set_queues(struct virtnet_info *vi, u16 queue_pairs)
@@ -3998,10 +3998,10 @@ static bool virtnet_commit_rss_command(struct virtnet_info *vi)
 
 static void virtnet_init_default_rss(struct virtnet_info *vi)
 {
-	vi->rss.hash_types = vi->rss_hash_types_supported;
+	vi->rss.hash_types = cpu_to_le32(vi->rss_hash_types_supported);
 	vi->rss_hash_types_saved = vi->rss_hash_types_supported;
 	vi->rss.indirection_table_mask = vi->rss_indir_table_size
-						? vi->rss_indir_table_size - 1 : 0;
+						? cpu_to_le16(vi->rss_indir_table_size - 1) : 0;
 	vi->rss.unclassified_queue = 0;
 
 	virtnet_rss_update_by_qpairs(vi, vi->curr_queue_pairs);
@@ -4119,7 +4119,7 @@ static bool virtnet_set_hashflow(struct virtnet_info *vi, struct ethtool_rxnfc *
 
 	if (new_hashtypes != vi->rss_hash_types_saved) {
 		vi->rss_hash_types_saved = new_hashtypes;
-		vi->rss.hash_types = vi->rss_hash_types_saved;
+		vi->rss.hash_types = cpu_to_le32(vi->rss_hash_types_saved);
 		if (vi->dev->features & NETIF_F_RXHASH)
 			return virtnet_commit_rss_command(vi);
 	}
@@ -5291,7 +5291,7 @@ static int virtnet_get_rxfh(struct net_device *dev,
 
 	if (rxfh->indir) {
 		for (i = 0; i < vi->rss_indir_table_size; ++i)
-			rxfh->indir[i] = vi->rss.indirection_table[i];
+			rxfh->indir[i] = le16_to_cpu(vi->rss.indirection_table[i]);
 	}
 
 	if (rxfh->key)
@@ -5319,7 +5319,7 @@ static int virtnet_set_rxfh(struct net_device *dev,
 			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
 		for (i = 0; i < vi->rss_indir_table_size; ++i)
-			vi->rss.indirection_table[i] = rxfh->indir[i];
+			vi->rss.indirection_table[i] = cpu_to_le16(rxfh->indir[i]);
 		update = true;
 	}
 
@@ -5945,9 +5945,9 @@ static int virtnet_set_features(struct net_device *dev,
 
 	if ((dev->features ^ features) & NETIF_F_RXHASH) {
 		if (features & NETIF_F_RXHASH)
-			vi->rss.hash_types = vi->rss_hash_types_saved;
+			vi->rss.hash_types = cpu_to_le32(vi->rss_hash_types_saved);
 		else
-			vi->rss.hash_types = VIRTIO_NET_HASH_REPORT_NONE;
+			vi->rss.hash_types = cpu_to_le32(VIRTIO_NET_HASH_REPORT_NONE);
 
 		if (!virtnet_commit_rss_command(vi))
 			return -EINVAL;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#507 lore raw

PATCH 494/666 virtio_net: Use new RSS config structs

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Akihiko Odaki <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ed3100e90d0d120a045a551b85eb43cf2527e885 ]

The new RSS configuration structures allow easily constructing data for VIRTIO_NET_CTRL_MQ_RSS_CONFIG as they strictly follow the order of data for the command.

Stable-dep-of: 3bc06da858ef ("virtio_net: sync rss_trailer.max_tx_vq on queue_pairs change via VQ_PAIRS_SET")

---
 drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 117 ++++++++++++++-------------------------
 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 74 deletions(-)
drivers/net/virtio_net.c +43 -74
index 05b50a4626b85..7aa1832672942 100644
@@ -365,24 +365,7 @@ struct receive_queue {
 	bool do_dma;
 };
 
-/* This structure can contain rss message with maximum settings for indirection table and keysize
- * Note, that default structure that describes RSS configuration virtio_net_rss_config
- * contains same info but can't handle table values.
- * In any case, structure would be passed to virtio hw through sg_buf split by parts
- * because table sizes may be differ according to the device configuration.
- */
 #define VIRTIO_NET_RSS_MAX_KEY_SIZE     40
-struct virtio_net_ctrl_rss {
-	__le32 hash_types;
-	__le16 indirection_table_mask;
-	__le16 unclassified_queue;
-	__le16 hash_cfg_reserved; /* for HASH_CONFIG (see virtio_net_hash_config for details) */
-	__le16 max_tx_vq;
-	u8 hash_key_length;
-	u8 key[VIRTIO_NET_RSS_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
-
-	__le16 *indirection_table;
-};
 
 /* Control VQ buffers: protected by the rtnl lock */
 struct control_buf {
@@ -426,7 +409,9 @@ struct virtnet_info {
 	u16 rss_indir_table_size;
 	u32 rss_hash_types_supported;
 	u32 rss_hash_types_saved;
-	struct virtio_net_ctrl_rss rss;
+	struct virtio_net_rss_config_hdr *rss_hdr;
+	struct virtio_net_rss_config_trailer rss_trailer;
+	u8 rss_hash_key_data[VIRTIO_NET_RSS_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
 
 	/* Has control virtqueue */
 	bool has_cvq;
@@ -520,23 +505,16 @@ static struct sk_buff *virtnet_skb_append_frag(struct sk_buff *head_skb,
 					       struct page *page, void *buf,
 					       int len, int truesize);
 
-static int rss_indirection_table_alloc(struct virtio_net_ctrl_rss *rss, u16 indir_table_size)
+static size_t virtnet_rss_hdr_size(const struct virtnet_info *vi)
 {
-	if (!indir_table_size) {
-		rss->indirection_table = NULL;
-		return 0;
-	}
+	u16 indir_table_size = vi->has_rss ? vi->rss_indir_table_size : 1;
 
-	rss->indirection_table = kmalloc_array(indir_table_size, sizeof(u16), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!rss->indirection_table)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	return 0;
+	return struct_size(vi->rss_hdr, indirection_table, indir_table_size);
 }
 
-static void rss_indirection_table_free(struct virtio_net_ctrl_rss *rss)
+static size_t virtnet_rss_trailer_size(const struct virtnet_info *vi)
 {
-	kfree(rss->indirection_table);
+	return struct_size(&vi->rss_trailer, hash_key_data, vi->rss_key_size);
 }
 
 static bool is_xdp_frame(void *ptr)
@@ -3477,15 +3455,16 @@ static void virtnet_rss_update_by_qpairs(struct virtnet_info *vi, u16 queue_pair
 
 	for (; i < vi->rss_indir_table_size; ++i) {
 		indir_val = ethtool_rxfh_indir_default(i, queue_pairs);
-		vi->rss.indirection_table[i] = cpu_to_le16(indir_val);
+		vi->rss_hdr->indirection_table[i] = cpu_to_le16(indir_val);
 	}
-	vi->rss.max_tx_vq = cpu_to_le16(queue_pairs);
+	vi->rss_trailer.max_tx_vq = cpu_to_le16(queue_pairs);
 }
 
 static int virtnet_set_queues(struct virtnet_info *vi, u16 queue_pairs)
 {
 	struct virtio_net_ctrl_mq *mq __free(kfree) = NULL;
-	struct virtio_net_ctrl_rss old_rss;
+	struct virtio_net_rss_config_hdr *old_rss_hdr;
+	struct virtio_net_rss_config_trailer old_rss_trailer;
 	struct net_device *dev = vi->dev;
 	struct scatterlist sg;
 
@@ -3500,24 +3479,28 @@ static int virtnet_set_queues(struct virtnet_info *vi, u16 queue_pairs)
 	 * update (VIRTIO_NET_CTRL_MQ_VQ_PAIRS_SET below) and return directly.
 	 */
 	if (vi->has_rss && !netif_is_rxfh_configured(dev)) {
-		memcpy(&old_rss, &vi->rss, sizeof(old_rss));
-		if (rss_indirection_table_alloc(&vi->rss, vi->rss_indir_table_size)) {
-			vi->rss.indirection_table = old_rss.indirection_table;
+		old_rss_hdr = vi->rss_hdr;
+		old_rss_trailer = vi->rss_trailer;
+		vi->rss_hdr = kzalloc(virtnet_rss_hdr_size(vi), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!vi->rss_hdr) {
+			vi->rss_hdr = old_rss_hdr;
 			return -ENOMEM;
 		}
 
+		*vi->rss_hdr = *old_rss_hdr;
 		virtnet_rss_update_by_qpairs(vi, queue_pairs);
 
 		if (!virtnet_commit_rss_command(vi)) {
 			/* restore ctrl_rss if commit_rss_command failed */
-			rss_indirection_table_free(&vi->rss);
-			memcpy(&vi->rss, &old_rss, sizeof(old_rss));
+			kfree(vi->rss_hdr);
+			vi->rss_hdr = old_rss_hdr;
+			vi->rss_trailer = old_rss_trailer;
 
 			dev_warn(&dev->dev, "Fail to set num of queue pairs to %d, because committing RSS failed\n",
 				 queue_pairs);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
-		rss_indirection_table_free(&old_rss);
+		kfree(old_rss_hdr);
 		goto succ;
 	}
 
@@ -3960,28 +3943,12 @@ static int virtnet_set_ringparam(struct net_device *dev,
 static bool virtnet_commit_rss_command(struct virtnet_info *vi)
 {
 	struct net_device *dev = vi->dev;
-	struct scatterlist sgs[4];
-	unsigned int sg_buf_size;
+	struct scatterlist sgs[2];
 
 	/* prepare sgs */
-	sg_init_table(sgs, 4);
-
-	sg_buf_size = offsetof(struct virtio_net_ctrl_rss, hash_cfg_reserved);
-	sg_set_buf(&sgs[0], &vi->rss, sg_buf_size);
-
-	if (vi->has_rss) {
-		sg_buf_size = sizeof(uint16_t) * vi->rss_indir_table_size;
-		sg_set_buf(&sgs[1], vi->rss.indirection_table, sg_buf_size);
-	} else {
-		sg_set_buf(&sgs[1], &vi->rss.hash_cfg_reserved, sizeof(uint16_t));
-	}
-
-	sg_buf_size = offsetof(struct virtio_net_ctrl_rss, key)
-			- offsetof(struct virtio_net_ctrl_rss, max_tx_vq);
-	sg_set_buf(&sgs[2], &vi->rss.max_tx_vq, sg_buf_size);
-
-	sg_buf_size = vi->rss_key_size;
-	sg_set_buf(&sgs[3], vi->rss.key, sg_buf_size);
+	sg_init_table(sgs, 2);
+	sg_set_buf(&sgs[0], vi->rss_hdr, virtnet_rss_hdr_size(vi));
+	sg_set_buf(&sgs[1], &vi->rss_trailer, virtnet_rss_trailer_size(vi));
 
 	if (!virtnet_send_command(vi, VIRTIO_NET_CTRL_MQ,
 				  vi->has_rss ? VIRTIO_NET_CTRL_MQ_RSS_CONFIG
@@ -3998,17 +3965,17 @@ static bool virtnet_commit_rss_command(struct virtnet_info *vi)
 
 static void virtnet_init_default_rss(struct virtnet_info *vi)
 {
-	vi->rss.hash_types = cpu_to_le32(vi->rss_hash_types_supported);
+	vi->rss_hdr->hash_types = cpu_to_le32(vi->rss_hash_types_supported);
 	vi->rss_hash_types_saved = vi->rss_hash_types_supported;
-	vi->rss.indirection_table_mask = vi->rss_indir_table_size
+	vi->rss_hdr->indirection_table_mask = vi->rss_indir_table_size
 						? cpu_to_le16(vi->rss_indir_table_size - 1) : 0;
-	vi->rss.unclassified_queue = 0;
+	vi->rss_hdr->unclassified_queue = 0;
 
 	virtnet_rss_update_by_qpairs(vi, vi->curr_queue_pairs);
 
-	vi->rss.hash_key_length = vi->rss_key_size;
+	vi->rss_trailer.hash_key_length = vi->rss_key_size;
 
-	netdev_rss_key_fill(vi->rss.key, vi->rss_key_size);
+	netdev_rss_key_fill(vi->rss_hash_key_data, vi->rss_key_size);
 }
 
 static void virtnet_get_hashflow(const struct virtnet_info *vi, struct ethtool_rxnfc *info)
@@ -4119,7 +4086,7 @@ static bool virtnet_set_hashflow(struct virtnet_info *vi, struct ethtool_rxnfc *
 
 	if (new_hashtypes != vi->rss_hash_types_saved) {
 		vi->rss_hash_types_saved = new_hashtypes;
-		vi->rss.hash_types = cpu_to_le32(vi->rss_hash_types_saved);
+		vi->rss_hdr->hash_types = cpu_to_le32(vi->rss_hash_types_saved);
 		if (vi->dev->features & NETIF_F_RXHASH)
 			return virtnet_commit_rss_command(vi);
 	}
@@ -5291,11 +5258,11 @@ static int virtnet_get_rxfh(struct net_device *dev,
 
 	if (rxfh->indir) {
 		for (i = 0; i < vi->rss_indir_table_size; ++i)
-			rxfh->indir[i] = le16_to_cpu(vi->rss.indirection_table[i]);
+			rxfh->indir[i] = le16_to_cpu(vi->rss_hdr->indirection_table[i]);
 	}
 
 	if (rxfh->key)
-		memcpy(rxfh->key, vi->rss.key, vi->rss_key_size);
+		memcpy(rxfh->key, vi->rss_hash_key_data, vi->rss_key_size);
 
 	rxfh->hfunc = ETH_RSS_HASH_TOP;
 
@@ -5319,7 +5286,7 @@ static int virtnet_set_rxfh(struct net_device *dev,
 			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
 		for (i = 0; i < vi->rss_indir_table_size; ++i)
-			vi->rss.indirection_table[i] = cpu_to_le16(rxfh->indir[i]);
+			vi->rss_hdr->indirection_table[i] = cpu_to_le16(rxfh->indir[i]);
 		update = true;
 	}
 
@@ -5331,7 +5298,7 @@ static int virtnet_set_rxfh(struct net_device *dev,
 		if (!vi->has_rss && !vi->has_rss_hash_report)
 			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-		memcpy(vi->rss.key, rxfh->key, vi->rss_key_size);
+		memcpy(vi->rss_hash_key_data, rxfh->key, vi->rss_key_size);
 		update = true;
 	}
 
@@ -5945,9 +5912,9 @@ static int virtnet_set_features(struct net_device *dev,
 
 	if ((dev->features ^ features) & NETIF_F_RXHASH) {
 		if (features & NETIF_F_RXHASH)
-			vi->rss.hash_types = cpu_to_le32(vi->rss_hash_types_saved);
+			vi->rss_hdr->hash_types = cpu_to_le32(vi->rss_hash_types_saved);
 		else
-			vi->rss.hash_types = cpu_to_le32(VIRTIO_NET_HASH_REPORT_NONE);
+			vi->rss_hdr->hash_types = cpu_to_le32(VIRTIO_NET_HASH_REPORT_NONE);
 
 		if (!virtnet_commit_rss_command(vi))
 			return -EINVAL;
@@ -6619,9 +6586,11 @@ static int virtnet_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev)
 			virtio_cread16(vdev, offsetof(struct virtio_net_config,
 				rss_max_indirection_table_length));
 	}
-	err = rss_indirection_table_alloc(&vi->rss, vi->rss_indir_table_size);
-	if (err)
+	vi->rss_hdr = kzalloc(virtnet_rss_hdr_size(vi), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!vi->rss_hdr) {
+		err = -ENOMEM;
 		goto free;
+	}
 
 	if (vi->has_rss || vi->has_rss_hash_report) {
 		vi->rss_key_size =
@@ -6900,7 +6869,7 @@ static void virtnet_remove(struct virtio_device *vdev)
 
 	remove_vq_common(vi);
 
-	rss_indirection_table_free(&vi->rss);
+	kfree(vi->rss_hdr);
 
 	free_netdev(vi->dev);
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#508 lore raw

PATCH 495/666 virtio_net: sync rss_trailer.max_tx_vq on queue_pairs change via VQ_PAIRS_SET

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Brett Creeley <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3bc06da858ef17cfe94b49efc0d9713727012835 ]

When netif_is_rxfh_configured() is true (i.e., the user has explicitly configured the RSS indirection table), virtnet_set_queues() skips the RSS update path and falls through to the VIRTIO_NET_CTRL_MQ_VQ_PAIRS_SET command to change the number of queue pairs. However, it does not update vi->rss_trailer.max_tx_vq to reflect the new queue_pairs value.

This causes a mismatch between vi->curr_queue_pairs and vi->rss_trailer.max_tx_vq. Any subsequent RSS reconfiguration (e.g., via ethtool -X) calls virtnet_commit_rss_command(), which sends the stale max_tx_vq to the device, silently reverting the queue count.

Reproduction:
1. User configured RSS
ethtool -X eth0 equal 8
2. VQ_PAIRS_SET path; max_tx_vq stays 16
ethtool -L eth0 combined 12
3. RSS commit uses max_tx_vq=16 instead of 12
ethtool -X eth0 equal 4

Fix this by updating vi->rss_trailer.max_tx_vq after a successful VQ_PAIRS_SET command when RSS is enabled, keeping it in sync with curr_queue_pairs.

---
 drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/net/virtio_net.c +6 -0
index 7aa1832672942..324802cef40b4 100644
@@ -3517,6 +3517,12 @@ static int virtnet_set_queues(struct virtnet_info *vi, u16 queue_pairs)
 			 queue_pairs);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
+
+	/* Keep max_tx_vq in sync so that a later RSS command does not
+	 * revert queue_pairs to a stale value.
+	 */
+	if (vi->has_rss)
+		vi->rss_trailer.max_tx_vq = cpu_to_le16(queue_pairs);
 succ:
 	vi->curr_queue_pairs = queue_pairs;
 	/* virtnet_open() will refill when device is going to up. */
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#509 lore raw

PATCH 496/666 nfp: fix swapped arguments in nfp_encode_basic_qdr() calls

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alexey Kodanev <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4078c5611d7585548b249377ebd60c272e410490 ]

There is a mismatch between the passed arguments and the actual nfp_encode_basic_qdr() function parameter names:

static int nfp_encode_basic_qdr(u64 addr, int dest_island, int cpp_tgt,
int mode, bool addr40, int isld1, int isld0)

  {
      ...

But "dest_island" and "cpp_tgt" are swapped at every call-site. For example:

return nfp_encode_basic_qdr(*addr, cpp_tgt, dest_island,

                              mode, addr40, isld1, isld0);

As a result, nfp_encode_basic_qdr() receives "dest_island" as CPP target type, which is always NFP_CPP_TARGET_QDR(2) for these calls, and "cpp_tgt" as the destination island ID, which can accidentally match or be outside the valid NFP_CPP_TARGET_* types (e.g. '-1' for any destination).

Since code already worked for years, also add extra pr_warn() to error paths in nfp_encode_basic_qdr() to help identify any potential address verification failures.

Detected using the static analysis tool - Svace.

---
 .../ethernet/netronome/nfp/nfpcore/nfp_target.c | 17 +++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/nfpcore/nfp_target.c +11 -6
index 79470f198a62a..9cf19446657c6 100644
@@ -435,12 +435,17 @@ static int nfp_encode_basic_qdr(u64 addr, int dest_island, int cpp_tgt,
 
 	/* Full Island ID and channel bits overlap? */
 	ret = nfp_decode_basic(addr, &v, cpp_tgt, mode, addr40, isld1, isld0);
-	if (ret)
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_warn("%s: decode dest_island failed: %d\n", __func__, ret);
 		return ret;
+	}
 
 	/* The current address won't go where expected? */
-	if (dest_island != -1 && dest_island != v)
+	if (dest_island != -1 && dest_island != v) {
+		pr_warn("%s: dest_island mismatch: current (%d) != decoded (%d)\n",
+			__func__, dest_island, v);
 		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 
 	/* If dest_island was -1, we don't care where it goes. */
 	return 0;
@@ -493,7 +498,7 @@ static int nfp_encode_basic(u64 *addr, int dest_island, int cpp_tgt,
 			 * the address but we can verify if the existing
 			 * contents will point to a valid island.
 			 */
-			return nfp_encode_basic_qdr(*addr, cpp_tgt, dest_island,
+			return nfp_encode_basic_qdr(*addr, dest_island, cpp_tgt,
 						    mode, addr40, isld1, isld0);
 
 		iid_lsb = addr40 ? 34 : 26;
@@ -504,7 +509,7 @@ static int nfp_encode_basic(u64 *addr, int dest_island, int cpp_tgt,
 		return 0;
 	case 1:
 		if (cpp_tgt == NFP_CPP_TARGET_QDR && !addr40)
-			return nfp_encode_basic_qdr(*addr, cpp_tgt, dest_island,
+			return nfp_encode_basic_qdr(*addr, dest_island, cpp_tgt,
 						    mode, addr40, isld1, isld0);
 
 		idx_lsb = addr40 ? 39 : 31;
@@ -530,7 +535,7 @@ static int nfp_encode_basic(u64 *addr, int dest_island, int cpp_tgt,
 			 * be set before hand and with them select an island.
 			 * So we need to confirm that it's at least plausible.
 			 */
-			return nfp_encode_basic_qdr(*addr, cpp_tgt, dest_island,
+			return nfp_encode_basic_qdr(*addr, dest_island, cpp_tgt,
 						    mode, addr40, isld1, isld0);
 
 		/* Make sure we compare against isldN values
@@ -551,7 +556,7 @@ static int nfp_encode_basic(u64 *addr, int dest_island, int cpp_tgt,
 			 * iid<1> = addr<30> = channel<0>
 			 * channel<1> = addr<31> = Index
 			 */
-			return nfp_encode_basic_qdr(*addr, cpp_tgt, dest_island,
+			return nfp_encode_basic_qdr(*addr, dest_island, cpp_tgt,
 						    mode, addr40, isld1, isld0);
 
 		isld[0] &= ~3;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#510 lore raw

PATCH 497/666 tipc: fix double-free in tipc_buf_append()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lee Jones <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d293ca716e7d5dffdaecaf6b9b2f857a33dc3d3a ]

tipc_msg_validate() can potentially reallocate the skb it is validating, freeing the old one. In tipc_buf_append(), it was being called with a pointer to a local variable which was a copy of the caller's skb pointer.

If the skb was reallocated and validation subsequently failed, the error handling path would free the original skb pointer, which had already been freed, leading to double-free.

Fix this by checking if head now points to a newly allocated reassembled skb. If it does, reassign *headbuf for later freeing operations.

Fixes d618d09a68e4 ("tipc: enforce valid ratio between skb truesize and contents")
---
 net/tipc/msg.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/tipc/msg.c +13 -1
index 76284fc538ebd..b0bba0feef564 100644
@@ -177,8 +177,20 @@ int tipc_buf_append(struct sk_buff **headbuf, struct sk_buff **buf)
 
 	if (fragid == LAST_FRAGMENT) {
 		TIPC_SKB_CB(head)->validated = 0;
-		if (unlikely(!tipc_msg_validate(&head)))
+
+		/* If the reassembled skb has been freed in
+		 * tipc_msg_validate() because of an invalid truesize,
+		 * then head will point to a newly allocated reassembled
+		 * skb, while *headbuf points to freed reassembled skb.
+		 * In such cases, correct *headbuf for freeing the newly
+		 * allocated reassembled skb later.
+		 */
+		if (unlikely(!tipc_msg_validate(&head))) {
+			if (head != *headbuf)
+				*headbuf = head;
 			goto err;
+		}
+
 		*buf = head;
 		TIPC_SKB_CB(head)->tail = NULL;
 		*headbuf = NULL;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#511 lore raw

PATCH 498/666 vhost_net: fix sleeping with preempt-disabled in vhost_net_busy_poll()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kohei Enju <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e08a9fac5cf8c3fecf4755e7e3ac059f78b8f83d ]

syzbot reported "sleeping function called from invalid context" in vhost_net_busy_poll().

Commit 030881372460 ("vhost_net: basic polling support") introduced a busy-poll loop and preempt_{disable,enable}() around it, where each iteration calls a sleepable function inside the loop.

The purpose of disabling preemption was to keep local_clock()-based timeout accounting on a single CPU, rather than as a requirement of busy-poll itself:

https://lore.kernel.org/[email protected]

Quoted 1 line

From this perspective, migrate_disable() is sufficient here, so replace

preempt_disable() with migrate_disable(), avoiding sleepable accesses from a preempt-disabled context.

---
 drivers/vhost/net.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/vhost/net.c +2 -2
index aff4ec7835628..3ad1a6f4ef965 100644
@@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ static void vhost_net_busy_poll(struct vhost_net *net,
 	busyloop_timeout = poll_rx ? rvq->busyloop_timeout:
 				     tvq->busyloop_timeout;
 
-	preempt_disable();
+	migrate_disable();
 	endtime = busy_clock() + busyloop_timeout;
 
 	while (vhost_can_busy_poll(endtime)) {
@@ -566,7 +566,7 @@ static void vhost_net_busy_poll(struct vhost_net *net,
 		cpu_relax();
 	}
 
-	preempt_enable();
+	migrate_enable();
 
 	if (poll_rx || sock_has_rx_data(sock))
 		vhost_net_busy_poll_try_queue(net, vq);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#512 lore raw

PATCH 499/666 fs/adfs: validate nzones in adfs_validate_bblk()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bae Yeonju <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit dd9d3e16c2d5fa166e13dce07413be51f42c8f5d ]

Reject ADFS disc records with a zero zone count during boot block validation, before the disc record is used.

When nzones is 0, adfs_read_map() passes it to kmalloc_array(0, ...) which returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR, and adfs_map_layout() then writes to dm[-1], causing an out-of-bounds write before the allocated buffer.

adfs_validate_dr0() already rejects nzones != 1 for old-format images. Add the equivalent check to adfs_validate_bblk() for new-format images so that a crafted image with nzones == 0 is rejected at probe time.

Found by syzkaller.

Fixes f6f14a0d71b0 ("fs/adfs: map: move map-specific sb initialisation to map.c")
---
 fs/adfs/super.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/adfs/super.c +3 -0
index f0b999a4961b2..998ea8a2f8337 100644
@@ -343,6 +343,9 @@ static int adfs_validate_bblk(struct super_block *sb, struct buffer_head *bh,
 	if (adfs_checkdiscrecord(dr))
 		return -EILSEQ;
 
+	if ((dr->nzones | dr->nzones_high << 8) == 0)
+		return -EILSEQ;
+
 	*drp = dr;
 	return 0;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#513 lore raw

PATCH 500/666 rtc: abx80x: Disable alarm feature if no interrupt attached

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Anthony Pighin (Nokia) <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0fedce7244e4b85c049ce579c87e298a1b0b811d ]

Commit 795cda8338ea ("rtc: interface: Fix long-standing race when setting alarm") exposed an issue where the rtc-abx80x driver does not clear the alarm feature bit, but instead relies on the set_alarm operation to return invalid.

For example, when a RTC_UIE_ON ioctl is handled, it should abort at the feature validation. Instead, it proceeds to the rtc_timer_enqueue(), which used to return an error from the set_alarm call. However, following the race condition handling, which likely should not be discarding predecing errors, a success condition is returned to the ioctl() caller. This results in (for example):
hwclock: select() to /dev/rtc0 to wait for clock tick timed out

Notwithstanding the validity of the race condition handling, if an interrupt wasn't specified, or could not be attached, the driver should clear the alarm feature bit.

---
 drivers/rtc/rtc-abx80x.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/rtc/rtc-abx80x.c +2 -0
index 3fee27914ba80..5f3a3e60a19d0 100644
@@ -933,6 +933,8 @@ static int abx80x_probe(struct i2c_client *client)
 			client->irq = 0;
 		}
 	}
+	if (client->irq <= 0)
+		clear_bit(RTC_FEATURE_ALARM, priv->rtc->features);
 
 	err = rtc_add_group(priv->rtc, &rtc_calib_attr_group);
 	if (err) {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#514 lore raw

PATCH 501/666 kbuild: builddeb - avoid recompiles for non-cross-compiles

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2452dcf4d740effff5aa71b7f6529ee8c04fd8f6 ]

Commit e2c318225ac1 ("kbuild: deb-pkg: add pkg.linux-upstream.nokernelheaders build profile") changed how install-extmod-build gets called, making it always rebuild the host programs below scripts/ if HOSTCC wasn't specified with its full triplet on the make command line. That is, apparently, needed to fix up commit f1d87664b82a ("kbuild: cross-compile linux-headers package when possible") for cross-compiles. However, in the much more common case of non-cross-compile builds this will lead to unnecessary rebuilding of host tools including gcc plugins. This, in turn, will lead to a full kernel rebuild on the next 'make bindeb-pkg' which is unfortunate.

Avoid that by only triggering the rebuild of host tools for actual cross-compile builds.

Fixes e2c318225ac1 ("kbuild: deb-pkg: add pkg.linux-upstream.nokernelheaders build profile")
Cc Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>
---
 scripts/package/builddeb | 8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
scripts/package/builddeb +7 -1
index fb686fd3266f0..1d7d4838eebd4 100755
@@ -125,7 +125,13 @@ install_kernel_headers () {
 	pdir=debian/$1
 	version=${1#linux-headers-}
 
-	CC="${DEB_HOST_GNU_TYPE}-gcc" "${srctree}/scripts/package/install-extmod-build" "${pdir}/usr/src/linux-headers-${version}"
+	# Override $CC only for cross-compiles, to not unnecessarily rebuild
+	# scripts/ including plugins, which may lead to a full kernel rebuild.
+	if [ -n "${CROSS_COMPILE}" ]; then
+		CC="${DEB_HOST_GNU_TYPE}-gcc" "${srctree}/scripts/package/install-extmod-build" "${pdir}/usr/src/linux-headers-${version}"
+	else
+		"${srctree}/scripts/package/install-extmod-build" "${pdir}/usr/src/linux-headers-${version}"
+	fi
 
 	mkdir -p $pdir/lib/modules/$version/
 	ln -s /usr/src/linux-headers-$version $pdir/lib/modules/$version/build
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#515 lore raw

PATCH 502/666 fbdev: offb: fix PCI device reference leak on probe failure

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yuho Choi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 869b93ba04088713596e68453c1146f52f713290 ]

offb_init_nodriver() gets a referenced PCI device with pci_get_device(). If pci_enable_device() fails, the function returns without dropping that reference.

Release the PCI device reference before returning from the pci_enable_device() failure path.

Fixes 5bda8f7b5468 ("video: fbdev: offb: Call pci_enable_device() before using the PCI VGA device")
---
 drivers/video/fbdev/offb.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/video/fbdev/offb.c +6 -1
index f85428e13996b..166b2dff36f59 100644
@@ -640,8 +640,13 @@ static void offb_init_nodriver(struct platform_device *parent, struct device_nod
 			vid = be32_to_cpup(vidp);
 			did = be32_to_cpup(didp);
 			pdev = pci_get_device(vid, did, NULL);
-			if (!pdev || pci_enable_device(pdev))
+			if (!pdev)
 				return;
+
+			if (pci_enable_device(pdev)) {
+				pci_dev_put(pdev);
+				return;
+			}
 		}
 #endif
 		/* kludge for valkyrie */
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#516 lore raw

PATCH 503/666 mailbox: mtk-cmdq: Fix CURR and END addr for task insert case

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jason-JH Lin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d2591db9c8ef19fbb4d24ed15e0c6edfa6bc7917 ]

Fix CURR and END address calculation for inserting a cmdq task into the task list by using cmdq_reg_shift_addr() for proper address converting. This ensures both CURR and END addresses are set correctly when enabling the thread.

Fixes a195c7ccfb7a ("mailbox: mtk-cmdq: Refine DMA address handling for the command buffer")
---
 drivers/mailbox/mtk-cmdq-mailbox.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/mailbox/mtk-cmdq-mailbox.c +4 -4
index 80a10361492b0..f1159dabcd4e9 100644
@@ -434,14 +434,14 @@ static int cmdq_mbox_send_data(struct mbox_chan *chan, void *data)
 		if (curr_pa == end_pa - CMDQ_INST_SIZE ||
 		    curr_pa == end_pa) {
 			/* set to this task directly */
-			writel(task->pa_base >> cmdq->pdata->shift,
-			       thread->base + CMDQ_THR_CURR_ADDR);
+			gce_addr = cmdq_convert_gce_addr(task->pa_base, cmdq->pdata);
+			writel(gce_addr, thread->base + CMDQ_THR_CURR_ADDR);
 		} else {
 			cmdq_task_insert_into_thread(task);
 			smp_mb(); /* modify jump before enable thread */
 		}
-		writel((task->pa_base + pkt->cmd_buf_size) >> cmdq->pdata->shift,
-		       thread->base + CMDQ_THR_END_ADDR);
+		gce_addr = cmdq_convert_gce_addr(task->pa_base + pkt->cmd_buf_size, cmdq->pdata);
+		writel(gce_addr, thread->base + CMDQ_THR_END_ADDR);
 		cmdq_thread_resume(thread);
 	}
 	list_move_tail(&task->list_entry, &thread->task_busy_list);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#517 lore raw

PATCH 504/666 mailbox: mailbox-test: free channels on probe error

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wolfram Sang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c02053a9055d5fdfd32432287cca8958db1d5bc5 ]

On probe error, free the previously obtained channels. This not only prevents a leak, but also UAF scenarios because the client structure will be removed nonetheless because it was allocated with devm.

Fixes 8ea4484d0c2b ("mailbox: Add generic mechanism for testing Mailbox Controllers")
---
 drivers/mailbox/mailbox-test.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/mailbox/mailbox-test.c +12 -3
index e416ce9e2d674..2e0ce6c590485 100644
@@ -404,18 +404,27 @@ static int mbox_test_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	if (tdev->rx_channel) {
 		tdev->rx_buffer = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev,
 					       MBOX_MAX_MSG_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!tdev->rx_buffer)
-			return -ENOMEM;
+		if (!tdev->rx_buffer) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto err_free_chans;
+		}
 	}
 
 	ret = mbox_test_add_debugfs(pdev, tdev);
 	if (ret)
-		return ret;
+		goto err_free_chans;
 
 	init_waitqueue_head(&tdev->waitq);
 	dev_info(&pdev->dev, "Successfully registered\n");
 
 	return 0;
+
+err_free_chans:
+	if (tdev->tx_channel)
+		mbox_free_channel(tdev->tx_channel);
+	if (tdev->rx_channel)
+		mbox_free_channel(tdev->rx_channel);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static void mbox_test_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#518 lore raw

PATCH 505/666 sched/psi: fix race between file release and pressure write

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Edward Adam Davis <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a5b98009f16d8a5fb4a8ff9a193f5735515c38fa ]

A potential race condition exists between pressure write and cgroup file release regarding the priv member of struct kernfs_open_file, which triggers the uaf reported in [1].

Consider the following scenario involving execution on two separate CPUs:

CPU0 CPU1
==== ====

					vfs_rmdir()
					kernfs_iop_rmdir()
					cgroup_rmdir()
					cgroup_kn_lock_live()
					cgroup_destroy_locked()
					cgroup_addrm_files()
					cgroup_rm_file()
					kernfs_remove_by_name()
					kernfs_remove_by_name_ns()
 vfs_write()				__kernfs_remove()
 new_sync_write()			kernfs_drain()
 kernfs_fop_write_iter()		kernfs_drain_open_files()
 cgroup_file_write()			kernfs_release_file()
 pressure_write()			cgroup_file_release()
 ctx = of->priv;
					kfree(ctx);

of->priv = NULL; cgroup_kn_unlock()
cgroup_kn_lock_live()
cgroup_get(cgrp)
cgroup_kn_unlock()
if (ctx->psi.trigger) // here, trigger uaf for ctx, that is of->priv

The cgroup_rmdir() is protected by the cgroup_mutex, it also safeguards the memory deallocation of of->priv performed within cgroup_file_release(). However, the operations involving of->priv executed within pressure_write() are not entirely covered by the protection of cgroup_mutex. Consequently, if the code in pressure_write(), specifically the section handling the ctx variable executes after cgroup_file_release() has completed, a uaf vulnerability involving of->priv is triggered.

Therefore, the issue can be resolved by extending the scope of the cgroup_mutex lock within pressure_write() to encompass all code paths involving of->priv, thereby properly synchronizing the race condition occurring between cgroup_file_release() and pressure_write().

And, if an live kn lock can be successfully acquired while executing the pressure write operation, it indicates that the cgroup deletion process has not yet reached its final stage; consequently, the priv pointer within open_file cannot be NULL. Therefore, the operation to retrieve the ctx value must be moved to a point *after* the live kn lock has been successfully acquired.

In another situation, specifically after entering cgroup_kn_lock_live() but before acquiring cgroup_mutex, there exists a different class of race condition:

CPU0: write memory.pressure CPU1: write cgroup.pressure=0
=========================== =============================

kernfs_fop_write_iter()
kernfs_get_active_of(of)
pressure_write()
cgroup_kn_lock_live(memory.pressure)
cgroup_tryget(cgrp)
kernfs_break_active_protection(kn)
... blocks on cgroup_mutex

cgroup_pressure_write() cgroup_kn_lock_live(cgroup.pressure) cgroup_file_show(memory.pressure, false)
kernfs_show(false)
kernfs_drain_open_files()
cgroup_file_release(of)
kfree(ctx)
of->priv = NULL
cgroup_kn_unlock()

... acquires cgroup_mutex
ctx = of->priv; // may now be NULL
if (ctx->psi.trigger) // NULL dereference

Consequently, there is a possibility that of->priv is NULL, the pressure write needs to check for this.

Now that the scope of the cgroup_mutex has been expanded, the original explicit cgroup_get/put operations are no longer necessary, this is because acquiring/releasing the live kn lock inherently executes a cgroup get/put operation.

[1]

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in pressure_write+0xa4/0x210 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4011
Call Trace:
 pressure_write+0xa4/0x210 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4011
 cgroup_file_write+0x36f/0x790 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4311
 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x3b0/0x540 fs/kernfs/file.c:352

Allocated by task 9352:
 cgroup_file_open+0x90/0x3a0 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4256
 kernfs_fop_open+0x9eb/0xcb0 fs/kernfs/file.c:724
 do_dentry_open+0x83d/0x13e0 fs/open.c:949

Freed by task 9353:
 cgroup_file_release+0xd6/0x100 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4283
 kernfs_release_file fs/kernfs/file.c:764 [inline]
 kernfs_drain_open_files+0x392/0x720 fs/kernfs/file.c:834
 kernfs_drain+0x470/0x600 fs/kernfs/dir.c:525
---
 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c +16 -8
index 046f671532b04..0914a1a189ee1 100644
@@ -3876,33 +3876,41 @@ static int cgroup_cpu_pressure_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
 static ssize_t pressure_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of, char *buf,
 			      size_t nbytes, enum psi_res res)
 {
-	struct cgroup_file_ctx *ctx = of->priv;
+	struct cgroup_file_ctx *ctx;
 	struct psi_trigger *new;
 	struct cgroup *cgrp;
 	struct psi_group *psi;
+	ssize_t ret = 0;
 
 	cgrp = cgroup_kn_lock_live(of->kn, false);
 	if (!cgrp)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
-	cgroup_get(cgrp);
-	cgroup_kn_unlock(of->kn);
+	ctx = of->priv;
+	if (!ctx) {
+		ret = -ENODEV;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
 
 	/* Allow only one trigger per file descriptor */
 	if (ctx->psi.trigger) {
-		cgroup_put(cgrp);
-		return -EBUSY;
+		ret = -EBUSY;
+		goto out_unlock;
 	}
 
 	psi = cgroup_psi(cgrp);
 	new = psi_trigger_create(psi, buf, res, of->file, of);
 	if (IS_ERR(new)) {
-		cgroup_put(cgrp);
-		return PTR_ERR(new);
+		ret = PTR_ERR(new);
+		goto out_unlock;
 	}
 
 	smp_store_release(&ctx->psi.trigger, new);
-	cgroup_put(cgrp);
+
+out_unlock:
+	cgroup_kn_unlock(of->kn);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 
 	return nbytes;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
#519 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 6.12 505/666] sched/psi: fix race between file release and pressure write

Hi Greg/Sasha,

Quoted 143 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Edward Adam Davis <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a5b98009f16d8a5fb4a8ff9a193f5735515c38fa ]

A potential race condition exists between pressure write and cgroup file release regarding the priv member of struct kernfs_open_file, which triggers the uaf reported in [1].

Consider the following scenario involving execution on two separate CPUs:

    CPU0					CPU1
    ====					====
					vfs_rmdir()
					kernfs_iop_rmdir()
					cgroup_rmdir()
					cgroup_kn_lock_live()
					cgroup_destroy_locked()
					cgroup_addrm_files()
					cgroup_rm_file()
					kernfs_remove_by_name()
					kernfs_remove_by_name_ns()
  vfs_write()				__kernfs_remove()
  new_sync_write()			kernfs_drain()
  kernfs_fop_write_iter()		kernfs_drain_open_files()
  cgroup_file_write()			kernfs_release_file()
  pressure_write()			cgroup_file_release()
  ctx = of->priv;
					kfree(ctx);

of->priv = NULL; cgroup_kn_unlock()
cgroup_kn_lock_live()
cgroup_get(cgrp)
cgroup_kn_unlock()
if (ctx->psi.trigger) // here, trigger uaf for ctx, that is of->priv

The cgroup_rmdir() is protected by the cgroup_mutex, it also safeguards the memory deallocation of of->priv performed within cgroup_file_release(). However, the operations involving of->priv executed within pressure_write() are not entirely covered by the protection of cgroup_mutex. Consequently, if the code in pressure_write(), specifically the section handling the ctx variable executes after cgroup_file_release() has completed, a uaf vulnerability involving of->priv is triggered.

Therefore, the issue can be resolved by extending the scope of the cgroup_mutex lock within pressure_write() to encompass all code paths involving of->priv, thereby properly synchronizing the race condition occurring between cgroup_file_release() and pressure_write().

And, if an live kn lock can be successfully acquired while executing the pressure write operation, it indicates that the cgroup deletion process has not yet reached its final stage; consequently, the priv pointer within open_file cannot be NULL. Therefore, the operation to retrieve the ctx value must be moved to a point *after* the live kn lock has been successfully acquired.

In another situation, specifically after entering cgroup_kn_lock_live() but before acquiring cgroup_mutex, there exists a different class of race condition:

CPU0: write memory.pressure CPU1: write cgroup.pressure=0
=========================== =============================

kernfs_fop_write_iter()
kernfs_get_active_of(of)
pressure_write()

    cgroup_kn_lock_live(memory.pressure)
      cgroup_tryget(cgrp)
      kernfs_break_active_protection(kn)
      ... blocks on cgroup_mutex

                                      	  cgroup_pressure_write()
                                      	  cgroup_kn_lock_live(cgroup.pressure)
                                      	  cgroup_file_show(memory.pressure, false)
                                      	    kernfs_show(false)
                                      	      kernfs_drain_open_files()
                                      	        cgroup_file_release(of)
                                      	          kfree(ctx)
                                      	            of->priv = NULL
                                      	  cgroup_kn_unlock()

    ... acquires cgroup_mutex
    ctx = of->priv;        // may now be NULL
    if (ctx->psi.trigger)  // NULL dereference

Consequently, there is a possibility that of->priv is NULL, the pressure write needs to check for this.

Now that the scope of the cgroup_mutex has been expanded, the original explicit cgroup_get/put operations are no longer necessary, this is because acquiring/releasing the live kn lock inherently executes a cgroup get/put operation.

[1]

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in pressure_write+0xa4/0x210 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4011
Call Trace:
  pressure_write+0xa4/0x210 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4011
  cgroup_file_write+0x36f/0x790 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4311
  kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x3b0/0x540 fs/kernfs/file.c:352

Allocated by task 9352:
  cgroup_file_open+0x90/0x3a0 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4256
  kernfs_fop_open+0x9eb/0xcb0 fs/kernfs/file.c:724
  do_dentry_open+0x83d/0x13e0 fs/open.c:949

Freed by task 9353:
  cgroup_file_release+0xd6/0x100 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4283
  kernfs_release_file fs/kernfs/file.c:764 [inline]
  kernfs_drain_open_files+0x392/0x720 fs/kernfs/file.c:834
  kernfs_drain+0x470/0x600 fs/kernfs/dir.c:525
---
  kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++--------
  1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c +2 -1
index 046f671532b04..0914a1a189ee1 100644
@@ -3876,33 +3876,41 @@ static int cgroup_cpu_pressure_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
  static ssize_t pressure_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of, char *buf,
  			      size_t nbytes, enum psi_res res)
  {
-	struct cgroup_file_ctx *ctx = of->priv;
+	struct cgroup_file_ctx *ctx;
  	struct psi_trigger *new;
  	struct cgroup *cgrp;
  	struct psi_group *psi;
+	ssize_t ret = 0;
 
  	cgrp = cgroup_kn_lock_live(of->kn, false);
  	if (!cgrp)

kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c static int cgroup_cpu_pressure_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) · line 3894

Quoted 10 lines
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c +5 -2
  		return -ENODEV;
 
-	cgroup_get(cgrp);
-	cgroup_kn_unlock(of->kn);
+	ctx = of->priv;
+	if (!ctx) {
+		ret = -ENODEV;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
 

I have run an AI assisted backport review and it spotted an issue: I have taken a look and the issues goes like:

Upstream has:

static void cgroup_file_release(struct kernfs_open_file *of)

{
        struct cftype *cft = of_cft(of);
        struct cgroup_file_ctx *ctx = of->priv;

        if (cft->release)
                cft->release(of);
        put_cgroup_ns(ctx->ns);
        kfree(ctx);
        of->priv = NULL;
}

On 6.12.y:

static void cgroup_file_release(struct kernfs_open_file *of)

{
        struct cftype *cft = of_cft(of);
        struct cgroup_file_ctx *ctx = of->priv;

        if (cft->release)
                cft->release(of);
        put_cgroup_ns(ctx->ns);
        kfree(ctx);
}

On 6.12.y, cgroup_file_release() frees ctx but does not clear of->priv. The posted backport adds

	ctx = of->priv;
	if (!ctx)

in pressure_write(), but that only works if release turns of->priv into NULL. In the pressure_write() vs cgroup_pressure_write() race from the commit message, 6.12.y still leaves a dangling pointer there, so this backport alone is incomplete and can still hit UAF.

So upstream has commit: 94a4acfec146 ("cgroup/psi: Set of->priv to NULL upon file release") which might be needed here as well, without that I would suggest a drop.

Thanks,
Harshit

author maintainer
#520 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 6.12 505/666] sched/psi: fix race between file release and pressure write

Quoted 191 lines · Harshit Mogalapalli

Hi Greg/Sasha,

Quoted 140 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Edward Adam Davis <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a5b98009f16d8a5fb4a8ff9a193f5735515c38fa ]

A potential race condition exists between pressure write and cgroup file release regarding the priv member of struct kernfs_open_file, which triggers the uaf reported in [1].

Consider the following scenario involving execution on two separate CPUs:

    CPU0					CPU1
    ====					====
					vfs_rmdir()
					kernfs_iop_rmdir()
					cgroup_rmdir()
					cgroup_kn_lock_live()
					cgroup_destroy_locked()
					cgroup_addrm_files()
					cgroup_rm_file()
					kernfs_remove_by_name()
					kernfs_remove_by_name_ns()
  vfs_write()				__kernfs_remove()
  new_sync_write()			kernfs_drain()
  kernfs_fop_write_iter()		kernfs_drain_open_files()
  cgroup_file_write()			kernfs_release_file()
  pressure_write()			cgroup_file_release()
  ctx = of->priv;
					kfree(ctx);

of->priv = NULL; cgroup_kn_unlock()
cgroup_kn_lock_live()
cgroup_get(cgrp)
cgroup_kn_unlock()
if (ctx->psi.trigger) // here, trigger uaf for ctx, that is of->priv

The cgroup_rmdir() is protected by the cgroup_mutex, it also safeguards the memory deallocation of of->priv performed within cgroup_file_release(). However, the operations involving of->priv executed within pressure_write() are not entirely covered by the protection of cgroup_mutex. Consequently, if the code in pressure_write(), specifically the section handling the ctx variable executes after cgroup_file_release() has completed, a uaf vulnerability involving of->priv is triggered.

Therefore, the issue can be resolved by extending the scope of the cgroup_mutex lock within pressure_write() to encompass all code paths involving of->priv, thereby properly synchronizing the race condition occurring between cgroup_file_release() and pressure_write().

And, if an live kn lock can be successfully acquired while executing the pressure write operation, it indicates that the cgroup deletion process has not yet reached its final stage; consequently, the priv pointer within open_file cannot be NULL. Therefore, the operation to retrieve the ctx value must be moved to a point *after* the live kn lock has been successfully acquired.

In another situation, specifically after entering cgroup_kn_lock_live() but before acquiring cgroup_mutex, there exists a different class of race condition:

CPU0: write memory.pressure CPU1: write cgroup.pressure=0
=========================== =============================

kernfs_fop_write_iter()
kernfs_get_active_of(of)
pressure_write()

    cgroup_kn_lock_live(memory.pressure)
      cgroup_tryget(cgrp)
      kernfs_break_active_protection(kn)
      ... blocks on cgroup_mutex

                                      	  cgroup_pressure_write()
                                      	  cgroup_kn_lock_live(cgroup.pressure)
                                      	  cgroup_file_show(memory.pressure, false)
                                      	    kernfs_show(false)
                                      	      kernfs_drain_open_files()
                                      	        cgroup_file_release(of)
                                      	          kfree(ctx)
                                      	            of->priv = NULL
                                      	  cgroup_kn_unlock()

    ... acquires cgroup_mutex
    ctx = of->priv;        // may now be NULL
    if (ctx->psi.trigger)  // NULL dereference

Consequently, there is a possibility that of->priv is NULL, the pressure write needs to check for this.

Now that the scope of the cgroup_mutex has been expanded, the original explicit cgroup_get/put operations are no longer necessary, this is because acquiring/releasing the live kn lock inherently executes a cgroup get/put operation.

[1]

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in pressure_write+0xa4/0x210 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4011
Call Trace:
  pressure_write+0xa4/0x210 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4011
  cgroup_file_write+0x36f/0x790 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4311
  kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x3b0/0x540 fs/kernfs/file.c:352

Allocated by task 9352:
  cgroup_file_open+0x90/0x3a0 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4256
  kernfs_fop_open+0x9eb/0xcb0 fs/kernfs/file.c:724
  do_dentry_open+0x83d/0x13e0 fs/open.c:949

Freed by task 9353:
  cgroup_file_release+0xd6/0x100 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4283
  kernfs_release_file fs/kernfs/file.c:764 [inline]
  kernfs_drain_open_files+0x392/0x720 fs/kernfs/file.c:834
  kernfs_drain+0x470/0x600 fs/kernfs/dir.c:525
---
  kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++--------
  1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c +2 -1
index 046f671532b04..0914a1a189ee1 100644
@@ -3876,33 +3876,41 @@ static int cgroup_cpu_pressure_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
  static ssize_t pressure_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of, char *buf,
  			      size_t nbytes, enum psi_res res)
  {
-	struct cgroup_file_ctx *ctx = of->priv;
+	struct cgroup_file_ctx *ctx;
  	struct psi_trigger *new;
  	struct cgroup *cgrp;
  	struct psi_group *psi;
+	ssize_t ret = 0;

kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c static int cgroup_cpu_pressure_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) · line 3891

Quoted 10 lines
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c +5 -2
  	cgrp = cgroup_kn_lock_live(of->kn, false);
  	if (!cgrp)
  		return -ENODEV;
-	cgroup_get(cgrp);
-	cgroup_kn_unlock(of->kn);
+	ctx = of->priv;
+	if (!ctx) {
+		ret = -ENODEV;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}

I have run an AI assisted backport review and it spotted an issue: I have taken a look and the issues goes like:

Upstream has:

static void cgroup_file_release(struct kernfs_open_file *of)

{
        struct cftype *cft = of_cft(of);
        struct cgroup_file_ctx *ctx = of->priv;

        if (cft->release)
                cft->release(of);
        put_cgroup_ns(ctx->ns);
        kfree(ctx);
        of->priv = NULL;
}

On 6.12.y:

static void cgroup_file_release(struct kernfs_open_file *of)

{
        struct cftype *cft = of_cft(of);
        struct cgroup_file_ctx *ctx = of->priv;

        if (cft->release)
                cft->release(of);
        put_cgroup_ns(ctx->ns);
        kfree(ctx);
}

On 6.12.y, cgroup_file_release() frees ctx but does not clear of->priv. The posted backport adds

	ctx = of->priv;
	if (!ctx)
Quoted 8 lines

in pressure_write(), but that only works if release turns of->priv into NULL. In the pressure_write() vs cgroup_pressure_write() race from the commit message, 6.12.y still leaves a dangling pointer there, so this backport alone is incomplete and can still hit UAF.

So upstream has commit: 94a4acfec146 ("cgroup/psi: Set of->priv to NULL upon file release") which might be needed here as well, without that I would suggest a drop.

Dropped from 6.12 and older, thanks.

greg k-h

author maintainer
#521 lore raw

PATCH 506/666 cgroup/rdma: fix integer overflow in rdmacg_try_charge()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: cuitao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c802f460dd485c1332b5a35e7adcfb2bc22536a2 ]

The expression rpool->resources[index].usage + 1 is computed in int arithmetic before being assigned to s64 variable new. When usage equals INT_MAX (the default "max" value), the addition overflows to INT_MIN. This negative value then passes the new > max check incorrectly, allowing a charge that should be rejected and corrupting usage to negative.

Fix by casting usage to s64 before the addition so the arithmetic is done in 64-bit.

Fixes 39d3e7584a68 ("rdmacg: Added rdma cgroup controller")
---
 kernel/cgroup/rdma.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/cgroup/rdma.c +1 -1
index ef5878fb20057..d544a747f3954 100644
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ int rdmacg_try_charge(struct rdma_cgroup **rdmacg,
 			ret = PTR_ERR(rpool);
 			goto err;
 		} else {
-			new = rpool->resources[index].usage + 1;
+			new = (s64)rpool->resources[index].usage + 1;
 			if (new > rpool->resources[index].max) {
 				ret = -EAGAIN;
 				goto err;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#522 lore raw

PATCH 507/666 mailbox: add sanity check for channel array

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wolfram Sang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c1aad75595fb67edc7fda8af249d3b886efa1be9 ]

Fail gracefully if there is no channel array attached to the mailbox controller. Otherwise the later dereference will cause an OOPS which might not be seen because mailbox controllers might instantiate very early. Remove the comment explaining the obvious while here.

Fixes 2b6d83e2b8b7 ("mailbox: Introduce framework for mailbox")
---
 drivers/mailbox/mailbox.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/mailbox/mailbox.c +1 -2
index b4d52b814055b..39269359e3a64 100644
@@ -520,8 +520,7 @@ int mbox_controller_register(struct mbox_controller *mbox)
 {
 	int i, txdone;
 
-	/* Sanity check */
-	if (!mbox || !mbox->dev || !mbox->ops || !mbox->num_chans)
+	if (!mbox || !mbox->dev || !mbox->ops || !mbox->chans || !mbox->num_chans)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (mbox->txdone_irq)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#523 lore raw

PATCH 508/666 mailbox: mailbox-test: dont free the reused channel

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wolfram Sang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 88ebadbf0deefdaccdab868b44ff70a0a257f473 ]

The RX channel can be aliased to the TX channel if it has a different MMIO. This special case needs to be handled when freeing the channels otherwise a double-free occurs.

Fixes 8ea4484d0c2b ("mailbox: Add generic mechanism for testing Mailbox Controllers")
---
 drivers/mailbox/mailbox-test.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/mailbox/mailbox-test.c +2 -2
index 2e0ce6c590485..30b0a230a3e28 100644
@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ static int mbox_test_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 err_free_chans:
 	if (tdev->tx_channel)
 		mbox_free_channel(tdev->tx_channel);
-	if (tdev->rx_channel)
+	if (tdev->rx_channel && tdev->rx_channel != tdev->tx_channel)
 		mbox_free_channel(tdev->rx_channel);
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ static void mbox_test_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	if (tdev->tx_channel)
 		mbox_free_channel(tdev->tx_channel);
-	if (tdev->rx_channel)
+	if (tdev->rx_channel && tdev->rx_channel != tdev->tx_channel)
 		mbox_free_channel(tdev->rx_channel);
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#524 lore raw

PATCH 509/666 mailbox: mailbox-test: initialize struct earlier

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wolfram Sang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bbcf9af68bfedb3d9cc3c7eae62f5c844d8b78b9 ]

The waitqueue must be initialized before the debugfs files are created because from that time, requests from userspace can already be made. Similarily, drvdata and spinlock needs to be initialized before we request the channel, otherwise dangling irqs might run into problems like a NULL pointer exception.

Fixes 8ea4484d0c2b ("mailbox: Add generic mechanism for testing Mailbox Controllers")
---
 drivers/mailbox/mailbox-test.c | 13 ++++++-------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/mailbox/mailbox-test.c +6 -7
index 30b0a230a3e28..9eeb0b61b887c 100644
@@ -366,6 +366,12 @@ static int mbox_test_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	if (!tdev)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	tdev->dev = &pdev->dev;
+	spin_lock_init(&tdev->lock);
+	mutex_init(&tdev->mutex);
+	init_waitqueue_head(&tdev->waitq);
+	platform_set_drvdata(pdev, tdev);
+
 	/* It's okay for MMIO to be NULL */
 	tdev->tx_mmio = devm_platform_get_and_ioremap_resource(pdev, 0, &res);
 	if (PTR_ERR(tdev->tx_mmio) == -EBUSY) {
@@ -395,12 +401,6 @@ static int mbox_test_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	if (!tdev->rx_channel && (tdev->rx_mmio != tdev->tx_mmio))
 		tdev->rx_channel = tdev->tx_channel;
 
-	tdev->dev = &pdev->dev;
-	platform_set_drvdata(pdev, tdev);
-
-	spin_lock_init(&tdev->lock);
-	mutex_init(&tdev->mutex);
-
 	if (tdev->rx_channel) {
 		tdev->rx_buffer = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev,
 					       MBOX_MAX_MSG_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -414,7 +414,6 @@ static int mbox_test_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	if (ret)
 		goto err_free_chans;
 
-	init_waitqueue_head(&tdev->waitq);
 	dev_info(&pdev->dev, "Successfully registered\n");
 
 	return 0;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#525 lore raw

PATCH 510/666 mailbox: mailbox-test: make data_ready a per-instance variable

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wolfram Sang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6e937f4e769e60947909e3525965f0137b9039e8 ]

While not the default case, multiple tests can be run simultaneously. Then, data_ready being a global variable will be overwritten and the per-instance lock will not help. Turn the global variable into a per-instance one to avoid this problem.

Fixes e339c80af95e ("mailbox: mailbox-test: don't rely on rx_buffer content to signal data ready")
---
 drivers/mailbox/mailbox-test.c | 9 ++++-----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/mailbox/mailbox-test.c +4 -5
index 9eeb0b61b887c..b4ed96be815db 100644
@@ -28,8 +28,6 @@
 #define MBOX_HEXDUMP_MAX_LEN	(MBOX_HEXDUMP_LINE_LEN *		\
 				 (MBOX_MAX_MSG_LEN / MBOX_BYTES_PER_LINE))
 
-static bool mbox_data_ready;
-
 struct mbox_test_device {
 	struct device		*dev;
 	void __iomem		*tx_mmio;
@@ -42,6 +40,7 @@ struct mbox_test_device {
 	spinlock_t		lock;
 	struct mutex		mutex;
 	wait_queue_head_t	waitq;
+	bool			data_ready;
 	struct fasync_struct	*async_queue;
 	struct dentry		*root_debugfs_dir;
 };
@@ -162,7 +161,7 @@ static bool mbox_test_message_data_ready(struct mbox_test_device *tdev)
 	unsigned long flags;
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&tdev->lock, flags);
-	data_ready = mbox_data_ready;
+	data_ready = tdev->data_ready;
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tdev->lock, flags);
 
 	return data_ready;
@@ -227,7 +226,7 @@ static ssize_t mbox_test_message_read(struct file *filp, char __user *userbuf,
 	*(touser + l) = '\0';
 
 	memset(tdev->rx_buffer, 0, MBOX_MAX_MSG_LEN);
-	mbox_data_ready = false;
+	tdev->data_ready = false;
 
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tdev->lock, flags);
 
@@ -297,7 +296,7 @@ static void mbox_test_receive_message(struct mbox_client *client, void *message)
 				     message, MBOX_MAX_MSG_LEN);
 		memcpy(tdev->rx_buffer, message, MBOX_MAX_MSG_LEN);
 	}
-	mbox_data_ready = true;
+	tdev->data_ready = true;
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tdev->lock, flags);
 
 	wake_up_interruptible(&tdev->waitq);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#526 lore raw

PATCH 511/666 fsnotify: fix inode reference leak in fsnotify_recalc_mask()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Amir Goldstein <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4aca914ac152f5d055ddcb36704d1e539ac08977 ]

fsnotify_recalc_mask() fails to handle the return value of __fsnotify_recalc_mask(), which may return an inode pointer that needs to be released via fsnotify_drop_object() when the connector's HAS_IREF flag transitions from set to cleared.

This manifests as a hung task with the following call trace:

  INFO: task umount:1234 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
  Call Trace:
   __schedule
   schedule
   fsnotify_sb_delete
   generic_shutdown_super
   kill_anon_super
   cleanup_mnt
   task_work_run
   do_exit
   do_group_exit

The race window that triggers the iref leak:

Thread A (adding mark) Thread B (removing mark)
────────────────────── ────────────────────────
fsnotify_add_mark_locked():

    fsnotify_add_mark_list():
      spin_lock(conn->lock)
      add mark_B(evictable) to list
      spin_unlock(conn->lock)
    return

    /* ---- gap: no lock held ---- */

                                      fsnotify_detach_mark(mark_A):
                                        spin_lock(mark_A->lock)
                                        clear ATTACHED flag on mark_A
                                        spin_unlock(mark_A->lock)
                                        fsnotify_put_mark(mark_A)

    fsnotify_recalc_mask():
      spin_lock(conn->lock)
      __fsnotify_recalc_mask():
        /* mark_A skipped: ATTACHED cleared */
        /* only mark_B(evictable) remains */
        want_iref = false
        has_iref = true  /* not yet cleared */
        -> HAS_IREF transitions true -> false
        -> returns inode pointer
      spin_unlock(conn->lock)
      /* BUG: return value discarded!
       * iput() and fsnotify_put_sb_watched_objects()
       * are never called */

Fix this by deferring the transition true -> false of HAS_IREF flag from fsnotify_recalc_mask() (Thread A) to fsnotify_put_mark() (thread B).

---
 fs/notify/mark.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/notify/mark.c +36 -3
index 09e50fe5757c4..a263305ed7c85 100644
@@ -233,7 +233,12 @@ static struct inode *fsnotify_update_iref(struct fsnotify_mark_connector *conn,
 	return inode;
 }
 
-static void *__fsnotify_recalc_mask(struct fsnotify_mark_connector *conn)
+/*
+ * Calculate mask of events for a list of marks.
+ *
+ * Return true if any of the attached marks want to hold an inode reference.
+ */
+static bool __fsnotify_recalc_mask(struct fsnotify_mark_connector *conn)
 {
 	u32 new_mask = 0;
 	bool want_iref = false;
@@ -257,6 +262,34 @@ static void *__fsnotify_recalc_mask(struct fsnotify_mark_connector *conn)
 	 */
 	WRITE_ONCE(*fsnotify_conn_mask_p(conn), new_mask);
 
+	return want_iref;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate mask of events for a list of marks after attach/modify mark
+ * and get an inode reference for the connector if needed.
+ *
+ * A concurrent add of evictable mark and detach of non-evictable mark can
+ * lead to __fsnotify_recalc_mask() returning false want_iref, but in this
+ * case we defer clearing iref to fsnotify_recalc_mask_clear_iref() called
+ * from fsnotify_put_mark().
+ */
+static void fsnotify_recalc_mask_set_iref(struct fsnotify_mark_connector *conn)
+{
+	bool has_iref = conn->flags & FSNOTIFY_CONN_FLAG_HAS_IREF;
+	bool want_iref = __fsnotify_recalc_mask(conn) || has_iref;
+
+	(void) fsnotify_update_iref(conn, want_iref);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate mask of events for a list of marks after detach mark
+ * and return the inode object if its reference is no longer needed.
+ */
+static void *fsnotify_recalc_mask_clear_iref(struct fsnotify_mark_connector *conn)
+{
+	bool want_iref = __fsnotify_recalc_mask(conn);
+
 	return fsnotify_update_iref(conn, want_iref);
 }
 
@@ -293,7 +326,7 @@ void fsnotify_recalc_mask(struct fsnotify_mark_connector *conn)
 
 	spin_lock(&conn->lock);
 	update_children = !fsnotify_conn_watches_children(conn);
-	__fsnotify_recalc_mask(conn);
+	fsnotify_recalc_mask_set_iref(conn);
 	update_children &= fsnotify_conn_watches_children(conn);
 	spin_unlock(&conn->lock);
 	/*
@@ -408,7 +441,7 @@ void fsnotify_put_mark(struct fsnotify_mark *mark)
 		/* Update watched objects after detaching mark */
 		if (sb)
 			fsnotify_update_sb_watchers(sb, conn);
-		objp = __fsnotify_recalc_mask(conn);
+		objp = fsnotify_recalc_mask_clear_iref(conn);
 		type = conn->type;
 	}
 	WRITE_ONCE(mark->connector, NULL);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#527 lore raw

PATCH 512/666 btrfs: fix double-decrement of bytes_may_use in submit_one_async_extent()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mark Harmstone <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 82323b1a7088b7a5c3e528a5d634bff447fa286f ]

submit_one_async_extent() calls btrfs_reserve_extent(), which decrements bytes_may_use. If the call btrfs_create_io_em() fails, we jump to out_free_reserve, which calls extent_clear_unlock_delalloc().

Because we're specifying EXTENT_DO_ACCOUNTING, i.e. EXTENT_CLEAR_META_RESV | EXTENT_CLEAR_DATA_RESV, this decreases bytes_may_use again. This can lead to problems later on, as an initial write can fail only for the writeback to silently ENOSPC.

Fix this by replacing EXTENT_DO_ACCOUNTING with EXTENT_CLEAR_META_RESV. This parallels a4fe134fc1d8eb ("btrfs: fix a double release on reserved extents in cow_one_range()"), which is the same fix in cow_one_range().

Fixes 151a41bc46df ("Btrfs: fix what bits we clear when erroring out from delalloc")
---
 fs/btrfs/inode.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/btrfs/inode.c +1 -1
index 28024c827b756..3e39692e36913 100644
@@ -1288,7 +1288,7 @@ static void submit_one_async_extent(struct async_chunk *async_chunk,
 				     NULL, &cached,
 				     EXTENT_LOCKED | EXTENT_DELALLOC |
 				     EXTENT_DELALLOC_NEW |
-				     EXTENT_DEFRAG | EXTENT_DO_ACCOUNTING,
+				     EXTENT_DEFRAG | EXTENT_CLEAR_META_RESV,
 				     PAGE_UNLOCK | PAGE_START_WRITEBACK |
 				     PAGE_END_WRITEBACK);
 	free_async_extent_pages(async_extent);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#528 lore raw

PATCH 513/666 cgroup: Increment nr_dying_subsys_* from rmdir context

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Petr Malat <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 13e786b64bd3fd81c7eb22aa32bf8305c32f2ccf ]

Incrementing nr_dying_subsys_* in offline_css(), which is executed by cgroup_offline_wq worker, leads to a race where user can see the value to be 0 if he reads cgroup.stat after calling rmdir and before the worker executes. This makes the user wrongly expect resources released by the removed cgroup to be available for a new assignment.

Increment nr_dying_subsys_* from kill_css(), which is called from the cgroup_rmdir() context.

Fixes ab0312526867 ("cgroup: Show # of subsystem CSSes in cgroup.stat")
---
 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c | 22 ++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c +12 -10
index 0914a1a189ee1..dfb93a201fc32 100644
@@ -5654,16 +5654,6 @@ static void offline_css(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css)
 	RCU_INIT_POINTER(css->cgroup->subsys[ss->id], NULL);
 
 	wake_up_all(&css->cgroup->offline_waitq);
-
-	css->cgroup->nr_dying_subsys[ss->id]++;
-	/*
-	 * Parent css and cgroup cannot be freed until after the freeing
-	 * of child css, see css_free_rwork_fn().
-	 */
-	while ((css = css->parent)) {
-		css->nr_descendants--;
-		css->cgroup->nr_dying_subsys[ss->id]++;
-	}
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5965,6 +5955,8 @@ static void css_killed_ref_fn(struct percpu_ref *ref)
  */
 static void kill_css(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css)
 {
+	struct cgroup_subsys *ss = css->ss;
+
 	lockdep_assert_held(&cgroup_mutex);
 
 	if (css->flags & CSS_DYING)
@@ -6001,6 +5993,16 @@ static void kill_css(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css)
 	 * css is confirmed to be seen as killed on all CPUs.
 	 */
 	percpu_ref_kill_and_confirm(&css->refcnt, css_killed_ref_fn);
+
+	css->cgroup->nr_dying_subsys[ss->id]++;
+	/*
+	 * Parent css and cgroup cannot be freed until after the freeing
+	 * of child css, see css_free_rwork_fn().
+	 */
+	while ((css = css->parent)) {
+		css->nr_descendants--;
+		css->cgroup->nr_dying_subsys[ss->id]++;
+	}
 }
 
 /**
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#529 lore raw

PATCH 514/666 tracing: branch: Fix inverted check on stat tracer registration

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Breno Leitao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3b75dd76e64a04771861bb5647951c264919e563 ]

init_annotated_branch_stats() and all_annotated_branch_stats() check the return value of register_stat_tracer() with "if (!ret)", but register_stat_tracer() returns 0 on success and a negative errno on failure. The inverted check causes the warning to be printed on every successful registration, e.g.:

Warning: could not register annotated branches stats

while leaving real failures silent. The initcall also returned a hard-coded 1 instead of the actual error.

Invert the check and propagate ret so that the warning fires on real errors and the initcall reports the correct status.

Cc Mathieu Desnoyers <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Fixes 002bb86d8d42 ("tracing/ftrace: separate events tracing and stats tracing engine")
---
 kernel/trace/trace_branch.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
kernel/trace/trace_branch.c +4 -4
index e47fdb4c92fbc..30f72e0ecb5d4 100644
@@ -379,10 +379,10 @@ __init static int init_annotated_branch_stats(void)
 	int ret;
 
 	ret = register_stat_tracer(&annotated_branch_stats);
-	if (!ret) {
+	if (ret) {
 		printk(KERN_WARNING "Warning: could not register "
 				    "annotated branches stats\n");
-		return 1;
+		return ret;
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -444,10 +444,10 @@ __init static int all_annotated_branch_stats(void)
 	int ret;
 
 	ret = register_stat_tracer(&all_branch_stats);
-	if (!ret) {
+	if (ret) {
 		printk(KERN_WARNING "Warning: could not register "
 				    "all branches stats\n");
-		return 1;
+		return ret;
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#530 lore raw

PATCH 515/666 nvmet-tcp: propagate nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec() errors to its callers

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Maurizio Lombardi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ea8e356acb165cb1fd75537a52e1f66e5e76c538 ]

Currently, when nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec() detects an out-of-bounds PDU length or offset, it triggers nvmet_tcp_fatal_error(cmd->queue) and returns early. However, because the function returns void, the callers are entirely unaware that a fatal error has occurred and that the cmd->recv_msg.msg_iter was left uninitialized.

Callers such as nvmet_tcp_handle_h2c_data_pdu() proceed to blindly overwrite the queue state with queue->rcv_state = NVMET_TCP_RECV_DATA Consequently, the socket receiving loop may attempt to read incoming network data into the uninitialized iterator.

Fix this by shifting the error handling responsibility to the callers.

Fixes 52a0a9854934 ("nvmet-tcp: add bounds checks in nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec")
---
 drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c +29 -22
index 0e92198813057..6c64af6a7c07a 100644
@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ static void nvmet_tcp_free_cmd_buffers(struct nvmet_tcp_cmd *cmd)
 
 static void nvmet_tcp_fatal_error(struct nvmet_tcp_queue *queue);
 
-static void nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec(struct nvmet_tcp_cmd *cmd)
+static int nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec(struct nvmet_tcp_cmd *cmd)
 {
 	struct bio_vec *iov = cmd->iov;
 	struct scatterlist *sg;
@@ -372,22 +372,19 @@ static void nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec(struct nvmet_tcp_cmd *cmd)
 	offset = cmd->rbytes_done;
 	cmd->sg_idx = offset / PAGE_SIZE;
 	sg_offset = offset % PAGE_SIZE;
-	if (!cmd->req.sg_cnt || cmd->sg_idx >= cmd->req.sg_cnt) {
-		nvmet_tcp_fatal_error(cmd->queue);
-		return;
-	}
+	if (!cmd->req.sg_cnt || cmd->sg_idx >= cmd->req.sg_cnt)
+		return -EPROTO;
+
 	sg = &cmd->req.sg[cmd->sg_idx];
 	sg_remaining = cmd->req.sg_cnt - cmd->sg_idx;
 
 	while (length) {
-		if (!sg_remaining) {
-			nvmet_tcp_fatal_error(cmd->queue);
-			return;
-		}
-		if (!sg->length || sg->length <= sg_offset) {
-			nvmet_tcp_fatal_error(cmd->queue);
-			return;
-		}
+		if (!sg_remaining)
+			return -EPROTO;
+
+		if (!sg->length || sg->length <= sg_offset)
+			return -EPROTO;
+
 		u32 iov_len = min_t(u32, length, sg->length - sg_offset);
 
 		bvec_set_page(iov, sg_page(sg), iov_len,
@@ -402,6 +399,7 @@ static void nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec(struct nvmet_tcp_cmd *cmd)
 
 	iov_iter_bvec(&cmd->recv_msg.msg_iter, ITER_DEST, cmd->iov,
 		      nr_pages, cmd->pdu_len);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static void nvmet_tcp_fatal_error(struct nvmet_tcp_queue *queue)
@@ -997,7 +995,7 @@ static int nvmet_tcp_handle_icreq(struct nvmet_tcp_queue *queue)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void nvmet_tcp_handle_req_failure(struct nvmet_tcp_queue *queue,
+static int nvmet_tcp_handle_req_failure(struct nvmet_tcp_queue *queue,
 		struct nvmet_tcp_cmd *cmd, struct nvmet_req *req)
 {
 	size_t data_len = le32_to_cpu(req->cmd->common.dptr.sgl.length);
@@ -1013,19 +1011,23 @@ static void nvmet_tcp_handle_req_failure(struct nvmet_tcp_queue *queue,
 	if (!nvme_is_write(cmd->req.cmd) || !data_len ||
 	    data_len > cmd->req.port->inline_data_size) {
 		nvmet_prepare_receive_pdu(queue);
-		return;
+		return 0;
 	}
 
 	ret = nvmet_tcp_map_data(cmd);
 	if (unlikely(ret)) {
 		pr_err("queue %d: failed to map data\n", queue->idx);
 		nvmet_tcp_fatal_error(queue);
-		return;
+		return -EPROTO;
 	}
 
 	queue->rcv_state = NVMET_TCP_RECV_DATA;
-	nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec(cmd);
 	cmd->flags |= NVMET_TCP_F_INIT_FAILED;
+	ret = nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec(cmd);
+	if (unlikely(ret))
+		pr_err("queue %d: failed to build PDU iovec\n", queue->idx);
+
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static int nvmet_tcp_handle_h2c_data_pdu(struct nvmet_tcp_queue *queue)
@@ -1077,7 +1079,10 @@ static int nvmet_tcp_handle_h2c_data_pdu(struct nvmet_tcp_queue *queue)
 		goto err_proto;
 	}
 	cmd->pdu_recv = 0;
-	nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec(cmd);
+	if (unlikely(nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec(cmd))) {
+		pr_err("queue %d: failed to build PDU iovec\n", queue->idx);
+		goto err_proto;
+	}
 	queue->cmd = cmd;
 	queue->rcv_state = NVMET_TCP_RECV_DATA;
 
@@ -1140,8 +1145,7 @@ static int nvmet_tcp_done_recv_pdu(struct nvmet_tcp_queue *queue)
 			req->cmd->common.opcode,
 			le32_to_cpu(req->cmd->common.dptr.sgl.length));
 
-		nvmet_tcp_handle_req_failure(queue, queue->cmd, req);
-		return 0;
+		return nvmet_tcp_handle_req_failure(queue, queue->cmd, req);
 	}
 
 	ret = nvmet_tcp_map_data(queue->cmd);
@@ -1158,8 +1162,11 @@ static int nvmet_tcp_done_recv_pdu(struct nvmet_tcp_queue *queue)
 	if (nvmet_tcp_need_data_in(queue->cmd)) {
 		if (nvmet_tcp_has_inline_data(queue->cmd)) {
 			queue->rcv_state = NVMET_TCP_RECV_DATA;
-			nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec(queue->cmd);
-			return 0;
+			ret = nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec(queue->cmd);
+			if (unlikely(ret))
+				pr_err("queue %d: failed to build PDU iovec\n",
+					queue->idx);
+			return ret;
 		}
 		/* send back R2T */
 		nvmet_tcp_queue_response(&queue->cmd->req);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#531 lore raw

PATCH 516/666 netfilter: arp_tables: fix IEEE1394 ARP payload parsing

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1e8e3f449b1e73b73a843257635b9c50f0cc0f0a ]

Weiming Shi says:

"arp_packet_match() unconditionally parses the ARP payload assuming two hardware addresses are present (source and target). However, IPv4-over-IEEE1394 ARP (RFC 2734) omits the target hardware address field, and arp_hdr_len() already accounts for this by returning a shorter length for ARPHRD_IEEE1394 devices.

As a result, on IEEE1394 interfaces arp_packet_match() advances past a nonexistent target hardware address and reads the wrong bytes for both the target device address comparison and the target IP address. This causes arptables rules to match against garbage data, leading to incorrect filtering decisions: packets that should be accepted may be dropped and vice versa.

The ARP stack in net/ipv4/arp.c (arp_create and arp_process) already handles this correctly by skipping the target hardware address for ARPHRD_IEEE1394. Apply the same pattern to arp_packet_match()."

Mangle the original patch to always return 0 (no match) in case user matches on the target hardware address which is never present in IEEE1394.

Note that this returns 0 (no match) for either normal and inverse match because matching in the target hardware address in ARPHRD_IEEE1394 has never been supported by arptables. This is intentional, matching on the target hardware address should never evaluate true for ARPHRD_IEEE1394.

Moreover, adjust arpt_mangle to drop the packet too as AI suggests:

In arpt_mangle, the logic assumes a standard ARP layout. Because IEEE1394 (FireWire) omits the target hardware address, the linear pointer arithmetic miscalculates the offset for the target IP address. This causes mangling operations to write to the wrong location, leading to packet corruption. To ensure safety, this patch drops packets (NF_DROP) when mangling is requested for these fields on IEEE1394 devices, as the current implementation cannot correctly map the FireWire ARP payload.

This omits both mangling target hardware and IP address. Even if IP address mangling should be possible in IEEE1394, this would require to adjust arpt_mangle offset calculation, which has never been supported.

Based on patch from Weiming Shi <[email protected]>.

Fixes 6752c8db8e0c ("firewire net, ipv4 arp: Extend hardware address and remove driver-level packet inspection.")
---
 net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c  | 18 +++++++++++++++---
 net/ipv4/netfilter/arpt_mangle.c |  8 ++++++++
 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +15 -3
index 1cdd9c28ab2da..97ead883e4a13 100644
@@ -110,13 +110,25 @@ static inline int arp_packet_match(const struct arphdr *arphdr,
 	arpptr += dev->addr_len;
 	memcpy(&src_ipaddr, arpptr, sizeof(u32));
 	arpptr += sizeof(u32);
-	tgt_devaddr = arpptr;
-	arpptr += dev->addr_len;
+
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FIREWIRE_NET) && dev->type == ARPHRD_IEEE1394) {
+		if (unlikely(memchr_inv(arpinfo->tgt_devaddr.mask, 0,
+					sizeof(arpinfo->tgt_devaddr.mask))))
+			return 0;
+
+		tgt_devaddr = NULL;
+	} else {
+		tgt_devaddr = arpptr;
+		arpptr += dev->addr_len;
+	}
 	memcpy(&tgt_ipaddr, arpptr, sizeof(u32));
 
 	if (NF_INVF(arpinfo, ARPT_INV_SRCDEVADDR,
 		    arp_devaddr_compare(&arpinfo->src_devaddr, src_devaddr,
-					dev->addr_len)) ||
+					dev->addr_len)))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (tgt_devaddr &&
 	    NF_INVF(arpinfo, ARPT_INV_TGTDEVADDR,
 		    arp_devaddr_compare(&arpinfo->tgt_devaddr, tgt_devaddr,
 					dev->addr_len)))
net/ipv4/netfilter/arpt_mangle.c +8 -0
index a4e07e5e9c118..f65dd339208e8 100644
@@ -40,6 +40,10 @@ target(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)
 	}
 	arpptr += pln;
 	if (mangle->flags & ARPT_MANGLE_TDEV) {
+		if (unlikely(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FIREWIRE_NET) &&
+			     skb->dev->type == ARPHRD_IEEE1394))
+			return NF_DROP;
+
 		if (ARPT_DEV_ADDR_LEN_MAX < hln ||
 		   (arpptr + hln > skb_tail_pointer(skb)))
 			return NF_DROP;
@@ -47,6 +51,10 @@ target(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)
 	}
 	arpptr += hln;
 	if (mangle->flags & ARPT_MANGLE_TIP) {
+		if (unlikely(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FIREWIRE_NET) &&
+			     skb->dev->type == ARPHRD_IEEE1394))
+			return NF_DROP;
+
 		if (ARPT_MANGLE_ADDR_LEN_MAX < pln ||
 		   (arpptr + pln > skb_tail_pointer(skb)))
 			return NF_DROP;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#532 lore raw

PATCH 517/666 nvme-pci: fix missed admin queue sq doorbell write

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Keith Busch <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1cc4cdae2a3b7730d462d69e30f213fd2efe7807 ]

We can batch admin commands submitted through io_uring_cmd passthrough, which means bd->last may be false and skips the doorbell write to aggregate multiple commands per write. If a subsequent command can't be dispatched for whatever reason, we have to provide the blk-mq ops' commit_rqs callback in order to ensure we properly update the doorbell.

Fixes 58e5bdeb9c2b ("nvme: enable uring-passthrough for admin commands")
---
 drivers/nvme/host/pci.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/nvme/host/pci.c +1 -0
index 8eb1e4d48c432..758a187a8ab33 100644
@@ -1816,6 +1816,7 @@ static int nvme_create_queue(struct nvme_queue *nvmeq, int qid, bool polled)
 static const struct blk_mq_ops nvme_mq_admin_ops = {
 	.queue_rq	= nvme_queue_rq,
 	.complete	= nvme_pci_complete_rq,
+	.commit_rqs	= nvme_commit_rqs,
 	.init_hctx	= nvme_admin_init_hctx,
 	.init_request	= nvme_pci_init_request,
 	.timeout	= nvme_timeout,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#533 lore raw

PATCH 518/666 drm/amdgpu/gmc: Fix AMDGPU_GART_PLACEMENT_LOW to not overlap with VRAM

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Timur Kristóf <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 36d65da7570bf72ce28504fa9a81abfc728e6d96 ]

When the GART placement is set to AMDGPU_GART_PLACEMENT_LOW:
Make sure that GART does not overlap with VRAM when VRAM is configured to be in the low address space.

Solve this according to the following logic:
- When GART fits before VRAM, use zero address for GART
- Otherwise, put GART after the end of VRAM, aligned to 4 GiB

Previously, I had assumed this was not possible so it was OK to not handle it, but now we got a report from a user who has a board that is configured this way.

Fixes 917f91d8d8e8 ("drm/amdgpu/gmc: add a way to force a particular placement for GART")
(cherry picked from commit 3d9de5d86a1658cadb311461b001eb1df67263ad)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_gmc.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_gmc.c +4 -1
index 564c68c9277b3..cf41ef9e3ad83 100644
@@ -297,7 +297,10 @@ void amdgpu_gmc_gart_location(struct amdgpu_device *adev, struct amdgpu_gmc *mc,
 		mc->gart_start = max_mc_address - mc->gart_size + 1;
 		break;
 	case AMDGPU_GART_PLACEMENT_LOW:
-		mc->gart_start = 0;
+		if (size_bf >= mc->gart_size)
+			mc->gart_start = 0;
+		else
+			mc->gart_start = ALIGN(mc->fb_end, four_gb);
 		break;
 	case AMDGPU_GART_PLACEMENT_BEST_FIT:
 	default:
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#534 lore raw

PATCH 519/666 drm/amdgpu: fix AMDGPU_INFO_READ_MMR_REG

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian König <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0ef196a208385b7d7da79f411c161b04e97283e2 ]

There were multiple issues in that code.

First of all the order between the reset semaphore and the mm_lock was wrong (e.g. copy_to_user) was called while holding the lock.

Then we allocated memory while holding the reset semaphore which is also a pretty big bug and can deadlock.

Then we used down_read_trylock() instead of waiting for the reset to finish.

Fixes 9e823f307074 ("drm/amdgpu: Block MMR_READ IOCTL in reset")
(cherry picked from commit 361b6e6b303d4b691f6c5974d3eaab67ca6dd90e)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_kms.c | 57 +++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_kms.c +24 -33
index c626f66ded189..6788265157dbf 100644
@@ -786,68 +786,59 @@ int amdgpu_info_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data, struct drm_file *filp)
 				    ? -EFAULT : 0;
 	}
 	case AMDGPU_INFO_READ_MMR_REG: {
-		int ret = 0;
-		unsigned int n, alloc_size;
-		uint32_t *regs;
 		unsigned int se_num = (info->read_mmr_reg.instance >>
 				   AMDGPU_INFO_MMR_SE_INDEX_SHIFT) &
 				  AMDGPU_INFO_MMR_SE_INDEX_MASK;
 		unsigned int sh_num = (info->read_mmr_reg.instance >>
 				   AMDGPU_INFO_MMR_SH_INDEX_SHIFT) &
 				  AMDGPU_INFO_MMR_SH_INDEX_MASK;
-
-		if (!down_read_trylock(&adev->reset_domain->sem))
-			return -ENOENT;
+		unsigned int alloc_size;
+		uint32_t *regs;
+		int ret;
 
 		/* set full masks if the userspace set all bits
 		 * in the bitfields
 		 */
-		if (se_num == AMDGPU_INFO_MMR_SE_INDEX_MASK) {
+		if (se_num == AMDGPU_INFO_MMR_SE_INDEX_MASK)
 			se_num = 0xffffffff;
-		} else if (se_num >= AMDGPU_GFX_MAX_SE) {
-			ret = -EINVAL;
-			goto out;
-		}
+		else if (se_num >= AMDGPU_GFX_MAX_SE)
+			return -EINVAL;
 
-		if (sh_num == AMDGPU_INFO_MMR_SH_INDEX_MASK) {
+		if (sh_num == AMDGPU_INFO_MMR_SH_INDEX_MASK)
 			sh_num = 0xffffffff;
-		} else if (sh_num >= AMDGPU_GFX_MAX_SH_PER_SE) {
-			ret = -EINVAL;
-			goto out;
-		}
+		else if (sh_num >= AMDGPU_GFX_MAX_SH_PER_SE)
+			return -EINVAL;
 
-		if (info->read_mmr_reg.count > 128) {
-			ret = -EINVAL;
-			goto out;
-		}
+		if (info->read_mmr_reg.count > 128)
+			return -EINVAL;
 
-		regs = kmalloc_array(info->read_mmr_reg.count, sizeof(*regs), GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!regs) {
-			ret = -ENOMEM;
-			goto out;
-		}
+		regs = kmalloc_array(info->read_mmr_reg.count, sizeof(*regs),
+				     GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!regs)
+			return -ENOMEM;
 
+		down_read(&adev->reset_domain->sem);
 		alloc_size = info->read_mmr_reg.count * sizeof(*regs);
-
 		amdgpu_gfx_off_ctrl(adev, false);
+		ret = 0;
 		for (i = 0; i < info->read_mmr_reg.count; i++) {
 			if (amdgpu_asic_read_register(adev, se_num, sh_num,
 						      info->read_mmr_reg.dword_offset + i,
 						      &regs[i])) {
 				DRM_DEBUG_KMS("unallowed offset %#x\n",
 					      info->read_mmr_reg.dword_offset + i);
-				kfree(regs);
-				amdgpu_gfx_off_ctrl(adev, true);
 				ret = -EFAULT;
-				goto out;
+				break;
 			}
 		}
 		amdgpu_gfx_off_ctrl(adev, true);
-		n = copy_to_user(out, regs, min(size, alloc_size));
-		kfree(regs);
-		ret = (n ? -EFAULT : 0);
-out:
 		up_read(&adev->reset_domain->sem);
+
+		if (!ret) {
+			ret = copy_to_user(out, regs, min(size, alloc_size))
+				? -EFAULT : 0;
+		}
+		kfree(regs);
 		return ret;
 	}
 	case AMDGPU_INFO_DEV_INFO: {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#535 lore raw

PATCH 520/666 drm/amdgpu: fix spelling typos

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alexandre Demers <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ce43abd7ec9464cf954f90e1c69e11768b02fa0a ]

Found some typos while exploring amdgpu code.

Stable-dep-of: 13e4cf116dbf ("drm/amdgpu/uvd3.1: Don't validate the firmware when already validated")

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_gmc.c | 2 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/uvd_v3_1.c   | 6 +++---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/uvd_v4_2.c   | 3 ++-
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vce_v2_0.c   | 2 +-
 4 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_gmc.c +1 -1
index cf41ef9e3ad83..f63b5a429b107 100644
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ void amdgpu_gmc_sysvm_location(struct amdgpu_device *adev, struct amdgpu_gmc *mc
  * @mc: memory controller structure holding memory information
  * @gart_placement: GART placement policy with respect to VRAM
  *
- * Function will place try to place GART before or after VRAM.
+ * Function will try to place GART before or after VRAM.
  * If GART size is bigger than space left then we ajust GART size.
  * Thus function will never fails.
  */
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/uvd_v3_1.c +3 -3
index 2dd89f490dc37..4dd1595dc3d88 100644
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static void uvd_v3_1_ring_emit_ib(struct amdgpu_ring *ring,
 }
 
 /**
- * uvd_v3_1_ring_emit_fence - emit an fence & trap command
+ * uvd_v3_1_ring_emit_fence - emit a fence & trap command
  *
  * @ring: amdgpu_ring pointer
  * @addr: address
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static void uvd_v3_1_mc_resume(struct amdgpu_device *adev)
 	uint64_t addr;
 	uint32_t size;
 
-	/* programm the VCPU memory controller bits 0-27 */
+	/* program the VCPU memory controller bits 0-27 */
 	addr = (adev->uvd.inst->gpu_addr + AMDGPU_UVD_FIRMWARE_OFFSET) >> 3;
 	size = AMDGPU_UVD_FIRMWARE_SIZE(adev) >> 3;
 	WREG32(mmUVD_VCPU_CACHE_OFFSET0, addr);
@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ static int uvd_v3_1_start(struct amdgpu_device *adev)
 	/* Set the write pointer delay */
 	WREG32(mmUVD_RBC_RB_WPTR_CNTL, 0);
 
-	/* programm the 4GB memory segment for rptr and ring buffer */
+	/* Program the 4GB memory segment for rptr and ring buffer */
 	WREG32(mmUVD_LMI_EXT40_ADDR, upper_32_bits(ring->gpu_addr) |
 		   (0x7 << 16) | (0x1 << 31));
 
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/uvd_v4_2.c +2 -1
index 0d291c497eed7..a1227867dc887 100644
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ static int uvd_v4_2_start(struct amdgpu_device *adev)
 	/* enable VCPU clock */
 	WREG32(mmUVD_VCPU_CNTL,  1 << 9);
 
-	/* disable interupt */
+	/* disable interrupt */
 	WREG32_P(mmUVD_MASTINT_EN, 0, ~(1 << 1));
 
 #ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
@@ -318,6 +318,7 @@ static int uvd_v4_2_start(struct amdgpu_device *adev)
 #endif
 	WREG32(mmUVD_LMI_SWAP_CNTL, lmi_swap_cntl);
 	WREG32(mmUVD_MP_SWAP_CNTL, mp_swap_cntl);
+
 	/* initialize UVD memory controller */
 	WREG32(mmUVD_LMI_CTRL, 0x203108);
 
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vce_v2_0.c +1 -1
index 97ce06228a910..8a6c24b98f1fa 100644
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ static int vce_v2_0_stop(struct amdgpu_device *adev)
 	int status;
 
 	if (vce_v2_0_lmi_clean(adev)) {
-		DRM_INFO("vce is not idle \n");
+		DRM_INFO("VCE is not idle \n");
 		return 0;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#536 lore raw

PATCH 521/666 drm/amdgpu/uvd3.1: Dont validate the firmware when already validated

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Timur Kristóf <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 13e4cf116dbf7a1fb8123a59bea2c098f30d3736 ]

UVD 3.1 firmware validation seems to always fail after attempting it when it had already been validated. (This works similarly with the VCE 1.0 as well.)

Don't attempt repeating the validation when it's already done.

This caused issues in situations when the system isn't able to suspend the GPU properly and so the GPU isn't actually powered down. Then amdgpu would fail when calling the IP block resume function.

Fixes bb7978111dd3 ("drm/amdgpu: fix SI UVD firmware validate resume fail")
(cherry picked from commit 889a2cfd889c4a4dd9d0c89ce9a8e60b78be71dd)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/uvd_v3_1.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/uvd_v3_1.c +10 -0
index 4dd1595dc3d88..0344f74cc4547 100644
@@ -242,6 +242,10 @@ static void uvd_v3_1_mc_resume(struct amdgpu_device *adev)
 	uint64_t addr;
 	uint32_t size;
 
+	/* When the keyselect is already set, don't perturb it. */
+	if (RREG32(mmUVD_FW_START))
+		return;
+
 	/* program the VCPU memory controller bits 0-27 */
 	addr = (adev->uvd.inst->gpu_addr + AMDGPU_UVD_FIRMWARE_OFFSET) >> 3;
 	size = AMDGPU_UVD_FIRMWARE_SIZE(adev) >> 3;
@@ -284,6 +288,12 @@ static int uvd_v3_1_fw_validate(struct amdgpu_device *adev)
 	int i;
 	uint32_t keysel = adev->uvd.keyselect;
 
+	if (RREG32(mmUVD_FW_START) & UVD_FW_STATUS__PASS_MASK) {
+		dev_dbg(adev->dev, "UVD keyselect already set: 0x%x (on CPU: 0x%x)\n",
+			RREG32(mmUVD_FW_START), adev->uvd.keyselect);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	WREG32(mmUVD_FW_START, keysel);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < 10; ++i) {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#537 lore raw

PATCH 522/666 drm/amdgpu/gfx6: Support harvested SI chips with disabled TCCs (v2)

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Timur Kristóf <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fe2b84f9228e2a0903221a4d0d8c350b018e9c0c ]

This commit fixes amdgpu to work on the Radeon HD 7870 XT which has never worked with the Linux open source drivers before.

Some boards have "harvested" chips, meaning that some parts of the chip are disabled and fused, and it's sold for cheaper and under a different marketing name.
On a harvested chip, any of the following can be disabled:
- CUs (Compute Units)
- RBs (Render Backend, aka. ROP)
- Memory channels (ie. the chip has a lower bandwidth)
- TCCs (ie. less L2 cache)

Handle chips with harvested TCCs by patching the registers that configure how TCCs are mapped.

If some TCCs are disabled, we need to make sure that the disabled TCCs are not used, and the remaining TCCs are used optimally.

TCP_CHAN_STEER_LO/HI control which TCC is used by TCP channels. TCP_ADDR_CONFIG.NUM_TCC_BANKS controls how many channels are used.

Note that the TCC configuration is highly relevant to performance. Suboptimal configuration (eg. CHAN_STEER=0) can significantly reduce gaming performance.

For optimal performance:
- Rely on the CHAN_STEER from the golden registers table, only skip disabled TCCs but keep the mapping order.
- Limit NUM_TCC_BANKS to number of active TCCs to avoid thrashing, which performs better than using the same TCC twice.

v2:
- Also consider CGTS_USER_TCC_DISABLE for disabled TCCs.

Fixes 2cd46ad22383 ("drm/amdgpu: add graphic pipeline implementation for si v8")
(cherry picked from commit 00218d15528fab9f6b31241fe5904eea4fcaa30d)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gfx_v6_0.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 66 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gfx_v6_0.c +66 -0
index cc9f9b10b435b..90c426ee877b6 100644
@@ -1553,6 +1553,71 @@ static void gfx_v6_0_setup_spi(struct amdgpu_device *adev)
 	mutex_unlock(&adev->grbm_idx_mutex);
 }
 
+/**
+ * gfx_v6_0_setup_tcc() - setup which TCCs are used
+ *
+ * @adev: amdgpu_device pointer
+ *
+ * Verify whether the current GPU has any TCCs disabled,
+ * which can happen when the GPU is harvested and some
+ * memory channels are disabled, reducing the memory bus width.
+ * For example, on the Radeon HD 7870 XT (Tahiti LE).
+ *
+ * If some TCCs are disabled, we need to make sure that
+ * the disabled TCCs are not used, and the remaining TCCs
+ * are used optimally.
+ *
+ * TCP_CHAN_STEER_LO/HI control which TCC is used by TCP channels.
+ * TCP_ADDR_CONFIG.NUM_TCC_BANKS controls how many channels are used.
+ *
+ * For optimal performance:
+ * - Rely on the CHAN_STEER from the golden registers table,
+ *   only skip disabled TCCs but keep the mapping order.
+ * - Limit NUM_TCC_BANKS to number of active TCCs to avoid thrashing,
+ *   which performs better than using the same TCC twice.
+ */
+static void gfx_v6_0_setup_tcc(struct amdgpu_device *adev)
+{
+	u32 i, tcc, tcp_addr_config, num_active_tcc = 0;
+	u64 chan_steer, patched_chan_steer = 0;
+	const u32 num_max_tcc = adev->gfx.config.max_texture_channel_caches;
+	const u32 dis_tcc_mask =
+		amdgpu_gfx_create_bitmask(num_max_tcc) &
+		(REG_GET_FIELD(RREG32(mmCGTS_TCC_DISABLE),
+			       CGTS_TCC_DISABLE, TCC_DISABLE) |
+		 REG_GET_FIELD(RREG32(mmCGTS_USER_TCC_DISABLE),
+			       CGTS_USER_TCC_DISABLE, TCC_DISABLE));
+
+	/* When no TCC is disabled, the golden registers table already has optimal TCC setup */
+	if (!dis_tcc_mask)
+		return;
+
+	/* Each 4-bit nibble contains the index of a TCC used by all TCPs */
+	chan_steer = RREG32(mmTCP_CHAN_STEER_LO) | ((u64)RREG32(mmTCP_CHAN_STEER_HI) << 32ull);
+
+	/* Patch the TCP to TCC mapping to skip disabled TCCs */
+	for (i = 0; i < num_max_tcc; ++i) {
+		tcc = (chan_steer >> (u64)(4 * i)) & 0xf;
+
+		if (!((1 << tcc) & dis_tcc_mask)) {
+			/* Copy enabled TCC indices to the patched register value. */
+			patched_chan_steer |= (u64)tcc << (u64)(4 * num_active_tcc);
+			++num_active_tcc;
+		}
+	}
+
+	WARN_ON(num_active_tcc != num_max_tcc - hweight32(dis_tcc_mask));
+
+	/* Patch number of TCCs used by TCPs */
+	tcp_addr_config = REG_SET_FIELD(RREG32(mmTCP_ADDR_CONFIG),
+					TCP_ADDR_CONFIG, NUM_TCC_BANKS,
+					num_active_tcc - 1);
+
+	WREG32(mmTCP_ADDR_CONFIG, tcp_addr_config);
+	WREG32(mmTCP_CHAN_STEER_HI, upper_32_bits(patched_chan_steer));
+	WREG32(mmTCP_CHAN_STEER_LO, lower_32_bits(patched_chan_steer));
+}
+
 static void gfx_v6_0_config_init(struct amdgpu_device *adev)
 {
 	adev->gfx.config.double_offchip_lds_buf = 0;
@@ -1711,6 +1776,7 @@ static void gfx_v6_0_constants_init(struct amdgpu_device *adev)
 	gfx_v6_0_tiling_mode_table_init(adev);
 
 	gfx_v6_0_setup_rb(adev);
+	gfx_v6_0_setup_tcc(adev);
 
 	gfx_v6_0_setup_spi(adev);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#538 lore raw

PATCH 523/666 netfilter: xt_policy: fix strict mode inbound policy matching

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jiexun Wang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4b2b4d7d4e203c92db8966b163edfacb1f0e1e29 ]

match_policy_in() walks sec_path entries from the last transform to the first one, but strict policy matching needs to consume info->pol[] in the same forward order as the rule layout.

Derive the strict-match policy position from the number of transforms already consumed so that multi-element inbound rules are matched consistently.

Fixes c4b885139203 ("[NETFILTER]: x_tables: replace IPv4/IPv6 policy match by address family independant version")
---
 net/netfilter/xt_policy.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/netfilter/xt_policy.c +1 -1
index cb6e8279010a4..b5fa65558318f 100644
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ match_policy_in(const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_policy_info *info,
 		return 0;
 
 	for (i = sp->len - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
-		pos = strict ? i - sp->len + 1 : 0;
+		pos = strict ? sp->len - i - 1 : 0;
 		if (pos >= info->len)
 			return 0;
 		e = &info->pol[pos];
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#539 lore raw

PATCH 524/666 netfilter: nf_conntrack_sip: dont use simple_strtoul

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8cf6809cddcbe301aedfc6b51bcd4944d45795f6 ]

Replace unsafe port parsing in epaddr_len(), ct_sip_parse_header_uri(), and ct_sip_parse_request() with a new sip_parse_port() helper that validates each digit against the buffer limit, eliminating the use of simple_strtoul() which assumes NUL-terminated strings.

The previous code dereferenced pointers without bounds checks after sip_parse_addr() and relied on simple_strtoul() on non-NUL-terminated skb data. A port that reaches the buffer limit without a trailing character is also rejected as malformed.

Also get rid of all simple_strtoul() usage in conntrack, prefer a stricter version instead. There are intentional changes:

- Bail out if number is > UINT_MAX and indicate a failure, same for too long sequences.
While we do accept 05535 as port 5535, we will not accept e.g. 'sip:10.0.0.1:005060'. While its syntactically valid under RFC 3261, we should restrict this to not waste cycles when presented with malformed packets with 64k '0' characters.

- Force base 10 in ct_sip_parse_numerical_param(). This is used to fetch 'expire=' and 'rports='; both are expected to use base-10.

- In nf_nat_sip.c, only accept the parsed value if its within the 1k-64k range.

- epaddr_len now returns 0 if the port is invalid, as it already does for invalid ip addresses. This is intentional. nf_conntrack_sip performs lots of guesswork to find the right parts of the message to parse. Being stricter could break existing setups. Connection tracking helpers are designed to allow traffic to pass, not to block it.

Based on an earlier patch from Jenny Guanni Qu <[email protected]>.

Fixes 05e3ced297fe ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack_sip: introduce SIP-URI parsing helper")
---
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c | 152 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 net/netfilter/nf_nat_sip.c       |   1 +
 2 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c +118 -34
index fda6fc1fc4c58..4b32ee408ea15 100644
@@ -181,6 +181,57 @@ static int sip_parse_addr(const struct nf_conn *ct, const char *cp,
 	return 1;
 }
 
+/* Parse optional port number after IP address.
+ * Returns false on malformed input, true otherwise.
+ * If port is non-NULL, stores parsed port in network byte order.
+ * If no port is present, sets *port to default SIP port.
+ */
+static bool sip_parse_port(const char *dptr, const char **endp,
+			   const char *limit, __be16 *port)
+{
+	unsigned int p = 0;
+	int len = 0;
+
+	if (dptr >= limit)
+		return false;
+
+	if (*dptr != ':') {
+		if (port)
+			*port = htons(SIP_PORT);
+		if (endp)
+			*endp = dptr;
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	dptr++; /* skip ':' */
+
+	while (dptr < limit && isdigit(*dptr)) {
+		p = p * 10 + (*dptr - '0');
+		dptr++;
+		len++;
+		if (len > 5) /* max "65535" */
+			return false;
+	}
+
+	if (len == 0)
+		return false;
+
+	/* reached limit while parsing port */
+	if (dptr >= limit)
+		return false;
+
+	if (p < 1024 || p > 65535)
+		return false;
+
+	if (port)
+		*port = htons(p);
+
+	if (endp)
+		*endp = dptr;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
 /* skip ip address. returns its length. */
 static int epaddr_len(const struct nf_conn *ct, const char *dptr,
 		      const char *limit, int *shift)
@@ -193,11 +244,8 @@ static int epaddr_len(const struct nf_conn *ct, const char *dptr,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	/* Port number */
-	if (*dptr == ':') {
-		dptr++;
-		dptr += digits_len(ct, dptr, limit, shift);
-	}
+	if (!sip_parse_port(dptr, &dptr, limit, NULL))
+		return 0;
 	return dptr - aux;
 }
 
@@ -228,6 +276,51 @@ static int skp_epaddr_len(const struct nf_conn *ct, const char *dptr,
 	return epaddr_len(ct, dptr, limit, shift);
 }
 
+/* simple_strtoul stops after first non-number character.
+ * But as we're not dealing with c-strings, we can't rely on
+ * hitting \r,\n,\0 etc. before moving past end of buffer.
+ *
+ * This is a variant of simple_strtoul, but doesn't require
+ * a c-string.
+ *
+ * If value exceeds UINT_MAX, 0 is returned.
+ */
+static unsigned int sip_strtouint(const char *cp, unsigned int len, char **endp)
+{
+	const unsigned int max = sizeof("4294967295");
+	unsigned int olen = len;
+	const char *s = cp;
+	u64 result = 0;
+
+	if (len > max)
+		len = max;
+
+	while (olen > 0 && isdigit(*s)) {
+		unsigned int value;
+
+		if (len == 0)
+			goto err;
+
+		value = *s - '0';
+		result = result * 10 + value;
+
+		if (result > UINT_MAX)
+			goto err;
+		s++;
+		len--;
+		olen--;
+	}
+
+	if (endp)
+		*endp = (char *)s;
+
+	return result;
+err:
+	if (endp)
+		*endp = (char *)cp;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /* Parse a SIP request line of the form:
  *
  * Request-Line = Method SP Request-URI SP SIP-Version CRLF
@@ -241,7 +334,6 @@ int ct_sip_parse_request(const struct nf_conn *ct,
 {
 	const char *start = dptr, *limit = dptr + datalen, *end;
 	unsigned int mlen;
-	unsigned int p;
 	int shift = 0;
 
 	/* Skip method and following whitespace */
@@ -267,14 +359,8 @@ int ct_sip_parse_request(const struct nf_conn *ct,
 
 	if (!sip_parse_addr(ct, dptr, &end, addr, limit, true))
 		return -1;
-	if (end < limit && *end == ':') {
-		end++;
-		p = simple_strtoul(end, (char **)&end, 10);
-		if (p < 1024 || p > 65535)
-			return -1;
-		*port = htons(p);
-	} else
-		*port = htons(SIP_PORT);
+	if (!sip_parse_port(end, &end, limit, port))
+		return -1;
 
 	if (end == dptr)
 		return 0;
@@ -509,7 +595,6 @@ int ct_sip_parse_header_uri(const struct nf_conn *ct, const char *dptr,
 			    union nf_inet_addr *addr, __be16 *port)
 {
 	const char *c, *limit = dptr + datalen;
-	unsigned int p;
 	int ret;
 
 	ret = ct_sip_walk_headers(ct, dptr, dataoff ? *dataoff : 0, datalen,
@@ -520,14 +605,8 @@ int ct_sip_parse_header_uri(const struct nf_conn *ct, const char *dptr,
 
 	if (!sip_parse_addr(ct, dptr + *matchoff, &c, addr, limit, true))
 		return -1;
-	if (*c == ':') {
-		c++;
-		p = simple_strtoul(c, (char **)&c, 10);
-		if (p < 1024 || p > 65535)
-			return -1;
-		*port = htons(p);
-	} else
-		*port = htons(SIP_PORT);
+	if (!sip_parse_port(c, &c, limit, port))
+		return -1;
 
 	if (dataoff)
 		*dataoff = c - dptr;
@@ -609,7 +688,7 @@ int ct_sip_parse_numerical_param(const struct nf_conn *ct, const char *dptr,
 		return 0;
 
 	start += strlen(name);
-	*val = simple_strtoul(start, &end, 0);
+	*val = sip_strtouint(start, limit - start, (char **)&end);
 	if (start == end)
 		return -1;
 	if (matchoff && matchlen) {
@@ -1065,6 +1144,8 @@ static int process_sdp(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff,
 
 	mediaoff = sdpoff;
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sdp_media_types); ) {
+		char *end;
+
 		if (ct_sip_get_sdp_header(ct, *dptr, mediaoff, *datalen,
 					  SDP_HDR_MEDIA, SDP_HDR_UNSPEC,
 					  &mediaoff, &medialen) <= 0)
@@ -1080,8 +1161,8 @@ static int process_sdp(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff,
 		mediaoff += t->len;
 		medialen -= t->len;
 
-		port = simple_strtoul(*dptr + mediaoff, NULL, 10);
-		if (port == 0)
+		port = sip_strtouint(*dptr + mediaoff, *datalen - mediaoff, (char **)&end);
+		if (port == 0 || *dptr + mediaoff == end)
 			continue;
 		if (port < 1024 || port > 65535) {
 			nf_ct_helper_log(skb, ct, "wrong port %u", port);
@@ -1255,7 +1336,7 @@ static int process_register_request(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff,
 	 */
 	if (ct_sip_get_header(ct, *dptr, 0, *datalen, SIP_HDR_EXPIRES,
 			      &matchoff, &matchlen) > 0)
-		expires = simple_strtoul(*dptr + matchoff, NULL, 10);
+		expires = sip_strtouint(*dptr + matchoff, *datalen - matchoff, NULL);
 
 	ret = ct_sip_parse_header_uri(ct, *dptr, NULL, *datalen,
 				      SIP_HDR_CONTACT, NULL,
@@ -1359,7 +1440,7 @@ static int process_register_response(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff,
 
 	if (ct_sip_get_header(ct, *dptr, 0, *datalen, SIP_HDR_EXPIRES,
 			      &matchoff, &matchlen) > 0)
-		expires = simple_strtoul(*dptr + matchoff, NULL, 10);
+		expires = sip_strtouint(*dptr + matchoff, *datalen - matchoff, NULL);
 
 	while (1) {
 		unsigned int c_expires = expires;
@@ -1419,10 +1500,12 @@ static int process_sip_response(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff,
 	struct nf_conn *ct = nf_ct_get(skb, &ctinfo);
 	unsigned int matchoff, matchlen, matchend;
 	unsigned int code, cseq, i;
+	char *end;
 
 	if (*datalen < strlen("SIP/2.0 200"))
 		return NF_ACCEPT;
-	code = simple_strtoul(*dptr + strlen("SIP/2.0 "), NULL, 10);
+	code = sip_strtouint(*dptr + strlen("SIP/2.0 "),
+			     *datalen - strlen("SIP/2.0 "), NULL);
 	if (!code) {
 		nf_ct_helper_log(skb, ct, "cannot get code");
 		return NF_DROP;
@@ -1433,8 +1516,8 @@ static int process_sip_response(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff,
 		nf_ct_helper_log(skb, ct, "cannot parse cseq");
 		return NF_DROP;
 	}
-	cseq = simple_strtoul(*dptr + matchoff, NULL, 10);
-	if (!cseq && *(*dptr + matchoff) != '0') {
+	cseq = sip_strtouint(*dptr + matchoff, *datalen - matchoff, (char **)&end);
+	if (*dptr + matchoff == end) {
 		nf_ct_helper_log(skb, ct, "cannot get cseq");
 		return NF_DROP;
 	}
@@ -1483,6 +1566,7 @@ static int process_sip_request(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff,
 
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sip_handlers); i++) {
 		const struct sip_handler *handler;
+		char *end;
 
 		handler = &sip_handlers[i];
 		if (handler->request == NULL)
@@ -1499,8 +1583,8 @@ static int process_sip_request(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff,
 			nf_ct_helper_log(skb, ct, "cannot parse cseq");
 			return NF_DROP;
 		}
-		cseq = simple_strtoul(*dptr + matchoff, NULL, 10);
-		if (!cseq && *(*dptr + matchoff) != '0') {
+		cseq = sip_strtouint(*dptr + matchoff, *datalen - matchoff, (char **)&end);
+		if (*dptr + matchoff == end) {
 			nf_ct_helper_log(skb, ct, "cannot get cseq");
 			return NF_DROP;
 		}
@@ -1576,7 +1660,7 @@ static int sip_help_tcp(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff,
 				      &matchoff, &matchlen) <= 0)
 			break;
 
-		clen = simple_strtoul(dptr + matchoff, (char **)&end, 10);
+		clen = sip_strtouint(dptr + matchoff, datalen - matchoff, (char **)&end);
 		if (dptr + matchoff == end)
 			break;
 
net/netfilter/nf_nat_sip.c +1 -0
index c845b6d1a2bdf..9fbfc6bff0c22 100644
@@ -246,6 +246,7 @@ static unsigned int nf_nat_sip(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff,
 		if (ct_sip_parse_numerical_param(ct, *dptr, matchend, *datalen,
 						 "rport=", &poff, &plen,
 						 &n) > 0 &&
+		    n >= 1024 && n <= 65535 &&
 		    htons(n) == ct->tuplehash[dir].tuple.dst.u.udp.port &&
 		    htons(n) != ct->tuplehash[!dir].tuple.src.u.udp.port) {
 			__be16 p = ct->tuplehash[!dir].tuple.src.u.udp.port;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#540 lore raw

PATCH 525/666 ASoC: amd: acp: Add DMI quirk for Valve Steam Deck OLED

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Guilherme G. Piccoli <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b0f6f4ac7d5d04fe2adcdd63ed1cd1ad505b8958 ]

Commit 671dd2ffbd8b ("ASoC: amd: acp: Add new cpu dai and dailink creation for I2S BT instance") introduced a change that "broke" Steam Deck's audio probe, in the OLED
model, as observed in the following dmesg snippet:

[...]
snd_sof_amd_vangogh 0000:04:00.5: Topology: ABI 3:26:0 Kernel ABI 3:23:1
sof_mach nau8821-max: ASoC: physical link acp-bt-codec (id 2) not exist
sof_mach nau8821-max: ASoC: topology: could not load header: -22
snd_sof_amd_vangogh 0000:04:00.5: tplg amd/sof-tplg/sof-vangogh-nau8821-max.tplg component load failed -22 snd_sof_amd_vangogh 0000:04:00.5: error: failed to load DSP topology -22 snd_sof_amd_vangogh 0000:04:00.5: ASoC error (-22): at snd_soc_component_probe() on 0000:04:00.5 sof_mach nau8821-max: ASoC: failed to instantiate card -22
sof_mach nau8821-max: error -EINVAL: Failed to register card(sof-nau8821-max)
sof_mach nau8821-max: probe with driver sof_mach failed with error -22
[...]

Notice the quotes in "broke": it's not really a bug in such commit, but instead a problem with a topology file from Steam Deck OLED. This was discussed to great extent in [1], and Cristian proposed a pretty simple and functional change that resolved the issue for the Deck's issue. That change, though, would break other devices, so it wasn't accepted upstream. And the proper suggested solution (fix the topology) was never implemented, so Valve's kernel (and anyone that wants to boot the mainline on Steam Deck OLED) is carrying that fix downstream.

So, we propose hereby a different approach: a DMI quirk, as many already present in the sound drivers, to address this issue solely on Steam Deck OLED, not breaking other devices and as a bonus, allowing simple patch up in case eventually the topology file gets fixed (we'd just need to check against any DMI info reflecting that or the topology/FW versions).

The motivation of such upstream quirk is related to users that want to test latest kernel trees on their devices and get no only non-working sound device, but seems some games (like Ori and the Blind Forest) can't properly work without a proper functional audio device. Example of such report can be seen at [2].

---
 sound/soc/amd/acp/acp-legacy-mach.c |  2 +-
 sound/soc/amd/acp/acp-mach-common.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++---
 sound/soc/amd/acp/acp-mach.h        |  4 ++++
 sound/soc/amd/acp/acp-sof-mach.c    |  2 +-
 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
sound/soc/amd/acp/acp-legacy-mach.c +1 -1
index d104f7e8fdcd8..4221fc0f081b8 100644
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ static int acp_asoc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 		acp_card_drvdata->platform =  *((int *)dev->platform_data);
 
 	dmi_id = dmi_first_match(acp_quirk_table);
-	if (dmi_id && dmi_id->driver_data)
+	if (dmi_id && dmi_id->driver_data == (void *)QUIRK_TDM_MODE_ENABLE)
 		acp_card_drvdata->tdm_mode = dmi_id->driver_data;
 
 	ret = acp_legacy_dai_links_create(card);
sound/soc/amd/acp/acp-mach-common.c +19 -3
index e9ff4815c12c8..6c0a92d76b54d 100644
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <sound/soc.h>
 #include <linux/input.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/dmi.h>
 
 #include "../../codecs/rt5682.h"
 #include "../../codecs/rt1019.h"
@@ -37,15 +38,21 @@
 #define NAU8821_FREQ_OUT	12288000
 #define MAX98388_CODEC_DAI	"max98388-aif1"
 
-#define TDM_MODE_ENABLE 1
-
 const struct dmi_system_id acp_quirk_table[] = {
 	{
 		/* Google skyrim proto-0 */
 		.matches = {
 			DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_FAMILY, "Google_Skyrim"),
 		},
-		.driver_data = (void *)TDM_MODE_ENABLE,
+		.driver_data = (void *)QUIRK_TDM_MODE_ENABLE,
+	},
+	{
+		/* Valve Steam Deck OLED */
+		.matches = {
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Valve"),
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "Galileo"),
+		},
+		.driver_data = (void *)QUIRK_REMAP_DMIC_BT,
 	},
 	{}
 };
@@ -1385,6 +1392,7 @@ int acp_sofdsp_dai_links_create(struct snd_soc_card *card)
 	struct snd_soc_dai_link *links;
 	struct device *dev = card->dev;
 	struct acp_card_drvdata *drv_data = card->drvdata;
+	const struct dmi_system_id *dmi_id = dmi_first_match(acp_quirk_table);
 	int i = 0, num_links = 0;
 
 	if (drv_data->hs_cpu_id)
@@ -1562,6 +1570,9 @@ int acp_sofdsp_dai_links_create(struct snd_soc_card *card)
 			links[i].codecs = &snd_soc_dummy_dlc;
 			links[i].num_codecs = 1;
 		}
+
+		if (dmi_id && dmi_id->driver_data == (void *)QUIRK_REMAP_DMIC_BT)
+			links[i].id = DMIC_BE_ID;
 		i++;
 	}
 
@@ -1577,6 +1588,11 @@ int acp_sofdsp_dai_links_create(struct snd_soc_card *card)
 		links[i].dpcm_capture = 1;
 		links[i].nonatomic = true;
 		links[i].no_pcm = 1;
+
+		if (dmi_id && dmi_id->driver_data == (void *)QUIRK_REMAP_DMIC_BT) {
+			links[i].id = BT_BE_ID;
+			dev_dbg(dev, "quirk REMAP_DMIC_BT enabled\n");
+		}
 	}
 
 	card->dai_link = links;
sound/soc/amd/acp/acp-mach.h +4 -0
index 93d9e3886b7ec..4b255cbde9ff4 100644
@@ -24,6 +24,10 @@
 
 #define acp_get_drvdata(card) ((struct acp_card_drvdata *)(card)->drvdata)
 
+/* List of DMI quirks - check acp-mach-common.c for usage. */
+#define QUIRK_TDM_MODE_ENABLE 1
+#define QUIRK_REMAP_DMIC_BT 2
+
 enum be_id {
 	HEADSET_BE_ID = 0,
 	AMP_BE_ID,
sound/soc/amd/acp/acp-sof-mach.c +1 -1
index f36750167fa29..4c069a34fbe17 100644
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static int acp_sof_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	acp_card_drvdata = card->drvdata;
 	dmi_id = dmi_first_match(acp_quirk_table);
-	if (dmi_id && dmi_id->driver_data)
+	if (dmi_id && dmi_id->driver_data == (void *)QUIRK_TDM_MODE_ENABLE)
 		acp_card_drvdata->tdm_mode = dmi_id->driver_data;
 
 	ret = acp_sofdsp_dai_links_create(card);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#541 lore raw

PATCH 526/666 spi: rockchip: Read ISR, not IMR, to detect cs-inactive IRQ

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: John Madieu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b4683a239a409d65f88052f5630c748a8ba070cd ]

rockchip_spi_isr() decides whether the current interrupt was the cs-inactive event by reading IMR:

	if (rs->cs_inactive &&
	    readl_relaxed(rs->regs + ROCKCHIP_SPI_IMR) & INT_CS_INACTIVE)
		ctlr->target_abort(ctlr);

IMR is the interrupt mask register: it tells which sources are enabled, not which one fired. In the PIO path, rockchip_spi_prepare_irq() enables both INT_RF_FULL and INT_CS_INACTIVE in IMR when rs->cs_inactive is true:

	if (rs->cs_inactive)
		writel_relaxed(INT_RF_FULL | INT_CS_INACTIVE,
			       rs->regs + ROCKCHIP_SPI_IMR);

so the IMR check is always true once cs_inactive is enabled, and every PIO interrupt - including normal RF_FULL completions - is dispatched to ctlr->target_abort(), aborting the transfer. The bug is reachable on ROCKCHIP_SPI_VER2_TYPE2 in target mode with a DMA-capable controller when the transfer is short enough to fall back to PIO (rockchip_spi_can_dma() returns false below fifo_len).

Read ISR (which is RISR masked by IMR) so the check actually reflects which interrupt fired, and parenthesise the expression for clarity while at it.

Fixes 869f2c94db92 ("spi: rockchip: Stop spi slave dma receiver when cs inactive")
---
 drivers/spi/spi-rockchip.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/spi/spi-rockchip.c +2 -1
index b480408c812f8..ccb35a2e39fbd 100644
@@ -357,7 +357,8 @@ static irqreturn_t rockchip_spi_isr(int irq, void *dev_id)
 	struct rockchip_spi *rs = spi_controller_get_devdata(ctlr);
 
 	/* When int_cs_inactive comes, spi target abort */
-	if (rs->cs_inactive && readl_relaxed(rs->regs + ROCKCHIP_SPI_IMR) & INT_CS_INACTIVE) {
+	if (rs->cs_inactive &&
+	    (readl_relaxed(rs->regs + ROCKCHIP_SPI_ISR) & INT_CS_INACTIVE)) {
 		ctlr->target_abort(ctlr);
 		writel_relaxed(0, rs->regs + ROCKCHIP_SPI_IMR);
 		writel_relaxed(0xffffffff, rs->regs + ROCKCHIP_SPI_ICR);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#542 lore raw

PATCH 527/666 drm/sysfb: ofdrm: fix PCI device reference leaks

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yuho Choi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4aa8110000b0d215deef8eed283565dd0c1def88 ]

display_get_pci_dev_of() gets a referenced PCI device via pci_get_device(). Drop that reference when pci_enable_device() fails and release it during the managed teardown path after pci_disable_device().

Without that, ofdrm leaks the pci_dev reference on both the error path and the normal cleanup path.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/tiny/ofdrm.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/tiny/ofdrm.c +2 -0
index 35996f7eedac0..cc90e0035d034 100644
@@ -350,6 +350,7 @@ static void ofdrm_pci_release(void *data)
 	struct pci_dev *pcidev = data;
 
 	pci_disable_device(pcidev);
+	pci_dev_put(pcidev);
 }
 
 static int ofdrm_device_init_pci(struct ofdrm_device *odev)
@@ -375,6 +376,7 @@ static int ofdrm_device_init_pci(struct ofdrm_device *odev)
 	if (ret) {
 		drm_err(dev, "pci_enable_device(%s) failed: %d\n",
 			dev_name(&pcidev->dev), ret);
+		pci_dev_put(pcidev);
 		return ret;
 	}
 	ret = devm_add_action_or_reset(&pdev->dev, ofdrm_pci_release, pcidev);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#543 lore raw

PATCH 528/666 arm64/scs: Fix potential sign extension issue of advance_loc4

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wentao Guan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4023b7424ecd5d38cc75b650d6c1bf630ef8cb40 ]

The expression (*opcode++ << 24) and exp * code_alignment_factor may overflow signed int and becomes negative.

Fix this by casting each byte to u64 before shifting. Also fix the misaligned break statement while we are here.

Example of the result can be seen here:

It maybe not a real problem, but could be a issue in future.

Fixes d499e9627d70 ("arm64/scs: Fix handling of advance_loc4")
---
 arch/arm64/kernel/pi/patch-scs.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/pi/patch-scs.c +2 -2
index be7050fdfbba0..76e69df0085d1 100644
@@ -178,9 +178,9 @@ static int scs_handle_fde_frame(const struct eh_frame *frame,
 			loc += *opcode++ * code_alignment_factor;
 			loc += (*opcode++ << 8) * code_alignment_factor;
 			loc += (*opcode++ << 16) * code_alignment_factor;
-			loc += (*opcode++ << 24) * code_alignment_factor;
+			loc += ((u64)*opcode++ << 24) * code_alignment_factor;
 			size -= 4;
-		break;
+			break;
 
 		case DW_CFA_def_cfa:
 		case DW_CFA_offset_extended:
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#544 lore raw

PATCH 529/666 cdrom, scsi: sr: propagate read-only status to block layer via set_disk_ro()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Daan De Meyer <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0898a817621a2f0cddca8122d9b974003fe5036d ]

The cdrom core never calls set_disk_ro() for a registered device, so BLKROGET on a CD-ROM device always returns 0 (writable), even when the drive has no write capabilities and writes will inevitably fail. This causes problems for userspace that relies on BLKROGET to determine whether a block device is read-only. For example, systemd's loop device setup uses BLKROGET to decide whether to create a loop device with LO_FLAGS_READ_ONLY. Without the read-only flag, writes pass through the loop device to the CD-ROM and fail with I/O errors. systemd-fsck similarly checks BLKROGET to decide whether to run fsck in no-repair mode (-n).

The write-capability bits in cdi->mask come from two different sources:
CDC_DVD_RAM and CDC_CD_RW are populated by the driver from the MODE SENSE capabilities page (page 0x2A) before register_cdrom() is called, while CDC_MRW_W and CDC_RAM require the MMC GET CONFIGURATION command and were only probed by cdrom_open_write() at device open time. This meant that any attempt to compute the writable state from the full mask at probe time was incorrect, because the GET CONFIGURATION bits were still unset (and cdi->mask is initialized such that capabilities are assumed present).

Fix this by factoring the GET CONFIGURATION probing out of cdrom_open_write() into a new exported helper, cdrom_probe_write_features(), and having sr call it from sr_probe() right after get_capabilities() has populated the MODE SENSE bits. register_cdrom() then calls set_disk_ro() based on the full write-capability mask (CDC_DVD_RAM | CDC_MRW_W | CDC_RAM | CDC_CD_RW) so the block layer reflects the drive's actual write support. The feature queries used (CDF_MRW and CDF_RWRT via GET CONFIGURATION with RT=00) report drive-level capabilities that are persistent across media, so a single probe before register_cdrom() is sufficient and the redundant probe at open time is dropped.

With set_disk_ro() now accurate, the long-vestigial cd->writeable flag in sr can go: get_capabilities() used to set cd->writeable based on the same four mask bits, but because CDC_MRW_W and CDC_RAM default to "capability present" in cdi->mask and aren't touched by MODE SENSE, the condition that gated cd->writeable was always true, making it unconditionally 1. Replace the corresponding gate in sr_init_command() with get_disk_ro(cd->disk), which turns a previously no-op check into a real one and also catches kernel-internal bio writers that bypass blkdev_write_iter()'s bdev_read_only() check.

The sd driver (SCSI disks) does not have this problem because it checks the MODE SENSE Write Protect bit and calls set_disk_ro() accordingly. The sr driver cannot use the same approach because the MMC specification does not define the WP bit in the MODE SENSE device-specific parameter byte for CD-ROM devices.

---
 drivers/cdrom/cdrom.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 drivers/scsi/sr.c     | 11 ++-----
 drivers/scsi/sr.h     |  1 -
 include/linux/cdrom.h |  1 +
 4 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
drivers/cdrom/cdrom.c +48 -25
index 6a99a459b80b2..19d6f9a069bdf 100644
@@ -634,6 +634,16 @@ int register_cdrom(struct gendisk *disk, struct cdrom_device_info *cdi)
 
 	WARN_ON(!cdo->generic_packet);
 
+	/*
+	 * Propagate the drive's write support to the block layer so BLKROGET
+	 * reflects actual write capability. Drivers that use GET CONFIGURATION
+	 * features (CDC_MRW_W, CDC_RAM) must have called
+	 * cdrom_probe_write_features() before register_cdrom() so the mask is
+	 * complete here.
+	 */
+	set_disk_ro(disk, !CDROM_CAN(CDC_DVD_RAM | CDC_MRW_W | CDC_RAM |
+				     CDC_CD_RW));
+
 	cd_dbg(CD_REG_UNREG, "drive \"/dev/%s\" registered\n", cdi->name);
 	mutex_lock(&cdrom_mutex);
 	list_add(&cdi->list, &cdrom_list);
@@ -748,6 +758,44 @@ static int cdrom_is_random_writable(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi, int *write)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Probe write-related MMC features via GET CONFIGURATION and update
+ * cdi->mask accordingly. Drivers that populate cdi->mask from the MODE SENSE
+ * capabilities page (e.g. sr) should call this after those MODE SENSE bits
+ * have been set but before register_cdrom(), so that the full set of
+ * write-capability bits is known by the time register_cdrom() decides on the
+ * initial read-only state of the disk.
+ */
+void cdrom_probe_write_features(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi)
+{
+	int mrw, mrw_write, ram_write;
+
+	mrw = 0;
+	if (!cdrom_is_mrw(cdi, &mrw_write))
+		mrw = 1;
+
+	if (CDROM_CAN(CDC_MO_DRIVE))
+		ram_write = 1;
+	else
+		(void) cdrom_is_random_writable(cdi, &ram_write);
+
+	if (mrw)
+		cdi->mask &= ~CDC_MRW;
+	else
+		cdi->mask |= CDC_MRW;
+
+	if (mrw_write)
+		cdi->mask &= ~CDC_MRW_W;
+	else
+		cdi->mask |= CDC_MRW_W;
+
+	if (ram_write)
+		cdi->mask &= ~CDC_RAM;
+	else
+		cdi->mask |= CDC_RAM;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(cdrom_probe_write_features);
+
 static int cdrom_media_erasable(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi)
 {
 	disc_information di;
@@ -900,33 +948,8 @@ static int cdrom_is_dvd_rw(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi)
  */
 static int cdrom_open_write(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi)
 {
-	int mrw, mrw_write, ram_write;
 	int ret = 1;
 
-	mrw = 0;
-	if (!cdrom_is_mrw(cdi, &mrw_write))
-		mrw = 1;
-
-	if (CDROM_CAN(CDC_MO_DRIVE))
-		ram_write = 1;
-	else
-		(void) cdrom_is_random_writable(cdi, &ram_write);
-	
-	if (mrw)
-		cdi->mask &= ~CDC_MRW;
-	else
-		cdi->mask |= CDC_MRW;
-
-	if (mrw_write)
-		cdi->mask &= ~CDC_MRW_W;
-	else
-		cdi->mask |= CDC_MRW_W;
-
-	if (ram_write)
-		cdi->mask &= ~CDC_RAM;
-	else
-		cdi->mask |= CDC_RAM;
-
 	if (CDROM_CAN(CDC_MRW_W))
 		ret = cdrom_mrw_open_write(cdi);
 	else if (CDROM_CAN(CDC_DVD_RAM))
drivers/scsi/sr.c +2 -9
index add13e3068983..803fc9c132298 100644
@@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ static blk_status_t sr_init_command(struct scsi_cmnd *SCpnt)
 
 	switch (req_op(rq)) {
 	case REQ_OP_WRITE:
-		if (!cd->writeable)
+		if (get_disk_ro(cd->disk))
 			goto out;
 		SCpnt->cmnd[0] = WRITE_10;
 		cd->cdi.media_written = 1;
@@ -681,6 +681,7 @@ static int sr_probe(struct device *dev)
 	error = -ENOMEM;
 	if (get_capabilities(cd))
 		goto fail_minor;
+	cdrom_probe_write_features(&cd->cdi);
 	sr_vendor_init(cd);
 
 	set_capacity(disk, cd->capacity);
@@ -899,14 +900,6 @@ static int get_capabilities(struct scsi_cd *cd)
 	/*else    I don't think it can close its tray
 		cd->cdi.mask |= CDC_CLOSE_TRAY; */
 
-	/*
-	 * if DVD-RAM, MRW-W or CD-RW, we are randomly writable
-	 */
-	if ((cd->cdi.mask & (CDC_DVD_RAM | CDC_MRW_W | CDC_RAM | CDC_CD_RW)) !=
-			(CDC_DVD_RAM | CDC_MRW_W | CDC_RAM | CDC_CD_RW)) {
-		cd->writeable = 1;
-	}
-
 	kfree(buffer);
 	return 0;
 }
drivers/scsi/sr.h +0 -1
index dc899277b3a44..2d92f9cb6fec7 100644
@@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ typedef struct scsi_cd {
 	struct scsi_device *device;
 	unsigned int vendor;	/* vendor code, see sr_vendor.c         */
 	unsigned long ms_offset;	/* for reading multisession-CD's        */
-	unsigned writeable : 1;
 	unsigned use:1;		/* is this device still supportable     */
 	unsigned xa_flag:1;	/* CD has XA sectors ? */
 	unsigned readcd_known:1;	/* drive supports READ_CD (0xbe) */
include/linux/cdrom.h +1 -0
index fdfb61ccf55ae..b4f2b23744413 100644
@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ int cdrom_ioctl(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi, struct block_device *bdev,
 extern unsigned int cdrom_check_events(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi,
 				       unsigned int clearing);
 
+extern void cdrom_probe_write_features(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi);
 extern int register_cdrom(struct gendisk *disk, struct cdrom_device_info *cdi);
 extern void unregister_cdrom(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#545 lore raw

PATCH 530/666 netdevsim: zero initialize struct iphdr in dummy sk_buff

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Nikola Z. Ivanov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 35eaa6d8d6c2ee65e96f507add856e0eacf24591 ]

Syzbot reports a KMSAN uninit-value originating from nsim_dev_trap_skb_build, with the allocation also being performed in the same function.

Fix this by calling skb_put_zero instead of skb_put to guarantee zero initialization of the whole IP header.

---
 drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c +1 -1
index 2614d6509954c..daec92570c2e3 100644
@@ -758,7 +758,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *nsim_dev_trap_skb_build(void)
 	skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IP);
 
 	skb_set_network_header(skb, skb->len);
-	iph = skb_put(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr));
+	iph = skb_put_zero(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr));
 	iph->protocol = IPPROTO_UDP;
 	iph->saddr = in_aton("192.0.2.1");
 	iph->daddr = in_aton("198.51.100.1");
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#546 lore raw

PATCH 531/666 net/sched: netem: fix probability gaps in 4-state loss model

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 732b463449fd0ef90acd13cda68eab1c91adb00c ]

The 4-state Markov chain in loss_4state() has gaps at the boundaries between transition probability ranges. The comparisons use:

  if (rnd < a4)
  else if (a4 < rnd && rnd < a1 + a4)

When rnd equals a boundary value exactly, neither branch matches and no state transition occurs. The redundant lower-bound check (a4 < rnd) is already implied by being in the else branch.

Remove the unnecessary lower-bound comparisons so the ranges are contiguous and every random value produces a transition, matching the GI (General and Intuitive) loss model specification.

This bug goes back to original implementation of this model.

---
 net/sched/sch_netem.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/sched/sch_netem.c +4 -4
index 825c398aa1232..add20b1ab79b2 100644
@@ -226,10 +226,10 @@ static bool loss_4state(struct netem_sched_data *q)
 		if (rnd < clg->a4) {
 			clg->state = LOST_IN_GAP_PERIOD;
 			return true;
-		} else if (clg->a4 < rnd && rnd < clg->a1 + clg->a4) {
+		} else if (rnd < clg->a1 + clg->a4) {
 			clg->state = LOST_IN_BURST_PERIOD;
 			return true;
-		} else if (clg->a1 + clg->a4 < rnd) {
+		} else {
 			clg->state = TX_IN_GAP_PERIOD;
 		}
 
@@ -246,9 +246,9 @@ static bool loss_4state(struct netem_sched_data *q)
 	case LOST_IN_BURST_PERIOD:
 		if (rnd < clg->a3)
 			clg->state = TX_IN_BURST_PERIOD;
-		else if (clg->a3 < rnd && rnd < clg->a2 + clg->a3) {
+		else if (rnd < clg->a2 + clg->a3) {
 			clg->state = TX_IN_GAP_PERIOD;
-		} else if (clg->a2 + clg->a3 < rnd) {
+		} else {
 			clg->state = LOST_IN_BURST_PERIOD;
 			return true;
 		}
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#547 lore raw

PATCH 532/666 net/sched: netem: fix queue limit check to include reordered packets

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4185701fcce6b426b6c3630b25330dddd9c47b0d ]

The queue limit check in netem_enqueue() uses q->t_len which only counts packets in the internal tfifo. Packets placed in sch->q by the reorder path (__qdisc_enqueue_head) are not counted, allowing the total queue occupancy to exceed sch->limit under reordering.

Include sch->q.qlen in the limit check.

Fixes f8d4bc455047 ("net/sched: netem: account for backlog updates from child qdisc")
---
 net/sched/sch_netem.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/sched/sch_netem.c +1 -1
index add20b1ab79b2..542ab3f7e3d07 100644
@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ static int netem_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch,
 				1 << get_random_u32_below(8);
 	}
 
-	if (unlikely(q->t_len >= sch->limit)) {
+	if (unlikely(sch->q.qlen >= sch->limit)) {
 		/* re-link segs, so that qdisc_drop_all() frees them all */
 		skb->next = segs;
 		qdisc_drop_all(skb, sch, to_free);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#548 lore raw

PATCH 533/666 net/sched: netem: only reseed PRNG when seed is explicitly provided

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 986afaf809940577224a99c3a08d97a15eb37e93 ]

netem_change() unconditionally reseeds the PRNG on every tc change command. If TCA_NETEM_PRNG_SEED is not specified, a new random seed is generated, destroying reproducibility for users who set a deterministic seed on a previous change.

Move the initial random seed generation to netem_init() and only reseed in netem_change() when TCA_NETEM_PRNG_SEED is explicitly provided by the user.

Fixes 4072d97ddc44 ("netem: add prng attribute to netem_sched_data")
---
 net/sched/sch_netem.c | 10 ++++++----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/sched/sch_netem.c +6 -4
index 542ab3f7e3d07..67f3b06373dcf 100644
@@ -1110,11 +1110,10 @@ static int netem_change(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt,
 	/* capping jitter to the range acceptable by tabledist() */
 	q->jitter = min_t(s64, abs(q->jitter), INT_MAX);
 
-	if (tb[TCA_NETEM_PRNG_SEED])
+	if (tb[TCA_NETEM_PRNG_SEED]) {
 		q->prng.seed = nla_get_u64(tb[TCA_NETEM_PRNG_SEED]);
-	else
-		q->prng.seed = get_random_u64();
-	prandom_seed_state(&q->prng.prng_state, q->prng.seed);
+		prandom_seed_state(&q->prng.prng_state, q->prng.seed);
+	}
 
 unlock:
 	sch_tree_unlock(sch);
@@ -1137,6 +1136,9 @@ static int netem_init(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt,
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	q->loss_model = CLG_RANDOM;
+	q->prng.seed = get_random_u64();
+	prandom_seed_state(&q->prng.prng_state, q->prng.seed);
+
 	ret = netem_change(sch, opt, extack);
 	if (ret)
 		pr_info("netem: change failed\n");
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#549 lore raw

PATCH 534/666 net/sched: netem: validate slot configuration

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 01801c359a74737b9b1aa28568b60374d857241a ]

Reject slot configurations that have no defensible meaning:

- negative min_delay or max_delay
- min_delay greater than max_delay
- negative dist_delay or dist_jitter
- negative max_packets or max_bytes

Negative or out-of-order delays underflow in get_slot_next(), producing garbage intervals. Negative limits trip the per-slot accounting (packets_left/bytes_left <= 0) on the first packet of every slot, defeating the rate-limiting half of the slot feature.

Note that dist_jitter has been silently coerced to its absolute value by get_slot() since the feature was introduced; rejecting negatives here converts that silent coercion into -EINVAL. The abs() can be removed in a follow-up.

Fixes 836af83b54e3 ("netem: support delivering packets in delayed time slots")
---
 net/sched/sch_netem.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
net/sched/sch_netem.c +29 -0
index 67f3b06373dcf..330d4ff7324d1 100644
@@ -825,6 +825,29 @@ static int get_dist_table(struct disttable **tbl, const struct nlattr *attr)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int validate_slot(const struct nlattr *attr, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
+{
+	const struct tc_netem_slot *c = nla_data(attr);
+
+	if (c->min_delay < 0 || c->max_delay < 0) {
+		NL_SET_ERR_MSG_ATTR(extack, attr, "negative slot delay");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (c->min_delay > c->max_delay) {
+		NL_SET_ERR_MSG_ATTR(extack, attr, "slot min delay greater than max delay");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (c->dist_delay < 0 || c->dist_jitter < 0) {
+		NL_SET_ERR_MSG_ATTR(extack, attr, "negative dist delay");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (c->max_packets < 0 || c->max_bytes < 0) {
+		NL_SET_ERR_MSG_ATTR(extack, attr, "negative slot limit");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static void get_slot(struct netem_sched_data *q, const struct nlattr *attr)
 {
 	const struct tc_netem_slot *c = nla_data(attr);
@@ -1038,6 +1061,12 @@ static int netem_change(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt,
 			goto table_free;
 	}
 
+	if (tb[TCA_NETEM_SLOT]) {
+		ret = validate_slot(tb[TCA_NETEM_SLOT], extack);
+		if (ret)
+			goto table_free;
+	}
+
 	sch_tree_lock(sch);
 	/* backup q->clg and q->loss_model */
 	old_clg = q->clg;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#550 lore raw

PATCH 535/666 net/sched: netem: fix slot delay calculation overflow

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 51e94e1e2fef351c74d69eb53666df808d26af95 ]

get_slot_next() computes a random delay between min_delay and max_delay using:

get_random_u32() * (max_delay - min_delay) >> 32

This overflows signed 64-bit arithmetic when the delay range exceeds approximately 2.1 seconds (2^31 nanoseconds), producing a negative result that effectively disables slot-based pacing. This is a realistic configuration for WAN emulation (e.g., slot 1s 5s).

Use mul_u64_u32_shr() which handles the widening multiply without overflow.

Fixes 0a9fe5c375b5 ("netem: slotting with non-uniform distribution")
---
 net/sched/sch_netem.c | 5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/sched/sch_netem.c +2 -3
index 330d4ff7324d1..543a043f84f41 100644
@@ -657,9 +657,8 @@ static void get_slot_next(struct netem_sched_data *q, u64 now)
 
 	if (!q->slot_dist)
 		next_delay = q->slot_config.min_delay +
-				(get_random_u32() *
-				 (q->slot_config.max_delay -
-				  q->slot_config.min_delay) >> 32);
+			mul_u64_u32_shr(q->slot_config.max_delay - q->slot_config.min_delay,
+					get_random_u32(), 32);
 	else
 		next_delay = tabledist(q->slot_config.dist_delay,
 				       (s32)(q->slot_config.dist_jitter),
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#551 lore raw

PATCH 536/666 net/sched: netem: check for negative latency and jitter

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 90be9fedb218ee95a1cf59050d1306fbfb0e8b87 ]

Reject requests with negative latency or jitter.
A negative value added to current timestamp (u64) wraps
to an enormous time_to_send, disabling dequeue.
The original UAPI used u32 for these values; the conversion to 64-bit time values via TCA_NETEM_LATENCY64 and TCA_NETEM_JITTER64 allowed signed values to reach the kernel without validation.

Jitter is already silently clamped by an abs() in netem_change(); that abs() can be removed in a follow-up once this rejection is in place.

Fixes 99803171ef04 ("netem: add uapi to express delay and jitter in nanoseconds")
---
 net/sched/sch_netem.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
net/sched/sch_netem.c +22 -0
index 543a043f84f41..498c18d7d9c39 100644
@@ -824,6 +824,16 @@ static int get_dist_table(struct disttable **tbl, const struct nlattr *attr)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int validate_time(const struct nlattr *attr, const char *name,
+			 struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
+{
+	if (nla_get_s64(attr) < 0) {
+		NL_SET_ERR_MSG_ATTR_FMT(extack, attr, "negative %s", name);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int validate_slot(const struct nlattr *attr, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
 {
 	const struct tc_netem_slot *c = nla_data(attr);
@@ -1066,6 +1076,18 @@ static int netem_change(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt,
 			goto table_free;
 	}
 
+	if (tb[TCA_NETEM_LATENCY64]) {
+		ret = validate_time(tb[TCA_NETEM_LATENCY64], "latency", extack);
+		if (ret)
+			goto table_free;
+	}
+
+	if (tb[TCA_NETEM_JITTER64]) {
+		ret = validate_time(tb[TCA_NETEM_JITTER64], "jitter", extack);
+		if (ret)
+			goto table_free;
+	}
+
 	sch_tree_lock(sch);
 	/* backup q->clg and q->loss_model */
 	old_clg = q->clg;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#552 lore raw

PATCH 537/666 net/sched: sch_choke: annotate data-races in choke_dump_stats()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d3aeb889dcbd78e95f500d383799a23d949796e0 ]

choke_dump_stats() only runs with RTNL held. It reads fields that can be changed in qdisc fast path. Add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations.

Fixes edb09eb17ed8 ("net: sched: do not acquire qdisc spinlock in qdisc/class stats dump")
---
 net/sched/sch_choke.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
net/sched/sch_choke.c +16 -10
index 757b89292e7e6..87d92b2a74441 100644
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ static int choke_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch,
 
 		/* Draw a packet at random from queue and compare flow */
 		if (choke_match_random(q, skb, &idx)) {
-			q->stats.matched++;
+			WRITE_ONCE(q->stats.matched, q->stats.matched + 1);
 			choke_drop_by_idx(sch, idx, to_free);
 			goto congestion_drop;
 		}
@@ -241,11 +241,13 @@ static int choke_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch,
 			qdisc_qstats_overlimit(sch);
 			if (use_harddrop(q) || !use_ecn(q) ||
 			    !INET_ECN_set_ce(skb)) {
-				q->stats.forced_drop++;
+				WRITE_ONCE(q->stats.forced_drop,
+					   q->stats.forced_drop + 1);
 				goto congestion_drop;
 			}
 
-			q->stats.forced_mark++;
+			WRITE_ONCE(q->stats.forced_mark,
+				   q->stats.forced_mark + 1);
 		} else if (++q->vars.qcount) {
 			if (red_mark_probability(p, &q->vars, q->vars.qavg)) {
 				q->vars.qcount = 0;
@@ -253,11 +255,13 @@ static int choke_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch,
 
 				qdisc_qstats_overlimit(sch);
 				if (!use_ecn(q) || !INET_ECN_set_ce(skb)) {
-					q->stats.prob_drop++;
+					WRITE_ONCE(q->stats.prob_drop,
+					           q->stats.prob_drop + 1);
 					goto congestion_drop;
 				}
 
-				q->stats.prob_mark++;
+				WRITE_ONCE(q->stats.prob_mark,
+					   q->stats.prob_mark + 1);
 			}
 		} else
 			q->vars.qR = red_random(p);
@@ -272,7 +276,7 @@ static int choke_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch,
 		return NET_XMIT_SUCCESS;
 	}
 
-	q->stats.pdrop++;
+	WRITE_ONCE(q->stats.pdrop, q->stats.pdrop + 1);
 	return qdisc_drop(skb, sch, to_free);
 
 congestion_drop:
@@ -461,10 +465,12 @@ static int choke_dump_stats(struct Qdisc *sch, struct gnet_dump *d)
 {
 	struct choke_sched_data *q = qdisc_priv(sch);
 	struct tc_choke_xstats st = {
-		.early	= q->stats.prob_drop + q->stats.forced_drop,
-		.marked	= q->stats.prob_mark + q->stats.forced_mark,
-		.pdrop	= q->stats.pdrop,
-		.matched = q->stats.matched,
+		.early	= READ_ONCE(q->stats.prob_drop) +
+			  READ_ONCE(q->stats.forced_drop),
+		.marked	= READ_ONCE(q->stats.prob_mark) +
+			  READ_ONCE(q->stats.forced_mark),
+		.pdrop	= READ_ONCE(q->stats.pdrop),
+		.matched = READ_ONCE(q->stats.matched),
 	};
 
 	return gnet_stats_copy_app(d, &st, sizeof(st));
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#553 lore raw

PATCH 538/666 net/sched: sch_fq_pie: annotate data-races in fq_pie_dump_stats()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 59b145771c7982cfe9020d4e9e22da92d6b5ae31 ]

fq_codel_dump_stats() acquires the qdisc spinlock a bit too late.

Move this acquisition before we fill tc_fq_pie_xstats with live data.

Alternative would be to add READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() annotations, but the spinlock is needed anyway to scan q->new_flows and q->old_flows.

Fixes ec97ecf1ebe4 ("net: sched: add Flow Queue PIE packet scheduler")
---
 net/sched/sch_fq_pie.c | 19 ++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
net/sched/sch_fq_pie.c +10 -9
index 6ed08b705f8a5..ceba154656624 100644
@@ -506,18 +506,19 @@ static int fq_pie_dump(struct Qdisc *sch, struct sk_buff *skb)
 static int fq_pie_dump_stats(struct Qdisc *sch, struct gnet_dump *d)
 {
 	struct fq_pie_sched_data *q = qdisc_priv(sch);
-	struct tc_fq_pie_xstats st = {
-		.packets_in	= q->stats.packets_in,
-		.overlimit	= q->stats.overlimit,
-		.overmemory	= q->overmemory,
-		.dropped	= q->stats.dropped,
-		.ecn_mark	= q->stats.ecn_mark,
-		.new_flow_count = q->new_flow_count,
-		.memory_usage   = q->memory_usage,
-	};
+	struct tc_fq_pie_xstats st = { 0 };
 	struct list_head *pos;
 
 	sch_tree_lock(sch);
+
+	st.packets_in	= q->stats.packets_in;
+	st.overlimit	= q->stats.overlimit;
+	st.overmemory	= q->overmemory;
+	st.dropped	= q->stats.dropped;
+	st.ecn_mark	= q->stats.ecn_mark;
+	st.new_flow_count = q->new_flow_count;
+	st.memory_usage   = q->memory_usage;
+
 	list_for_each(pos, &q->new_flows)
 		st.new_flows_len++;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#554 lore raw

PATCH 539/666 vrf: Fix a potential NPD when removing a port from a VRF

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2674d603a9e6970463b2b9ebcf8e31e90beae169 ]

RCU readers that identified a net device as a VRF port using netif_is_l3_slave() assume that a subsequent call to netdev_master_upper_dev_get_rcu() will return a VRF device. They then continue to dereference its l3mdev operations.

This assumption is not always correct and can result in a NPD [1]. There is no RCU synchronization when removing a port from a VRF, so it is possible for an RCU reader to see a new master device (e.g., a bridge) that does not have l3mdev operations.

Fix by adding RCU synchronization after clearing the IFF_L3MDEV_SLAVE flag. Skip this synchronization when a net device is removed from a VRF as part of its deletion and when the VRF device itself is deleted. In the latter case an RCU grace period will pass by the time RTNL is released.

[1]

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[...]
RIP: 0010:l3mdev_fib_table_rcu (net/l3mdev/l3mdev.c:181)
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
l3mdev_fib_table_by_index (net/l3mdev/l3mdev.c:201 net/l3mdev/l3mdev.c:189)
__inet_bind (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:499 (discriminator 3))
inet_bind_sk (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:469)
__sys_bind (./include/linux/file.h:62 (discriminator 1) ./include/linux/file.h:83 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:1951 (discriminator 1))
__x64_sys_bind (net/socket.c:1969 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:1967 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:1967 (discriminator 1))
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 (discriminator 1))

entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)

---
 drivers/net/vrf.c | 15 +++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/net/vrf.c +11 -4
index b62462d8eff26..93ecd9577f4d3 100644
@@ -1104,6 +1104,7 @@ static int do_vrf_add_slave(struct net_device *dev, struct net_device *port_dev,
 
 err:
 	port_dev->priv_flags &= ~IFF_L3MDEV_SLAVE;
+	synchronize_net();
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -1123,10 +1124,16 @@ static int vrf_add_slave(struct net_device *dev, struct net_device *port_dev,
 }
 
 /* inverse of do_vrf_add_slave */
-static int do_vrf_del_slave(struct net_device *dev, struct net_device *port_dev)
+static int do_vrf_del_slave(struct net_device *dev, struct net_device *port_dev,
+			    bool needs_sync)
 {
 	netdev_upper_dev_unlink(port_dev, dev);
 	port_dev->priv_flags &= ~IFF_L3MDEV_SLAVE;
+	/* Make sure that concurrent RCU readers that identified the device
+	 * as a VRF port see a VRF master or no master at all.
+	 */
+	if (needs_sync)
+		synchronize_net();
 
 	cycle_netdev(port_dev, NULL);
 
@@ -1135,7 +1142,7 @@ static int do_vrf_del_slave(struct net_device *dev, struct net_device *port_dev)
 
 static int vrf_del_slave(struct net_device *dev, struct net_device *port_dev)
 {
-	return do_vrf_del_slave(dev, port_dev);
+	return do_vrf_del_slave(dev, port_dev, true);
 }
 
 static void vrf_dev_uninit(struct net_device *dev)
@@ -1691,7 +1698,7 @@ static void vrf_dellink(struct net_device *dev, struct list_head *head)
 	struct list_head *iter;
 
 	netdev_for_each_lower_dev(dev, port_dev, iter)
-		vrf_del_slave(dev, port_dev);
+		do_vrf_del_slave(dev, port_dev, false);
 
 	vrf_map_unregister_dev(dev);
 
@@ -1822,7 +1829,7 @@ static int vrf_device_event(struct notifier_block *unused,
 			goto out;
 
 		vrf_dev = netdev_master_upper_dev_get(dev);
-		vrf_del_slave(vrf_dev, dev);
+		do_vrf_del_slave(vrf_dev, dev, false);
 	}
 out:
 	return NOTIFY_DONE;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#555 lore raw

PATCH 540/666 net: usb: rtl8150: fix use-after-free in rtl8150_start_xmit()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhan Jun <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 23f0e34c64acba15cad4d23e50f41f533da195fa ]

syzbot reported a KASAN slab-use-after-free read in rtl8150_start_xmit() when accessing skb->len for tx statistics after usb_submit_urb() has been called:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rtl8150_start_xmit+0x71f/0x760
    drivers/net/usb/rtl8150.c:712
  Read of size 4 at addr ffff88810eb7a930 by task kworker/0:4/5226

The URB completion handler write_bulk_callback() frees the skb via dev_kfree_skb_irq(dev->tx_skb). The URB may complete on another CPU in softirq context before usb_submit_urb() returns in the submitter, so by the time the submitter reads skb->len the skb has already been queued to the per-CPU completion_queue and freed by net_tx_action():

CPU A (xmit) CPU B (USB completion softirq)
------------ ------------------------------
dev->tx_skb = skb;
usb_submit_urb() --+

                          |-------> write_bulk_callback()
                          |           dev_kfree_skb_irq(dev->tx_skb)
                          |         net_tx_action()
                          |           napi_skb_cache_put()   <-- free
  netdev->stats.tx_bytes  |
    += skb->len;          <-- UAF read

Fix it by caching skb->len before submitting the URB and using the cached value when updating the tx_bytes counter.

The pre-existing tx_bytes semantics are preserved: the counter tracks the original frame length (skb->len), not the ETH_ZLEN/USB-alignment padded "count" value that is handed to the device. Changing that would be a user-visible accounting change and is out of scope for this UAF fix.

---
 drivers/net/usb/rtl8150.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/usb/rtl8150.c +4 -1
index e40b0669d9f4b..8700ae392b10a 100644
@@ -685,6 +685,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t rtl8150_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb,
 					    struct net_device *netdev)
 {
 	rtl8150_t *dev = netdev_priv(netdev);
+	unsigned int skb_len;
 	int count, res;
 
 	/* pad the frame and ensure terminating USB packet, datasheet 9.2.3 */
@@ -696,6 +697,8 @@ static netdev_tx_t rtl8150_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		return NETDEV_TX_OK;
 	}
 
+	skb_len = skb->len;
+
 	netif_stop_queue(netdev);
 	dev->tx_skb = skb;
 	usb_fill_bulk_urb(dev->tx_urb, dev->udev, usb_sndbulkpipe(dev->udev, 2),
@@ -711,7 +714,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t rtl8150_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		}
 	} else {
 		netdev->stats.tx_packets++;
-		netdev->stats.tx_bytes += skb->len;
+		netdev->stats.tx_bytes += skb_len;
 		netif_trans_update(netdev);
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#556 lore raw

PATCH 541/666 net: usb: rtl8150: free skb on usb_submit_urb() failure in xmit

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Morduan Zang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit adbe2cdf75461891e50dbe11896ac78e9af1f874 ]

When rtl8150_start_xmit() fails to submit the tx URB, the URB is never handed to the USB core and write_bulk_callback() will not run. The driver returns NETDEV_TX_OK, which tells the networking stack that the skb has been consumed, but nothing actually frees the skb on this error path:

  dev->tx_skb = skb;
  ...
  if ((res = usb_submit_urb(dev->tx_urb, GFP_ATOMIC))) {
          ...
          /* no kfree_skb here */
  }
  return NETDEV_TX_OK;

This leaks the skb on every submit failure and also leaves dev->tx_skb pointing at memory that the driver itself may later free, which is fragile.

Free the skb with dev_kfree_skb_any() in the error path and clear dev->tx_skb so no stale pointer is left behind.

---
 drivers/net/usb/rtl8150.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/net/usb/rtl8150.c +7 -0
index 8700ae392b10a..647f28b367b99 100644
@@ -712,6 +712,13 @@ static netdev_tx_t rtl8150_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb,
 			netdev->stats.tx_errors++;
 			netif_start_queue(netdev);
 		}
+		/*
+		 * The URB was not submitted, so write_bulk_callback() will
+		 * never run to free dev->tx_skb.  Drop the skb here and
+		 * clear tx_skb to avoid leaving a stale pointer.
+		 */
+		dev->tx_skb = NULL;
+		dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
 	} else {
 		netdev->stats.tx_packets++;
 		netdev->stats.tx_bytes += skb_len;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#557 lore raw

PATCH 542/666 NFC: trf7970a: Ignore antenna noise when checking for RF field

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paul Geurts <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a9bc28aa4e64320668131349436a650bf42591a5 ]

The main channel Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) measurement is used to determine whether an RF field is present or not. RSSI != 0 is interpreted as an RF Field is present. This does not take RF noise and measurement inaccuracy into account, and results in false positives in the field.

Define a noise level and make sure the RF field is only interpreted as present when the RSSI is above the noise level.

Fixes 851ee3cbf850 ("NFC: trf7970a: Don't turn on RF if there is already an RF field")
---
 drivers/nfc/trf7970a.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/nfc/trf7970a.c +2 -1
index 9e1a34e23af26..6b8311f526a5e 100644
@@ -311,6 +311,7 @@
 #define TRF7970A_RSSI_OSC_STATUS_RSSI_MASK	(BIT(2) | BIT(1) | BIT(0))
 #define TRF7970A_RSSI_OSC_STATUS_RSSI_X_MASK	(BIT(5) | BIT(4) | BIT(3))
 #define TRF7970A_RSSI_OSC_STATUS_RSSI_OSC_OK	BIT(6)
+#define TRF7970A_RSSI_OSC_STATUS_RSSI_NOISE_LEVEL	1
 
 #define TRF7970A_SPECIAL_FCN_REG1_COL_7_6		BIT(0)
 #define TRF7970A_SPECIAL_FCN_REG1_14_ANTICOLL		BIT(1)
@@ -1253,7 +1254,7 @@ static int trf7970a_is_rf_field(struct trf7970a *trf, bool *is_rf_field)
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	if (rssi & TRF7970A_RSSI_OSC_STATUS_RSSI_MASK)
+	if ((rssi & TRF7970A_RSSI_OSC_STATUS_RSSI_MASK) > TRF7970A_RSSI_OSC_STATUS_RSSI_NOISE_LEVEL)
 		*is_rf_field = true;
 	else
 		*is_rf_field = false;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#558 lore raw

PATCH 543/666 net/sched: taprio: fix NULL pointer dereference in class dump

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Weiming Shi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3d07ca5c0fae311226f737963984bd94bb159a87 ]

When a TAPRIO child qdisc is deleted via RTM_DELQDISC, taprio_graft() is called with new == NULL and stores NULL into q->qdiscs[cl - 1]. Subsequent RTM_GETTCLASS dump operations walk all classes via taprio_walk() and call taprio_dump_class(), which calls taprio_leaf() returning the NULL pointer, then dereferences it to read child->handle, causing a kernel NULL pointer dereference.

The bug is reachable with namespace-scoped CAP_NET_ADMIN on any kernel with CONFIG_NET_SCH_TAPRIO enabled. On systems with unprivileged user namespaces enabled, an unprivileged local user can trigger a kernel panic by creating a taprio qdisc inside a new network namespace, grafting an explicit child qdisc, deleting it, and requesting a class dump. The RTM_GETTCLASS dump itself requires no capability.

 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000007: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
 KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000038-0x000000000000003f]
 RIP: 0010:taprio_dump_class (net/sched/sch_taprio.c:2478)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  tc_fill_tclass (net/sched/sch_api.c:1966)
  qdisc_class_dump (net/sched/sch_api.c:2326)
  taprio_walk (net/sched/sch_taprio.c:2514)
  tc_dump_tclass_qdisc (net/sched/sch_api.c:2352)
  tc_dump_tclass_root (net/sched/sch_api.c:2370)
  tc_dump_tclass (net/sched/sch_api.c:2431)
  rtnl_dumpit (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6864)
  netlink_dump (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2325)
  rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6959)
  netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550)
  </TASK>

Fix this by substituting &noop_qdisc when new is NULL in taprio_graft(), a common pattern used by other qdiscs (e.g., multiq_graft()) to ensure the q->qdiscs[] slots are never NULL. This makes control-plane dump paths safe without requiring individual NULL checks.

Since the data-plane paths (taprio_enqueue and taprio_dequeue_from_txq) previously had explicit NULL guards that would drop/skip the packet cleanly, update those checks to test for &noop_qdisc instead. Without this, packets would reach taprio_enqueue_one() which increments the root qdisc's qlen and backlog before calling the child's enqueue; noop_qdisc drops the packet but those counters are never rolled back, permanently inflating the root qdisc's statistics.

After this change *old can be a valid qdisc, NULL, or &noop_qdisc. Only call qdisc_put(*old) in the first case to avoid decreasing noop_qdisc's refcount, which was never increased.

---
 net/sched/sch_taprio.c | 13 ++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/sched/sch_taprio.c +8 -5
index 366eb7627b30d..f1709efb5f04e 100644
@@ -633,7 +633,7 @@ static int taprio_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch,
 	queue = skb_get_queue_mapping(skb);
 
 	child = q->qdiscs[queue];
-	if (unlikely(!child))
+	if (unlikely(child == &noop_qdisc))
 		return qdisc_drop(skb, sch, to_free);
 
 	if (taprio_skb_exceeds_queue_max_sdu(sch, skb)) {
@@ -716,7 +716,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *taprio_dequeue_from_txq(struct Qdisc *sch, int txq,
 	int len;
 	u8 tc;
 
-	if (unlikely(!child))
+	if (unlikely(child == &noop_qdisc))
 		return NULL;
 
 	if (TXTIME_ASSIST_IS_ENABLED(q->flags))
@@ -2191,6 +2191,9 @@ static int taprio_graft(struct Qdisc *sch, unsigned long cl,
 	if (!dev_queue)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (!new)
+		new = &noop_qdisc;
+
 	if (dev->flags & IFF_UP)
 		dev_deactivate(dev);
 
@@ -2204,14 +2207,14 @@ static int taprio_graft(struct Qdisc *sch, unsigned long cl,
 	*old = q->qdiscs[cl - 1];
 	if (FULL_OFFLOAD_IS_ENABLED(q->flags)) {
 		WARN_ON_ONCE(dev_graft_qdisc(dev_queue, new) != *old);
-		if (new)
+		if (new != &noop_qdisc)
 			qdisc_refcount_inc(new);
-		if (*old)
+		if (*old && *old != &noop_qdisc)
 			qdisc_put(*old);
 	}
 
 	q->qdiscs[cl - 1] = new;
-	if (new)
+	if (new != &noop_qdisc)
 		new->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE | TCQ_F_NOPARENT;
 
 	if (dev->flags & IFF_UP)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#559 lore raw

PATCH 544/666 neigh: let neigh_xmit take skb ownership

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4438113be604ee67a7bf4f81da6e1cca41332ce4 ]

neigh_xmit always releases the skb, except when no neighbour table is found. But even the first added user of neigh_xmit (mpls) relied on neigh_xmit to release the skb (or queue it for tx).

sashiko reported:
If neigh_xmit() is called with an uninitialized neighbor table (for example, NEIGH_ND_TABLE when IPv6 is disabled), it returns -EAFNOSUPPORT and bypasses its internal out_kfree_skb error path. Because the return value of neigh_xmit() is ignored here, does this leak the SKB?

Assume full ownership and remove the last code path that doesn't xmit or free skb.

---
 net/core/neighbour.c | 10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/core/neighbour.c +5 -5
index 96786016dbb4e..bf07438d6dfa5 100644
@@ -3161,8 +3161,10 @@ int neigh_xmit(int index, struct net_device *dev,
 
 		rcu_read_lock();
 		tbl = rcu_dereference(neigh_tables[index]);
-		if (!tbl)
-			goto out_unlock;
+		if (!tbl) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			goto out_kfree_skb;
+		}
 		if (index == NEIGH_ARP_TABLE) {
 			u32 key = *((u32 *)addr);
 
@@ -3178,7 +3180,6 @@ int neigh_xmit(int index, struct net_device *dev,
 			goto out_kfree_skb;
 		}
 		err = READ_ONCE(neigh->output)(neigh, skb);
-out_unlock:
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 	}
 	else if (index == NEIGH_LINK_TABLE) {
@@ -3188,11 +3189,10 @@ int neigh_xmit(int index, struct net_device *dev,
 			goto out_kfree_skb;
 		err = dev_queue_xmit(skb);
 	}
-out:
 	return err;
 out_kfree_skb:
 	kfree_skb(skb);
-	goto out;
+	return err;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(neigh_xmit);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#560 lore raw

PATCH 545/666 tcp: make probe0 timer handle expired user timeout

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Altan Hacigumus <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2b9f6f7065d4cfb65ba19126e0b35ac4544c3f3a ]

tcp_clamp_probe0_to_user_timeout() computes remaining time in jiffies using subtraction with an unsigned lvalue. If elapsed probing time exceeds the configured TCP_USER_TIMEOUT, the underflow yields a large value.

This ends up re-arming the probe timer for a full backoff interval instead of expiring immediately, delaying connection teardown beyond the configured timeout.

Fix this by preventing underflow so user-set timeout expiration is handled correctly without extending the probe timer.

---
 net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c +3 -2
index 79064580c8c0d..0cc8f19bc1024 100644
@@ -49,7 +49,8 @@ static u32 tcp_clamp_rto_to_user_timeout(const struct sock *sk)
 u32 tcp_clamp_probe0_to_user_timeout(const struct sock *sk, u32 when)
 {
 	const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
-	u32 remaining, user_timeout;
+	u32 user_timeout;
+	s32 remaining;
 	s32 elapsed;
 
 	user_timeout = READ_ONCE(icsk->icsk_user_timeout);
@@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ u32 tcp_clamp_probe0_to_user_timeout(const struct sock *sk, u32 when)
 	if (unlikely(elapsed < 0))
 		elapsed = 0;
 	remaining = msecs_to_jiffies(user_timeout) - elapsed;
-	remaining = max_t(u32, remaining, TCP_TIMEOUT_MIN);
+	remaining = max_t(int, remaining, TCP_TIMEOUT_MIN);
 
 	return min_t(u32, remaining, when);
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#561 lore raw

PATCH 546/666 net, treewide: define and use MAC_ADDR_STR_LEN

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Uday Shankar <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6d6c1ba7824022528dbe3e283fafbd0775424128 ]

There are a few places in the tree which compute the length of the string representation of a MAC address as 3 * ETH_ALEN - 1. Define a constant for this and use it where relevant. No functionality changes are expected.

Stable-dep-of: 3bc179bc7146 ("netpoll: fix IPv6 local-address corruption")

---
 drivers/net/netconsole.c           | 2 +-
 drivers/nvmem/brcm_nvram.c         | 2 +-
 drivers/nvmem/layouts/u-boot-env.c | 2 +-
 include/linux/if_ether.h           | 3 +++
 lib/net_utils.c                    | 4 +---
 net/mac80211/debugfs_sta.c         | 7 ++++---
 6 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/net/netconsole.c +1 -1
index 2f20f9ed3a0d8..4048d99b7c57d 100644
@@ -652,7 +652,7 @@ static ssize_t remote_mac_store(struct config_item *item, const char *buf,
 
 	if (!mac_pton(buf, remote_mac))
 		goto out_unlock;
-	if (buf[3 * ETH_ALEN - 1] && buf[3 * ETH_ALEN - 1] != '\n')
+	if (buf[MAC_ADDR_STR_LEN] && buf[MAC_ADDR_STR_LEN] != '\n')
 		goto out_unlock;
 	memcpy(nt->np.remote_mac, remote_mac, ETH_ALEN);
 
drivers/nvmem/brcm_nvram.c +1 -1
index 3d8c87835f4d6..65f458af3a195 100644
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ static int brcm_nvram_read_post_process_macaddr(void *context, const char *id, i
 {
 	u8 mac[ETH_ALEN];
 
-	if (bytes != 3 * ETH_ALEN - 1)
+	if (bytes != MAC_ADDR_STR_LEN)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (!mac_pton(buf, mac))
drivers/nvmem/layouts/u-boot-env.c +1 -1
index 21f6dcf905dd9..8571aac56295a 100644
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ static int u_boot_env_read_post_process_ethaddr(void *context, const char *id, i
 {
 	u8 mac[ETH_ALEN];
 
-	if (bytes != 3 * ETH_ALEN - 1)
+	if (bytes != MAC_ADDR_STR_LEN)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (!mac_pton(buf, mac))
include/linux/if_ether.h +3 -0
index 47a0feffc1215..ca9afa824aa4f 100644
@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@
 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/if_ether.h>
 
+/* XX:XX:XX:XX:XX:XX */
+#define MAC_ADDR_STR_LEN (3 * ETH_ALEN - 1)
+
 static inline struct ethhdr *eth_hdr(const struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	return (struct ethhdr *)skb_mac_header(skb);
lib/net_utils.c +1 -3
index 42bb0473fb22f..215cda672fee1 100644
@@ -7,11 +7,9 @@
 
 bool mac_pton(const char *s, u8 *mac)
 {
-	size_t maxlen = 3 * ETH_ALEN - 1;
 	int i;
 
-	/* XX:XX:XX:XX:XX:XX */
-	if (strnlen(s, maxlen) < maxlen)
+	if (strnlen(s, MAC_ADDR_STR_LEN) < MAC_ADDR_STR_LEN)
 		return false;
 
 	/* Don't dirty result unless string is valid MAC. */
net/mac80211/debugfs_sta.c +4 -3
index e6f937cfedcf6..3df6725ab00e7 100644
@@ -454,11 +454,12 @@ static ssize_t link_sta_addr_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf,
 				  size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
 	struct link_sta_info *link_sta = file->private_data;
-	u8 mac[3 * ETH_ALEN + 1];
+	u8 mac[MAC_ADDR_STR_LEN + 2];
 
 	snprintf(mac, sizeof(mac), "%pM\n", link_sta->pub->addr);
 
-	return simple_read_from_buffer(userbuf, count, ppos, mac, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(userbuf, count, ppos, mac,
+				       MAC_ADDR_STR_LEN + 1);
 }
 
 LINK_STA_OPS(addr);
@@ -1237,7 +1238,7 @@ void ieee80211_sta_debugfs_add(struct sta_info *sta)
 	struct ieee80211_local *local = sta->local;
 	struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = sta->sdata;
 	struct dentry *stations_dir = sta->sdata->debugfs.subdir_stations;
-	u8 mac[3*ETH_ALEN];
+	u8 mac[MAC_ADDR_STR_LEN + 1];
 
 	if (!stations_dir)
 		return;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#562 lore raw

PATCH 547/666 netconsole: allow selection of egress interface via MAC address

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Uday Shankar <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f8a10bed32f5fbede13a5f22fdc4ab8740ea213a ]

Currently, netconsole has two methods of configuration - module parameter and configfs. The former interface allows for netconsole activation earlier during boot (by specifying the module parameter on the kernel command line), so it is preferred for debugging issues which arise before userspace is up/the configfs interface can be used. The module parameter syntax requires specifying the egress interface name. This requirement makes it hard to use for a couple reasons:
- The egress interface name can be hard or impossible to predict. For example, installing a new network card in a system can change the interface names assigned by the kernel.
- When constructing the module parameter, one may have trouble determining the original (kernel-assigned) name of the interface (which is the name that should be given to netconsole) if some stable interface naming scheme is in effect. A human can usually look at kernel logs to determine the original name, but this is very painful if automation is constructing the parameter.

For these reasons, allow selection of the egress interface via MAC address when configuring netconsole using the module parameter. Update the netconsole documentation with an example of the new syntax. Selection of egress interface by MAC address via configfs is far less interesting (since when this interface can be used, one should be able to easily convert between MAC address and interface name), so it is left unimplemented.

Stable-dep-of: 3bc179bc7146 ("netpoll: fix IPv6 local-address corruption")

---
 Documentation/networking/netconsole.rst |  6 ++-
 include/linux/netpoll.h                 |  6 +++
 net/core/netpoll.c                      | 51 +++++++++++++++++++------
 3 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
Documentation/networking/netconsole.rst +5 -1
index d55c2a22ec7af..56578486ff7e8 100644
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ following format::
 	r             if present, prepend kernel version (release) to the message
 	src-port      source for UDP packets (defaults to 6665)
 	src-ip        source IP to use (interface address)
-	dev           network interface (eth0)
+	dev           network interface name (eth0) or MAC address
 	tgt-port      port for logging agent (6666)
 	tgt-ip        IP address for logging agent
 	tgt-macaddr   ethernet MAC address for logging agent (broadcast)
@@ -62,6 +62,10 @@ or using IPv6::
 
  insmod netconsole netconsole=@/,@fd00:1:2:3::1/
 
+or using a MAC address to select the egress interface::
+
+   linux [email protected]/22:33:44:55:66:77,[email protected]/12:34:56:78:9a:bc
+
 It also supports logging to multiple remote agents by specifying
 parameters for the multiple agents separated by semicolons and the
 complete string enclosed in "quotes", thusly::
include/linux/netpoll.h +6 -0
index b34301650c479..ca88b1b87059f 100644
@@ -25,7 +25,13 @@ union inet_addr {
 struct netpoll {
 	struct net_device *dev;
 	netdevice_tracker dev_tracker;
+	/*
+	 * Either dev_name or dev_mac can be used to specify the local
+	 * interface - dev_name is used if it is a nonempty string, else
+	 * dev_mac is used.
+	 */
 	char dev_name[IFNAMSIZ];
+	u8 dev_mac[ETH_ALEN];
 	const char *name;
 
 	union inet_addr local_ip, remote_ip;
net/core/netpoll.c +39 -12

111 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#563 lore raw

PATCH 548/666 netpoll: Extract carrier wait function

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Breno Leitao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 76d30b51e818064e02917ce6328fb2c8adce5c87 ]

Extract the carrier waiting logic into a dedicated helper function netpoll_wait_carrier() to improve code readability and reduce duplication in netpoll_setup().

Stable-dep-of: 3bc179bc7146 ("netpoll: fix IPv6 local-address corruption")

---
 net/core/netpoll.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
net/core/netpoll.c +16 -12
index a38b239cd7db6..a9c38f75b00ec 100644
@@ -706,6 +706,21 @@ static char *egress_dev(struct netpoll *np, char *buf)
 	return buf;
 }
 
+static void netpoll_wait_carrier(struct netpoll *np, struct net_device *ndev,
+				 unsigned int timeout)
+{
+	unsigned long atmost;
+
+	atmost = jiffies + timeout * HZ;
+	while (!netif_carrier_ok(ndev)) {
+		if (time_after(jiffies, atmost)) {
+			np_notice(np, "timeout waiting for carrier\n");
+			break;
+		}
+		msleep(1);
+	}
+}
+
 int netpoll_setup(struct netpoll *np)
 {
 	struct net *net = current->nsproxy->net_ns;
@@ -736,28 +751,17 @@ int netpoll_setup(struct netpoll *np)
 	}
 
 	if (!netif_running(ndev)) {
-		unsigned long atmost;
-
 		np_info(np, "device %s not up yet, forcing it\n",
 			egress_dev(np, buf));
 
 		err = dev_open(ndev, NULL);
-
 		if (err) {
 			np_err(np, "failed to open %s\n", ndev->name);
 			goto put;
 		}
 
 		rtnl_unlock();
-		atmost = jiffies + carrier_timeout * HZ;
-		while (!netif_carrier_ok(ndev)) {
-			if (time_after(jiffies, atmost)) {
-				np_notice(np, "timeout waiting for carrier\n");
-				break;
-			}
-			msleep(1);
-		}
-
+		netpoll_wait_carrier(np, ndev, carrier_timeout);
 		rtnl_lock();
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#564 lore raw

PATCH 549/666 netpoll: extract IPv4 address retrieval into helper function

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Breno Leitao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3699f992e8c22d3ce54d2c1a5774e2c49028f99c ]

Move the IPv4 address retrieval logic from netpoll_setup() into a separate netpoll_take_ipv4() function to improve code organization and readability. This change consolidates the IPv4-specific logic and error handling into a dedicated function while maintaining the same functionality.

No functional changes.

Stable-dep-of: 3bc179bc7146 ("netpoll: fix IPv6 local-address corruption")

---
 net/core/netpoll.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
net/core/netpoll.c +31 -17
index a9c38f75b00ec..b5305ff217a8b 100644
@@ -721,13 +721,41 @@ static void netpoll_wait_carrier(struct netpoll *np, struct net_device *ndev,
 	}
 }
 
+/*
+ * Take the IPv4 from ndev and populate local_ip structure in netpoll
+ */
+static int netpoll_take_ipv4(struct netpoll *np, struct net_device *ndev)
+{
+	char buf[MAC_ADDR_STR_LEN + 1];
+	const struct in_ifaddr *ifa;
+	struct in_device *in_dev;
+
+	in_dev = __in_dev_get_rtnl(ndev);
+	if (!in_dev) {
+		np_err(np, "no IP address for %s, aborting\n",
+		       egress_dev(np, buf));
+		return -EDESTADDRREQ;
+	}
+
+	ifa = rtnl_dereference(in_dev->ifa_list);
+	if (!ifa) {
+		np_err(np, "no IP address for %s, aborting\n",
+		       egress_dev(np, buf));
+		return -EDESTADDRREQ;
+	}
+
+	np->local_ip.ip = ifa->ifa_local;
+	np_info(np, "local IP %pI4\n", &np->local_ip.ip);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 int netpoll_setup(struct netpoll *np)
 {
 	struct net *net = current->nsproxy->net_ns;
 	char buf[MAC_ADDR_STR_LEN + 1];
 	struct net_device *ndev = NULL;
 	bool ip_overwritten = false;
-	struct in_device *in_dev;
 	int err;
 
 	rtnl_lock();
@@ -767,24 +795,10 @@ int netpoll_setup(struct netpoll *np)
 
 	if (!np->local_ip.ip) {
 		if (!np->ipv6) {
-			const struct in_ifaddr *ifa;
-
-			in_dev = __in_dev_get_rtnl(ndev);
-			if (!in_dev)
-				goto put_noaddr;
-
-			ifa = rtnl_dereference(in_dev->ifa_list);
-			if (!ifa) {
-put_noaddr:
-				np_err(np, "no IP address for %s, aborting\n",
-				       egress_dev(np, buf));
-				err = -EDESTADDRREQ;
+			err = netpoll_take_ipv4(np, ndev);
+			if (err)
 				goto put;
-			}
-
-			np->local_ip.ip = ifa->ifa_local;
 			ip_overwritten = true;
-			np_info(np, "local IP %pI4\n", &np->local_ip.ip);
 		} else {
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
 			struct inet6_dev *idev;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#565 lore raw

PATCH 550/666 netpoll: fix IPv6 local-address corruption

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Breno Leitao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3bc179bc7146c26c9dff75d2943d10528274e301 ]

netpoll_setup() decides whether to auto-populate the local source address by testing np->local_ip.ip, which only inspects the first 4 bytes of the union inet_addr storage.

For an IPv6 netpoll whose caller-supplied local address has a zero high-32 bits (::1, ::<suffix>, IPv4-mapped ::ffff:a.b.c.d, etc.), this misdetects the address as unset (which they are not, but the first 4 bytes are empty), calls netpoll_take_ipv6() and overwrites it with whatever matching link-local/global address the device happens to expose first.

Introduce a helper netpoll_local_ip_unset() that picks the correct family-aware test (ipv6_addr_any() for IPv6, !.ip for IPv4) and use it from netpoll_setup().

Reproducer is something like:

echo "::2" > local_ip
echo 1 > enabled
cat local_ip

  # before this fix: 2001:db8::1   (caller-supplied ::2 was clobbered)
  # after  this fix: ::2
---
 net/core/netpoll.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/core/netpoll.c +18 -1
index b5305ff217a8b..b754341db50fe 100644
@@ -750,6 +750,23 @@ static int netpoll_take_ipv4(struct netpoll *np, struct net_device *ndev)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Test whether the caller left np->local_ip unset, so that
+ * netpoll_setup() should auto-populate it from the egress device.
+ *
+ * np->local_ip is a union of __be32 (IPv4) and struct in6_addr (IPv6),
+ * so an IPv6 address whose first 4 bytes are zero (e.g. ::1, ::2,
+ * IPv4-mapped ::ffff:a.b.c.d) must not be tested via the IPv4 arm —
+ * doing so would misclassify a caller-supplied address as unset and
+ * silently overwrite it with whatever address the device exposes.
+ */
+static bool netpoll_local_ip_unset(const struct netpoll *np)
+{
+	if (np->ipv6)
+		return ipv6_addr_any(&np->local_ip.in6);
+	return !np->local_ip.ip;
+}
+
 int netpoll_setup(struct netpoll *np)
 {
 	struct net *net = current->nsproxy->net_ns;
@@ -793,7 +810,7 @@ int netpoll_setup(struct netpoll *np)
 		rtnl_lock();
 	}
 
-	if (!np->local_ip.ip) {
+	if (netpoll_local_ip_unset(np)) {
 		if (!np->ipv6) {
 			err = netpoll_take_ipv4(np, ndev);
 			if (err)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#566 lore raw

PATCH 551/666 ALSA: usb-audio: Fix potential leak of pd at parsing UAC3 streams

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c39f0bc03f84ba64c9144c95714df1dc36150f6d ]

At parsing UAC3 streams, we allocate a PD object at each time, and either assign or free it. But there is a case where the PD object may be leaked; namely, in __snd_usb_parse_audio_interface() loop, when an audioformat shares the same endpoint with others, it's put to a link and returns from snd_usb_add_audio_stream(), but the PD is forgotten afterwards. Overall, the treatment of PD object in the parser code is a bit flaky, and we should be more careful about the object ownership.

This patch tries to fix the above case and improve the code a bit. The pd object is now managed with the auto-cleanup in the loop, and the ownership is updated when the pd object gets assigned to the stream, which guarantees the release of the leftover object.

Fixes 7edf3b5e6a45 ("ALSA: usb-audio: AudioStreaming Power Domain parsing")
---
 sound/usb/quirks.c |  2 +-
 sound/usb/stream.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++----------------------------
 sound/usb/stream.h |  3 ++-
 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
sound/usb/quirks.c +1 -1
index fb81dcd6ca2ac..489dd84e20967 100644
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static int add_audio_stream_from_fixed_fmt(struct snd_usb_audio *chip,
 
 	snd_usb_audioformat_set_sync_ep(chip, fp);
 
-	err = snd_usb_add_audio_stream(chip, stream, fp);
+	err = snd_usb_add_audio_stream(chip, stream, fp, NULL);
 	if (err < 0)
 		return err;
 
sound/usb/stream.c +22 -36

129 lines not on this page · raw message

sound/usb/stream.h +2 -1
index d92e18d5818fe..61b9a133da018 100644
@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ int snd_usb_parse_audio_interface(struct snd_usb_audio *chip,
 
 int snd_usb_add_audio_stream(struct snd_usb_audio *chip,
 			     int stream,
-			     struct audioformat *fp);
+			     struct audioformat *fp,
+			     struct snd_usb_power_domain **pdptr);
 
 #endif /* __USBAUDIO_STREAM_H */
 
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#567 lore raw

PATCH 552/666 sched/fair: Clear rel_deadline when initializing forked entities

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zicheng Qu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3da56dc063cd77b9c0b40add930767fab4e389f3 ]

A yield-triggered crash can happen when a newly forked sched_entity enters the fair class with se->rel_deadline unexpectedly set.

The failing sequence is:

1. A task is forked while se->rel_deadline is still set.
2. __sched_fork() initializes vruntime, vlag and other sched_entity state, but does not clear rel_deadline.
3. On the first enqueue, enqueue_entity() calls place_entity().
4. Because se->rel_deadline is set, place_entity() treats se->deadline as a relative deadline and converts it to an absolute deadline by adding the current vruntime.
5. However, the forked entity's deadline is not a valid inherited relative deadline for this new scheduling instance, so the conversion produces an abnormally large deadline.
6. If the task later calls sched_yield(), yield_task_fair() advances

     se->vruntime to se->deadline.

7. The inflated vruntime is then used by the following enqueue path, where the vruntime-derived key can overflow when multiplied by the entity weight.
8. This corrupts cfs_rq->sum_w_vruntime, breaks EEVDF eligibility calculation, and can eventually make all entities appear ineligible. pick_next_entity() may then return NULL unexpectedly, leading to a later NULL dereference.

A captured trace shows the effect clearly. Before yield, the entity's vruntime was around:

9834017729983308

After yield_task_fair() executed:

se->vruntime = se->deadline

the vruntime jumped to:

19668035460670230

and the deadline was later advanced further to:

19668035463470230

This shows that the deadline had already become abnormally large before yield_task_fair() copied it into vruntime.

rel_deadline is only meaningful when se->deadline really carries a relative deadline that still needs to be placed against vruntime. A freshly forked sched_entity should not inherit or retain this state. Clear se->rel_deadline in __sched_fork(), together with the other sched_entity runtime state, so that the first enqueue does not interpret the new entity's deadline as a stale relative deadline.

Fixes 82e9d0456e06 ("sched/fair: Avoid re-setting virtual deadline on 'migrations'")
---
 kernel/sched/core.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
kernel/sched/core.c +1 -0
index df76b32a013fb..9b238c9c71c67 100644
@@ -4453,6 +4453,7 @@ static void __sched_fork(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *p)
 	p->se.nr_migrations		= 0;
 	p->se.vruntime			= 0;
 	p->se.vlag			= 0;
+	p->se.rel_deadline		= 0;
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->se.group_node);
 
 	/* A delayed task cannot be in clone(). */
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#568 lore raw

PATCH 553/666 net: mctp i2c: check length before marking flow active

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: William A. Kennington III <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4ca07b9239bd0478ae586632a2ed72be37ed8407 ]

Currently, mctp_i2c_get_tx_flow_state() is called before the packet length sanity check. This function marks a new flow as active in the MCTP core.

If the sanity check fails, mctp_i2c_xmit() returns early without calling mctp_i2c_lock_nest(). This results in a mismatched locking state: the flow is active, but the I2C bus lock was never acquired for it.

When the flow is later released, mctp_i2c_release_flow() will see the active state and queue an unlock marker. The TX thread will then decrement midev->i2c_lock_count from 0, causing it to underflow to -1.

This underflow permanently breaks the driver's locking logic, allowing future transmissions to occur without holding the I2C bus lock, leading to bus collisions and potential hardware hangs.

Move the mctp_i2c_get_tx_flow_state() call to after the length sanity check to ensure we only transition the flow state if we are actually going to proceed with the transmission and locking.

---
 drivers/net/mctp/mctp-i2c.c | 4 ++--
 net/sched/cls_flower.c      | 4 +++-
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/mctp/mctp-i2c.c +2 -2
index f8f83fe424e51..a939bc084fe8d 100644
@@ -497,8 +497,6 @@ static void mctp_i2c_xmit(struct mctp_i2c_dev *midev, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	u8 *pecp;
 	int rc;
 
-	fs = mctp_i2c_get_tx_flow_state(midev, skb);
-
 	hdr = (void *)skb_mac_header(skb);
 	/* Sanity check that packet contents matches skb length,
 	 * and can't exceed MCTP_I2C_BUFSZ
@@ -510,6 +508,8 @@ static void mctp_i2c_xmit(struct mctp_i2c_dev *midev, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		return;
 	}
 
+	fs = mctp_i2c_get_tx_flow_state(midev, skb);
+
 	if (skb_tailroom(skb) >= 1) {
 		/* Linear case with space, we can just append the PEC */
 		skb_put(skb, 1);
net/sched/cls_flower.c +3 -1
index 099ff6a3e1f51..f3af0ac892a86 100644
@@ -560,6 +560,7 @@ static int __fl_delete(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct cls_fl_filter *f,
 		       struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
 {
 	struct cls_fl_head *head = fl_head_dereference(tp);
+	struct fl_flow_mask *mask;
 
 	*last = false;
 
@@ -576,11 +577,12 @@ static int __fl_delete(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct cls_fl_filter *f,
 	list_del_rcu(&f->list);
 	spin_unlock(&tp->lock);
 
-	*last = fl_mask_put(head, f->mask);
+	mask = f->mask;
 	if (!tc_skip_hw(f->flags))
 		fl_hw_destroy_filter(tp, f, rtnl_held, extack);
 	tcf_unbind_filter(tp, &f->res);
 	__fl_put(f);
+	*last = fl_mask_put(head, mask);
 
 	return 0;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#569 lore raw

PATCH 554/666 net: phy: dp83869: fix setting CLK_O_SEL field.

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Heiko Schocher <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 46f74a3f7d57d9cc0110b09cbc8163fa0a01afa2 ]

Table 7-121 in datasheet says we have to set register 0xc6 to value 0x10 before CLK_O_SEL can be modified. No more infos about this field found in datasheet. With this fix, setting of CLK_O_SEL field in IO_MUX_CFG register worked through dts property "ti,clk-output-sel" on a DP83869HMRGZR.

---
 drivers/net/phy/dp83869.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/phy/dp83869.c +12 -1
index b6b38caf9c0ed..96e5b8b03083a 100644
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #define DP83869_RGMIICTL	0x0032
 #define DP83869_STRAP_STS1	0x006e
 #define DP83869_RGMIIDCTL	0x0086
+#define DP83869_ANA_PLL_PROG_PI	0x00c6
 #define DP83869_RXFCFG		0x0134
 #define DP83869_RXFPMD1		0x0136
 #define DP83869_RXFPMD2		0x0137
@@ -827,12 +828,22 @@ static int dp83869_config_init(struct phy_device *phydev)
 		dp83869_config_port_mirroring(phydev);
 
 	/* Clock output selection if muxing property is set */
-	if (dp83869->clk_output_sel != DP83869_CLK_O_SEL_REF_CLK)
+	if (dp83869->clk_output_sel != DP83869_CLK_O_SEL_REF_CLK) {
+		/*
+		 * Table 7-121 in datasheet says we have to set register 0xc6
+		 * to value 0x10 before CLK_O_SEL can be modified.
+		 */
+		ret = phy_write_mmd(phydev, DP83869_DEVADDR,
+				    DP83869_ANA_PLL_PROG_PI, 0x10);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+
 		ret = phy_modify_mmd(phydev,
 				     DP83869_DEVADDR, DP83869_IO_MUX_CFG,
 				     DP83869_IO_MUX_CFG_CLK_O_SEL_MASK,
 				     dp83869->clk_output_sel <<
 				     DP83869_IO_MUX_CFG_CLK_O_SEL_SHIFT);
+	}
 
 	if (phy_interface_is_rgmii(phydev)) {
 		ret = phy_write_mmd(phydev, DP83869_DEVADDR, DP83869_RGMIIDCTL,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#570 lore raw

PATCH 555/666 drm/amdgpu/vcn: set no_user_fence for VCN v2.0 enc/dec rings

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yinjie Yao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8d80b293b41fcb5e9396db93e788b0f4ebcbafb7 ]

VCN encoder and decoder rings do not support 64-bit user fence writes, reject CS submissions with user fences.

Fixes 1b61de45dfaf ("drm/amdgpu: add initial VCN2.0 support (v2)")
(cherry picked from commit e2b5499fca55f1a32960a311bbb62e35891eaf73)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vcn_v2_0.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vcn_v2_0.c +2 -0
index 5431b2589ed61..29f5f6b1eb0a4 100644
@@ -2127,6 +2127,7 @@ static const struct amd_ip_funcs vcn_v2_0_ip_funcs = {
 static const struct amdgpu_ring_funcs vcn_v2_0_dec_ring_vm_funcs = {
 	.type = AMDGPU_RING_TYPE_VCN_DEC,
 	.align_mask = 0xf,
+	.no_user_fence = true,
 	.secure_submission_supported = true,
 	.get_rptr = vcn_v2_0_dec_ring_get_rptr,
 	.get_wptr = vcn_v2_0_dec_ring_get_wptr,
@@ -2158,6 +2159,7 @@ static const struct amdgpu_ring_funcs vcn_v2_0_enc_ring_vm_funcs = {
 	.type = AMDGPU_RING_TYPE_VCN_ENC,
 	.align_mask = 0x3f,
 	.nop = VCN_ENC_CMD_NO_OP,
+	.no_user_fence = true,
 	.get_rptr = vcn_v2_0_enc_ring_get_rptr,
 	.get_wptr = vcn_v2_0_enc_ring_get_wptr,
 	.set_wptr = vcn_v2_0_enc_ring_set_wptr,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#571 lore raw

PATCH 556/666 drm/amdgpu/vcn: set no_user_fence for VCN v2.5 enc/dec rings

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yinjie Yao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4f317863a3ab212a027d8c8c3cc3af4e3fb95704 ]

VCN encoder and decoder rings do not support 64-bit user fence writes, reject CS submissions with user fences.

Fixes 28c17d72072b ("drm/amdgpu: add VCN2.5 basic supports")
(cherry picked from commit efc9dd5590894109bce9a0bfe1fa5592dd6b20b1)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vcn_v2_5.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vcn_v2_5.c +2 -0
index 9708b9a47b536..42edc91f4a78d 100644
@@ -1628,6 +1628,7 @@ static void vcn_v2_5_dec_ring_set_wptr(struct amdgpu_ring *ring)
 static const struct amdgpu_ring_funcs vcn_v2_5_dec_ring_vm_funcs = {
 	.type = AMDGPU_RING_TYPE_VCN_DEC,
 	.align_mask = 0xf,
+	.no_user_fence = true,
 	.secure_submission_supported = true,
 	.get_rptr = vcn_v2_5_dec_ring_get_rptr,
 	.get_wptr = vcn_v2_5_dec_ring_get_wptr,
@@ -1728,6 +1729,7 @@ static const struct amdgpu_ring_funcs vcn_v2_5_enc_ring_vm_funcs = {
 	.type = AMDGPU_RING_TYPE_VCN_ENC,
 	.align_mask = 0x3f,
 	.nop = VCN_ENC_CMD_NO_OP,
+	.no_user_fence = true,
 	.get_rptr = vcn_v2_5_enc_ring_get_rptr,
 	.get_wptr = vcn_v2_5_enc_ring_get_wptr,
 	.set_wptr = vcn_v2_5_enc_ring_set_wptr,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#572 lore raw

PATCH 557/666 drm/amdgpu/vcn: set no_user_fence for VCN v3.0 enc/dec rings

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yinjie Yao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f1e5a6660d7cbf006079126d9babbf0ccf538c6b ]

VCN encoder and decoder rings do not support 64-bit user fence writes, reject CS submissions with user fences.

Fixes cf14826cdfb5 ("drm/amdgpu: add VCN3.0 support for Sienna_Cichlid")
(cherry picked from commit 663bed3c7b8b9a7624b0d95d300ddae034ad0614)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vcn_v3_0.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vcn_v3_0.c +3 -0
index 53428a364c1ae..09f8324fdb990 100644
@@ -1791,6 +1791,7 @@ static const struct amdgpu_ring_funcs vcn_v3_0_dec_sw_ring_vm_funcs = {
 	.type = AMDGPU_RING_TYPE_VCN_DEC,
 	.align_mask = 0x3f,
 	.nop = VCN_DEC_SW_CMD_NO_OP,
+	.no_user_fence = true,
 	.secure_submission_supported = true,
 	.get_rptr = vcn_v3_0_dec_ring_get_rptr,
 	.get_wptr = vcn_v3_0_dec_ring_get_wptr,
@@ -1972,6 +1973,7 @@ static int vcn_v3_0_ring_patch_cs_in_place(struct amdgpu_cs_parser *p,
 static const struct amdgpu_ring_funcs vcn_v3_0_dec_ring_vm_funcs = {
 	.type = AMDGPU_RING_TYPE_VCN_DEC,
 	.align_mask = 0xf,
+	.no_user_fence = true,
 	.secure_submission_supported = true,
 	.get_rptr = vcn_v3_0_dec_ring_get_rptr,
 	.get_wptr = vcn_v3_0_dec_ring_get_wptr,
@@ -2073,6 +2075,7 @@ static const struct amdgpu_ring_funcs vcn_v3_0_enc_ring_vm_funcs = {
 	.type = AMDGPU_RING_TYPE_VCN_ENC,
 	.align_mask = 0x3f,
 	.nop = VCN_ENC_CMD_NO_OP,
+	.no_user_fence = true,
 	.get_rptr = vcn_v3_0_enc_ring_get_rptr,
 	.get_wptr = vcn_v3_0_enc_ring_get_wptr,
 	.set_wptr = vcn_v3_0_enc_ring_set_wptr,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#573 lore raw

PATCH 558/666 drm/amdgpu/vcn: set no_user_fence for VCN v4.0.3 enc ring

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yinjie Yao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4532b52b34e4e4310386e6fdf6a643368599f522 ]

VCN encoder and decoder rings do not support 64-bit user fence writes, reject CS submissions with user fences.

Fixes b889ef4ac988 ("drm/amdgpu/vcn: add vcn support for VCN4_0_3")
(cherry picked from commit ff1a5a125c5a70c328806b9bc01d7d942cf3f9aa)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vcn_v4_0_3.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vcn_v4_0_3.c +1 -0
index 1cdf0a381f6b7..7edb6da93fd2e 100644
@@ -1520,6 +1520,7 @@ static const struct amdgpu_ring_funcs vcn_v4_0_3_unified_ring_vm_funcs = {
 	.type = AMDGPU_RING_TYPE_VCN_ENC,
 	.align_mask = 0x3f,
 	.nop = VCN_ENC_CMD_NO_OP,
+	.no_user_fence = true,
 	.get_rptr = vcn_v4_0_3_unified_ring_get_rptr,
 	.get_wptr = vcn_v4_0_3_unified_ring_get_wptr,
 	.set_wptr = vcn_v4_0_3_unified_ring_set_wptr,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#574 lore raw

PATCH 559/666 drm/amdgpu/vcn: set no_user_fence for VCN v4.0.5 enc ring

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yinjie Yao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 589a254bf3e88204c8402b9cbccd5e23a0af990f ]

VCN encoder and decoder rings do not support 64-bit user fence writes, reject CS submissions with user fences.

Fixes 547aad32edac ("drm/amdgpu: add VCN4 ip block support")
(cherry picked from commit 084d94ac93707bdda07efb5cee786f632de4219b)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vcn_v4_0_5.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vcn_v4_0_5.c +1 -0
index e2533776173ca..f0354a7dfb461 100644
@@ -1414,6 +1414,7 @@ static const struct amdgpu_ring_funcs vcn_v4_0_5_unified_ring_vm_funcs = {
 	.type = AMDGPU_RING_TYPE_VCN_ENC,
 	.align_mask = 0x3f,
 	.nop = VCN_ENC_CMD_NO_OP,
+	.no_user_fence = true,
 	.get_rptr = vcn_v4_0_5_unified_ring_get_rptr,
 	.get_wptr = vcn_v4_0_5_unified_ring_get_wptr,
 	.set_wptr = vcn_v4_0_5_unified_ring_set_wptr,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#575 lore raw

PATCH 560/666 drm/amdgpu/vcn: set no_user_fence for VCN v5.0.0 enc ring

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yinjie Yao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8cae0ce77de492d7c31c1532a2e80c0c6e7e58cb ]

VCN encoder and decoder rings do not support 64-bit user fence writes, reject CS submissions with user fences.

Fixes b6d1a0632051 ("drm/amdgpu: add VCN_5_0_0 IP block support")
(cherry picked from commit 49b1fbbb5a071197ee71e2d70959b1cb29bdc317)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vcn_v5_0_0.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vcn_v5_0_0.c +1 -0
index e21193111d4d4..f8994e4bdf4b6 100644
@@ -1137,6 +1137,7 @@ static const struct amdgpu_ring_funcs vcn_v5_0_0_unified_ring_vm_funcs = {
 	.type = AMDGPU_RING_TYPE_VCN_ENC,
 	.align_mask = 0x3f,
 	.nop = VCN_ENC_CMD_NO_OP,
+	.no_user_fence = true,
 	.get_rptr = vcn_v5_0_0_unified_ring_get_rptr,
 	.get_wptr = vcn_v5_0_0_unified_ring_get_wptr,
 	.set_wptr = vcn_v5_0_0_unified_ring_set_wptr,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#576 lore raw

PATCH 561/666 drm/amdgpu/jpeg: set no_user_fence for JPEG v2.0 ring

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yinjie Yao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e5f612dc91650561fe2b5b76dd6d2898ec9ad480 ]

JPEG rings do not support 64-bit user fence writes, reject CS submissions with user fences.

Fixes 6ac27241106b ("drm/amdgpu: add JPEG v2.0 function supports")
(cherry picked from commit 96179da0c6b059eb31706a0abe8dd6381c533143)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/jpeg_v2_0.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/jpeg_v2_0.c +1 -0
index 341c551dad8b0..5c95cf6167d94 100644
@@ -766,6 +766,7 @@ static const struct amd_ip_funcs jpeg_v2_0_ip_funcs = {
 static const struct amdgpu_ring_funcs jpeg_v2_0_dec_ring_vm_funcs = {
 	.type = AMDGPU_RING_TYPE_VCN_JPEG,
 	.align_mask = 0xf,
+	.no_user_fence = true,
 	.get_rptr = jpeg_v2_0_dec_ring_get_rptr,
 	.get_wptr = jpeg_v2_0_dec_ring_get_wptr,
 	.set_wptr = jpeg_v2_0_dec_ring_set_wptr,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#577 lore raw

PATCH 562/666 drm/amdgpu/jpeg: set no_user_fence for JPEG v2.5 ring

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yinjie Yao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 79405e774ede411c6b47ed41c651e40b92de64a2 ]

JPEG rings do not support 64-bit user fence writes, reject CS submissions with user fences.

Fixes 14f43e8f88c5 ("drm/amdgpu: move JPEG2.5 out from VCN2.5")
(cherry picked from commit 3216a7f4e2642bda5fd14f57586e835ae9202587)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/jpeg_v2_5.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/jpeg_v2_5.c +2 -0
index ec0fa685e1275..e4cfa6b7141f6 100644
@@ -659,6 +659,7 @@ static const struct amd_ip_funcs jpeg_v2_6_ip_funcs = {
 static const struct amdgpu_ring_funcs jpeg_v2_5_dec_ring_vm_funcs = {
 	.type = AMDGPU_RING_TYPE_VCN_JPEG,
 	.align_mask = 0xf,
+	.no_user_fence = true,
 	.get_rptr = jpeg_v2_5_dec_ring_get_rptr,
 	.get_wptr = jpeg_v2_5_dec_ring_get_wptr,
 	.set_wptr = jpeg_v2_5_dec_ring_set_wptr,
@@ -689,6 +690,7 @@ static const struct amdgpu_ring_funcs jpeg_v2_5_dec_ring_vm_funcs = {
 static const struct amdgpu_ring_funcs jpeg_v2_6_dec_ring_vm_funcs = {
 	.type = AMDGPU_RING_TYPE_VCN_JPEG,
 	.align_mask = 0xf,
+	.no_user_fence = true,
 	.get_rptr = jpeg_v2_5_dec_ring_get_rptr,
 	.get_wptr = jpeg_v2_5_dec_ring_get_wptr,
 	.set_wptr = jpeg_v2_5_dec_ring_set_wptr,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#578 lore raw

PATCH 563/666 drm/amdgpu/jpeg: set no_user_fence for JPEG v3.0 ring

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yinjie Yao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a2baf12eec41f246689e6a3f8619af1200031576 ]

JPEG rings do not support 64-bit user fence writes, reject CS submissions with user fences.

Fixes dfd57dbf44dd ("drm/amdgpu: add JPEG3.0 support for Sienna_Cichlid")
(cherry picked from commit 4d7d774f100efb5089c86a1fb8c5bf47c63fc9ef)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/jpeg_v3_0.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/jpeg_v3_0.c +1 -0
index dd00daa1d7eda..27a27de6c6c3d 100644
@@ -557,6 +557,7 @@ static const struct amd_ip_funcs jpeg_v3_0_ip_funcs = {
 static const struct amdgpu_ring_funcs jpeg_v3_0_dec_ring_vm_funcs = {
 	.type = AMDGPU_RING_TYPE_VCN_JPEG,
 	.align_mask = 0xf,
+	.no_user_fence = true,
 	.get_rptr = jpeg_v3_0_dec_ring_get_rptr,
 	.get_wptr = jpeg_v3_0_dec_ring_get_wptr,
 	.set_wptr = jpeg_v3_0_dec_ring_set_wptr,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#579 lore raw

PATCH 564/666 drm/amdgpu/jpeg: set no_user_fence for JPEG v4.0 ring

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yinjie Yao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e7e90b5839aeb8805ec83bb4da610b8dab8e184d ]

JPEG rings do not support 64-bit user fence writes, reject CS submissions with user fences.

Fixes b13111de32a9 ("drm/amdgpu/jpeg: add jpeg support for VCN4_0_0")
(cherry picked from commit 8d0cac9478a3f046279c657d6a2545de49ae675a)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/jpeg_v4_0.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/jpeg_v4_0.c +1 -0
index b147e0eba31da..90f64a46bff7c 100644
@@ -724,6 +724,7 @@ static const struct amd_ip_funcs jpeg_v4_0_ip_funcs = {
 static const struct amdgpu_ring_funcs jpeg_v4_0_dec_ring_vm_funcs = {
 	.type = AMDGPU_RING_TYPE_VCN_JPEG,
 	.align_mask = 0xf,
+	.no_user_fence = true,
 	.get_rptr = jpeg_v4_0_dec_ring_get_rptr,
 	.get_wptr = jpeg_v4_0_dec_ring_get_wptr,
 	.set_wptr = jpeg_v4_0_dec_ring_set_wptr,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#580 lore raw

PATCH 565/666 drm/amdgpu/jpeg: set no_user_fence for JPEG v4.0.3 ring

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yinjie Yao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 83e37c0987ca92f9e87789b46dd311dcf5a4a6c8 ]

JPEG rings do not support 64-bit user fence writes, reject CS submissions with user fences.

Fixes e684e654eba9 ("drm/amdgpu/jpeg: add jpeg support for VCN4_0_3")
(cherry picked from commit 2f6afc97d259d530f4f86c7743efbc573a8da927)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/jpeg_v4_0_3.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/jpeg_v4_0_3.c +1 -0
index fd0ba04a66045..c4f812939a85f 100644
@@ -1122,6 +1122,7 @@ static const struct amd_ip_funcs jpeg_v4_0_3_ip_funcs = {
 static const struct amdgpu_ring_funcs jpeg_v4_0_3_dec_ring_vm_funcs = {
 	.type = AMDGPU_RING_TYPE_VCN_JPEG,
 	.align_mask = 0xf,
+	.no_user_fence = true,
 	.get_rptr = jpeg_v4_0_3_dec_ring_get_rptr,
 	.get_wptr = jpeg_v4_0_3_dec_ring_get_wptr,
 	.set_wptr = jpeg_v4_0_3_dec_ring_set_wptr,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#581 lore raw

PATCH 566/666 drm/amdgpu/jpeg: set no_user_fence for JPEG v4.0.5 ring

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yinjie Yao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b65b7f3f3c18f797f81a2af7c97e2079900ad6db ]

JPEG rings do not support 64-bit user fence writes, reject CS submissions with user fences.

Fixes 8f98a715da8e ("drm/amdgpu/jpeg: add jpeg support for VCN4_0_5")
(cherry picked from commit f05d0a4f21fc720116d6e238f23308b199891058)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/jpeg_v4_0_5.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/jpeg_v4_0_5.c +1 -0
index 48ab3e0a62d25..78a9fb26bce2e 100644
@@ -765,6 +765,7 @@ static const struct amd_ip_funcs jpeg_v4_0_5_ip_funcs = {
 static const struct amdgpu_ring_funcs jpeg_v4_0_5_dec_ring_vm_funcs = {
 	.type = AMDGPU_RING_TYPE_VCN_JPEG,
 	.align_mask = 0xf,
+	.no_user_fence = true,
 	.get_rptr = jpeg_v4_0_5_dec_ring_get_rptr,
 	.get_wptr = jpeg_v4_0_5_dec_ring_get_wptr,
 	.set_wptr = jpeg_v4_0_5_dec_ring_set_wptr,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#582 lore raw

PATCH 567/666 drm/amdgpu/jpeg: set no_user_fence for JPEG v5.0.0 ring

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yinjie Yao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ea7c61c5f895e8f9ea0ffffa180498ef9c740152 ]

JPEG rings do not support 64-bit user fence writes, reject CS submissions with user fences.

Fixes dfad65c65728 ("drm/amdgpu: Add JPEG5 support")
(cherry picked from commit 0f43893d3cd478fa57836697525b338817c9c23d)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/jpeg_v5_0_0.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/jpeg_v5_0_0.c +1 -0
index 61288104060de..d0f800e7938dd 100644
@@ -644,6 +644,7 @@ static const struct amd_ip_funcs jpeg_v5_0_0_ip_funcs = {
 static const struct amdgpu_ring_funcs jpeg_v5_0_0_dec_ring_vm_funcs = {
 	.type = AMDGPU_RING_TYPE_VCN_JPEG,
 	.align_mask = 0xf,
+	.no_user_fence = true,
 	.get_rptr = jpeg_v5_0_0_dec_ring_get_rptr,
 	.get_wptr = jpeg_v5_0_0_dec_ring_get_wptr,
 	.set_wptr = jpeg_v5_0_0_dec_ring_set_wptr,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#583 lore raw

PATCH 568/666 ASoC: codecs: ab8500: Fix casting of private data

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian A. Ehrhardt <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a201aef1a88b675e9eb8487e27d14e2eef3cef80 ]

ab8500_filter_controls[i].private_value is initialized using

	.private_value = (unsigned long)&(struct filter_control)
		{.count = xcount, .min = xmin, .max = xmax}

thus it's a pointer to a struct filter_control casted to unsigned long.

So to get back that pointer .private_data must be cast back, not its address.

---
 sound/soc/codecs/ab8500-codec.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
sound/soc/codecs/ab8500-codec.c +3 -3
index 04b5e1d5a6530..32d9cdbc8c310 100644
@@ -2496,13 +2496,13 @@ static int ab8500_codec_probe(struct snd_soc_component *component)
 		return status;
 	}
 	fc = (struct filter_control *)
-		&ab8500_filter_controls[AB8500_FILTER_ANC_FIR].private_value;
+		ab8500_filter_controls[AB8500_FILTER_ANC_FIR].private_value;
 	drvdata->anc_fir_values = (long *)fc->value;
 	fc = (struct filter_control *)
-		&ab8500_filter_controls[AB8500_FILTER_ANC_IIR].private_value;
+		ab8500_filter_controls[AB8500_FILTER_ANC_IIR].private_value;
 	drvdata->anc_iir_values = (long *)fc->value;
 	fc = (struct filter_control *)
-		&ab8500_filter_controls[AB8500_FILTER_SID_FIR].private_value;
+		ab8500_filter_controls[AB8500_FILTER_SID_FIR].private_value;
 	drvdata->sid_fir_values = (long *)fc->value;
 
 	snd_soc_dapm_disable_pin(dapm, "ANC Configure Input");
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#584 lore raw

PATCH 569/666 netfilter: skip recording stale or retransmitted INIT

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Xin Long <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 576a5d2bad4814c881a829576b1261b9b8159d2b ]

An INIT whose init_tag matches the peer's vtag does not provide new state information. It indicates either:

- a stale INIT (after INIT-ACK has already been seen on the same side), or
- a retransmitted INIT (after INIT has already been recorded on the same side).

In both cases, the INIT must not update ct->proto.sctp.init[] state, since it does not advance the handshake tracking and may otherwise corrupt INIT/INIT-ACK validation logic.

Allow INIT processing only when the conntrack entry is newly created (SCTP_CONNTRACK_NONE), or when the init_tag differs from the stored peer vtag.

Note it skips the check for the ct with old_state SCTP_CONNTRACK_NONE in nf_conntrack_sctp_packet(), as it is just created in sctp_new() where it set ct->proto.sctp.vtag[IP_CT_DIR_REPLY] = ih->init_tag.

---
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_sctp.c | 10 +++++++---
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_sctp.c +7 -3
index fabb2c1ca00ab..0dd55d3fba38d 100644
@@ -471,9 +471,13 @@ int nf_conntrack_sctp_packet(struct nf_conn *ct,
 			if (!ih)
 				goto out_unlock;
 
-			if (ct->proto.sctp.init[dir] && ct->proto.sctp.init[!dir])
-				ct->proto.sctp.init[!dir] = 0;
-			ct->proto.sctp.init[dir] = 1;
+			/* Do not record INIT matching peer vtag (stale or retransmitted INIT). */
+			if (old_state == SCTP_CONNTRACK_NONE ||
+			    ct->proto.sctp.vtag[!dir] != ih->init_tag) {
+				if (ct->proto.sctp.init[dir] && ct->proto.sctp.init[!dir])
+					ct->proto.sctp.init[!dir] = 0;
+				ct->proto.sctp.init[dir] = 1;
+			}
 
 			pr_debug("Setting vtag %x for dir %d\n", ih->init_tag, !dir);
 			ct->proto.sctp.vtag[!dir] = ih->init_tag;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#585 lore raw

PATCH 570/666 sctp: discard stale INIT after handshake completion

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Xin Long <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8a92cb475ca90d84db769e4d4383e631ace0d6e5 ]

After an association reaches ESTABLISHED, the peer’s init_tag is already known from the handshake. Any subsequent INIT with the same init_tag is not a valid restart, but a delayed or duplicate INIT.

Drop such INIT chunks in sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init() instead of processing them as new association attempts.

---
 net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +6 -0
index 966bd6a44594a..376d4ce5ebb3c 100644
@@ -1556,6 +1556,12 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init(
 	/* Tag the variable length parameters.  */
 	chunk->param_hdr.v = skb_pull(chunk->skb, sizeof(struct sctp_inithdr));
 
+	if (asoc->state >= SCTP_STATE_ESTABLISHED) {
+		/* Discard INIT matching peer vtag after handshake completion (stale INIT). */
+		if (ntohl(chunk->subh.init_hdr->init_tag) == asoc->peer.i.init_tag)
+			return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+	}
+
 	/* Verify the INIT chunk before processing it. */
 	err_chunk = NULL;
 	if (!sctp_verify_init(net, ep, asoc, chunk->chunk_hdr->type,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#586 lore raw

PATCH 571/666 bareudp: fix NULL pointer dereference in bareudp_fill_metadata_dst()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Weiming Shi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit aa6c6d9ee064aabfede4402fd1283424e649ca19 ]

bareudp_fill_metadata_dst() passes bareudp->sock to udp_tunnel6_dst_lookup() in the IPv6 path without a NULL check. The socket is only created in bareudp_open() and NULLed in bareudp_stop(), so calling this function while the device is down triggers a NULL dereference via sock->sk.

 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018
 RIP: 0010:udp_tunnel6_dst_lookup (net/ipv6/ip6_udp_tunnel.c:160)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  bareudp_fill_metadata_dst (drivers/net/bareudp.c:532)
  do_execute_actions (net/openvswitch/actions.c:901)
  ovs_execute_actions (net/openvswitch/actions.c:1589)
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute (net/openvswitch/datapath.c:700)
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1114)
  genl_rcv_msg (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1209)
  netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550)
  </TASK>

Add a NULL check returning -ESHUTDOWN, consistent with the xmit paths in the same driver.

Fixes 571912c69f0e ("net: UDP tunnel encapsulation module for tunnelling different protocols like MPLS, IP, NSH etc.")
---
 drivers/net/bareudp.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/net/bareudp.c +3 -0
index fa2dd76ba3d9e..8d6b632371f89 100644
@@ -528,6 +528,9 @@ static int bareudp_fill_metadata_dst(struct net_device *dev,
 		struct in6_addr saddr;
 		struct socket *sock = rcu_dereference(bareudp->sock);
 
+		if (!sock)
+			return -ESHUTDOWN;
+
 		dst = udp_tunnel6_dst_lookup(skb, dev, bareudp->net, sock,
 					     0, &saddr, &info->key,
 					     sport, bareudp->port, info->key.tos,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#587 lore raw

PATCH 572/666 net/sched: sch_cake: annotate data-races in cake_dump_stats() (V)

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a6c95b833dc17e84d16a8ac0f40fd0931616a52d ]

cake_dump_stats() runs without qdisc spinlock being held.

In this final patch, I add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations for cparams.target and cparams.interval.

Fixes 046f6fd5daef ("sched: Add Common Applications Kept Enhanced (cake) qdisc")
---
 net/sched/sch_cake.c | 13 +++++++------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
net/sched/sch_cake.c +7 -6
index ee8d662db747c..ba1a5c15e6cab 100644
@@ -2297,10 +2297,11 @@ static void cake_set_rate(struct cake_tin_data *b, u64 rate, u32 mtu,
 
 	byte_target_ns = (byte_target * rate_ns) >> rate_shft;
 
-	b->cparams.target = max((byte_target_ns * 3) / 2, target_ns);
-	b->cparams.interval = max(rtt_est_ns +
-				     b->cparams.target - target_ns,
-				     b->cparams.target * 2);
+	WRITE_ONCE(b->cparams.target,
+		   max((byte_target_ns * 3) / 2, target_ns));
+	WRITE_ONCE(b->cparams.interval,
+		   max(rtt_est_ns + b->cparams.target - target_ns,
+		       b->cparams.target * 2));
 	b->cparams.mtu_time = byte_target_ns;
 	b->cparams.p_inc = 1 << 24; /* 1/256 */
 	b->cparams.p_dec = 1 << 20; /* 1/4096 */
@@ -2930,9 +2931,9 @@ static int cake_dump_stats(struct Qdisc *sch, struct gnet_dump *d)
 		PUT_TSTAT_U32(BACKLOG_BYTES, b->tin_backlog);
 
 		PUT_TSTAT_U32(TARGET_US,
-			      ktime_to_us(ns_to_ktime(b->cparams.target)));
+			      ktime_to_us(ns_to_ktime(READ_ONCE(b->cparams.target))));
 		PUT_TSTAT_U32(INTERVAL_US,
-			      ktime_to_us(ns_to_ktime(b->cparams.interval)));
+			      ktime_to_us(ns_to_ktime(READ_ONCE(b->cparams.interval))));
 
 		PUT_TSTAT_U32(SENT_PACKETS, b->packets);
 		PUT_TSTAT_U32(DROPPED_PACKETS, b->tin_dropped);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#588 lore raw

PATCH 573/666 netconsole: propagate device name truncation in dev_name_store()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Breno Leitao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 92ceb7bff62c2606f664c204750eca0b85d44112 ]

dev_name_store() calls strscpy(nt->np.dev_name, buf, IFNAMSIZ) without checking the return value. If userspace writes an interface name longer than IFNAMSIZ - 1, strscpy() silently truncates and returns -E2BIG, but the function ignores it and reports a fully successful write back to userspace.

If a real interface happens to match the truncated name, netconsole will bind to the wrong device on the next enable, sending kernel logs and panic output to an unintended network segment with no indication to userspace that anything was rewritten.

Reject writes whose length cannot fit in nt->np.dev_name up front:

	if (count >= IFNAMSIZ)
		return -ENAMETOOLONG;

This is not a big deal of a problem, but, it is still the correct approach.

Fixes 0bcc1816188e57 ("[NET] netconsole: Support dynamic reconfiguration using configfs")
---
 drivers/net/netconsole.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/net/netconsole.c +7 -0
index 4048d99b7c57d..60375bb814a1e 100644
@@ -502,6 +502,13 @@ static ssize_t dev_name_store(struct config_item *item, const char *buf,
 		size_t count)
 {
 	struct netconsole_target *nt = to_target(item);
+	size_t len = count;
+
+	/* Account for a trailing newline appended by tools like echo */
+	if (len && buf[len - 1] == '\n')
+		len--;
+	if (len >= IFNAMSIZ)
+		return -ENAMETOOLONG;
 
 	mutex_lock(&dynamic_netconsole_mutex);
 	if (nt->enabled) {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#589 lore raw

PATCH 574/666 ALSA: hda/conexant: Renaming the codec with device ID 0x1f86 and 0x1f87

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: wangdicheng <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7f4c540e0859e2025675d2c5c5c6ab88eaf817e2 ]

Due to changes in the manufacturer's plan, all 0x14f11f86 will be named CX11880, and 0x14f11f87 will be named SN6140

Stable-dep-of: b0e2333a2311 ("ALSA: hda/conexant: Fix missing error check for jack detection")

---
 sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c | 12 ++++++------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c +6 -6
index b7c9eba9236d8..00ac0e170619b 100644
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ struct conexant_spec {
 	unsigned int gpio_led;
 	unsigned int gpio_mute_led_mask;
 	unsigned int gpio_mic_led_mask;
-	bool is_cx8070_sn6140;
+	bool is_cx11880_sn6140;
 };
 
 
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ static int cx_auto_init(struct hda_codec *codec)
 	cxt_init_gpio_led(codec);
 	snd_hda_apply_fixup(codec, HDA_FIXUP_ACT_INIT);
 
-	if (spec->is_cx8070_sn6140)
+	if (spec->is_cx11880_sn6140)
 		cx_fixup_headset_recog(codec);
 
 	return 0;
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ static void cx_update_headset_mic_vref(struct hda_codec *codec, struct hda_jack_
 {
 	unsigned int mic_present;
 
-	/* In cx8070 and sn6140, the node 16 can only be configured to headphone or disabled,
+	/* In cx11880 and sn6140, the node 16 can only be configured to headphone or disabled,
 	 * the node 19 can only be configured to microphone or disabled.
 	 * Check hp&mic tag to process headset plugin & plugout.
 	 */
@@ -1193,11 +1193,11 @@ static int patch_conexant_auto(struct hda_codec *codec)
 	codec->spec = spec;
 	codec->patch_ops = cx_auto_patch_ops;
 
-	/* init cx8070/sn6140 flag and reset headset_present_flag */
+	/* init cx11880/sn6140 flag and reset headset_present_flag */
 	switch (codec->core.vendor_id) {
 	case 0x14f11f86:
 	case 0x14f11f87:
-		spec->is_cx8070_sn6140 = true;
+		spec->is_cx11880_sn6140 = true;
 		snd_hda_jack_detect_enable_callback(codec, 0x19, cx_update_headset_mic_vref);
 		break;
 	}
@@ -1285,7 +1285,7 @@ static int patch_conexant_auto(struct hda_codec *codec)
  */
 
 static const struct hda_device_id snd_hda_id_conexant[] = {
-	HDA_CODEC_ENTRY(0x14f11f86, "CX8070", patch_conexant_auto),
+	HDA_CODEC_ENTRY(0x14f11f86, "CX11880", patch_conexant_auto),
 	HDA_CODEC_ENTRY(0x14f11f87, "SN6140", patch_conexant_auto),
 	HDA_CODEC_ENTRY(0x14f12008, "CX8200", patch_conexant_auto),
 	HDA_CODEC_ENTRY(0x14f120d0, "CX11970", patch_conexant_auto),
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#590 lore raw

PATCH 575/666 ALSA: hda/conexant: Fix missing error check for jack detection

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: wangdicheng <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b0e2333a231107adedd38c6fcfe1adc6162716fc ]

In cx_probe(), the return value of snd_hda_jack_detect_enable_callback() is ignored. This function returns a pointer, and if it fails (e.g., due to memory allocation failure), it returns an error pointer which must be checked using IS_ERR().

If the registration fails, the driver continues to probe, but the jack detection callback will not be registered. This can lead to a kernel crash later when the driver attempts to handle jack events or accesses the uninitialized structure.

Check the return value using IS_ERR() and propagate the error via PTR_ERR() to the probe caller.

Fixes 7aeb25908648 ("ALSA: hda/conexant: Fix headset auto detect fail in cx8070 and SN6140")
---
 sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c | 8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c +7 -1
index 00ac0e170619b..0296777bb380b 100644
@@ -1182,6 +1182,7 @@ static void add_cx5051_fake_mutes(struct hda_codec *codec)
 static int patch_conexant_auto(struct hda_codec *codec)
 {
 	struct conexant_spec *spec;
+	struct hda_jack_callback *callback;
 	int err;
 
 	codec_info(codec, "%s: BIOS auto-probing.\n", codec->core.chip_name);
@@ -1198,7 +1199,12 @@ static int patch_conexant_auto(struct hda_codec *codec)
 	case 0x14f11f86:
 	case 0x14f11f87:
 		spec->is_cx11880_sn6140 = true;
-		snd_hda_jack_detect_enable_callback(codec, 0x19, cx_update_headset_mic_vref);
+		callback = snd_hda_jack_detect_enable_callback(codec, 0x19,
+				cx_update_headset_mic_vref);
+		if (IS_ERR(callback)) {
+			err = PTR_ERR(callback);
+			goto error;
+		}
 		break;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#591 lore raw

PATCH 576/666 ALSA: hda: cs35l56: Fix uninitialized value in cs35l56_hda_read_acpi()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Richard Fitzgerald <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 90df4957a3271adf391b3432cd76a40887cf3273 ]

Eliminate the uninitialized 'nval' in cs35l56_hda_read_acpi() if a system-specific quirk overrides processing of the dev-index property. The value is now stored in a new 'num_amps' member of struct cs35l56_hda so that the quirk handler can set the value.

The quirk for the Lenovo Yoga Book 9i GenX replaces the values from the dev-index property with hardcoded indexes. So cs35l56_hda_read_acpi() would then skip reading the property. But this left the 'nval' local variable uninitialized when it is later passed to cirrus_scodec_get_speaker_id().

---
 sound/pci/hda/cs35l56_hda.c | 12 +++++++-----
 sound/pci/hda/cs35l56_hda.h |  1 +
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
sound/pci/hda/cs35l56_hda.c +7 -5
index c868177712866..ee5387140ae48 100644
@@ -888,6 +888,7 @@ static int cs35l56_hda_system_resume(struct device *dev)
 static int cs35l56_hda_fixup_yoga9(struct cs35l56_hda *cs35l56, int *bus_addr)
 {
 	/* The cirrus,dev-index property has the wrong values */
+	cs35l56->num_amps = 2;
 	switch (*bus_addr) {
 	case 0x30:
 		cs35l56->index = 1;
@@ -937,7 +938,6 @@ static int cs35l56_hda_read_acpi(struct cs35l56_hda *cs35l56, int hid, int id)
 	char hid_string[8];
 	struct acpi_device *adev;
 	const char *property, *sub;
-	size_t nval;
 	int i, ret;
 
 	/*
@@ -973,13 +973,14 @@ static int cs35l56_hda_read_acpi(struct cs35l56_hda *cs35l56, int hid, int id)
 			ret = -EINVAL;
 			goto err;
 		}
-		nval = ret;
+		cs35l56->num_amps = ret;
 
-		ret = device_property_read_u32_array(cs35l56->base.dev, property, values, nval);
+		ret = device_property_read_u32_array(cs35l56->base.dev, property, values,
+						     cs35l56->num_amps);
 		if (ret)
 			goto err;
 
-		for (i = 0; i < nval; i++) {
+		for (i = 0; i < cs35l56->num_amps; i++) {
 			if (values[i] == id) {
 				cs35l56->index = i;
 				break;
@@ -1002,7 +1003,8 @@ static int cs35l56_hda_read_acpi(struct cs35l56_hda *cs35l56, int hid, int id)
 			 "Read ACPI _SUB failed(%ld): fallback to generic firmware\n",
 			 PTR_ERR(sub));
 	} else {
-		ret = cirrus_scodec_get_speaker_id(cs35l56->base.dev, cs35l56->index, nval, -1);
+		ret = cirrus_scodec_get_speaker_id(cs35l56->base.dev, cs35l56->index,
+						   cs35l56->num_amps, -1);
 		if (ret == -ENOENT) {
 			cs35l56->system_name = sub;
 		} else if (ret >= 0) {
sound/pci/hda/cs35l56_hda.h +1 -0
index 38d94fb213a50..0074e8f5f18cb 100644
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ struct cs35l56_hda {
 	struct work_struct dsp_work;
 
 	int index;
+	int num_amps;
 	const char *system_name;
 	const char *amp_name;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#592 lore raw

PATCH 577/666 futex: Prevent lockup in requeue-PI during signal/ timeout wakeup

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bc7304f3ae20972d11db6e0b1b541c63feda5f05 ]

During wait-requeue-pi (task A) and requeue-PI (task B) the following race can happen:

Task A Task B
futex_wait_requeue_pi()

    futex_setup_timer()
    futex_do_wait()
                                   futex_requeue()
                                        CLASS(hb, hb1)(&key1);
                                        CLASS(hb, hb2)(&key2);
        *timeout*
    futex_requeue_pi_wakeup_sync()
        requeue_state = Q_REQUEUE_PI_IGNORE

    *blocks on hb->lock*

                                        futex_proxy_trylock_atomic()
                                          futex_requeue_pi_prepare()
                                            Q_REQUEUE_PI_IGNORE => -EAGAIN
                                        double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2)
                                         *retry*

Task B acquires both hb locks and attempts to acquire the PI-lock of the top most waiter (task B). Task A is leaving early due to a signal/ timeout and started removing itself from the queue. It updates its requeue_state but can not remove it from the list because this requires the hb lock which is owned by task B.

Usually task A is able to swoop the lock after task B unlocked it. However if task B is of higher priority then task A may not be able to wake up in time and acquire the lock before task B gets it again. Especially on a UP system where A is never scheduled.

As a result task A blocks on the lock and task B busy loops, trying to make progress but live locks the system instead. Tragic.

This can be fixed by removing the top most waiter from the list in this case. This allows task B to grab the next top waiter (if any) in the next iteration and make progress.

Remove the top most waiter if futex_requeue_pi_prepare() fails. Let the waiter conditionally remove itself from the list in handle_early_requeue_pi_wakeup().

---
 kernel/futex/requeue.c | 13 +++++++++----
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
kernel/futex/requeue.c +9 -4
index 559aae55792c6..f4a69942780f6 100644
@@ -309,8 +309,11 @@ futex_proxy_trylock_atomic(u32 __user *pifutex, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb1,
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* Ensure that this does not race against an early wakeup */
-	if (!futex_requeue_pi_prepare(top_waiter, NULL))
+	if (!futex_requeue_pi_prepare(top_waiter, NULL)) {
+		plist_del(&top_waiter->list, &hb1->chain);
+		futex_hb_waiters_dec(hb1);
 		return -EAGAIN;
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Try to take the lock for top_waiter and set the FUTEX_WAITERS bit
@@ -711,10 +714,12 @@ int handle_early_requeue_pi_wakeup(struct futex_hash_bucket *hb,
 
 	/*
 	 * We were woken prior to requeue by a timeout or a signal.
-	 * Unqueue the futex_q and determine which it was.
+	 * Conditionally unqueue the futex_q and determine which it was.
 	 */
-	plist_del(&q->list, &hb->chain);
-	futex_hb_waiters_dec(hb);
+	if (!plist_node_empty(&q->list)) {
+		plist_del(&q->list, &hb->chain);
+		futex_hb_waiters_dec(hb);
+	}
 
 	/* Handle spurious wakeups gracefully */
 	ret = -EWOULDBLOCK;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#593 lore raw

PATCH 578/666 drm/amd/display: Allow DCE link encoder without AUX registers

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Timur Kristóf <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ac27e3f99035f132f23bc0409d0e57f11f054c70 ]

Allow constructing the DCE link encoder without DDC, which means the AUX registers array will be NULL.

This is necessary to support embedded connectors without DDC.

Fixes 4562236b3bc0 ("drm/amd/dc: Add dc display driver (v2)")
(cherry picked from commit 87f30b101af62590faf6020d106da07efdda199b)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce/dce_link_encoder.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce/dce_link_encoder.c +3 -1
index 0c50fe266c8a1..4103213a572ad 100644
@@ -989,7 +989,9 @@ void dce110_link_encoder_hw_init(
 		ASSERT(result == BP_RESULT_OK);
 
 	}
-	aux_initialize(enc110);
+
+	if (enc110->aux_regs)
+		aux_initialize(enc110);
 
 	/* reinitialize HPD.
 	 * hpd_initialize() will pass DIG_FE id to HW context.
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#594 lore raw

PATCH 579/666 drm/amd/display: Read EDID from VBIOS embedded panel info

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Timur Kristóf <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9ea16f64189bf7b6ba50fc7f0325b3c1f836d105 ]

Some board manufacturers hardcode the EDID for the embedded panel in the VBIOS. This EDID should be used when the panel doesn't have a DDC.

For reference, see the legacy non-DC display code:
amdgpu_atombios_encoder_get_lcd_info()

This is necessary to support embedded connectors without DDC.

Fixes 4562236b3bc0 ("drm/amd/dc: Add dc display driver (v2)")
(cherry picked from commit eb105e63b474c11ef6a84a1c6b18100d851ff364)
---
 .../gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../display/include/grph_object_ctrl_defs.h   |  4 ++
 2 files changed, 66 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser.c +62 -0
index a523c5cfcd248..fad0129bf8b12 100644
@@ -1215,6 +1215,60 @@ static enum bp_result bios_parser_get_embedded_panel_info(
 	return BP_RESULT_FAILURE;
 }
 
+static enum bp_result get_embedded_panel_extra_info(
+	struct bios_parser *bp,
+	struct embedded_panel_info *info,
+	const uint32_t table_offset)
+{
+	uint8_t *record = bios_get_image(&bp->base, table_offset, 1);
+	ATOM_PANEL_RESOLUTION_PATCH_RECORD *panel_res_record;
+	ATOM_FAKE_EDID_PATCH_RECORD *fake_edid_record;
+
+	while (*record != ATOM_RECORD_END_TYPE) {
+		switch (*record) {
+		case LCD_MODE_PATCH_RECORD_MODE_TYPE:
+			record += sizeof(ATOM_PATCH_RECORD_MODE);
+			break;
+		case LCD_RTS_RECORD_TYPE:
+			record += sizeof(ATOM_LCD_RTS_RECORD);
+			break;
+		case LCD_CAP_RECORD_TYPE:
+			record += sizeof(ATOM_LCD_MODE_CONTROL_CAP);
+			break;
+		case LCD_FAKE_EDID_PATCH_RECORD_TYPE:
+			fake_edid_record = (ATOM_FAKE_EDID_PATCH_RECORD *)record;
+			if (fake_edid_record->ucFakeEDIDLength) {
+				if (fake_edid_record->ucFakeEDIDLength == 128)
+					info->fake_edid_size =
+						fake_edid_record->ucFakeEDIDLength;
+				else
+					info->fake_edid_size =
+						fake_edid_record->ucFakeEDIDLength * 128;
+
+				info->fake_edid = fake_edid_record->ucFakeEDIDString;
+
+				record += struct_size(fake_edid_record,
+						      ucFakeEDIDString,
+						      info->fake_edid_size);
+			} else {
+				/* empty fake edid record must be 3 bytes long */
+				record += sizeof(ATOM_FAKE_EDID_PATCH_RECORD) + 1;
+			}
+			break;
+		case LCD_PANEL_RESOLUTION_RECORD_TYPE:
+			panel_res_record = (ATOM_PANEL_RESOLUTION_PATCH_RECORD *)record;
+			info->panel_width_mm = panel_res_record->usHSize;
+			info->panel_height_mm = panel_res_record->usVSize;
+			record += sizeof(ATOM_PANEL_RESOLUTION_PATCH_RECORD);
+			break;
+		default:
+			return BP_RESULT_BADBIOSTABLE;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return BP_RESULT_OK;
+}
+
 static enum bp_result get_embedded_panel_info_v1_2(
 	struct bios_parser *bp,
 	struct embedded_panel_info *info)
@@ -1331,6 +1385,10 @@ static enum bp_result get_embedded_panel_info_v1_2(
 	if (ATOM_PANEL_MISC_API_ENABLED & lvds->ucLVDS_Misc)
 		info->lcd_timing.misc_info.API_ENABLED = true;
 
+	if (lvds->usExtInfoTableOffset)
+		return get_embedded_panel_extra_info(bp, info,
+			le16_to_cpu(lvds->usExtInfoTableOffset) + DATA_TABLES(LCD_Info));
+
 	return BP_RESULT_OK;
 }
 
@@ -1456,6 +1514,10 @@ static enum bp_result get_embedded_panel_info_v1_3(
 			(uint32_t) (ATOM_PANEL_MISC_V13_GREY_LEVEL &
 				lvds->ucLCD_Misc) >> ATOM_PANEL_MISC_V13_GREY_LEVEL_SHIFT;
 
+	if (lvds->usExtInfoTableOffset)
+		return get_embedded_panel_extra_info(bp, info,
+			le16_to_cpu(lvds->usExtInfoTableOffset) + DATA_TABLES(LCD_Info));
+
 	return BP_RESULT_OK;
 }
 
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/include/grph_object_ctrl_defs.h +4 -0
index 813463ffe15c5..8e776c90d21bf 100644
@@ -153,6 +153,10 @@ struct embedded_panel_info {
 	uint32_t drr_enabled;
 	uint32_t min_drr_refresh_rate;
 	bool realtek_eDPToLVDS;
+	uint16_t panel_width_mm;
+	uint16_t panel_height_mm;
+	uint16_t fake_edid_size;
+	const uint8_t *fake_edid;
 };
 
 struct dc_firmware_info {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#595 lore raw

PATCH 580/666 drm/xe/debugfs: Correct printing of register whitelist ranges

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Matt Roper <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 03f2499c51dffce611b065b2894406beb9f2ebe0 ]

The register-save-restore debugfs prints whitelist entries as offset ranges. E.g.,

        REG[0x39319c-0x39319f]: allow read access

for a single dword-sized register. However the GENMASK value used to set the lower bits to '1' for the upper bound of the whitelist range incorrectly included one more bit than it should have, causing the whitelist ranges to sometimes appear twice as large as they really were. For example,

        REG[0x6210-0x6217]: allow rw access

was also intended to be a single dword-sized register whitelist (with a range 0x6210-0x6213) but was printed incorrectly as a qword-sized range because one too many bits was flipped on. Similar 'off by one' logic was applied when printing 4-dword register ranges and 64-dword register ranges as well.

Correct the GENMASK logic to print these ranges in debugfs correctly. No impact outside of correcting the misleading debugfs output.

Fixes d855d2246ea6 ("drm/xe: Print whitelist while applying")
(cherry picked from commit 1a2a722ff96749734a5585dfe7f0bea7719caa8b)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_reg_whitelist.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_reg_whitelist.c +1 -1
index 3996934974fa0..3de0a867149da 100644
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ void xe_reg_whitelist_print_entry(struct drm_printer *p, unsigned int indent,
 	}
 
 	range_start = reg & REG_GENMASK(25, range_bit);
-	range_end = range_start | REG_GENMASK(range_bit, 0);
+	range_end = range_start | REG_GENMASK(range_bit - 1, 0);
 
 	switch (val & RING_FORCE_TO_NONPRIV_ACCESS_MASK) {
 	case RING_FORCE_TO_NONPRIV_ACCESS_RW:
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#596 lore raw

PATCH 581/666 drm/xe: Fix error cleanup in xe_exec_queue_create_ioctl()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shuicheng Lin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f3cc22d4df3ed58439ea7e21daa54c3608e03b78 ]

Two error handling issues exist in xe_exec_queue_create_ioctl():

1. When xe_hw_engine_group_add_exec_queue() fails, the error path jumps to put_exec_queue which skips xe_exec_queue_kill(). If the VM is in preempt fence mode, xe_vm_add_compute_exec_queue() has already added the queue to the VM's compute exec queue list. Skipping the kill leaves the queue on that list, leading to a dangling pointer after the queue is freed.

2. When xa_alloc() fails after xe_hw_engine_group_add_exec_queue() has succeeded, the error path does not call xe_hw_engine_group_del_exec_queue() to remove the queue from the hw engine group list. The queue is then freed while still linked into the hw engine group, causing a use-after-free.

Fix both by:
- Changing the xe_hw_engine_group_add_exec_queue() failure path to jump to kill_exec_queue so that xe_exec_queue_kill() properly removes the queue from the VM's compute list.
- Adding a del_hw_engine_group label before kill_exec_queue for the xa_alloc() failure path, which removes the queue from the hw engine group before proceeding with the rest of the cleanup.

Fixes 7970cb36966c ("'drm/xe/hw_engine_group: Register hw engine group's exec queues")
Cc Francois Dugast <[email protected]>
Cc Matthew Brost <[email protected]>
Cc Niranjana Vishwanathapura <[email protected]>
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4.6
(cherry picked from commit 37c831f401746a45d510b312b0ed7a77b1e06ec8)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_exec_queue.c | 7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_exec_queue.c +5 -2
index 268cd3123be9d..e6c3074d0a785 100644
@@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ int xe_exec_queue_create_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
 		if (q->vm && q->hwe->hw_engine_group) {
 			err = xe_hw_engine_group_add_exec_queue(q->hwe->hw_engine_group, q);
 			if (err)
-				goto put_exec_queue;
+				goto kill_exec_queue;
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -647,12 +647,15 @@ int xe_exec_queue_create_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
 	/* user id alloc must always be last in ioctl to prevent UAF */
 	err = xa_alloc(&xef->exec_queue.xa, &id, q, xa_limit_32b, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (err)
-		goto kill_exec_queue;
+		goto del_hw_engine_group;
 
 	args->exec_queue_id = id;
 
 	return 0;
 
+del_hw_engine_group:
+	if (q->vm && q->hwe && q->hwe->hw_engine_group)
+		xe_hw_engine_group_del_exec_queue(q->hwe->hw_engine_group, q);
 kill_exec_queue:
 	xe_exec_queue_kill(q);
 put_exec_queue:
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#597 lore raw

PATCH 582/666 drm/xe/gsc: Fix BO leak on error in query_compatibility_version()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shuicheng Lin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3762d6c36549accea7068c4a175483fafdd03657 ]

When xe_gsc_read_out_header() fails, query_compatibility_version() returns directly instead of jumping to the out_bo label. This skips the xe_bo_unpin_map_no_vm() call, leaving the BO pinned and mapped with no remaining reference to free it.

Fix by using goto out_bo so the error path properly cleans up the BO, consistent with the other error handling in the same function.

Fixes 0881cbe04077 ("drm/xe/gsc: Query GSC compatibility version")
Cc Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 8de86d0a843c32ca9d36864bdb92f0376a830bce)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_gsc.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_gsc.c +1 -1
index feb680d127e60..efc480d34c9dd 100644
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ static int query_compatibility_version(struct xe_gsc *gsc)
 				     &rd_offset);
 	if (err) {
 		xe_gt_err(gt, "HuC: invalid GSC reply for version query (err=%d)\n", err);
-		return err;
+		goto out_bo;
 	}
 
 	compat->major = version_query_rd(xe, &bo->vmap, rd_offset, proj_major);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#598 lore raw

PATCH 583/666 page_pool: Set `dma_sync` to false for devmem memory provider

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Samiullah Khawaja <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b400f4b87430c105d92550cee5a72aea01fdf3d6 ]

Move the dma_map and dma_sync checks to page_pool_init to make them generic. Set dma_sync to false for devmem memory provider because the dma_sync APIs should not be used for dma_buf backed devmem memory provider.

Stable-dep-of: 5ef343614db7 ("page_pool: fix memory-provider leak in page_pool_create_percpu() error path")

---
 net/core/devmem.c    | 9 ++++-----
 net/core/page_pool.c | 3 +++
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/core/devmem.c +4 -5
index 17f8a83a5ee74..f04a89b0a41fe 100644
@@ -333,11 +333,10 @@ int mp_dmabuf_devmem_init(struct page_pool *pool)
 	if (!binding)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (!pool->dma_map)
-		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-
-	if (pool->dma_sync)
-		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	/* dma-buf dma addresses do not need and should not be used with
+	 * dma_sync_for_cpu/device. Force disable dma_sync.
+	 */
+	pool->dma_sync = false;
 
 	if (pool->p.order != 0)
 		return -E2BIG;
net/core/page_pool.c +3 -0
index 458b040a8655d..2ad52612d8ae8 100644
@@ -283,6 +283,9 @@ static int page_pool_init(struct page_pool *pool,
 	}
 
 	if (pool->mp_priv) {
+		if (!pool->dma_map || !pool->dma_sync)
+			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
 		err = mp_dmabuf_devmem_init(pool);
 		if (err) {
 			pr_warn("%s() mem-provider init failed %d\n", __func__,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#599 lore raw

PATCH 584/666 net: page_pool: create hooks for custom memory providers

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Pavel Begunkov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 57afb483015768903029c8336ee287f4b03c1235 ]

A spin off from the original page pool memory providers patch by Jakub, which allows extending page pools with custom allocators. One of such providers is devmem TCP, and the other is io_uring zerocopy added in following patches.

Stable-dep-of: 5ef343614db7 ("page_pool: fix memory-provider leak in page_pool_create_percpu() error path")

---
 include/net/page_pool/memory_provider.h | 15 +++++++++++++++
 include/net/page_pool/types.h           |  4 ++++
 net/core/devmem.c                       | 15 ++++++++++++++-
 net/core/page_pool.c                    | 23 +++++++++++++++--------
 4 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 include/net/page_pool/memory_provider.h
include/net/page_pool/memory_provider.h new file +15 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..e49d0a52629d7
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _NET_PAGE_POOL_MEMORY_PROVIDER_H
+#define _NET_PAGE_POOL_MEMORY_PROVIDER_H
+
+#include <net/netmem.h>
+#include <net/page_pool/types.h>
+
+struct memory_provider_ops {
+	netmem_ref (*alloc_netmems)(struct page_pool *pool, gfp_t gfp);
+	bool (*release_netmem)(struct page_pool *pool, netmem_ref netmem);
+	int (*init)(struct page_pool *pool);
+	void (*destroy)(struct page_pool *pool);
+};
+
+#endif
include/net/page_pool/types.h +4 -0
index f53e2c90b6866..7fae0d4eef5eb 100644
@@ -156,8 +156,11 @@ struct page_pool_stats {
  */
 #define PAGE_POOL_FRAG_GROUP_ALIGN	(4 * sizeof(long))
 
+struct memory_provider_ops;
+
 struct pp_memory_provider_params {
 	void *mp_priv;
+	const struct memory_provider_ops *mp_ops;
 };
 
 struct page_pool {
@@ -219,6 +222,7 @@ struct page_pool {
 	struct ptr_ring ring;
 
 	void *mp_priv;
+	const struct memory_provider_ops *mp_ops;
 
 	struct xarray dma_mapped;
 
net/core/devmem.c +14 -1
index f04a89b0a41fe..55f27a9ed1214 100644
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <net/netdev_queues.h>
 #include <net/netdev_rx_queue.h>
 #include <net/page_pool/helpers.h>
+#include <net/page_pool/memory_provider.h>
 #include <trace/events/page_pool.h>
 
 #include "devmem.h"
@@ -26,6 +27,8 @@
 /* Protected by rtnl_lock() */
 static DEFINE_XARRAY_FLAGS(net_devmem_dmabuf_bindings, XA_FLAGS_ALLOC1);
 
+static const struct memory_provider_ops dmabuf_devmem_ops;
+
 static void net_devmem_dmabuf_free_chunk_owner(struct gen_pool *genpool,
 					       struct gen_pool_chunk *chunk,
 					       void *not_used)
@@ -117,6 +120,7 @@ void net_devmem_unbind_dmabuf(struct net_devmem_dmabuf_binding *binding)
 		WARN_ON(rxq->mp_params.mp_priv != binding);
 
 		rxq->mp_params.mp_priv = NULL;
+		rxq->mp_params.mp_ops = NULL;
 
 		rxq_idx = get_netdev_rx_queue_index(rxq);
 
@@ -143,7 +147,7 @@ int net_devmem_bind_dmabuf_to_queue(struct net_device *dev, u32 rxq_idx,
 	}
 
 	rxq = __netif_get_rx_queue(dev, rxq_idx);
-	if (rxq->mp_params.mp_priv) {
+	if (rxq->mp_params.mp_ops) {
 		NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "designated queue already memory provider bound");
 		return -EEXIST;
 	}
@@ -161,6 +165,7 @@ int net_devmem_bind_dmabuf_to_queue(struct net_device *dev, u32 rxq_idx,
 		return err;
 
 	rxq->mp_params.mp_priv = binding;
+	rxq->mp_params.mp_ops = &dmabuf_devmem_ops;
 
 	err = netdev_rx_queue_restart(dev, rxq_idx);
 	if (err)
@@ -170,6 +175,7 @@ int net_devmem_bind_dmabuf_to_queue(struct net_device *dev, u32 rxq_idx,
 
 err_xa_erase:
 	rxq->mp_params.mp_priv = NULL;
+	rxq->mp_params.mp_ops = NULL;
 	xa_erase(&binding->bound_rxqs, xa_idx);
 
 	return err;
@@ -388,3 +394,10 @@ bool mp_dmabuf_devmem_release_page(struct page_pool *pool, netmem_ref netmem)
 	/* We don't want the page pool put_page()ing our net_iovs. */
 	return false;
 }
+
+static const struct memory_provider_ops dmabuf_devmem_ops = {
+	.init			= mp_dmabuf_devmem_init,
+	.destroy		= mp_dmabuf_devmem_destroy,
+	.alloc_netmems		= mp_dmabuf_devmem_alloc_netmems,
+	.release_netmem		= mp_dmabuf_devmem_release_page,
+};
net/core/page_pool.c +15 -8
index 2ad52612d8ae8..5c089469541c4 100644
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 
 #include <net/netdev_rx_queue.h>
 #include <net/page_pool/helpers.h>
+#include <net/page_pool/memory_provider.h>
 #include <net/xdp.h>
 
 #include <linux/dma-direction.h>
@@ -280,13 +281,19 @@ static int page_pool_init(struct page_pool *pool,
 		rxq = __netif_get_rx_queue(pool->slow.netdev,
 					   pool->slow.queue_idx);
 		pool->mp_priv = rxq->mp_params.mp_priv;
+		pool->mp_ops = rxq->mp_params.mp_ops;
 	}
 
-	if (pool->mp_priv) {
+	if (pool->mp_ops) {
 		if (!pool->dma_map || !pool->dma_sync)
 			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-		err = mp_dmabuf_devmem_init(pool);
+		if (WARN_ON(!is_kernel_rodata((unsigned long)pool->mp_ops))) {
+			err = -EFAULT;
+			goto free_ptr_ring;
+		}
+
+		err = pool->mp_ops->init(pool);
 		if (err) {
 			pr_warn("%s() mem-provider init failed %d\n", __func__,
 				err);
@@ -651,8 +658,8 @@ netmem_ref page_pool_alloc_netmem(struct page_pool *pool, gfp_t gfp)
 		return netmem;
 
 	/* Slow-path: cache empty, do real allocation */
-	if (static_branch_unlikely(&page_pool_mem_providers) && pool->mp_priv)
-		netmem = mp_dmabuf_devmem_alloc_netmems(pool, gfp);
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&page_pool_mem_providers) && pool->mp_ops)
+		netmem = pool->mp_ops->alloc_netmems(pool, gfp);
 	else
 		netmem = __page_pool_alloc_pages_slow(pool, gfp);
 	return netmem;
@@ -746,8 +753,8 @@ void page_pool_return_page(struct page_pool *pool, netmem_ref netmem)
 	bool put;
 
 	put = true;
-	if (static_branch_unlikely(&page_pool_mem_providers) && pool->mp_priv)
-		put = mp_dmabuf_devmem_release_page(pool, netmem);
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&page_pool_mem_providers) && pool->mp_ops)
+		put = pool->mp_ops->release_netmem(pool, netmem);
 	else
 		__page_pool_release_page_dma(pool, netmem);
 
@@ -1081,8 +1088,8 @@ static void __page_pool_destroy(struct page_pool *pool)
 	page_pool_unlist(pool);
 	page_pool_uninit(pool);
 
-	if (pool->mp_priv) {
-		mp_dmabuf_devmem_destroy(pool);
+	if (pool->mp_ops) {
+		pool->mp_ops->destroy(pool);
 		static_branch_dec(&page_pool_mem_providers);
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#600 lore raw

PATCH 585/666 page_pool: fix memory-provider leak in page_pool_create_percpu() error path

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hasan Basbunar <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5ef343614db766acdc01c56d66e780a1b43c6ac6 ]

When page_pool_create_percpu() fails on page_pool_list(), it falls through to its err_uninit: label, which calls page_pool_uninit(). At that point page_pool_init() has already taken two references when the user requested PP_FLAG_ALLOW_UNREADABLE_NETMEM:

	pool->mp_ops->init(pool)
	static_branch_inc(&page_pool_mem_providers);

Neither is undone by page_pool_uninit(); both are only undone by __page_pool_destroy() (success-side teardown). The error path therefore leaks the per-provider reference taken by mp_ops->init (io_zcrx_ifq->refs in the io_uring zcrx provider, the dmabuf binding refcount in the devmem provider) plus one increment of the page_pool_mem_providers static branch on every failure of xa_alloc_cyclic() inside page_pool_list().

The leaked io_zcrx_ifq->refs in turn pins everything io_zcrx_ifq_free() would release on cleanup: ifq->user (uid), ifq->mm_account (mmdrop), ifq->dev (device refcount), ifq->netdev_tracker (netdev refcount), and the rbuf region. The leaked static branch increment forces all subsequent page_pool_alloc_netmems() and page_pool_return_page() callers to take the slow mp_ops branch for the lifetime of the kernel.

Reachable via the io_uring zcrx path:

	io_uring_register(IORING_REGISTER_ZCRX_IFQ)  /* CAP_NET_ADMIN */
	  -> __io_uring_register
	  -> io_register_zcrx
	  -> zcrx_register_netdev
	  -> netif_mp_open_rxq
	  -> driver ndo_queue_mem_alloc
	  -> page_pool_create_percpu
	    -> page_pool_init succeeds (mp_ops->init runs, branch++)
	    -> page_pool_list fails (xa_alloc_cyclic -ENOMEM)
	    -> goto err_uninit         <-- leak

The same shape applies to the devmem dmabuf provider via mp_dmabuf_devmem_init()/mp_dmabuf_devmem_destroy().

Restore the cleanup symmetry by moving the mp_ops->destroy() and static_branch_dec() calls out of __page_pool_destroy() and into page_pool_uninit(), so page_pool_uninit() is again the strict inverse of page_pool_init(). page_pool_uninit() has only two callers (the err_uninit: path and __page_pool_destroy()), so this preserves the single-call invariant on the success path while fixing the err path. The error path of page_pool_init() itself still skips the mp_ops cleanup correctly: mp_ops->init is the last action that takes a reference before page_pool_init() returns 0, so when it returns an error neither the refcount nor the static branch has been touched.

Triggering the bug requires xa_alloc_cyclic() to fail with -ENOMEM, which under normal GFP_KERNEL retry behaviour is rare. It is deterministic under CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION with fail_page_alloc / xa fault injection, or under sustained memory pressure. The leak is silent: there is no warning, and the released kernel build continues running with a permanently-incremented static branch.

Fixes 0f9214046893 ("memory-provider: dmabuf devmem memory provider")
---
 net/core/page_pool.c | 10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/core/page_pool.c +5 -5
index 5c089469541c4..9c569a0371656 100644
@@ -323,6 +323,11 @@ static void page_pool_uninit(struct page_pool *pool)
 	if (!pool->system)
 		free_percpu(pool->recycle_stats);
 #endif
+
+	if (pool->mp_ops) {
+		pool->mp_ops->destroy(pool);
+		static_branch_dec(&page_pool_mem_providers);
+	}
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1088,11 +1093,6 @@ static void __page_pool_destroy(struct page_pool *pool)
 	page_pool_unlist(pool);
 	page_pool_uninit(pool);
 
-	if (pool->mp_ops) {
-		pool->mp_ops->destroy(pool);
-		static_branch_dec(&page_pool_mem_providers);
-	}
-
 	kfree(pool);
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#601 lore raw

PATCH 586/666 iavf: rename IAVF_VLAN_IS_NEW to IAVF_VLAN_ADDING

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Petr Oros <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 70d62b669f1f9080a25278fc90b64309f4ae8959 ]

Rename the IAVF_VLAN_IS_NEW state to IAVF_VLAN_ADDING to better describe what the state represents: an ADD request has been sent to the PF and is waiting for a response.

This is a pure rename with no behavioral change, preparing for a cleanup of the VLAN filter state machine.

Stable-dep-of: f2ce65b9b917 ("iavf: stop removing VLAN filters from PF on interface down")

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/iavf/iavf.h          | 2 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/iavf/iavf_virtchnl.c | 8 ++++----
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/iavf/iavf.h +1 -1
index 48cd1d06761c8..3ed541529e4fe 100644
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ struct iavf_vlan {
 enum iavf_vlan_state_t {
 	IAVF_VLAN_INVALID,
 	IAVF_VLAN_ADD,		/* filter needs to be added */
-	IAVF_VLAN_IS_NEW,	/* filter is new, wait for PF answer */
+	IAVF_VLAN_ADDING,	/* ADD sent to PF, waiting for response */
 	IAVF_VLAN_ACTIVE,	/* filter is accepted by PF */
 	IAVF_VLAN_DISABLE,	/* filter needs to be deleted by PF, then marked INACTIVE */
 	IAVF_VLAN_INACTIVE,	/* filter is inactive, we are in IFF_DOWN */
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/iavf/iavf_virtchnl.c +4 -4
index 7e810b65380ca..84eea8f8c62ff 100644
@@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ static void iavf_vlan_add_reject(struct iavf_adapter *adapter)
 
 	spin_lock_bh(&adapter->mac_vlan_list_lock);
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(f, ftmp, &adapter->vlan_filter_list, list) {
-		if (f->state == IAVF_VLAN_IS_NEW) {
+		if (f->state == IAVF_VLAN_ADDING) {
 			list_del(&f->list);
 			kfree(f);
 			adapter->num_vlan_filters--;
@@ -701,7 +701,7 @@ void iavf_add_vlans(struct iavf_adapter *adapter)
 			if (f->state == IAVF_VLAN_ADD) {
 				vvfl->vlan_id[i] = f->vlan.vid;
 				i++;
-				f->state = IAVF_VLAN_IS_NEW;
+				f->state = IAVF_VLAN_ADDING;
 				if (i == count)
 					break;
 			}
@@ -762,7 +762,7 @@ void iavf_add_vlans(struct iavf_adapter *adapter)
 				vlan->tpid = f->vlan.tpid;
 
 				i++;
-				f->state = IAVF_VLAN_IS_NEW;
+				f->state = IAVF_VLAN_ADDING;
 			}
 		}
 
@@ -2549,7 +2549,7 @@ void iavf_virtchnl_completion(struct iavf_adapter *adapter,
 
 		spin_lock_bh(&adapter->mac_vlan_list_lock);
 		list_for_each_entry(f, &adapter->vlan_filter_list, list) {
-			if (f->state == IAVF_VLAN_IS_NEW)
+			if (f->state == IAVF_VLAN_ADDING)
 				f->state = IAVF_VLAN_ACTIVE;
 		}
 		spin_unlock_bh(&adapter->mac_vlan_list_lock);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#602 lore raw

PATCH 587/666 iavf: stop removing VLAN filters from PF on interface down

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Petr Oros <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f2ce65b9b917474a1a6ce68d357e15fac2aca0f2 ]

When a VF goes down, the driver currently sends DEL_VLAN to the PF for every VLAN filter (ACTIVE -> DISABLE -> send DEL -> INACTIVE), then re-adds them all on UP (INACTIVE -> ADD -> send ADD -> ADDING -> ACTIVE). This round-trip is unnecessary because:

1. The PF disables the VF's queues via VIRTCHNL_OP_DISABLE_QUEUES, which already prevents all RX/TX traffic regardless of VLAN filter state.

2. The VLAN filters remaining in PF HW while the VF is down is harmless - packets matching those filters have nowhere to go with queues disabled.

3. The DEL+ADD cycle during down/up creates race windows where the VLAN filter list is incomplete. With spoofcheck enabled, the PF enables TX VLAN filtering on the first non-zero VLAN add, blocking traffic for any VLANs not yet re-added.

Remove the entire DISABLE/INACTIVE state machinery:
- Remove IAVF_VLAN_DISABLE and IAVF_VLAN_INACTIVE enum values
- Remove iavf_restore_filters() and its call from iavf_open()
- Remove VLAN filter handling from iavf_clear_mac_vlan_filters(), rename it to iavf_clear_mac_filters()
- Remove DEL_VLAN_FILTER scheduling from iavf_down()
- Remove all DISABLE/INACTIVE handling from iavf_del_vlans()

VLAN filters now stay ACTIVE across down/up cycles. Only explicit user removal (ndo_vlan_rx_kill_vid) or PF/VF reset triggers VLAN filter deletion/re-addition.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/iavf/iavf.h        |  6 +--
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/iavf/iavf_main.c   | 39 ++-----------------
 .../net/ethernet/intel/iavf/iavf_virtchnl.c   | 33 +++-------------
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/iavf/iavf.h +2 -4
index 3ed541529e4fe..41596b9889540 100644
@@ -159,10 +159,8 @@ enum iavf_vlan_state_t {
 	IAVF_VLAN_INVALID,
 	IAVF_VLAN_ADD,		/* filter needs to be added */
 	IAVF_VLAN_ADDING,	/* ADD sent to PF, waiting for response */
-	IAVF_VLAN_ACTIVE,	/* filter is accepted by PF */
-	IAVF_VLAN_DISABLE,	/* filter needs to be deleted by PF, then marked INACTIVE */
-	IAVF_VLAN_INACTIVE,	/* filter is inactive, we are in IFF_DOWN */
-	IAVF_VLAN_REMOVE,	/* filter needs to be removed from list */
+	IAVF_VLAN_ACTIVE,	/* PF confirmed, filter is in HW */
+	IAVF_VLAN_REMOVE,	/* filter queued for DEL from PF */
 };
 
 struct iavf_vlan_filter {
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/iavf/iavf_main.c +4 -35
index 5f07f37933a04..cc1430b2ec593 100644
@@ -818,27 +818,6 @@ static void iavf_del_vlan(struct iavf_adapter *adapter, struct iavf_vlan vlan)
 	spin_unlock_bh(&adapter->mac_vlan_list_lock);
 }
 
-/**
- * iavf_restore_filters
- * @adapter: board private structure
- *
- * Restore existing non MAC filters when VF netdev comes back up
- **/
-static void iavf_restore_filters(struct iavf_adapter *adapter)
-{
-	struct iavf_vlan_filter *f;
-
-	/* re-add all VLAN filters */
-	spin_lock_bh(&adapter->mac_vlan_list_lock);
-
-	list_for_each_entry(f, &adapter->vlan_filter_list, list) {
-		if (f->state == IAVF_VLAN_INACTIVE)
-			f->state = IAVF_VLAN_ADD;
-	}
-
-	spin_unlock_bh(&adapter->mac_vlan_list_lock);
-	adapter->aq_required |= IAVF_FLAG_AQ_ADD_VLAN_FILTER;
-}
 
 /**
  * iavf_get_num_vlans_added - get number of VLANs added
@@ -1257,13 +1236,12 @@ static void iavf_up_complete(struct iavf_adapter *adapter)
 }
 
 /**
- * iavf_clear_mac_vlan_filters - Remove mac and vlan filters not sent to PF
- * yet and mark other to be removed.
+ * iavf_clear_mac_filters - Remove MAC filters not sent to PF yet and mark
+ * others to be removed.
  * @adapter: board private structure
  **/
-static void iavf_clear_mac_vlan_filters(struct iavf_adapter *adapter)
+static void iavf_clear_mac_filters(struct iavf_adapter *adapter)
 {
-	struct iavf_vlan_filter *vlf, *vlftmp;
 	struct iavf_mac_filter *f, *ftmp;
 
 	spin_lock_bh(&adapter->mac_vlan_list_lock);
@@ -1282,11 +1260,6 @@ static void iavf_clear_mac_vlan_filters(struct iavf_adapter *adapter)
 		}
 	}
 
-	/* disable all VLAN filters */
-	list_for_each_entry_safe(vlf, vlftmp, &adapter->vlan_filter_list,
-				 list)
-		vlf->state = IAVF_VLAN_DISABLE;
-
 	spin_unlock_bh(&adapter->mac_vlan_list_lock);
 }
 
@@ -1382,7 +1355,7 @@ void iavf_down(struct iavf_adapter *adapter)
 	iavf_napi_disable_all(adapter);
 	iavf_irq_disable(adapter);
 
-	iavf_clear_mac_vlan_filters(adapter);
+	iavf_clear_mac_filters(adapter);
 	iavf_clear_cloud_filters(adapter);
 	iavf_clear_fdir_filters(adapter);
 	iavf_clear_adv_rss_conf(adapter);
@@ -1399,8 +1372,6 @@ void iavf_down(struct iavf_adapter *adapter)
 		 */
 		if (!list_empty(&adapter->mac_filter_list))
 			adapter->aq_required |= IAVF_FLAG_AQ_DEL_MAC_FILTER;
-		if (!list_empty(&adapter->vlan_filter_list))
-			adapter->aq_required |= IAVF_FLAG_AQ_DEL_VLAN_FILTER;
 		if (!list_empty(&adapter->cloud_filter_list))
 			adapter->aq_required |= IAVF_FLAG_AQ_DEL_CLOUD_FILTER;
 		if (!list_empty(&adapter->fdir_list_head))
@@ -4363,8 +4334,6 @@ static int iavf_open(struct net_device *netdev)
 
 	spin_unlock_bh(&adapter->mac_vlan_list_lock);
 
-	/* Restore filters that were removed with IFF_DOWN */
-	iavf_restore_filters(adapter);
 	iavf_restore_fdir_filters(adapter);
 
 	iavf_configure(adapter);
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/iavf/iavf_virtchnl.c +6 -27
index 84eea8f8c62ff..316ce79f14c36 100644
@@ -799,22 +799,12 @@ void iavf_del_vlans(struct iavf_adapter *adapter)
 	spin_lock_bh(&adapter->mac_vlan_list_lock);
 
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(f, ftmp, &adapter->vlan_filter_list, list) {
-		/* since VLAN capabilities are not allowed, we dont want to send
-		 * a VLAN delete request because it will most likely fail and
-		 * create unnecessary errors/noise, so just free the VLAN
-		 * filters marked for removal to enable bailing out before
-		 * sending a virtchnl message
-		 */
 		if (f->state == IAVF_VLAN_REMOVE &&
 		    !VLAN_FILTERING_ALLOWED(adapter)) {
 			list_del(&f->list);
 			kfree(f);
 			adapter->num_vlan_filters--;
-		} else if (f->state == IAVF_VLAN_DISABLE &&
-		    !VLAN_FILTERING_ALLOWED(adapter)) {
-			f->state = IAVF_VLAN_INACTIVE;
-		} else if (f->state == IAVF_VLAN_REMOVE ||
-			   f->state == IAVF_VLAN_DISABLE) {
+		} else if (f->state == IAVF_VLAN_REMOVE) {
 			count++;
 		}
 	}
@@ -846,13 +836,7 @@ void iavf_del_vlans(struct iavf_adapter *adapter)
 		vvfl->vsi_id = adapter->vsi_res->vsi_id;
 		vvfl->num_elements = count;
 		list_for_each_entry_safe(f, ftmp, &adapter->vlan_filter_list, list) {
-			if (f->state == IAVF_VLAN_DISABLE) {
-				vvfl->vlan_id[i] = f->vlan.vid;
-				f->state = IAVF_VLAN_INACTIVE;
-				i++;
-				if (i == count)
-					break;
-			} else if (f->state == IAVF_VLAN_REMOVE) {
+			if (f->state == IAVF_VLAN_REMOVE) {
 				vvfl->vlan_id[i] = f->vlan.vid;
 				list_del(&f->list);
 				kfree(f);
@@ -893,8 +877,7 @@ void iavf_del_vlans(struct iavf_adapter *adapter)
 		vvfl_v2->vport_id = adapter->vsi_res->vsi_id;
 		vvfl_v2->num_elements = count;
 		list_for_each_entry_safe(f, ftmp, &adapter->vlan_filter_list, list) {
-			if (f->state == IAVF_VLAN_DISABLE ||
-			    f->state == IAVF_VLAN_REMOVE) {
+			if (f->state == IAVF_VLAN_REMOVE) {
 				struct virtchnl_vlan_supported_caps *filtering_support =
 					&adapter->vlan_v2_caps.filtering.filtering_support;
 				struct virtchnl_vlan *vlan;
@@ -908,13 +891,9 @@ void iavf_del_vlans(struct iavf_adapter *adapter)
 				vlan->tci = f->vlan.vid;
 				vlan->tpid = f->vlan.tpid;
 
-				if (f->state == IAVF_VLAN_DISABLE) {
-					f->state = IAVF_VLAN_INACTIVE;
-				} else {
-					list_del(&f->list);
-					kfree(f);
-					adapter->num_vlan_filters--;
-				}
+				list_del(&f->list);
+				kfree(f);
+				adapter->num_vlan_filters--;
 				i++;
 				if (i == count)
 					break;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#603 lore raw

PATCH 588/666 iavf: wait for PF confirmation before removing VLAN filters

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Petr Oros <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bbcbe4ed70dea948849549af7edf44bd42bbd695 ]

The VLAN filter DELETE path was asymmetric with the ADD path: ADD waits for PF confirmation (ADD -> ADDING -> ACTIVE), but DELETE immediately frees the filter struct after sending the DEL message without waiting for the PF response.

This is problematic because:
- If the PF rejects the DEL, the filter remains in HW but the driver has already freed the tracking structure, losing sync.
- Race conditions between DEL pending and other operations (add, reset) cannot be properly resolved if the filter struct is already gone.

Add IAVF_VLAN_REMOVING state to make the DELETE path symmetric:

REMOVE -> REMOVING (send DEL) -> PF confirms -> kfree

                                -> PF rejects  -> ACTIVE

In iavf_del_vlans(), transition filters from REMOVE to REMOVING instead of immediately freeing them. The new DEL completion handler in iavf_virtchnl_completion() frees filters on success or reverts them to ACTIVE on error.

Update iavf_add_vlan() to handle the REMOVING state: if a DEL is pending and the user re-adds the same VLAN, queue it for ADD so it gets re-programmed after the PF processes the DEL.

The !VLAN_FILTERING_ALLOWED early-exit path still frees filters directly since no PF message is sent in that case.

Also update iavf_del_vlan() to skip filters already in REMOVING
state: DEL has been sent to PF and the completion handler will free the filter when PF confirms. Without this guard, the sequence DEL(pending) -> user-del -> second DEL could cause the PF to return an error for the second DEL (filter already gone), causing the completion handler to incorrectly revert a deleted filter back to ACTIVE.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/iavf/iavf.h        |  1 +
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/iavf/iavf_main.c   | 13 ++++---
 .../net/ethernet/intel/iavf/iavf_virtchnl.c   | 37 +++++++++++++------
 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/iavf/iavf.h +1 -0
index 41596b9889540..8cd742c4da913 100644
@@ -161,6 +161,7 @@ enum iavf_vlan_state_t {
 	IAVF_VLAN_ADDING,	/* ADD sent to PF, waiting for response */
 	IAVF_VLAN_ACTIVE,	/* PF confirmed, filter is in HW */
 	IAVF_VLAN_REMOVE,	/* filter queued for DEL from PF */
+	IAVF_VLAN_REMOVING,	/* DEL sent to PF, waiting for response */
 };
 
 struct iavf_vlan_filter {
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/iavf/iavf_main.c +8 -5
index cc1430b2ec593..383e015a6f4eb 100644
@@ -774,10 +774,10 @@ iavf_vlan_filter *iavf_add_vlan(struct iavf_adapter *adapter,
 		adapter->num_vlan_filters++;
 		iavf_schedule_aq_request(adapter, IAVF_FLAG_AQ_ADD_VLAN_FILTER);
 	} else if (f->state == IAVF_VLAN_REMOVE) {
-		/* Re-add the filter since we cannot tell whether the
-		 * pending delete has already been processed by the PF.
-		 * A duplicate add is harmless.
-		 */
+		/* DEL not yet sent to PF, cancel it */
+		f->state = IAVF_VLAN_ACTIVE;
+	} else if (f->state == IAVF_VLAN_REMOVING) {
+		/* DEL already sent to PF, re-add after completion */
 		f->state = IAVF_VLAN_ADD;
 		iavf_schedule_aq_request(adapter,
 					 IAVF_FLAG_AQ_ADD_VLAN_FILTER);
@@ -808,11 +808,14 @@ static void iavf_del_vlan(struct iavf_adapter *adapter, struct iavf_vlan vlan)
 			list_del(&f->list);
 			kfree(f);
 			adapter->num_vlan_filters--;
-		} else {
+		} else if (f->state != IAVF_VLAN_REMOVING) {
 			f->state = IAVF_VLAN_REMOVE;
 			iavf_schedule_aq_request(adapter,
 						 IAVF_FLAG_AQ_DEL_VLAN_FILTER);
 		}
+		/* If REMOVING, DEL is already sent to PF; completion
+		 * handler will free the filter when PF confirms.
+		 */
 	}
 
 	spin_unlock_bh(&adapter->mac_vlan_list_lock);
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/iavf/iavf_virtchnl.c +25 -12
index 316ce79f14c36..9ba36e12dabf0 100644
@@ -835,12 +835,10 @@ void iavf_del_vlans(struct iavf_adapter *adapter)
 
 		vvfl->vsi_id = adapter->vsi_res->vsi_id;
 		vvfl->num_elements = count;
-		list_for_each_entry_safe(f, ftmp, &adapter->vlan_filter_list, list) {
+		list_for_each_entry(f, &adapter->vlan_filter_list, list) {
 			if (f->state == IAVF_VLAN_REMOVE) {
 				vvfl->vlan_id[i] = f->vlan.vid;
-				list_del(&f->list);
-				kfree(f);
-				adapter->num_vlan_filters--;
+				f->state = IAVF_VLAN_REMOVING;
 				i++;
 				if (i == count)
 					break;
@@ -876,7 +874,7 @@ void iavf_del_vlans(struct iavf_adapter *adapter)
 
 		vvfl_v2->vport_id = adapter->vsi_res->vsi_id;
 		vvfl_v2->num_elements = count;
-		list_for_each_entry_safe(f, ftmp, &adapter->vlan_filter_list, list) {
+		list_for_each_entry(f, &adapter->vlan_filter_list, list) {
 			if (f->state == IAVF_VLAN_REMOVE) {
 				struct virtchnl_vlan_supported_caps *filtering_support =
 					&adapter->vlan_v2_caps.filtering.filtering_support;
@@ -891,9 +889,7 @@ void iavf_del_vlans(struct iavf_adapter *adapter)
 				vlan->tci = f->vlan.vid;
 				vlan->tpid = f->vlan.tpid;
 
-				list_del(&f->list);
-				kfree(f);
-				adapter->num_vlan_filters--;
+				f->state = IAVF_VLAN_REMOVING;
 				i++;
 				if (i == count)
 					break;
@@ -2040,10 +2036,6 @@ void iavf_virtchnl_completion(struct iavf_adapter *adapter,
 			ether_addr_copy(adapter->hw.mac.addr, netdev->dev_addr);
 			wake_up(&adapter->vc_waitqueue);
 			break;
-		case VIRTCHNL_OP_DEL_VLAN:
-			dev_err(&adapter->pdev->dev, "Failed to delete VLAN filter, error %s\n",
-				iavf_stat_str(&adapter->hw, v_retval));
-			break;
 		case VIRTCHNL_OP_DEL_ETH_ADDR:
 			dev_err(&adapter->pdev->dev, "Failed to delete MAC filter, error %s\n",
 				iavf_stat_str(&adapter->hw, v_retval));
@@ -2534,6 +2526,27 @@ void iavf_virtchnl_completion(struct iavf_adapter *adapter,
 		spin_unlock_bh(&adapter->mac_vlan_list_lock);
 		}
 		break;
+	case VIRTCHNL_OP_DEL_VLAN:
+	case VIRTCHNL_OP_DEL_VLAN_V2: {
+		struct iavf_vlan_filter *f, *ftmp;
+
+		spin_lock_bh(&adapter->mac_vlan_list_lock);
+		list_for_each_entry_safe(f, ftmp, &adapter->vlan_filter_list,
+					 list) {
+			if (f->state == IAVF_VLAN_REMOVING) {
+				if (v_retval) {
+					/* PF rejected DEL, keep filter */
+					f->state = IAVF_VLAN_ACTIVE;
+				} else {
+					list_del(&f->list);
+					kfree(f);
+					adapter->num_vlan_filters--;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		spin_unlock_bh(&adapter->mac_vlan_list_lock);
+		}
+		break;
 	case VIRTCHNL_OP_ENABLE_VLAN_STRIPPING:
 		/* PF enabled vlan strip on this VF.
 		 * Update netdev->features if needed to be in sync with ethtool.
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#604 lore raw

PATCH 589/666 iavf: add VIRTCHNL_OP_ADD_VLAN to success completion handler

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Petr Oros <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 34d33313b52eeac3a97ad2e3176d523ec70d9283 ]

The V1 ADD_VLAN opcode had no success handler; filters sent via V1 stayed in ADDING state permanently. Add a fallthrough case so V1 filters also transition ADDING -> ACTIVE on PF confirmation.

Critically, add an if (v_retval) break guard: the error switch in iavf_virtchnl_completion() does NOT return after handling errors, it falls through to the success switch. Without this guard, a PF-rejected ADD would incorrectly mark ADDING filters as ACTIVE, creating a driver/HW mismatch where the driver believes the filter is installed but the PF never accepted it.

For V2, this is harmless: iavf_vlan_add_reject() in the error block already kfree'd all ADDING filters, so the success handler finds nothing to transition.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/iavf/iavf_virtchnl.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/iavf/iavf_virtchnl.c +4 -0
index 9ba36e12dabf0..3e6bdd6ba5372 100644
@@ -2515,9 +2515,13 @@ void iavf_virtchnl_completion(struct iavf_adapter *adapter,
 		spin_unlock_bh(&adapter->adv_rss_lock);
 		}
 		break;
+	case VIRTCHNL_OP_ADD_VLAN:
 	case VIRTCHNL_OP_ADD_VLAN_V2: {
 		struct iavf_vlan_filter *f;
 
+		if (v_retval)
+			break;
+
 		spin_lock_bh(&adapter->mac_vlan_list_lock);
 		list_for_each_entry(f, &adapter->vlan_filter_list, list) {
 			if (f->state == IAVF_VLAN_ADDING)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#605 lore raw

PATCH 590/666 ice: fix NULL pointer dereference in ice_reset_all_vfs()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Petr Oros <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 54ef02487914c24170c7e1c061e45212dc55365e ]

ice_reset_all_vfs() ignores the return value of ice_vf_rebuild_vsi(). When the VSI rebuild fails (e.g. during NVM firmware update via nvmupdate64e), ice_vsi_rebuild() tears down the VSI on its error path, leaving txq_map and rxq_map as NULL. The subsequent unconditional call to ice_vf_post_vsi_rebuild() leads to a NULL pointer dereference in ice_ena_vf_q_mappings() when it accesses vsi->txq_map[0].

The single-VF reset path in ice_reset_vf() already handles this correctly by checking the return value of ice_vf_reconfig_vsi() and skipping ice_vf_post_vsi_rebuild() on failure.

Apply the same pattern to ice_reset_all_vfs(): check the return value of ice_vf_rebuild_vsi() and skip ice_vf_post_vsi_rebuild() and ice_eswitch_attach_vf() on failure. The VF is left safely disabled (ICE_VF_STATE_INIT not set, VFGEN_RSTAT not set to VFACTIVE) and can be recovered via a VFLR triggered by a PCI reset of the VF (sysfs reset or driver rebind).

Note that this patch does not prevent the VF VSI rebuild from failing during NVM update — the underlying cause is firmware being in a transitional state while the EMP reset is processed, which can cause Admin Queue commands (ice_add_vsi, ice_cfg_vsi_lan) to fail. This patch only prevents the subsequent NULL pointer dereference that crashes the kernel when the rebuild does fail.

crash> bt

     PID: 50795    TASK: ff34c9ee708dc680  CPU: 1    COMMAND: "kworker/u512:5"
      #0 [ff72159bcfe5bb50] machine_kexec at ffffffffaa8850ee
      #1 [ff72159bcfe5bba8] __crash_kexec at ffffffffaaa15fba
      #2 [ff72159bcfe5bc68] crash_kexec at ffffffffaaa16540
      #3 [ff72159bcfe5bc70] oops_end at ffffffffaa837eda
      #4 [ff72159bcfe5bc90] page_fault_oops at ffffffffaa893997
      #5 [ff72159bcfe5bce8] exc_page_fault at ffffffffab528595
      #6 [ff72159bcfe5bd10] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffffab600bb2
         [exception RIP: ice_ena_vf_q_mappings+0x79]
         RIP: ffffffffc0a85b29  RSP: ff72159bcfe5bdc8  RFLAGS: 00010206
         RAX: 00000000000f0000  RBX: ff34c9efc9c00000  RCX: 0000000000000000
         RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: 0000000000000010  RDI: ff34c9efc9c00000
         RBP: ff34c9efc27d4828   R8: 0000000000000093   R9: 0000000000000040
         R10: ff34c9efc27d4828  R11: 0000000000000040  R12: 0000000000100000
         R13: 0000000000000010  R14:   R15:
         ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
      #7 [ff72159bcfe5bdf8] ice_sriov_post_vsi_rebuild at ffffffffc0a85e2e [ice]
      #8 [ff72159bcfe5be08] ice_reset_all_vfs at ffffffffc0a920b4 [ice]
      #9 [ff72159bcfe5be48] ice_service_task at ffffffffc0a31519 [ice]
     #10 [ff72159bcfe5be88] process_one_work at ffffffffaa93dca4
     #11 [ff72159bcfe5bec8] worker_thread at ffffffffaa93e9de
     #12 [ff72159bcfe5bf18] kthread at ffffffffaa946663
     #13 [ff72159bcfe5bf50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffaa8086b9

The panic occurs attempting to dereference the NULL pointer in RDX at ice_sriov.c:294, which loads vsi->txq_map (offset 0x4b8 in ice_vsi).

The faulting VSI is an allocated slab object but not fully initialized after a failed ice_vsi_rebuild():

crash> struct ice_vsi 0xff34c9efc27d4828

    netdev = 0x0,
    rx_rings = 0x0,
    tx_rings = 0x0,
    q_vectors = 0x0,
    txq_map = 0x0,
    rxq_map = 0x0,
    alloc_txq = 0x10,
    num_txq = 0x10,
    alloc_rxq = 0x10,
    num_rxq = 0x10,

The nvmupdate64e process was performing NVM firmware update:

crash> bt 0xff34c9edd1a30000
PID: 49858 TASK: ff34c9edd1a30000 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "nvmupdate64e"
#0 [ff72159bcd617618] __schedule at ffffffffab5333f8
#4 [ff72159bcd617750] ice_sq_send_cmd at ffffffffc0a35347 [ice] #5 [ff72159bcd6177a8] ice_sq_send_cmd_retry at ffffffffc0a35b47 [ice] #6 [ff72159bcd617810] ice_aq_send_cmd at ffffffffc0a38018 [ice] #7 [ff72159bcd617848] ice_aq_read_nvm at ffffffffc0a40254 [ice] #8 [ff72159bcd6178b8] ice_read_flat_nvm at ffffffffc0a4034c [ice] #9 [ff72159bcd617918] ice_devlink_nvm_snapshot at ffffffffc0a6ffa5 [ice]

dmesg:
ice 0000:13:00.0: firmware recommends not updating fw.mgmt, as it
may result in a downgrade. continuing anyways
ice 0000:13:00.1: ice_init_nvm failed -5
ice 0000:13:00.1: Rebuild failed, unload and reload driver

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c +6 -1
index 815ad0bfe8326..5267b08011fcf 100644
@@ -803,7 +803,12 @@ void ice_reset_all_vfs(struct ice_pf *pf)
 			ice_vf_ctrl_invalidate_vsi(vf);
 
 		ice_vf_pre_vsi_rebuild(vf);
-		ice_vf_rebuild_vsi(vf);
+		if (ice_vf_rebuild_vsi(vf)) {
+			dev_err(dev, "VF %u VSI rebuild failed, leaving VF disabled\n",
+				vf->vf_id);
+			mutex_unlock(&vf->cfg_lock);
+			continue;
+		}
 		ice_vf_post_vsi_rebuild(vf);
 
 		ice_eswitch_attach_vf(pf, vf);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#606 lore raw

PATCH 591/666 net: tls: fix strparser anchor skb leak on offload RX setup failure

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 58689498ca3384851145a754dbb1d8ed1cf9fb54 ]

When tls_set_device_offload_rx() fails at tls_dev_add(), the error path calls tls_sw_free_resources_rx() to clean up the SW context that was initialized by tls_set_sw_offload(). This function calls tls_sw_release_resources_rx() (which stops the strparser via tls_strp_stop()) and tls_sw_free_ctx_rx() (which kfrees the context), but never frees the anchor skb that was allocated by alloc_skb(0) in tls_strp_init().

Note that tls_sw_free_resources_rx() is exclusively used for this "failed to start offload" code path, there's no other caller.

The leak did not exist before commit 84c61fe1a75b ("tls: rx: do not use the standard strparser"), because the standard strparser doesn't try to pre-allocate an skb.

The normal close path in tls_sk_proto_close() handles cleanup by calling tls_sw_strparser_done() (which calls tls_strp_done()) after dropping the socket lock, because tls_strp_done() does cancel_work_sync() and the strparser work handler takes the socket lock.

Fixes 84c61fe1a75b ("tls: rx: do not use the standard strparser")
---
 net/tls/tls.h      | 1 +
 net/tls/tls_strp.c | 6 ++++++
 net/tls/tls_sw.c   | 4 ++++
 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+)
net/tls/tls.h +1 -0
index fca0c0e170047..97eba6f6ab653 100644
@@ -186,6 +186,7 @@ int tls_strp_dev_init(void);
 void tls_strp_dev_exit(void);
 
 void tls_strp_done(struct tls_strparser *strp);
+void __tls_strp_done(struct tls_strparser *strp);
 void tls_strp_stop(struct tls_strparser *strp);
 int tls_strp_init(struct tls_strparser *strp, struct sock *sk);
 void tls_strp_data_ready(struct tls_strparser *strp);
net/tls/tls_strp.c +6 -0
index 98e12f0ff57e5..c72e883176273 100644
@@ -624,6 +624,12 @@ void tls_strp_done(struct tls_strparser *strp)
 	WARN_ON(!strp->stopped);
 
 	cancel_work_sync(&strp->work);
+	__tls_strp_done(strp);
+}
+
+/* For setup error paths where the strparser was initialized but never armed. */
+void __tls_strp_done(struct tls_strparser *strp)
+{
 	tls_strp_anchor_free(strp);
 }
 
net/tls/tls_sw.c +4 -0
index 36351942903b9..4550f15d052dc 100644
@@ -2591,8 +2591,12 @@ void tls_sw_free_ctx_rx(struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
 void tls_sw_free_resources_rx(struct sock *sk)
 {
 	struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+	struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx;
+
+	ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
 
 	tls_sw_release_resources_rx(sk);
+	__tls_strp_done(&ctx->strp);
 	tls_sw_free_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#607 lore raw

PATCH 592/666 sfc: fix error code in efx_devlink_info_running_versions()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 051ffb001b8a232cfa6e72f38bb5f51c4270a60b ]

Return -EIO if efx_mcdi_rpc() doesn't return enough space.

Fixes 14743ddd2495 ("sfc: add devlink info support for ef100")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/efx_devlink.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/efx_devlink.c +1 -1
index 3cd750820fdde..d5a4b3cf94544 100644
@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ static int efx_devlink_info_running_versions(struct efx_nic *efx,
 	if (rc || outlength < MC_CMD_GET_VERSION_OUT_LEN) {
 		netif_err(efx, drv, efx->net_dev,
 			  "mcdi MC_CMD_GET_VERSION failed\n");
-		return rc;
+		return rc ?: -EIO;
 	}
 
 	/* Handle previous output */
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#608 lore raw

PATCH 593/666 net/sched: cls_flower: revert unintended changes

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1e01abec856593e02cd69fd95b784c10dd46880c ]

While applying the blamed commit 4ca07b9239bd ("net: mctp i2c: check length before marking flow active"), I unintentionally included unrelated and unacceptable changes.

Revert them.

---
 net/sched/cls_flower.c | 4 +---
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/sched/cls_flower.c +1 -3
index f3af0ac892a86..099ff6a3e1f51 100644
@@ -560,7 +560,6 @@ static int __fl_delete(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct cls_fl_filter *f,
 		       struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
 {
 	struct cls_fl_head *head = fl_head_dereference(tp);
-	struct fl_flow_mask *mask;
 
 	*last = false;
 
@@ -577,12 +576,11 @@ static int __fl_delete(struct tcf_proto *tp, struct cls_fl_filter *f,
 	list_del_rcu(&f->list);
 	spin_unlock(&tp->lock);
 
-	mask = f->mask;
+	*last = fl_mask_put(head, f->mask);
 	if (!tc_skip_hw(f->flags))
 		fl_hw_destroy_filter(tp, f, rtnl_held, extack);
 	tcf_unbind_filter(tp, &f->res);
 	__fl_put(f);
-	*last = fl_mask_put(head, mask);
 
 	return 0;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#609 lore raw

PATCH 594/666 arm64: Reserve an extra page for early kernel mapping

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhaoyang Huang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4d8e74ad4585672489da6145b3328d415f50db82 ]

The final part of [data, end) segment may overflow into the next page of init_pg_end[1] which is the gap page before early_init_stack[2]:

[1]
crash_arm64_v9.0.1> vtop ffffffed00601000
VIRTUAL PHYSICAL
ffffffed00601000 83401000

PAGE DIRECTORY: ffffffecffd62000
PGD: ffffffecffd62da0 => 10000000833fb003
PMD: ffffff80033fb018 => 10000000833fe003
PTE: ffffff80033fe008 => 68000083401f03
PAGE: 83401000

     PTE        PHYSICAL  FLAGS
68000083401f03  83401000  (VALID|SHARED|AF|NG|PXN|UXN)

PAGE PHYSICAL MAPPING INDEX CNT FLAGS
fffffffec00d0040 83401000 0 0 1 4000 reserved

[2]
ffffffed002c8000 (r) __pi__data
ffffffed0054e000 (d) __pi___bss_start
ffffffed005f5000 (b) __pi_init_pg_dir
ffffffed005fe000 (b) __pi_init_pg_end
ffffffed005ff000 (B) early_init_stack
ffffffed00608000 (b) __pi__end

For 4K pages, the early kernel mapping may use 2MB block entries but the kernel segments are only 64KB aligned. Segment boundaries that fall within a 2MB block therefore require a PTE table so that different attributes can be applied on either side of the boundary.

KERNEL_SEGMENT_COUNT still correctly counts the five permanent kernel VMAs registered by declare_kernel_vmas(). However, since commit 5973a62efa34 ("arm64: map [_text, _stext) virtual address range non-executable+read-only"), the early mapper also maps [_text, _stext) separately from [_stext, _etext). This adds one more early-only split and can require one more page-table page than the existing EARLY_SEGMENT_EXTRA_PAGES allowance reserves.

Increase the 4K-page early mapping allowance by one page to cover that additional split.

Fixes 5973a62efa34 ("arm64: map [_text, _stext) virtual address range non-executable+read-only")
Assisted-by TRAE:GLM-5.1
[[email protected]: rewrote part of the commit log]
[[email protected]: expanded the code comment]
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kernel-pgtable.h | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/kernel-pgtable.h +6 -1
index bf05a77873a49..56fe12a6f7b0a 100644
@@ -69,7 +69,12 @@
 #define KERNEL_SEGMENT_COUNT	5
 
 #if SWAPPER_BLOCK_SIZE > SEGMENT_ALIGN
-#define EARLY_SEGMENT_EXTRA_PAGES (KERNEL_SEGMENT_COUNT + 1)
+/*
+ * KERNEL_SEGMENT_COUNT counts the permanent kernel VMAs. The early mapping
+ * has one additional split, [_text, _stext). Reserve one more page for the
+ * SWAPPER_BLOCK_SIZE-unaligned boundaries.
+ */
+#define EARLY_SEGMENT_EXTRA_PAGES (KERNEL_SEGMENT_COUNT + 2)
 /*
  * The initial ID map consists of the kernel image, mapped as two separate
  * segments, and may appear misaligned wrt the swapper block size. This means
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0