libbpf: harden parse_vma_segs() path parsing
PATCH v2 1/1 libbpf: harden parse_vma_segs() path parsing
parse_vma_segs() in tools/lib/bpf/usdt.c parses /proc/<pid>/maps with two widthless scansets, "%s" into mode[16] and "%[^\n]" into line[PATH_MAX]. Both assume the kernel caps maps records to PATH_MAX; it does not.
show_map_vma() emits the path via seq_path() against the seq buffer, which doubles on overflow (m->size <<= 1 in fs/seq_file.c), so a VMA whose backing path is a deeply nested directory tree produces a single maps record longer than PATH_MAX. scanf "%s" / "%[^\n]" without a width writes until the field terminator regardless of destination size, so a bpf_program__attach_usdt() consumer attaching against an attacker-controlled PID overflows its own stack inside parse_vma_segs().
Bound both scansets to the declared buffer sizes ("%15s" for mode[16] and "%4095[^\n]" for line[PATH_MAX]) and drain any residue past line[4094] with "%*[^\n]" before the trailing "\n", matching the libbpf-local fscanf style. Without the drain the residue of an over-long record would stay in the stream and break the next "%zx-%zx" parse, so the loop would exit early and any maps records after the over-long entry would be silently skipped.
Also stop using sscanf(..., "%s") to peel the /proc/<pid>/root prefix from lib_path. Build the exact prefix for the requested PID with snprintf(), check it directly, and copy the remainder with libbpf_strlcpy(). That removes a second unbounded stack write and preserves paths containing spaces.
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v2:
- Replace the unbounded /proc/<pid>/root sscanf() path peeling with snprintf() + prefix check + libbpf_strlcpy(), addressing review feedback on v1 and preserving paths containing spaces.
- Keep the v1 maps parser fix using bounded fscanf() scansets and a suppressed scanset drain for over-long records.
- Re-ran real parse_vma_segs() ASAN harnesses for the original maps overflow, the proc-root overflow, proc-root paths with spaces, and adjacent successful parses after an over-long maps record.
Reproduced with Debian 12 on rootless podman: an unprivileged container process mkdirs 50 nested 200-char directories and mmaps a file at the bottom, producing a 10403-byte /proc/<host-pid>/maps line. A harness on the host then calls the real parse_vma_segs() against the container's PID; libbpf is built with -fsanitize=address and the only local source change is dropping the "static" keyword on parse_vma_segs so the symbol is linkable from the harness.
Stock libbpf reports:
==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow WRITE of size 10349 at <line> thread T0
#0 scanf_common -> #1 __isoc99_fscanf
#3 parse_vma_segs tools/lib/bpf/usdt.c:509 Address ... in frame parse_vma_segs at offset 8512, just past line[PATH_MAX].
Patched libbpf parses the same maps cleanly. Follow-up calls return 0 with seg_cnt > 0 for libc.so.6 and for ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 (format drain), which appears in maps after the over-long entry.
On normal hardened builds the stack canary aborts the consumer; on builds without stack protector the bytes past line[] are attacker-influenced path bytes.
Selftest gate
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tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs -t usdt under QEMU x86_64 (KVM) on the patched kernel: all 6 subtests pass (usdt/basic, basic_optimized, optimized_attach, multispec, urand_auto_attach, urand_pid_attach) on both stock and patched libbpf, diff-clean. The in-tree selftest does not itself exercise long maps records.
tools/lib/bpf/usdt.c | 14 +++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
tools/lib/bpf/usdt.c +11 -3
@@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ static int parse_vma_segs(int pid, const char *lib_path, struct elf_seg **segs,char path[PATH_MAX ], line[PATH_MAX ], mode[16 ];size_t seg_start, seg_end, seg_off;struct elf_seg *seg; -int tmp_pid, i, err; +int n, i, err;FILE *f; *seg_cnt =0 ;
@@ -480,8 +480,13 @@ static int parse_vma_segs(int pid, const char *lib_path, struct elf_seg **segs,* /proc/<pid>/root/<path>. They will be reported as just /<path> in * /proc/<pid>/maps. */ -if (sscanf (lib_path,"/proc/%d/root%s" , &tmp_pid, path) ==2 && pid == tmp_pid) + n =snprintf (line,sizeof (line),"/proc/%d/root" , pid); +if (n <0 || n >= (int )sizeof (line)) +return -ENAMETOOLONG ; +if (str_has_pfx (lib_path, line) && lib_path[n] =='/' ) { +libbpf_strlcpy (path, lib_path + n,sizeof (path)); goto proceed; + }if (!realpath (lib_path, path)) { pr_warn("usdt: failed to get absolute path of '%s' (err %s), using path as is...\n",
@@ -504,8 +509,11 @@ static int parse_vma_segs(int pid, const char *lib_path, struct elf_seg **segs,* 7f5c6f5d1000-7f5c6f5d3000 rw-p 001c7000 08:04 21238613 /usr/lib64/libc-2.17.so * 7f5c6f5d3000-7f5c6f5d8000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 * 7f5c6f5d8000-7f5c6f5d9000 r-xp 00000000 103:01 362990598 /data/users/andriin/linux/tools/bpf/usdt/libhello_usdt.so +* +* Bound the writes and drain residue: maps lines can exceed +* PATH_MAX when seq_path() uses a larger seq buffer. */ -while (fscanf (f,"%zx-%zx %s %zx %*s %*d%[^\n]\n" , +while (fscanf (f,"%zx-%zx %15s %zx %*s %*d%4095[^\n]%*[^\n]\n" , &seg_start, &seg_end, mode, &seg_off, line) ==5 ) {void *tmp;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
[email protected]
AI reviewShould the Fixes: tag reference commit 74cc6311cec9 instead? The vulnerable unbounded scanf patterns in parse_vma_segs() (originally parse_lib_segs()) were present in the initial USDT implementation.
Quoted 29 lines
libbpf: harden
parse_vma_segs()path parsing
parse_vma_segs()intools/lib/bpf/usdt.cparses /proc/<pid>/maps with two widthless scansets, "%s" into mode[16] and "%[^\n]" into line[PATH_MAX]. Both assume the kernel caps maps records toPATH_MAX; it does not.
show_map_vma()emits the path viaseq_path()against the seq buffer, which doubles on overflow (m->size<<= 1 infs/seq_file.c), so a VMA whose backing path is a deeply nested directory tree produces a single maps record longer thanPATH_MAX. scanf "%s" / "%[^\n]" without a width writes until the field terminator regardless of destination size, so abpf_program__attach_usdt()consumer attaching against an attacker-controlled PID overflows its own stack insideparse_vma_segs().Bound both scansets to the declared buffer sizes ("%15s" for mode[16] and "%4095[^\n]" for line[PATH_MAX]) and drain any residue past line[4094] with "%*[^\n]" before the trailing "\n", matching the libbpf-local fscanf style. Without the drain the residue of an over-long record would stay in the stream and break the next "%zx-%zx" parse, so the loop would exit early and any maps records after the over-long entry would be silently skipped.
Also stop using
sscanf(..., "%s")to peel the /proc/<pid>/root prefix fromlib_path. Build the exact prefix for the requested PID withsnprintf(), check it directly, and copy the remainder withlibbpf_strlcpy(). That removes a second unbounded stack write and preserves paths containing spaces.
Quoted 4 lines
Fixes 3e6fe5ce4d486 ("libbpf: Fix internal USDT address translation logic for shared libraries")Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-7Signed-off-by Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>
Should the Fixes: tag reference commit 74cc6311cec9 instead? The vulnerable unbounded scanf patterns in parse_vma_segs() (originally parse_lib_segs()) were present in the initial USDT implementation.
Commit 3e6fe5ce4d486 renamed the function and refactored address translation logic without introducing the vulnerability. The original implementation in 74cc6311cec9 ("libbpf: Add USDT notes parsing and resolution logic") already contained the unbounded "%s" and "%[^\n]" format specifiers.
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AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md
CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/26261732702