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mm/migrate: find_mm_struct: fix race between security checks and suid exec

PATCH Applied Oleg Nesterov 3 participants 6 messages May 26 – May 27

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 mm/migrate: find_mm_struct: fix race between security checks and suid exec

The target task can execute a setuid binary between ptrace_may_access() and get_task_mm(). Protect this critical section with exec_update_lock.

I don't think cpuset_mems_allowed(task) should be called under exec_update_lock, but this patch just tries to add the minimal fix.

Perhaps we can later add a common helper which can be used by find_mm_struct() and kernel_migrate_pages().

---
 mm/migrate.c | 13 +++++++++----
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
mm/migrate.c +9 -4
index 8a64291ab5b4..e4cf664fb161 100644
@@ -2557,24 +2557,29 @@ static struct mm_struct *find_mm_struct(pid_t pid, nodemask_t *mem_nodes)
 	}
 
 	task = find_get_task_by_vpid(pid);
-	if (!task) {
+	if (!task)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ESRCH);
-	}
 
+	if (down_read_killable(&task->signal->exec_update_lock)) {
+		mm = ERR_PTR(-EINTR);
+		goto out;
+	}
 	/*
 	 * Check if this process has the right to modify the specified
 	 * process. Use the regular "ptrace_may_access()" checks.
 	 */
 	if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) {
 		mm = ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
-		goto out;
+		goto unlock;
 	}
 
 	mm = ERR_PTR(security_task_movememory(task));
 	if (IS_ERR(mm))
-		goto out;
+		goto unlock;
 	*mem_nodes = cpuset_mems_allowed(task);
 	mm = get_task_mm(task);
+unlock:
+	up_read(&task->signal->exec_update_lock);
 out:
 	put_task_struct(task);
 	if (!mm)
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
maintainer
#1 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · On Tue, 26 May 2026 16:42:11 +0200 Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]> wrote:

The target task can execute a setuid binary between ptrace_may_access() and get_task_mm(). Protect this critical section with exec_update_lock.

I don't think cpuset_mems_allowed(task) should be called under exec_update_lock, but this patch just tries to add the minimal fix.

Perhaps we can later add a common helper which can be used by find_mm_struct() and kernel_migrate_pages().

Thanks. Sashiko thinks we should fix kernel_migrate_pages() also:
https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]

#2 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 6 lines · On Tue, 26 May 2026 16:42:11 +0200 Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]> wrote:

The target task can execute a setuid binary between ptrace_may_access() and get_task_mm(). Protect this critical section with exec_update_lock.

I don't think cpuset_mems_allowed(task) should be called under exec_update_lock, but this patch just tries to add the minimal fix.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Perhaps we can later add a common helper which can be used by find_mm_struct() and kernel_migrate_pages().

Thanks. Sashiko thinks we should fix kernel_migrate_pages() also:
https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]

Of course ;) That is why I have already sent

[PATCH 0/4] mm/mempolicy: kernel_migrate_pages: fix race between security checks and suid exec
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

and mentioned this in 0/4.

Sashiko has concern about 3/4 in the series above.

I personally do not think this is a problem... Without hidepid != 0 /proc/pid/status reports the same "info leak".

But may be I am wrong. Still waiting for review from maintainers.

Oleg.

maintainer
#3 lore raw
In reply to Oleg Nesterov
Quoted 9 lines · On Tue, 26 May 2026 16:42:11 +0200 Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]> wrote:

The target task can execute a setuid binary between ptrace_may_access() and get_task_mm(). Protect this critical section with exec_update_lock.

I don't think cpuset_mems_allowed(task) should be called under exec_update_lock, but this patch just tries to add the minimal fix.

Perhaps we can later add a common helper which can be used by find_mm_struct() and kernel_migrate_pages().

Do you think we should backport this into earlier kernels?

#4 lore raw
Quoted 6 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 3 lines · On Tue, 26 May 2026 16:42:11 +0200 Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]> wrote:

The target task can execute a setuid binary between ptrace_may_access() and get_task_mm(). Protect this critical section with exec_update_lock.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines

I don't think cpuset_mems_allowed(task) should be called under exec_update_lock, but this patch just tries to add the minimal fix.

Perhaps we can later add a common helper which can be used by find_mm_struct() and kernel_migrate_pages().

Do you think we should backport this into earlier kernels?

Probably not... The race is very unlikely and iiuc the impact is not serious...

Up to maintainers.

Oleg.

reviewer Reviewed-by on v1 1/1
#5 lore raw
In reply to Oleg Nesterov
Quoted 6 lines · Oleg Nesterov

The target task can execute a setuid binary between ptrace_may_access() and get_task_mm(). Protect this critical section with exec_update_lock.

I don't think cpuset_mems_allowed(task) should be called under exec_update_lock, but this patch just tries to add the minimal fix.

Claude suggests this is at least safe and the correct ordering, for which there already exists code that does the same thing:

This ordering already exists in the exec path itself: exec_mmap() write-locks exec_update_lock, and subsequent memory allocations during exec can reach callback_lock through the page allocator's cpuset checks (cpuset_zone_allowed etc.).

This is inline with my experience hacking on page_alloc.c and cgroups, the callback lock is always the inner-most lock - so lgtm.

Quoted 4 lines

Perhaps we can later add a common helper which can be used by find_mm_struct() and kernel_migrate_pages().

~Gregory