Skip to contentSkip to conversation

HID: core: Mitigate potential OOB by removing bogus memset()

PATCH New Wenshan Lan 1 participant 1 message Jun 3 Stable branch

lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 HID: core: Mitigate potential OOB by removing bogus memset()

From: Lee Jones <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0a3fe972a7cb1404f693d6f1711f32bc1d244b1c ]

The memset() in hid_report_raw_event() has the good intention of clearing out bogus data by zeroing the area from the end of the incoming data string to the assumed end of the buffer. However, as we have previously seen, doing so can easily result in OOB reads and writes in the subsequent thread of execution.

The current suggestion from one of the HID maintainers is to remove the memset() and simply return if the incoming event buffer size is not large enough to fill the associated report.

Suggested-by Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]>

[bentiss: changed the return value]
[ Replace hid_warn_ratelimited() with hid_warn() in v6.6. ]
---
 drivers/hid/hid-core.c | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/hid/hid-core.c +4 -3
index e3d728d67b53..1f32aa933c9e 100644
@@ -2017,9 +2017,10 @@ int hid_report_raw_event(struct hid_device *hid, enum hid_report_type type, u8 *
 		rsize = max_buffer_size;
 
 	if (csize < rsize) {
-		dbg_hid("report %d is too short, (%d < %d)\n", report->id,
-				csize, rsize);
-		memset(cdata + csize, 0, rsize - csize);
+		hid_warn(hid, "Event data for report %d was too short (%d vs %d)\n",
+			 report->id, rsize, csize);
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
 	}
 
 	if ((hid->claimed & HID_CLAIMED_HIDDEV) && hid->hiddev_report_event)
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0