HID: uhid: convert to hid_safe_input_report()
Subsystems (3)
PATCH 1/1 HID: uhid: convert to hid_safe_input_report()
Commit 0a3fe972a7cb ("HID: core: Mitigate potential OOB by removing bogus memset()"), added a check in hid_report_raw_event() to reject reports if the received data size is smaller than expected. This was intended to prevent OOB errors by no longer allowing zeroing-out of shorter reports due to the lack of buffer size information.
However, this leads to regressions in hid_report_raw_event(), where shorter than expected reports are rejected, even though their buffers are sufficiently large to be zero-padded.
To solve this issue, Benjamin introduced a safer alternative in commit 206342541fc8 ("HID: core: introduce hid_safe_input_report()"), which forwards the buffer size and allows hid_report_raw_event() to safely zero-pad the data.
Convert uhid to use hid_safe_input_report() and pass UHID_DATA_MAX as the buffer size. This prevents the reported regressions [1], allowing hid core to zero-pad the shorter reports safely as expected.
--- drivers/hid/uhid.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/hid/uhid.c +4 -4
@@ -595,8 +595,8 @@ static int uhid_dev_input(struct uhid_device *uhid, struct uhid_event *ev)if (!READ_ONCE (uhid->running))return -EINVAL ; -hid_input_report (uhid->hid,HID_INPUT_REPORT , ev->u.input.data, -min_t (size_t, ev->u.input.size,UHID_DATA_MAX ),0 ); +hid_safe_input_report (uhid->hid,HID_INPUT_REPORT , ev->u.input.data,UHID_DATA_MAX , +min_t (size_t, ev->u.input.size,UHID_DATA_MAX ),0 );return 0 ; }
@@ -606,8 +606,8 @@ static int uhid_dev_input2(struct uhid_device *uhid, struct uhid_event *ev)if (!READ_ONCE (uhid->running))return -EINVAL ; -hid_input_report (uhid->hid,HID_INPUT_REPORT , ev->u.input2.data, -min_t (size_t, ev->u.input2.size,UHID_DATA_MAX ),0 ); +hid_safe_input_report (uhid->hid,HID_INPUT_REPORT , ev->u.input2.data,UHID_DATA_MAX , +min_t (size_t, ev->u.input2.size,UHID_DATA_MAX ),0 );return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0.1032.g2f8565e1d1-goog
[email protected]
AI reviewThank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [Critical] In dispatch_hid_bpf_device_event(), there is no bounds check before copying *size bytes into hdev->bpf.device_data, leading to an out-of-bounds write if the injected report size exceeds the BPF allocated memory. --
commit c570c0c551ca1ea46eb86fb2144c1ad379f64069
Author: Carlos Llamas <[email protected]>
HID: uhid: convert to hid_safe_input_report()
This commit converts uhid to use hid_safe_input_report() and passes UHID_DATA_MAX as the buffer size. This allows hid core to safely zero-pad shorter reports instead of rejecting them, preventing regressions caused by the earlier bogus memset() removal.
drivers/hid/uhid.c static int uhid_dev_input(struct uhid_device *uhid, struct uhid_event *ev) · line 599
Quoted 12 lines
drivers/hid/uhid.c +2
-2@@ -595,8 +595,8 @@ static int uhid_dev_input(struct uhid_device *uhid, struct uhid_event *ev)if (!READ_ONCE (uhid->running))return -EINVAL ; -hid_input_report (uhid->hid,HID_INPUT_REPORT , ev->u.input.data, -min_t (size_t, ev->u.input.size,UHID_DATA_MAX ),0 ); +hid_safe_input_report (uhid->hid,HID_INPUT_REPORT , ev->u.input.data,UHID_DATA_MAX , +min_t (size_t, ev->u.input.size,UHID_DATA_MAX ),0 );
[Severity: Critical]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does forwarding this report size without constraining it to the device's max_report_len cause a buffer overflow in HID BPF?
In uhid_dev_input(), we allow userspace to inject input reports up to UHID_DATA_MAX (4096 bytes) regardless of the device's parsed max_report_len.
When a HID-BPF program is attached to the device, hdev->bpf.device_data is allocated based on the device's max_report_len, which could be much smaller.
Later, in drivers/hid/bpf/hid_bpf_dispatch.c:dispatch_hid_bpf_device_event(), it executes:
memset(ctx_kern.data, 0, hdev->bpf.allocated_data); memcpy(ctx_kern.data, data, *size);
Since there is no bounds check on *size before the memcpy(), could a malicious uhid client injecting a large report size cause a heap buffer overflow when copying into the smaller BPF allocated memory?
[ ... ]
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
Quoted 15 lines · Carlos Llamas
Commit
0a3fe972a7cb("HID: core: Mitigate potential OOB by removing bogusmemset()"), added a check inhid_report_raw_event()to reject reports if the received data size is smaller than expected. This was intended to prevent OOB errors by no longer allowing zeroing-out of shorter reports due to the lack of buffer size information.However, this leads to regressions in
hid_report_raw_event(), where shorter than expected reports are rejected, even though their buffers are sufficiently large to be zero-padded.To solve this issue, Benjamin introduced a safer alternative in commit
206342541fc8("HID: core: introducehid_safe_input_report()"), which forwards the buffer size and allowshid_report_raw_event()to safely zero-pad the data.
Quoted 8 lines
Convert uhid to use
hid_safe_input_report()and passUHID_DATA_MAXas the buffer size. This prevents the reported regressions [1], allowing hid core to zero-pad the shorter reports safely as expected.Fixes 0a3fe972a7cb ("HID: core: Mitigate potential OOB by removing bogus memset()")Signed-off-by Carlos Llamas <[email protected]>
Quoted 33 lines
--- drivers/hid/uhid.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)drivers/hid/uhid.c +4
-4@@ -595,8 +595,8 @@ static int uhid_dev_input(struct uhid_device *uhid, struct uhid_event *ev)if (!READ_ONCE (uhid->running))return -EINVAL ; -hid_input_report (uhid->hid,HID_INPUT_REPORT , ev->u.input.data, -min_t (size_t, ev->u.input.size,UHID_DATA_MAX ),0 ); +hid_safe_input_report (uhid->hid,HID_INPUT_REPORT , ev->u.input.data,UHID_DATA_MAX , +min_t (size_t, ev->u.input.size,UHID_DATA_MAX ),0 );return 0 ; }@@ -606,8 +606,8 @@ static int uhid_dev_input2(struct uhid_device *uhid, struct uhid_event *ev)if (!READ_ONCE (uhid->running))return -EINVAL ; -hid_input_report (uhid->hid,HID_INPUT_REPORT , ev->u.input2.data, -min_t (size_t, ev->u.input2.size,UHID_DATA_MAX ),0 ); +hid_safe_input_report (uhid->hid,HID_INPUT_REPORT , ev->u.input2.data,UHID_DATA_MAX , +min_t (size_t, ev->u.input2.size,UHID_DATA_MAX ),0 );return 0 ; }Signature · 1 line
2.54.0.1032.g2f8565e1d1-goog
Signature · 1 line
Lee Jones
Quoted 15 lines · Carlos Llamas
Commit
0a3fe972a7cb("HID: core: Mitigate potential OOB by removing bogusmemset()"), added a check inhid_report_raw_event()to reject reports if the received data size is smaller than expected. This was intended to prevent OOB errors by no longer allowing zeroing-out of shorter reports due to the lack of buffer size information.However, this leads to regressions in
hid_report_raw_event(), where shorter than expected reports are rejected, even though their buffers are sufficiently large to be zero-padded.To solve this issue, Benjamin introduced a safer alternative in commit
206342541fc8("HID: core: introducehid_safe_input_report()"), which forwards the buffer size and allowshid_report_raw_event()to safely zero-pad the data.
Quoted 8 lines
Convert uhid to use
hid_safe_input_report()and passUHID_DATA_MAXas the buffer size. This prevents the reported regressions [1], allowing hid core to zero-pad the shorter reports safely as expected.Fixes 0a3fe972a7cb ("HID: core: Mitigate potential OOB by removing bogus memset()")Signed-off-by Carlos Llamas <[email protected]>
Applied, thanks.
Signature · 2 lines
Jiri Kosina SUSE Labs