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6.18.35-rc1 review

PATCH In review Greg Kroah-Hartman 18 participants 648 messages Jun 7 – Jun 21 Page 2 of 5

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author maintainer
#131 lore raw

PATCH 130/315 Bluetooth: HIDP: fix missing length checks in hidp_input_report()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Muhammad Bilal <[email protected]>

commit 2a3ac9ee11dbb9845f3947cef4a79dba658cf6f6 upstream.

hidp_input_report() reads keyboard and mouse payload data from an skb without first verifying that skb->len contains enough data.

hidp_recv_intr_frame() pulls the 1-byte HIDP header before dispatching to hidp_input_report(). If a paired device sends a truncated packet, the handler reads beyond the valid skb data, resulting in an out-of-bounds read of skb data. The OOB bytes may be interpreted as phantom key presses or spurious mouse movement.

Replace the open-coded length tracking and pointer arithmetic with skb_pull_data() calls. skb_pull_data() returns NULL if the requested bytes are not present, eliminating the need for a manual size variable and the separate skb->len guard.

---
 net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c |   23 ++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c +18 -5
@@ -179,12 +179,21 @@ static void hidp_input_report(struct hid
 {
 	struct input_dev *dev = session->input;
 	unsigned char *keys = session->keys;
-	unsigned char *udata = skb->data + 1;
-	signed char *sdata = skb->data + 1;
-	int i, size = skb->len - 1;
+	unsigned char *udata;
+	signed char *sdata;
+	u8 *hdr;
+	int i;
+
+	hdr = skb_pull_data(skb, 1);
+	if (!hdr)
+		return;
 
-	switch (skb->data[0]) {
+	switch (*hdr) {
 	case 0x01:	/* Keyboard report */
+		udata = skb_pull_data(skb, 8);
+		if (!udata)
+			break;
+
 		for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
 			input_report_key(dev, hidp_keycode[i + 224], (udata[0] >> i) & 1);
 
@@ -213,6 +222,10 @@ static void hidp_input_report(struct hid
 		break;
 
 	case 0x02:	/* Mouse report */
+		sdata = skb_pull_data(skb, 3);
+		if (!sdata)
+			break;
+
 		input_report_key(dev, BTN_LEFT,   sdata[0] & 0x01);
 		input_report_key(dev, BTN_RIGHT,  sdata[0] & 0x02);
 		input_report_key(dev, BTN_MIDDLE, sdata[0] & 0x04);
@@ -222,7 +235,7 @@ static void hidp_input_report(struct hid
 		input_report_rel(dev, REL_X, sdata[1]);
 		input_report_rel(dev, REL_Y, sdata[2]);
 
-		if (size > 3)
+		if (skb->len > 0)
 			input_report_rel(dev, REL_WHEEL, sdata[3]);
 		break;
 	}
author maintainer
#132 lore raw

PATCH 131/315 Bluetooth: ISO: fix UAF in iso_recv_frame

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Muhammad Bilal <[email protected]>

commit 47f23a259517abbdb8032c057a1e8a6bf3734878 upstream.

iso_recv_frame reads conn->sk under iso_conn_lock but releases the lock before using sk, with no reference held. A concurrent iso_sock_kill() can free sk in that window, causing use-after-free on sk->sk_state and sock_queue_rcv_skb().

Fix by replacing the bare pointer read with iso_sock_hold(conn), which calls sock_hold() while the spinlock is held, atomically elevating the refcount before the lock drops. Add a drop_put label so sock_put() is called on all exit paths where the hold succeeded.

Fixes ccf74f2390d60a2f9a75ef496d2564abb478f46a ("Bluetooth: Add BTPROTO_ISO socket type")
---
 net/bluetooth/iso.c |   10 +++++++---
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/iso.c +7 -3
@@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ static void iso_recv_frame(struct iso_co
 	struct sock *sk;
 
 	iso_conn_lock(conn);
-	sk = conn->sk;
+	sk = iso_sock_hold(conn);
 	iso_conn_unlock(conn);
 
 	if (!sk)
@@ -580,11 +580,15 @@ static void iso_recv_frame(struct iso_co
 	BT_DBG("sk %p len %d", sk, skb->len);
 
 	if (sk->sk_state != BT_CONNECTED)
-		goto drop;
+		goto drop_put;
 
-	if (!sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb))
+	if (!sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb)) {
+		sock_put(sk);
 		return;
+	}
 
+drop_put:
+	sock_put(sk);
 drop:
 	kfree_skb(skb);
 }
author maintainer
#133 lore raw

PATCH 132/315 Bluetooth: ISO: serialize iso_sock_clear_timer with socket lock

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Muhammad Bilal <[email protected]>

commit 4b5f8e608749b7e8fa386c6e4301cf9272595859 upstream.

iso_sock_close() calls iso_sock_clear_timer() before acquiring lock_sock(sk).

iso_sock_clear_timer() reads iso_pi(sk)->conn twice without the socket lock held:

    if (!iso_pi(sk)->conn)
        return;
    cancel_delayed_work(&iso_pi(sk)->conn->timeout_work);

Concurrently, iso_conn_del() executes under lock_sock(sk) and calls iso_chan_del(), which sets iso_pi(sk)->conn to NULL and may result in the final reference to the connection being dropped:

    CPU0                         CPU1
    ----                         ----
    iso_sock_clear_timer()
      if (conn != NULL) ...      lock_sock(sk)
                                   iso_chan_del()
                                   iso_pi(sk)->conn = NULL
      cancel_delayed_work(conn)  /* NULL deref or UAF */

iso_pi(sk)->conn is not stable across the unlock window, causing a NULL pointer dereference or use-after-free.

Serialize iso_sock_clear_timer() with the socket lock by moving it inside lock_sock()/release_sock(), matching the pattern used in iso_conn_del() and all other call sites.

Fixes ccf74f2390d60a2f9a75ef496d2564abb478f46a ("Bluetooth: Add BTPROTO_ISO socket type")
---
 net/bluetooth/iso.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/bluetooth/iso.c +1 -1
@@ -854,8 +854,8 @@ static void __iso_sock_close(struct sock
 /* Must be called on unlocked socket. */
 static void iso_sock_close(struct sock *sk)
 {
-	iso_sock_clear_timer(sk);
 	lock_sock(sk);
+	iso_sock_clear_timer(sk);
 	__iso_sock_close(sk);
 	release_sock(sk);
 	iso_sock_kill(sk);
author maintainer
#134 lore raw

PATCH 133/315 Bluetooth: hci_conn: Fix memory leak in hci_le_big_terminate()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Pavitra Jha <[email protected]>

commit bfa9d28960ed677d556bdf097073bc3129686229 upstream.

hci_le_big_terminate() allocates iso_list_data via kzalloc_obj but returns 0 without freeing it when neither pa_sync_term nor big_sync_term flags are set after evaluating the PA and BIG sync connection state.

This early-return path was introduced when hci_le_big_terminate() was refactored to take struct hci_conn instead of raw u8 parameters, adding PA/BIG flag evaluation logic. The existing kfree() on hci_cmd_sync_queue failure does not cover this path.

Fixes a7bcffc673de ("Bluetooth: Add PA_LINK to distinguish BIG sync and PA sync connections")
---
 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c +3 -1
@@ -803,8 +803,10 @@ static int hci_le_big_terminate(struct h
 			d->big_sync_term = true;
 	}
 
-	if (!d->pa_sync_term && !d->big_sync_term)
+	if (!d->pa_sync_term && !d->big_sync_term) {
+		kfree(d);
 		return 0;
+	}
 
 	ret = hci_cmd_sync_queue(hdev, big_terminate_sync, d,
 				 terminate_big_destroy);
author maintainer
#135 lore raw

PATCH 134/315 Bluetooth: hci_qca: Use 100 ms SSR delay for rampatch and NVM loading

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shuai Zhang <[email protected]>

commit fa21e86caba2347e89eb65af926205a36a097c53 upstream.

When bt_en is pulled high by hardware, the host does not re-download the firmware after SSR. The controller loads the rampatch and NVM internally.

On HMT chip, the rampatch is ~264 KB and the NVM is ~9.4 KB. The loading process takes approximately 70 ms. The previous 50 ms delay is too short, causing the controller to not respond to the reset command sent by the host, which leads to BT initialization failure:

Bluetooth: hci0: QCA memdump Done, received 458752, total 458752
Bluetooth: hci0: mem_dump_status: 2
Bluetooth: hci0: Opcode 0x0c03 failed: -110

Increase the delay to 100 ms, which was confirmed as a safe value by the controller, to ensure the controller has finished loading the firmware before the host sends commands.

Steps to reproduce:
1. Trigger SSR and wait for SSR to complete:
hcitool cmd 0x3f 0c 26
2. Run "bluetoothctl power on" and observe that BT fails to start.

Fixes fce1a9244a0f ("Bluetooth: hci_qca: Fix SSR (SubSystem Restart) fail when BT_EN is pulled up by hw")
---
 drivers/bluetooth/hci_qca.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/bluetooth/hci_qca.c +2 -2
@@ -1676,8 +1676,8 @@ static void qca_hw_error(struct hci_dev
 		mod_timer(&qca->tx_idle_timer, jiffies +
 				  msecs_to_jiffies(qca->tx_idle_delay));
 
-		/* Controller reset completion time is 50ms */
-		msleep(50);
+		/* Wait for the controller to load the rampatch and NVM. */
+		msleep(100);
 
 		clear_bit(QCA_SSR_TRIGGERED, &qca->flags);
 		clear_bit(QCA_IBS_DISABLED, &qca->flags);
author maintainer
#136 lore raw

PATCH 135/315 Bluetooth: hci_sync: fix UAF in hci_le_create_cis_sync

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Doruk Tan Ozturk <[email protected]>

commit bfea6091e0fffb270c20e74384b660910277eb6c upstream.

hci_le_create_cis_sync() dereferences conn->conn_timeout after releasing both rcu_read_lock() and hci_dev_lock(hdev). The conn pointer was obtained from an RCU-protected iteration over hdev->conn_hash.list and is not valid once these locks are dropped. A concurrent disconnect can free the hci_conn between the unlock and the dereference, causing a use-after-free read.

The cancellation mechanism in hci_conn_del() cannot prevent this because hci_le_create_cis_pending() queues hci_create_cis_sync with data=NULL:

    hci_cmd_sync_queue(hdev, hci_create_cis_sync, NULL, NULL);

While hci_conn_del() dequeues with data=conn:

    hci_cmd_sync_dequeue(hdev, NULL, conn, NULL);

Since NULL != conn, the lookup in _hci_cmd_sync_lookup_entry() never matches, and the pending work item is not cancelled.

Fix this by saving conn->conn_timeout into a local variable while the locks are still held, so the stale conn pointer is never dereferenced after unlock.

This is the same class of bug as the one fixed by commit 035c25007c9e ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix UAF on le_read_features_complete") which addressed the identical pattern in a different function.

This vulnerability was identified using 0sec.ai, an open-source automated security auditing platform (https://github.com/0sec-labs).

Fixes c09b80be6ffc ("Bluetooth: hci_conn: Fix not waiting for HCI_EVT_LE_CIS_ESTABLISHED")
---
 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c +3 -1
@@ -6656,6 +6656,7 @@ int hci_le_create_cis_sync(struct hci_de
 	DEFINE_FLEX(struct hci_cp_le_create_cis, cmd, cis, num_cis, 0x1f);
 	size_t aux_num_cis = 0;
 	struct hci_conn *conn;
+	u16 timeout = 0;
 	u8 cig = BT_ISO_QOS_CIG_UNSET;
 
 	/* The spec allows only one pending LE Create CIS command at a time. If
@@ -6726,6 +6727,7 @@ int hci_le_create_cis_sync(struct hci_de
 		set_bit(HCI_CONN_CREATE_CIS, &conn->flags);
 		cis->acl_handle = cpu_to_le16(conn->parent->handle);
 		cis->cis_handle = cpu_to_le16(conn->handle);
+		timeout = conn->conn_timeout;
 		aux_num_cis++;
 
 		if (aux_num_cis >= cmd->num_cis)
@@ -6745,7 +6747,7 @@ done:
 	return __hci_cmd_sync_status_sk(hdev, HCI_OP_LE_CREATE_CIS,
 					struct_size(cmd, cis, cmd->num_cis),
 					cmd, HCI_EVT_LE_CIS_ESTABLISHED,
-					conn->conn_timeout, NULL);
+					timeout, NULL);
 }
 
 int hci_le_remove_cig_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 handle)
author maintainer
#137 lore raw

PATCH 136/315 Input: xpad - fix out-of-bounds access for Share button

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>

commit 6cdc46b38cf146ce81d4831b6472dbf7731849a2 upstream.

xpadone_process_packet() receives len directly from urb->actual_length and uses it to index the share-button byte at data[len - 18] or data[len - 26]. Since both len and data[0] are under the device's control, a broken controller can send a GIP_CMD_INPUT packet with actual_length < 18 (e.g. 5 bytes) and reach this code path, causing accesses beyond the actual array.

Fix this by calculating the offset and checking bounds against the packet length.

Fixes 4ef46367073b ("Input: xpad - fix Share button on Xbox One controllers")
---
 drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c +4 -4
@@ -1110,10 +1110,10 @@ static void xpadone_process_packet(struc
 		input_report_key(dev, BTN_START,  data[4] & BIT(2));
 		input_report_key(dev, BTN_SELECT, data[4] & BIT(3));
 		if (xpad->mapping & MAP_SHARE_BUTTON) {
-			if (xpad->mapping & MAP_SHARE_OFFSET)
-				input_report_key(dev, KEY_RECORD, data[len - 26] & BIT(0));
-			else
-				input_report_key(dev, KEY_RECORD, data[len - 18] & BIT(0));
+			u32 offset = (xpad->mapping & MAP_SHARE_OFFSET) ? 26 : 18;
+
+			if (len >= offset)
+				input_report_key(dev, KEY_RECORD, data[len - offset] & BIT(0));
 		}
 
 		/* buttons A,B,X,Y */
author maintainer
#138 lore raw

PATCH 137/315 parport: Fix race between port and client registration

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>

commit ef15ccbb3e8640a723c42ad90eaf81d66ae02017 upstream.

The parport subsystem registers port devices before they are fully initialised, resulting in a race condition where client drivers such as lp can attach to ports that are not completely initialised or even being torn down.

When the port and client drivers are built as modules and loaded around the same time during boot, this occasionally results in a crash. I was able to make this happen reliably in a VM with a PC-style parallel port by patching parport_pc to fail probing:

drivers/parport/parport_pc.c static struct parport *__parport_pc_probe_port(unsigned long int base, · line 2075

Quoted 11 lines
drivers/parport/parport_pc.c +1 -1
@@ -2069,7 +2069,7 @@ static struct parport *__parport_pc_probe_port(unsigned long int base,
 	if (!p)
 		goto out3;
 
-	base_res = request_region(base, 3, p->name);
+	base_res = NULL;
 	if (!base_res)
 		goto out4;
 

and then running:

while true; do
modprobe lp & modprobe parport_pc
wait
rmmod lp parport_pc
done

for a few seconds.

In the long term I think port registration should be changed to put the call to device_add() inside parport_announce_port(), but since the latter currently cannot fail this will require changing all port drivers.

For now, add a flag to indicate whether a port has been "announced" and only try to attach client drivers to ports when the flag is set.

---
 drivers/parport/share.c |   11 +++++++++--
 include/linux/parport.h |    1 +
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/parport/share.c +9 -2
@@ -214,10 +214,14 @@ static void get_lowlevel_driver(void)
 static int port_check(struct device *dev, void *dev_drv)
 {
 	struct parport_driver *drv = dev_drv;
+	struct parport *port;
 
 	/* only send ports, do not send other devices connected to bus */
-	if (is_parport(dev))
-		drv->match_port(to_parport_dev(dev));
+	if (is_parport(dev)) {
+		port = to_parport_dev(dev);
+		if (test_bit(PARPORT_ANNOUNCED, &port->devflags))
+			drv->match_port(port);
+	}
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -532,6 +536,7 @@ void parport_announce_port(struct parpor
 		if (slave)
 			attach_driver_chain(slave);
 	}
+	set_bit(PARPORT_ANNOUNCED, &port->devflags);
 	mutex_unlock(&registration_lock);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(parport_announce_port);
@@ -561,6 +566,8 @@ void parport_remove_port(struct parport
 
 	mutex_lock(&registration_lock);
 
+	clear_bit(PARPORT_ANNOUNCED, &port->devflags);
+
 	/* Spread the word. */
 	detach_driver_chain(port);
 
include/linux/parport.h +1 -0
@@ -240,6 +240,7 @@ struct parport {
 
 	unsigned long devflags;
 #define PARPORT_DEVPROC_REGISTERED	0
+#define PARPORT_ANNOUNCED		1
 	struct pardevice *proc_device;	/* Currently register proc device */
 
 	struct list_head full_list;
author maintainer
#139 lore raw

PATCH 138/315 rust_binder: Avoid holding lock when dropping delivered_death

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Matthew Maurer <[email protected]>

commit f6d8fea9e3953151a4adb4f603503dc3dc9c69da upstream.

In 6c37bebd8c926, we switched to looping over the list and dropping each individual node, ostensibly without the lock held in the loop body.

If the kernel were using Rust Edition 2024, the comment would be accurate, and the lock would not be held across the drop. However, the kernel is currently using 2021, so tail expression lifetime extension results in the lock being held across the drop. Explicitly binding the expression result to a variable makes the lockguard no longer part of a tail expression, causing the lock to be dropped before entering the loop body.

This was detected via CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING identifying an invalid wait context at the drop site.

---
 drivers/android/binder/process.rs |    7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/android/binder/process.rs +6 -1
@@ -1366,7 +1366,12 @@ impl Process {
         // Clear delivered_deaths list.
         //
         // Scope ensures that MutexGuard is dropped while executing the body.
-        while let Some(delivered_death) = { self.inner.lock().delivered_deaths.pop_front() } {
+        while let Some(delivered_death) = {
+            // Explicitly bind to avoid tail expression lifetime extension of the lockguard
+            // Can be removed when the kernel moves to edition 2024
+            let maybe_death = self.inner.lock().delivered_deaths.pop_front();
+            maybe_death
+        } {
             drop(delivered_death);
         }
 
author maintainer
#140 lore raw

PATCH 139/315 rust_binder: avoid calling pending_oneway_finished() on TF_UPDATE_TXN

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alice Ryhl <[email protected]>

commit 4c19719eb8b8df08c5bec7c499f73ddaea6f09fc upstream.

When an outdated transaction is removed from oneway_todo due to TF_UPDATE_TXN, its Allocation is dropped. The current implementation of Allocation::drop calls pending_oneway_finished(), assuming the transaction was executed. This leads to premature execution of the next queued one-way transaction.

Fix this by taking the oneway_node from the Allocation of the outdated transaction before it is dropped. This prevents Allocation::drop from signaling completion.

We do not call take_oneway_node() from Transaction::cancel because it's actually correct to call pending_oneway_finished() on cancel if the transaction did not come from oneway_todo. This ensures that if BINDER_THREAD_EXIT is invoked and cancels a oneway transaction, then the next transaction is taken from oneway_todo.

This bug does not lead to any issues in the kernel, but may lead to Binder delivering transactions to userspace earlier than userspace expected to receive them.

Cc stable <[email protected]>
Fixes eafedbc7c050 ("rust_binder: add Rust Binder driver")
Assisted-by Antigravity:gemini
---
 drivers/android/binder/allocation.rs  |    8 ++++++++
 drivers/android/binder/transaction.rs |   11 ++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/android/binder/allocation.rs +8 -0
@@ -160,6 +160,14 @@ impl Allocation {
         self.get_or_init_info().target_node = Some(target_node);
     }
 
+    pub(crate) fn take_oneway_node(&mut self) -> Option<DArc<Node>> {
+        if let Some(info) = self.allocation_info.as_mut() {
+            info.oneway_node.take()
+        } else {
+            None
+        }
+    }
+
     /// Reserve enough space to push at least `num_fds` fds.
     pub(crate) fn info_add_fd_reserve(&mut self, num_fds: usize) -> Result {
         self.get_or_init_info()
drivers/android/binder/transaction.rs +10 -1
@@ -239,7 +239,8 @@ impl Transaction {
     /// Not used for replies.
     pub(crate) fn submit(self: DLArc<Self>) -> BinderResult {
         // Defined before `process_inner` so that the destructor runs after releasing the lock.
-        let mut _t_outdated;
+        let _t_outdated;
+        let _oneway_node;
 
         let oneway = self.flags & TF_ONE_WAY != 0;
         let process = self.to.clone();
@@ -255,6 +256,14 @@ impl Transaction {
                         if let Some(t_outdated) =
                             target_node.take_outdated_transaction(&self, &mut process_inner)
                         {
+                            let mut alloc_guard = t_outdated.allocation.lock();
+                            if let Some(alloc) = (*alloc_guard).as_mut() {
+                                // Take the oneway node to prevent `Allocation::drop` from calling
+                                // `pending_oneway_finished()`, which would be incorrect as this
+                                // transaction is not being submitted.
+                                _oneway_node = alloc.take_oneway_node();
+                            }
+                            drop(alloc_guard);
                             // Save the transaction to be dropped after locks are released.
                             _t_outdated = t_outdated;
                         }
author maintainer
#141 lore raw

PATCH 140/315 USB: cdc-acm: Fix bit overlap and move quirk definitions to header

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wentao Guan <[email protected]>

commit 5eb070769ea5e18405535609d1d3f6886f3755bd upstream.

The VENDOR_CLASS_DATA_IFACE and ALWAYS_POLL_CTRL quirk flags added in commit f58752ebcb35 ("USB: cdc-acm: Add quirks for Yoga Book 9 14IAH10 INGENIC touchscreen") were placed inside the acm_ctrl_msg() function rather than in the header with the other quirk flags. Then, their values (BIT(9) and BIT(10)) collided with NO_UNION_12 which is already BIT(9).

Move the definitions to drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.h where they belong and shift them to BIT(10) and BIT(11) to avoid the overlap.

Fixes f58752ebcb35 ("USB: cdc-acm: Add quirks for Yoga Book 9 14IAH10 INGENIC touchscreen")
Cc stable <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c |    2 --
 drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.h |    2 ++
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c +0 -2
@@ -114,8 +114,6 @@ static int acm_ctrl_msg(struct acm *acm,
 	int retval;
 
 	retval = usb_autopm_get_interface(acm->control);
-#define VENDOR_CLASS_DATA_IFACE		BIT(9)  /* data interface uses vendor-specific class */
-#define ALWAYS_POLL_CTRL		BIT(10) /* keep ctrl URB active even without an open TTY */
 	if (retval)
 		return retval;
 
drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.h +2 -0
@@ -115,3 +115,5 @@ struct acm {
 #define DISABLE_ECHO			BIT(7)
 #define MISSING_CAP_BRK			BIT(8)
 #define NO_UNION_12			BIT(9)
+#define VENDOR_CLASS_DATA_IFACE		BIT(10)  /* data interface uses vendor-specific class */
+#define ALWAYS_POLL_CTRL		BIT(11) /* keep ctrl URB active even without an open TTY */
author maintainer
#142 lore raw

PATCH 141/315 KVM: arm64: Correctly cap ZCR_EL2 provided by a guest hypervisor

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mark Brown <[email protected]>

commit 83726330748981372bde86ed5411d7b306612991 upstream.

ZCR_EL2 can be updated by a VHE guest hypervisor either using ZCR_EL2 (which traps) or ZCR_EL1 (which does not trap). KVM handles both in different way:

- on ZCR_EL2 trap, ZCR_EL2.LEN is immediately capped at the VM's own VL limit. This has the potential to break existing SW that relies on the full LEN field to be stateful.

- on ZCR_EL1 access, we do absolutely nothing.

On restoring the SVE context for an L2 guest, we directly restore the guest hypervisor's view of ZCR_EL2 into the physical ZCR_EL2. If the guest's view of the register was updated using the ZCR_EL2 accessor, the value has already been sanitised (with the caveat mentioned above).

But if the guest used ZCR_EL1, the raw value is written into the HW, and the L2 guest can now access VLs that it shouldn't.

Fix all the above by moving the VL capping to the restore points, ensuring that:

- the HW is always programmed with a capped value, irrespective of the accessor being used,

- the ZCR_EL2.LEN field is always completely stateful, irrespective of the accessor being used.

Additionally, move ZCR_EL2 to be a sanitised register, ensuring that only the LEN field is actually stateful. This requires some creative construction of the RES0 mask, as the sysreg generation script does not yet generate RAZ/WI fields.

Fixes b3d29a823099 ("KVM: arm64: nv: Handle ZCR_EL2 traps")
[maz: rewrote commit message, tidy up access_zcr_el2()]
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h       |    2 +-
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h |   16 ++++++++++------
 arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c                 |    5 +++++
 arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c               |   11 +++--------
 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1 -1
@@ -496,7 +496,6 @@ enum vcpu_sysreg {
 	ACTLR_EL2,	/* Auxiliary Control Register (EL2) */
 	CPTR_EL2,	/* Architectural Feature Trap Register (EL2) */
 	HACR_EL2,	/* Hypervisor Auxiliary Control Register */
-	ZCR_EL2,	/* SVE Control Register (EL2) */
 	TTBR0_EL2,	/* Translation Table Base Register 0 (EL2) */
 	TTBR1_EL2,	/* Translation Table Base Register 1 (EL2) */
 	TCR_EL2,	/* Translation Control Register (EL2) */
@@ -527,6 +526,7 @@ enum vcpu_sysreg {
 	SCTLR2_EL2,	/* System Control Register 2 (EL2) */
 	MDCR_EL2,	/* Monitor Debug Configuration Register (EL2) */
 	CNTHCTL_EL2,	/* Counter-timer Hypervisor Control register */
+	ZCR_EL2,	/* SVE Control Register (EL2) */
 
 	/* Any VNCR-capable reg goes after this point */
 	MARKER(__VNCR_START__),
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h +10 -6
@@ -433,11 +433,13 @@ static inline bool kvm_hyp_handle_mops(s
 
 static inline void __hyp_sve_restore_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
+	u64 zcr_el2 = vcpu_sve_max_vq(vcpu) - 1;
+
 	/*
 	 * The vCPU's saved SVE state layout always matches the max VL of the
 	 * vCPU. Start off with the max VL so we can load the SVE state.
 	 */
-	sve_cond_update_zcr_vq(vcpu_sve_max_vq(vcpu) - 1, SYS_ZCR_EL2);
+	sve_cond_update_zcr_vq(zcr_el2, SYS_ZCR_EL2);
 	__sve_restore_state(vcpu_sve_pffr(vcpu),
 			    &vcpu->arch.ctxt.fp_regs.fpsr,
 			    true);
@@ -447,8 +449,10 @@ static inline void __hyp_sve_restore_gue
 	 * nested guest, as the guest hypervisor could select a smaller VL. Slap
 	 * that into hardware before wrapping up.
 	 */
-	if (is_nested_ctxt(vcpu))
-		sve_cond_update_zcr_vq(__vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, ZCR_EL2), SYS_ZCR_EL2);
+	if (is_nested_ctxt(vcpu)) {
+		zcr_el2 = min(zcr_el2, __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, ZCR_EL2));
+		sve_cond_update_zcr_vq(zcr_el2, SYS_ZCR_EL2);
+	}
 
 	write_sysreg_el1(__vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, vcpu_sve_zcr_elx(vcpu)), SYS_ZCR);
 }
@@ -472,11 +476,11 @@ static inline void fpsimd_lazy_switch_to
 		return;
 
 	if (vcpu_has_sve(vcpu)) {
+		zcr_el2 = vcpu_sve_max_vq(vcpu) - 1;
+
 		/* A guest hypervisor may restrict the effective max VL. */
 		if (is_nested_ctxt(vcpu))
-			zcr_el2 = __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, ZCR_EL2);
-		else
-			zcr_el2 = vcpu_sve_max_vq(vcpu) - 1;
+			zcr_el2 = min(zcr_el2, __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, ZCR_EL2));
 
 		write_sysreg_el2(zcr_el2, SYS_ZCR);
 
arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c +5 -0
@@ -1772,6 +1772,11 @@ int kvm_init_nv_sysregs(struct kvm_vcpu
 	/* VNCR_EL2 */
 	set_sysreg_masks(kvm, VNCR_EL2, VNCR_EL2_RES0, VNCR_EL2_RES1);
 
+	/* ZCR_EL2 - bits 8:4 are RAZ/WI so treat them as RES0 */
+	resx.res0 = ZCR_ELx_RES0 | GENMASK_ULL(8, 4);
+	resx.res1 = ZCR_ELx_RES1;
+	set_sysreg_masks(kvm, ZCR_EL2, resx);
+
 out:
 	for (enum vcpu_sysreg sr = __SANITISED_REG_START__; sr < NR_SYS_REGS; sr++)
 		__vcpu_rmw_sys_reg(vcpu, sr, |=, 0);
arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c +3 -8
@@ -2749,21 +2749,16 @@ static bool access_zcr_el2(struct kvm_vc
 			   struct sys_reg_params *p,
 			   const struct sys_reg_desc *r)
 {
-	unsigned int vq;
-
 	if (guest_hyp_sve_traps_enabled(vcpu)) {
 		kvm_inject_nested_sve_trap(vcpu);
 		return false;
 	}
 
-	if (!p->is_write) {
+	if (!p->is_write)
 		p->regval = __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, ZCR_EL2);
-		return true;
-	}
+	else
+		__vcpu_assign_sys_reg(vcpu, ZCR_EL2, p->regval);
 
-	vq = SYS_FIELD_GET(ZCR_ELx, LEN, p->regval) + 1;
-	vq = min(vq, vcpu_sve_max_vq(vcpu));
-	__vcpu_assign_sys_reg(vcpu, ZCR_EL2, vq - 1);
 	return true;
 }
 
maintainer
#143 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 6.18 141/315] KVM: arm64: Correctly cap ZCR_EL2 provided by a guest hypervisor

Quoted 41 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mark Brown <[email protected]>

commit 83726330748981372bde86ed5411d7b306612991 upstream.

ZCR_EL2 can be updated by a VHE guest hypervisor either using ZCR_EL2 (which traps) or ZCR_EL1 (which does not trap). KVM handles both in different way:

- on ZCR_EL2 trap, ZCR_EL2.LEN is immediately capped at the VM's own VL limit. This has the potential to break existing SW that relies on the full LEN field to be stateful.

- on ZCR_EL1 access, we do absolutely nothing.

On restoring the SVE context for an L2 guest, we directly restore the guest hypervisor's view of ZCR_EL2 into the physical ZCR_EL2. If the guest's view of the register was updated using the ZCR_EL2 accessor, the value has already been sanitised (with the caveat mentioned above).

But if the guest used ZCR_EL1, the raw value is written into the HW, and the L2 guest can now access VLs that it shouldn't.

Fix all the above by moving the VL capping to the restore points, ensuring that:

- the HW is always programmed with a capped value, irrespective of the accessor being used,

- the ZCR_EL2.LEN field is always completely stateful, irrespective of the accessor being used.

Additionally, move ZCR_EL2 to be a sanitised register, ensuring that only the LEN field is actually stateful. This requires some creative construction of the RES0 mask, as the sysreg generation script does not yet generate RAZ/WI fields.

Quoted 7 lines
Fixes b3d29a823099 ("KVM: arm64: nv: Handle ZCR_EL2 traps")
[maz: rewrote commit message, tidy up access_zcr_el2()]

As pointed out by Miguel at [1], this doesn't backport cleanly before 7.0. I'll provide a backport separately, so please drop this for now.

Thanks,

	M.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

Signature · 1 line
Jazz isn't dead. It just smells funny.
maintainer
#144 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 6.18 141/315] KVM: arm64: Correctly cap ZCR_EL2 provided by a guest hypervisor

Quoted 2 lines

This doesn't backport cleanly before 7.0, so please drop it for now. I'll provide a separate backport.

Dropped from the 6.18 queue (kept in 7.0, where it builds), thanks.

--
Thanks,
Sasha

author maintainer
#145 lore raw

PATCH 142/315 KVM: arm64: PMU: Preserve AArch32 counter low bits

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Qiang Ma <[email protected]>

commit 1750ad1388e03fb27068cd1f22c9c8b4590fe936 upstream.

AArch32 writes to PMU event counters cannot update the top 32 bits, even when PMUv3p5 makes the counters 64-bit. KVM therefore needs to preserve the existing high half and only update the low half written by the guest, unless the caller explicitly forces a full reset through PMCR.P.

The current code masks @val down to the old high half before taking lower_32_bits(val), which means the low half is always zero. As a result, AArch32 writes to event counters discard the guest-provided low 32 bits instead of storing them.

Build the new value from the old high 32 bits and the low 32 bits of the value supplied by the guest.

Fixes 26d2d0594d70 ("KVM: arm64: PMU: Do not let AArch32 change the counters' top 32 bits")
---
 arch/arm64/kvm/pmu-emul.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/pmu-emul.c +2 -2
@@ -174,8 +174,8 @@ static void kvm_pmu_set_pmc_value(struct
 		 * action is to use PMCR.P, which will reset them to
 		 * 0 (the only use of the 'force' parameter).
 		 */
-		val  = __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, reg) & GENMASK(63, 32);
-		val |= lower_32_bits(val);
+		val = (__vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, reg) & GENMASK(63, 32)) |
+		      lower_32_bits(val);
 	}
 
 	__vcpu_assign_sys_reg(vcpu, reg, val);
author maintainer
#146 lore raw

PATCH 143/315 KVM: SVM: Flush the current TLB when transitioning from xAVIC => x2AVIC

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

commit a9e18aa3263f356edae305e29830e5fe63d8597a upstream.

Flush the current TLB when xAVIC *or* x2AVIC is activated, as KVM is (apparently) responsible for purging TLB entries when transitioning from xAVIC to x2AVIC. The APM says a whole lot of nothing about TLB flushing with respect to (x2)AVIC, but empirical data strongly suggests hardware also does a whole lot of nothing.

Failure to flush the TLB when enabling x2AVIC can lead to guest accesses to the APIC base address getting incorrectly redirected to the virtual APIC page. The flaw most visibly manifests as failures in KVM-Unit-Test's verify_disabled_apic_mmio() testcase when x2APIC is enabled (though for reasons unknown, the test only reliably fails with EFI builds).

Fixes 0ccf3e7cb95a ("KVM: SVM: Flush the "current" TLB when activating AVIC")
Fixes 4d1d7942e36a ("KVM: SVM: Introduce logic to (de)activate x2AVIC mode")
Cc Naveen N Rao (AMD) <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c |   35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c +29 -6
@@ -187,6 +187,35 @@ static void avic_activate_vmcb(struct vc
 	svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_WRITE);
 
 	/*
+	 * Flush the TLB when enabling (x2)AVIC and when transitioning between
+	 * xAVIC and x2AVIC, as the CPU may have inserted a TLB entry for the
+	 * "wrong" mapping.
+	 *
+	 * KVM uses a per-VM "scratch" page to back the APIC memslot, because
+	 * KVM also uses per-VM page tables *and* maintains the page table (NPT
+	 * or shadow page) mappings for said memslot even if one or more vCPUs
+	 * have their local APIC hardware-disabled or are in x2APIC mode, i.e.
+	 * even if one or more vCPUs' APIC MMIO BAR is effectively disabled.
+	 *
+	 * If xAVIC is fully enabled, hardware ignores the physical address in
+	 * KVM's page tables, i.e. in the leaf SPTE for the APIC memslot, and
+	 * instead redirects the access to the AVIC backing page, i.e. to the
+	 * vCPU's virtual APIC page.  If xAVIC is not enabled (APIC is either
+	 * hardware-disabled or in x2APIC mode), then guest accesses will use
+	 * the page table mapping verbatim, i.e. will access the per-VM scratch
+	 * page, as normal memory.
+	 *
+	 * In both cases, the CPU is allowed to cache TLB entries for the APIC
+	 * base GPA.  So, KVM needs to flush the TLB when enabling xAVIC, as
+	 * accesses need to be redirected to the virtual APIC page, but the TLB
+	 * may contain entries pointing at the scratch page.  KVM also needs to
+	 * flush the TLB when enabling x2AVIC, as accesses need to go to the
+	 * scratch page, but the TLB may contain entries tagged as xAVIC, i.e.
+	 * entries pointing to the vCPU's virtual APIC page.
+	 */
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_CURRENT, &svm->vcpu);
+
+	/*
 	 * Note: KVM supports hybrid-AVIC mode, where KVM emulates x2APIC MSR
 	 * accesses, while interrupt injection to a running vCPU can be
 	 * achieved using AVIC doorbell.  KVM disables the APIC access page
@@ -199,12 +228,6 @@ static void avic_activate_vmcb(struct vc
 		/* Disabling MSR intercept for x2APIC registers */
 		avic_set_x2apic_msr_interception(svm, false);
 	} else {
-		/*
-		 * Flush the TLB, the guest may have inserted a non-APIC
-		 * mapping into the TLB while AVIC was disabled.
-		 */
-		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH_CURRENT, &svm->vcpu);
-
 		/* Enabling MSR intercept for x2APIC registers */
 		avic_set_x2apic_msr_interception(svm, true);
 	}
author maintainer
#147 lore raw

PATCH 144/315 KVM: SEV: Require in-GHCB scratch area if GHCB v2+ is in use

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Roth <[email protected]>

commit db3f2195d29344a3cf1e9dd9ab7f21ced7308cf7 upstream.

As per the GHCB spec, when using GHCB v2+ require the software scratch area to reside in the GHCB's shared buffer. Note, things like Page State Change (PSC) requests _rely_ on this behavior, as the guest can't provide a length when making the request, i.e. the size of the guest payload is bounded by the size of the shared buffer.

Failure to force usage of the GHCB, and a slew of other flaws, lets a malicious SNP guest corrupt host kernel heap memory, and leak host heap layout information.

setup_vmgexit_scratch() allocates a buffer via kvzalloc(exit_info_2), where exit_info_2 is guest-controlled. With exit_info_2=24, this yields a 24-byte allocation in kmalloc-cg-32 (32-byte slab objects). The buffer holds an 8-byte psc_hdr followed by 8-byte psc_entry structs, so only entries[0] and entries[1] are in-bounds.

snp_begin_psc() validates end_entry against VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_COUNT (253) but NOT against the actual buffer size:

      idx_end = hdr->end_entry;

      if (idx_end >= VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_COUNT) {   // checks 253, not buffer
          snp_complete_psc(svm, ...);
          return 1;
      }

      for (idx = idx_start; idx <= idx_end; idx++) {
          entry_start = entries[idx];           // OOB when idx >= 2

The guest sets end_entry=10+, causing the host to iterate entries[2+] which are OOB into adjacent slab objects. For each OOB entry:

- The host reads 8 bytes (OOB READ / info leak oracle)
- If the data passes PSC validation, __snp_complete_one_psc() writes

    cur_page = 1 or 512 into the entry (OOB WRITE, sev.c:3806)

- If validation fails, the error response reveals whether adjacent memory is zero vs non-zero (information disclosure to guest)

The guest controls allocation size (exit_info_2), entry range (cur_entry/end_entry), and can fire unlimited VMGEXITs to repeatedly hit different slab positions.

By exploiting the variety of bugs, a malicious SEV-SNP guest can:
- OOB read adjacent kmalloc-cg-32 objects (heap layout disclosure)
- OOB write cur_page bits into adjacent objects (heap corruption)
- Trigger use-after-free conditions across VMGEXITs

E.g. with KASAN enabled, a single insmod of the PoC guest module produces 73 KASAN reports:

    BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in snp_begin_psc+0x126/0x890
    Read of size 8 at addr ffff888219ffb5e0 by task qemu-system-x86/2199

    BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in snp_begin_psc+0x468/0x890
    Write of size 8 at addr ffff888351566648 by task qemu-system-x86/2199

    The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888XXXXXXXXX
     which belongs to the cache kmalloc-cg-32 of size 32
    The buggy address is located N bytes to the right of
     allocated 32-byte region [ffff888XXXXXXXXX, ffff888XXXXXXXXX)

Breakdown:
62 slab-out-of-bounds (reads + writes past allocation)
7 slab-use-after-free
4 use-after-free

All credit to Stan for the wonderful description and reproducer!

Cc Michael Roth <[email protected]>
Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Gonda <[email protected]>
Cc Jacky Li <[email protected]>
Fixes 4af663c2f64a ("KVM: SEV: Allow per-guest configuration of GHCB protocol version")
[sean: write changelog]

Message-ID: <[email protected]>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +4 -0
@@ -3651,6 +3651,10 @@ static int setup_vmgexit_scratch(struct
 		scratch_va = (void *)svm->sev_es.ghcb;
 		scratch_va += (scratch_gpa_beg - control->ghcb_gpa);
 	} else {
+		/* GHCB v2 requires the scratch area to be within the GHCB. */
+		if (to_kvm_sev_info(svm->vcpu.kvm)->ghcb_version >= 2)
+			goto e_scratch;
+
 		/*
 		 * The guest memory must be read into a kernel buffer, so
 		 * limit the size
author maintainer
#148 lore raw

PATCH 145/315 KVM: SEV: Ignore Port I/O requests of length 0

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

commit 3988bd2723de407ae90fa7a6f6029b4e60238c58 upstream.

Explicitly ignore Port I/O requests of length '0' (or count '0'), so that setting up the software scratch area (and other code) doesn't have to worry about underflowing the length, and to allow for WARNing on trying to configure the scratch area with len==0.

Fixes 291bd20d5d88 ("KVM: SVM: Add initial support for a VMGEXIT VMEXIT")

Message-ID: <[email protected]>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +8 -0
@@ -4499,6 +4499,11 @@ int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct kvm_vcpu *
 			    control->exit_info_1, control->exit_info_2);
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		break;
+	case SVM_EXIT_IOIO:
+		if (!((control->exit_info_1 & SVM_IOIO_SIZE_MASK) >> SVM_IOIO_SIZE_SHIFT))
+			return 1;
+
+		fallthrough;
 	default:
 		ret = svm_invoke_exit_handler(vcpu, exit_code);
 	}
@@ -4519,6 +4524,9 @@ int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *sv
 	if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(count, size, &bytes)))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (!bytes)
+		return 1;
+
 	r = setup_vmgexit_scratch(svm, in, bytes);
 	if (r)
 		return r;
author maintainer
#149 lore raw

PATCH 146/315 KVM: SEV: Use the size of the PSC header as the minimum size for PSC requests

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

commit 2be54670bdc017004c4a4b8bddb6ff02ebe7dbe2 upstream.

When handling a Page State Change (PSC) #VMGEXIT use the size of the PSC header as the minimum size for the scratch area. Per the GHCB spec, PSC requests do NOT provide the length, i.e. using control->exit_info_2 for the length is completely made up behavior. The existing code "works", e.g. even though Linux-as-a-guest always passes '0', because KVM doesn't do anything with the length when the request is in the GHCB's shared buffer.

Use the header as the min length. Once the header is retrieved, KVM can use the specified indices to compute the full size of the request.

Fixes 9b54e248d264 ("KVM: SEV: Add support to handle Page State Change VMGEXIT")

Message-ID: <[email protected]>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +1 -1
@@ -4473,7 +4473,7 @@ int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct kvm_vcpu *
 		vcpu->run->system_event.data[0] = control->ghcb_gpa;
 		break;
 	case SVM_VMGEXIT_PSC:
-		ret = setup_vmgexit_scratch(svm, true, control->exit_info_2);
+		ret = setup_vmgexit_scratch(svm, true, sizeof(struct psc_hdr));
 		if (ret)
 			break;
 
author maintainer
#150 lore raw

PATCH 147/315 KVM: SEV: WARN if KVM attempts to setup scratch area with min_len==0

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

commit f185e05dce6f170f83c4ba602e969b1c3c7a22e6 upstream.

Now that all paths in KVM properly validate the length needed for the scratch area, and are guaranteed to pass in a non-zero length, WARN if KVM attempts to configured the scratch area with min_len==0 to guard against future bugs.

Message-ID: <[email protected]>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +3 -0
@@ -3617,6 +3617,9 @@ static int setup_vmgexit_scratch(struct
 	u64 scratch_gpa_beg, scratch_gpa_end;
 	void *scratch_va;
 
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!min_len))
+		goto e_scratch;
+
 	scratch_gpa_beg = svm->sev_es.sw_scratch;
 	if (!scratch_gpa_beg) {
 		pr_err("vmgexit: scratch gpa not provided\n");
author maintainer
#151 lore raw

PATCH 148/315 KVM: SEV: Compute the correct max length of the in-GHCB scratch area

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

commit 5867d7e202e09f037cefe77f7af4413c7c0fa088 upstream.

When setting the length of the GHCB scratch area, and the area is in the GHCB shared buffer, set the effective length of the scratch area to the max possible size given the start of the guest-provided pointer, and the end of the shared buffer.

The code was "fine" when first introduced, as KVM doesn't consult the length of the buffer when emulating MMIO, because the passed in @len always specifies the *max* size required. But for PSC requests, the incoming @len is just the minimum length (to process the header), and KVM needs to know the full size of the scratch area to avoid buffer overflows (spoiler alert).

Opportunistically rename @len => @min_len to better reflect its role.

Fixes 9b54e248d264 ("KVM: SEV: Add support to handle Page State Change VMGEXIT")

Message-ID: <[email protected]>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c |   19 ++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +10 -9
@@ -3610,7 +3610,7 @@ int pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, in
 }
 
 #define GHCB_SCRATCH_AREA_LIMIT		(16ULL * PAGE_SIZE)
-static int setup_vmgexit_scratch(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool sync, u64 len)
+static int setup_vmgexit_scratch(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool sync, u64 min_len)
 {
 	struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
 	u64 ghcb_scratch_beg, ghcb_scratch_end;
@@ -3626,10 +3626,10 @@ static int setup_vmgexit_scratch(struct
 		goto e_scratch;
 	}
 
-	scratch_gpa_end = scratch_gpa_beg + len;
+	scratch_gpa_end = scratch_gpa_beg + min_len;
 	if (scratch_gpa_end < scratch_gpa_beg) {
 		pr_err("vmgexit: scratch length (%#llx) not valid for scratch address (%#llx)\n",
-		       len, scratch_gpa_beg);
+		       min_len, scratch_gpa_beg);
 		goto e_scratch;
 	}
 
@@ -3653,6 +3653,8 @@ static int setup_vmgexit_scratch(struct
 
 		scratch_va = (void *)svm->sev_es.ghcb;
 		scratch_va += (scratch_gpa_beg - control->ghcb_gpa);
+
+		svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_len = ghcb_scratch_end - scratch_gpa_beg;
 	} else {
 		/* GHCB v2 requires the scratch area to be within the GHCB. */
 		if (to_kvm_sev_info(svm->vcpu.kvm)->ghcb_version >= 2)
@@ -3662,16 +3664,16 @@ static int setup_vmgexit_scratch(struct
 		 * The guest memory must be read into a kernel buffer, so
 		 * limit the size
 		 */
-		if (len > GHCB_SCRATCH_AREA_LIMIT) {
+		if (min_len > GHCB_SCRATCH_AREA_LIMIT) {
 			pr_err("vmgexit: scratch area exceeds KVM limits (%#llx requested, %#llx limit)\n",
-			       len, GHCB_SCRATCH_AREA_LIMIT);
+			       min_len, GHCB_SCRATCH_AREA_LIMIT);
 			goto e_scratch;
 		}
-		scratch_va = kvzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+		scratch_va = kvzalloc(min_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
 		if (!scratch_va)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 
-		if (kvm_read_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm, scratch_gpa_beg, scratch_va, len)) {
+		if (kvm_read_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm, scratch_gpa_beg, scratch_va, min_len)) {
 			/* Unable to copy scratch area from guest */
 			pr_err("vmgexit: kvm_read_guest for scratch area failed\n");
 
@@ -3687,11 +3689,10 @@ static int setup_vmgexit_scratch(struct
 		 */
 		svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_sync = sync;
 		svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free = true;
+		svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_len = min_len;
 	}
 
 	svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa = scratch_va;
-	svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_len = len;
-
 	return 0;
 
 e_scratch:
author maintainer
#152 lore raw

PATCH 149/315 KVM: SEV: Check PSC request indices against the actual size of the buffer

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

commit 121d88de56bc5c0ba0ce2f6381af67f948a7e7c1 upstream.

When processing Page State Change (PSC) requests, validate the PSC buffer against the effective size of the scratch area, which could be less than the maximum size if the guest provided a pointer that isn't exactly at the start of the GHCB shared buffer.

Fixes 9b54e248d264 ("KVM: SEV: Add support to handle Page State Change VMGEXIT")

Message-ID: <[email protected]>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c |   17 +++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +15 -2
@@ -3850,7 +3850,7 @@ static int snp_begin_psc(struct vcpu_svm
 	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
 	struct psc_hdr *hdr = &psc->hdr;
 	struct psc_entry entry_start;
-	u16 idx, idx_start, idx_end;
+	u16 idx, idx_start, idx_end, max_nr_entries;
 	int npages;
 	bool huge;
 	u64 gfn;
@@ -3860,6 +3860,19 @@ static int snp_begin_psc(struct vcpu_svm
 		return 1;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * GHCB v2 requires the scratch area to reside within the GHCB itself,
+	 * and PSC requests are only supported for GHCB v2+.  Thus it should be
+	 * impossible to exceed the max PSC entry count (which is derived from
+	 * the size of the shared GHCB buffer).
+	 */
+	max_nr_entries = (sev_es->ghcb_sa_len - sizeof(struct psc_hdr)) /
+			 sizeof(struct psc_entry);
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(max_nr_entries > VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_COUNT)) {
+		snp_complete_psc(svm, VMGEXIT_PSC_ERROR_GENERIC);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
 next_range:
 	/* There should be no other PSCs in-flight at this point. */
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(svm->sev_es.psc_inflight)) {
@@ -3875,7 +3888,7 @@ next_range:
 	idx_start = hdr->cur_entry;
 	idx_end = hdr->end_entry;
 
-	if (idx_end >= VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_COUNT) {
+	if (idx_end >= max_nr_entries) {
 		snp_complete_psc(svm, VMGEXIT_PSC_ERROR_INVALID_HDR);
 		return 1;
 	}
author maintainer
#153 lore raw

PATCH 150/315 KVM: SEV: Use READ_ONCE() when reading entries/indices from PSC buffer

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

commit c8cc238093ca6c99267032f6cfe78f59389f3157 upstream.

Use READ_ONCE() when reading entries/indices from the guest-accessible Page State Change buffer to defend against TOCTOU bugs.

Don't bother with READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() for cases where KVM is writing (and not consuming the result!), as the guest isn't supposed to touch the buffer while it's being processed. I.e. using READ_ONCE() is all about protecting against misbehaving guests.

Fixes 9b54e248d264 ("KVM: SEV: Add support to handle Page State Change VMGEXIT")

Message-ID: <[email protected]>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c |   12 ++++++------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +6 -6
@@ -3820,9 +3820,9 @@ static void __snp_complete_one_psc(struc
 	 */
 	for (idx = svm->sev_es.psc_idx; svm->sev_es.psc_inflight;
 	     svm->sev_es.psc_inflight--, idx++) {
-		struct psc_entry *entry = &entries[idx];
+		struct psc_entry entry = READ_ONCE(entries[idx]);
 
-		entry->cur_page = entry->pagesize ? 512 : 1;
+		entries[idx].cur_page = entry.pagesize ? 512 : 1;
 	}
 
 	hdr->cur_entry = idx;
@@ -3885,8 +3885,8 @@ next_range:
 	 * validation, so take care to only use validated copies of values used
 	 * for things like array indexing.
 	 */
-	idx_start = hdr->cur_entry;
-	idx_end = hdr->end_entry;
+	idx_start = READ_ONCE(hdr->cur_entry);
+	idx_end = READ_ONCE(hdr->end_entry);
 
 	if (idx_end >= max_nr_entries) {
 		snp_complete_psc(svm, VMGEXIT_PSC_ERROR_INVALID_HDR);
@@ -3895,7 +3895,7 @@ next_range:
 
 	/* Find the start of the next range which needs processing. */
 	for (idx = idx_start; idx <= idx_end; idx++, hdr->cur_entry++) {
-		entry_start = entries[idx];
+		entry_start = READ_ONCE(entries[idx]);
 
 		gfn = entry_start.gfn;
 		huge = entry_start.pagesize;
@@ -3939,7 +3939,7 @@ next_range:
 	 * KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE exit.
 	 */
 	while (++idx <= idx_end) {
-		struct psc_entry entry = entries[idx];
+		struct psc_entry entry = READ_ONCE(entries[idx]);
 
 		if (entry.operation != entry_start.operation ||
 		    entry.gfn != entry_start.gfn + npages ||
author maintainer
#154 lore raw

PATCH 151/315 KVM: SEV: Dont explicitly pass PSC buffer to snp_begin_psc()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

commit ebe4b2dc9cfbfb2d8f665667c4d08f4c6c9bec05 upstream.

Stop explicitly passing the PSC buffer to snp_begin_psc(): it *must* be the scratch area. This will allow fixing a variety of bugs without further complicating the code.

No functional change intended.

Message-ID: <[email protected]>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c |   11 ++++++-----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +6 -5
@@ -3789,7 +3789,7 @@ struct psc_buffer {
 	struct psc_entry entries[];
 } __packed;
 
-static int snp_begin_psc(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct psc_buffer *psc);
+static int snp_begin_psc(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
 
 static void snp_complete_psc(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u64 psc_ret)
 {
@@ -3831,7 +3831,6 @@ static void __snp_complete_one_psc(struc
 static int snp_complete_one_psc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
-	struct psc_buffer *psc = svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa;
 
 	if (vcpu->run->hypercall.ret) {
 		snp_complete_psc(svm, VMGEXIT_PSC_ERROR_GENERIC);
@@ -3841,11 +3840,13 @@ static int snp_complete_one_psc(struct k
 	__snp_complete_one_psc(svm);
 
 	/* Handle the next range (if any). */
-	return snp_begin_psc(svm, psc);
+	return snp_begin_psc(svm);
 }
 
-static int snp_begin_psc(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct psc_buffer *psc)
+static int snp_begin_psc(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 {
+	struct vcpu_sev_es_state *sev_es = &svm->sev_es;
+	struct psc_buffer *psc = sev_es->ghcb_sa;
 	struct psc_entry *entries = psc->entries;
 	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
 	struct psc_hdr *hdr = &psc->hdr;
@@ -4494,7 +4495,7 @@ int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct kvm_vcpu *
 		if (ret)
 			break;
 
-		ret = snp_begin_psc(svm, svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa);
+		ret = snp_begin_psc(svm);
 		break;
 	case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_CREATION:
 		ret = sev_snp_ap_creation(svm);
author maintainer
#155 lore raw

PATCH 152/315 Disable -Wattribute-alias for clang-23 and newer

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

commit 175db11786bde9061db526bf1ac5107d915f5163 upstream.

Clang recently added support for -Wattribute-alias [1], which results in the same warnings that necessitated commit bee20031772a ("disable -Wattribute-alias warning for SYSCALL_DEFINEx()") for GCC.

kernel/time/itimer.c:325:1: error: alias and aliasee have different types 'long (unsigned int)' and 'long (typeof (__builtin_choose_expr((__builtin_types_compatible_p(typeof ((unsigned int)0), typeof (0LL)) || __builtin_types_compatible_p(typeof ((unsigned int)0), typeof (0ULL))), 0LL, 0L)))' (aka 'long (long)') [-Werror,-Wattribute-alias]
325 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(alarm, unsigned int, seconds)
| ^
include/linux/syscalls.h:225:36: note: expanded from macro 'SYSCALL_DEFINE1'

    225 | #define SYSCALL_DEFINE1(name, ...) SYSCALL_DEFINEx(1, _##name, __VA_ARGS__)
        |                                    ^
  include/linux/syscalls.h:236:2: note: expanded from macro 'SYSCALL_DEFINEx'
    236 |         __SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, sname, __VA_ARGS__)
        |         ^
  include/linux/syscalls.h:251:18: note: expanded from macro '__SYSCALL_DEFINEx'
    251 |                 __attribute__((alias(__stringify(__se_sys##name))));    \
        |                                ^
  kernel/time/itimer.c:325:1: note: aliasee is declared here
  include/linux/syscalls.h:225:36: note: expanded from macro 'SYSCALL_DEFINE1'
    225 | #define SYSCALL_DEFINE1(name, ...) SYSCALL_DEFINEx(1, _##name, __VA_ARGS__)
        |                                    ^
  include/linux/syscalls.h:236:2: note: expanded from macro 'SYSCALL_DEFINEx'
    236 |         __SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, sname, __VA_ARGS__)
        |         ^
  include/linux/syscalls.h:255:18: note: expanded from macro '__SYSCALL_DEFINEx'
    255 |         asmlinkage long __se_sys##name(__MAP(x,__SC_LONG,__VA_ARGS__))  \
        |                         ^
  <scratch space>:16:1: note: expanded from here
     16 | __se_sys_alarm
        | ^

Disable the warnings in the same way for clang-23 and newer. Disable the warning about unknown warning options to avoid breaking the build for versions of clang-23 that do not have -Wattribute-alias, such as ones deployed by vendors like Android or CI systems or when bisecting LLVM between llvmorg-23-init and release/23.x.

---
 arch/riscv/include/asm/syscall_wrapper.h |    4 ++++
 include/linux/compat.h                   |    4 ++++
 include/linux/compiler-clang.h           |    6 ++++++
 include/linux/compiler_types.h           |    4 ++++
 include/linux/syscalls.h                 |    4 ++++
 5 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
arch/riscv/include/asm/syscall_wrapper.h +4 -0
@@ -32,6 +32,10 @@ asmlinkage long __riscv_sys_ni_syscall(c
 	__diag_push();									\
 	__diag_ignore(GCC, 8, "-Wattribute-alias",					\
 			"Type aliasing is used to sanitize syscall arguments");		\
+	__diag_ignore(clang, 23, "-Wunknown-warning-option",				\
+		      "Avoid breaking versions without -Wattribute-alias");		\
+	__diag_ignore(clang, 23, "-Wattribute-alias",					\
+			"Type aliasing is used to sanitize syscall arguments");		\
 	static long __se_##prefix##name(ulong, ulong, ulong, ulong, ulong, ulong, 	\
 					ulong)						\
 			__attribute__((alias(__stringify(___se_##prefix##name))));	\
include/linux/compat.h +4 -0
@@ -72,6 +72,10 @@
 	__diag_push();								\
 	__diag_ignore(GCC, 8, "-Wattribute-alias",				\
 		      "Type aliasing is used to sanitize syscall arguments");\
+	__diag_ignore(clang, 23, "-Wunknown-warning-option",			\
+		      "Avoid breaking versions without -Wattribute-alias");	\
+	__diag_ignore(clang, 23, "-Wattribute-alias",				\
+		      "Type aliasing is used to sanitize syscall arguments");	\
 	asmlinkage long compat_sys##name(__MAP(x,__SC_DECL,__VA_ARGS__))	\
 		__attribute__((alias(__stringify(__se_compat_sys##name))));	\
 	ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION(compat_sys##name, ERRNO);				\
include/linux/compiler-clang.h +6 -0
@@ -131,6 +131,12 @@
 #define __diag_str(s)		__diag_str1(s)
 #define __diag(s)		_Pragma(__diag_str(clang diagnostic s))
 
+#if CONFIG_CLANG_VERSION >= 230000
+#define __diag_clang_23(s)	__diag(s)
+#else
+#define __diag_clang_23(s)
+#endif
+
 #define __diag_clang_13(s)	__diag(s)
 
 #define __diag_ignore_all(option, comment) \
include/linux/compiler_types.h +4 -0
@@ -636,6 +636,10 @@ struct ftrace_likely_data {
 #define __diag_GCC(version, severity, string)
 #endif
 
+#ifndef __diag_clang
+#define __diag_clang(version, severity, string)
+#endif
+
 #define __diag_push()	__diag(push)
 #define __diag_pop()	__diag(pop)
 
include/linux/syscalls.h +4 -0
@@ -247,6 +247,10 @@ static inline int is_syscall_trace_event
 	__diag_push();							\
 	__diag_ignore(GCC, 8, "-Wattribute-alias",			\
 		      "Type aliasing is used to sanitize syscall arguments");\
+	__diag_ignore(clang, 23, "-Wunknown-warning-option",		\
+		      "Avoid breaking versions without -Wattribute-alias");\
+	__diag_ignore(clang, 23, "-Wattribute-alias",			\
+		      "Type aliasing is used to sanitize syscall arguments");\
 	asmlinkage long sys##name(__MAP(x,__SC_DECL,__VA_ARGS__))	\
 		__attribute__((alias(__stringify(__se_sys##name))));	\
 	ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION(sys##name, ERRNO);			\
author maintainer
#156 lore raw

PATCH 153/315 iio: adc: xilinx-xadc: Fix sequencer mode in postdisable for dual mux

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christofer Jonason <[email protected]>

commit 852534744c2d35626a604f128ff0b8ec12805591 upstream.

xadc_postdisable() unconditionally sets the sequencer to continuous mode. For dual external multiplexer configurations this is incorrect:
simultaneous sampling mode is required so that ADC-A samples through the mux on VAUX[0-7] while ADC-B simultaneously samples through the mux on VAUX[8-15]. In continuous mode only ADC-A is active, so VAUX[8-15] channels return incorrect data.

Since postdisable is also called from xadc_probe() to set the initial idle state, the wrong sequencer mode is active from the moment the driver loads.

The preenable path already uses xadc_get_seq_mode() which returns SIMULTANEOUS for dual mux. Fix postdisable to do the same.

---
 drivers/iio/adc/xilinx-xadc-core.c |   11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/iio/adc/xilinx-xadc-core.c +9 -2
@@ -817,6 +817,7 @@ static int xadc_postdisable(struct iio_d
 {
 	struct xadc *xadc = iio_priv(indio_dev);
 	unsigned long scan_mask;
+	int seq_mode;
 	int ret;
 	int i;
 
@@ -824,6 +825,12 @@ static int xadc_postdisable(struct iio_d
 	for (i = 0; i < indio_dev->num_channels; i++)
 		scan_mask |= BIT(indio_dev->channels[i].scan_index);
 
+	/*
+	 * Use the correct sequencer mode for the idle state: simultaneous
+	 * mode for dual external mux configurations, continuous otherwise.
+	 */
+	seq_mode = xadc_get_seq_mode(xadc, scan_mask);
+
 	/* Enable all channels and calibration */
 	ret = xadc_write_adc_reg(xadc, XADC_REG_SEQ(0), scan_mask & 0xffff);
 	if (ret)
@@ -834,11 +841,11 @@ static int xadc_postdisable(struct iio_d
 		return ret;
 
 	ret = xadc_update_adc_reg(xadc, XADC_REG_CONF1, XADC_CONF1_SEQ_MASK,
-		XADC_CONF1_SEQ_CONTINUOUS);
+				  seq_mode);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	return xadc_power_adc_b(xadc, XADC_CONF1_SEQ_CONTINUOUS);
+	return xadc_power_adc_b(xadc, seq_mode);
 }
 
 static int xadc_preenable(struct iio_dev *indio_dev)
author maintainer
#157 lore raw

PATCH 154/315 iio: adc: npcm: fix unbalanced clk_disable_unprepare()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Carlier <[email protected]>

commit 0d42e2c0bd6ceb89e44c6e065f9bdf9b1df3ef0c upstream.

The driver acquired the ADC clock with devm_clk_get() and read its rate, but never called clk_prepare_enable(). The probe error path and npcm_adc_remove() both called clk_disable_unprepare() unconditionally, causing the clk framework's enable/prepare counts to underflow on probe failure or module unbind.

The issue went unnoticed because NPCM BMC firmware leaves the ADC clock enabled at boot, so the driver happened to work in practice.

Switch to devm_clk_get_enabled() so the clock is properly enabled during probe and automatically released by the device-managed cleanup, and drop the now-redundant clk_disable_unprepare() from both the probe error path and remove().

While at it, drop the duplicate error message on devm_request_irq() failure since the IRQ core already logs it.

Fixes 9bf85fbc9d8f ("iio: adc: add NPCM ADC driver")
---
 drivers/iio/adc/npcm_adc.c |   25 ++++++++-----------------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
drivers/iio/adc/npcm_adc.c +8 -17
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ static int npcm_adc_probe(struct platfor
 	if (IS_ERR(info->reset))
 		return PTR_ERR(info->reset);
 
-	info->adc_clk = devm_clk_get(&pdev->dev, NULL);
+	info->adc_clk = devm_clk_get_enabled(&pdev->dev, NULL);
 	if (IS_ERR(info->adc_clk)) {
 		dev_warn(&pdev->dev, "ADC clock failed: can't read clk\n");
 		return PTR_ERR(info->adc_clk);
@@ -244,17 +244,13 @@ static int npcm_adc_probe(struct platfor
 	info->adc_sample_hz = clk_get_rate(info->adc_clk) / ((div + 1) * 2);
 
 	irq = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0);
-	if (irq < 0) {
-		ret = irq;
-		goto err_disable_clk;
-	}
+	if (irq < 0)
+		return irq;
 
 	ret = devm_request_irq(&pdev->dev, irq, npcm_adc_isr, 0,
 			       "NPCM_ADC", indio_dev);
-	if (ret < 0) {
-		dev_err(dev, "failed requesting interrupt\n");
-		goto err_disable_clk;
-	}
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
 
 	reg_con = ioread32(info->regs + NPCM_ADCCON);
 	info->vref = devm_regulator_get_optional(&pdev->dev, "vref");
@@ -262,7 +258,7 @@ static int npcm_adc_probe(struct platfor
 		ret = regulator_enable(info->vref);
 		if (ret) {
 			dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Can't enable ADC reference voltage\n");
-			goto err_disable_clk;
+			return ret;
 		}
 
 		iowrite32(reg_con & ~NPCM_ADCCON_REFSEL,
@@ -272,10 +268,8 @@ static int npcm_adc_probe(struct platfor
 		 * Any error which is not ENODEV indicates the regulator
 		 * has been specified and so is a failure case.
 		 */
-		if (PTR_ERR(info->vref) != -ENODEV) {
-			ret = PTR_ERR(info->vref);
-			goto err_disable_clk;
-		}
+		if (PTR_ERR(info->vref) != -ENODEV)
+			return PTR_ERR(info->vref);
 
 		/* Use internal reference */
 		iowrite32(reg_con | NPCM_ADCCON_REFSEL,
@@ -314,8 +308,6 @@ err_iio_register:
 	iowrite32(reg_con & ~NPCM_ADCCON_ADC_EN, info->regs + NPCM_ADCCON);
 	if (!IS_ERR(info->vref))
 		regulator_disable(info->vref);
-err_disable_clk:
-	clk_disable_unprepare(info->adc_clk);
 
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -332,7 +324,6 @@ static void npcm_adc_remove(struct platf
 	iowrite32(regtemp & ~NPCM_ADCCON_ADC_EN, info->regs + NPCM_ADCCON);
 	if (!IS_ERR(info->vref))
 		regulator_disable(info->vref);
-	clk_disable_unprepare(info->adc_clk);
 }
 
 static struct platform_driver npcm_adc_driver = {
author maintainer
#158 lore raw

PATCH 155/315 iio: dac: ad3530r: Fix AD3531/AD3531R powerdown mode strings

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kim Seer Paller <[email protected]>

commit ebd250c2581ec46c64c73fdfa918c9a7f757505e upstream.

The AD3531/AD3531R has different output operating modes from the AD3530/AD3530R. According to the AD3531/AD3531R datasheet, the powerdown modes are:
01: 500 Ohm output impedance
10: 3.85 kOhm output impedance
11: 16 kOhm output impedance

The driver currently uses the AD3530R modes (1k, 7.7k, 32k) for all variants, which is incorrect for AD3531/AD3531R.

Add AD3531R-specific powerdown mode strings and assign them to the AD3531/AD3531R chip variants.

Fixes 93583174a3df ("iio: dac: ad3530r: Add driver for AD3530R and AD3531R")
---
 drivers/iio/dac/ad3530r.c |   54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
drivers/iio/dac/ad3530r.c +40 -14
@@ -108,6 +108,12 @@ static const char * const ad3530r_powerd
 	"32kohm_to_gnd",
 };
 
+static const char * const ad3531r_powerdown_modes[] = {
+	"500ohm_to_gnd",
+	"3.85kohm_to_gnd",
+	"16kohm_to_gnd",
+};
+
 static int ad3530r_get_powerdown_mode(struct iio_dev *indio_dev,
 				      const struct iio_chan_spec *chan)
 {
@@ -136,6 +142,13 @@ static const struct iio_enum ad3530r_pow
 	.set = ad3530r_set_powerdown_mode,
 };
 
+static const struct iio_enum ad3531r_powerdown_mode_enum = {
+	.items = ad3531r_powerdown_modes,
+	.num_items = ARRAY_SIZE(ad3531r_powerdown_modes),
+	.get = ad3530r_get_powerdown_mode,
+	.set = ad3530r_set_powerdown_mode,
+};
+
 static ssize_t ad3530r_get_dac_powerdown(struct iio_dev *indio_dev,
 					 uintptr_t private,
 					 const struct iio_chan_spec *chan,
@@ -279,7 +292,20 @@ static const struct iio_chan_spec_ext_in
 	{ }
 };
 
-#define AD3530R_CHAN(_chan)					\
+static const struct iio_chan_spec_ext_info ad3531r_ext_info[] = {
+	{
+		.name = "powerdown",
+		.shared = IIO_SEPARATE,
+		.read = ad3530r_get_dac_powerdown,
+		.write = ad3530r_set_dac_powerdown,
+	},
+	IIO_ENUM("powerdown_mode", IIO_SEPARATE, &ad3531r_powerdown_mode_enum),
+	IIO_ENUM_AVAILABLE("powerdown_mode", IIO_SHARED_BY_TYPE,
+			   &ad3531r_powerdown_mode_enum),
+	{ }
+};
+
+#define AD3530R_CHAN(_chan, _ext_info)				\
 {								\
 	.type = IIO_VOLTAGE,					\
 	.indexed = 1,						\
@@ -287,25 +313,25 @@ static const struct iio_chan_spec_ext_in
 	.output = 1,						\
 	.info_mask_separate = BIT(IIO_CHAN_INFO_RAW) |		\
 			      BIT(IIO_CHAN_INFO_SCALE),		\
-	.ext_info = ad3530r_ext_info,				\
+	.ext_info = _ext_info,					\
 }
 
 static const struct iio_chan_spec ad3530r_channels[] = {
-	AD3530R_CHAN(0),
-	AD3530R_CHAN(1),
-	AD3530R_CHAN(2),
-	AD3530R_CHAN(3),
-	AD3530R_CHAN(4),
-	AD3530R_CHAN(5),
-	AD3530R_CHAN(6),
-	AD3530R_CHAN(7),
+	AD3530R_CHAN(0, ad3530r_ext_info),
+	AD3530R_CHAN(1, ad3530r_ext_info),
+	AD3530R_CHAN(2, ad3530r_ext_info),
+	AD3530R_CHAN(3, ad3530r_ext_info),
+	AD3530R_CHAN(4, ad3530r_ext_info),
+	AD3530R_CHAN(5, ad3530r_ext_info),
+	AD3530R_CHAN(6, ad3530r_ext_info),
+	AD3530R_CHAN(7, ad3530r_ext_info),
 };
 
 static const struct iio_chan_spec ad3531r_channels[] = {
-	AD3530R_CHAN(0),
-	AD3530R_CHAN(1),
-	AD3530R_CHAN(2),
-	AD3530R_CHAN(3),
+	AD3530R_CHAN(0, ad3531r_ext_info),
+	AD3530R_CHAN(1, ad3531r_ext_info),
+	AD3530R_CHAN(2, ad3531r_ext_info),
+	AD3530R_CHAN(3, ad3531r_ext_info),
 };
 
 static const struct ad3530r_chip_info ad3530_chip = {
author maintainer
#159 lore raw

PATCH 156/315 iio: dac: max5821: fix return value check in powerdown sync

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Salah Triki <[email protected]>

commit d0a228d903425e653f18a4341e60c0538afb6d41 upstream.

The function max5821_sync_powerdown_mode() returned the result of i2c_master_send() directly. If a partial transfer occurred, it would be incorrectly treated as a success by the caller.

While the caller currently handles the positive return value of 2 as success, this patch refactors the function to return 0 on full success and -EIO on short writes. This ensures robust error handling for incomplete transfers and improves code maintainability by using sizeof(outbuf).

Fixes 472988972737 ("iio: add support of the max5821")
---
 drivers/iio/dac/max5821.c |    9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/iio/dac/max5821.c +8 -1
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ static int max5821_sync_powerdown_mode(s
 				       const struct iio_chan_spec *chan)
 {
 	u8 outbuf[2];
+	int ret;
 
 	outbuf[0] = MAX5821_EXTENDED_COMMAND_MODE;
 
@@ -103,7 +104,13 @@ static int max5821_sync_powerdown_mode(s
 	else
 		outbuf[1] |= MAX5821_EXTENDED_POWER_UP;
 
-	return i2c_master_send(data->client, outbuf, 2);
+	ret = i2c_master_send(data->client, outbuf, sizeof(outbuf));
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+	if (ret != sizeof(outbuf))
+		return -EIO;
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static ssize_t max5821_write_dac_powerdown(struct iio_dev *indio_dev,
author maintainer
#160 lore raw

PATCH 157/315 iio: dac: ad5686: fix ref bit initialization for single-channel parts

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Rodrigo Alencar <[email protected]>

commit ecae2ae606d493cf11457946436335bd0e726663 upstream.

The reference bit position was ignored when writing the register at the probe() function (!!val was used). When such bit is 1, internal voltage reference is disabled so that an external one can be used. For multi-channel devices, bit 0 of the Internal Reference Setup command behaves the same way, so AD5686_REF_BIT_MSK is created. The issue exists since support for single-channel devices were first introduced.

Fixes be1b24d24541 ("iio:dac:ad5686: Add AD5691R/AD5692R/AD5693/AD5693R support")
---
 drivers/iio/dac/ad5686.c |    6 +++---
 drivers/iio/dac/ad5686.h |    1 +
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/iio/dac/ad5686.c +3 -3
@@ -509,7 +509,7 @@ int ad5686_probe(struct device *dev,
 		break;
 	case AD5686_REGMAP:
 		cmd = AD5686_CMD_INTERNAL_REFER_SETUP;
-		ref_bit_msk = 0;
+		ref_bit_msk = AD5686_REF_BIT_MSK;
 		break;
 	case AD5693_REGMAP:
 		cmd = AD5686_CMD_CONTROL_REG;
@@ -520,9 +520,9 @@ int ad5686_probe(struct device *dev,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	val = (has_external_vref | ref_bit_msk);
+	val = has_external_vref ? ref_bit_msk : 0;
 
-	ret = st->write(st, cmd, 0, !!val);
+	ret = st->write(st, cmd, 0, val);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
drivers/iio/dac/ad5686.h +1 -0
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
 
 #define AD5310_REF_BIT_MSK			BIT(8)
 #define AD5683_REF_BIT_MSK			BIT(12)
+#define AD5686_REF_BIT_MSK			BIT(0)
 #define AD5693_REF_BIT_MSK			BIT(12)
 
 /**
author maintainer
#161 lore raw

PATCH 158/315 iio: dac: ad5686: fix input raw value check

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Rodrigo Alencar <[email protected]>

commit d01220ee5e43c65a206df827b39bf5cf5f7b9dce upstream.

Fix range check for input raw value, which is off by one, i.e., for a 10-bit DAC the max valid value is 1023, but 1 << 10 equals 1024, which passes the previous check, allowing an out-of-range write. The issue exists since the ad5686 driver was first introduced.

Fixes c2f37c8dcadc ("iio: dac: New driver for AD5686R, AD5685R, AD5684R Digital to analog converters")
---
 drivers/iio/dac/ad5686.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/iio/dac/ad5686.c +1 -1
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ static int ad5686_write_raw(struct iio_d
 
 	switch (mask) {
 	case IIO_CHAN_INFO_RAW:
-		if (val > (1 << chan->scan_type.realbits) || val < 0)
+		if (val >= (1 << chan->scan_type.realbits) || val < 0)
 			return -EINVAL;
 
 		mutex_lock(&st->lock);
author maintainer
#162 lore raw

PATCH 159/315 iio: dac: ad5686: acquire lock when doing powerdown control

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Rodrigo Alencar <[email protected]>

commit 5237c3175cae5ab05f18878cec3301a04403859e upstream.

Protect access of pwr_down_mode and pwr_down_mask fields with existing mutex lock. Each channel exposes their own attributes for controlling powerdown modes and powerdown state. This fixes potential race conditions as those the write functions perform non-atomic read-modify-write operations to those pwr_down_* fields. This issue exists since the ad5686 driver was first introduced.

Fixes c2f37c8dcadc ("iio: dac: New driver for AD5686R, AD5685R, AD5684R Digital to analog converters")
---
 drivers/iio/dac/ad5686.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
drivers/iio/dac/ad5686.c +8 -0
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ static int ad5686_get_powerdown_mode(str
 {
 	struct ad5686_state *st = iio_priv(indio_dev);
 
+	guard(mutex)(&st->lock);
+
 	return ((st->pwr_down_mode >> (chan->channel * 2)) & 0x3) - 1;
 }
 
@@ -39,6 +41,8 @@ static int ad5686_set_powerdown_mode(str
 {
 	struct ad5686_state *st = iio_priv(indio_dev);
 
+	guard(mutex)(&st->lock);
+
 	st->pwr_down_mode &= ~(0x3 << (chan->channel * 2));
 	st->pwr_down_mode |= ((mode + 1) << (chan->channel * 2));
 
@@ -57,6 +61,8 @@ static ssize_t ad5686_read_dac_powerdown
 {
 	struct ad5686_state *st = iio_priv(indio_dev);
 
+	guard(mutex)(&st->lock);
+
 	return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", !!(st->pwr_down_mask &
 				       (0x3 << (chan->channel * 2))));
 }
@@ -77,6 +83,8 @@ static ssize_t ad5686_write_dac_powerdow
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
+	guard(mutex)(&st->lock);
+
 	if (readin)
 		st->pwr_down_mask |= (0x3 << (chan->channel * 2));
 	else
author maintainer
#163 lore raw

PATCH 160/315 iio: dac: ad5686: fix powerdown control on dual-channel devices

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Rodrigo Alencar <[email protected]>

commit 8aeaf25a85263a7a43357e16ad78ab969f6f8aeb upstream.

Fix powerdown control by using a proper bit shift for the powerdown mask values. During initialization, powerdown bits are initialized so that unused bits are set to 1 and the correct bit shift is used. Dual-channel devices use one-hot encoding in the address and that reflects on the position of the powerdown bits, which are not channel-index based for that case. Quad-channel devices also use one-hot encoding for the channel address but the result of log2(address) coincides with the channel index value. Mask as 0x3U is used rather than 0x3, because shift can reach value of 30 (last channel of a 16-channel device), which would mess with the sign bit. The issue was introduced when first adding support for dual-channel devices, which overlooked powerdown control differences.

Fixes 7dc8faeab3e3 ("iio: dac: ad5686: add support for AD5338R")
---
 drivers/iio/dac/ad5686.c |   40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
drivers/iio/dac/ad5686.c +30 -10
@@ -25,26 +25,37 @@ static const char * const ad5686_powerdo
 	"three_state"
 };
 
+static inline unsigned int ad5686_pd_mask_shift(const struct iio_chan_spec *chan)
+{
+	if (chan->channel == chan->address)
+		return chan->channel * 2;
+
+	/* one-hot encoding is used in dual/quad channel devices */
+	return __ffs(chan->address) * 2;
+}
+
 static int ad5686_get_powerdown_mode(struct iio_dev *indio_dev,
 				     const struct iio_chan_spec *chan)
 {
+	unsigned int shift = ad5686_pd_mask_shift(chan);
 	struct ad5686_state *st = iio_priv(indio_dev);
 
 	guard(mutex)(&st->lock);
 
-	return ((st->pwr_down_mode >> (chan->channel * 2)) & 0x3) - 1;
+	return ((st->pwr_down_mode >> shift) & 0x3U) - 1;
 }
 
 static int ad5686_set_powerdown_mode(struct iio_dev *indio_dev,
 				     const struct iio_chan_spec *chan,
 				     unsigned int mode)
 {
+	unsigned int shift = ad5686_pd_mask_shift(chan);
 	struct ad5686_state *st = iio_priv(indio_dev);
 
 	guard(mutex)(&st->lock);
 
-	st->pwr_down_mode &= ~(0x3 << (chan->channel * 2));
-	st->pwr_down_mode |= ((mode + 1) << (chan->channel * 2));
+	st->pwr_down_mode &= ~(0x3U << shift);
+	st->pwr_down_mode |= (mode + 1) << shift;
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -59,12 +70,12 @@ static const struct iio_enum ad5686_powe
 static ssize_t ad5686_read_dac_powerdown(struct iio_dev *indio_dev,
 		uintptr_t private, const struct iio_chan_spec *chan, char *buf)
 {
+	unsigned int shift = ad5686_pd_mask_shift(chan);
 	struct ad5686_state *st = iio_priv(indio_dev);
 
 	guard(mutex)(&st->lock);
 
-	return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", !!(st->pwr_down_mask &
-				       (0x3 << (chan->channel * 2))));
+	return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", !!(st->pwr_down_mask & (0x3U << shift)));
 }
 
 static ssize_t ad5686_write_dac_powerdown(struct iio_dev *indio_dev,
@@ -86,9 +97,9 @@ static ssize_t ad5686_write_dac_powerdow
 	guard(mutex)(&st->lock);
 
 	if (readin)
-		st->pwr_down_mask |= (0x3 << (chan->channel * 2));
+		st->pwr_down_mask |= 0x3U << ad5686_pd_mask_shift(chan);
 	else
-		st->pwr_down_mask &= ~(0x3 << (chan->channel * 2));
+		st->pwr_down_mask &= ~(0x3U << ad5686_pd_mask_shift(chan));
 
 	switch (st->chip_info->regmap_type) {
 	case AD5310_REGMAP:
@@ -468,7 +479,7 @@ int ad5686_probe(struct device *dev,
 {
 	struct ad5686_state *st;
 	struct iio_dev *indio_dev;
-	unsigned int val, ref_bit_msk;
+	unsigned int val, ref_bit_msk, shift;
 	bool has_external_vref;
 	u8 cmd;
 	int ret, i;
@@ -492,9 +503,18 @@ int ad5686_probe(struct device *dev,
 	has_external_vref = ret != -ENODEV;
 	st->vref_mv = has_external_vref ? ret / 1000 : st->chip_info->int_vref_mv;
 
+	/* Initialize masks to all ones provided the max shift (last channel) */
+	shift = ad5686_pd_mask_shift(&st->chip_info->channels[st->chip_info->num_channels - 1]);
+	st->pwr_down_mask = GENMASK(shift + 1, 0);
+	st->pwr_down_mode = GENMASK(shift + 1, 0);
+
 	/* Set all the power down mode for all channels to 1K pulldown */
-	for (i = 0; i < st->chip_info->num_channels; i++)
-		st->pwr_down_mode |= (0x01 << (i * 2));
+	for (i = 0; i < st->chip_info->num_channels; i++) {
+		shift = ad5686_pd_mask_shift(&st->chip_info->channels[i]);
+		st->pwr_down_mask &= ~(0x3U << shift); /* powered up state */
+		st->pwr_down_mode &= ~(0x3U << shift);
+		st->pwr_down_mode |= 0x01U << shift;
+	}
 
 	indio_dev->name = name;
 	indio_dev->info = &ad5686_info;
author maintainer
#164 lore raw

PATCH 161/315 iio: adc: mt6359: fix unchecked return value in mt6358_read_imp

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Salah Triki <[email protected]>

commit f9bbd943c34a9ad60e593a4b99ce2394e4e2381b upstream.

In mt6358_read_imp(), the variable val_v is passed to regmap_read() but the return value is not checked. If the read fails, val_v remains uninitialized and its random stack content is subsequently reported as a measurement result.

Initialize val_v to zero to ensure a predictable value is reported in case of bus failure and to prevent potential stack data leakage. This also satisfies static analyzers that might otherwise flag the variable as used uninitialized.

Fixes 3587914bf61d ("iio: adc: Add support for MediaTek MT6357/8/9 Auxiliary ADC")
---
 drivers/iio/adc/mt6359-auxadc.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/iio/adc/mt6359-auxadc.c +1 -0
@@ -497,6 +497,7 @@ static int mt6358_read_imp(struct mt6359
 		return ret;
 
 	/* Read the params before stopping */
+	val_v = 0;
 	regmap_read(regmap, reg_adc0 + (cinfo->imp_adc_num << 1), &val_v);
 
 	mt6358_stop_imp_conv(adc_dev);
author maintainer
#165 lore raw

PATCH 162/315 iio: adc: viperboard: Fix error handling in vprbrd_iio_read_raw

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Salah Triki <[email protected]>

commit 422b5bbf333f75fb486855ad0eedc23cf21f3277 upstream.

The driver proceeds to the reception phase even if the preceding transmission fails.

This uses a goto error label for an early bail out and ensures the mutex is properly unlocked in case of failure.

---
 drivers/iio/adc/viperboard_adc.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/iio/adc/viperboard_adc.c +3 -1
@@ -70,8 +70,10 @@ static int vprbrd_iio_read_raw(struct ii
 			VPRBRD_USB_TYPE_OUT, 0x0000, 0x0000, admsg,
 			sizeof(struct vprbrd_adc_msg), VPRBRD_USB_TIMEOUT_MS);
 		if (ret != sizeof(struct vprbrd_adc_msg)) {
-			dev_err(&iio_dev->dev, "usb send error on adc read\n");
+			mutex_unlock(&vb->lock);
 			error = -EREMOTEIO;
+			dev_err(&iio_dev->dev, "usb send error on adc read\n");
+			goto error;
 		}
 
 		ret = usb_control_msg(vb->usb_dev,
author maintainer
#166 lore raw

PATCH 163/315 iio: adc: ad4695: Fix call ordering in offload buffer postenable

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Radu Sabau <[email protected]>

commit 1a772719318c11e146f6fbe621fffd230a6f456a upstream.

ad4695_enter_advanced_sequencer_mode() was called after spi_offload_trigger_enable(). That is wrong because ad4695_enter_advanced_sequencer_mode() issues regular SPI transfers to put the ADC into advanced sequencer mode, and not all SPI offload capable controllers support regular SPI transfers while offloading is enabled.

Fix this by calling ad4695_enter_advanced_sequencer_mode() before spi_offload_trigger_enable(), so the ADC is fully configured before the first CNV pulse can occur. This is consistent with the same constraint that already applies to the BUSY_GP_EN write above it.

Update the error unwind labels accordingly: add err_exit_conversion_mode so that a failure of spi_offload_trigger_enable() correctly exits conversion mode before clearing BUSY_GP_EN.

Fixes f09f140e3ea8 ("iio: adc: ad4695: Add support for SPI offload")
---
 drivers/iio/adc/ad4695.c | 23 ++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
drivers/iio/adc/ad4695.c +8 -15
index cda419638d9a..53642de7330d 100644
@@ -876,14 +876,14 @@ static int ad4695_offload_buffer_postenable(struct iio_dev *indio_dev)
 	if (ret)
 		goto err_unoptimize_message;
 
-	ret = spi_offload_trigger_enable(st->offload, st->offload_trigger,
-					 &config);
+	ret = ad4695_enter_advanced_sequencer_mode(st, num_slots);
 	if (ret)
 		goto err_disable_busy_output;
 
-	ret = ad4695_enter_advanced_sequencer_mode(st, num_slots);
+	ret = spi_offload_trigger_enable(st->offload, st->offload_trigger,
+					 &config);
 	if (ret)
-		goto err_offload_trigger_disable;
+		goto err_exit_conversion_mode;
 
 	mutex_lock(&st->cnv_pwm_lock);
 	pwm_get_state(st->cnv_pwm, &state);
@@ -895,23 +895,16 @@ static int ad4695_offload_buffer_postenable(struct iio_dev *indio_dev)
 	ret = pwm_apply_might_sleep(st->cnv_pwm, &state);
 	mutex_unlock(&st->cnv_pwm_lock);
 	if (ret)
-		goto err_offload_exit_conversion_mode;
+		goto err_offload_trigger_disable;
 
 	return 0;
 
-err_offload_exit_conversion_mode:
-	/*
-	 * We have to unwind in a different order to avoid triggering offload.
-	 * ad4695_exit_conversion_mode() triggers a conversion, so it has to be
-	 * done after spi_offload_trigger_disable().
-	 */
-	spi_offload_trigger_disable(st->offload, st->offload_trigger);
-	ad4695_exit_conversion_mode(st);
-	goto err_disable_busy_output;
-
 err_offload_trigger_disable:
 	spi_offload_trigger_disable(st->offload, st->offload_trigger);
 
+err_exit_conversion_mode:
+	ad4695_exit_conversion_mode(st);
+
 err_disable_busy_output:
 	regmap_clear_bits(st->regmap, AD4695_REG_GP_MODE,
 			  AD4695_REG_GP_MODE_BUSY_GP_EN);
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
author maintainer
#167 lore raw

PATCH 164/315 iio: gyro: itg3200: fix i2c read into the wrong stack location

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Carlier <[email protected]>

commit 6bdc3023d62ed5c7d591f0eb27a5adb37fb892ae upstream.

itg3200_read_all_channels() takes __be16 *buf' as a parameter and fills the i2c_msg destination as (char *)&buf'. Since buf' is the parameter (a pointer), &buf' is the address of the local pointer slot on the stack of itg3200_read_all_channels(), not the address of the caller's scan buffer. The (char *) cast hides the type mismatch.

i2c_transfer() therefore writes ITG3200_SCAN_ELEMENTS * sizeof(s16) = 8 bytes into the parameter's stack slot, which is discarded when the function returns. The caller's scan buffer in itg3200_trigger_handler() is never written to, so iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp() pushes uninitialised stack contents to userspace via /dev/iio:deviceX every scan -- both a functional bug (no actual gyroscope or temperature data is delivered through the triggered buffer) and an information leak.

The non-buffered read_raw() path is unaffected: it goes through itg3200_read_reg_s16() which uses `&out' on a local s16 value, where that is correct.

Drop the spurious `&' so the i2c read writes into the caller's buffer.

---
 drivers/iio/gyro/itg3200_buffer.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/iio/gyro/itg3200_buffer.c +1 -1
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ static int itg3200_read_all_channels(str
 			.addr = i2c->addr,
 			.flags = i2c->flags | I2C_M_RD,
 			.len = ITG3200_SCAN_ELEMENTS * sizeof(s16),
-			.buf = (char *)&buf,
+			.buf = (char *)buf,
 		},
 	};
 
author maintainer
#168 lore raw

PATCH 165/315 iio: gyro: adis16260: fix division by zero in write_raw

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Antoniu Miclaus <[email protected]>

commit 761e8b489e6cf166c574034b70637f8a7eadd0ee upstream.

Add a validation check for the sampling frequency value before using it as a divisor. A user writing zero to the sampling_frequency sysfs attribute triggers a division by zero in the kernel.

Fixes 089a41985c6c ("staging: iio: adis16260 digital gyro driver")
---
 drivers/iio/gyro/adis16260.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/iio/gyro/adis16260.c +3 -0
@@ -287,6 +287,9 @@ static int adis16260_write_raw(struct ii
 		addr = adis16260_addresses[chan->scan_index][1];
 		return adis_write_reg_16(adis, addr, val);
 	case IIO_CHAN_INFO_SAMP_FREQ:
+		if (val <= 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
 		if (spi_get_device_id(adis->spi)->driver_data)
 			t = 256 / val;
 		else
author maintainer
#169 lore raw

PATCH 166/315 iio: ssp_sensors: cancel delayed work_refresh on remove

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sanjay Chitroda <[email protected]>

commit eedf7602fbd929e97e0c480da501dc7a34beb2a8 upstream.

The work_refresh may still be pending or running when the device is removed, cancel the delayed work_refresh in remove path.

Fixes 50dd64d57eee ("iio: common: ssp_sensors: Add sensorhub driver")
---
 drivers/iio/common/ssp_sensors/ssp_dev.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/iio/common/ssp_sensors/ssp_dev.c +1 -0
@@ -590,6 +590,7 @@ static void ssp_remove(struct spi_device
 	ssp_clean_pending_list(data);
 
 	free_irq(data->spi->irq, data);
+	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&data->work_refresh);
 
 	timer_delete_sync(&data->wdt_timer);
 	cancel_work_sync(&data->work_wdt);
author maintainer
#170 lore raw

PATCH 167/315 iio: temperature: tsys01: fix broken PROM checksum validation

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Salah Triki <[email protected]>

commit 4701e471c16866e7aa8f5e6a3a6b0d31e097e2c9 upstream.

The current implementation of tsys01_crc_valid() incorrectly sums the first word (n_prom[0]) repeatedly instead of iterating over the 8 words retrieved from the PROM. This leads to a checksum mismatch and probe failure on hardware.

According to the TSYS01 datasheet, the PROM consists of 8 words. A valid check must iterate through all 8 words to verify the integrity of the calibration data. The current driver only checks the first word 8 times.

Note: This fix was identified during a code audit and is based on datasheet specifications. It has not been tested on real hardware.

Fixes 43e53407f680 ("Add tsys01 meas-spec driver support")
---
 drivers/iio/temperature/tsys01.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/iio/temperature/tsys01.c +1 -1
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ static bool tsys01_crc_valid(u16 *n_prom
 	u8 sum = 0;
 
 	for (cnt = 0; cnt < TSYS01_PROM_WORDS_NB; cnt++)
-		sum += ((n_prom[0] >> 8) + (n_prom[0] & 0xFF));
+		sum += ((n_prom[cnt] >> 8) + (n_prom[cnt] & 0xFF));
 
 	return (sum == 0);
 }
author maintainer
#171 lore raw

PATCH 168/315 iio: magnetometer: st_magn: fix default DRDY pin selection for LIS2MDL

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Advait Dhamorikar <[email protected]>

commit 49f79cd28f1e3333cbe0d616ce59ead0b24bf34e upstream.

The device tree binding for st,lis2mdl does not support st,drdy-int-pin property. However, when no platform data is provided and the property is absent, the driver falls back to default_magn_pdata which hardcodes drdy_int_pin = 2. This causes st_sensors_set_drdy_int_pin to fail with -EINVAL because the LIS2MDL sensor settings have no INT2 DRDY mask defined.

Fix this by checking the sensor's INT2 DRDY mask availability at probe time and selecting the appropriate default pin. Sensors that do not support INT2 DRDY will default to INT1, while all others retain the existing default of INT2.

Fixes 38934daf7b5c ("iio: magnetometer: st_magn: Provide default platform data")
---
 drivers/iio/magnetometer/st_magn_core.c |   13 +++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/iio/magnetometer/st_magn_core.c +11 -2
@@ -506,6 +506,11 @@ static const struct st_sensors_platform_
 	.drdy_int_pin = 2,
 };
 
+/* LIS2MDL only supports DRDY on INT1 */
+static const struct st_sensors_platform_data alt_magn_pdata = {
+	.drdy_int_pin = 1,
+};
+
 static int st_magn_read_raw(struct iio_dev *indio_dev,
 			struct iio_chan_spec const *ch, int *val,
 							int *val2, long mask)
@@ -628,8 +633,12 @@ int st_magn_common_probe(struct iio_dev
 	mdata->current_fullscale = &mdata->sensor_settings->fs.fs_avl[0];
 	mdata->odr = mdata->sensor_settings->odr.odr_avl[0].hz;
 
-	if (!pdata)
-		pdata = (struct st_sensors_platform_data *)&default_magn_pdata;
+	if (!pdata) {
+		if (mdata->sensor_settings->drdy_irq.int2.mask)
+			pdata = (struct st_sensors_platform_data *)&default_magn_pdata;
+		else
+			pdata = (struct st_sensors_platform_data *)&alt_magn_pdata;
+	}
 
 	err = st_sensors_init_sensor(indio_dev, pdata);
 	if (err < 0)
author maintainer
#172 lore raw

PATCH 169/315 iio: light: veml6070: Fix resource leak in probe error path

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Felix Gu <[email protected]>

commit b66f922f6a4fa92840f662fbcfeb4f8a0f774bcc upstream.

The driver calls i2c_new_dummy_device() to create a dummy device, then calls i2c_smbus_write_byte(). If i2c_smbus_write_byte() fails and returns, the cleanup via devm_add_action_or_reset() was never registered, so the dummy device leaks.

Switch to devm_i2c_new_dummy_device() which registers cleanup atomically with device creation, eliminating the error-path window.

Fixes 7501bff87c3e ("iio: light: veml6070: add action for i2c_unregister_device")
---
 drivers/iio/light/veml6070.c |   14 ++------------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
drivers/iio/light/veml6070.c +2 -12
@@ -245,13 +245,6 @@ static const struct iio_info veml6070_in
 	.write_raw = veml6070_write_raw,
 };
 
-static void veml6070_i2c_unreg(void *p)
-{
-	struct veml6070_data *data = p;
-
-	i2c_unregister_device(data->client2);
-}
-
 static int veml6070_probe(struct i2c_client *client)
 {
 	struct veml6070_data *data;
@@ -281,7 +274,8 @@ static int veml6070_probe(struct i2c_cli
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
-	data->client2 = i2c_new_dummy_device(client->adapter, VEML6070_ADDR_DATA_LSB);
+	data->client2 = devm_i2c_new_dummy_device(&client->dev, client->adapter,
+						  VEML6070_ADDR_DATA_LSB);
 	if (IS_ERR(data->client2))
 		return dev_err_probe(&client->dev, PTR_ERR(data->client2),
 				     "i2c device for second chip address failed\n");
@@ -292,10 +286,6 @@ static int veml6070_probe(struct i2c_cli
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
-	ret = devm_add_action_or_reset(&client->dev, veml6070_i2c_unreg, data);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		return ret;
-
 	return devm_iio_device_register(&client->dev, indio_dev);
 }
 
author maintainer
#173 lore raw

PATCH 170/315 iio: Fix iio_multiply_value use in iio_read_channel_processed_scale

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Svyatoslav Ryhel <[email protected]>

commit bb21ee31f5753a7972148798fd7dfb841dd33bdb upstream.

The function iio_multiply_value returns IIO_VAL_INT (1) on success or a negative error number on failure, while iio_read_channel_processed_scale should return an error code or 0. This creates a situation where the expected result is treated as an error. Fix this by checking the iio_multiply_value result separately, instead of passing it as a return value.

Fixes 05f958d003c9 ("iio: Improve iio_read_channel_processed_scale() precision")
---
 drivers/iio/inkern.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/iio/inkern.c +5 -1
index 0df0ab3de270..9ce20cb05a9b 100644
@@ -738,7 +738,11 @@ int iio_read_channel_processed_scale(struct iio_channel *chan, int *val,
 		if (ret < 0)
 			return ret;
 
-		return iio_multiply_value(val, scale, ret, pval, pval2);
+		ret = iio_multiply_value(val, scale, ret, pval, pval2);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+
+		return 0;
 	} else {
 		ret = iio_channel_read(chan, val, NULL, IIO_CHAN_INFO_RAW);
 		if (ret < 0)
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
author maintainer
#174 lore raw

PATCH 171/315 iio: chemical: mhz19b: reject oversized serial replies

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Pengpeng Hou <[email protected]>

commit 673478bc29cf72010faaf293c1c8c667393335a0 upstream.

mhz19b_receive_buf() appends each serdev chunk into the fixed MHZ19B_CMD_SIZE receive buffer and advances buf_idx by len without checking that the chunk fits in the remaining space. A large callback can therefore overflow st->buf before the command path validates the reply.

Reset the reply state before each command and reject oversized serial replies before copying them into the fixed buffer. When an oversized reply is detected, wake the waiter and report -EMSGSIZE instead of overwriting st->buf.

Fixes 4572a70b3681 ("iio: chemical: Add support for Winsen MHZ19B CO2 sensor")
---
 drivers/iio/chemical/mhz19b.c |   17 +++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
drivers/iio/chemical/mhz19b.c +17 -0
@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ struct mhz19b_state {
 	struct completion buf_ready;
 
 	u8 buf_idx;
+	bool buf_overflow;
+
 	/*
 	 * Serdev receive buffer.
 	 * When data is received from the MH-Z19B,
@@ -106,6 +108,10 @@ static int mhz19b_serdev_cmd(struct iio_
 	cmd_buf[8] = mhz19b_get_checksum(cmd_buf);
 
 	/* Write buf to uart ctrl synchronously */
+	st->buf_idx = 0;
+	st->buf_overflow = false;
+	reinit_completion(&st->buf_ready);
+
 	ret = serdev_device_write(serdev, cmd_buf, MHZ19B_CMD_SIZE, 0);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
@@ -121,6 +127,9 @@ static int mhz19b_serdev_cmd(struct iio_
 		if (!ret)
 			return -ETIMEDOUT;
 
+		if (st->buf_overflow)
+			return -EMSGSIZE;
+
 		if (st->buf[8] != mhz19b_get_checksum(st->buf)) {
 			dev_err(dev, "checksum err");
 			return -EINVAL;
@@ -240,6 +249,14 @@ static size_t mhz19b_receive_buf(struct
 {
 	struct iio_dev *indio_dev = dev_get_drvdata(&serdev->dev);
 	struct mhz19b_state *st = iio_priv(indio_dev);
+	size_t remaining = MHZ19B_CMD_SIZE - st->buf_idx;
+
+	if (len > remaining) {
+		st->buf_idx = 0;
+		st->buf_overflow = true;
+		complete(&st->buf_ready);
+		return len;
+	}
 
 	memcpy(st->buf + st->buf_idx, data, len);
 	st->buf_idx += len;
author maintainer
#175 lore raw

PATCH 172/315 iio: chemical: scd30: fix division by zero in write_raw

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Antoniu Miclaus <[email protected]>

commit 5aba4f94b225617a55fed442a70329b2ee19c0a5 upstream.

Add a zero check for val2 before using it as a divisor when setting the sampling frequency. A user writing a zero fractional part to the sampling_frequency sysfs attribute triggers a division by zero in the kernel.

Fixes 64b3d8b1b0f5 ("iio: chemical: scd30: add core driver")
---
 drivers/iio/chemical/scd30_core.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/iio/chemical/scd30_core.c +1 -1
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ static int scd30_write_raw(struct iio_de
 	guard(mutex)(&state->lock);
 	switch (mask) {
 	case IIO_CHAN_INFO_SAMP_FREQ:
-		if (val)
+		if (val || !val2)
 			return -EINVAL;
 
 		val = 1000000000 / val2;
author maintainer
#176 lore raw

PATCH 173/315 iio: light: cm3323: fix reg_conf not being initialized correctly

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Aldo Conte <[email protected]>

commit 1f4f0bcc5255dec5c4c3a1551bf49d8c33b69b20 upstream.

The code stores the return value of i2c_smbus_write_word_data() in data->reg_conf; however, this value represents the result of the write operation and not the value actually written to the configuration register. This meant that the contents of data->reg_conf did not truly reflect the contents
of the hardware register.

Instead, save the value of the register before the write and use this value in the I2C write.

The bug was found by code inspection: i2c_smbus_write_word_data() returns 0 on success, not the value written to the register.

Tested using i2c-stub on a Raspberry Pi 3B running a custom 6.19.10 kernel. Before loading the driver, the configuration register 0x00 CM3323_CMD_CONF was populated with 0x0030 using
i2cset -y 11 0x10 0x00 0x0030 w, encoding an integration time of 320ms in bits[6:4].

Due to incorrect initialization of data->reg_conf in cm3323_init(), the print of integration_time returns 0.040000 instead of the expected 0.320000. This happens because the read of the integration_time depends on cm3323_get_it_bits() that is based on the value of data->reg_conf, which is erroneously set to 0.

With this fix applied, data->reg_conf correctly saves 0x0030 after init and the successive integration_time reports 0.320000 as expected.

Fixes 8b0544263761 ("iio: light: Add support for Capella CM3323 color sensor")
---
 drivers/iio/light/cm3323.c |    5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/iio/light/cm3323.c +2 -3
@@ -89,15 +89,14 @@ static int cm3323_init(struct iio_dev *i
 
 	/* enable sensor and set auto force mode */
 	ret &= ~(CM3323_CONF_SD_BIT | CM3323_CONF_AF_BIT);
+	data->reg_conf = ret;
 
-	ret = i2c_smbus_write_word_data(data->client, CM3323_CMD_CONF, ret);
+	ret = i2c_smbus_write_word_data(data->client, CM3323_CMD_CONF, data->reg_conf);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		dev_err(&data->client->dev, "Error writing reg_conf\n");
 		return ret;
 	}
 
-	data->reg_conf = ret;
-
 	return 0;
 }
 
author maintainer
#177 lore raw

PATCH 174/315 iio: buffer: hw-consumer: fix use-after-free in error path

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Felix Gu <[email protected]>

commit 6f5ed4f2c7c83f33344e0ba179f72a12e5dad4a4 upstream.

In the err_put_buffers cleanup path of iio_hw_consumer_alloc(), the code was using list_for_each_entry() to iterate through buffers while calling iio_buffer_put() which can free the current buffer if refcount drops to 0. The list_for_each_entry() loop macro then evaluates buf->head.next to continue iteration, accessing the freed buffer.

Fix this by using list_for_each_entry_safe().

---
 drivers/iio/buffer/industrialio-hw-consumer.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/iio/buffer/industrialio-hw-consumer.c +2 -2
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ static struct hw_consumer_buffer *iio_hw
  */
 struct iio_hw_consumer *iio_hw_consumer_alloc(struct device *dev)
 {
-	struct hw_consumer_buffer *buf;
+	struct hw_consumer_buffer *buf, *tmp;
 	struct iio_hw_consumer *hwc;
 	struct iio_channel *chan;
 	int ret;
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ struct iio_hw_consumer *iio_hw_consumer_
 	return hwc;
 
 err_put_buffers:
-	list_for_each_entry(buf, &hwc->buffers, head)
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(buf, tmp, &hwc->buffers, head)
 		iio_buffer_put(&buf->buffer);
 	iio_channel_release_all(hwc->channels);
 err_free_hwc:
author maintainer
#178 lore raw

PATCH 175/315 iio: buffer: Fix DMA fence leak in iio_buffer_enqueue_dmabuf()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Benoît Monin <[email protected]>

commit a093999355084bdbfe6e97f1dd232e58a1525f0b upstream.

iio_buffer_enqueue_dmabuf() allocates a struct iio_dma_fence (104 bytes, kmalloc-128) via kmalloc_obj()+dma_fence_init(), which sets the initial kref to 1. It then calls dma_resv_add_fence() which takes a second reference (kref=2), and stores a raw pointer in block->fence.

On the success path the function returns without calling dma_fence_put() to release the initial reference, so every buffer enqueue permanently leaks one kmalloc-128 allocation.

The iio_buffer_cleanup() work item only releases the temporary reference taken during completion signalling by iio_buffer_signal_dmabuf_done(); the initial reference from dma_fence_init() is never released.

With four iio_rwdev instances at 240kHz and 512 samples per buffer, this produces ~1875 kmalloc-128 allocations per second matching the observed slab growth exactly. A test with ftrace confirmed that the dma_fence_destroy event was never triggered.

Fix by calling dma_fence_put() after dma_resv_add_fence(), transferring ownership of the fence to the DMA reservation object. The DMA fence then gets properly discarded after being signalled.

Fixes 3e26d9f08fbe0 ("iio: core: Add new DMABUF interface infrastructure")
---
 drivers/iio/industrialio-buffer.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/iio/industrialio-buffer.c +1 -0
@@ -1911,6 +1911,7 @@ static int iio_buffer_enqueue_dmabuf(str
 
 	dma_resv_add_fence(dmabuf->resv, &fence->base,
 			   dma_to_ram ? DMA_RESV_USAGE_WRITE : DMA_RESV_USAGE_READ);
+	dma_fence_put(&fence->base);
 	dma_resv_unlock(dmabuf->resv);
 
 	cookie = dma_fence_begin_signalling();
author maintainer
#179 lore raw

PATCH 176/315 USB: serial: omninet: fix memory corruption with small endpoint

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

commit 60df93d30f9bdd27db17c4d80ed80ef718d7226b upstream.

Make sure that the bulk-out buffers are at least as large as the hardcoded transfer size to avoid user-controlled slab corruption should a malicious device report a smaller endpoint max packet size than expected.

---
 drivers/usb/serial/omninet.c |    9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/serial/omninet.c +5 -4
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@
 /* This one seems to be a re-branded ZyXEL device */
 #define BT_IGNITIONPRO_ID	0x2000
 
+#define OMNINET_HEADERLEN	4
+#define OMNINET_BULKOUTSIZE	64
+#define OMNINET_PAYLOADSIZE	(OMNINET_BULKOUTSIZE - OMNINET_HEADERLEN)
+
 /* function prototypes */
 static void omninet_process_read_urb(struct urb *urb);
 static int omninet_prepare_write_buffer(struct usb_serial_port *port,
@@ -54,6 +58,7 @@ static struct usb_serial_driver zyxel_om
 	.description =		"ZyXEL - omni.net usb",
 	.id_table =		id_table,
 	.num_bulk_out =		2,
+	.bulk_out_size =	OMNINET_BULKOUTSIZE,
 	.calc_num_ports =	omninet_calc_num_ports,
 	.port_probe =		omninet_port_probe,
 	.port_remove =		omninet_port_remove,
@@ -130,10 +135,6 @@ static void omninet_port_remove(struct u
 	kfree(od);
 }
 
-#define OMNINET_HEADERLEN	4
-#define OMNINET_BULKOUTSIZE	64
-#define OMNINET_PAYLOADSIZE	(OMNINET_BULKOUTSIZE - OMNINET_HEADERLEN)
-
 static void omninet_process_read_urb(struct urb *urb)
 {
 	struct usb_serial_port *port = urb->context;
author maintainer
#180 lore raw

PATCH 177/315 usb: cdns3: gadget: fix request skipping after clearing halt

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yongchao Wu <[email protected]>

commit c8778ff817a7047d6848fefba99dcb27b1bf01fe upstream.

According to the cdns3 datasheet, the EPRST (Endpoint Reset) command causes the DMA engine to reposition its internal pointer to the next Transfer Descriptor (TD) if it was already processing one.

This issue is consistently observed during the ADB identification process on macOS hosts, where the host issues a Clear_Halt. Although commit 4bf2dd65135a ("usb: cdns3: gadget: toggle cycle bit before reset endpoint") attempted to avoid DMA advance by toggling the cycle bit, trace logs show that on certain hosts like macOS, the DMA pointer (EP_TRADDR) still shifts after EPRST:

cdns3_ctrl_req: Clear Endpoint Feature(Halt ep1out)
cdns3_doorbell_epx: ep1out, ep_trbaddr f9c04030 <-- Should be f9c04000
cdns3_gadget_giveback: ep1out: req: ... length: 16384/16384

As shown above, the DMA pointer jumped to the next TD, causing the controller to skip the initial TRBs of the request. This leads to data misalignment and ADB protocol hangs on macOS.

Fix this by manually restoring the EP_TRADDR register to the starting physical address of the current request after the EPRST operation is complete.

---
 drivers/usb/cdns3/cdns3-gadget.c |   12 +++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/cdns3/cdns3-gadget.c +11 -1
@@ -2817,9 +2817,19 @@ int __cdns3_gadget_ep_clear_halt(struct
 	priv_ep->flags &= ~(EP_STALLED | EP_STALL_PENDING);
 
 	if (request) {
-		if (trb)
+		if (trb) {
 			*trb = trb_tmp;
 
+			/*
+			 * Per datasheet, EPRST causes DMA to reposition to the next TD.
+			 * Manually reset EP_TRADDR to the current TRB to prevent
+			 * the hardware from skipping the interrupted request.
+			 */
+			writel(EP_TRADDR_TRADDR(priv_ep->trb_pool_dma +
+						priv_req->start_trb * TRB_SIZE),
+						&priv_dev->regs->ep_traddr);
+		}
+
 		cdns3_rearm_transfer(priv_ep, 1);
 	}
 
author maintainer
#181 lore raw

PATCH 178/315 usb: cdns3: plat: fix leaked usb2_phy initialization on usb3_phy acquisition failure

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Peter Chen <[email protected]>

commit e6970cda63fd4b4546aeed9d0e2f53a7c95cd09c upstream.

Move usb2_phy initialization after usb3_phy acquisition.

---
 drivers/usb/cdns3/cdns3-plat.c |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/cdns3/cdns3-plat.c +4 -4
@@ -126,15 +126,15 @@ static int cdns3_plat_probe(struct platf
 		return dev_err_probe(dev, PTR_ERR(cdns->usb2_phy),
 				     "Failed to get cdn3,usb2-phy\n");
 
-	ret = phy_init(cdns->usb2_phy);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-
 	cdns->usb3_phy = devm_phy_optional_get(dev, "cdns3,usb3-phy");
 	if (IS_ERR(cdns->usb3_phy))
 		return dev_err_probe(dev, PTR_ERR(cdns->usb3_phy),
 				     "Failed to get cdn3,usb3-phy\n");
 
+	ret = phy_init(cdns->usb2_phy);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
 	ret = phy_init(cdns->usb3_phy);
 	if (ret)
 		goto err_phy3_init;
author maintainer
#182 lore raw

PATCH 179/315 usb: cdns3: plat: fix unbalanced pm_runtime_forbid() call permanently leaks the runtime PM usage counter across bind/unbind cycles

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Peter Chen <[email protected]>

commit ae6f3b82324e4f39ad8443c9020787e6fc889637 upstream.

Call pm_runtime_allow(dev) conditionally at cdns3_plat_remove.

---
 drivers/usb/cdns3/cdns3-plat.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/cdns3/cdns3-plat.c +3 -0
@@ -186,6 +186,9 @@ static void cdns3_plat_remove(struct pla
 	struct device *dev = cdns->dev;
 
 	pm_runtime_get_sync(dev);
+	if (!(cdns->pdata && (cdns->pdata->quirks & CDNS3_DEFAULT_PM_RUNTIME_ALLOW)))
+		pm_runtime_allow(dev);
+
 	pm_runtime_disable(dev);
 	pm_runtime_put_noidle(dev);
 	cdns_remove(cdns);
author maintainer
#183 lore raw

PATCH 180/315 usb: dwc2: Fix use after free in debug code

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>

commit 9ea06a3fbf9f16e0d98c52cb3b99642be15ec281 upstream.

We're not allowed to dereference "urb" after calling usb_hcd_giveback_urb() so save the urb->status ahead of time.

---
 drivers/usb/dwc2/hcd.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/dwc2/hcd.c +3 -1
@@ -4804,6 +4804,7 @@ static int _dwc2_hcd_urb_dequeue(struct
 	struct dwc2_hsotg *hsotg = dwc2_hcd_to_hsotg(hcd);
 	int rc;
 	unsigned long flags;
+	int urb_status;
 
 	dev_dbg(hsotg->dev, "DWC OTG HCD URB Dequeue\n");
 	dwc2_dump_urb_info(hcd, urb, "urb_dequeue");
@@ -4828,11 +4829,12 @@ static int _dwc2_hcd_urb_dequeue(struct
 
 	/* Higher layer software sets URB status */
 	spin_unlock(&hsotg->lock);
+	urb_status = urb->status;
 	usb_hcd_giveback_urb(hcd, urb, status);
 	spin_lock(&hsotg->lock);
 
 	dev_dbg(hsotg->dev, "Called usb_hcd_giveback_urb()\n");
-	dev_dbg(hsotg->dev, "  urb->status = %d\n", urb->status);
+	dev_dbg(hsotg->dev, "  urb->status = %d\n", urb_status);
 out:
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hsotg->lock, flags);
 
author maintainer
#184 lore raw

PATCH 181/315 Input: elan_i2c - validate firmware size before use

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>

commit 76b0d0baa9ae9c60e726bbe1b6ff0bec2c993634 upstream.

Ensure that the firmware file is large enough to contain the expected number of pages and the signature (which resides at the end of the firmware blob) before accessing them to prevent potential out-of-bounds reads.

---
 drivers/input/mouse/elan_i2c_core.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/input/mouse/elan_i2c_core.c +5 -0
@@ -645,6 +645,11 @@ static ssize_t elan_sysfs_update_fw(stru
 		return error;
 	}
 
+	if (fw->size < data->fw_signature_address + sizeof(signature)) {
+		dev_err(dev, "firmware file too small\n");
+		return -EBADF;
+	}
+
 	/* Firmware file must match signature data */
 	fw_signature = &fw->data[data->fw_signature_address];
 	if (memcmp(fw_signature, signature, sizeof(signature)) != 0) {
author maintainer
#185 lore raw

PATCH 182/315 i2c: davinci: fix division by zero on missing clock-frequency

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Chaitanya Sabnis <[email protected]>

commit 030675aa54cf757769b3db65642433d626b3ed7c upstream.

When the 'clock-frequency' property is missing from the device tree, the driver falls back to DAVINCI_I2C_DEFAULT_BUS_FREQ. However, this macro was defined in kHz (100), whereas the device tree property is expected in Hz.

The probe function divided the fallback value by 1000, causing integer truncation that resulted in dev->bus_freq = 0. This triggered a deterministic division-by-zero kernel panic when calculating clock dividers later in the probe sequence.

Fix this by redefining DAVINCI_I2C_DEFAULT_BUS_FREQ in Hz (100000) to match the expected device tree property unit, allowing the existing division logic to work correctly for both cases.

---
 drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-davinci.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-davinci.c +1 -1
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@
 /* timeout for pm runtime autosuspend */
 #define DAVINCI_I2C_PM_TIMEOUT	1000	/* ms */
 
-#define DAVINCI_I2C_DEFAULT_BUS_FREQ	100
+#define DAVINCI_I2C_DEFAULT_BUS_FREQ	100000
 
 struct davinci_i2c_dev {
 	struct device           *dev;
author maintainer
#186 lore raw

PATCH 183/315 x86/ftrace: Relocate %rip-relative percpu refs in dynamic trampolines

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <[email protected]>

commit a17dc12bfed8868e6a86f3b45c16065a70641acb upstream.

With CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING enabled on an x86 retbleed-affected platform (eg: Skylake), with retbleed=stuff, registering a dynamic ftrace trampoline crashes on the first call into the traced function:

  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff88817ae18880
  #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
  PGD 4b53067 P4D 4b53067 PUD 0
  Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI
  CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 187 Comm: usleep Not tainted 7.0.10 #243 PREEMPT(full)
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.17.0-2-2 04/01/2014
  Code: 24 78 00 00 00 00 48 89 ea 48 89 54 24 20 48 8b b4 24 b8 00 00 00 48 8b bc 24 b0 00 00 00 48 89 bc 24 80 00 00 00 48 83 ef 05 <65> 48 c1 3d 1f a8 b6 02 05 48 8b 15 f6 00 00 00 4c 89 3c 24 4c 89
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   ? find_held_lock
   ? exc_page_fault
   ? lock_release
   ? __x64_sys_clock_nanosleep
   ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare
   ? trace_hardirqs_on
   __x64_sys_clock_nanosleep
   do_syscall_64
   ? exc_page_fault
   ? call_depth_return_thunk
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
  ...
  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

This small reproducer allows to easily trigger the crash:

  # echo 'p __x64_sys_clock_nanosleep' > /sys/kernel/tracing/kprobe_events
  # echo 1 > /sys/kernel/tracing/events/kprobes/p___x64_sys_clock_nanosleep_0/enable
  # usleep 1

Monitoring the crash under GDB points to the exact instruction in charge of incrementing the call depth:

sarq $5, %gs:__x86_call_depth(%rip)

This instruction matches the one inserted by the ftrace_regs_caller from ftrace_64.S. This emitted code was likely working fine until the introduction of

59bec00ace28 ("x86/percpu: Introduce %rip-relative addressing to PER_CPU_VAR()"):

it has made the call depth accounting addressing relative to $rip, instead of being based on an absolute address.

As this code exact location depends on where the trampoline lives in memory, the corresponding displacement needs to be adjusted at runtime to actually correctly find the per-cpu __x86_call_depth value, otherwise the targeted address is wrong, leading to the page fault seen above.

Fix the %rip-relative displacement of the copied CALL_DEPTH_ACCOUNT instruction (from ftrace_regs_caller) by calling text_poke_apply_relocation(), as it is done for example by the x86 BPF JIT compiler through x86_call_depth_emit_accounting(). This corrects both CALL_DEPTH_ACCOUNT slots, in ftrace_caller and ftrace_regs_caller.

[ bp: Massage. ]

---
 arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c +7 -0
@@ -371,6 +371,13 @@ create_trampoline(struct ftrace_ops *ops
 	}
 
 	/*
+	 * Generated trampoline may contain rIP-relative addressing which
+	 * displacement needs to be fixed.
+	 */
+	text_poke_apply_relocation(trampoline, trampoline, size,
+				   (void *)start_offset, size);
+
+	/*
 	 * The address of the ftrace_ops that is used for this trampoline
 	 * is stored at the end of the trampoline. This will be used to
 	 * load the third parameter for the callback. Basically, that
author maintainer
#187 lore raw

PATCH 184/315 wireguard: send: append trailer after expanding head

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>

commit f75e3eb08fe31d30a9af6ed80cdd22e6772837e2 upstream.

With how this is currently written, we add the trailer, zero it out, and then add the header space on. If that header space requires a reallocation + copy, the zeros in the trailer aren't copied, because the skb len hasn't actually been yet expanded to cover that. Instead add the padding at the end of the process rather than at the beginning.

---
 drivers/net/wireguard/send.c |   20 ++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireguard/send.c +10 -10
@@ -177,16 +177,6 @@ static bool encrypt_packet(struct sk_buf
 	trailer_len = padding_len + noise_encrypted_len(0);
 	plaintext_len = skb->len + padding_len;
 
-	/* Expand data section to have room for padding and auth tag. */
-	num_frags = skb_cow_data(skb, trailer_len, &trailer);
-	if (unlikely(num_frags < 0 || num_frags > ARRAY_SIZE(sg)))
-		return false;
-
-	/* Set the padding to zeros, and make sure it and the auth tag are part
-	 * of the skb.
-	 */
-	memset(skb_tail_pointer(trailer), 0, padding_len);
-
 	/* Expand head section to have room for our header and the network
 	 * stack's headers.
 	 */
@@ -198,6 +188,16 @@ static bool encrypt_packet(struct sk_buf
 		     skb_checksum_help(skb)))
 		return false;
 
+	/* Expand data section to have room for padding and auth tag. */
+	num_frags = skb_cow_data(skb, trailer_len, &trailer);
+	if (unlikely(num_frags < 0 || num_frags > ARRAY_SIZE(sg)))
+		return false;
+
+	/* Set the padding to zeros, and make sure it and the auth tag are part
+	 * of the skb.
+	 */
+	memset(skb_tail_pointer(trailer), 0, padding_len);
+
 	/* Only after checksumming can we safely add on the padding at the end
 	 * and the header.
 	 */
author maintainer
#188 lore raw

PATCH 185/315 bpf: sockmap: fix tail fragment offset in bpf_msg_push_data

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yuqi Xu <[email protected]>

commit f72eed9b84fb771019a955908132410a9ba9ea3f upstream.

When bpf_msg_push_data() inserts data in the middle of a scatterlist entry, it splits the original entry into a left fragment and a right fragment.

The right fragment offset is page-local, but the code advances it with start, which is the message-global insertion point. For inserts into a non-first SG entry, this over-advances the offset and leaves the split layout inconsistent.

Advance the right fragment offset by the fragment-local delta, start - offset, which matches the length removed from the front of the original entry.

---
 net/core/filter.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/core/filter.c +1 -1
@@ -2859,7 +2859,7 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_push_data, struct sk_
 
 		psge->length = start - offset;
 		rsge.length -= psge->length;
-		rsge.offset += start;
+		rsge.offset += start - offset;
 
 		sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
 		sg_unmark_end(psge);
author maintainer
#189 lore raw

PATCH 186/315 macsec: fix replay protection at XPN lower-PN wrap

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Junrui Luo <[email protected]>

commit e68842b3356471ba56c882209f324613dac47f64 upstream.

In macsec_post_decrypt(), when pn is U32_MAX, pn + 1 overflows u32 to 0 and the first branch never fires. If next_pn_halves.lower is also in the upper half, pn_same_half(pn, lower) is true and the XPN else-if does not fire either, leaving next_pn_halves unchanged. An attacker that captures the legitimate frame carrying pn == 0xFFFFFFFF on an XPN association can then replay it indefinitely, since lowest_pn never rises above the captured pn and macsec_decrypt() reconstructs the same IV.

Extend the XPN else-if to also fire when pn + 1 wraps to 0, so receipt of pn == U32_MAX advances next_pn_halves to (upper + 1, 0).

---
 drivers/net/macsec.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/macsec.c +2 -1
@@ -804,7 +804,8 @@ static bool macsec_post_decrypt(struct s
 		if (pn + 1 > rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower) {
 			rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower = pn + 1;
 		} else if (secy->xpn &&
-			   !pn_same_half(pn, rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower)) {
+			   (pn + 1 == 0 ||
+			    !pn_same_half(pn, rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower))) {
 			rx_sa->next_pn_halves.upper++;
 			rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower = pn + 1;
 		}
author maintainer
#190 lore raw

PATCH 187/315 ipv6: exthdrs: refresh nh pointer after ipv6_hop_jumbo()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Justin Iurman <[email protected]>

commit d47548a36639095939f4747d4c43f2271366f565 upstream.

ipv6_hop_jumbo() calls pskb_trim_rcsum(), which can change skb pointers. Let's recompute nh pointer to make sure any change won't mess things up.

---
 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/ipv6/exthdrs.c +2 -0
@@ -184,6 +184,8 @@ static bool ip6_parse_tlv(bool hopbyhop,
 				case IPV6_TLV_JUMBO:
 					if (!ipv6_hop_jumbo(skb, off))
 						return false;
+
+					nh = skb_network_header(skb);
 					break;
 				case IPV6_TLV_CALIPSO:
 					if (!ipv6_hop_calipso(skb, off))
author maintainer
#191 lore raw

PATCH 188/315 ASoC: qcom: q6asm-dai: fix error handling in prepare and set_params

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>

commit 4b4db09f283df65d780bc7cee66cb4a7e9bf4770 upstream.

Fix error handling in q6asm_dai_compr_set_params() and q6asm_dai_prepare() for both CMD_CLOSE and q6asm_unmap_memory_regions().

In both the functions, we are doing q6asm_audio_client_free in failure cases, which means if prepare or set_params fail, we can never recover. Now open and close are done in respective dai_open/close functions.

---
 sound/soc/qcom/qdsp6/q6asm-dai.c |   24 ++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
sound/soc/qcom/qdsp6/q6asm-dai.c +16 -8
@@ -235,9 +235,19 @@ static int q6asm_dai_prepare(struct snd_
 	/* rate and channels are sent to audio driver */
 	if (prtd->state == Q6ASM_STREAM_RUNNING) {
 		/* clear the previous setup if any  */
-		q6asm_cmd(prtd->audio_client, prtd->stream_id, CMD_CLOSE);
-		q6asm_unmap_memory_regions(substream->stream,
-					   prtd->audio_client);
+		ret = q6asm_cmd(prtd->audio_client, prtd->stream_id, CMD_CLOSE);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			dev_err(dev, "Failed to close q6asm stream %d\n", prtd->stream_id);
+			return ret;
+		}
+
+		ret = q6asm_unmap_memory_regions(substream->stream, prtd->audio_client);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			dev_err(dev, "Failed to unmap memory regions for q6asm stream %d\n",
+				prtd->stream_id);
+			return ret;
+		}
+
 		q6routing_stream_close(soc_prtd->dai_link->id,
 					 substream->stream);
 		prtd->state = Q6ASM_STREAM_STOPPED;
@@ -305,8 +315,6 @@ routing_err:
 	q6asm_cmd(prtd->audio_client, prtd->stream_id,  CMD_CLOSE);
 open_err:
 	q6asm_unmap_memory_regions(substream->stream, prtd->audio_client);
-	q6asm_audio_client_free(prtd->audio_client);
-	prtd->audio_client = NULL;
 
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -903,7 +911,7 @@ static int q6asm_dai_compr_set_params(st
 			      prtd->session_id, dir);
 	if (ret) {
 		dev_err(dev, "Stream reg failed ret:%d\n", ret);
-		goto q6_err;
+		goto routing_err;
 	}
 
 	ret = __q6asm_dai_compr_set_codec_params(component, stream,
@@ -929,11 +937,11 @@ static int q6asm_dai_compr_set_params(st
 	return 0;
 
 q6_err:
+	q6routing_stream_close(rtd->dai_link->id, dir);
+routing_err:
 	q6asm_cmd(prtd->audio_client, prtd->stream_id, CMD_CLOSE);
 
 open_err:
-	q6asm_audio_client_free(prtd->audio_client);
-	prtd->audio_client = NULL;
 	return ret;
 }
 
author maintainer
#192 lore raw

PATCH 189/315 ipv6: exthdrs: refresh nh after handling HAO option

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhengchuan Liang <[email protected]>

commit f7b52afe3592eae66e160586b45a3f2242972c63 upstream.

ip6_parse_tlv() caches skb_network_header(skb) in nh while walking IPv6 TLVs.

ipv6_dest_hao() may call pskb_expand_head() for a cloned skb, which can move the skb head and invalidate the cached network header pointer. Refresh nh after ipv6_dest_hao() returns so any trailing padding or TLVs are parsed from the current skb head.

This matches the existing pattern used in ip6_parse_tlv() after helpers that can modify skb header storage.

---
 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/ipv6/exthdrs.c +2 -0
@@ -203,6 +203,8 @@ static bool ip6_parse_tlv(bool hopbyhop,
 				case IPV6_TLV_HAO:
 					if (!ipv6_dest_hao(skb, off))
 						return false;
+
+					nh = skb_network_header(skb);
 					break;
 #endif
 				default:
author maintainer
#193 lore raw

PATCH 190/315 ip6: vti: Use ip6_tnl.net in vti6_siocdevprivate().

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Maoyi Xie <[email protected]>

commit 8b484efd5cb4eeef9021a661e198edc5349dacf6 upstream.

After patch 1/2 in this series, vti6_update() unlinks and relinks the tunnel through t->net. vti6_siocdevprivate() still uses dev_net(dev) for the collision lookup. For a tunnel moved through IFLA_NET_NS_FD, dev_net(dev) is the new netns, not t->net.

SIOCCHGTUNNEL on a migrated tunnel then runs:

net = dev_net(dev) /* migrated netns */
t = vti6_locate(net, &p1, false) /* misses target in t->net */
...
t = netdev_priv(dev)
vti6_update(t, &p1, false) /* mutates t->net's hash */

A caller in the migrated netns picks params that match a tunnel in the creation netns. The lookup in dev_net(dev) finds nothing. vti6_update() prepends the migrated tunnel at the head of the creation netns hash bucket for those params. Later lookups in the creation netns resolve to the migrated device. xfrm receive delivers the matched packets through a device the caller controls.

Reachable from an unprivileged user namespace (unshare --user --map-root-user --net). Cross tenant scope on container hosts.

Switch the SIOCCHGTUNNEL path on a non fallback device to use t->net for the lookup. The lookup now matches the netns vti6_update() operates on.

Also add ns_capable(self->net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN) before the lookup. The check at the top of the case is against dev_net(dev)->user_ns, which after migration is the attacker's netns. A caller there can pick params absent from self->net, the lookup returns NULL, t becomes self, and vti6_update() inserts the device into the creation netns hash. The new check requires CAP_NET_ADMIN in the creation netns user_ns too.

SIOCADDTUNNEL and SIOCCHGTUNNEL on the fallback device keep dev_net(dev), which equals init_net there.

---
 net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c |   11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c +9 -2
@@ -834,17 +834,24 @@ vti6_siocdevprivate(struct net_device *d
 		if (p.proto != IPPROTO_IPV6  && p.proto != 0)
 			break;
 		vti6_parm_from_user(&p1, &p);
-		t = vti6_locate(net, &p1, cmd == SIOCADDTUNNEL);
 		if (dev != ip6n->fb_tnl_dev && cmd == SIOCCHGTUNNEL) {
+			struct ip6_tnl *self = netdev_priv(dev);
+
+			err = -EPERM;
+			if (!ns_capable(self->net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+				break;
+			t = vti6_locate(self->net, &p1, false);
 			if (t) {
 				if (t->dev != dev) {
 					err = -EEXIST;
 					break;
 				}
 			} else
-				t = netdev_priv(dev);
+				t = self;
 
 			err = vti6_update(t, &p1, false);
+		} else {
+			t = vti6_locate(net, &p1, cmd == SIOCADDTUNNEL);
 		}
 		if (t) {
 			err = 0;
author maintainer
#194 lore raw

PATCH 191/315 ipv6: validate extension header length before copying to cmsg

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Qi Tang <[email protected]>

commit dd433671fef381fdaf7b530c631e6b782d66e224 upstream.

ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl() builds IPV6_{HOPOPTS,DSTOPTS,RTHDR} cmsgs (and their IPV6_2292* legacy counterparts) by trusting the on-wire hdrlen byte (ptr[1]) when computing the put_cmsg() length. The length was validated only at parse time (ipv6_parse_hopopts(), etc.). An nftables payload-write expression can rewrite hdrlen after parsing and before the skb reaches recvmsg; the write itself is in-bounds but put_cmsg() then reads up to ((hdrlen+1) << 3) = 2040 bytes from an 8-byte header. nftables is reachable from an unprivileged user namespace, so this is an unprivileged slab-out-of-bounds read:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in put_cmsg+0x3ac/0x540
   put_cmsg+0x3ac/0x540
   udpv6_recvmsg+0xca0/0x1250
   sock_recvmsg+0xdf/0x190
   ____sys_recvmsg+0x1b1/0x620

Add ipv6_get_exthdr_len() which validates that at least two bytes are accessible before reading the hdrlen field, then checks the computed length against skb_tail_pointer(skb), returning 0 on failure. Extension headers are kept in the linear skb area by pskb_may_pull() during input, so skb_tail_pointer() is the correct bound.

Use ipv6_get_exthdr_len() at all non-AH call sites: the five standalone cmsg blocks (HbH, 2292HbH, 2292DSTOPTS x2, 2292RTHDR) and the three standard cases in the extension-header walk loop (DSTOPTS, ROUTING, default). AH retains an inline bounds check because its length formula differs ((ptr[1]+2)<<2).

The walk loop also gets a pre-read bounds check at the top to validate ptr before any case accesses ptr[0] or ptr[1].

When the walk loop detects a corrupted header, return from the function instead of continuing to process later socket options.

---
 net/ipv6/datagram.c |   54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/datagram.c +46 -8
@@ -617,6 +617,18 @@ void ip6_datagram_recv_common_ctl(struct
 	}
 }
 
+static u16 ipv6_get_exthdr_len(const struct sk_buff *skb, const u8 *ptr)
+{
+	u16 len;
+
+	if (ptr + 2 > skb_tail_pointer(skb))
+		return 0;
+
+	len = (ptr[1] + 1) << 3;
+
+	return (len <= skb_tail_pointer(skb) - ptr) ? len : 0;
+}
+
 void ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
 				    struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
@@ -643,7 +655,10 @@ void ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl(stru
 	/* HbH is allowed only once */
 	if (np->rxopt.bits.hopopts && (opt->flags & IP6SKB_HOPBYHOP)) {
 		u8 *ptr = nh + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
-		put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_HOPOPTS, (ptr[1]+1)<<3, ptr);
+		u16 len = ipv6_get_exthdr_len(skb, ptr);
+
+		if (len)
+			put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_HOPOPTS, len, ptr);
 	}
 
 	if (opt->lastopt &&
@@ -664,26 +679,37 @@ void ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl(stru
 			unsigned int len;
 			u8 *ptr = nh + off;
 
+			if (ptr + 2 > skb_tail_pointer(skb))
+				return;
+
 			switch (nexthdr) {
 			case IPPROTO_DSTOPTS:
 				nexthdr = ptr[0];
-				len = (ptr[1] + 1) << 3;
+				len = ipv6_get_exthdr_len(skb, ptr);
+				if (!len)
+					return;
 				if (np->rxopt.bits.dstopts)
 					put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_DSTOPTS, len, ptr);
 				break;
 			case IPPROTO_ROUTING:
 				nexthdr = ptr[0];
-				len = (ptr[1] + 1) << 3;
+				len = ipv6_get_exthdr_len(skb, ptr);
+				if (!len)
+					return;
 				if (np->rxopt.bits.srcrt)
 					put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_RTHDR, len, ptr);
 				break;
 			case IPPROTO_AH:
 				nexthdr = ptr[0];
 				len = (ptr[1] + 2) << 2;
+				if (ptr + len > skb_tail_pointer(skb))
+					return;
 				break;
 			default:
 				nexthdr = ptr[0];
-				len = (ptr[1] + 1) << 3;
+				len = ipv6_get_exthdr_len(skb, ptr);
+				if (!len)
+					return;
 				break;
 			}
 
@@ -705,19 +731,31 @@ void ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl(stru
 	}
 	if (np->rxopt.bits.ohopopts && (opt->flags & IP6SKB_HOPBYHOP)) {
 		u8 *ptr = nh + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
-		put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_2292HOPOPTS, (ptr[1]+1)<<3, ptr);
+		u16 len = ipv6_get_exthdr_len(skb, ptr);
+
+		if (len)
+			put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_2292HOPOPTS, len, ptr);
 	}
 	if (np->rxopt.bits.odstopts && opt->dst0) {
 		u8 *ptr = nh + opt->dst0;
-		put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_2292DSTOPTS, (ptr[1]+1)<<3, ptr);
+		u16 len = ipv6_get_exthdr_len(skb, ptr);
+
+		if (len)
+			put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_2292DSTOPTS, len, ptr);
 	}
 	if (np->rxopt.bits.osrcrt && opt->srcrt) {
 		struct ipv6_rt_hdr *rthdr = (struct ipv6_rt_hdr *)(nh + opt->srcrt);
-		put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_2292RTHDR, (rthdr->hdrlen+1) << 3, rthdr);
+		u16 len = ipv6_get_exthdr_len(skb, (u8 *)rthdr);
+
+		if (len)
+			put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_2292RTHDR, len, rthdr);
 	}
 	if (np->rxopt.bits.odstopts && opt->dst1) {
 		u8 *ptr = nh + opt->dst1;
-		put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_2292DSTOPTS, (ptr[1]+1)<<3, ptr);
+		u16 len = ipv6_get_exthdr_len(skb, ptr);
+
+		if (len)
+			put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_2292DSTOPTS, len, ptr);
 	}
 	if (np->rxopt.bits.rxorigdstaddr) {
 		struct sockaddr_in6 sin6;
author maintainer
#195 lore raw

PATCH 192/315 xfrm: input: hold netns during deferred transport reinjection

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhengchuan Liang <[email protected]>

commit c16f74dc1d75d0e2e7670076d5375deda110ebeb upstream.

Transport-mode reinjection stores a struct net pointer in skb->cb and uses it later from xfrm_trans_reinject(). That pointer must stay valid until the deferred callback runs.

Take a netns reference when queueing deferred reinjection work and drop it after the callback completes. Use maybe_get_net() so the queueing path does not revive a namespace that is already being torn down.

This keeps the existing workqueue design and fixes the netns lifetime handling in one place for all users of xfrm_trans_queue_net().

Fixes 7b3801927e52 ("xfrm: introduce xfrm_trans_queue_net")
Assisted-by Codex:gpt-5.4
---
 net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c |   16 ++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c +12 -4
@@ -794,9 +794,12 @@ static void xfrm_trans_reinject(struct w
 	spin_unlock_bh(&trans->queue_lock);
 
 	local_bh_disable();
-	while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&queue)))
-		XFRM_TRANS_SKB_CB(skb)->finish(XFRM_TRANS_SKB_CB(skb)->net,
-					       NULL, skb);
+	while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&queue))) {
+		struct net *net = XFRM_TRANS_SKB_CB(skb)->net;
+
+		XFRM_TRANS_SKB_CB(skb)->finish(net, NULL, skb);
+		put_net(net);
+	}
 	local_bh_enable();
 }
 
@@ -805,6 +808,7 @@ int xfrm_trans_queue_net(struct net *net
 				       struct sk_buff *))
 {
 	struct xfrm_trans_tasklet *trans;
+	struct net *hold_net;
 
 	trans = this_cpu_ptr(&xfrm_trans_tasklet);
 
@@ -813,8 +817,12 @@ int xfrm_trans_queue_net(struct net *net
 
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct xfrm_trans_cb) > sizeof(skb->cb));
 
+	hold_net = maybe_get_net(net);
+	if (!hold_net)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
 	XFRM_TRANS_SKB_CB(skb)->finish = finish;
-	XFRM_TRANS_SKB_CB(skb)->net = net;
+	XFRM_TRANS_SKB_CB(skb)->net = hold_net;
 	spin_lock_bh(&trans->queue_lock);
 	__skb_queue_tail(&trans->queue, skb);
 	spin_unlock_bh(&trans->queue_lock);
author maintainer
#196 lore raw

PATCH 193/315 l2tp: use refcount_inc_not_zero in l2tp_session_get_by_ifname

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>

commit 05f95729ca844704d15e49ce14868af4b403b32b upstream.

A reader in l2tp_session_get_by_ifname() can return a pointer to a session whose refcount has reached zero. The getter takes its reference with plain refcount_inc(), but every other session getter in the same file (l2tp_v2_session_get, l2tp_v3_session_get, and the corresponding _get_next variants) uses refcount_inc_not_zero() because the IDR/RCU lookup can race with refcount_dec_and_test() -> l2tp_session_free() -> kfree_rcu(). The ifname getter is the only outlier; the inconsistency was raised on-list after 979c017803c4 ("l2tp: use list_del_rcu in l2tp_session_unhash").

A reader inside rcu_read_lock_bh() that matches session->ifname can be preempted between the strcmp() and the refcount_inc(). If the last reference drops on another CPU in that window, the reader's refcount_inc() runs on a counter that has reached zero. refcount_t catches the addition-on-zero, prints "refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free", saturates the counter, and returns the saturated pointer to the caller. Session memory is held live by the in-flight RCU read section, but the kfree_rcu() callback queued from l2tp_session_free() will free it once the grace period closes; a caller that dereferences the returned session past that point hits a slab-use-after-free. On PREEMPT_RT local_bh_disable() is a per-CPU sleeping lock and the preemption window is real; on stock PREEMPT kernels local_bh_disable() is a preempt_count increment that closes the cross-CPU race in practice (see below).

Use refcount_inc_not_zero() and continue the list walk on failure, matching the other session getters in the file. The ifname getter is the only session getter in net/l2tp/ that still uses the bare refcount_inc() pattern; this change restores file-internal consistency. The success path is unchanged.

---
 net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c |   11 ++++++-----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c +6 -5
@@ -441,12 +441,13 @@ struct l2tp_session *l2tp_session_get_by
 	idr_for_each_entry_ul(&pn->l2tp_tunnel_idr, tunnel, tmp, tunnel_id) {
 		if (tunnel) {
 			list_for_each_entry_rcu(session, &tunnel->session_list, list) {
-				if (!strcmp(session->ifname, ifname)) {
-					refcount_inc(&session->ref_count);
-					rcu_read_unlock_bh();
+				if (strcmp(session->ifname, ifname))
+					continue;
+				if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&session->ref_count))
+					continue;
+				rcu_read_unlock_bh();
 
-					return session;
-				}
+				return session;
 			}
 		}
 	}
author maintainer
#197 lore raw

PATCH 194/315 ip6: vti: Use ip6_tnl.net in vti6_changelink().

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>

commit 11b326fb0a374f4654f9be22d0f0f7abd9f7d3fe upstream.

ip netns add ns1
ip netns add ns2
ip -n ns1 link add vti6_test type vti6 remote ::1 local ::2 key 7 ip -n ns1 link set vti6_test netns ns2
ip -n ns2 link set vti6_test type vti6 remote ::3 local ::4 key 9 ip netns del ns2
ip netns del ns1

[  132.495484] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  132.497609] kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:12376!

Commit 61220ab34948 ("vti6: Enable namespace changing") dropped NETIF_F_NETNS_LOCAL from vti6 devices. A vti6 tunnel can then move through IFLA_NET_NS_FD. After the move dev_net(dev) points at the new netns while t->net stays at the creation netns.

vti6_changelink() and vti6_update() still use dev_net(dev) and dev_net(t->dev). They unlink from one per netns hash and relink into another. The creation netns is left with a stale entry. cleanup_net() of that netns later walks freed memory.

Reachable from an unprivileged user namespace (unshare --user --map-root-user --net). Cross tenant scope on container hosts.

---
 net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c |   12 +++++++-----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c +7 -5
@@ -722,10 +722,11 @@ vti6_tnl_change(struct ip6_tnl *t, const
 static int vti6_update(struct ip6_tnl *t, struct __ip6_tnl_parm *p,
 		       bool keep_mtu)
 {
-	struct net *net = dev_net(t->dev);
-	struct vti6_net *ip6n = net_generic(net, vti6_net_id);
+	struct net *net = t->net;
+	struct vti6_net *ip6n;
 	int err;
 
+	ip6n = net_generic(net, vti6_net_id);
 	vti6_tnl_unlink(ip6n, t);
 	synchronize_net();
 	err = vti6_tnl_change(t, p, keep_mtu);
@@ -1038,11 +1039,12 @@ static int vti6_changelink(struct net_de
 			   struct nlattr *data[],
 			   struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
 {
-	struct ip6_tnl *t;
+	struct ip6_tnl *t = netdev_priv(dev);
+	struct net *net = t->net;
 	struct __ip6_tnl_parm p;
-	struct net *net = dev_net(dev);
-	struct vti6_net *ip6n = net_generic(net, vti6_net_id);
+	struct vti6_net *ip6n;
 
+	ip6n = net_generic(net, vti6_net_id);
 	if (dev == ip6n->fb_tnl_dev)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
author maintainer
#198 lore raw

PATCH 195/315 net: skbuff: fix missing zerocopy reference in pskb_carve helpers

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Minh Nguyen <[email protected]>

commit 98d0912e9f841e5529a5b89a972805f34cb1c69d upstream.

pskb_carve_inside_header() and pskb_carve_inside_nonlinear() both copy the old skb_shared_info header into a new buffer via memcpy(), which includes the destructor_arg pointer (uarg) for MSG_ZEROCOPY skbs. Neither function calls net_zcopy_get() for the new shinfo, creating an unaccounted holder: every skb_shared_info with destructor_arg set will call skb_zcopy_clear() once when freed, but the corresponding net_zcopy_get() was never called for the new copy. Repeated calls drive uarg->refcnt to zero prematurely, freeing ubuf_info_msgzc while TX skbs still hold live destructor_arg pointers.

KASAN reports use-after-free on a freed ubuf_info_msgzc:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in skb_release_data+0x77b/0x810
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff88801574d3e8 by task poc/220

  Call Trace:
   skb_release_data+0x77b/0x810
   kfree_skb_list_reason+0x13e/0x610
   skb_release_data+0x4cd/0x810
   sk_skb_reason_drop+0xf3/0x340
   skb_queue_purge_reason+0x282/0x440
   rds_tcp_inc_free+0x1e/0x30
   rds_recvmsg+0x354/0x1780
   __sys_recvmsg+0xdf/0x180

  Allocated by task 219:
   msg_zerocopy_realloc+0x157/0x7b0
   tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x2892/0x3ba0

  Freed by task 219:
   ip_recv_error+0x74a/0xb10
   tcp_recvmsg+0x475/0x530

The skb consuming the late access still referenced the same uarg via shinfo->destructor_arg copied by pskb_carve_inside_nonlinear() without a refcount bump. This has been verified to be reliably exploitable: a working proof-of-concept achieves full root privilege escalation from an unprivileged local user on a default kernel configuration.

The fix follows the pattern of pskb_expand_head() which has the same memcpy/cloned structure. For pskb_carve_inside_header(), net_zcopy_get() is placed after skb_orphan_frags() succeeds, so the orphan error path needs no cleanup. For pskb_carve_inside_nonlinear(), net_zcopy_get() is placed after all failure points and just before skb_release_data(), so no error path needs cleanup at all -- matching pskb_expand_head() more closely and avoiding the need for a balancing net_zcopy_put().

Fixes 6fa01ccd8830 ("skbuff: Add pskb_extract() helper function")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-sonnet-4-6
---
 net/core/skbuff.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
net/core/skbuff.c +4 -0
@@ -6787,6 +6787,8 @@ static int pskb_carve_inside_header(stru
 			skb_kfree_head(data, size);
 			return -ENOMEM;
 		}
+		if (skb_zcopy(skb))
+			net_zcopy_get(skb_zcopy(skb));
 		for (i = 0; i < skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags; i++)
 			skb_frag_ref(skb, i);
 		if (skb_has_frag_list(skb))
@@ -6935,6 +6937,8 @@ static int pskb_carve_inside_nonlinear(s
 		skb_kfree_head(data, size);
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
+	if (skb_zcopy(skb))
+		net_zcopy_get(skb_zcopy(skb));
 	skb_release_data(skb, SKB_CONSUMED);
 
 	skb->head = data;
author maintainer
#199 lore raw

PATCH 196/315 spi: spi-mem: avoid mutating op template in spi_mem_supports_op()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Santhosh Kumar K <[email protected]>

commit 79378db6a86c7014cce40b65252e6c18f5b8bcc2 upstream.

spi_mem_supports_op() accepts a const struct spi_mem_op pointer but casts away const internally to call spi_mem_adjust_op_freq(). This mutates the caller's op template, which causes stale max_freq values when callers reuse persistent templates - subsequent calls won't re-apply the device frequency cap since spi_mem_adjust_op_freq() skips non-zero values.

Fix by operating on a stack-local copy instead.

Fixes a4f8e70d75dd ("spi: spi-mem: add spi_mem_adjust_op_freq() in spi_mem_supports_op()")
Cc Tianyu Xu <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/spi/spi-mem.c |   15 +++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/spi/spi-mem.c +11 -4
@@ -276,13 +276,20 @@ static bool spi_mem_internal_supports_op
  */
 bool spi_mem_supports_op(struct spi_mem *mem, const struct spi_mem_op *op)
 {
-	/* Make sure the operation frequency is correct before going futher */
-	spi_mem_adjust_op_freq(mem, (struct spi_mem_op *)op);
+	struct spi_mem_op eval_op = *op;
 
-	if (spi_mem_check_op(op))
+	/*
+	 * Work on a local copy; this is a pure capability check and must
+	 * not modify the caller's op. Stored templates with max_freq == 0
+	 * must remain unset so their frequency is always re-capped to the
+	 * current device maximum at execution time.
+	 */
+	spi_mem_adjust_op_freq(mem, &eval_op);
+
+	if (spi_mem_check_op(&eval_op))
 		return false;
 
-	return spi_mem_internal_supports_op(mem, op);
+	return spi_mem_internal_supports_op(mem, &eval_op);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spi_mem_supports_op);
 
author maintainer
#200 lore raw

PATCH 197/315 HID: wacom: Fix OOB write in wacom_hid_set_device_mode()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lee Jones <[email protected]>

commit c0a8899e02ddebd51e2589835182c239c2e224ae upstream.

wacom_hid_set_device_mode() currently assumes that the HID_DG_INPUTMODE usage is always located in the first field (field[0]) of the feature report. However, a device can specify HID_DG_INPUTMODE in a different field.

If HID_DG_INPUTMODE is in a field other than the first one and the first field has a report_count smaller than the usage_index of HID_DG_INPUTMODE, this leads to an out-of-bounds write to r->field[0]->value.

Fix this by storing the field index of HID_DG_INPUTMODE in 'struct hid_data' during feature mapping. In wacom_hid_set_device_mode(), use this stored field index to access the correct field and add bounds checks to ensure both the field index and the value index are within valid ranges before writing.

Fixes 5ae6e89f7409 ("HID: wacom: implement the finger part of the HID generic handling")
---
 drivers/hid/wacom_sys.c |   13 ++++++++++---
 drivers/hid/wacom_wac.h |    1 +
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/hid/wacom_sys.c +10 -3
@@ -356,6 +356,7 @@ static void wacom_feature_mapping(struct
 
 		hid_data->inputmode = field->report->id;
 		hid_data->inputmode_index = usage->usage_index;
+		hid_data->inputmode_field_index = field->index;
 		break;
 
 	case HID_UP_DIGITIZER:
@@ -571,9 +572,14 @@ static int wacom_hid_set_device_mode(str
 
 	re = &(hdev->report_enum[HID_FEATURE_REPORT]);
 	r = re->report_id_hash[hid_data->inputmode];
-	if (r) {
-		r->field[0]->value[hid_data->inputmode_index] = 2;
-		hid_hw_request(hdev, r, HID_REQ_SET_REPORT);
+	if (r && hid_data->inputmode_field_index >= 0 &&
+	    hid_data->inputmode_field_index < r->maxfield) {
+		struct hid_field *field = r->field[hid_data->inputmode_field_index];
+
+		if (field && hid_data->inputmode_index < field->report_count) {
+			field->value[hid_data->inputmode_index] = 2;
+			hid_hw_request(hdev, r, HID_REQ_SET_REPORT);
+		}
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -2846,6 +2852,7 @@ static int wacom_probe(struct hid_device
 		return -ENODEV;
 
 	wacom_wac->hid_data.inputmode = -1;
+	wacom_wac->hid_data.inputmode_field_index = -1;
 	wacom_wac->mode_report = -1;
 
 	if (hid_is_usb(hdev)) {
drivers/hid/wacom_wac.h +1 -0
@@ -295,6 +295,7 @@ struct wacom_shared {
 struct hid_data {
 	__s16 inputmode;	/* InputMode HID feature, -1 if non-existent */
 	__s16 inputmode_index;	/* InputMode HID feature index in the report */
+	__s16 inputmode_field_index; /* InputMode HID feature field index in the report */
 	bool sense_state;
 	bool inrange_state;
 	bool eraser;
author maintainer
#201 lore raw

PATCH 198/315 iommu, debugobjects: avoid gcc-16.1 section mismatch warnings

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>

commit 4c9ad387aa2d6785299722e54224d34764edaeb3 upstream.

gcc-16 has gained some more advanced inter-procedual optimization techniques that enable it to inline the dummy_tlb_add_page() and dummy_tlb_flush() function pointers into a specialized version of __arm_v7s_unmap:

WARNING: modpost: vmlinux: section mismatch in reference: __arm_v7s_unmap+0x2cc (section: .text) -> dummy_tlb_add_page (section: .init.text)
ERROR: modpost: Section mismatches detected.

Quoted 1 line

From what I can tell, the transformation is correct, as this is only

called when __arm_v7s_unmap() is called from arm_v7s_do_selftests(), which is also __init. Since __arm_v7s_unmap() however is not __init, gcc cannot inline the inner function calls directly.

In debug_objects_selftest(), the same thing happens. Both the caller and the leaf function are __init, but the IPA pulls it into a non-init one:

WARNING: modpost: vmlinux: section mismatch in reference: lookup_object_or_alloc+0x7c (section: .text.lookup_object_or_alloc) -> is_static_object (section: .init.text)

Marking the affected functions as not "__init" would reliably avoid this issue but is not a good solution because it removes an otherwise correct annotation. I tried marking the functions as 'noinline', but that ended up not covering all the affected configurations.

With some more experimenting, I found that marking these functions as __attribute__((noipa)) is both logical and reliable.

In order to keep the syntax readable, add a custom macro for this in include/linux/compiler_attributes.h next to other related macros and use it to annotate both files.

---
 drivers/iommu/io-pgtable-arm-v7s.c  |   18 ++++++++++++------
 include/linux/compiler_attributes.h |   11 +++++++++++
 lib/debugobjects.c                  |    2 +-
 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/iommu/io-pgtable-arm-v7s.c +12 -6
@@ -777,21 +777,27 @@ struct io_pgtable_init_fns io_pgtable_ar
 
 static struct io_pgtable_cfg *cfg_cookie __initdata;
 
-static void __init dummy_tlb_flush_all(void *cookie)
+/*
+ * __noipa prevents gcc from turning indirect iommu_flush_ops calls
+ * into direct calls from a specialized __arm_v7s_unmap() that triggers
+ * a build time section mismatch assertion.
+ */
+static __noipa void __init dummy_tlb_flush_all(void *cookie)
 {
 	WARN_ON(cookie != cfg_cookie);
 }
 
-static void __init dummy_tlb_flush(unsigned long iova, size_t size,
-				   size_t granule, void *cookie)
+static __noipa void __init dummy_tlb_flush(unsigned long iova, size_t size,
+					   size_t granule, void *cookie)
 {
 	WARN_ON(cookie != cfg_cookie);
 	WARN_ON(!(size & cfg_cookie->pgsize_bitmap));
 }
 
-static void __init dummy_tlb_add_page(struct iommu_iotlb_gather *gather,
-				      unsigned long iova, size_t granule,
-				      void *cookie)
+static __noipa void __init dummy_tlb_add_page(struct iommu_iotlb_gather *gather,
+					      unsigned long iova,
+					      size_t granule,
+					      void *cookie)
 {
 	dummy_tlb_flush(iova, granule, granule, cookie);
 }
include/linux/compiler_attributes.h +11 -0
@@ -397,6 +397,17 @@
 #endif
 
 /*
+ * Optional: not supported by clang
+ *
+ *   gcc: https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Common-Attributes.html#index-noipa
+ */
+#if __has_attribute(noipa)
+# define __noipa __attribute__((noipa))
+#else
+# define __noipa
+#endif
+
+/*
  *   gcc: https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Common-Function-Attributes.html#index-weak-function-attribute
  *   gcc: https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Common-Variable-Attributes.html#index-weak-variable-attribute
  */
lib/debugobjects.c +1 -1
@@ -1212,7 +1212,7 @@ struct self_test {
 
 static __initconst const struct debug_obj_descr descr_type_test;
 
-static bool __init is_static_object(void *addr)
+static __noipa bool __init is_static_object(void *addr)
 {
 	struct self_test *obj = addr;
 
author maintainer
#202 lore raw

PATCH 199/315 nfc: hci: fix out-of-bounds read in HCP header parsing

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ashutosh Desai <[email protected]>

commit f040e590c035bfd9553fe79ee9585caf1b14d67b upstream.

Both nfc_hci_recv_from_llc() and nci_hci_data_received_cb() read packet->header from skb->data at function entry without first checking that the buffer holds at least one byte. A malicious NFC peer can send a 0-byte HCP frame that passes through the SHDLC layer and reaches these functions, causing an out-of-bounds heap read of packet->header. The same 0-byte frame, if queued as a non-final fragment, also causes the reassembly loop to underflow msg_len to UINT_MAX, triggering skb_over_panic() when the reassembled skb is written.

Fix this by adding a pskb_may_pull() check at the entry of each function before packet->header is first accessed. The existing pskb_may_pull() checks before the reassembled hcp_skb is cast to struct hcp_packet remain in place to guard the 2-byte HCP message header.

Fixes 8b8d2e08bf0d ("NFC: HCI support")
Fixes 11f54f228643 ("NFC: nci: Add HCI over NCI protocol support")
---
 net/nfc/hci/core.c |   10 ++++++++++
 net/nfc/nci/hci.c  |   10 ++++++++++
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+)
net/nfc/hci/core.c +10 -0
@@ -861,6 +861,11 @@ static void nfc_hci_recv_from_llc(struct
 	struct sk_buff *frag_skb;
 	int msg_len;
 
+	if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, NFC_HCI_HCP_PACKET_HEADER_LEN)) {
+		kfree_skb(skb);
+		return;
+	}
+
 	packet = (struct hcp_packet *)skb->data;
 	if ((packet->header & ~NFC_HCI_FRAGMENT) == 0) {
 		skb_queue_tail(&hdev->rx_hcp_frags, skb);
@@ -904,6 +909,11 @@ static void nfc_hci_recv_from_llc(struct
 	 * unblock waiting cmd context. Otherwise, enqueue to dispatch
 	 * in separate context where handler can also execute command.
 	 */
+	if (!pskb_may_pull(hcp_skb, NFC_HCI_HCP_HEADER_LEN)) {
+		kfree_skb(hcp_skb);
+		return;
+	}
+
 	packet = (struct hcp_packet *)hcp_skb->data;
 	type = HCP_MSG_GET_TYPE(packet->message.header);
 	if (type == NFC_HCI_HCP_RESPONSE) {
net/nfc/nci/hci.c +10 -0
@@ -439,6 +439,11 @@ void nci_hci_data_received_cb(void *cont
 		return;
 	}
 
+	if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, NCI_HCI_HCP_PACKET_HEADER_LEN)) {
+		kfree_skb(skb);
+		return;
+	}
+
 	packet = (struct nci_hcp_packet *)skb->data;
 	if ((packet->header & ~NCI_HCI_FRAGMENT) == 0) {
 		skb_queue_tail(&ndev->hci_dev->rx_hcp_frags, skb);
@@ -482,6 +487,11 @@ void nci_hci_data_received_cb(void *cont
 	 * unblock waiting cmd context. Otherwise, enqueue to dispatch
 	 * in separate context where handler can also execute command.
 	 */
+	if (!pskb_may_pull(hcp_skb, NCI_HCI_HCP_HEADER_LEN)) {
+		kfree_skb(hcp_skb);
+		return;
+	}
+
 	packet = (struct nci_hcp_packet *)hcp_skb->data;
 	type = NCI_HCP_MSG_GET_TYPE(packet->message.header);
 	if (type == NCI_HCI_HCP_RESPONSE) {
author maintainer
#203 lore raw

PATCH 200/315 xfrm: route MIGRATE notifications to callers netns

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Maoyi Xie <[email protected]>

commit 7e2a4f7ca0952820731ef7bdadfc9a9e9d3571b4 upstream.

xfrm_send_migrate() in net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c and pfkey_send_migrate() in net/key/af_key.c both hardcode &init_net for the multicast that announces a successful XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE / SADB_X_MIGRATE.

XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE arrives on a per-netns NETLINK_XFRM socket, and the rest of the xfrm/af_key netlink path was made netns-aware in 2008. The other 14 multicast paths in xfrm_user.c route their event using xs_net(x), xp_net(xp) or sock_net(skb->sk); only the migrate path was missed.

Two consequences of the init_net hardcoding:

1. The notification (selector, old/new endpoint addresses, and the km_address) is delivered to listeners on init_net's XFRMNLGRP_MIGRATE / pfkey BROADCAST_ALL groups rather than on the issuing netns. An IKE daemon running in init_net therefore receives migration notifications originating from any other netns on the host.

2. An IKE daemon running inside a non-init netns and subscribed to its own XFRMNLGRP_MIGRATE / pfkey groups never receives the notification of its own migration. IKEv2 MOBIKE / address-update handling inside a netns is silently broken.

Thread struct net through km_migrate() and the xfrm_mgr.migrate function pointer, drop the &init_net override in xfrm_send_migrate() and pfkey_send_migrate(), and pass the caller's net (already in scope in xfrm_migrate() via sock_net(skb->sk)) all the way down. struct xfrm_mgr is in-tree only and not exported as a stable API, so the function-pointer signature change is internal.

pfkey_broadcast() is already netns-aware via net_generic(net, pfkey_net_id) since the pernet conversion. The five other pfkey_broadcast() callers in af_key.c already pass xs_net(x), sock_net(sk) or a per-netns net, so this only removes the &init_net outlier.

Fixes 5c79de6e79cd ("[XFRM]: User interface for handling XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE")
Cc [email protected] # v5.15+
---
 include/net/xfrm.h     |    3 ++-
 net/key/af_key.c       |    6 +++---
 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c |    2 +-
 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c  |    4 ++--
 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c   |    5 ++---
 5 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
include/net/xfrm.h +2 -1
@@ -715,6 +715,7 @@ struct xfrm_mgr {
 					   const struct xfrm_migrate *m,
 					   int num_bundles,
 					   const struct xfrm_kmaddress *k,
+					   struct net *net,
 					   const struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap);
 	bool			(*is_alive)(const struct km_event *c);
 };
@@ -1891,7 +1892,7 @@ int xfrm_sk_policy_insert(struct sock *s
 #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM_MIGRATE
 int km_migrate(const struct xfrm_selector *sel, u8 dir, u8 type,
 	       const struct xfrm_migrate *m, int num_bundles,
-	       const struct xfrm_kmaddress *k,
+	       const struct xfrm_kmaddress *k, struct net *net,
 	       const struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap);
 struct xfrm_state *xfrm_migrate_state_find(struct xfrm_migrate *m, struct net *net,
 						u32 if_id);
net/key/af_key.c +3 -3
@@ -3564,7 +3564,7 @@ static int set_ipsecrequest(struct sk_bu
 #ifdef CONFIG_NET_KEY_MIGRATE
 static int pfkey_send_migrate(const struct xfrm_selector *sel, u8 dir, u8 type,
 			      const struct xfrm_migrate *m, int num_bundles,
-			      const struct xfrm_kmaddress *k,
+			      const struct xfrm_kmaddress *k, struct net *net,
 			      const struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap)
 {
 	int i;
@@ -3669,7 +3669,7 @@ static int pfkey_send_migrate(const stru
 	}
 
 	/* broadcast migrate message to sockets */
-	pfkey_broadcast(skb, GFP_ATOMIC, BROADCAST_ALL, NULL, &init_net);
+	pfkey_broadcast(skb, GFP_ATOMIC, BROADCAST_ALL, NULL, net);
 
 	return 0;
 
@@ -3680,7 +3680,7 @@ err:
 #else
 static int pfkey_send_migrate(const struct xfrm_selector *sel, u8 dir, u8 type,
 			      const struct xfrm_migrate *m, int num_bundles,
-			      const struct xfrm_kmaddress *k,
+			      const struct xfrm_kmaddress *k, struct net *net,
 			      const struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap)
 {
 	return -ENOPROTOOPT;
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +1 -1
@@ -4704,7 +4704,7 @@ int xfrm_migrate(const struct xfrm_selec
 	}
 
 	/* Stage 5 - announce */
-	km_migrate(sel, dir, type, m, num_migrate, k, encap);
+	km_migrate(sel, dir, type, m, num_migrate, k, net, encap);
 
 	xfrm_pol_put(pol);
 
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c +2 -2
@@ -2836,7 +2836,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(km_policy_expired);
 #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM_MIGRATE
 int km_migrate(const struct xfrm_selector *sel, u8 dir, u8 type,
 	       const struct xfrm_migrate *m, int num_migrate,
-	       const struct xfrm_kmaddress *k,
+	       const struct xfrm_kmaddress *k, struct net *net,
 	       const struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap)
 {
 	int err = -EINVAL;
@@ -2847,7 +2847,7 @@ int km_migrate(const struct xfrm_selecto
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(km, &xfrm_km_list, list) {
 		if (km->migrate) {
 			ret = km->migrate(sel, dir, type, m, num_migrate, k,
-					  encap);
+					  net, encap);
 			if (!ret)
 				err = ret;
 		}
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +2 -3
@@ -3262,10 +3262,9 @@ out_cancel:
 
 static int xfrm_send_migrate(const struct xfrm_selector *sel, u8 dir, u8 type,
 			     const struct xfrm_migrate *m, int num_migrate,
-			     const struct xfrm_kmaddress *k,
+			     const struct xfrm_kmaddress *k, struct net *net,
 			     const struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap)
 {
-	struct net *net = &init_net;
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 	int err;
 
@@ -3283,7 +3282,7 @@ static int xfrm_send_migrate(const struc
 #else
 static int xfrm_send_migrate(const struct xfrm_selector *sel, u8 dir, u8 type,
 			     const struct xfrm_migrate *m, int num_migrate,
-			     const struct xfrm_kmaddress *k,
+			     const struct xfrm_kmaddress *k, struct net *net,
 			     const struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap)
 {
 	return -ENOPROTOOPT;
author maintainer
#204 lore raw

PATCH 201/315 xfrm: ipcomp: Free destination pages on acomp errors

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>

commit 7dbac7680eb629b3b4dc7e98c34f943b8814c0c8 upstream.

Move the out_free_req label up by a couple of lines so that the allocated dst SG list gets freed on error as well as success.

---
 net/xfrm/xfrm_ipcomp.c |   12 ++++++++----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/xfrm/xfrm_ipcomp.c +8 -4
@@ -51,11 +51,15 @@ static int ipcomp_post_acomp(struct sk_b
 	struct scatterlist *dsg;
 	int len, dlen;
 
-	if (unlikely(err))
-		goto out_free_req;
+	if (unlikely(!req))
+		return err;
 
 	extra = acomp_request_extra(req);
 	dsg = extra->sg;
+
+	if (unlikely(err))
+		goto out_free_req;
+
 	dlen = req->dlen;
 
 	pskb_trim_unique(skb, 0);
@@ -84,10 +88,10 @@ static int ipcomp_post_acomp(struct sk_b
 		skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags++;
 	} while ((dlen -= len));
 
-	for (; dsg; dsg = sg_next(dsg))
+out_free_req:
+	for (; dsg && sg_page(dsg); dsg = sg_next(dsg))
 		__free_page(sg_page(dsg));
 
-out_free_req:
 	acomp_request_free(req);
 	return err;
 }
author maintainer
#205 lore raw

PATCH 202/315 xfrm: ah: use skb_to_full_sk in async output callbacks

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>

commit 79d8be262377f7112cfa3088dfc4142d5a2533f3 upstream.

When AH output is offloaded to an asynchronous crypto provider (hardware accelerators such as AMD CCP, or a forced-async software shim used for testing), the digest completion fires ah_output_done() / ah6_output_done() on a workqueue. The egress skb at that point may have been originated by a TCP listener sending a SYN-ACK, which sets skb->sk to a request_sock via skb_set_owner_edemux(); it may also have been originated by an inet_timewait_sock retransmit. Neither is a full struct sock, and passing the raw skb->sk to xfrm_output_resume() then forwards a non-full socket through the rest of the xfrm output chain.

xfrm_output_resume() and its downstream consumers expect a full sk where they dereference at all. The natural egress path through ah_output_done() does not crash today because the consumers that read past sock_common are either gated by sk_fullsock() or short-circuit on flags that are clear on a fresh request_sock; an exhaustive walk of the 50 most plausible consumers under sch_fq, dev_queue_xmit, netfilter, tc-egress and cgroup-egress BPF found no current unguarded deref. The bug is still a real type confusion that future consumer changes could turn into a memory-corruption primitive.

This is the same bug class fixed for ESP in commit 1620c88887b1 ("xfrm: Fix the usage of skb->sk"). Apply the analogous fix to
AH: convert skb->sk to a full socket pointer (or NULL) via skb_to_full_sk() before handing it to xfrm_output_resume().

The same async AH callbacks were touched recently for an independent ESN-related ICV layout bug in commit ec54093e6a8f ("xfrm: ah: account for ESN high bits in async callbacks"); the sk type-confusion addressed here is orthogonal. This patch is part of an ongoing audit of the AH callback paths; an ah_output ihl-validation hardening series is also currently under review on netdev.

Reproduced under UML + KASAN + lockdep with a forced-async hmac(sha1) shim that registers at priority 9999 and wraps the sync in-tree hmac-sha1-lib. With the shim loaded, ah_output_done runs on every SYN-ACK egress through a transport-mode AH SA and skb->sk arrives as a request_sock (TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV); after this patch, xfrm_output_resume() receives the listener (the result of sk_to_full_sk()) and consumer derefs land on full-sock fields as intended.

Fixes 9ab1265d5231 ("xfrm: Use actual socket sk instead of skb socket for xfrm_output_resume")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-7
---
 net/ipv4/ah4.c |    2 +-
 net/ipv6/ah6.c |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/ah4.c +1 -1
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ static void ah_output_done(void *data, i
 	}
 
 	kfree(AH_SKB_CB(skb)->tmp);
-	xfrm_output_resume(skb->sk, skb, err);
+	xfrm_output_resume(skb_to_full_sk(skb), skb, err);
 }
 
 static int ah_output(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
net/ipv6/ah6.c +1 -1
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ static void ah6_output_done(void *data,
 	ah6_restore_hdrs(top_iph, iph_ext, extlen);
 
 	kfree(AH_SKB_CB(skb)->tmp);
-	xfrm_output_resume(skb->sk, skb, err);
+	xfrm_output_resume(skb_to_full_sk(skb), skb, err);
 }
 
 static int ah6_output(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
author maintainer
#206 lore raw

PATCH 203/315 ALSA: scarlett2: Fix 2i2 Gen 4 direct monitor gain on firmware 2417

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Geoffrey D. Bennett <[email protected]>

commit db37cf47b67e38ade40de5cd74a4d4d772ff1416 upstream.

Firmware 2417 for the Scarlett 4th Gen 2i2 moved the direct monitor gain parameter by 4 bytes, from offset 0x2a0 to 0x2a4, breaking the "Direct Monitor X Mix Y" controls.

Special-case the offset in the get/set config helpers when the running firmware is 2417 or later.

Fixes 4e809a299677 ("ALSA: scarlett2: Add support for Solo, 2i2, and 4i4 Gen 4")
---
 sound/usb/mixer_scarlett2.c |   33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
sound/usb/mixer_scarlett2.c +29 -4
@@ -2504,6 +2504,27 @@ static int scarlett2_has_config_item(
 	return !!private->config_set->items[config_item_num].offset;
 }
 
+/* Return the configuration item's offset, applying any per-firmware
+ * overrides.
+ *
+ * Firmware 2417 for the 2i2 Gen 4 moved DIRECT_MONITOR_GAIN by 4
+ * bytes. Apply that shift here so that the rest of the driver can
+ * keep using the single config set. This override can be removed
+ * once the multi-config-set framework lands.
+ */
+static int scarlett2_config_item_offset(
+	struct scarlett2_data *private, int config_item_num)
+{
+	int offset = private->config_set->items[config_item_num].offset;
+
+	if (config_item_num == SCARLETT2_CONFIG_DIRECT_MONITOR_GAIN &&
+	    private->info == &s2i2_gen4_info &&
+	    private->firmware_version >= 2417)
+		offset = 0x2a4;
+
+	return offset;
+}
+
 /* Send a USB message to get configuration parameters; result placed in *buf */
 static int scarlett2_usb_get_config(
 	struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer,
@@ -2513,6 +2534,7 @@ static int scarlett2_usb_get_config(
 	const struct scarlett2_config *config_item =
 		&private->config_set->items[config_item_num];
 	int size, err, i;
+	int item_offset;
 	u8 *buf_8;
 	u8 value;
 
@@ -2522,13 +2544,15 @@ static int scarlett2_usb_get_config(
 	if (!config_item->offset)
 		return -EFAULT;
 
+	item_offset = scarlett2_config_item_offset(private, config_item_num);
+
 	/* Writes to the parameter buffer are always 1 byte */
 	size = config_item->size ? config_item->size : 8;
 
 	/* For byte-sized parameters, retrieve directly into buf */
 	if (size >= 8) {
 		size = size / 8 * count;
-		err = scarlett2_usb_get(mixer, config_item->offset, buf, size);
+		err = scarlett2_usb_get(mixer, item_offset, buf, size);
 		if (err < 0)
 			return err;
 		if (config_item->size == 16) {
@@ -2546,7 +2570,7 @@ static int scarlett2_usb_get_config(
 	}
 
 	/* For bit-sized parameters, retrieve into value */
-	err = scarlett2_usb_get(mixer, config_item->offset, &value, 1);
+	err = scarlett2_usb_get(mixer, item_offset, &value, 1);
 	if (err < 0)
 		return err;
 
@@ -2696,7 +2720,8 @@ static int scarlett2_usb_set_config(
 	 */
 	if (config_item->size >= 8) {
 		size = config_item->size / 8;
-		offset = config_item->offset + index * size;
+		offset = scarlett2_config_item_offset(private, config_item_num) +
+			 index * size;
 
 	/* If updating a bit, retrieve the old value, set/clear the
 	 * bit as needed, and update value
@@ -2705,7 +2730,7 @@ static int scarlett2_usb_set_config(
 		u8 tmp;
 
 		size = 1;
-		offset = config_item->offset;
+		offset = scarlett2_config_item_offset(private, config_item_num);
 
 		err = scarlett2_usb_get(mixer, offset, &tmp, 1);
 		if (err < 0)
author maintainer
#207 lore raw

PATCH 204/315 ALSA: firewire-motu: Protect register DSP event queue positions

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>

commit 98fb1c1bb11e29eb609b7200a25e136e05aa4498 upstream.

The register DSP event queue is updated under parser->lock, but snd_motu_register_dsp_message_parser_count_event() reads pull_pos and push_pos without the lock. snd_motu_register_dsp_message_parser_copy_event() also reads both queue positions before taking the lock.

Protect these accesses with parser->lock as well. This keeps the hwdep poll/read path consistent with the producer side and with the cached meter/parameter accessors.

---
 sound/firewire/motu/motu-register-dsp-message-parser.c |   11 +++++++----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
sound/firewire/motu/motu-register-dsp-message-parser.c +7 -4
@@ -386,6 +386,8 @@ unsigned int snd_motu_register_dsp_messa
 {
 	struct msg_parser *parser = motu->message_parser;
 
+	guard(spinlock_irqsave)(&parser->lock);
+
 	if (parser->pull_pos > parser->push_pos)
 		return EVENT_QUEUE_SIZE - parser->pull_pos + parser->push_pos;
 	else
@@ -395,13 +397,14 @@ unsigned int snd_motu_register_dsp_messa
 bool snd_motu_register_dsp_message_parser_copy_event(struct snd_motu *motu, u32 *event)
 {
 	struct msg_parser *parser = motu->message_parser;
-	unsigned int pos = parser->pull_pos;
-
-	if (pos == parser->push_pos)
-		return false;
+	unsigned int pos;
 
 	guard(spinlock_irqsave)(&parser->lock);
 
+	if (parser->pull_pos == parser->push_pos)
+		return false;
+
+	pos = parser->pull_pos;
 	*event = parser->event_queue[pos];
 
 	++pos;
author maintainer
#208 lore raw

PATCH 205/315 netfilter: conntrack: tcp: do not force CLOSE on invalid-seq RST without direction check

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hamza Mahfooz <[email protected]>

commit bed6e04be8e6b9133d8b16d5a42d0e0ce674fa9a upstream.

An unintended behavior in the TCP conntrack state machine allows a connection to be forced into the CLOSE state using an RST packet with an invalid sequence number.

Specifically, after a SYN packet is observed, an RST with an invalid SEQ can transition the conntrack entry to TCP_CONNTRACK_CLOSE, regardless of whether the RST corresponds to the expected reply direction. The relevant code path assumes the RST is a response to an outgoing SYN, but does not validate packet direction or ensure that a matching SYN was actually sent in the opposite direction.

As a result, a crafted packet sequence consisting of a SYN followed by an invalid-sequence RST can prematurely terminate an active NAT entry. This makes connection teardown easier than intended.

So, tighten the state transition logic to ensure that RST-triggered CLOSE transitions only occur when the RST is a valid response to a previously observed SYN in the correct direction.

Fixes 9fb9cbb1082d ("[NETFILTER]: Add nf_conntrack subsystem.")
---
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c +2 -1
@@ -1221,7 +1221,8 @@ int nf_conntrack_tcp_packet(struct nf_co
 			new_state = old_state;
 		}
 		if (((test_bit(IPS_SEEN_REPLY_BIT, &ct->status)
-			 && ct->proto.tcp.last_index == TCP_SYN_SET)
+			 && ct->proto.tcp.last_index == TCP_SYN_SET
+			 && ct->proto.tcp.last_dir != dir)
 			|| (!test_bit(IPS_ASSURED_BIT, &ct->status)
 			    && ct->proto.tcp.last_index == TCP_ACK_SET))
 		    && ntohl(th->ack_seq) == ct->proto.tcp.last_end) {
author maintainer
#209 lore raw

PATCH 206/315 ASoC: qcom: q6asm-dai: close stream only when running

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>

commit 048c540ee76ded666bda74f9dae1ca3254e0633c upstream.

q6asm_dai_close() and q6asm_dai_compr_free() currently issue CMD_CLOSE whenever prtd->state is non-zero.

After prepare() closes an existing stream, the state is updated to Q6ASM_STREAM_STOPPED. Since this state is also non-zero, the close and free paths can send CMD_CLOSE again for a stream that has already been closed.

Restrict CMD_CLOSE to the Q6ASM_STREAM_RUNNING state so the command is sent only when the ASM stream is still active.

---
 sound/soc/qcom/qdsp6/q6asm-dai.c |   14 +++++++-------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
sound/soc/qcom/qdsp6/q6asm-dai.c +7 -7
@@ -447,12 +447,12 @@ static int q6asm_dai_close(struct snd_so
 	struct q6asm_dai_rtd *prtd = runtime->private_data;
 
 	if (prtd->audio_client) {
-		if (prtd->state)
+		if (prtd->state == Q6ASM_STREAM_RUNNING) {
 			q6asm_cmd(prtd->audio_client, prtd->stream_id,
 				  CMD_CLOSE);
-
-		q6asm_unmap_memory_regions(substream->stream,
+			q6asm_unmap_memory_regions(substream->stream,
 					   prtd->audio_client);
+		}
 		q6asm_audio_client_free(prtd->audio_client);
 		prtd->audio_client = NULL;
 	}
@@ -669,7 +669,7 @@ static int q6asm_dai_compr_free(struct s
 	struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *rtd = stream->private_data;
 
 	if (prtd->audio_client) {
-		if (prtd->state) {
+		if (prtd->state == Q6ASM_STREAM_RUNNING) {
 			q6asm_cmd(prtd->audio_client, prtd->stream_id,
 				  CMD_CLOSE);
 			if (prtd->next_track_stream_id) {
@@ -677,11 +677,11 @@ static int q6asm_dai_compr_free(struct s
 					  prtd->next_track_stream_id,
 					  CMD_CLOSE);
 			}
-		}
 
-		snd_dma_free_pages(&prtd->dma_buffer);
-		q6asm_unmap_memory_regions(stream->direction,
+			q6asm_unmap_memory_regions(stream->direction,
 					   prtd->audio_client);
+		}
+		snd_dma_free_pages(&prtd->dma_buffer);
 		q6asm_audio_client_free(prtd->audio_client);
 		prtd->audio_client = NULL;
 	}
author maintainer
#210 lore raw

PATCH 207/315 ASoC: qcom: q6asm-dai: do not set stream state in event and trigger callbacks

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Srinivas Kandagatla <[email protected]>

commit cee3e63e7106c3c81b2053371fdf14240bfba2fc upstream.

The q6asm-dai stream state is used by prepare() to decide whether an existing stream setup needs to be closed before opening/configuring a new one. Updating the state from trigger or asynchronous DSP callbacks can make that state stale or incorrect relative to the actual setup lifetime.

In particular, setting Q6ASM_STREAM_STOPPED on STOP or EOS completion can make prepare() believe there is no active setup to close, which can result in opening/configuring the same stream more than once.

Keep stream state updates tied to prepare(), where the stream is actually closed and reopened, and stop changing it from trigger and EOS callbacks.

---
 sound/soc/qcom/qdsp6/q6asm-dai.c |    5 -----
 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)
sound/soc/qcom/qdsp6/q6asm-dai.c +0 -5
@@ -187,7 +187,6 @@ static void event_handler(uint32_t opcod
 				   prtd->pcm_count, 0, 0, 0);
 		break;
 	case ASM_CLIENT_EVENT_CMD_EOS_DONE:
-		prtd->state = Q6ASM_STREAM_STOPPED;
 		break;
 	case ASM_CLIENT_EVENT_DATA_WRITE_DONE: {
 		prtd->pcm_irq_pos += prtd->pcm_count;
@@ -334,7 +333,6 @@ static int q6asm_dai_trigger(struct snd_
 				       0, 0, 0);
 		break;
 	case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_STOP:
-		prtd->state = Q6ASM_STREAM_STOPPED;
 		ret = q6asm_cmd_nowait(prtd->audio_client, prtd->stream_id,
 				       CMD_EOS);
 		break;
@@ -545,8 +543,6 @@ static void compress_event_handler(uint3
 			snd_compr_drain_notify(prtd->cstream);
 			prtd->notify_on_drain = false;
 
-		} else {
-			prtd->state = Q6ASM_STREAM_STOPPED;
 		}
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&prtd->lock, flags);
 		break;
@@ -1009,7 +1005,6 @@ static int q6asm_dai_compr_trigger(struc
 				       0, 0, 0);
 		break;
 	case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_STOP:
-		prtd->state = Q6ASM_STREAM_STOPPED;
 		ret = q6asm_cmd_nowait(prtd->audio_client, prtd->stream_id,
 				       CMD_EOS);
 		break;
author maintainer
#211 lore raw

PATCH 208/315 xfrm: esp: restore combined single-frag length gate

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jingguo Tan <[email protected]>

commit dfa0d7b0ff1eb6b2c416b8fdb9b4f2cefba57a40 upstream.

The ESP out-of-place fast path appends the trailer in esp_output_head() before esp_output_tail() allocates the destination page frag. The head-side gate currently checks skb->data_len and tailen separately, but the tail code allocates a single destination frag from the combined post-trailer skb->data_len.

Reject the page-frag fast path when the combined aligned length exceeds a page. Otherwise skb_page_frag_refill() may fall back to a single page while the destination sg still spans the combined skb->data_len.

Restore this combined-length page gate for both IPv4 and IPv6.

Fixes 5bd8baab087d ("esp: limit skb_page_frag_refill use to a single page")
---
 net/ipv4/esp4.c |    4 ++--
 net/ipv6/esp6.c |    4 ++--
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/esp4.c +2 -2
@@ -419,8 +419,8 @@ int esp_output_head(struct xfrm_state *x
 			return err;
 	}
 
-	if (ALIGN(tailen, L1_CACHE_BYTES) > PAGE_SIZE ||
-	    ALIGN(skb->data_len, L1_CACHE_BYTES) > PAGE_SIZE)
+	if (ALIGN(skb->data_len + tailen, L1_CACHE_BYTES) >
+	    PAGE_SIZE)
 		goto cow;
 
 	if (!skb_cloned(skb)) {
net/ipv6/esp6.c +2 -2
@@ -448,8 +448,8 @@ int esp6_output_head(struct xfrm_state *
 			return err;
 	}
 
-	if (ALIGN(tailen, L1_CACHE_BYTES) > PAGE_SIZE ||
-	    ALIGN(skb->data_len, L1_CACHE_BYTES) > PAGE_SIZE)
+	if (ALIGN(skb->data_len + tailen, L1_CACHE_BYTES) >
+	    PAGE_SIZE)
 		goto cow;
 
 	if (!skb_cloned(skb)) {
author maintainer
#212 lore raw

PATCH 209/315 ALSA: hda/realtek: Fix speaker output on ASUS ROG Strix G615LP

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhang Heng <[email protected]>

commit 20587302f8d700f26ee2c8a60ffb0a69ae0edf16 upstream.

Add quirk for ALC294 codec on ASUS ROG Strix G615LP (SSID 1043:1214) using ALC287_FIXUP_TXNW2781_I2C_ASUS to fix speaker output.

---
 sound/hda/codecs/realtek/alc269.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
sound/hda/codecs/realtek/alc269.c +1 -0
@@ -7053,6 +7053,7 @@ static const struct hda_quirk alc269_fix
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x11c0, "ASUS X556UR", ALC255_FIXUP_ASUS_MIC_NO_PRESENCE),
 	HDA_CODEC_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x1204, "ASUS Strix G16 G615JMR", ALC287_FIXUP_TXNW2781_I2C_ASUS),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x1204, "ASUS Strix G615JHR_JMR_JPR", ALC287_FIXUP_TAS2781_I2C),
+	HDA_CODEC_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x1214, "ASUS ROG Strix G615LP", ALC287_FIXUP_TXNW2781_I2C_ASUS),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x1214, "ASUS Strix G615LH_LM_LP", ALC287_FIXUP_TAS2781_I2C),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x125e, "ASUS Q524UQK", ALC255_FIXUP_ASUS_MIC_NO_PRESENCE),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x1271, "ASUS X430UN", ALC256_FIXUP_ASUS_MIC_NO_PRESENCE),
author maintainer
#213 lore raw

PATCH 210/315 Input: xpad - add "Nova 2 Lite" from GameSir

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Qbeliw Tanaka <[email protected]>

commit 1f6ac0f8441c48c4cc250141e1da8486c13512ba upstream.

Add support for the gamepad "Nova 2 Lite" from GameSir, compatible with the Xbox 360 gamepad.

---
 drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c +1 -0
@@ -425,6 +425,7 @@ static const struct xpad_device {
 	{ 0x3285, 0x0662, "Nacon Revolution5 Pro", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 },
 	{ 0x3285, 0x0663, "Nacon Evol-X", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE },
 	{ 0x3537, 0x1004, "GameSir T4 Kaleid", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 },
+	{ 0x3537, 0x100f, "GameSir Nova 2 Lite", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 },
 	{ 0x3537, 0x1010, "GameSir G7 SE", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE },
 	{ 0x3651, 0x1000, "CRKD SG", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 },
 	{ 0x366c, 0x0005, "ByoWave Proteus Controller", MAP_SHARE_BUTTON, XTYPE_XBOXONE, FLAG_DELAY_INIT },
author maintainer
#214 lore raw

PATCH 211/315 Input: xpad - add support for ASUS ROG RAIKIRI II

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dmitriy Zharov <[email protected]>

commit c897cf120696b94f56ed0f3197ba9a77071a59ec upstream.

Add the VID/PIDs for the ASUS ROG RAIKIRI II controller to xpad_device and the VID to xpad_table. The controller has a physical PC/XBOX toggle which switches between XBOX360 and XBOXONE protocols.

---
 drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c +5 -0
@@ -220,6 +220,10 @@ static const struct xpad_device {
 	{ 0x07ff, 0xffff, "Mad Catz GamePad", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 },
 	{ 0x0b05, 0x1a38, "ASUS ROG RAIKIRI", MAP_SHARE_BUTTON, XTYPE_XBOXONE },
 	{ 0x0b05, 0x1abb, "ASUS ROG RAIKIRI PRO", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE },
+	{ 0x0b05, 0x1c91, "ASUS ROG RAIKIRI II", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 },
+	{ 0x0b05, 0x1c92, "ASUS ROG RAIKIRI II WIRELESS", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 },
+	{ 0x0b05, 0x1c96, "ASUS ROG RAIKIRI II XBOX", MAP_SHARE_BUTTON, XTYPE_XBOXONE },
+	{ 0x0b05, 0x1d04, "ASUS ROG RAIKIRI II XBOX WIRELESS", MAP_SHARE_BUTTON, XTYPE_XBOXONE },
 	{ 0x0c12, 0x0005, "Intec wireless", 0, XTYPE_XBOX },
 	{ 0x0c12, 0x8801, "Nyko Xbox Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX },
 	{ 0x0c12, 0x8802, "Zeroplus Xbox Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX },
@@ -542,6 +546,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id xpad_t
 	{ USB_DEVICE(0x0738, 0x4540) },		/* Mad Catz Beat Pad */
 	XPAD_XBOXONE_VENDOR(0x0738),		/* Mad Catz FightStick TE 2 */
 	XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x07ff),		/* Mad Catz Gamepad */
+	XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x0b05),		/* ASUS controllers */
 	XPAD_XBOXONE_VENDOR(0x0b05),		/* ASUS controllers */
 	XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x0c12),		/* Zeroplus X-Box 360 controllers */
 	XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x0db0),		/* Micro Star International X-Box 360 controllers */
author maintainer
#215 lore raw

PATCH 212/315 ksmbd: OOB read regression in smb_check_perm_dacl() ACE-walk loops

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ali Ganiyev <[email protected]>

commit 0e60dafe97eca61721f3db456f97d97a80c6c8ae upstream.

Commit d07b26f39246 ("ksmbd: require minimum ACE size in smb_check_perm_dacl()") introduced a transposed bounds check:

if (offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) + aces_size < CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE)

Since offsetof(..sid) is 8 and CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE is 8, this evaluates to aces_size < 0. Because aces_size is always non-negative, this check becomes dead code and never breaks the loop.

Worse, that commit removed the old 4-byte guard, meaning the loop now reads ace->size (offset 2) even when aces_size is 0-3 bytes. This re-opens a 2-byte heap out-of-bounds (OOB) read past the pntsd allocation during subsequent SMB2_CREATE operations.

Fix this by properly transposing the comparison to require at least 16 bytes (8-byte offset + 8-byte SID base), matching the correct form used in smb_inherit_dacl().

Fixes d07b26f39246 ("ksmbd: require minimum ACE size in smb_check_perm_dacl()")
---
 fs/smb/server/smbacl.c |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/smb/server/smbacl.c +4 -4
@@ -1446,8 +1446,8 @@ int smb_check_perm_dacl(struct ksmbd_con
 		ace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)pdacl + sizeof(struct smb_acl));
 		aces_size = acl_size - sizeof(struct smb_acl);
 		for (i = 0; i < le16_to_cpu(pdacl->num_aces); i++) {
-			if (offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) +
-			    aces_size < CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE)
+			if (aces_size < offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) +
+			    CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE)
 				break;
 			ace_size = le16_to_cpu(ace->size);
 			if (ace_size > aces_size ||
@@ -1470,8 +1470,8 @@ int smb_check_perm_dacl(struct ksmbd_con
 	ace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)pdacl + sizeof(struct smb_acl));
 	aces_size = acl_size - sizeof(struct smb_acl);
 	for (i = 0; i < le16_to_cpu(pdacl->num_aces); i++) {
-		if (offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) +
-		    aces_size < CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE)
+		if (aces_size < offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) +
+		    CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE)
 			break;
 		ace_size = le16_to_cpu(ace->size);
 		if (ace_size > aces_size ||
author maintainer
#216 lore raw

PATCH 213/315 misc: rp1: Send IACK on IRQ activate to fix kdump/kexec

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Xiaolei Wang <[email protected]>

commit 36770417153644bc88281c7284730ef1d14d8d3c upstream.

After a kexec/kdump reboot, the macb Ethernet controller fails to receive any packets, causing DHCP to hang indefinitely and the network interface to be unusable despite link being up.

The root cause is that RP1's level-triggered MSI-X interrupt sources (such as macb on hwirq 6) may have their internal state machines stuck in the "waiting for IACK" state. This happens because the previous kernel crashed before sending the acknowledgment for a pending level interrupt.

In this stuck state, RP1 will not generate new MSI-X writes even though the interrupt source remains asserted. Since no new MSI-X is sent, the GIC never sees a new edge, the chained IRQ handler is never invoked, and the interrupt is permanently lost.

Fix this by sending MSIX_CFG_IACK in rp1_irq_activate(). This unconditionally resets the MSI-X state machine back to idle when a child device requests its interrupt. If the interrupt source is still asserted, RP1 will immediately issue a new MSI-X with the freshly configured msg_addr/msg_data, and normal interrupt delivery resumes.

Writing IACK when the state machine is already idle (i.e., on a normal cold boot) is harmless — it has no effect.

Fixes 49d63971f963 ("misc: rp1: RaspberryPi RP1 misc driver")
Cc stable <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/misc/rp1/rp1_pci.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/misc/rp1/rp1_pci.c +1 -0
@@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ static int rp1_irq_activate(struct irq_d
 	struct rp1_dev *rp1 = d->host_data;
 
 	msix_cfg_set(rp1, (unsigned int)irqd->hwirq, MSIX_CFG_ENABLE);
+	msix_cfg_set(rp1, (unsigned int)irqd->hwirq, MSIX_CFG_IACK);
 
 	return 0;
 }
author maintainer
#217 lore raw

PATCH 214/315 Input: atmel_mxt_ts - fix boundary check in mxt_prepare_cfg_mem

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>

commit baa0210fb6a9dc3882509a9411b6d284d88fe30e upstream.

When a configuration file provides an object size that is larger than the driver's known mxt_obj_size(object), the driver intends to discard the extra bytes.

The loop iterates using for (i = 0; i < size; i++). Inside the loop, the condition to skip processing extra bytes is:

if (i > mxt_obj_size(object))
continue;

Since i is a 0-based index, the valid indices for the object are 0 through mxt_obj_size(object) - 1.

When i == mxt_obj_size(object), the condition evaluates to false, and the code processes the byte instead of discarding it.

This causes the code to calculate byte_offset = reg + i - cfg->start_ofs and writes the byte there, overwriting exactly one byte of the adjacent instance or object.

Update the boundary check to skip extra bytes correctly by using >=.

Fixes 50a77c658b80 ("Input: atmel_mxt_ts - download device config using firmware loader")
Assisted-by Gemini:gemini-3.1-pro
---
 drivers/input/touchscreen/atmel_mxt_ts.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/input/touchscreen/atmel_mxt_ts.c +1 -1
@@ -1477,7 +1477,7 @@ static int mxt_prepare_cfg_mem(struct mx
 			}
 			cfg->raw_pos += offset;
 
-			if (i > mxt_obj_size(object))
+			if (i >= mxt_obj_size(object))
 				continue;
 
 			byte_offset = reg + i - cfg->start_ofs;
author maintainer
#218 lore raw

PATCH 215/315 Input: synaptics - add LEN2058 to SMBus passlist for ThinkPad E490

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Nicolás Bazaes <[email protected]>

commit 16ca52bc209fa4bf9239cd9e5643e95533476b58 upstream.

The Lenovo ThinkPad E490 (PNP ID: LEN2058) has a Synaptics TM3471-020 touchpad that supports SMBus/RMI4 mode but is not listed in smbus_pnp_ids[]. Without this entry, RMI4 over SMBus is not enabled by default, and the touchpad falls back to PS/2 mode.

Adding LEN2058 to the passlist enables automatic RMI4 detection without requiring the psmouse.synaptics_intertouch parameter, and matches the behavior of similar ThinkPad models already in the list (E480/LEN2054, E580/LEN2055).

Tested on ThinkPad E490 with kernel 7.0.5-zen1 and Arch Linux. RMI4 over SMBus is confirmed working without any kernel parameters.

---
 drivers/input/mouse/synaptics.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/input/mouse/synaptics.c +1 -0
@@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ static const char * const smbus_pnp_ids[
 	"LEN2044", /* L470  */
 	"LEN2054", /* E480 */
 	"LEN2055", /* E580 */
+	"LEN2058", /* E490 */
 	"LEN2068", /* T14 Gen 1 */
 	"SYN1221", /* TUXEDO InfinityBook Pro 14 v5 */
 	"SYN3003", /* HP EliteBook 850 G1 */
author maintainer
#219 lore raw

PATCH 216/315 gpib: cb7210: Fix region leak when request_irq fails

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hongling Zeng <[email protected]>

commit 2eae90a457baa0048a96ed38ad93090ee38c8b2f upstream.

When request_irq() fails, the region allocated by request_region() is not released. Fix this by adding an error handling path with proper goto labels to release the region.

---
 drivers/staging/gpib/cb7210/cb7210.c |   10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/staging/gpib/cb7210/cb7210.c +8 -2
@@ -1048,7 +1048,8 @@ static int cb_isa_attach(struct gpib_boa
 	if (!request_region(config->ibbase, cb7210_iosize, DRV_NAME)) {
 		dev_err(board->gpib_dev, "ioports starting at 0x%x are already in use\n",
 			config->ibbase);
-		return -EBUSY;
+		retval = -EBUSY;
+		goto err_release_region;
 	}
 	nec_priv->iobase = config->ibbase;
 	cb_priv->fifo_iobase = nec7210_iobase(cb_priv);
@@ -1061,11 +1062,16 @@ static int cb_isa_attach(struct gpib_boa
 	// install interrupt handler
 	if (request_irq(config->ibirq, cb7210_interrupt, isr_flags, DRV_NAME, board)) {
 		dev_err(board->gpib_dev, "failed to obtain IRQ %d\n", config->ibirq);
-		return -EBUSY;
+		retval = -EBUSY;
+		goto err_release_region;
 	}
 	cb_priv->irq = config->ibirq;
 
 	return cb7210_init(cb_priv, board);
+
+err_release_region:
+	release_region(nec7210_iobase(cb_priv), cb7210_iosize);
+	return retval;
 }
 
 static void cb_isa_detach(struct gpib_board *board)
author maintainer
#220 lore raw

PATCH 217/315 comedi: comedi_test: fix check for valid scan_begin_src in waveform_ai_cmdtest()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ian Abbott <[email protected]>

commit 542f5248cb481073203e0dadab5bcbd28aeae308 upstream.

Commit 783ddaebd397 ("staging: comedi: comedi_test: support scan_begin_src == TRIG_FOLLOW") neglected to add a test that scan_begin_src has only one bit set. The allowed values are TRIG_FOLLOW and TRIG_TIMER, but the code incorrectly also allows TRIG_FOLLOW | TRIG_TIMER. Add a call to comedi_check_trigger_is_unique() to check that only one trigger source bit is set.

Fixes 783ddaebd397 ("staging: comedi: comedi_test: support scan_begin_src == TRIG_FOLLOW")
Cc stable <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/comedi/drivers/comedi_test.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/comedi/drivers/comedi_test.c +1 -0
@@ -274,6 +274,7 @@ static int waveform_ai_cmdtest(struct co
 	/* Step 2a : make sure trigger sources are unique */
 
 	err |= comedi_check_trigger_is_unique(cmd->convert_src);
+	err |= comedi_check_trigger_is_unique(cmd->scan_begin_src);
 	err |= comedi_check_trigger_is_unique(cmd->stop_src);
 
 	/* Step 2b : and mutually compatible */
author maintainer
#221 lore raw

PATCH 218/315 comedi: comedi_test: Fix limiting of convert_arg in waveform_ai_cmdtest()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ian Abbott <[email protected]>

commit 8a3bee801d420be8a7a0bae4a26547b353b8fe22 upstream.

The function checks and possibly modifies the description of an asynchronous command to be run on the analog input subdevice of a comedi device attached to the "comedi_test" driver, returning 0 if no modifications were required, or a positive value that indicates which step of the checking process it failed on. Step 4 fixes up various argument values for various trigger sources.

There are two bugs in the fixing up of the convert_arg value to keep the scan_begin_arg value within the range of unsigned int when scan_begin_src and convert_src both have the value TRIG_TIMER, which indicates that the corresponding _arg values hold a time period in nanoseconds. The code also uses scan_end_arg which hold the number of "conversions" within each "scan". The goal is to end up with the scan period being less than or equal to the convert period multiplied by the number of conversions per scan. It intends to do that by clamping the convert_arg value to a maximum value of UINT_MAX / scan_end_arg rounded down to a multiple of 1000 (NSEC_PER_USEC).

(The rounding from nanoseconds to microseconds is because the driver is modelling a device that uses a 1 MHz clock for timing. This is partly because that is a more typical timing base for real hardware devices driven by comedi, and partly because the driver used to use struct timeval internally.)

The first bug is that the code checks if scan_begin_arg == TRIG_TIMER when it should be checking if scan_begin_src == TRIG_TIMER. The bugged check will always fail because if scan_begin_src == TRIG_TIMER, then scan_begin_arg will be at least 1000 (NSEC_PER_USEC), otherwise scan_begin_src == TRIG_FOLLOW and scan_begin_arg will be 0. (N.B TRIG_TIMER is defined as 0x10.) The second bug is that is rounding the maximum value down to a multiple of 1000000000 (NSEC_PER_SEC) instead of 1000 (NSEC_PER_USEC), however this bug is not reached due to the first bug. This patch fixes both bugs.

Fixes 783ddaebd397 ("staging: comedi: comedi_test: support scan_begin_src == TRIG_FOLLOW")
Fixes 5afdcad2f818 ("staging: comedi: comedi_test: limit maximum convert_arg")
Cc stable <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/comedi/drivers/comedi_test.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/comedi/drivers/comedi_test.c +2 -2
@@ -325,10 +325,10 @@ static int waveform_ai_cmdtest(struct co
 		arg = min(arg,
 			  rounddown(UINT_MAX, (unsigned int)NSEC_PER_USEC));
 		arg = NSEC_PER_USEC * DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST(arg, NSEC_PER_USEC);
-		if (cmd->scan_begin_arg == TRIG_TIMER) {
+		if (cmd->scan_begin_src == TRIG_TIMER) {
 			/* limit convert_arg to keep scan_begin_arg in range */
 			limit = UINT_MAX / cmd->scan_end_arg;
-			limit = rounddown(limit, (unsigned int)NSEC_PER_SEC);
+			limit = rounddown(limit, (unsigned int)NSEC_PER_USEC);
 			arg = min(arg, limit);
 		}
 		err |= comedi_check_trigger_arg_is(&cmd->convert_arg, arg);
author maintainer
#222 lore raw

PATCH 219/315 counter: Fix refcount leak in counter_alloc() error path

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Guangshuo Li <[email protected]>

commit d9eeb0ea0d2de658663bfaa9c26eccdd8fd64440 upstream.

After device_initialize(), the lifetime of the embedded struct device is expected to be managed through the device core reference counting.

In counter_alloc(), if dev_set_name() fails after device_initialize(), the error path removes the chrdev, frees the ID, and frees the backing allocation directly instead of releasing the device reference with put_device(). This bypasses the normal device lifetime rules and may leave the reference count of the embedded struct device unbalanced, resulting in a refcount leak.

The issue was identified by a static analysis tool I developed and confirmed by manual review.

Fix this by using put_device() in the dev_set_name() failure path and let counter_device_release() handle the final cleanup.

---
 drivers/counter/counter-core.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/counter/counter-core.c +2 -1
@@ -124,7 +124,8 @@ struct counter_device *counter_alloc(siz
 
 err_dev_set_name:
 
-	counter_chrdev_remove(counter);
+	put_device(dev);
+	return NULL;
 err_chrdev_add:
 
 	ida_free(&counter_ida, dev->id);
author maintainer
#223 lore raw

PATCH 220/315 tty: serial: pch_uart: add check for dma_alloc_coherent()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhaoyang Yu <[email protected]>

commit 6fe472c1bbbe238e91141f7cabc1226e96a60d43 upstream.

Add a check for dma_alloc_coherent() failure to prevent a potential NULL pointer dereference in dma_handle_rx(). Properly release DMA channels and the PCI device reference using a goto ladder if the allocation fails.

---
 drivers/tty/serial/pch_uart.c |   19 +++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/tty/serial/pch_uart.c +13 -6
@@ -689,8 +689,7 @@ static void pch_request_dma(struct uart_
 	if (!chan) {
 		dev_err(priv->port.dev, "%s:dma_request_channel FAILS(Tx)\n",
 			__func__);
-		pci_dev_put(dma_dev);
-		return;
+		goto err_pci_get;
 	}
 	priv->chan_tx = chan;
 
@@ -704,18 +703,26 @@ static void pch_request_dma(struct uart_
 	if (!chan) {
 		dev_err(priv->port.dev, "%s:dma_request_channel FAILS(Rx)\n",
 			__func__);
-		dma_release_channel(priv->chan_tx);
-		priv->chan_tx = NULL;
-		pci_dev_put(dma_dev);
-		return;
+		goto err_req_tx;
 	}
 
 	/* Get Consistent memory for DMA */
 	priv->rx_buf_virt = dma_alloc_coherent(port->dev, port->fifosize,
 				    &priv->rx_buf_dma, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!priv->rx_buf_virt)
+		goto err_req_rx;
 	priv->chan_rx = chan;
 
 	pci_dev_put(dma_dev);
+	return;
+
+err_req_rx:
+	dma_release_channel(chan);
+err_req_tx:
+	dma_release_channel(priv->chan_tx);
+	priv->chan_tx = NULL;
+err_pci_get:
+	pci_dev_put(dma_dev);
 }
 
 static void pch_dma_rx_complete(void *arg)
author maintainer
#224 lore raw

PATCH 221/315 tty: serial: samsung: Remove redundant port lock acquisition in rx helpers

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tudor Ambarus <[email protected]>

commit a3bb136bff5e6a5e48cdd813246c9c4686feaaa9 upstream.

Sashiko identified a deadlock when the console flow is engaged [1].

When console flow control is enabled (UPF_CONS_FLOW), s3c24xx_serial_stop_tx() calls s3c24xx_serial_rx_enable() and s3c24xx_serial_start_tx() calls s3c24xx_serial_rx_disable().

The serial core framework invokes the .stop_tx() and .start_tx() callbacks with the port->lock spinlock already held. Furthermore, all internal driver paths that invoke stop_tx (such as the DMA TX completion handler s3c24xx_serial_tx_dma_complete() or the PIO TX IRQ handler s3c24xx_serial_tx_irq()) also acquire port->lock prior to calling it. (Note that s3c24xx_serial_start_tx() is only invoked by the serial core).

However, s3c24xx_serial_rx_enable() and s3c24xx_serial_rx_disable() unconditionally attempt to acquire port->lock again using uart_port_lock_irqsave(). Since spinlocks are not recursive, this causes a deadlock on the same CPU when console flow control is engaged.

Remove the redundant lock acquisition from both rx helper functions.

---
 drivers/tty/serial/samsung_tty.c |    8 --------
 1 file changed, 8 deletions(-)
drivers/tty/serial/samsung_tty.c +0 -8
@@ -245,12 +245,9 @@ static bool s3c24xx_serial_txempty_nofif
 static void s3c24xx_serial_rx_enable(struct uart_port *port)
 {
 	struct s3c24xx_uart_port *ourport = to_ourport(port);
-	unsigned long flags;
 	int count = 10000;
 	u32 ucon, ufcon;
 
-	uart_port_lock_irqsave(port, &flags);
-
 	while (--count && !s3c24xx_serial_txempty_nofifo(port))
 		udelay(100);
 
@@ -263,23 +260,18 @@ static void s3c24xx_serial_rx_enable(str
 	wr_regl(port, S3C2410_UCON, ucon);
 
 	ourport->rx_enabled = 1;
-	uart_port_unlock_irqrestore(port, flags);
 }
 
 static void s3c24xx_serial_rx_disable(struct uart_port *port)
 {
 	struct s3c24xx_uart_port *ourport = to_ourport(port);
-	unsigned long flags;
 	u32 ucon;
 
-	uart_port_lock_irqsave(port, &flags);
-
 	ucon = rd_regl(port, S3C2410_UCON);
 	ucon &= ~S3C2410_UCON_RXIRQMODE;
 	wr_regl(port, S3C2410_UCON, ucon);
 
 	ourport->rx_enabled = 0;
-	uart_port_unlock_irqrestore(port, flags);
 }
 
 static void s3c24xx_serial_stop_tx(struct uart_port *port)
author maintainer
#225 lore raw

PATCH 222/315 usb: chipidea: core: convert ci_role_switch to local variable

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Xu Yang <[email protected]>

commit 8f6aa392653e52a45858cff5c063df550028836b upstream.

When a system contains multiple USB controllers, the global ci_role_switch variable may be overwritten by subsequent driver initialization code.

This can cause issues in the following cases:
- The 2nd ci_hdrc_probe() sees ci_role_switch.fwnode as non-NULL even though the "usb-role-switch" property is not present for the controller.
- When the ci_hdrc device is unbound and bound again, ci_role_switch fwnode will not be reassigned, and the old value will be used instead.

Convert ci_role_switch to a local variable to fix these issues.

Fixes 05559f10ed79 ("usb: chipidea: add role switch class support")
Cc stable <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/usb/chipidea/core.c |   16 ++++++----------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/chipidea/core.c +6 -10
@@ -669,12 +669,6 @@ static enum ci_role ci_get_role(struct c
 	return role;
 }
 
-static struct usb_role_switch_desc ci_role_switch = {
-	.set = ci_usb_role_switch_set,
-	.get = ci_usb_role_switch_get,
-	.allow_userspace_control = true,
-};
-
 static int ci_get_platdata(struct device *dev,
 		struct ci_hdrc_platform_data *platdata)
 {
@@ -801,9 +795,6 @@ static int ci_get_platdata(struct device
 			cable->connected = false;
 	}
 
-	if (device_property_read_bool(dev, "usb-role-switch"))
-		ci_role_switch.fwnode = dev->fwnode;
-
 	platdata->pctl = devm_pinctrl_get(dev);
 	if (!IS_ERR(platdata->pctl)) {
 		struct pinctrl_state *p;
@@ -1045,6 +1036,7 @@ ATTRIBUTE_GROUPS(ci);
 
 static int ci_hdrc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 {
+	struct usb_role_switch_desc ci_role_switch = {};
 	struct device	*dev = &pdev->dev;
 	struct ci_hdrc	*ci;
 	struct resource	*res;
@@ -1191,7 +1183,11 @@ static int ci_hdrc_probe(struct platform
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (ci_role_switch.fwnode) {
+	if (device_property_read_bool(dev, "usb-role-switch")) {
+		ci_role_switch.set = ci_usb_role_switch_set;
+		ci_role_switch.get = ci_usb_role_switch_get;
+		ci_role_switch.allow_userspace_control = true;
+		ci_role_switch.fwnode = dev_fwnode(dev);
 		ci_role_switch.driver_data = ci;
 		ci->role_switch = usb_role_switch_register(dev,
 					&ci_role_switch);
author maintainer
#226 lore raw

PATCH 223/315 usb: core: Fix up Interrupt IN endpoints with bogus wBytesPerInterval

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michal Pecio <[email protected]>

commit 727d045d064b7c9a24db3bce9c0485a382cb768b upstream.

Tao Xue found that some common devices violate USB 3.x section 9.6.7 by reporting wBytesPerInterval lower than the size of packets they actually send. I confirmed that AX88179 may set it to 0 and RTL8153 CDC configuration sets it to 8 but sends both 8 and 16 byte packets:

S Ii:11:007:3 -115:128 16 <
C Ii:11:007:3 0:128 8 = a1000000 01000000
S Ii:11:007:3 -115:128 16 <
C Ii:11:007:3 0:128 16 = a12a0000 01000800 00000000 00000000

Most xHCI host controllers neglect interrupt bandwidth reservations and let such devices exceed theirs, some fail the URB with EOVERFLOW.

Assume that wBytesPerInterval lower than wMaxPacketSize is bogus and increase it to the worst case maximum on interrupt IN endpoints. This solves xHCI problems and appears to have no other effect. Interrupt transfers are not limited to one interval and drivers submit URBs of class defined size without looking at wBytesPerInterval. Any multi- interval transfer is considered terminated by a packet shorter than wMaxPacketSize regardless of wBytesPerInterval - see USB3 8.10.3.

Stay in spec on OUT endpoints and isochronous. No buggy devices are known and we don't want to risk sending more data than the device is prepared to handle or confusing isoc drivers regarding altsetting capacities guaranteed by the device itself. And don't complain when wMaxPacketSize <= wBytesPerInterval < wMaxPacketSize * (bMaxBurst+1) because enabling this seems to be the exact goal of the spec.

---
 drivers/usb/core/config.c |    9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/core/config.c +8 -1
@@ -191,7 +191,14 @@ static void usb_parse_ss_endpoint_compan
 			(desc->bMaxBurst + 1);
 	else
 		max_tx = 999999;
-	if (le16_to_cpu(desc->wBytesPerInterval) > max_tx) {
+	/*
+	 * wBytesPerInterval > max_tx is bogus, but USB3 spec doesn't forbid the opposite.
+	 * Experience shows that wBytesPerInterval < wMaxPacketSize on common interrupt IN
+	 * endpoints is usually bogus too, and recent HCs enforce interrupt BW limits.
+	 */
+	if (le16_to_cpu(desc->wBytesPerInterval) > max_tx ||
+	    (le16_to_cpu(desc->wBytesPerInterval) < usb_endpoint_maxp(&ep->desc) &&
+	     usb_endpoint_is_int_in(&ep->desc))) {
 		dev_notice(ddev, "%s endpoint with wBytesPerInterval of %d in "
 				"config %d interface %d altsetting %d ep %d: "
 				"setting to %d\n",
author maintainer
#227 lore raw

PATCH 224/315 usb: musb: omap2430: Fix use-after-free in omap2430_probe()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wentao Liang <[email protected]>

commit e194ce048f5a6c549b3a23a8c568c6470f40f772 upstream.

In omap2430_probe(), of_node_put(np) is called prematurely before the last access to np, leading to a use-after-free if the node's reference count drops to zero. Move the of_node_put() calls after the last use of np in both the success and error paths.

Fixes ffbe2feac59b ("usb: musb: omap2430: Fix probe regression for missing resources")
Cc stable <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/usb/musb/omap2430.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/musb/omap2430.c +2 -1
@@ -338,7 +338,6 @@ static int omap2430_probe(struct platfor
 	} else {
 		device_set_of_node_from_dev(&musb->dev, &pdev->dev);
 	}
-	of_node_put(np);
 
 	glue->dev			= &pdev->dev;
 	glue->musb			= musb;
@@ -456,6 +455,7 @@ static int omap2430_probe(struct platfor
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "failed to register musb device\n");
 		goto err_disable_rpm;
 	}
+	of_node_put(np);
 
 	return 0;
 
@@ -465,6 +465,7 @@ err_put_control_otghs:
 	if (!IS_ERR(glue->control_otghs))
 		put_device(glue->control_otghs);
 err_put_musb:
+	of_node_put(np);
 	platform_device_put(musb);
 
 	return ret;
author maintainer
#228 lore raw

PATCH 225/315 USB: quirks: add NO_LPM for Lenovo ThinkPad USB-C Dock Gen2 hub controllers

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Stephen J. Fuhry <[email protected]>

commit 9ddb9c0deca48d2c2a22ebf4d2f35c925a520328 upstream.

The Lenovo ThinkPad USB-C Dock Gen2 (17ef:a391, 17ef:a392) hub controllers exhibit link instability when USB Link Power Management is enabled, similar to the dock's Ethernet adapter (17ef:a387) which already carries USB_QUIRK_NO_LPM.

When the dock reconnects after a transient disconnect, the hub controllers enter LPM states between re-enumeration retries, causing repeated disconnect/reconnect cycles lasting up to two minutes. Disabling LPM for these devices restores stable enumeration.

---
 drivers/usb/core/quirks.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/core/quirks.c +4 -0
@@ -514,6 +514,10 @@ static const struct usb_device_id usb_qu
 	/* Lenovo ThinkPad USB-C Dock Gen2 Ethernet (RTL8153 GigE) */
 	{ USB_DEVICE(0x17ef, 0xa387), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_NO_LPM },
 
+	/* Lenovo ThinkPad USB-C Dock Gen2 USB 3.1 and USB 2.0 hub controllers */
+	{ USB_DEVICE(0x17ef, 0xa391), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_NO_LPM },
+	{ USB_DEVICE(0x17ef, 0xa392), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_NO_LPM },
+
 	/* BUILDWIN Photo Frame */
 	{ USB_DEVICE(0x1908, 0x1315), .driver_info =
 			USB_QUIRK_HONOR_BNUMINTERFACES },
author maintainer
#229 lore raw

PATCH 226/315 usb: storage: Add quirks for PNY Elite Portable SSD

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sam Burkels <[email protected]>

commit b53ebb811e00be50a779ce4e7aee604178b4a825 upstream.

The PNY Elite Portable SSD (USB ID 154b:f009) is a sibling of the already-quirked PNY Pro Elite SSDs (154b:f00b and 154b:f00d). Like its siblings, it uses a Phison-based USB-SATA bridge that exhibits firmware bugs when bound to the uas driver.

Without quirks, the device fails to complete READ CAPACITY commands when accessed over UAS on a SuperSpeed (USB 3) port. The device enumerates and reports as a SCSI direct-access device, but reports zero logical blocks and never finishes spin-up:

usb 2-3: new SuperSpeed USB device number 8 using xhci_hcd usb 2-3: New USB device found, idVendor=154b, idProduct=f009 usb 2-3: Product: PNY ELITE PSSD
usb 2-3: Manufacturer: PNY
scsi host0: uas
scsi 0:0:0:0: Direct-Access PNY PNY ELITE PSSD 0
sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] Spinning up disk...
[...10+ seconds of polling, no progress...]
sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] Read Capacity(16) failed: hostbyte=DID_ERROR sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] Read Capacity(10) failed: hostbyte=DID_ERROR sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] 0 512-byte logical blocks: (0 B/0 B)

Tested each individual quirk to find the minimum that fixes this:
- US_FL_NO_ATA_1X alone: device hangs on spin-up
- US_FL_NO_REPORT_OPCODES alone: works on USB 2.0, hangs on USB 3.0
- US_FL_NO_ATA_1X | US_FL_NO_REPORT_OPCODES: works on both

With both quirks the device enumerates correctly while still using the uas driver, and delivers full UAS throughput (~281 MB/s sequential read on a USB 3.0 Gen 1 port).

The existing PNY Pro Elite entries (f00b, f00d) only set NO_ATA_1X, but this device additionally chokes on REPORT OPCODES under SuperSpeed.

---
 drivers/usb/storage/unusual_uas.h |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/storage/unusual_uas.h +7 -0
@@ -132,6 +132,13 @@ UNUSUAL_DEV(0x152d, 0x0583, 0x0000, 0x99
 		USB_SC_DEVICE, USB_PR_DEVICE, NULL,
 		US_FL_NO_REPORT_OPCODES),
 
+/* Reported-by: Sam Burkels <[email protected]> */
+UNUSUAL_DEV(0x154b, 0xf009, 0x0000, 0x9999,
+		"PNY",
+		"PNY ELITE PSSD",
+		USB_SC_DEVICE, USB_PR_DEVICE, NULL,
+		US_FL_NO_ATA_1X | US_FL_NO_REPORT_OPCODES),
+
 /* Reported-by: Thinh Nguyen <[email protected]> */
 UNUSUAL_DEV(0x154b, 0xf00b, 0x0000, 0x9999,
 		"PNY",
author maintainer
#230 lore raw

PATCH 227/315 usbip: vudc: Fix use after free bug in vudc_remove due to race condition

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>

commit d96209626a29ea64666be98c30b30ac82e5f1be6 upstream.

This patch follows up Zheng Wang's 2023 report of a use-after-free in vudc_remove(). The original thread stalled on Shuah Khan's request for runtime testing of the unplug/unbind path. This patch supplies that testing and keeps Zheng's original fix shape.

In vudc_probe(), v_init_timer() binds udc->tr_timer.timer to v_timer(). usbip_sockfd_store() starts the timer via v_start_timer()/v_kick_timer(). vudc_remove() can then free the containing struct vudc while the timer is still pending or executing.

KASAN confirms the race on an unpatched x86_64 QEMU guest with CONFIG_KASAN=y, CONFIG_USBIP_VUDC=y, CONFIG_USB_ZERO=y, and a tight loop that repeatedly writes a socket fd to usbip_sockfd, closes the socket pair, and unbinds/rebinds usbip-vudc.0:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __run_timer_base.part.0+0x8ba/0x8e0
  Write of size 8 at addr ffff888001b80740 by task trigger_and_unb/239
  Allocated by task 239:
    vudc_probe+0x4d/0xaa0
  Freed by task 239:
    kfree+0x18f/0x520
    device_release_driver_internal+0x388/0x540
    unbind_store+0xd9/0x100

This lands in the timer core rather than v_timer() itself because the embedded timer_list is being walked after its containing struct vudc has already been freed. The underlying lifetime bug is the same one Zheng reported.

With v_stop_timer() called from vudc_remove() and the timer deleted synchronously, the same harness completed 5000 bind/unbind iterations with no KASAN report.

---
 drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_dev.c      |    1 +
 drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_transfer.c |    3 ++-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_dev.c +1 -0
@@ -632,6 +632,7 @@ void vudc_remove(struct platform_device
 {
 	struct vudc *udc = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
 
+	v_stop_timer(udc);
 	usb_del_gadget_udc(&udc->gadget);
 	cleanup_vudc_hw(udc);
 	kfree(udc);
drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_transfer.c +2 -1
@@ -490,7 +490,8 @@ void v_stop_timer(struct vudc *udc)
 {
 	struct transfer_timer *t = &udc->tr_timer;
 
-	/* timer itself will take care of stopping */
+	/* Delete the timer synchronously before teardown frees udc. */
 	dev_dbg(&udc->pdev->dev, "timer stop");
+	timer_delete_sync(&t->timer);
 	t->state = VUDC_TR_STOPPED;
 }
author maintainer
#231 lore raw

PATCH 228/315 usb: usbtmc: check URB actual_length for interrupt-IN notifications

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Heitor Alves de Siqueira <[email protected]>

commit 52f2ad3f7e5eb3b5908e1d685d4342519dc9cfcd upstream.

USBTMC devices can use an optional interrupt endpoint for notification messages. These typically contain two-byte headers indicating the payload format, but the driver does not check if these headers are present before accessing the data buffers. In cases where the URB actual_length is not enough to fit these headers, the driver will either cause an out-of-bounds read, or consume stale leftover data from a previous notification.

Fix by checking if actual_data contains enough bytes for the headers, otherwise resubmit URB to the interrupt endpoint.

---
 drivers/usb/class/usbtmc.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/class/usbtmc.c +8 -0
@@ -2310,6 +2310,14 @@ static void usbtmc_interrupt(struct urb
 
 	switch (status) {
 	case 0: /* SUCCESS */
+		/* ensure at least two bytes of headers were transferred */
+		if (urb->actual_length < 2) {
+			dev_warn(dev,
+				"actual length %d not sufficient for interrupt headers\n",
+				urb->actual_length);
+			goto exit;
+		}
+
 		/* check for valid STB notification */
 		if (data->iin_buffer[0] > 0x81) {
 			data->bNotify1 = data->iin_buffer[0];
author maintainer
#232 lore raw

PATCH 229/315 usb: usbtmc: reject interrupt endpoints with small wMaxPacketSize

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Heitor Alves de Siqueira <[email protected]>

commit 121d2f682ba912b1427cddca7cf84840f41cc620 upstream.

The USB488 subclass specification requires interrupt wMaxPacketSize to be 0x02, unless the device sends vendor-specific notifications. Endpoints that advertise less than 2 bytes for wMaxPacketSize are unlikely to work with the current driver, as URBs will not have enough space for interrupt headers. Considering that any notification URBs will be ignored by the driver, reject these endpoints early during probe.

---
 drivers/usb/class/usbtmc.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/class/usbtmc.c +6 -0
@@ -2444,6 +2444,12 @@ static int usbtmc_probe(struct usb_inter
 		data->iin_ep = int_in->bEndpointAddress;
 		data->iin_wMaxPacketSize = usb_endpoint_maxp(int_in);
 		data->iin_interval = int_in->bInterval;
+		/* wMaxPacketSize should be 0x02 or more as per USB488 Table 22 */
+		if (iface_desc->desc.bInterfaceProtocol == 1 &&
+		    data->iin_wMaxPacketSize < 2) {
+			retcode = -EINVAL;
+			goto err_put;
+		}
 		dev_dbg(&intf->dev, "Found Int in endpoint at %u\n",
 				data->iin_ep);
 	}
author maintainer
#233 lore raw

PATCH 230/315 usb: typec: tipd: Fix error code in tps6598x_probe()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>

commit b02900c85a6423cf9b3dcc6b47bf060c85075e69 upstream.

Set the error code on these two error paths. The existing code returns success.

Fixes 77ed2f4538da ("usb: typec: tipd: Use read_power_status function in probe")
Fixes 04041fd7d6ec ("usb: typec: tipd: Read data status in probe and cache its value")
Cc stable <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/usb/typec/tipd/core.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/usb/typec/tipd/core.c +1 -0
@@ -1828,6 +1828,7 @@ static int tps6598x_probe(struct i2c_cli
 		goto err_role_put;
 
 	if (status & TPS_STATUS_PLUG_PRESENT) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
 		if (!tps6598x_read_power_status(tps))
 			goto err_unregister_port;
 		if (!tps->data->read_data_status(tps))
author maintainer
#234 lore raw

PATCH 231/315 usb: typec: tcpm: improve handling of DISCOVER_MODES failures

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sebastian Reichel <[email protected]>

commit c06e6cd488194e37ed4dc29d1488d1ffb760de60 upstream.

UGREEN USB-C Multifunction Adapter Model CM512 (AKA "Revodok 107") exposes two SVIDs: 0xff01 (DP Alt Mode) and 0x1d5c. The DISCOVER_MODES step succeeds for 0xff01 and gets a NAK for 0x1d5c. Currently this results in DP Alt Mode not being registered either, since the modes are only registered once all of them have been discovered. The NAK results in the processing being stopped and thus no Alt modes being registered.

Improve the situation by handling the NAK gracefully and continue processing the other modes.

Before this change, the TCPM log ends like this:

(more log entries before this)

[    5.028287] AMS DISCOVER_SVIDS finished
[    5.028291] cc:=4
[    5.040040] SVID 1: 0xff01
[    5.040054] SVID 2: 0x1d5c
[    5.040082] AMS DISCOVER_MODES start
[    5.040096] PD TX, header: 0x1b6f
[    5.050946] PD TX complete, status: 0
[    5.059609] PD RX, header: 0x264f [1]
[    5.059626] Rx VDM cmd 0xff018043 type 1 cmd 3 len 2
[    5.059640] AMS DISCOVER_MODES finished
[    5.059644] cc:=4
[    5.069994]  Alternate mode 0: SVID 0xff01, VDO 1: 0x000c0045
[    5.070029] AMS DISCOVER_MODES start
[    5.070043] PD TX, header: 0x1d6f
[    5.081139] PD TX complete, status: 0
[    5.087498] PD RX, header: 0x184f [1]
[    5.087515] Rx VDM cmd 0x1d5c8083 type 2 cmd 3 len 1
[    5.087529] AMS DISCOVER_MODES finished
[    5.087534] cc:=4

(no further log entries after this point)

After this patch the TCPM log looks exactly the same, but then continues like this:

[    5.100222] Skip SVID 0x1d5c (failed to discover mode)
[    5.101699] AMS DFP_TO_UFP_ENTER_MODE start

(log goes on as the system initializes DP AltMode)

---
 drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c |   97 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 61 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c +61 -36
@@ -1989,6 +1989,55 @@ static bool tcpm_cable_vdm_supported(str
 	       tcpm_can_communicate_sop_prime(port);
 }
 
+static int tcpm_handle_discover_mode(struct tcpm_port *port, u32 *response,
+				     enum tcpm_transmit_type rx_sop_type,
+				     enum tcpm_transmit_type *response_tx_sop_type)
+{
+	struct typec_port *typec = port->typec_port;
+	struct pd_mode_data *modep;
+
+	if (rx_sop_type == TCPC_TX_SOP) {
+		modep = &port->mode_data;
+		modep->svid_index++;
+
+		if (modep->svid_index < modep->nsvids) {
+			u16 svid = modep->svids[modep->svid_index];
+			*response_tx_sop_type = TCPC_TX_SOP;
+			response[0] = VDO(svid, 1,
+					  typec_get_negotiated_svdm_version(typec),
+					  CMD_DISCOVER_MODES);
+			return 1;
+		}
+
+		if (tcpm_cable_vdm_supported(port)) {
+			*response_tx_sop_type = TCPC_TX_SOP_PRIME;
+			response[0] = VDO(USB_SID_PD, 1,
+					  typec_get_cable_svdm_version(typec),
+					  CMD_DISCOVER_SVID);
+			return 1;
+		}
+
+		tcpm_register_partner_altmodes(port);
+	} else if (rx_sop_type == TCPC_TX_SOP_PRIME) {
+		modep = &port->mode_data_prime;
+		modep->svid_index++;
+
+		if (modep->svid_index < modep->nsvids) {
+			u16 svid = modep->svids[modep->svid_index];
+			*response_tx_sop_type = TCPC_TX_SOP_PRIME;
+			response[0] = VDO(svid, 1,
+					  typec_get_cable_svdm_version(typec),
+					  CMD_DISCOVER_MODES);
+			return 1;
+		}
+
+		tcpm_register_plug_altmodes(port);
+		tcpm_register_partner_altmodes(port);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int tcpm_pd_svdm(struct tcpm_port *port, struct typec_altmode *adev,
 			const u32 *p, int cnt, u32 *response,
 			enum adev_actions *adev_action,
@@ -2246,41 +2295,11 @@ static int tcpm_pd_svdm(struct tcpm_port
 			}
 			break;
 		case CMD_DISCOVER_MODES:
-			if (rx_sop_type == TCPC_TX_SOP) {
-				/* 6.4.4.3.3 */
-				svdm_consume_modes(port, p, cnt, rx_sop_type);
-				modep->svid_index++;
-				if (modep->svid_index < modep->nsvids) {
-					u16 svid = modep->svids[modep->svid_index];
-					*response_tx_sop_type = TCPC_TX_SOP;
-					response[0] = VDO(svid, 1, svdm_version,
-							  CMD_DISCOVER_MODES);
-					rlen = 1;
-				} else if (tcpm_cable_vdm_supported(port)) {
-					*response_tx_sop_type = TCPC_TX_SOP_PRIME;
-					response[0] = VDO(USB_SID_PD, 1,
-							  typec_get_cable_svdm_version(typec),
-							  CMD_DISCOVER_SVID);
-					rlen = 1;
-				} else {
-					tcpm_register_partner_altmodes(port);
-				}
-			} else if (rx_sop_type == TCPC_TX_SOP_PRIME) {
-				/* 6.4.4.3.3 */
-				svdm_consume_modes(port, p, cnt, rx_sop_type);
-				modep_prime->svid_index++;
-				if (modep_prime->svid_index < modep_prime->nsvids) {
-					u16 svid = modep_prime->svids[modep_prime->svid_index];
-					*response_tx_sop_type = TCPC_TX_SOP_PRIME;
-					response[0] = VDO(svid, 1,
-							  typec_get_cable_svdm_version(typec),
-							  CMD_DISCOVER_MODES);
-					rlen = 1;
-				} else {
-					tcpm_register_plug_altmodes(port);
-					tcpm_register_partner_altmodes(port);
-				}
-			}
+			/* 6.4.4.3.3 */
+			svdm_consume_modes(port, p, cnt, rx_sop_type);
+			rlen = tcpm_handle_discover_mode(port, response,
+							 rx_sop_type,
+							 response_tx_sop_type);
 			break;
 		case CMD_ENTER_MODE:
 			*response_tx_sop_type = rx_sop_type;
@@ -2323,9 +2342,15 @@ static int tcpm_pd_svdm(struct tcpm_port
 		switch (cmd) {
 		case CMD_DISCOVER_IDENT:
 		case CMD_DISCOVER_SVID:
-		case CMD_DISCOVER_MODES:
 		case VDO_CMD_VENDOR(0) ... VDO_CMD_VENDOR(15):
 			break;
+		case CMD_DISCOVER_MODES:
+			tcpm_log(port, "Skip SVID 0x%04x (failed to discover mode)",
+				 PD_VDO_SVID_SVID0(p[0]));
+			rlen = tcpm_handle_discover_mode(port, response,
+							 rx_sop_type,
+							 response_tx_sop_type);
+			break;
 		case CMD_ENTER_MODE:
 			/* Back to USB Operation */
 			*adev_action = ADEV_NOTIFY_USB_AND_QUEUE_VDM;
author maintainer
#235 lore raw

PATCH 232/315 usb: typec: ucsi: Check if power role change actually happened before handling

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Myrrh Periwinkle <[email protected]>

commit b80e7d34c7ea6a564525119d6138fbb577a23dba upstream.

The CrOS EC may send a connector status change event with the power direction changed flag set even if the power direction hasn't actually changed after initiating a SET_PDR command internally [1]. In practice this happens on every system suspend due to other changes performed by the EC [2][3][4], causing suspend to fail.

Fix this by checking if the power role change actually happened before handling it.

[1]: https://source.chromium.org/chromiumos/chromiumos/codesearch/+/main:src/platform/ec/zephyr/subsys/pd_controller/pdc_power_mgmt.c;l=1689;drc=2d5a1cffce4e5ac8a39442cb3b764d2d5e1cf794
[2]: https://source.chromium.org/chromiumos/chromiumos/codesearch/+/main:src/platform/ec/zephyr/subsys/pd_controller/pdc_power_mgmt.c;l=3923;drc=2d5a1cffce4e5ac8a39442cb3b764d2d5e1cf794
[3]: https://source.chromium.org/chromiumos/chromiumos/codesearch/+/main:src/platform/ec/zephyr/subsys/pd_controller/pdc_power_mgmt.c;l=5094;drc=2d5a1cffce4e5ac8a39442cb3b764d2d5e1cf794
[4]: https://source.chromium.org/chromiumos/chromiumos/codesearch/+/main:src/platform/ec/zephyr/subsys/pd_controller/pdc_power_mgmt.c;l=2229;drc=2d5a1cffce4e5ac8a39442cb3b764d2d5e1cf794

Cc stable <[email protected]>
Fixes 7616f006db07 ("usb: typec: ucsi: Update power_supply on power role change")
---
 drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c +4 -2
@@ -1224,7 +1224,7 @@ static void ucsi_handle_connector_change
 						  work);
 	struct ucsi *ucsi = con->ucsi;
 	u8 curr_scale, volt_scale;
-	enum typec_role role;
+	enum typec_role role, prev_role;
 	u16 change;
 	int ret;
 	u32 val;
@@ -1235,6 +1235,8 @@ static void ucsi_handle_connector_change
 		dev_err_once(ucsi->dev, "%s entered without EVENT_PENDING\n",
 			     __func__);
 
+	prev_role = UCSI_CONSTAT(con, PWR_DIR);
+
 	ret = ucsi_get_connector_status(con, true);
 	if (ret) {
 		dev_err(ucsi->dev, "%s: GET_CONNECTOR_STATUS failed (%d)\n",
@@ -1251,7 +1253,7 @@ static void ucsi_handle_connector_change
 	change = UCSI_CONSTAT(con, CHANGE);
 	role = UCSI_CONSTAT(con, PWR_DIR);
 
-	if (change & UCSI_CONSTAT_POWER_DIR_CHANGE) {
+	if ((change & UCSI_CONSTAT_POWER_DIR_CHANGE) && role != prev_role) {
 		typec_set_pwr_role(con->port, role);
 		ucsi_port_psy_changed(con);
 
author maintainer
#236 lore raw

PATCH 233/315 usb: typec: ucsi: Dont update power_supply on power role change if not connected

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Myrrh Periwinkle <[email protected]>

commit d98d413ca65d0790a8f3695d0a5845538958ab84 upstream.

We only need to update the power_supply on power role change if the port is connected, because otherwise the online status should be the same for both cases.

Cc stable <[email protected]>
Fixes 7616f006db07 ("usb: typec: ucsi: Update power_supply on power role change")
---
 drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c |    7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c +6 -1
@@ -1255,7 +1255,12 @@ static void ucsi_handle_connector_change
 
 	if ((change & UCSI_CONSTAT_POWER_DIR_CHANGE) && role != prev_role) {
 		typec_set_pwr_role(con->port, role);
-		ucsi_port_psy_changed(con);
+
+		/* Some power_supply properties vary depending on the power direction when
+		 * connected
+		 */
+		if (UCSI_CONSTAT(con, CONNECTED))
+			ucsi_port_psy_changed(con);
 
 		/* Complete pending power role swap */
 		if (!completion_done(&con->complete))
author maintainer
#237 lore raw

PATCH 234/315 USB: serial: option: add MeiG SRM813Q

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jan Volckaert <[email protected]>

commit 7d2b37d3e42d19071b62f4ddbee6e16e905efbf1 upstream.

Add support for the Qualcomm Technology Snapdragon X35-based MeiG SRM813Q module.

The module can be put in different modes via AT commands to enable/disable GPS functionality:

MODEM - PPP mode(2dee:4d63): AT+SER=1,1

If#= 0: RMNET
If#= 1: DIAG/ADB
If#= 2: MODEM
If#= 3: AT

P:  Vendor=2dee ProdID=4d63 Rev=05.15
S:  Manufacturer=MEIG
S:  Product=LTE-A Module
S:  SerialNumber=1bd51f0e
C:  #Ifs= 4 Cfg#= 1 Atr=80 MxPwr=500mA
I:  If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=50 Driver=qmi_wwan
E:  Ad=01(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=81(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=82(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS=   8 Ivl=32ms
I:  If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=30 Driver=option
E:  Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=83(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I:  If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option
E:  Ad=03(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=84(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=85(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS=  10 Ivl=32ms
I:  If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option
E:  Ad=04(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=86(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=87(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS=  10 Ivl=32ms

NMEA mode(2dee:4d64): AT+SER=51,1

If#= 0: RMNET
If#= 1: DIAG/ADB
If#= 2: NMEA
If#= 3: AT

P:  Vendor=2dee ProdID=4d64 Rev=05.15
S:  Manufacturer=MEIG
S:  Product=LTE-A Module
S:  SerialNumber=1bd51f0e
C:  #Ifs= 4 Cfg#= 1 Atr=80 MxPwr=500mA
I:  If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=50 Driver=qmi_wwan
E:  Ad=01(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=81(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=82(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS=   8 Ivl=32ms
I:  If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=30 Driver=option
E:  Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=83(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I:  If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=60 Driver=option
E:  Ad=03(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=84(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=85(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS=  10 Ivl=32ms
I:  If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option
E:  Ad=04(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=86(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=87(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS=  10 Ivl=32ms
---
 drivers/usb/serial/option.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/serial/option.c +6 -0
@@ -2450,6 +2450,12 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option
 	{ USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x2dee, 0x4d38, 0xff, 0xff, 0x30) },	/* MeiG Smart SRM825WN (Diag) */
 	{ USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x2dee, 0x4d38, 0xff, 0xff, 0x40) },	/* MeiG Smart SRM825WN (AT) */
 	{ USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x2dee, 0x4d38, 0xff, 0xff, 0x60) },	/* MeiG Smart SRM825WN (NMEA) */
+	{ USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x2dee, 0x4d63, 0xff, 0xff, 0x30) },	/* MeiG SRM813Q (Diag) */
+	{ USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x2dee, 0x4d63, 0xff, 0xff, 0x40) },	/* MeiG SRM813Q (AT) */
+	{ USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x2dee, 0x4d64, 0xff, 0xff, 0x30) },	/* MeiG SRM813Q (Diag) */
+	{ USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x2dee, 0x4d64, 0xff, 0xff, 0x40) },	/* MeiG SRM813Q (AT) */
+	{ USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x2dee, 0x4d64, 0xff, 0xff, 0x60) },	/* MeiG SRM813Q (NMEA) */
+
 	{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(0x2df3, 0x9d03, 0xff) },			/* LongSung M5710 */
 	{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(0x305a, 0x1404, 0xff) },			/* GosunCn GM500 RNDIS */
 	{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(0x305a, 0x1405, 0xff) },			/* GosunCn GM500 MBIM */
author maintainer
#238 lore raw

PATCH 235/315 USB: serial: option: add missing RSVD(5) flag for Rolling RW135R-GL

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wanquan Zhong <[email protected]>

commit 689f2facc689c8add11d7ff69fbbad17d65ee596 upstream.

The RW135R-GL entry added in commit 01e8d0f74222 ("USB: serial: option:
add support for Rolling Wireless RW135R-GL") was missing the .driver_info = RSVD(5) flag used by other Rolling Wireless MBIM laptop modules (e.g. RW135-GL and RW350-GL).

Without this flag, the option driver incorrectly binds to the reserved ADB interface (If#5) in multi-interface USB modes, causing AT/MBIM communication failures after mode switching. This matches the handling of other Rolling Wireless MBIM devices.

- VID:PID 33f8:1003, RW135R-GL for laptop debug M.2 cards (with MBIM interface for Linux/Chrome OS)

0x1003: mbim, diag, AT, pipe

Here are the outputs of usb-devices:

T:  Bus=03 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=04 Cnt=02 Dev#=  8 Spd=480  MxCh= 0
D:  Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs=  1
P:  Vendor=33f8 ProdID=1003 Rev= 5.15
S:  Manufacturer=Rolling Wireless S.a.r.l.
S:  Product=Rolling RW135R-GL Module
S:  SerialNumber=12345678
C:* #Ifs= 5 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA
A:  FirstIf#= 0 IfCount= 2 Cls=02(comm.) Sub=0e Prot=00
I:* If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(comm.) Sub=0e Prot=00 Driver=cdc_mbim
E:  Ad=82(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS=  64 Ivl=32ms
I:  If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 0 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=02 Driver=cdc_mbim
I:* If#= 1 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=02 Driver=cdc_mbim
E:  Ad=81(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=01(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I:* If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
E:  Ad=83(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I:* If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=30 Driver=option
E:  Ad=03(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=84(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I:* If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option
E:  Ad=86(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS=  10 Ivl=32ms
E:  Ad=85(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=04(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms

- VID:PID 33f8:1003, RW135R-GL for laptop debug M.2 cards (with MBIM interface for Linux/Chrome OS)

0x1003: mbim, diag, AT, ADB, pipe

Here are the outputs of usb-devices:

T:  Bus=03 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=04 Cnt=02 Dev#=  7 Spd=480  MxCh= 0
D:  Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs=  1
P:  Vendor=33f8 ProdID=1003 Rev= 5.15
S:  Manufacturer=Rolling Wireless S.a.r.l.
S:  Product=Rolling RW135R-GL Module
S:  SerialNumber=12345678
C:* #Ifs= 6 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA
A:  FirstIf#= 0 IfCount= 2 Cls=02(comm.) Sub=0e Prot=00
I:* If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(comm.) Sub=0e Prot=00 Driver=cdc_mbim
E:  Ad=82(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS=  64 Ivl=32ms
I:  If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 0 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=02 Driver=cdc_mbim
I:* If#= 1 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=02 Driver=cdc_mbim
E:  Ad=81(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=01(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I:* If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
E:  Ad=83(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I:* If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=30 Driver=option
E:  Ad=03(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=84(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I:* If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option
E:  Ad=86(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS=  10 Ivl=32ms
E:  Ad=85(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=04(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I:* If#= 5 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=42 Prot=01 Driver=(none)
E:  Ad=05(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=87(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms

- VID:PID 33f8:1003, RW135R-GL for laptop debug M.2 cards (with MBIM interface for Linux/Chrome OS)

0x1003: mbim, pipe

Here are the outputs of usb-devices:

T:  Bus=03 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=04 Cnt=02 Dev#=  9 Spd=480  MxCh= 0
D:  Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs=  1
P:  Vendor=33f8 ProdID=1003 Rev= 5.15
S:  Manufacturer=Rolling Wireless S.a.r.l.
S:  Product=Rolling RW135R-GL Module
S:  SerialNumber=12345678
C:* #Ifs= 3 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA
A:  FirstIf#= 0 IfCount= 2 Cls=02(comm.) Sub=0e Prot=00
I:* If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(comm.) Sub=0e Prot=00 Driver=cdc_mbim
E:  Ad=82(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS=  64 Ivl=32ms
I:  If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 0 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=02 Driver=cdc_mbim
I:* If#= 1 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=02 Driver=cdc_mbim
E:  Ad=81(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=01(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I:* If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
E:  Ad=83(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
Fixes 01e8d0f74222 ("USB: serial: option: add support for Rolling Wireless RW135R-GL")
---
 drivers/usb/serial/option.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/serial/option.c +2 -1
@@ -2476,7 +2476,8 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option
 	{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(0x33f8, 0x0302, 0xff) },			/* Rolling RW101R-GL (laptop MBIM) */
 	{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(0x33f8, 0x0802, 0xff),			/* Rolling RW350-GL (laptop MBIM) */
 	  .driver_info = RSVD(5) },
-	{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(0x33f8, 0x1003, 0xff) },			/* Rolling RW135R-GL (laptop MBIM) */
+	{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(0x33f8, 0x1003, 0xff),			/* Rolling RW135R-GL (laptop MBIM) */
+	  .driver_info = RSVD(5) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x3731, 0x0100, 0xff, 0xff, 0x30) },	/* NetPrisma LCUK54-WWD for Global */
 	{ USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x3731, 0x0100, 0xff, 0x00, 0x40) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x3731, 0x0100, 0xff, 0xff, 0x40) },
author maintainer
#239 lore raw

PATCH 236/315 USB: serial: belkin_sa: validate interrupt status length

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhang Cen <[email protected]>

commit 4ce058df2ee02cc2a0f0fd5cd64ce6f1482a0b65 upstream.

The Belkin interrupt callback treats interrupt data as a four-byte status report and reads LSR/MSR fields at offsets 2 and 3. The interrupt-in buffer length is derived from endpoint wMaxPacketSize, and short interrupt transfers may complete successfully with a smaller actual_length.

Check the completed interrupt packet length before parsing status fields so short interrupt endpoints and short successful packets are ignored instead of causing out-of-bounds or stale status-byte reads.

KASAN report as below:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in belkin_sa_read_int_callback()
Read of size 1
Call trace:
  belkin_sa_read_int_callback() (drivers/usb/serial/belkin_sa.c:202)
  __usb_hcd_giveback_urb() (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1630)
  dummy_timer() (?:?)
Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Assisted-by Codex:gpt-5.5
---
 drivers/usb/serial/belkin_sa.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/serial/belkin_sa.c +3 -0
@@ -194,6 +194,9 @@ static void belkin_sa_read_int_callback(
 
 	usb_serial_debug_data(&port->dev, __func__, urb->actual_length, data);
 
+	if (urb->actual_length < BELKIN_SA_MSR_INDEX + 1)
+		goto exit;
+
 	/* Handle known interrupt data */
 	/* ignore data[0] and data[1] */
 
author maintainer
#240 lore raw

PATCH 237/315 USB: serial: cypress_m8: validate interrupt packet headers

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhang Cen <[email protected]>

commit 9f9bfc80c67f35a275820da7e83a35dface08281 upstream.

cypress_read_int_callback() parses the interrupt-in buffer according to the selected Cypress packet format. Format 1 has a two-byte status/count header and format 2 has a one-byte combined status/count header. The usb-serial core sizes the interrupt-in buffer from the endpoint descriptor's wMaxPacketSize, and successful interrupt transfers can complete short when URB_SHORT_NOT_OK is not set.

Check that the completed packet contains the selected header before reading it. Malformed short reports are ignored and the interrupt URB is resubmitted through the existing retry path, preventing out-of-bounds header-byte reads.

KASAN report as below:
KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in cypress_read_int_callback+0x240/0x7f0

Read of size 1
Call trace:
  cypress_read_int_callback() (drivers/usb/serial/cypress_m8.c:1009)
  __usb_hcd_giveback_urb()
  dummy_timer()
Fixes 3416eaa1f8f8 ("USB: cypress_m8: Packet format is separate from characteristic size")
Assisted-by Codex:gpt-5.5
Fixes 3416eaa1f8f8 ("USB: cypress_m8: Packet format is separate from characteristic size")
Cc [email protected] # 2.6.26
[ johan: use constants in header length sanity checks ]
---
 drivers/usb/serial/cypress_m8.c |   12 +++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/serial/cypress_m8.c +11 -1
@@ -1017,8 +1017,8 @@ static void cypress_read_int_callback(st
 	char tty_flag = TTY_NORMAL;
 	int bytes = 0;
 	int result;
-	int i = 0;
 	int status = urb->status;
+	int i;
 
 	switch (status) {
 	case 0: /* success */
@@ -1056,22 +1056,32 @@ static void cypress_read_int_callback(st
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->lock, flags);
 	result = urb->actual_length;
+	i = 0;
 	switch (priv->pkt_fmt) {
 	default:
 	case packet_format_1:
 		/* This is for the CY7C64013... */
+		if (result < 2)
+			break;
 		priv->current_status = data[0] & 0xF8;
 		bytes = data[1] + 2;
 		i = 2;
 		break;
 	case packet_format_2:
 		/* This is for the CY7C63743... */
+		if (result < 1)
+			break;
 		priv->current_status = data[0] & 0xF8;
 		bytes = (data[0] & 0x07) + 1;
 		i = 1;
 		break;
 	}
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->lock, flags);
+	if (i == 0) {
+		dev_dbg(dev, "%s - short packet received: %d bytes\n",
+			__func__, result);
+		goto continue_read;
+	}
 	if (result < bytes) {
 		dev_dbg(dev,
 			"%s - wrong packet size - received %d bytes but packet said %d bytes\n",
author maintainer
#241 lore raw

PATCH 238/315 USB: serial: keyspan: fix missing indat transfer sanity check

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

commit ab8336a7e414f018430aa1af3a46944032f7ff96 upstream.

Add the missing sanity check on the size of usa49wg indat transfers to avoid parsing stale or uninitialised slab data.

Fixes 0ca1268e109a ("USB Serial Keyspan: add support for USA-49WG & USA-28XG")
Cc [email protected] # 2.6.23
---
 drivers/usb/serial/keyspan.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/serial/keyspan.c +4 -0
@@ -1187,6 +1187,10 @@ static void usa49wg_indat_callback(struc
 	len = 0;
 
 	while (i < urb->actual_length) {
+		if (urb->actual_length - i < 3) {
+			dev_warn_ratelimited(&urb->dev->dev, "malformed indat packet\n");
+			break;
+		}
 
 		/* Check port number from message */
 		if (data[i] >= serial->num_ports) {
author maintainer
#242 lore raw

PATCH 239/315 USB: serial: mxuport: fix memory corruption with small endpoint

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

commit 4085f0dbb1ce2251c9a5938d693de6593f0ab2bd upstream.

Make sure that the bulk-out endpoint max packet size is at least eight bytes to avoid user-controlled slab corruption should a malicious device report a smaller size.

Fixes ee467a1f2066 ("USB: serial: add Moxa UPORT 12XX/14XX/16XX driver")
Cc Andrew Lunn <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/usb/serial/mxuport.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/serial/mxuport.c +8 -0
@@ -962,6 +962,14 @@ static int mxuport_calc_num_ports(struct
 	 */
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(epds->bulk_out) < 16);
 
+	/*
+	 * The bulk-out buffers must be large enough for the four-byte header
+	 * (and following data), but assume anything smaller than eight bytes
+	 * is broken.
+	 */
+	if (usb_endpoint_maxp(epds->bulk_out[0]) < 8)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	for (i = 1; i < num_ports; ++i)
 		epds->bulk_out[i] = epds->bulk_out[0];
 
author maintainer
#243 lore raw

PATCH 240/315 USB: serial: mct_u232: fix missing interrupt-in transfer sanity check

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

commit 245aba83e3c288e176ed037a1f6b618b09e92ed8 upstream.

Add the missing sanity check on the size of interrupt-in transfers to avoid parsing stale or uninitialised slab data (and leaking it to user space).

---
 drivers/usb/serial/mct_u232.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/serial/mct_u232.c +5 -0
@@ -543,6 +543,11 @@ static void mct_u232_read_int_callback(s
 		goto exit;
 	}
 
+	if (urb->actual_length < 2) {
+		dev_warn_ratelimited(&port->dev, "short interrupt-in packet\n");
+		goto exit;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * The interrupt-in pipe signals exceptional conditions (modem line
 	 * signal changes and errors). data[0] holds MSR, data[1] holds LSR.
author maintainer
#244 lore raw

PATCH 241/315 usb: gadget: uvc: hold opts->lock across XU walks in uvc_function_bind

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kai Aizen <[email protected]>

commit 68aa70648b625fa684bc0b71bbfd905f4943ca20 upstream.

uvc_function_bind() walks &opts->extension_units twice without holding opts->lock:

- directly, for the iExtension string-descriptor fixup loop;
- indirectly, four times via uvc_copy_descriptors() (once per speed),

    where the helper iterates uvc->desc.extension_units (which aliases
    &opts->extension_units) to size and emit XU descriptors.

The configfs side (uvcg_extension_make / uvcg_extension_drop, in drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c) takes opts->lock around its list_add_tail / list_del operations. A privileged userspace process that holds the configfs subtree open and writes the gadget UDC name to bind the function while concurrently rmdir()'ing an extensions subdir can race uvcg_extension_drop() against the bind-time list walks and dereference a freed struct uvcg_extension.

Hold opts->lock from the start of the XU string-descriptor fixup through the last uvc_copy_descriptors() call, releasing on the descriptor-error path via a new error_unlock label that drops the lock before falling through to the existing error label. This matches the locking discipline of the configfs callbacks and removes the only remaining unsynchronised reader of the XU list during bind.

Reachability: only privileged processes that can mount configfs and write to gadget UDC files can trigger the race, so this is a correctness fix rather than a security boundary.

Fixes 0525210c9840 ("usb: gadget: uvc: Allow definition of XUs in configfs")
Cc stable <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_uvc.c |   28 +++++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_uvc.c +21 -7
@@ -769,6 +769,16 @@ uvc_function_bind(struct usb_configurati
 	uvc_ss_streaming_ep.bEndpointAddress = uvc->video.ep->address;
 
 	/*
+	 * Hold opts->lock across both the XU string-descriptor fixup below and
+	 * the descriptor-copy block further down.  Without this, configfs
+	 * uvcg_extension_drop() (which takes opts->lock) can race with the
+	 * list_for_each_entry() walks here and inside uvc_copy_descriptors(),
+	 * leading to a UAF on a freed struct uvcg_extension.  See
+	 * drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c::uvcg_extension_drop().
+	 */
+	mutex_lock(&opts->lock);
+
+	/*
 	 * XUs can have an arbitrary string descriptor describing them. If they
 	 * have one pick up the ID.
 	 */
@@ -785,7 +795,7 @@ uvc_function_bind(struct usb_configurati
 				 ARRAY_SIZE(uvc_en_us_strings));
 	if (IS_ERR(us)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(us);
-		goto error;
+		goto error_unlock;
 	}
 
 	uvc_iad.iFunction = opts->iad_index ? cdev->usb_strings[opts->iad_index].id :
@@ -799,14 +809,14 @@ uvc_function_bind(struct usb_configurati
 
 	/* Allocate interface IDs. */
 	if ((ret = usb_interface_id(c, f)) < 0)
-		goto error;
+		goto error_unlock;
 	uvc_iad.bFirstInterface = ret;
 	uvc_control_intf.bInterfaceNumber = ret;
 	uvc->control_intf = ret;
 	opts->control_interface = ret;
 
 	if ((ret = usb_interface_id(c, f)) < 0)
-		goto error;
+		goto error_unlock;
 	uvc_streaming_intf_alt0.bInterfaceNumber = ret;
 	uvc_streaming_intf_alt1.bInterfaceNumber = ret;
 	uvc->streaming_intf = ret;
@@ -817,30 +827,32 @@ uvc_function_bind(struct usb_configurati
 	if (IS_ERR(f->fs_descriptors)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(f->fs_descriptors);
 		f->fs_descriptors = NULL;
-		goto error;
+		goto error_unlock;
 	}
 
 	f->hs_descriptors = uvc_copy_descriptors(uvc, USB_SPEED_HIGH);
 	if (IS_ERR(f->hs_descriptors)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(f->hs_descriptors);
 		f->hs_descriptors = NULL;
-		goto error;
+		goto error_unlock;
 	}
 
 	f->ss_descriptors = uvc_copy_descriptors(uvc, USB_SPEED_SUPER);
 	if (IS_ERR(f->ss_descriptors)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(f->ss_descriptors);
 		f->ss_descriptors = NULL;
-		goto error;
+		goto error_unlock;
 	}
 
 	f->ssp_descriptors = uvc_copy_descriptors(uvc, USB_SPEED_SUPER_PLUS);
 	if (IS_ERR(f->ssp_descriptors)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(f->ssp_descriptors);
 		f->ssp_descriptors = NULL;
-		goto error;
+		goto error_unlock;
 	}
 
+	mutex_unlock(&opts->lock);
+
 	/* Preallocate control endpoint request. */
 	uvc->control_req = usb_ep_alloc_request(cdev->gadget->ep0, GFP_KERNEL);
 	uvc->control_buf = kmalloc(UVC_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -872,6 +884,8 @@ uvc_function_bind(struct usb_configurati
 
 	return 0;
 
+error_unlock:
+	mutex_unlock(&opts->lock);
 v4l2_error:
 	v4l2_device_unregister(&uvc->v4l2_dev);
 error:
author maintainer
#245 lore raw

PATCH 242/315 usb: gadget: net2280: Fix double free in probe error path

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Guangshuo Li <[email protected]>

commit c8547c74988e0b5f4cbb1b895e2a57aae084f070 upstream.

usb_initialize_gadget() installs gadget_release() as the release callback for the embedded gadget device. The struct net2280 instance is therefore released through gadget_release() when the gadget device's last reference is dropped.

The probe error path calls net2280_remove(), which tears down the partially initialized device and drops the gadget reference with usb_put_gadget(). Calling kfree(dev) afterwards can free the same object again.

Drop the explicit kfree() and let the gadget device release callback handle the final free. This issue was found by a static analysis tool I am developing.

---
 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/net2280.c |    4 +---
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/net2280.c +1 -3
@@ -3790,10 +3790,8 @@ static int net2280_probe(struct pci_dev
 	return 0;
 
 done:
-	if (dev) {
+	if (dev)
 		net2280_remove(pdev);
-		kfree(dev);
-	}
 	return retval;
 }
 
author maintainer
#246 lore raw

PATCH 243/315 usb: gadget: f_hid: fix device reference leak in hidg_alloc()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Guangshuo Li <[email protected]>

commit 4f88d65def6f3c90121601b4f62a4c967f3063a6 upstream.

hidg_alloc() initializes hidg->dev with device_initialize() before calling dev_set_name(). If dev_set_name() fails, the function currently jumps to err_unlock and returns without calling put_device().

This leaves the device reference unbalanced and prevents hidg_release() from being called. Calling put_device() here is also safe, since hidg_release() only frees resources owned by hidg.

The issue was identified by a static analysis tool I developed and confirmed by manual review.

Route the dev_set_name() failure path through err_put_device so the device reference is dropped properly.

Fixes 89ff3dfac604 ("usb: gadget: f_hid: fix f_hidg lifetime vs cdev")
Cc stable <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_hid.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_hid.c +1 -2
@@ -1621,7 +1621,7 @@ static struct usb_function *hidg_alloc(s
 	hidg->dev.devt = MKDEV(major, opts->minor);
 	ret = dev_set_name(&hidg->dev, "hidg%d", opts->minor);
 	if (ret)
-		goto err_unlock;
+		goto err_put_device;
 
 	hidg->bInterfaceSubClass = opts->subclass;
 	hidg->bInterfaceProtocol = opts->protocol;
@@ -1658,7 +1658,6 @@ static struct usb_function *hidg_alloc(s
 
 err_put_device:
 	put_device(&hidg->dev);
-err_unlock:
 	mutex_unlock(&opts->lock);
 	return ERR_PTR(ret);
 }
author maintainer
#247 lore raw

PATCH 244/315 usb: gadget: composite: fix integer underflow in WebUSB GET_URL handling

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jeremy Erazo <[email protected]>

commit 6c5dbc104dadd79fc2923497c20bae759a18758c upstream.

The WebUSB GET_URL handler in composite_setup() narrows landing_page_length to fit the host-supplied wLength using

landing_page_length = w_length
- WEBUSB_URL_DESCRIPTOR_HEADER_LENGTH + landing_page_offset;

If wLength is smaller than WEBUSB_URL_DESCRIPTOR_HEADER_LENGTH the unsigned subtraction wraps, and the subsequent

	memcpy(url_descriptor->URL,
	       cdev->landing_page + landing_page_offset,
	       landing_page_length - landing_page_offset);

ends up copying close to UINT_MAX bytes from cdev->landing_page into cdev->req->buf. KASAN reports a slab-out-of-bounds in composite_setup on the kmalloc-2k gadget_info allocation, and FORTIFY_SOURCE traps the memcpy as a 4294967293-byte field-spanning write into url_descriptor->URL (size 252).

A USB host can reach this from a single SETUP packet against any gadget that has webusb/use=1 and a landingPage configured.

Handle the small-wLength case before the math: when the host requested fewer bytes than the URL descriptor header, only the header is meaningful and no URL bytes need to be copied. Setting landing_page_length to landing_page_offset makes the existing memcpy a no-op and leaves the descriptor returned to the host unchanged for all larger wLength values.

Fixes 93c473948c58 ("usb: gadget: add WebUSB landing page support")
Cc stable <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/usb/gadget/composite.c |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/gadget/composite.c +4 -1
@@ -2172,7 +2172,10 @@ unknown:
 				sizeof(url_descriptor->URL)
 				- WEBUSB_URL_DESCRIPTOR_HEADER_LENGTH + landing_page_offset);
 
-			if (w_length < WEBUSB_URL_DESCRIPTOR_HEADER_LENGTH + landing_page_length)
+			if (w_length < WEBUSB_URL_DESCRIPTOR_HEADER_LENGTH)
+				landing_page_length = landing_page_offset;
+			else if (w_length <
+				 WEBUSB_URL_DESCRIPTOR_HEADER_LENGTH + landing_page_length)
 				landing_page_length = w_length
 				- WEBUSB_URL_DESCRIPTOR_HEADER_LENGTH + landing_page_offset;
 
author maintainer
#248 lore raw

PATCH 245/315 usb: gadget: dummy_hcd: Reject hub port requests for non-existent ports

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Seungjin Bae <[email protected]>

commit 7d9633528dd40e33964d2dc74a5abbf5c4d116ce upstream.

The dummy_hub_control() function handles USB hub class requests to the virtual root hub. The GetPortStatus case returns -EPIPE for requests with wIndex != 1, since the virtual root hub has only a single port. However, the ClearPortFeature and SetPortFeature cases lack the same check.

Fix this by extending the wIndex != 1 rejection to both cases, matching the existing behavior of GetPortStatus.

---
 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c +4 -0
@@ -2134,6 +2134,8 @@ static int dummy_hub_control(
 	case ClearHubFeature:
 		break;
 	case ClearPortFeature:
+		if (wIndex != 1)
+			goto error;
 		switch (wValue) {
 		case USB_PORT_FEAT_SUSPEND:
 			if (hcd->speed == HCD_USB3) {
@@ -2248,6 +2250,8 @@ static int dummy_hub_control(
 		retval = -EPIPE;
 		break;
 	case SetPortFeature:
+		if (wIndex != 1)
+			goto error;
 		switch (wValue) {
 		case USB_PORT_FEAT_LINK_STATE:
 			if (hcd->speed != HCD_USB3) {
author maintainer
#249 lore raw

PATCH 246/315 usb: gadget: f_fs: copy only received bytes on short ep0 read

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>

commit 4e036c10e7f4df5d951c69cc3697bc8e209c6d02 upstream.

ffs_ep0_read() allocates its control-OUT data buffer with kmalloc() (not kzalloc) at the Length value from the Setup packet, then copies that full len to userspace regardless of how many bytes were actually received:

    data = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
    ...
    ret = __ffs_ep0_queue_wait(ffs, data, len);
    if ((ret > 0) && (copy_to_user(buf, data, len)))
            ret = -EFAULT;

__ffs_ep0_queue_wait() returns req->actual, which on a short control OUT transfer is strictly less than len. The copy_to_user() call still copies len bytes, so on a short OUT the last (len - ret) bytes of the kmalloc() buffer -- uninitialised slab residue -- are delivered to the FunctionFS daemon.

Short ep0 OUT completions are specified USB control-transfer behavior and are produced by in-tree UDCs:

* dwc2 continues on req->actual < req->length for ep0 DATA OUT (short-not-ok is the only ep0-OUT stall path).
* aspeed_udc ends ep0 OUT on rx_len < ep->ep.maxpacket.
* renesas_usbf logs "ep0 short packet" and completes the request.
* dwc3 stalls on short IN but not on short OUT.

A short ep0 OUT is therefore not evidence of a broken UDC; it is a normal condition f_fs has to cope with. The sibling gadgetfs implementation in drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c already does this correctly via min(len, dev->req->actual) before copy_to_user(). This patch brings f_fs.c to the same safe pattern rather than trimming at a defensive layer.

The bug is reached from the FunctionFS device node, which in real deployments is owned by the privileged gadget daemon (adbd, UMS, composite gadget services, etc.); it is not reachable from unprivileged userspace. Linux host stacks normally reject short-wLength control OUTs before they reach the gadget, so reproducing this required a build that bypasses that host-side check. With the bypass in place, a 1-byte payload on a 64-byte Setup produces 63 bytes of non-canary slab residue in the daemon's read buffer.

Fix by copying only ret (actually received) bytes to userspace.

Fixes ddf8abd25994 ("USB: f_fs: the FunctionFS driver")
Cc stable <[email protected]>
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-7
---
 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c +1 -1
@@ -622,7 +622,7 @@ static ssize_t ffs_ep0_read(struct file
 
 		/* unlocks spinlock */
 		ret = __ffs_ep0_queue_wait(ffs, data, len);
-		if ((ret > 0) && (copy_to_user(buf, data, len)))
+		if ((ret > 0) && (copy_to_user(buf, data, ret)))
 			ret = -EFAULT;
 		goto done_mutex;
 
author maintainer
#250 lore raw

PATCH 247/315 usb: gadget: f_fs: serialize DMABUF cancel against request completion

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>

commit 2796646f6d892c1eb6818c7ca41fdfa12568e8d1 upstream.

ffs_epfile_dmabuf_io_complete() calls usb_ep_free_request() on the completed request but leaves priv->req, the back-pointer that ffs_dmabuf_transfer() set on submission, pointing at the freed memory. A later FUNCTIONFS_DMABUF_DETACH ioctl or ffs_epfile_release() on the close path still sees priv->req non-NULL under ffs->eps_lock:

    if (priv->ep && priv->req)
            usb_ep_dequeue(priv->ep, priv->req);

so usb_ep_dequeue() is called on a freed usb_request.

On dummy_hcd the dequeue path only walks a live queue and pointer-compares, so the freed pointer reads without faulting and KASAN requires an explicit check at the FunctionFS call site to surface the use-after-free. On SG-capable in-tree UDCs the dequeue path dereferences the supplied request immediately:

* chipidea's ep_dequeue() does
container_of(req, struct ci_hw_req, req) and reads hwreq->req.status before acquiring its own lock.
* cdnsp's cdnsp_gadget_ep_dequeue() reads request->status first.

The narrower option of clearing priv->req via cmpxchg() in the completion does not close the race: the completion runs without eps_lock, so a cancel path holding eps_lock can still observe priv->req non-NULL, race a concurrent completion that clears and frees, and pass the freed pointer to usb_ep_dequeue(). A slightly longer fix that moves the free into the cleanup work is needed.

Same class of lifetime race as the recent usbip-vudc timer fix [1].

Take eps_lock in the sole place that mutates priv->req from the callback direction by moving usb_ep_free_request() out of the completion into ffs_dmabuf_cleanup(), the existing work handler scheduled by ffs_dmabuf_signal_done() on ffs->io_completion_wq. Clear priv->req there under eps_lock before freeing, and only clear if priv->req still names our request (a subsequent ffs_dmabuf_transfer() on the same attachment may have queued a new one).

This keeps the existing dummy_hcd sync-dequeue invariant: the completion callback is still invoked by the UDC without eps_lock held (dummy_hcd drops its own lock before calling the callback), and the callback now takes no f_fs lock at all. Serialization against the cancel path happens in cleanup, which runs from the workqueue with no f_fs lock held on entry.

The priv ref count protects the containing ffs_dmabuf_priv:
ffs_dmabuf_transfer() takes a ref via ffs_dmabuf_get(), cleanup drops it via ffs_dmabuf_put(), so priv stays live for the cleanup even after the cancel path's list_del + ffs_dmabuf_put.

The ffs_dmabuf_transfer() error path no longer frees usb_req
inline: fence->req and fence->ep are set before usb_ep_queue(), so ffs_dmabuf_cleanup() (scheduled by the error-path ffs_dmabuf_signal_done()) owns the free regardless of whether the queue succeeded.

Reproduced under KASAN on both detach and close paths against dummy_hcd with an observability hook (kasan_check_byte(priv->req) immediately before usb_ep_dequeue) at the two FunctionFS cancel sites to surface the stale-pointer access; the hook is not part of this patch. The KASAN allocator / free stacks in the captured splats identify the same request: alloc in dummy_alloc_request, free in dummy_timer, fault reached from ffs_epfile_release (close) and from the FUNCTIONFS_DMABUF_DETACH ioctl (detach). With the patch applied, both paths are silent under the same hook.

The bug is reached from the FunctionFS device node, which in real deployments is owned by the privileged gadget daemon (adbd, UMS, composite gadget services, etc.); it is not reachable from unprivileged userspace or from a USB host on the cable. FunctionFS mounts default to GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, but the filesystem supports uid=, gid=, and fmode= delegation to a non-root gadget daemon, so on real deployments the attacker may be a less-privileged service rather than root.

Fixes 7b07a2a7ca02 ("usb: gadget: functionfs: Add DMABUF import interface")
Cc stable <[email protected]>
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-7
---
 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c |   24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c +22 -2
@@ -151,6 +151,8 @@ struct ffs_dma_fence {
 	struct dma_fence base;
 	struct ffs_dmabuf_priv *priv;
 	struct work_struct work;
+	struct usb_ep *ep;
+	struct usb_request *req;
 };
 
 struct ffs_epfile {
@@ -1365,6 +1367,21 @@ static void ffs_dmabuf_cleanup(struct wo
 	struct ffs_dmabuf_priv *priv = dma_fence->priv;
 	struct dma_buf_attachment *attach = priv->attach;
 	struct dma_fence *fence = &dma_fence->base;
+	struct usb_request *req = dma_fence->req;
+	struct usb_ep *ep = dma_fence->ep;
+
+	/*
+	 * eps_lock pairs with the cancel paths so they cannot pass a freed
+	 * req to usb_ep_dequeue().  Only clear if priv->req still names ours;
+	 * a re-queue on the same attachment may have taken that slot.
+	 */
+	spin_lock_irq(&priv->ffs->eps_lock);
+	if (priv->req == req)
+		priv->req = NULL;
+	spin_unlock_irq(&priv->ffs->eps_lock);
+
+	if (ep && req)
+		usb_ep_free_request(ep, req);
 
 	ffs_dmabuf_put(attach);
 	dma_fence_put(fence);
@@ -1394,8 +1411,8 @@ static void ffs_epfile_dmabuf_io_complet
 					  struct usb_request *req)
 {
 	pr_vdebug("FFS: DMABUF transfer complete, status=%d\n", req->status);
+	/* req is freed by ffs_dmabuf_cleanup() under eps_lock. */
 	ffs_dmabuf_signal_done(req->context, req->status);
-	usb_ep_free_request(ep, req);
 }
 
 static const char *ffs_dmabuf_get_driver_name(struct dma_fence *fence)
@@ -1679,6 +1696,10 @@ static int ffs_dmabuf_transfer(struct fi
 	usb_req->context  = fence;
 	usb_req->complete = ffs_epfile_dmabuf_io_complete;
 
+	/* ffs_dmabuf_cleanup() frees usb_req via these two fields. */
+	fence->req = usb_req;
+	fence->ep = ep->ep;
+
 	cookie = dma_fence_begin_signalling();
 	ret = usb_ep_queue(ep->ep, usb_req, GFP_ATOMIC);
 	dma_fence_end_signalling(cookie);
@@ -1688,7 +1709,6 @@ static int ffs_dmabuf_transfer(struct fi
 	} else {
 		pr_warn("FFS: Failed to queue DMABUF: %d\n", ret);
 		ffs_dmabuf_signal_done(fence, ret);
-		usb_ep_free_request(ep->ep, usb_req);
 	}
 
 	spin_unlock_irq(&epfile->ffs->eps_lock);
author maintainer
#251 lore raw

PATCH 248/315 thunderbolt: property: Reject u32 wrap in tb_property_entry_valid()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>

commit 01deda0152066c6c955f0619114ea6afa070aaec upstream.

entry->value is u32 and entry->length is u16; the sum is performed in u32 and wraps. A malicious XDomain peer can pick
value = 0xffffff00, length = 0x100 so the sum 0x100000000 wraps to 0 and passes the > block_len check. tb_property_parse() then passes entry->value to parse_dwdata() as a dword offset into the property block, reading attacker-directed memory far past the allocation.

For TEXT-typed entries with the "deviceid" or "vendorid" keys this lands in xd->device_name / xd->vendor_name and is readable back via the per-XDomain device_name / vendor_name sysfs attributes; the leak is NUL-bounded (kstrdup() stops at the first zero byte) and untargeted (the attacker picks a delta, not an absolute address). DATA-typed entries are parsed into property->value.data but not generically surfaced to userspace.

Use check_add_overflow() so a wrapped sum is rejected.

Fixes cdae7c07e3e3 ("thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain properties")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-6
Assisted-by Codex:gpt-5-4
---
 drivers/thunderbolt/property.c |    6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/thunderbolt/property.c +5 -1
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
  */
 
 #include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/overflow.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/uuid.h>
@@ -52,13 +53,16 @@ static inline void format_dwdata(void *d
 static bool tb_property_entry_valid(const struct tb_property_entry *entry,
 				  size_t block_len)
 {
+	u32 end;
+
 	switch (entry->type) {
 	case TB_PROPERTY_TYPE_DIRECTORY:
 	case TB_PROPERTY_TYPE_DATA:
 	case TB_PROPERTY_TYPE_TEXT:
 		if (entry->length > block_len)
 			return false;
-		if (entry->value + entry->length > block_len)
+		if (check_add_overflow(entry->value, entry->length, &end) ||
+		    end > block_len)
 			return false;
 		break;
 
author maintainer
#252 lore raw

PATCH 249/315 thunderbolt: property: Reject dir_len < 4 to prevent size_t underflow

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>

commit de21b59c29e31c5108ddc04210631bbfab81b997 upstream.

On the non-root path, __tb_property_parse_dir() takes dir_len from entry->length (u16 widened to size_t). Two distinct OOB conditions follow when entry->length < 4:

1. The non-root path begins with kmemdup(&block[dir_offset], sizeof(*dir->uuid), ...) which always reads 4 dwords from dir_offset. tb_property_entry_valid() only enforces dir_offset + entry->length <= block_len, so a crafted entry with dir_offset close to the end of the property block and entry->length in 0..3 passes that gate but lets the UUID copy run off the block (e.g. dir_offset = 497, dir_len = 3 in a 500-dword block reads block[497..501]).

2. After the kmemdup, content_len = dir_len - 4 underflows size_t to ~SIZE_MAX, nentries becomes SIZE_MAX / 4, and the entry walk runs OOB on each iteration until an entry fails validation or the kernel oopses on an unmapped page.

Reject dir_len < 4 on the non-root path *before* the UUID kmemdup, which closes both holes.

Also move INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dir->properties) up to immediately after the dir allocation so the new error-return path (and the existing uuid-alloc failure path) calling tb_property_free_dir() sees a walkable list rather than the zero-initialized NULL next/prev that list_for_each_entry_safe() would oops on.

Fixes cdae7c07e3e3 ("thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain properties")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-6
Assisted-by Codex:gpt-5-4
---
 drivers/thunderbolt/property.c |    8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/thunderbolt/property.c +6 -2
@@ -174,10 +174,16 @@ static struct tb_property_dir *__tb_prop
 	if (!dir)
 		return NULL;
 
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dir->properties);
+
 	if (is_root) {
 		content_offset = dir_offset + 2;
 		content_len = dir_len;
 	} else {
+		if (dir_len < 4) {
+			tb_property_free_dir(dir);
+			return NULL;
+		}
 		dir->uuid = kmemdup(&block[dir_offset], sizeof(*dir->uuid),
 				    GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!dir->uuid) {
@@ -191,8 +197,6 @@ static struct tb_property_dir *__tb_prop
 	entries = (const struct tb_property_entry *)&block[content_offset];
 	nentries = content_len / (sizeof(*entries) / 4);
 
-	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dir->properties);
-
 	for (i = 0; i < nentries; i++) {
 		struct tb_property *property;
 
author maintainer
#253 lore raw

PATCH 250/315 scsi: fcoe: Reject FIP descriptors with zero fip_dlen in CVL walker

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>

commit 9eed1bd59937e6828b00d2f2dfef631d964f3636 upstream.

drivers/scsi/fcoe/fcoe_ctlr.c::fcoe_ctlr_recv_clr_vlink() advanced the descriptor cursor by an attacker-supplied fip_dlen without ever requiring dlen >= sizeof(struct fip_desc) in the default branch. The named descriptor cases (FIP_DT_MAC, FIP_DT_NAME, FIP_DT_VN_ID) checked their per-type minimum lengths, but a FIP_DT_NON_CRITICAL descriptor (fip_dtype >= 128, which the standard requires receivers to silently ignore) skipped that check entirely.

An unauthenticated L2 peer on the FCoE control VLAN could hang fcoe_ctlr_recv_work on an fcoe, qedf, or bnx2fc initiator indefinitely by emitting one FIP CVL frame whose single descriptor had fip_dtype == FIP_DT_NON_CRITICAL and fip_dlen == 0: the cursor advanced zero bytes per iteration and the loop condition rlen >= sizeof(*desc) stayed true forever, blocking every subsequent FIP frame on that controller.

Tighten the outer dlen guard to also reject dlen < sizeof(struct fip_desc), so a malformed descriptor whose length cannot even cover the descriptor header is rejected before the switch. This is the same lower-bound the named cases already apply and is the minimum scope that closes the loop.

Fixes 97c8389d54b9 ("[SCSI] fcoe, libfcoe: Add support for FIP. FCoE discovery and keep-alive.")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-7
---
 drivers/scsi/fcoe/fcoe_ctlr.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/scsi/fcoe/fcoe_ctlr.c +1 -1
@@ -1386,7 +1386,7 @@ static void fcoe_ctlr_recv_clr_vlink(str
 
 	while (rlen >= sizeof(*desc)) {
 		dlen = desc->fip_dlen * FIP_BPW;
-		if (dlen > rlen)
+		if (dlen < sizeof(*desc) || dlen > rlen)
 			goto err;
 		/* Drop CVL if there are duplicate critical descriptors */
 		if ((desc->fip_dtype < 32) &&
author maintainer
#254 lore raw

PATCH 251/315 scsi: scsi_transport_fc: Widen FPIN pname walker counter to u32

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>

commit a9a39233ec1fc9f97ea1340a4d09bb7ec2be5153 upstream.

An adjacent Fibre Channel fabric actor that can deliver an FPIN ELS frame to an lpfc or qla2xxx Linux initiator can trigger a non-return in the generic FC transport. This is not a local userspace or IP network path; the attacker must be able to inject fabric traffic, for example as a compromised switch or fabric controller, or as a same-zone N_Port on a fabric that permits source spoofing.

The Link-Integrity and Peer-Congestion FPIN walkers used a u8 loop counter against the 32-bit on-wire pname_count field, and did not bound pname_count by the descriptor body already validated by the TLV walker. A pname_count of 256 therefore wraps the counter and keeps the loop condition true indefinitely.

Factor the shared pname_list[] walk into one helper, widen the counter to u32, and clamp pname_count against the entries that fit in the descriptor body before iterating.

Fixes 3dcfe0de5a97 ("scsi: fc: Parse FPIN packets and update statistics")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-7
---
 drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_fc.c |   77 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_fc.c +41 -36
@@ -735,6 +735,37 @@ fc_cn_stats_update(u16 event_type, struc
 	}
 }
 
+static void
+fc_fpin_pname_stats_update(struct Scsi_Host *shost,
+			   struct fc_rport *attach_rport, u16 event_type,
+			   u32 desc_len, u32 fixed_len, u32 pname_count,
+			   __be64 *pname_list,
+			   void (*stats_update)(u16 event_type,
+						struct fc_fpin_stats *stats))
+{
+	u32 i;
+	struct fc_rport *rport;
+	u64 wwpn;
+
+	if (desc_len < fixed_len)
+		pname_count = 0;
+	else
+		pname_count = min(pname_count, (desc_len - fixed_len) /
+				   sizeof(pname_list[0]));
+
+	for (i = 0; i < pname_count; i++) {
+		wwpn = be64_to_cpu(pname_list[i]);
+		rport = fc_find_rport_by_wwpn(shost, wwpn);
+		if (rport &&
+		    (rport->roles & FC_PORT_ROLE_FCP_TARGET ||
+		     rport->roles & FC_PORT_ROLE_NVME_TARGET)) {
+			if (rport == attach_rport)
+				continue;
+			stats_update(event_type, &rport->fpin_stats);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 /*
  * fc_fpin_li_stats_update - routine to update Link Integrity
  * event statistics.
@@ -745,13 +776,11 @@ fc_cn_stats_update(u16 event_type, struc
 static void
 fc_fpin_li_stats_update(struct Scsi_Host *shost, struct fc_tlv_desc *tlv)
 {
-	u8 i;
 	struct fc_rport *rport = NULL;
 	struct fc_rport *attach_rport = NULL;
 	struct fc_host_attrs *fc_host = shost_to_fc_host(shost);
 	struct fc_fn_li_desc *li_desc = (struct fc_fn_li_desc *)tlv;
 	u16 event_type = be16_to_cpu(li_desc->event_type);
-	u64 wwpn;
 
 	rport = fc_find_rport_by_wwpn(shost,
 				      be64_to_cpu(li_desc->attached_wwpn));
@@ -762,22 +791,11 @@ fc_fpin_li_stats_update(struct Scsi_Host
 		fc_li_stats_update(event_type, &attach_rport->fpin_stats);
 	}
 
-	if (be32_to_cpu(li_desc->pname_count) > 0) {
-		for (i = 0;
-		    i < be32_to_cpu(li_desc->pname_count);
-		    i++) {
-			wwpn = be64_to_cpu(li_desc->pname_list[i]);
-			rport = fc_find_rport_by_wwpn(shost, wwpn);
-			if (rport &&
-			    (rport->roles & FC_PORT_ROLE_FCP_TARGET ||
-			    rport->roles & FC_PORT_ROLE_NVME_TARGET)) {
-				if (rport == attach_rport)
-					continue;
-				fc_li_stats_update(event_type,
-						   &rport->fpin_stats);
-			}
-		}
-	}
+	fc_fpin_pname_stats_update(shost, attach_rport, event_type,
+				   be32_to_cpu(li_desc->desc_len),
+				   FC_TLV_DESC_LENGTH_FROM_SZ(*li_desc),
+				   be32_to_cpu(li_desc->pname_count),
+				   li_desc->pname_list, fc_li_stats_update);
 
 	if (fc_host->port_name == be64_to_cpu(li_desc->attached_wwpn))
 		fc_li_stats_update(event_type, &fc_host->fpin_stats);
@@ -825,13 +843,11 @@ static void
 fc_fpin_peer_congn_stats_update(struct Scsi_Host *shost,
 				struct fc_tlv_desc *tlv)
 {
-	u8 i;
 	struct fc_rport *rport = NULL;
 	struct fc_rport *attach_rport = NULL;
 	struct fc_fn_peer_congn_desc *pc_desc =
 	    (struct fc_fn_peer_congn_desc *)tlv;
 	u16 event_type = be16_to_cpu(pc_desc->event_type);
-	u64 wwpn;
 
 	rport = fc_find_rport_by_wwpn(shost,
 				      be64_to_cpu(pc_desc->attached_wwpn));
@@ -842,22 +858,11 @@ fc_fpin_peer_congn_stats_update(struct S
 		fc_cn_stats_update(event_type, &attach_rport->fpin_stats);
 	}
 
-	if (be32_to_cpu(pc_desc->pname_count) > 0) {
-		for (i = 0;
-		    i < be32_to_cpu(pc_desc->pname_count);
-		    i++) {
-			wwpn = be64_to_cpu(pc_desc->pname_list[i]);
-			rport = fc_find_rport_by_wwpn(shost, wwpn);
-			if (rport &&
-			    (rport->roles & FC_PORT_ROLE_FCP_TARGET ||
-			     rport->roles & FC_PORT_ROLE_NVME_TARGET)) {
-				if (rport == attach_rport)
-					continue;
-				fc_cn_stats_update(event_type,
-						   &rport->fpin_stats);
-			}
-		}
-	}
+	fc_fpin_pname_stats_update(shost, attach_rport, event_type,
+				   be32_to_cpu(pc_desc->desc_len),
+				   FC_TLV_DESC_LENGTH_FROM_SZ(*pc_desc),
+				   be32_to_cpu(pc_desc->pname_count),
+				   pc_desc->pname_list, fc_cn_stats_update);
 }
 
 /*
author maintainer
#255 lore raw

PATCH 252/315 scsi: target: iscsi: Fix CRC overread and double-free in iscsit_handle_text_cmd()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>

commit 778c2ab142c625a8a8afa570e0f9b7873f445d99 upstream.

Two latent bugs in the Text-phase handler, both present since the original LIO integration in commit e48354ce078c ("iscsi-target: Add iSCSI fabric support for target v4.1"):

1) DataDigest CRC buffer overread (4 bytes past text_in).

text_in is kzalloc()'d at ALIGN(payload_length, 4). rx_size is then incremented by ISCSI_CRC_LEN to make room for the received DataDigest in the iovec, but the same (now-bumped) rx_size is passed as the buffer length to iscsit_crc_buf():

       if (conn->conn_ops->DataDigest) {
               ...
               rx_size += ISCSI_CRC_LEN;
       }
       ...
       if (conn->conn_ops->DataDigest) {
               data_crc = iscsit_crc_buf(text_in, rx_size, 0, NULL);

iscsit_crc_buf() walks rx_size bytes of text_in with crc32c(), so when DataDigest is negotiated it reads 4 bytes past the end of the text_in allocation. KASAN reproduces this directly on the unpatched mainline tree as slab-out-of-bounds in crc32c() called from the Text PDU path. The OOB bytes feed crc32c() and are then compared against the initiator-supplied checksum, so the value does not flow back to the attacker, but the kernel does read past the buffer on every Text PDU with DataDigest=CRC32C.

Fix by passing the actual padded payload length (ALIGN(payload_length, 4)) that was used for the kzalloc().

2) Stale cmd->text_in_ptr re-free (double-free) on ERL>0 bad DataDigest drop.

On DataDigest mismatch with ErrorRecoveryLevel > 0 the handler silently drops the PDU and lets the initiator plug the CmdSN gap:

               kfree(text_in);
               return 0;

cmd->text_in_ptr still points at the freed buffer. The next Text Request on the same ITT re-enters iscsit_setup_text_cmd(), which unconditionally does

       kfree(cmd->text_in_ptr);
       cmd->text_in_ptr = NULL;

freeing the same pointer a second time. Session teardown via iscsit_release_cmd() has the same shape and hits the same double-free if the connection is dropped before a second Text Request arrives.

On an unmodified mainline tree the bug-1 CRC overread fires first on the initial valid Text Request and perturbs the subsequent state, so #4 was isolated by building a kernel with only the bug-1 hunk of this patch applied plus temporary printk() observability around the three relevant kfree() sites. The observability prints are not part of this patch. On that build, a three-PDU Text Request sequence after login produces two back-to-back splats:

       BUG: KASAN: double-free in iscsit_setup_text_cmd+0x??
       BUG: KASAN: double-free in iscsit_release_cmd+0x??

showing the same pointer freed in the ERL>0 drop path and again in iscsit_setup_text_cmd() (next Text Request on the same ITT) and once more in iscsit_release_cmd() (session teardown). On distro kernels with CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y (default) the double-free becomes a remote kernel BUG(); on non-hardened kernels it corrupts the slab freelist.

Fix by clearing cmd->text_in_ptr after the kfree() in the ERL>0 drop path. With both hunks applied #4 is directly observable on the stock tree without observability printks; fixing bug-1 alone would mask #4 less, not more, so the hunks are submitted together.

Both fixes are one-liners. The Text PDU state machine is unchanged and the wire protocol is unaffected.

Fixes e48354ce078c ("iscsi-target: Add iSCSI fabric support for target v4.1")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-7
---
 drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c +4 -1
@@ -2281,7 +2281,9 @@ iscsit_handle_text_cmd(struct iscsit_con
 			goto reject;
 
 		if (conn->conn_ops->DataDigest) {
-			data_crc = iscsit_crc_buf(text_in, rx_size, 0, NULL);
+			data_crc = iscsit_crc_buf(text_in,
+						  ALIGN(payload_length, 4),
+						  0, NULL);
 			if (checksum != data_crc) {
 				pr_err("Text data CRC32C DataDigest"
 					" 0x%08x does not match computed"
@@ -2300,6 +2302,7 @@ iscsit_handle_text_cmd(struct iscsit_con
 					" Command CmdSN: 0x%08x due to"
 					" DataCRC error.\n", hdr->cmdsn);
 					kfree(text_in);
+					cmd->text_in_ptr = NULL;
 					return 0;
 				}
 			} else {
author maintainer
#256 lore raw

PATCH 253/315 scsi: target: iscsi: Bound iscsi_encode_text_output() appends to rsp_buf

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>

commit bf33e01f88388c43e285492a63e539df6ffed64c upstream.

iscsi_encode_text_output() concatenates "key=value\0" records into login->rsp_buf, an 8192-byte kzalloc(MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS) buffer allocated in iscsit_alloc_login_setup_buffer(). The three sprintf() call sites in this function (lines 1398, 1411, 1424 in v7.1-rc2) never check the remaining buffer capacity:

	*length += sprintf(output_buf, "%s=%s", er->key, er->value);
	*length += 1;
	output_buf = textbuf + *length;

The 8192-byte ceiling at iscsi_target_check_login_request() bounds the *input* Login PDU payload, but a single PDU can carry up to 2048 minimal four-byte "a=b\0" pairs, each unknown key expanding to a 16-byte "a=NotUnderstood\0" output record via iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(). 2048 * 16 = 32 KiB of output into an 8 KiB buffer, producing a ~24 KiB heap overrun in the kmalloc-8k slab.

The fix introduces a static iscsi_encode_text_record() helper that uses snprintf() with a per-call bounds check against the remaining buffer, and threads a u32 textbuf_size parameter through iscsi_encode_text_output(). Both call sites in iscsi_target_handle_csg_zero() (PHASE_SECURITY) and iscsi_target_handle_csg_one() (PHASE_OPERATIONAL) pass MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS. On overflow the encoder logs the condition, calls iscsi_release_extra_responses() to drop queued records, and returns -1; both caller sites now emit ISCSI_STATUS_CLS_INITIATOR_ERR / ISCSI_LOGIN_STATUS_INIT_ERR via iscsit_tx_login_rsp() before returning, so the initiator sees an explicit failed-login response rather than a silent connection drop. (Prior to this patch only the PHASE_OPERATIONAL caller did that; the PHASE_SECURITY caller is converted to the same shape.)

Fixes e48354ce078c ("iscsi-target: Add iSCSI fabric support for target v4.1")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-7
---
 drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_nego.c       |    7 ++
 drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_parameters.c |   62 +++++++++++++++++++------
 drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_parameters.h |    2 
 3 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_nego.c +6 -1
@@ -899,10 +899,14 @@ static int iscsi_target_handle_csg_zero(
 			SENDER_TARGET,
 			login->rsp_buf,
 			&login->rsp_length,
+			MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS,
 			conn->param_list,
 			conn->tpg->tpg_attrib.login_keys_workaround);
-	if (ret < 0)
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		iscsit_tx_login_rsp(conn, ISCSI_STATUS_CLS_INITIATOR_ERR,
+				ISCSI_LOGIN_STATUS_INIT_ERR);
 		return -1;
+	}
 
 	if (!iscsi_check_negotiated_keys(conn->param_list)) {
 		bool auth_required = iscsi_conn_auth_required(conn);
@@ -986,6 +990,7 @@ static int iscsi_target_handle_csg_one(s
 			SENDER_TARGET,
 			login->rsp_buf,
 			&login->rsp_length,
+			MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS,
 			conn->param_list,
 			conn->tpg->tpg_attrib.login_keys_workaround);
 	if (ret < 0) {
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_parameters.c +48 -14

101 lines not on this page · raw message

drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_parameters.h +1 -1
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ extern struct iscsi_param *iscsi_find_pa
 extern int iscsi_extract_key_value(char *, char **, char **);
 extern int iscsi_update_param_value(struct iscsi_param *, char *);
 extern int iscsi_decode_text_input(u8, u8, char *, u32, struct iscsit_conn *);
-extern int iscsi_encode_text_output(u8, u8, char *, u32 *,
+extern int iscsi_encode_text_output(u8, u8, char *, u32 *, u32,
 			struct iscsi_param_list *, bool);
 extern int iscsi_check_negotiated_keys(struct iscsi_param_list *);
 extern void iscsi_set_connection_parameters(struct iscsi_conn_ops *,
author maintainer
#257 lore raw

PATCH 254/315 scsi: target: iscsi: Validate CHAP_R length before base64 decode

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alexandru Hossu <[email protected]>

commit 85db7391310b1304d2dc8ae3b0b12105a9567147 upstream.

chap_server_compute_hash() allocates client_digest as kzalloc(chap->digest_size) and then, for BASE64-encoded responses, passes chap_r directly to chap_base64_decode() without checking whether the input length could produce more than digest_size bytes of output.

chap_base64_decode() writes to the destination unconditionally as long as there is input to consume. With MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH set to 128 and the "0b" prefix stripped by extract_param(), up to 127 base64 characters can reach the decoder. 127 characters decode to 95 bytes. For SHA-256 (digest_size=32) this overflows client_digest by 63 bytes; for MD5 (digest_size=16) the overflow is 79 bytes.

The length check at line 344 fires after the write has already happened.

The HEX branch in the same switch statement already validates the length up front. Apply the same approach to the BASE64 branch: strip trailing base64 padding characters, then reject any input whose data length exceeds DIV_ROUND_UP(digest_size * 4, 3) before calling the decoder.

Stripping trailing '=' before the comparison handles both padded and unpadded encodings. chap_base64_decode() already returns early on '=', so the full original string is still passed to the decoder unchanged.

The mutual CHAP path decodes CHAP_C into initiatorchg_binhex, which is kzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN). extract_param() caps initiatorchg at CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN characters, so at most CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1 base64 characters reach the decoder. The maximum decoded size, DIV_ROUND_UP((CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN-1) * 3, 4), is less than CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, so no overflow is possible there. A comment is added at the call site to document this.

---
 drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c |   19 ++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c +18 -1
@@ -339,13 +339,22 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash(
 			goto out;
 		}
 		break;
-	case BASE64:
+	case BASE64: {
+		size_t r_len = strlen(chap_r);
+
+		while (r_len > 0 && chap_r[r_len - 1] == '=')
+			r_len--;
+		if (r_len > DIV_ROUND_UP(chap->digest_size * 4, 3)) {
+			pr_err("Malformed CHAP_R: base64 payload too long\n");
+			goto out;
+		}
 		if (chap_base64_decode(client_digest, chap_r, strlen(chap_r)) !=
 		    chap->digest_size) {
 			pr_err("Malformed CHAP_R: invalid BASE64\n");
 			goto out;
 		}
 		break;
+	}
 	default:
 		pr_err("Could not find CHAP_R\n");
 		goto out;
@@ -472,6 +481,14 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash(
 		}
 		break;
 	case BASE64:
+		/*
+		 * No overflow check needed: initiatorchg_binhex is
+		 * CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN bytes and extract_param() caps
+		 * initiatorchg at CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN characters, so
+		 * the decoded output is at most DIV_ROUND_UP(
+		 * (CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN - 1) * 3, 4) bytes, which is
+		 * less than CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN.
+		 */
 		initiatorchg_len = chap_base64_decode(initiatorchg_binhex,
 						      initiatorchg,
 						      strlen(initiatorchg));
author maintainer
#258 lore raw

PATCH 255/315 drm/hyperv: validate resolution_count and fix WIN8 fallback

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Berkant Koc <[email protected]>

commit 13d33b9ef67066c77c84273fac5a1d3fde3533d1 upstream.

A SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE with resolution_count > 64 walks past the supported_resolution[SYNTHVID_MAX_RESOLUTION_COUNT] array in the parse loop. Bound resolution_count against the array size, folded into the existing zero-check.

When the WIN10 resolution probe fails, the caller in hyperv_connect_vsp() left hv->screen_*_max / preferred_* unpopulated, which sets mode_config.max_width / max_height to 0 and makes drm_internal_framebuffer_create() reject every userspace framebuffer with -EINVAL. The pre-WIN10 branch had the same gap for preferred_width / preferred_height. Use a single post-probe fallback guarded by screen_width_max == 0 so both paths converge on the WIN8 defaults.

Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-7 berkoc-pipeline
Fixes 76c56a5affeb ("drm/hyperv: Add DRM driver for hyperv synthetic video device")
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/hyperv/hyperv_drm_proto.c |   13 ++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/hyperv/hyperv_drm_proto.c +10 -3
@@ -396,8 +396,11 @@ static int hyperv_get_supported_resoluti
 		return -ETIMEDOUT;
 	}
 
-	if (msg->resolution_resp.resolution_count == 0) {
-		drm_err(dev, "No supported resolutions\n");
+	if (msg->resolution_resp.resolution_count == 0 ||
+	    msg->resolution_resp.resolution_count >
+	    SYNTHVID_MAX_RESOLUTION_COUNT) {
+		drm_err(dev, "Invalid resolution count: %d\n",
+			msg->resolution_resp.resolution_count);
 		return -ENODEV;
 	}
 
@@ -513,9 +516,13 @@ int hyperv_connect_vsp(struct hv_device
 		ret = hyperv_get_supported_resolution(hdev);
 		if (ret)
 			drm_err(dev, "Failed to get supported resolution from host, use default\n");
-	} else {
+	}
+
+	if (!hv->screen_width_max) {
 		hv->screen_width_max = SYNTHVID_WIDTH_WIN8;
 		hv->screen_height_max = SYNTHVID_HEIGHT_WIN8;
+		hv->preferred_width = SYNTHVID_WIDTH_WIN8;
+		hv->preferred_height = SYNTHVID_HEIGHT_WIN8;
 	}
 
 	hv->mmio_megabytes = hdev->channel->offermsg.offer.mmio_megabytes;
author maintainer
#259 lore raw

PATCH 256/315 drm/hyperv: validate VMBus packet size in receive callback

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Berkant Koc <[email protected]>

commit 7f87763f47a3c22fb50265a00619ef10f2394b18 upstream.

hyperv_receive_sub() reads msg->vid_hdr.type and dispatches into one of four message-type branches without knowing how many bytes the host wrote into hv->recv_buf. The completion path then runs memcpy(hv->init_buf, msg, VMBUS_MAX_PACKET_SIZE), so the consumer that wakes on wait_for_completion_timeout() can read up to 16 KiB of residue from a prior message as if it were the response payload.

Pass bytes_recvd into hyperv_receive_sub() and reject any packet that does not cover the pipe + synthvid header. A single switch on msg->vid_hdr.type then computes the type-specific payload size: the three completion-driving types (SYNTHVID_VERSION_RESPONSE, SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE, SYNTHVID_VRAM_LOCATION_ACK) fall through to a shared exit that requires that size before memcpy/complete, while SYNTHVID_FEATURE_CHANGE validates its own payload and returns before reading is_dirt_needed. Unknown types are dropped.

SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE is variable length: the host fills resolution_count entries, not the full SYNTHVID_MAX_RESOLUTION_COUNT array. Validate the fixed prefix first so resolution_count can be read, bound it against the array, then require only the count-sized array, so the shorter responses the host actually sends are accepted.

Only run the sub-handler when vmbus_recvpacket() returned success. The memcpy length is bytes_recvd, which is bounded by VMBUS_MAX_PACKET_SIZE only on a successful receive; on -ENOBUFS vmbus_recvpacket() instead reports the required length, which can exceed hv->recv_buf, so copying bytes_recvd would read and write past the 16 KiB buffers. Gating on the success return keeps the copy bounded. The nonzero-return path is itself a malformed-message case and is now logged rather than silently skipped; channel recovery is not attempted.

Rejected packets are reported via drm_err_ratelimited() rather than silently dropped, matching the CoCo-hardened pattern in hv_kvp_onchannelcallback().

Fixes 76c56a5affeb ("drm/hyperv: Add DRM driver for hyperv synthetic video device")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-7 berkoc-pipeline
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/hyperv/hyperv_drm_proto.c |  100 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 87 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/hyperv/hyperv_drm_proto.c +87 -13
@@ -425,30 +425,92 @@ static int hyperv_get_supported_resoluti
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void hyperv_receive_sub(struct hv_device *hdev)
+static void hyperv_receive_sub(struct hv_device *hdev, u32 bytes_recvd)
 {
 	struct hyperv_drm_device *hv = hv_get_drvdata(hdev);
 	struct synthvid_msg *msg;
+	size_t hdr_size;
+	size_t need;
 
 	if (!hv)
 		return;
 
-	msg = (struct synthvid_msg *)hv->recv_buf;
-
-	/* Complete the wait event */
-	if (msg->vid_hdr.type == SYNTHVID_VERSION_RESPONSE ||
-	    msg->vid_hdr.type == SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE ||
-	    msg->vid_hdr.type == SYNTHVID_VRAM_LOCATION_ACK) {
-		memcpy(hv->init_buf, msg, VMBUS_MAX_PACKET_SIZE);
-		complete(&hv->wait);
+	hdr_size = sizeof(struct pipe_msg_hdr) +
+		   sizeof(struct synthvid_msg_hdr);
+	if (bytes_recvd < hdr_size) {
+		drm_err_ratelimited(&hv->dev,
+				    "synthvid packet too small for header: %u\n",
+				    bytes_recvd);
 		return;
 	}
 
-	if (msg->vid_hdr.type == SYNTHVID_FEATURE_CHANGE) {
+	msg = (struct synthvid_msg *)hv->recv_buf;
+	need = hdr_size;
+
+	switch (msg->vid_hdr.type) {
+	case SYNTHVID_VERSION_RESPONSE:
+		need += sizeof(struct synthvid_version_resp);
+		break;
+	case SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE:
+		/*
+		 * The resolution response is variable length: the host
+		 * fills resolution_count entries, not the full
+		 * SYNTHVID_MAX_RESOLUTION_COUNT array. Require the fixed
+		 * prefix first so resolution_count can be read, then
+		 * demand exactly the count-sized array.
+		 */
+		need += offsetof(struct synthvid_supported_resolution_resp,
+				 supported_resolution);
+		if (bytes_recvd < need)
+			break;
+		if (msg->resolution_resp.resolution_count >
+		    SYNTHVID_MAX_RESOLUTION_COUNT) {
+			drm_err_ratelimited(&hv->dev,
+					    "synthvid resolution count too large: %u\n",
+					    msg->resolution_resp.resolution_count);
+			return;
+		}
+		need += msg->resolution_resp.resolution_count *
+			sizeof(struct hvd_screen_info);
+		break;
+	case SYNTHVID_VRAM_LOCATION_ACK:
+		need += sizeof(struct synthvid_vram_location_ack);
+		break;
+	case SYNTHVID_FEATURE_CHANGE:
+		/*
+		 * Not a completion-driving message: validate its own payload
+		 * and consume it here rather than falling through to the
+		 * memcpy/complete shared by the wait-event responses.
+		 */
+		if (bytes_recvd < need +
+		    sizeof(struct synthvid_feature_change)) {
+			drm_err_ratelimited(&hv->dev,
+					    "synthvid feature change packet too small: %u\n",
+					    bytes_recvd);
+			return;
+		}
 		hv->dirt_needed = msg->feature_chg.is_dirt_needed;
 		if (hv->dirt_needed)
 			hyperv_hide_hw_ptr(hv->hdev);
+		return;
+	default:
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Shared completion path for the wait-event responses
+	 * (VERSION_RESPONSE, RESOLUTION_RESPONSE, VRAM_LOCATION_ACK):
+	 * require the type-specific payload before handing the buffer to
+	 * the waiter.
+	 */
+	if (bytes_recvd < need) {
+		drm_err_ratelimited(&hv->dev,
+				    "synthvid packet too small for type %u: %u < %zu\n",
+				    msg->vid_hdr.type, bytes_recvd, need);
+		return;
 	}
+	memcpy(hv->init_buf, msg, bytes_recvd);
+	complete(&hv->wait);
 }
 
 static void hyperv_receive(void *ctx)
@@ -469,9 +531,21 @@ static void hyperv_receive(void *ctx)
 		ret = vmbus_recvpacket(hdev->channel, recv_buf,
 				       VMBUS_MAX_PACKET_SIZE,
 				       &bytes_recvd, &req_id);
-		if (bytes_recvd > 0 &&
-		    recv_buf->pipe_hdr.type == PIPE_MSG_DATA)
-			hyperv_receive_sub(hdev);
+		if (ret) {
+			/*
+			 * A nonzero return (e.g. -ENOBUFS for an oversized
+			 * packet) is itself a malformed message: bytes_recvd
+			 * then reports the required length rather than a copied
+			 * payload, so it must not be forwarded to the
+			 * sub-handler. Channel recovery is not attempted.
+			 */
+			drm_err_ratelimited(&hv->dev,
+					    "vmbus_recvpacket failed: %d (need %u)\n",
+					    ret, bytes_recvd);
+		} else if (bytes_recvd > 0 &&
+			   recv_buf->pipe_hdr.type == PIPE_MSG_DATA) {
+			hyperv_receive_sub(hdev, bytes_recvd);
+		}
 	} while (bytes_recvd > 0 && ret == 0);
 }
 
author maintainer
#260 lore raw

PATCH 257/315 drm/gem: fix race between change_handle and handle_delete

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhenghang Xiao <[email protected]>

commit 7164d78559b0ff29931a366a840a9e5dd53d4b7c upstream.

drm_gem_change_handle_ioctl leaves the old handle live in the IDR during the window between spin_unlock(table_lock) and the final spin_lock(table_lock). A concurrent drm_gem_handle_delete on the old handle succeeds in this window, decrements handle_count to 0, and frees the GEM object while the new handle's IDR entry still references it.

NULL the old handle's IDR entry before dropping table_lock so that any concurrent GEM_CLOSE on the old handle sees NULL and returns -EINVAL. Restore the old entry on the prime-bookkeeping error path.

Fixes 5e28b7b94408 ("drm: Set old handle to NULL before prime swap in change_handle")
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem.c +2 -0
@@ -1015,6 +1015,7 @@ int drm_gem_change_handle_ioctl(struct d
 	       goto out_unlock;
        }
 
+	idr_replace(&file_priv->object_idr, NULL, args->handle);
 	spin_unlock(&file_priv->table_lock);
 
 	if (obj->dma_buf) {
@@ -1023,6 +1024,7 @@ int drm_gem_change_handle_ioctl(struct d
 		if (ret < 0) {
 			spin_lock(&file_priv->table_lock);
 			idr_remove(&file_priv->object_idr, handle);
+			idr_replace(&file_priv->object_idr, obj, args->handle);
 			spin_unlock(&file_priv->table_lock);
 			goto out_unlock;
 		}
author maintainer
#261 lore raw

PATCH 258/315 drm/i915/psr: Block DC states on vblank enable when Panel Replay supported

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jouni Högander <[email protected]>

commit 8bb9093df555f9e89fdbe1405118b11384c03e04 upstream.

Currently we are blocking DC states only when Panel Replay is enabled on vblank enable. It may happen that Panel Replay is getting enabled when vblank is already enabled. Fix this by blocking DC states always if Panel Replay is supported.

While at it take care of possible dual eDP case by looping all encoders supporting PSR.

Fixes 0c427ac78a1d ("drm/i915/psr: Add interface to notify PSR of vblank enable/disable")
Cc <[email protected]> # v6.16+
(cherry picked from commit eb5911f990554f7ce947dd53df00c114362e4465)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_psr.c |   19 ++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_psr.c +10 -9
@@ -3982,32 +3982,33 @@ void intel_psr_notify_vblank_enable_disa
 					    bool enable)
 {
 	struct intel_encoder *encoder;
+	bool block_dc_states = false;
 
 	for_each_intel_encoder_with_psr(display->drm, encoder) {
 		struct intel_dp *intel_dp = enc_to_intel_dp(encoder);
 
 		mutex_lock(&intel_dp->psr.lock);
-		if (intel_dp->psr.panel_replay_enabled) {
-			mutex_unlock(&intel_dp->psr.lock);
-			break;
-		}
+		if (CAN_PANEL_REPLAY(intel_dp))
+			block_dc_states = true;
 
-		if (intel_dp->psr.enabled && intel_dp->psr.pkg_c_latency_used)
+		if (intel_dp->psr.enabled && !intel_dp->psr.panel_replay_enabled &&
+		    intel_dp->psr.pkg_c_latency_used)
 			intel_psr_apply_underrun_on_idle_wa_locked(intel_dp);
 
 		mutex_unlock(&intel_dp->psr.lock);
-		return;
 	}
 
 	/*
 	 * NOTE: intel_display_power_set_target_dc_state is used
-	 * only by PSR * code for DC3CO handling. DC3CO target
+	 * only by PSR code for DC3CO handling. DC3CO target
 	 * state is currently disabled in * PSR code. If DC3CO
 	 * is taken into use we need take that into account here
 	 * as well.
 	 */
-	intel_display_power_set_target_dc_state(display, enable ? DC_STATE_DISABLE :
-						DC_STATE_EN_UPTO_DC6);
+	if (block_dc_states)
+		intel_display_power_set_target_dc_state(display, enable ?
+							DC_STATE_DISABLE :
+							DC_STATE_EN_UPTO_DC6);
 }
 
 static void
author maintainer
#262 lore raw

PATCH 259/315 drm/i915: Fix potential UAF in TTM object purge

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Janusz Krzysztofik <[email protected]>

commit 5c4063c87a619e4df954c179d24628636f5db15f upstream.

TLDR: The bo->ttm object might be changed by calling ttm_bo_validate(),
move casting it to an i915_tt object later to actually get the right pointer.

A user reported hitting the following bug under heavy use on DG2:

[26620.095550] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xa56b6b6b6b6b6b8b: 0000 1 SMP NOPTI
[26620.095556] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 631 Comm: Xorg Not tainted 6.18.8 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
[26620.095558] Hardware name: ASRock B850M Steel Legend WiFi/B850M Steel Legend WiFi, BIOS 3.50 09/18/2025
[26620.095559] RIP: 0010:i915_ttm_purge+0x84/0x100 [i915]
[26620.095604] Code: 00 00 00 48 8d 54 24 10 48 89 e6 48 89 fb e8 83 aa ae ff 85 c0 75 6f 48 83 bb a8 01 00 00 00 74 2c 48 8b 45 78 48 85 c0 74 23 <48> 8b 78 20 48 c7 c2 ff ff ff ff 31 f6 e8 7a 73 e3 e0 48 8b 7d 78
[26620.095605] RSP: 0018:ffffc90005fd7430 EFLAGS: 00010282
[26620.095607] RAX: a56b6b6b6b6b6b6b RBX: ffff8881f46c3dc0 RCX: 0000000000000000
[26620.095608] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
[26620.095609] RBP: ffff888289610f00 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff88823b022000
[26620.095609] R10: ffff888103029b28 R11: ffff8881fc7f3800 R12: ffff88810b6150d0
[26620.095609] R13: ffff888289610f00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8881f46c3dc0
[26620.095610] FS: 00007f1004d86900(0000) GS:ffff88901c858000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[26620.095611] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[26620.095611] CR2: 00007f0fdf489000 CR3: 000000035b0c1000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
[26620.095612] PKRU: 55555554
[26620.095612] Call Trace:
[26620.095615] <TASK>
[26620.095615] i915_ttm_move+0x2b9/0x420 [i915]
[26620.095642] ? ttm_tt_init+0x65/0x80 [ttm]
[26620.095644] ? i915_ttm_tt_create+0xc6/0x150 [i915]
[26620.095667] ttm_bo_handle_move_mem+0xb6/0x160 [ttm]
[26620.095669] ttm_bo_evict+0x100/0x150 [ttm]
[26620.095671] ? preempt_count_add+0x64/0xa0
[26620.095673] ? _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x30
[26620.095675] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0xd/0x30
[26620.095675] ? i915_gem_object_evictable+0xb7/0xd0 [i915]
[26620.095704] ttm_bo_evict_cb+0x6e/0xd0 [ttm]
[26620.095705] ttm_lru_walk_for_evict+0xa6/0x200 [ttm]
[26620.095708] ttm_bo_alloc_resource+0x185/0x4f0 [ttm]
[26620.095709] ? init_object+0x62/0xd0
[26620.095712] ttm_bo_validate+0x7a/0x180 [ttm]
[26620.095713] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x16/0x30
[26620.095714] __i915_ttm_get_pages+0xb0/0x170 [i915]
[26620.095737] i915_ttm_get_pages+0x9f/0x150 [i915]
[26620.095759] ? i915_gem_do_execbuffer+0xedc/0x2b40 [i915]
[26620.095786] ? alloc_debug_processing+0xd0/0x100
[26620.095787] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x16/0x30
[26620.095788] ? i915_vma_instance+0xa0/0x4e0 [i915]
[26620.095822] __i915_gem_object_get_pages+0x2f/0x40 [i915]
[26620.095848] i915_vma_pin_ww+0x706/0x980 [i915]
[26620.095875] ? i915_gem_do_execbuffer+0xedc/0x2b40 [i915]
[26620.095904] eb_validate_vmas+0x170/0xa00 [i915]
[26620.095930] i915_gem_do_execbuffer+0x1201/0x2b40 [i915]
[26620.095953] ? alloc_debug_processing+0xd0/0x100
[26620.095954] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x16/0x30
[26620.095955] ? i915_gem_execbuffer2_ioctl+0xc9/0x240 [i915]
[26620.095977] ? __wake_up_sync_key+0x32/0x50
[26620.095979] ? i915_gem_execbuffer2_ioctl+0xc9/0x240 [i915]
[26620.096001] ? __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x67/0xc0
[26620.096003] i915_gem_execbuffer2_ioctl+0x11a/0x240 [i915]

Results from decode_stacktrace.sh pointed to dereference of a file pointer field of a i915 TTM page vector container associated with an object being purged on eviction. That path is taken when the object is marked as no longer needed.

Code analysis revealed a possibility of the i915 TTM page vector container being replaced with a new instance inside a function that purges content of the object, should it be still busy. That function is called, indirectly via a more general function that changes the object's placement and caching policy, before the problematic dereference, but still after a pointer to the container is captured, rendering the pointer no longer valid.

Fix the issue by capturing the pointer to the container only after its potential replacement.

v2: Move the container_of() inside the if block (Sebastian),
- a simplified version of the commit description that explains briefly why the change is necessary (Christian).

Fixes 7ae034590ceae ("drm/i915/ttm: add tt shmem backend")
Cc [email protected] # v5.17+
Cc Matthew Auld <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Hellström <[email protected]>
Cc Sebastian Brzezinka <[email protected]>
Cc Christian König <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 4462966a93eb185849b7f174f0d0de53476d00a4)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_ttm.c |   28 ++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_ttm.c +16 -12
@@ -416,8 +416,6 @@ void i915_ttm_free_cached_io_rsgt(struct
 int i915_ttm_purge(struct drm_i915_gem_object *obj)
 {
 	struct ttm_buffer_object *bo = i915_gem_to_ttm(obj);
-	struct i915_ttm_tt *i915_tt =
-		container_of(bo->ttm, typeof(*i915_tt), ttm);
 	struct ttm_operation_ctx ctx = {
 		.interruptible = true,
 		.no_wait_gpu = false,
@@ -432,16 +430,22 @@ int i915_ttm_purge(struct drm_i915_gem_o
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	if (bo->ttm && i915_tt->filp) {
-		/*
-		 * The below fput(which eventually calls shmem_truncate) might
-		 * be delayed by worker, so when directly called to purge the
-		 * pages(like by the shrinker) we should try to be more
-		 * aggressive and release the pages immediately.
-		 */
-		shmem_truncate_range(file_inode(i915_tt->filp),
-				     0, (loff_t)-1);
-		fput(fetch_and_zero(&i915_tt->filp));
+	if (bo->ttm) {
+		struct i915_ttm_tt *i915_tt =
+			container_of(bo->ttm, typeof(*i915_tt), ttm);
+
+		if (i915_tt->filp) {
+			/*
+			 * The below fput(which eventually calls shmem_truncate)
+			 * might be delayed by worker, so when directly called
+			 * to purge the pages(like by the shrinker) we should
+			 * try to be more aggressive and release the pages
+			 * immediately.
+			 */
+			shmem_truncate_range(file_inode(i915_tt->filp),
+					     0, (loff_t)-1);
+			fput(fetch_and_zero(&i915_tt->filp));
+		}
 	}
 
 	obj->write_domain = 0;
author maintainer
#263 lore raw

PATCH 260/315 drm/amd/pm/si: Disregard vblank time when no displays are connected

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Timur Kristóf <[email protected]>

commit dd4f3ee535b3b0ac027f75dbf9dc5fc88733c765 upstream.

When no displays are connected, there is no vblank happening so the power management code shouldn't worry about it.

This fixes a regression that caused the memory clock to be stuck at maximum when there were no displays connected to a SI GPU.

Fixes 9003a0746864 ("drm/amd/pm: Treat zero vblank time as too short in si_dpm (v3)")
Fixes 9d73b107a61b ("drm/amd/pm: Use pm_display_cfg in legacy DPM (v2)")
(cherry picked from commit 6d87e0199f7b83735b56e422d59f170a201897a8)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/legacy-dpm/si_dpm.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/legacy-dpm/si_dpm.c +4 -0
@@ -3081,6 +3081,10 @@ static bool si_dpm_vblank_too_short(void
 	/* we never hit the non-gddr5 limit so disable it */
 	u32 switch_limit = adev->gmc.vram_type == AMDGPU_VRAM_TYPE_GDDR5 ? 450 : 0;
 
+	/* Disregard vblank time when there are no displays connected */
+	if (!adev->pm.pm_display_cfg.num_display)
+		return false;
+
 	/* Consider zero vblank time too short and disable MCLK switching.
 	 * Note that the vblank time is set to maximum when no displays are attached,
 	 * so we'll still enable MCLK switching in that case.
author maintainer
#264 lore raw

PATCH 261/315 serial: altera_jtaguart: handle uart_add_one_port() failures

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Myeonghun Pak <[email protected]>

commit ea66be25f0e934f49d24cd0c5845d13cdba3520b upstream.

altera_jtaguart_probe() maps the register window before registering the UART port, but it ignores failures from uart_add_one_port(). If port registration fails, probe still returns success and the mapping remains live until a later remove path that is not part of probe failure cleanup.

Return the uart_add_one_port() error and unmap the register window on that failure path.

This issue was identified during our ongoing static-analysis research while reviewing kernel code.

Fixes 5bcd601049c6 ("serial: Add driver for the Altera JTAG UART")
Cc stable <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/tty/serial/altera_jtaguart.c |    7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/tty/serial/altera_jtaguart.c +6 -1
@@ -379,6 +379,7 @@ static int altera_jtaguart_probe(struct
 	struct resource *res_mem;
 	int i = pdev->id;
 	int irq;
+	int ret;
 
 	/* -1 emphasizes that the platform must have one port, no .N suffix */
 	if (i == -1)
@@ -418,7 +419,11 @@ static int altera_jtaguart_probe(struct
 	port->flags = UPF_BOOT_AUTOCONF;
 	port->dev = &pdev->dev;
 
-	uart_add_one_port(&altera_jtaguart_driver, port);
+	ret = uart_add_one_port(&altera_jtaguart_driver, port);
+	if (ret) {
+		iounmap(port->membase);
+		return ret;
+	}
 
 	return 0;
 }
author maintainer
#265 lore raw

PATCH 262/315 serial: qcom-geni: fix UART_RX_PAR_EN bit position

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Prasanna S <[email protected]>

commit ca2584d841b69391ffc4144840563d2e1a0018df upstream.

UART_RX_PAR_EN is incorrectly defined as bit 3, which triggers false framing errors (S_GP_IRQ_1_EN) and causes received data to be dropped when parity is enabled and the parity bit is 0.

Define UART_RX_PAR_EN as bit 4 of the SE_UART_RX_TRANS_CFG register, as specified in the reference manual.

Fixes c4f528795d1a ("tty: serial: msm_geni_serial: Add serial driver support for GENI based QUP")
Cc stable <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/tty/serial/qcom_geni_serial.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/tty/serial/qcom_geni_serial.c +1 -1
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
 #define TX_STOP_BIT_LEN_2		2
 
 /* SE_UART_RX_TRANS_CFG */
-#define UART_RX_PAR_EN			BIT(3)
+#define UART_RX_PAR_EN			BIT(4)
 
 /* SE_UART_RX_WORD_LEN */
 #define RX_WORD_LEN_MASK		GENMASK(9, 0)
author maintainer
#266 lore raw

PATCH 263/315 serial: qcom_geni: fix kfifo underflow when flush precedes DMA completion IRQ

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Viken Dadhaniya <[email protected]>

commit 452d6fa37ae9b021f4f6d397dbae077f7296f6f4 upstream.

When uart_flush_buffer() runs before the DMA completion IRQ is delivered, the following race can occur (all steps serialized by uart_port_lock):

1. DMA starts: tx_remaining = N, kfifo contains N bytes
2. DMA completes in hardware; IRQ is pending but not yet delivered
3. uart_flush_buffer() acquires the port lock and calls kfifo_reset(), making kfifo_len() = 0 while tx_remaining remains N
4. uart_flush_buffer() releases the port lock
5. DMA IRQ fires; handle_tx_dma() acquires the port lock and calls uart_xmit_advance(uport, tx_remaining) on an empty kfifo

uart_xmit_advance() increments kfifo->out by tx_remaining. Since kfifo_reset() already set both in and out to 0, out wraps past in, causing kfifo_len() to return UART_XMIT_SIZE - tx_remaining. The next start_tx_dma() call then submits a DMA transfer of stale buffer data.

Fix this by snapshotting kfifo_len() at the start of handle_tx_dma() and skipping uart_xmit_advance() when fifo_len < tx_remaining, which indicates the kfifo was reset by a preceding flush.

---
 drivers/tty/serial/qcom_geni_serial.c |   14 +++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/tty/serial/qcom_geni_serial.c +13 -1
@@ -1022,8 +1022,20 @@ static void qcom_geni_serial_handle_tx_d
 {
 	struct qcom_geni_serial_port *port = to_dev_port(uport);
 	struct tty_port *tport = &uport->state->port;
+	unsigned int fifo_len = kfifo_len(&tport->xmit_fifo);
+
+	/*
+	 * Only advance the kfifo if it still contains the bytes that were
+	 * transferred. uart_flush_buffer() may have run before this IRQ
+	 * fired: it calls kfifo_reset() under the port lock, making
+	 * fifo_len = 0 while tx_remaining remains non-zero. Calling
+	 * uart_xmit_advance() in that case would underflow kfifo->out past
+	 * kfifo->in, making kfifo_len() wrap to UART_XMIT_SIZE - tx_remaining
+	 * and triggering a spurious large DMA transfer of stale data.
+	 */
+	if (fifo_len >= port->tx_remaining)
+		uart_xmit_advance(uport, port->tx_remaining);
 
-	uart_xmit_advance(uport, port->tx_remaining);
 	geni_se_tx_dma_unprep(&port->se, port->tx_dma_addr, port->tx_remaining);
 	port->tx_dma_addr = 0;
 	port->tx_remaining = 0;
author maintainer
#267 lore raw

PATCH 264/315 serial: sh-sci: fix memory region release in error path

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hongling Zeng <[email protected]>

commit 92b1ea22454b08a39baef3a7290fb3ec50366616 upstream.

The sci_request_port() function uses request_mem_region() to reserve I/O memory, but in the error path when sci_remap_port() fails, it incorrectly calls release_resource() instead of release_mem_region().

This mismatch can cause resource accounting issues. Fix it by using the correct release function, consistent with sci_release_port().

---
 drivers/tty/serial/sh-sci.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/tty/serial/sh-sci.c +1 -1
@@ -2845,7 +2845,7 @@ int sci_request_port(struct uart_port *p
 
 	ret = sci_remap_port(port);
 	if (unlikely(ret != 0)) {
-		release_resource(res);
+		release_mem_region(port->mapbase, sport->reg_size);
 		return ret;
 	}
 
author maintainer
#268 lore raw

PATCH 265/315 serial: zs: Fix swapped RI/DSR modem line transition counting

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Maciej W. Rozycki <[email protected]>

commit d15cd40cb1858f75846eaafa9a6bca841b790a92 upstream.

Fix a thinko in the status interrupt handler that has caused counters for the RI and DSR modem line transitions to be used for the other line each.

Fixes 8b4a40809e53 ("zs: move to the serial subsystem")
Cc stable <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/tty/serial/zs.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/tty/serial/zs.c +2 -2
@@ -680,9 +680,9 @@ static void zs_status_handle(struct zs_p
 			uart_handle_dcd_change(uport,
 					       zport->mctrl & TIOCM_CAR);
 		if (delta & TIOCM_RNG)
-			uport->icount.dsr++;
-		if (delta & TIOCM_DSR)
 			uport->icount.rng++;
+		if (delta & TIOCM_DSR)
+			uport->icount.dsr++;
 
 		if (delta)
 			wake_up_interruptible(&uport->state->port.delta_msr_wait);
author maintainer
#269 lore raw

PATCH 266/315 serial: fsl_lpuart: fix rx buffer and DMA map leaks in start_rx_dma

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shitalkumar Gandhi <[email protected]>

commit 9a9254c4a2a3ca2b3da16d173f3b0dd01f397ff6 upstream.

lpuart_start_rx_dma() allocates sport->rx_ring.buf with kzalloc() and then maps a scatterlist via dma_map_sg(). On three subsequent error paths the function returns directly without releasing those resources:

- when dma_map_sg() returns 0 (-EINVAL):

      ring->buf is leaked.
  - when dmaengine_slave_config() fails:
      ring->buf and the DMA mapping are leaked.
  - when dmaengine_prep_dma_cyclic() returns NULL:
      ring->buf and the DMA mapping are leaked.

The sole cleanup path, lpuart_dma_rx_free(), is only reached when lpuart_dma_rx_use is set, and the caller lpuart_rx_dma_startup() clears that flag on failure of lpuart_start_rx_dma(). So these resources are permanently leaked on every failure in this function. Repeated port open/close or termios changes under error conditions will slowly consume memory and leave stale streaming DMA mappings behind.

Fix it by introducing two error labels that unmap the scatterlist and free the ring buffer as appropriate. While here, replace the misleading -EFAULT (bad userspace pointer) returned when dmaengine_prep_dma_cyclic() fails with the more accurate -ENOMEM, matching how other dmaengine users in the tree treat this failure.

No functional change on the success path.

Fixes 5887ad43ee02 ("tty: serial: fsl_lpuart: Use cyclic DMA for Rx")
Cc stable <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/tty/serial/fsl_lpuart.c |   15 ++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/tty/serial/fsl_lpuart.c +12 -3
@@ -1379,7 +1379,8 @@ static inline int lpuart_start_rx_dma(st
 
 	if (!nent) {
 		dev_err(sport->port.dev, "DMA Rx mapping error\n");
-		return -EINVAL;
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto err_free_buf;
 	}
 
 	dma_rx_sconfig.src_addr = lpuart_dma_datareg_addr(sport);
@@ -1391,7 +1392,7 @@ static inline int lpuart_start_rx_dma(st
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		dev_err(sport->port.dev,
 				"DMA Rx slave config failed, err = %d\n", ret);
-		return ret;
+		goto err_unmap_sg;
 	}
 
 	sport->dma_rx_desc = dmaengine_prep_dma_cyclic(chan,
@@ -1402,7 +1403,8 @@ static inline int lpuart_start_rx_dma(st
 				 DMA_PREP_INTERRUPT);
 	if (!sport->dma_rx_desc) {
 		dev_err(sport->port.dev, "Cannot prepare cyclic DMA\n");
-		return -EFAULT;
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err_unmap_sg;
 	}
 
 	sport->dma_rx_desc->callback = lpuart_dma_rx_complete;
@@ -1426,6 +1428,13 @@ static inline int lpuart_start_rx_dma(st
 	}
 
 	return 0;
+
+err_unmap_sg:
+	dma_unmap_sg(chan->device->dev, &sport->rx_sgl, 1, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+err_free_buf:
+	kfree(ring->buf);
+	ring->buf = NULL;
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static void lpuart_dma_rx_free(struct uart_port *port)
author maintainer
#270 lore raw

PATCH 267/315 drm/amdkfd: fix NULL pointer bug in svm_range_set_attr

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Huang <[email protected]>

commit e984d61d92e702096058f0f828f4b2b8563b88ce upstream.

The process_info could be NULL if user doesn't call kfd_ioctl_acquire_vm before calling kfd_ioctl_svm.

(cherry picked from commit 83a26c812e0529eb040d31a76f73e33e637243d4)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_svm.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_svm.c +3 -0
@@ -3680,6 +3680,9 @@ svm_range_set_attr(struct kfd_process *p
 
 	svms = &p->svms;
 
+	if (!process_info)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	mutex_lock(&process_info->lock);
 
 	svm_range_list_lock_and_flush_work(svms, mm);
author maintainer
#271 lore raw

PATCH 268/315 drm/amdkfd: fix a vulnerability of integer overflow in kfd debugger

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Huang <[email protected]>

commit 93f5534b35a05ef8a0109c1eefa800062fee810a upstream.

get_queue_ids() computes array_size = num_queues * sizeof(uint32_t), which could overflow on 32-bit size_t build. using array_size() instead, it saturates to SIZE_MAX on overflow.

(cherry picked from commit 2d57a0475f085c08b49312dfd8edcb461845f285)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_device_queue_manager.c |    8 +++++---
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_device_queue_manager.c +5 -3
@@ -3292,12 +3292,14 @@ static void copy_context_work_handler(st
 
 static uint32_t *get_queue_ids(uint32_t num_queues, uint32_t *usr_queue_id_array)
 {
-	size_t array_size = num_queues * sizeof(uint32_t);
-
 	if (!usr_queue_id_array)
 		return NULL;
 
-	return memdup_user(usr_queue_id_array, array_size);
+	if (num_queues > KFD_MAX_NUM_OF_QUEUES_PER_PROCESS)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	return memdup_user(usr_queue_id_array,
+			   array_size(num_queues, sizeof(uint32_t)));
 }
 
 int resume_queues(struct kfd_process *p,
author maintainer
#272 lore raw

PATCH 269/315 drm/amdkfd: Check for pdd drm file first in CRIU restore path

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Francis <[email protected]>

commit 6842b6a4b72da9b2906ffc5ca9d846ace2c54c14 upstream.

CRIU restore ioctls are meant to be called by CRIU with no existing drm file. There's an error path
for if the drm file unexpectedly exists. It was positioned so it was missing a fput(drm_file).

Do that check earlier, as soon as we have the pdd.

(cherry picked from commit 2bab781dac78916c5cc8de76345a4102449267d7)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_chardev.c |   10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_chardev.c +5 -5
@@ -2253,6 +2253,11 @@ static int criu_restore_devices(struct k
 			ret = -EINVAL;
 			goto exit;
 		}
+
+		if (pdd->drm_file) {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto exit;
+		}
 		pdd->user_gpu_id = device_buckets[i].user_gpu_id;
 
 		drm_file = fget(device_buckets[i].drm_fd);
@@ -2262,11 +2267,6 @@ static int criu_restore_devices(struct k
 			ret = -EINVAL;
 			goto exit;
 		}
-
-		if (pdd->drm_file) {
-			ret = -EINVAL;
-			goto exit;
-		}
 
 		/* create the vm using render nodes for kfd pdd */
 		if (kfd_process_device_init_vm(pdd, drm_file)) {
author maintainer
#273 lore raw

PATCH 270/315 drm/amdgpu: fix lock leak on ENOMEM in AMDGPU_GEM_OP_GET_MAPPING_INFO

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>

commit 2e7f55eb408c3f72ee1957a0d0ad11d8648a6379 upstream.

The AMDGPU_GEM_OP_GET_MAPPING_INFO branch of amdgpu_gem_op_ioctl() holds three cleanup-tracked resources before calling kvcalloc():
the drm_gem_object reference from drm_gem_object_lookup(), the drm_exec lock on the looked-up GEM via drm_exec_lock_obj(), and the drm_exec lock on the per-process VM root page directory via amdgpu_vm_lock_pd(). All three are released by the out_exec label that every other error path in this function jumps to. The kvcalloc() failure path returns -ENOMEM directly, skipping out_exec and leaking all three.

The leaked per-process VM root PD dma_resv lock is the load-bearing leak: any subsequent operation on the same VM (further GEM ops, command-submission, eviction, TTM shrinker callbacks) blocks on the held lock. DRM_IOCTL_AMDGPU_GEM_OP is DRM_AUTH | DRM_RENDER_ALLOW, so this is an unprivileged-local denial of service against the caller's GPU context, reachable by any process with /dev/dri/renderD* access.

Route the failure through out_exec so drm_exec_fini() and drm_gem_object_put() run.

Reproduced on stock 7.0.0-10, Ryzen 7 5700U / Radeon Vega (Lucienne): the failing ioctl returns -ENOMEM and a second GET_MAPPING_INFO on the same fd then blocks in drm_exec_lock_obj() on the leaked dma_resv. SIGKILL on the caller does not reap the task; the fd-release path during process exit goes through amdgpu_gem_object_close() -> drm_exec_prepare_obj() on the same lock, leaving the task in D state until the box is rebooted. The patched kernel was not rebuilt and re-tested on this hardware; the fix is mechanical. Tested on a single Lucienne / Vega box only.

Ziyi Guo posted an independent INT_MAX-bound check for args->num_entries in the same branch [1]; the two patches are complementary and can land in either order.

Fixes 4d82724f7f2b ("drm/amdgpu: Add mapping info option for GEM_OP ioctl")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-7
(cherry picked from commit b69d3256d79de15f54c322986ff4da68f1d65b0a)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_gem.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_gem.c +4 -2
@@ -1075,8 +1075,10 @@ int amdgpu_gem_op_ioctl(struct drm_devic
 		 * be retried.
 		 */
 		vm_entries = kvcalloc(args->num_entries, sizeof(*vm_entries), GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!vm_entries)
-			return -ENOMEM;
+		if (!vm_entries) {
+			r = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out_exec;
+		}
 
 		amdgpu_vm_bo_va_for_each_valid_mapping(bo_va, mapping) {
 			if (num_mappings < args->num_entries) {
author maintainer
#274 lore raw

PATCH 271/315 drm/amdgpu: fix calling VM invalidation in amdgpu_hmm_invalidate_gfx

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian König <[email protected]>

commit 1c824497d8acd3187d585d6187cedc1897dcc871 upstream.

Otherwise we don't invalidate page tables on next CS.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_hmm.c |    1 +
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vm.c  |    7 +++++--
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_hmm.c +1 -0
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ static bool amdgpu_hmm_invalidate_gfx(st
 
 	mmu_interval_set_seq(mni, cur_seq);
 
+	amdgpu_vm_bo_invalidate(bo, false);
 	r = dma_resv_wait_timeout(bo->tbo.base.resv, DMA_RESV_USAGE_BOOKKEEP,
 				  false, MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT);
 	mutex_unlock(&adev->notifier_lock);
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vm.c +5 -2
@@ -1610,6 +1610,7 @@ int amdgpu_vm_handle_moved(struct amdgpu
 {
 	struct amdgpu_bo_va *bo_va;
 	struct dma_resv *resv;
+	struct amdgpu_bo *bo;
 	bool clear, unlock;
 	int r;
 
@@ -1629,11 +1630,13 @@ int amdgpu_vm_handle_moved(struct amdgpu
 	while (!list_empty(&vm->invalidated)) {
 		bo_va = list_first_entry(&vm->invalidated, struct amdgpu_bo_va,
 					 base.vm_status);
-		resv = bo_va->base.bo->tbo.base.resv;
+		bo = bo_va->base.bo;
+		resv = bo->tbo.base.resv;
 		spin_unlock(&vm->status_lock);
 
 		/* Try to reserve the BO to avoid clearing its ptes */
-		if (!adev->debug_vm && dma_resv_trylock(resv)) {
+		if (!adev->debug_vm && !amdgpu_ttm_tt_get_usermm(bo->tbo.ttm) &&
+		    dma_resv_trylock(resv)) {
 			clear = false;
 			unlock = true;
 		/* The caller is already holding the reservation lock */
author maintainer
#275 lore raw

PATCH 272/315 drm/amdgpu: check num_entries in GEM_OP GET_MAPPING_INFO

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ziyi Guo <[email protected]>

commit a1ba4594232c87c3b8defd6f89a2e40f8b08395d upstream.

kvcalloc(args->num_entries, sizeof(*vm_entries), GFP_KERNEL) at amdgpu_gem.c:1050 uses the user-supplied num_entries directly without any upper bounds check. Since num_entries is a __u32 and sizeof(drm_amdgpu_gem_vm_entry) is 32 bytes, a large num_entries produces an allocation exceeding INT_MAX, triggering WARNING in __kvmalloc_node_noprof(), causing a kernel WARNING, TAINT_WARN, and panic on CONFIG_PANIC_ON_WARN=y systems.

Add a size bounds check before we invoke the kvzalloc() to reject oversized num_entries early with -EINVAL.

Fixes 4d82724f7f2b ("drm/amdgpu: Add mapping info option for GEM_OP ioctl")
(cherry picked from commit 1fe7bf5457f6efd7be60b17e23163ba54341d73d)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_gem.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_gem.c +5 -0
@@ -1074,6 +1074,11 @@ int amdgpu_gem_op_ioctl(struct drm_devic
 		 * If that number is larger than the size of the array, the ioctl must
 		 * be retried.
 		 */
+		if (args->num_entries > INT_MAX / sizeof(*vm_entries)) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto out_exec;
+		}
+
 		vm_entries = kvcalloc(args->num_entries, sizeof(*vm_entries), GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!vm_entries) {
 			r = -ENOMEM;
author maintainer
#276 lore raw

PATCH 273/315 serial: dz: Fix bootconsole message clobbering at chip reset

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Maciej W. Rozycki <[email protected]>

commit ca904f4b42355287bc5ce8b7550ebe909cda4c2c upstream.

In the DZ interface as implemented by the DC7085 gate array the serial transmitters are double buffered, meaning that at the time a transmitter is ready to accept the next character there is one in the transmit shift register still being sent to the line. Issuing a master clear at this time causes this character to be lost, so wait an extra amount of time sufficient for the transmit shift register to drain at 9600bps, which is the baud rate setting used by the firmware console.

Mind the specified 1.4us TRDY recovery time in the course and continue using iob() as the completion barrier, since the platforms involved use a write buffer that can delay and combine writes, and reorder them with respect to reads regardless of the MMIO locations accessed and we still lack a platform-independent handler for that.

When called from dz_serial_console_init() this is too early for fsleep() to work and even before lpj has been calculated and therefore the delay is actually not sufficient for the transmitter to drain and is merely a placeholder now. This will be addressed in a follow-up change.

---
 drivers/tty/serial/dz.c |   21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
drivers/tty/serial/dz.c +21 -0
@@ -542,10 +542,31 @@ static int dz_encode_baud_rate(unsigned
 static void dz_reset(struct dz_port *dport)
 {
 	struct dz_mux *mux = dport->mux;
+	unsigned short tcr;
+	int loops = 10000;
 
 	if (mux->initialised)
 		return;
 
+	tcr = dz_in(dport, DZ_TCR);
+
+	/* Do not disturb any ongoing transmissions.  */
+	if (dz_in(dport, DZ_CSR) & DZ_MSE) {
+		unsigned short csr, mask;
+
+		mask = tcr;
+		while ((mask & DZ_LNENB) && loops--) {
+			csr = dz_in(dport, DZ_CSR);
+			if (!(csr & DZ_TRDY))
+				continue;
+			mask &= ~(1 << ((csr & DZ_TLINE) >> 8));
+			dz_out(dport, DZ_TCR, mask);
+			iob();
+			udelay(2);		/* 1.4us TRDY recovery.  */
+		}
+		udelay(1200);			/* Transmitter drain.  */
+	}
+
 	dz_out(dport, DZ_CSR, DZ_CLR);
 	while (dz_in(dport, DZ_CSR) & DZ_CLR);
 	iob();
author maintainer
#277 lore raw

PATCH 274/315 serial: dz: Fix bootconsole handover lockup

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Maciej W. Rozycki <[email protected]>

commit 7f127b2208e5e2b817243cad41fe4211a6d5a7a3 upstream.

Calling dz_reset() in the course of setting up the serial device causes line parameters to be reset and the transmitter disabled. We've been lucky in that no message is usually produced to the kernel log between this call and the later call to uart_set_options() in the course of console setup done by dz_serial_console_init(), or the system would hang as the console output handler in the firmware tried to access a port the transmitter of which has been disabled and line parameters messed up.

This will change with the next change to the driver, so fix dz_reset() such that line parameters are set for 9600n8 console operation as with the system firmware and the transmitter re-enabled after reset. This also means dz_pm() serves no purpose anymore, so drop it.

---
 drivers/tty/serial/dz.c |   36 ++++++++++++------------------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
drivers/tty/serial/dz.c +12 -24
@@ -571,6 +571,18 @@ static void dz_reset(struct dz_port *dpo
 	while (dz_in(dport, DZ_CSR) & DZ_CLR);
 	iob();
 
+	/*
+	 * Set parameters across all lines such as not to interfere
+	 * with the initial PROM-based console.  Otherwise any output
+	 * produced before the console handover would cause the system
+	 * firmware to produce rubbish.
+	 */
+	for (int line = 0; line < DZ_NB_PORT; line++)
+		dz_out(dport, DZ_LPR, DZ_B9600 | DZ_CS8 | line);
+
+	/* Re-enable transmission for the initial PROM-based console.  */
+	dz_out(dport, DZ_TCR, tcr);
+
 	/* Enable scanning.  */
 	dz_out(dport, DZ_CSR, DZ_MSE);
 
@@ -654,26 +666,6 @@ static void dz_set_termios(struct uart_p
 	uart_port_unlock_irqrestore(&dport->port, flags);
 }
 
-/*
- * Hack alert!
- * Required solely so that the initial PROM-based console
- * works undisturbed in parallel with this one.
- */
-static void dz_pm(struct uart_port *uport, unsigned int state,
-		  unsigned int oldstate)
-{
-	struct dz_port *dport = to_dport(uport);
-	unsigned long flags;
-
-	uart_port_lock_irqsave(&dport->port, &flags);
-	if (state < 3)
-		dz_start_tx(&dport->port);
-	else
-		dz_stop_tx(&dport->port);
-	uart_port_unlock_irqrestore(&dport->port, flags);
-}
-
-
 static const char *dz_type(struct uart_port *uport)
 {
 	return "DZ";
@@ -769,7 +761,6 @@ static const struct uart_ops dz_ops = {
 	.startup	= dz_startup,
 	.shutdown	= dz_shutdown,
 	.set_termios	= dz_set_termios,
-	.pm		= dz_pm,
 	.type		= dz_type,
 	.release_port	= dz_release_port,
 	.request_port	= dz_request_port,
@@ -894,10 +885,7 @@ static int __init dz_console_setup(struc
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	spin_lock_init(&dport->port.lock);	/* For dz_pm().  */
-
 	dz_reset(dport);
-	dz_pm(uport, 0, -1);
 
 	if (options)
 		uart_parse_options(options, &baud, &parity, &bits, &flow);
author maintainer
#278 lore raw

PATCH 275/315 serial: dz: Convert to use a platform device

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Maciej W. Rozycki <[email protected]>

commit 5d7a49d60b8fda66da60e240fd7315232fa1754f upstream.

Prevent a crash from happening as the first serial port is initialised:

Console: switching to colour frame buffer device 160x64
tgafb: SFB+ detected, rev=0x02
fb0: Digital ZLX-E1 frame buffer device at 0x1e000000
DECstation DZ serial driver version 1.04
CPU 0 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 000000bc, epc == 8048b3a4, ra == 80470a78 Oops[#1]:

  CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.19.0-dirty #35 NONE
  $ 0   : 00000000 1000ac00 00000004 804707ac
  $ 4   : 00000000 80e20850 80e20858 81000030
  $ 8   : 00000000 8072c81c 00000008 fefefeff
  $12   : 6c616972 00000006 80c5917f 69726420
  $16   : 80e20800 00000000 808f8968 80e20800
  $20   : 00000000 807f5a90 808b0094 808d3bc8
  $24   : 00000018 80479030
  $28   : 80c2e000 80c2fd70 00000069 80470a78
  Hi    : 00000004
  Lo    : 00000000
  epc   : 8048b3a4 __dev_fwnode+0x0/0xc
  ra    : 80470a78 serial_base_ctrl_add+0xa0/0x168
  Status: 1000ac04	IEp
  Cause : 30000008 (ExcCode 02)
  BadVA : 000000bc
  PrId  : 00000220 (R3000)
  Modules linked in:
  Process swapper/0 (pid: 1, threadinfo=(ptrval), task=(ptrval), tls=00000000)
  Stack : 00400044 00400040 8046f4cc 00000000 808a6148 808a0000 808f8968 8086983c
          808e0000 8046fc84 1000ac01 00000028 80e20700 802ba3f8 80e20700 80d34a94
          80c1b900 80e20700 80e20700 80e20700 80e20700 80444650 00000000 00000000
          00000000 807f5a90 808b0094 80447080 00400040 808e0000 80d34a94 808a6148
          80d34a94 00000004 80e20700 00000000 8076974c 80469810 80c2fe3c 1000ac01
          ...
  Call Trace:
  [<8048b3a4>] __dev_fwnode+0x0/0xc
  [<80470a78>] serial_base_ctrl_add+0xa0/0x168
  [<8046fc84>] serial_core_register_port+0x1c8/0x974
  [<808c6af0>] dz_init+0x74/0xc8
  [<800470e0>] do_one_initcall+0x44/0x2d4
  [<808b111c>] kernel_init_freeable+0x258/0x308
  [<8072e434>] kernel_init+0x20/0x114
  [<80049cd0>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x14/0x1c

  Code: 27bd0018  03e00008  2402ffea <8c8200bc> 03e00008  00000000  27bdffc0  afbe0038  afb30024

  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

-- where a pointer is dereferenced that has been derived from a null pointer to the port's parent device.

Since no device is available with legacy probing and it's not anymore a preferable way to discover devices anyway, switch the driver to using a platform device and use it as the port's parent device. Update resource handling accordingly and only request the actual span of addresses used within the slot, which will have had its resource already requested by generic platform device code.

Use platform_driver_probe() not just because the DZ device is fixed with solder on board and not straightforward to remove, but foremost because the associated TTY's major device number is the same as used by the zs driver and the first driver to claim it will prevent the other one from using it. Either one DZ device or some SCC devices will be present in a given system but never both at a time, and therefore we want the major device number to be claimed by the first driver to actually successfully bind to its device and platform_driver_probe() is a way to fulfil that.

An unfortunate consequence of the switch to a platform device is we now hand the console over from the bootconsole much later in the bootstrap. The firmware console handler appears good enough though to work so late and in particular with interrupts enabled.

Conversely only starting the console port so late lets the reset code fully utilise our delay handlers, so switch from udelay() to fsleep() for transmitter draining so as to avoid busy-waiting for an excessive amount of time.

Fixes 84a9582fd203 ("serial: core: Start managing serial controllers to enable runtime PM")
Cc [email protected] # needs to use .remove_new for <= 6.10
---
 arch/mips/dec/platform.c |   55 +++++++++++++++++++++-
 drivers/tty/serial/dz.c  |  116 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
 2 files changed, 110 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)
arch/mips/dec/platform.c +54 -1
@@ -10,6 +10,13 @@
 #include <linux/mc146818rtc.h>
 #include <linux/platform_device.h>
 
+#include <asm/bootinfo.h>
+
+#include <asm/dec/interrupts.h>
+#include <asm/dec/kn01.h>
+#include <asm/dec/kn02.h>
+#include <asm/dec/system.h>
+
 static struct resource dec_rtc_resources[] = {
 	{
 		.name = "rtc",
@@ -30,11 +37,57 @@ static struct platform_device dec_rtc_de
 	.num_resources = ARRAY_SIZE(dec_rtc_resources),
 };
 
+static struct resource dec_dz_resources[] = {
+	{ .name = "dz", .flags = IORESOURCE_MEM, },
+	{ .name = "dz", .flags = IORESOURCE_IRQ, },
+};
+
+static struct platform_device dec_dz_device = {
+	.name = "dz",
+	.id = PLATFORM_DEVID_NONE,
+	.resource = dec_dz_resources,
+	.num_resources = ARRAY_SIZE(dec_dz_resources),
+};
+
+static struct platform_device *dec_dz_devices[] __initdata = {
+	&dec_dz_device,
+};
+
 static int __init dec_add_devices(void)
 {
+	int ret1, ret2;
+	int num_dz;
+	int irq, i;
+
 	dec_rtc_resources[0].start = RTC_PORT(0);
 	dec_rtc_resources[0].end = RTC_PORT(0) + dec_kn_slot_size - 1;
-	return platform_device_register(&dec_rtc_device);
+
+	i = 0;
+	irq = dec_interrupt[DEC_IRQ_DZ11];
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_32BIT) && irq >= 0) {
+		resource_size_t base;
+
+		switch (mips_machtype) {
+		case MACH_DS23100:
+		case MACH_DS5100:
+			base = dec_kn_slot_base + KN01_DZ11;
+			break;
+		default:
+			base = dec_kn_slot_base + KN02_DZ11;
+			break;
+		}
+		dec_dz_device.resource[0].start = base;
+		dec_dz_device.resource[0].end = base + dec_kn_slot_size - 1;
+		dec_dz_device.resource[1].start = irq;
+		dec_dz_device.resource[1].end = irq;
+		i++;
+	}
+	num_dz = i;
+
+	ret1 = platform_device_register(&dec_rtc_device);
+	ret2 = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_32BIT) ?
+	       platform_add_devices(dec_dz_devices, num_dz) : 0;
+	return ret1 ? ret1 : ret2;
 }
 
 device_initcall(dec_add_devices);
drivers/tty/serial/dz.c +56 -60

223 lines not on this page · raw message

author maintainer
#279 lore raw

PATCH 276/315 serial: zs: Fix bootconsole handover lockup

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Maciej W. Rozycki <[email protected]>

commit 6c05cf72e13314ce9b770b5951695dc5a2152920 upstream.

Calling zs_reset() in the course of setting up the serial device causes line parameters to be reset and the transmitter disabled. We've been lucky in that no message is usually produced to the kernel log between this call and the later call to uart_set_options() in the course of console setup done by zs_serial_console_init(), or the system would hang as the console output handler in the firmware tried to access a port the transmitter of which has been disabled and line parameters messed up.

This will change with the next change to the driver, so fix zs_reset() such that line parameters are set for 9600n8 console operation as with the system firmware and the transmitter re-enabled after reset. This also means zs_pm() serves no purpose anymore, so drop it.

Fixes 8b4a40809e53 ("zs: move to the serial subsystem")
Cc [email protected] # v2.6.23+
---
 drivers/tty/serial/zs.c |   29 ++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
drivers/tty/serial/zs.c +8 -21
@@ -105,18 +105,24 @@ struct zs_parms {
 
 static struct zs_scc zs_sccs[ZS_NUM_SCCS];
 
+/*
+ * Set parameters in WR5, WR12, WR13 such as not to interfere
+ * with the initial PROM-based console.  Otherwise any output
+ * produced before the console handover would cause the system
+ * firmware to hang (TxENAB) or produce rubbish (Tx8, B9600).
+ */
 static u8 zs_init_regs[ZS_NUM_REGS] __initdata = {
 	0,				/* write 0 */
 	PAR_SPEC,			/* write 1 */
 	0,				/* write 2 */
 	0,				/* write 3 */
 	X16CLK | SB1,			/* write 4 */
-	0,				/* write 5 */
+	Tx8 | TxENAB,			/* write 5 */
 	0, 0, 0,			/* write 6, 7, 8 */
 	MIE | DLC | NV,			/* write 9 */
 	NRZ,				/* write 10 */
 	TCBR | RCBR,			/* write 11 */
-	0, 0,				/* BRG time constant, write 12 + 13 */
+	0x16, 0x00,			/* BRG time constant, write 12 + 13 */
 	BRSRC | BRENABL,		/* write 14 */
 	0,				/* write 15 */
 };
@@ -956,23 +962,6 @@ static void zs_set_termios(struct uart_p
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&scc->zlock, flags);
 }
 
-/*
- * Hack alert!
- * Required solely so that the initial PROM-based console
- * works undisturbed in parallel with this one.
- */
-static void zs_pm(struct uart_port *uport, unsigned int state,
-		  unsigned int oldstate)
-{
-	struct zs_port *zport = to_zport(uport);
-
-	if (state < 3)
-		zport->regs[5] |= TxENAB;
-	else
-		zport->regs[5] &= ~TxENAB;
-	write_zsreg(zport, R5, zport->regs[5]);
-}
-
 
 static const char *zs_type(struct uart_port *uport)
 {
@@ -1055,7 +1044,6 @@ static const struct uart_ops zs_ops = {
 	.startup	= zs_startup,
 	.shutdown	= zs_shutdown,
 	.set_termios	= zs_set_termios,
-	.pm		= zs_pm,
 	.type		= zs_type,
 	.release_port	= zs_release_port,
 	.request_port	= zs_request_port,
@@ -1210,7 +1198,6 @@ static int __init zs_console_setup(struc
 		return ret;
 
 	zs_reset(zport);
-	zs_pm(uport, 0, -1);
 
 	if (options)
 		uart_parse_options(options, &baud, &parity, &bits, &flow);