ASoC: SOF: ipc3/ipc4-control: harden kcontrol payload handling
Subsystems (3)
Peter Ujfalusi
maintainercover ASoC: SOF: ipc3/ipc4-control: harden kcontrol payload handling
Hi,
This series hardens SOF kcontrol data paths for both IPC3 and IPC4 by fixing size-handling bugs in put/get/update flows and tightening bounds checks around firmware/user-provided payload lengths.
The changes include:
Fix TOCTOU-style size misuse in IPC3/IPC4 bytes put paths by validating and using the incoming payload size.
Add notification/update payload size validation before parsing control data. Use overflow-checked arithmetic when computing expected IPC3 control sizes. Ensure update/copy bounds are validated against actual allocation limits. Fix IPC3 bytes_ext bounds checks to account for struct header offset, closing a heap overflow/over-read issue from unprivileged userspace TLV access. Overall, the series makes control payload processing robust against malformed or inconsistent sizes and prevents out-of-bounds accesses.
Regards,
Peter
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Peter Ujfalusi (6):
ASoC: SOF: ipc4-control: Fix TOCTOU in sof_ipc4_bytes_put
ASoC: SOF: ipc4-control: Validate notification payload size
ASoC: SOF: ipc3-control: Use overflow checks in control_update size
calc
ASoC: SOF: ipc3-control: Validate size in snd_sof_update_control
ASoC: SOF: ipc3-control: Fix TOCTOU in bytes_put and bytes_get
ASoC: SOF: ipc3-control: Fix heap overflow in bytes_ext put/get
sound/soc/sof/ipc3-control.c | 79 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- sound/soc/sof/ipc4-control.c | 34 ++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
Peter Ujfalusi
maintainerPATCH 1/6 ASoC: SOF: ipc4-control: Fix TOCTOU in sof_ipc4_bytes_put
In sof_ipc4_bytes_put(), the copy size is derived from the old data->size in the buffer rather than the incoming new data's size field from ucontrol. If the new data has a different size, the copy uses the wrong length: it may truncate valid data or copy stale bytes.
Fix by validating and using the incoming data's sof_abi_hdr.size from ucontrol before copying.
--- sound/soc/sof/ipc4-control.c | 11 +++++++---- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
sound/soc/sof/ipc4-control.c +7 -4
@@ -554,6 +554,8 @@ static int sof_ipc4_bytes_put(struct snd_sof_control *scontrol,struct snd_soc_component *scomp = scontrol->scomp;struct snd_sof_dev *sdev =snd_soc_component_get_drvdata (scomp);struct sof_abi_hdr *data = cdata->data; +const struct sof_abi_hdr *new_hdr = + (const struct sof_abi_hdr *)ucontrol->value.bytes.data;size_t size;int ret;
@@ -564,15 +566,16 @@ static int sof_ipc4_bytes_put(struct snd_sof_control *scontrol,return -EINVAL ; } -/* scontrol->max_size has been verified to be >= sizeof(struct sof_abi_hdr) */ -if (data->size > scontrol->max_size -sizeof (*data)) { +/* Validate the new data's size, not the old one */ +if (new_hdr->size > scontrol->max_size -sizeof (*new_hdr)) {dev_err_ratelimited (scomp->dev,"data size too big %u bytes max is %zu\n" , - data->size, scontrol->max_size -sizeof (*data)); + new_hdr->size, + scontrol->max_size -sizeof (*new_hdr));return -EINVAL ; } - size = data->size +sizeof (*data); + size = new_hdr->size +sizeof (*new_hdr);/* copy from kcontrol */ memcpy (data, ucontrol->value.bytes.data, size);
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
Peter Ujfalusi
maintainerPATCH 2/6 ASoC: SOF: ipc4-control: Validate notification payload size
In reply to Peter UjfalusiValidate MODULE_NOTIFICATION payload length before reading bytes/channel data in control update handling.
--- sound/soc/sof/ipc4-control.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+)
sound/soc/sof/ipc4-control.c +23 -0
@@ -875,6 +875,16 @@ static void sof_ipc4_control_update(struct snd_sof_dev *sdev, void *ipc_message)*/ if (type ==SND_SOC_TPLG_TYPE_BYTES ) {struct sof_abi_hdr *data = cdata->data; +size_t source_size =struct_size (msg_data, data, msg_data->num_elems); + +if (source_size > ndata->event_data_size) { +dev_warn (sdev->dev, +"%s: invalid bytes notification size for %s (%zu, %u)\n" , + __func__, scontrol->name, source_size, + ndata->event_data_size); + scontrol->comp_data_dirty = true; + goto notify; + }if (msg_data->num_elems > scontrol->max_size -sizeof (*data)) { dev_warn(sdev->dev,
@@ -887,6 +897,17 @@ static void sof_ipc4_control_update(struct snd_sof_dev *sdev, void *ipc_message) scontrol->size =sizeof (*cdata) +sizeof (*data) + data->size; } }else { +size_t source_size =struct_size (msg_data, chanv, msg_data->num_elems); + +if (source_size > ndata->event_data_size) { +dev_warn (sdev->dev, +"%s: invalid channel notification size for %s (%zu, %u)\n" , + __func__, scontrol->name, source_size, + ndata->event_data_size); + scontrol->comp_data_dirty = true; + goto notify; + } +for (i =0 ; i < msg_data->num_elems; i++) {u32 channel = msg_data->chanv[i].channel;
@@ -914,6 +935,8 @@ static void sof_ipc4_control_update(struct snd_sof_dev *sdev, void *ipc_message) scontrol->comp_data_dirty = true; } +notify: +/* * Look up the ALSA kcontrol of the scontrol to be able to send a * notification to user space
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0