strongswan: Fix CVE-2026-35328
PATCH v2 1/6 strongswan: Fix CVE-2026-35328
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/strongswan/strongswan/commit/56c7f0d13dffcfebf4255470e375234144d28134]
--- ...nt-infinite-loop-if-supported-versio.patch | 42 +++++++++++++++++++ .../strongswan/strongswan_5.9.14.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/strongswan/tls-server-Prevent-infinite-loop-if-supported-versio.patch
meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/strongswan/tls-server-Prevent-infinite-loop-if-supported-versio.patch new file +42 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +From: Tobias Brunner <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2026 10:17:46 +0100 +Subject: tls-server: Prevent infinite loop if supported versions are too + short + +If the extension doesn't contain a multiple of two bytes, the previous +code would get stuck in an infinite loop as `remaining()` continued to +return TRUE while `read_uint16()` failed to parse a value. Initiating +several connections with such an extension allows a DoS attack as no +threads would eventually be available to handle packets/events. + +Fixes: 7fbe2e27ecf6 ("tls-server: TLS 1.3 support for TLS server implementation") +Fixes: CVE-2026-35328 + +CVE: CVE-2026-35328 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/strongswan/strongswan/commit/56c7f0d13dffcfebf4255470e375234144d28134] +Signed-off-by: Nitin Wankhade <[email protected]> +=== +diff --git a/src/libtls/tls_server.c b/src/libtls/tls_server.c +index 3ad9fd2..7b2238e 100644 +--- a/src/libtls/tls_server.c ++++ b/src/libtls/tls_server.c +@@ -471,15 +471,12 @@ static status_t process_client_hello(private_tls_server_t *this, + bio_reader_t *client_versions; + + client_versions = bio_reader_create(versions); +- while (client_versions->remaining(client_versions)) ++ while (client_versions->read_uint16(client_versions, &version)) + { +- if (client_versions->read_uint16(client_versions, &version)) ++ if (this->tls->set_version(this->tls, version, version)) + { +- if (this->tls->set_version(this->tls, version, version)) +- { +- this->client_version = version; +- break; +- } ++ this->client_version = version; ++ break; + } + } + client_versions->destroy(client_versions);
meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/strongswan_5.9.14.bb +1 -0
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.strongswan.org/strongswan-${PV}.tar.bz2 \ file://CVE-2025-62291.patch \ file://CVE-2026-25075.patch \ file://CVE-2026-35334.patch \ + file://tls-server-Prevent-infinite-loop-if-supported-versio.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "728027ddda4cb34c67c4cec97d3ddb8c274edfbabdaeecf7e74693b54fc33678"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v2 2/6 strongswan: Fix CVE-2026-35329
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/strongswan/strongswan/commit/8dae5605a79666c6def907efd8c872c91d93de5b]
[https://github.com/strongswan/strongswan/commit/4da84019ccec87fea161797af2901244fa5f170e]
--- ...d-NULL-pointer-dereference-when-veri.patch | 58 +++++++++++++++++++ .../strongswan/strongswan_5.9.14.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 59 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/strongswan/pkcs5-pkcs7-Avoid-NULL-pointer-dereference-when-veri.patch
meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/strongswan/pkcs5-pkcs7-Avoid-NULL-pointer-dereference-when-veri.patch new file +58 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +From: Tobias Brunner <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2026 10:28:45 +0100 +Subject: pkcs5/pkcs7: Avoid NULL pointer dereference when verifying padding + +Can be triggered via empty PKCS#7 encrypted- or enveloped-data content +in IKEv1 CERT payload. + +Fixes: 4076e3ee9121 ("Extract PKCS#5 handling from pkcs8 plugin to separate helper class") +Fixes: d7aa09104f08 ("Implement PKCS#7 enveloped-data parsing and decryption") +Fixes: CVE-2026-35329 + +CVE: CVE-2026-35329 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/strongswan/strongswan/commit/8dae5605a79666c6def907efd8c872c91d93de5b] + [https://github.com/strongswan/strongswan/commit/4da84019ccec87fea161797af2901244fa5f170e] +Patch is refreshed as per the source code version 5.9.14 +Signed-off-by: Nitin Wankhade <[email protected]> +=== +diff --git a/src/libstrongswan/crypto/pkcs5.c b/src/libstrongswan/crypto/pkcs5.c +index e48a9ad..134ccd3 100644 +--- a/src/libstrongswan/crypto/pkcs5.c ++++ b/src/libstrongswan/crypto/pkcs5.c +@@ -113,6 +113,11 @@ static bool verify_padding(crypter_t *crypter, chunk_t *blob) + { + uint8_t padding, count; + ++ if (!blob->len) ++ { ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ + padding = count = blob->ptr[blob->len - 1]; + + if (padding > crypter->get_block_size(crypter)) +diff --git a/src/libstrongswan/plugins/pkcs7/pkcs7_enveloped_data.c b/src/libstrongswan/plugins/pkcs7/pkcs7_enveloped_data.c +index 8b26bad..3d601d6 100644 +--- a/src/libstrongswan/plugins/pkcs7/pkcs7_enveloped_data.c ++++ b/src/libstrongswan/plugins/pkcs7/pkcs7_enveloped_data.c +@@ -182,10 +182,17 @@ static bool decrypt(private_key_t *private, chunk_t key, chunk_t iv, int oid, + */ + static bool remove_padding(private_pkcs7_enveloped_data_t *this) + { +- u_char *pos = this->content.ptr + this->content.len - 1; +- u_char pattern = *pos; +- size_t padding = pattern; ++ u_char *pos, pattern; ++ size_t padding; + ++ if (!this->content.len) ++ { ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ pos = this->content.ptr + this->content.len - 1; ++ pattern = *pos; ++ padding = pattern; + if (padding > this->content.len) + { + DBG1(DBG_LIB, "padding greater than data length");
meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/strongswan_5.9.14.bb +1 -0
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.strongswan.org/strongswan-${PV}.tar.bz2 \ file://CVE-2026-25075.patch \ file://CVE-2026-35334.patch \ file://tls-server-Prevent-infinite-loop-if-supported-versio.patch \ + file://pkcs5-pkcs7-Avoid-NULL-pointer-dereference-when-veri.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "728027ddda4cb34c67c4cec97d3ddb8c274edfbabdaeecf7e74693b54fc33678"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v2 3/6 strongswan: Fix CVE-2026-35330
In reply to Nitin WankhadeUpstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/strongswan/strongswan/commit/aa5aaebc33e0f326d8a0dbe01b236f2bfa0e6ea1]
--- ...-Reject-zero-length-EAP-SIM-AKA-attributes | 54 +++++++++++++++++++ .../strongswan/strongswan_5.9.14.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 55 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/strongswan/libsimaka-Reject-zero-length-EAP-SIM-AKA-attributes
meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/strongswan/libsimaka-Reject-zero-length-EAP-SIM-AKA-attributes new file +54 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +From: =?utf-8?q?Lukas_Johannes_M=C3=B6ller?= <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2026 16:07:10 +0000 +Subject: libsimaka: Reject zero-length EAP-SIM/AKA attributes +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +parse_attributes() accepts hdr->length == 0 in the AT_ENCR_DATA, +AT_RAND, AT_PADDING, default branches. The code then subtracts the +fixed attribute header size from the encoded length, which underflows +and exposes a wrapped payload length to later code. In particular, +for the cases where add_attribute() is called, this causes a heap-based +buffer overflow (a buffer of 12 bytes is allocated to which the wrapped +length is written). For AT_PADDING, the underflow is irrelevant as +add_attribute() is not called. Instead, this results in an infinite loop. + +Reject zero-length attributes before subtracting the attribute header. + +Signed-off-by: Lukas Johannes Möller <[email protected]> + +Fixes: f8330d03953b ("Added a libsimaka library with shared message handling code for EAP-SIM/AKA") +Fixes: CVE-2026-35330 + +CVE: CVE-2026-35330 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/strongswan/strongswan/commit/aa5aaebc33e0f326d8a0dbe01b236f2bfa0e6ea1] +Signed-off-by: Nitin Wankhade <[email protected]> +=== +diff --git a/src/libsimaka/simaka_message.c b/src/libsimaka/simaka_message.c +index 6706568..4862048 100644 +--- a/src/libsimaka/simaka_message.c ++++ b/src/libsimaka/simaka_message.c +@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ static bool parse_attributes(private_simaka_message_t *this, chunk_t in) + case AT_ENCR_DATA: + case AT_RAND: + { +- if (hdr->length * 4 > in.len || in.len < 4) ++ if (hdr->length == 0 || hdr->length * 4 > in.len || in.len < 4) + { + return invalid_length(hdr->type); + } +@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ static bool parse_attributes(private_simaka_message_t *this, chunk_t in) + case AT_PADDING: + default: + { +- if (hdr->length * 4 > in.len || in.len < 4) ++ if (hdr->length == 0 || hdr->length * 4 > in.len || in.len < 4) + { + return invalid_length(hdr->type); + } +@@ -932,4 +932,3 @@ simaka_message_t *simaka_message_create(bool request, uint8_t identifier, + return simaka_message_create_data(chunk_create((char*)&hdr, sizeof(hdr)), + crypto); + } +-
meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/strongswan_5.9.14.bb +1 -0
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.strongswan.org/strongswan-${PV}.tar.bz2 \ file://CVE-2026-35334.patch \ file://tls-server-Prevent-infinite-loop-if-supported-versio.patch \ file://pkcs5-pkcs7-Avoid-NULL-pointer-dereference-when-veri.patch \ + file://libsimaka-Reject-zero-length-EAP-SIM-AKA-attributes.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "728027ddda4cb34c67c4cec97d3ddb8c274edfbabdaeecf7e74693b54fc33678"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v2 4/6 strongswan: Fix CVE-2026-35331
In reply to Nitin WankhadeUpstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/strongswan/strongswan/commit/64130ede5cd8f61edd35a1b488c874fa328a42b0]
[https://github.com/strongswan/strongswan/commit/c66143db48bab9eb82cc86190687938b809611eb]
--- ...-insensitive-matching-and-reject-exc.patch | 176 ++++++++++++++++++ .../strongswan/strongswan_5.9.14.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 177 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/strongswan/constraints-Case-insensitive-matching-and-reject-exc.patch
meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/strongswan/constraints-Case-insensitive-matching-and-reject-exc.patch new file +176 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@ +From: Tobias Brunner <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2026 17:45:11 +0100 +Subject: constraints: Case-insensitive matching and reject excluded DN name + constraints + +The case is generally ignored when matching identities. So this is +an issue with excluded name constraints where a malicious intermediate +CA could evade the constraints by issuing certificates with names that +just modify the case (e.g. strongSwan.org instead strongswan.org). + +Note that it's likely that permitted name constraints are preferred over +excluded name constraints as it might be difficult to come up with a +conclusive list of names to exclude. + +With directoryName (DN) name constraints the issue is a bit more comples. +Some RDNs have to be matched in a case-insensitive manner, which we e.g. +do in `identification.c::rdn_equals`. By not doing it for name +constraints, a malicious intermediate CA could evade an excluded name +constraint just by modifying the case in such an RDN. + +While we could use the mentioned function in `dn_matches`, this doesn't +properly fix the problem because the function is basically too strict. +Especially in regards to RDNs of type UTF8String, which are only compared +binary. To match these properly, we'd have to implement the string +preparation described in RFC 5280, section 7.1 and the referenced RFCs. +Until that's the case, we reject excluded name constraints of type +directoryName as we are unable to enforce them. + +Fixes: a2b340764fac ("Implemented NameConstraint matching in constraints plugin") +Fixes: CVE-2026-35331 + +CVE: CVE-2026-35331 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/strongswan/strongswan/commit/64130ede5cd8f61edd35a1b488c874fa328a42b0] + [https://github.com/strongswan/strongswan/commit/c66143db48bab9eb82cc86190687938b809611eb] +Signed-off-by: Nitin Wankhade <[email protected]> +=== +diff --git a/src/libstrongswan/plugins/constraints/constraints_validator.c b/src/libstrongswan/plugins/constraints/constraints_validator.c +index 27bdb89..daa7bfa 100644 +--- a/src/libstrongswan/plugins/constraints/constraints_validator.c ++++ b/src/libstrongswan/plugins/constraints/constraints_validator.c +@@ -55,6 +55,18 @@ static bool check_pathlen(x509_t *issuer, int pathlen) + return TRUE; + } + ++/** ++ * Check if the constraint and ID strings match case-insensitively ++ */ ++static bool string_matches(chunk_t constraint, chunk_t id) ++{ ++ /* make sure the two strings have actually the same length */ ++ return constraint.len == id.len && ++ memchr(constraint.ptr, 0, constraint.len) == NULL && ++ memchr(id.ptr, 0, id.len) == NULL && ++ strncasecmp(constraint.ptr, id.ptr, constraint.len) == 0; ++} ++ + /** + * Check if a FQDN constraint matches + */ +@@ -70,7 +82,7 @@ static bool fqdn_matches(identification_t *constraint, identification_t *id) + return FALSE; + } + diff = chunk_create(i.ptr, i.len - c.len); +- if (!chunk_equals(c, chunk_skip(i, diff.len))) ++ if (!string_matches(c, chunk_skip(i, diff.len))) + { + return FALSE; + } +@@ -101,10 +113,10 @@ static bool email_matches(identification_t *constraint, identification_t *id) + } + if (memchr(c.ptr, '@', c.len)) + { /* constraint is a full email address */ +- return chunk_equals(c, i); ++ return string_matches(c, i); + } + diff = chunk_create(i.ptr, i.len - c.len); +- if (!chunk_equals(c, chunk_skip(i, diff.len))) ++ if (!string_matches(c, chunk_skip(i, diff.len))) + { + return FALSE; + } +@@ -389,9 +401,17 @@ static bool collect_constraints(x509_t *x509, bool permitted, hashtable_t **out) + type = constraint->get_type(constraint); + switch (type) + { ++ case ID_DER_ASN1_DN: ++ if (!permitted) ++ { ++ DBG1(DBG_CFG, "excluded %N NameConstraint not supported", ++ id_type_names, type); ++ success = FALSE; ++ break; ++ } ++ /* fall-through */ + case ID_FQDN: + case ID_RFC822_ADDR: +- case ID_DER_ASN1_DN: + case ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET: + case ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET: + break; +diff --git a/src/libstrongswan/tests/suites/test_certnames.c b/src/libstrongswan/tests/suites/test_certnames.c +index 2549fb6..14570ee 100644 +--- a/src/libstrongswan/tests/suites/test_certnames.c ++++ b/src/libstrongswan/tests/suites/test_certnames.c +@@ -207,8 +207,10 @@ static struct { + bool good; + } permitted_san[] = { + { ".strongswan.org", "test.strongswan.org", TRUE }, ++ { ".strongswan.org", "test.strongSwan.org", TRUE }, + { "strongswan.org", "test.strongswan.org", TRUE }, + { "a.b.c.strongswan.org", "d.a.b.c.strongswan.org", TRUE }, ++ { "a.b.c.strongswan.org", "d.A.b.C.strongswan.org", TRUE }, + { "a.b.c.strongswan.org", "a.b.c.d.strongswan.org", FALSE }, + { "strongswan.org", "strongswan.org.com", FALSE }, + { ".strongswan.org", "strongswan.org", FALSE }, +@@ -216,8 +218,11 @@ static struct { + { "strongswan.org", "swan.org", FALSE }, + { "strongswan.org", "swan.org", FALSE }, + { "[email protected]", "[email protected]", TRUE }, ++ { "[email protected]", "[email protected]", TRUE }, ++ { "[email protected]", "[email protected]", TRUE }, + { "[email protected]", "[email protected]", FALSE }, + { "email:strongswan.org", "[email protected]", TRUE }, ++ { "email:strongswan.org", "[email protected]", TRUE }, + { "email:strongswan.org", "[email protected]", FALSE }, + { "email:.strongswan.org", "[email protected]", TRUE }, + { "email:.strongswan.org", "[email protected]", FALSE }, +@@ -248,11 +253,11 @@ static struct { + char *subject; + bool good; + } excluded_dn[] = { +- { "C=CH, O=another", "C=CH, O=strongSwan, CN=tester", TRUE }, +- { "C=CH, O=another", "C=CH, O=anot", TRUE }, +- { "C=CH, O=another", "C=CH, O=anot, CN=tester", TRUE }, ++ { "C=CH, O=another", "C=CH, O=strongSwan, CN=tester", FALSE }, ++ { "C=CH, O=another", "C=CH, O=anot", FALSE }, ++ { "C=CH, O=another", "C=CH, O=anot, CN=tester", FALSE }, + { "C=CH, O=another", "C=CH, O=another, CN=tester", FALSE }, +- { "C=CH, O=another", "C=CH, CN=tester, O=another", TRUE }, ++ { "C=CH, O=another", "C=CH, CN=tester, O=another", FALSE }, + }; + + START_TEST(test_excluded_dn) +@@ -281,7 +286,9 @@ static struct { + } excluded_san[] = { + { ".strongswan.org", "test.strongswan.org", FALSE }, + { "strongswan.org", "test.strongswan.org", FALSE }, ++ { "strongswan.org", "test.strongSwan.org", FALSE }, + { "a.b.c.strongswan.org", "d.a.b.c.strongswan.org", FALSE }, ++ { "a.b.c.strongswan.org", "d.a.b.C.strongswan.org", FALSE }, + { "a.b.c.strongswan.org", "a.b.c.d.strongswan.org", TRUE }, + { "strongswan.org", "strongswan.org.com", TRUE }, + { ".strongswan.org", "strongswan.org", TRUE }, +@@ -289,8 +296,10 @@ static struct { + { "strongswan.org", "swan.org", TRUE }, + { "strongswan.org", "swan.org", TRUE }, + { "[email protected]", "[email protected]", FALSE }, ++ { "[email protected]", "[email protected]", FALSE }, + { "[email protected]", "[email protected]", TRUE }, + { "email:strongswan.org", "[email protected]", FALSE }, ++ { "email:strongswan.org", "[email protected]", FALSE }, + { "email:strongswan.org", "[email protected]", TRUE }, + { "email:.strongswan.org", "[email protected]", FALSE }, + { "email:.strongswan.org", "[email protected]", TRUE }, +@@ -418,9 +427,9 @@ static struct { + char *subject; + bool good; + } excluded_dn_levels[] = { +- { "C=CH, O=strongSwan", "C=CH", "C=DE", TRUE }, ++ { "C=CH, O=strongSwan", "C=CH", "C=DE", FALSE }, + { "C=CH, O=strongSwan", "C=CH", "C=CH", FALSE }, +- { "C=CH, O=strongSwan", "C=DE", "C=CH", TRUE }, ++ { "C=CH, O=strongSwan", "C=DE", "C=CH", FALSE }, + { "C=CH, O=strongSwan", "C=DE", "C=DE", FALSE }, + { "C=CH, O=strongSwan", "C=DE", "C=CH, O=strongSwan", FALSE }, + { NULL, "C=CH", "C=CH, O=strongSwan", FALSE },
meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/strongswan_5.9.14.bb +1 -0
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.strongswan.org/strongswan-${PV}.tar.bz2 \ file://tls-server-Prevent-infinite-loop-if-supported-versio.patch \ file://pkcs5-pkcs7-Avoid-NULL-pointer-dereference-when-veri.patch \ file://libsimaka-Reject-zero-length-EAP-SIM-AKA-attributes.patch \ + file://constraints-Case-insensitive-matching-and-reject-exc.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "728027ddda4cb34c67c4cec97d3ddb8c274edfbabdaeecf7e74693b54fc33678"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v2 5/6 strongswan: Fix CVE-2026-35332
In reply to Nitin WankhadeUpstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/strongswan/strongswan/commit/1e0643bef105704337efc141a37dfcfbaa53cb1f]
--- ...accept-non-empty-ECDH-public-keys-wi.patch | 51 +++++++++++++++++++ .../strongswan/strongswan_5.9.14.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/strongswan/tls-server-Only-accept-non-empty-ECDH-public-keys-wi.patch
meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/strongswan/tls-server-Only-accept-non-empty-ECDH-public-keys-wi.patch new file +51 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +From: Tobias Brunner <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2026 17:38:07 +0100 +Subject: tls-server: Only accept non-empty ECDH public keys with TLS < 1.3 + +This prevents a crash due to a null-pointer dereference when processing +an empty ECDH public key. + +The previous length check only applied in the `!ec` case, so in the `ec` +case, the access to `pub.ptr[0]` was unguarded. If a crafted TLS +record ends with an empty ClientKeyExchange, then `read_data8` sets +`pub` to `chunk_empty`, causing a null-pointer dereference. + +Note that if some data follows the empty ClientKeyExchange, this just +causes a 1-byte out-of-bounds read that has no further effect as the +TLS session is aborted immediately. Either because the read value +doesn't equal TLS_ANSI_UNCOMPRESSED or because the empty public key +is rejected by `set_public_key()`. + +The referenced commit that introduced the pointer access, added the +check for `pub.len` specifically to the `!ec` case, while the pointer +access was initially unconditional (probably because the code was just +copied from `tls_peer.c` which processes ECDH public keys in a separate +function, so there was no `ec` flag). The latter was fixed a couple of +days later with 7b3c01845f63 ("Read the compression type byte for EC +groups, only"). However, that commit didn't change the length check. +Anyway, it's possible that the original intention was to add the check +to the `ec` case on the previous line, or that there was some confusion +with the parenthesis and something like the current code was intended to +begin with. + +Fixes: e6cce7ff0d1b ("Prepend point format to ECDH public key") +Fixes: CVE-2026-35332 + +CVE: CVE-2026-35332 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/strongswan/strongswan/commit/1e0643bef105704337efc141a37dfcfbaa53cb1f] +Patch is refreshed as per the source code version 5.9.14 +Signed-off-by: Nitin Wankhade <[email protected]> +=== +diff --git a/src/libtls/tls_server.c b/src/libtls/tls_server.c +index 7b2238e..bffc01c 100644 +--- a/src/libtls/tls_server.c ++++ b/src/libtls/tls_server.c +@@ -857,7 +857,7 @@ static status_t process_key_exchange_dhe(private_tls_server_t *this, + group = this->dh->get_method(this->dh); + ec = key_exchange_is_ecdh(group); + if ((ec && !reader->read_data8(reader, &pub)) || +- (!ec && (!reader->read_data16(reader, &pub) || pub.len == 0))) ++ (!ec && !reader->read_data16(reader, &pub)) || pub.len == 0) + { + DBG1(DBG_TLS, "received invalid Client Key Exchange"); + this->alert->add(this->alert, TLS_FATAL, TLS_DECODE_ERROR);
meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/strongswan_5.9.14.bb +1 -0
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.strongswan.org/strongswan-${PV}.tar.bz2 \ file://pkcs5-pkcs7-Avoid-NULL-pointer-dereference-when-veri.patch \ file://libsimaka-Reject-zero-length-EAP-SIM-AKA-attributes.patch \ file://constraints-Case-insensitive-matching-and-reject-exc.patch \ + file://tls-server-Only-accept-non-empty-ECDH-public-keys-wi.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "728027ddda4cb34c67c4cec97d3ddb8c274edfbabdaeecf7e74693b54fc33678"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v2 6/6 strongswan: Fix CVE-2026-35333
In reply to Nitin WankhadeUpstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/strongswan/strongswan/commit/e067d24293953cff56011a1ea6989872bdd98fcd]
--- ...-undersized-attributes-in-enumerator.patch | 41 +++++++++++++++++++ .../strongswan/strongswan_5.9.14.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/strongswan/libradius-Reject-undersized-attributes-in-enumerator.patch
meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/strongswan/libradius-Reject-undersized-attributes-in-enumerator.patch new file +41 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +From: =?utf-8?q?Lukas_Johannes_M=C3=B6ller?= <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2026 10:24:45 +0000 +Subject: libradius: Reject undersized attributes in enumerator +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +attribute_enumerate() accepts RADIUS attributes whose length byte is +smaller than sizeof(rattr_t) (2). For length == 0, the iterator never +advances and traps callers — including verify() — in a non-advancing +loop. For length == 1, misaligned packed-struct reads occur. + +Add a separate check for this->next->length < sizeof(rattr_t) after +the existing truncation guard. This mirrors radius_message_parse(), +which already distinguishes invalid length from truncation. + +Signed-off-by: Lukas Johannes Möller <[email protected]> + +Fixes: 4a6b84a93461 ("reintegrated eap-radius branch into trunk") +Fixes: CVE-2026-35333 + +CVE: CVE-2026-35333 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/strongswan/strongswan/commit/e067d24293953cff56011a1ea6989872bdd98fcd] +Signed-off-by: Nitin Wankhade <[email protected]> +=== +diff --git a/src/libradius/radius_message.c b/src/libradius/radius_message.c +index 8e2db0c..2bbbb48 100644 +--- a/src/libradius/radius_message.c ++++ b/src/libradius/radius_message.c +@@ -261,6 +261,11 @@ METHOD(enumerator_t, attribute_enumerate, bool, + DBG1(DBG_IKE, "RADIUS message truncated"); + return FALSE; + } ++ if (this->next->length < sizeof(rattr_t)) ++ { ++ DBG1(DBG_IKE, "RADIUS attribute has invalid length"); ++ return FALSE; ++ } + *type = this->next->type; + data->ptr = this->next->value; + data->len = this->next->length - sizeof(rattr_t);
meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/strongswan_5.9.14.bb +1 -0
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.strongswan.org/strongswan-${PV}.tar.bz2 \ file://libsimaka-Reject-zero-length-EAP-SIM-AKA-attributes.patch \ file://constraints-Case-insensitive-matching-and-reject-exc.patch \ file://tls-server-Only-accept-non-empty-ECDH-public-keys-wi.patch \ + file://libradius-Reject-undersized-attributes-in-enumerator.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "728027ddda4cb34c67c4cec97d3ddb8c274edfbabdaeecf7e74693b54fc33678"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1