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scsi: validate ADDITIONAL LENGTH alignment from READ KEYS

PATCH New Stefan Hajnoczi 1 participant 1 message Jun 11

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PATCH 1/1 scsi: validate ADDITIONAL LENGTH alignment from READ KEYS

A malicious host SCSI device could report a bogus ADDITIONAL LENGTH value, causing a memcmp() up to 7 bytes beyond the end of the heap buffer.

This does not seem to be a practical way to extract the contents of QEMU's memory since it only happens once per live migration and each migration destination is a new QEMU process. It doesn't hurt to protect against it though.

---
 hw/scsi/scsi-generic.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
hw/scsi/scsi-generic.c +7 -0
index 8999f3b720..fb4e3c0f85 100644
@@ -522,6 +522,13 @@ static bool scsi_generic_pr_key_registered(SCSIDevice *s, uint64_t key,
         memcpy(&additional_length, &buf[4], sizeof(additional_length));
         be32_to_cpus(&additional_length);
 
+        /* The reservation key list consists of 8-byte elements */
+        if (additional_length % sizeof(key_be)) {
+            error_setg(errp, "got misaligned ADDITIONAL LENGTH %" PRIu32
+                       " from READ KEYS", additional_length);
+            return false;
+        }
+
         /*
          * The parameter data's ADDITIONAL LENGTH must not overflow the CDB's
          * 16-bit ALLOCATION LENGTH field since the next loop iteration will
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0