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bitbake: Add basic landlock support

RFC PATCH In review David Nyström 4 participants 12 messages Jun 12 – Sep 11

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#0 lore raw

cover bitbake: Add basic landlock support

When current implementation runs in an unprivileged docker container, basic networking will be allowed by default in all steps, ignoring the network varflags intention.
Introduce support for landlock blocking of bind and connect, providing basic support for blocking TCP.
UDP is corrently beeing worked on upstream, but not yet supported.

Landlock requires PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent escape, which is also attempted, this prevents privilege escalation from child. devshell and related are already tagged with network varflag and can sudo at will.

syscall ABI is asm-generic, 5.13+ for all archs except alpha. On alpha, we leak 2 fd:s in the childs context before graceful exit, which is cleaned up at child termination.
Don't have an alpha target, so this is not tested, evaluated via static analysis only.

Landlock also provides a future possibility for filesystem limitations with the purpose of catching bugs, and preventing persistance of supply chain releated payloads. writes to f.ex. .bashrc and friends.

---
David Nyström (2):
utils: Add landlock_restrict_network function
bitbake-worker: Call landlock_restrict_network for tasks without network

 bin/bitbake-worker |  2 ++
 lib/bb/utils.py    | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+)

---
base-commit: a0158cc8d8f29233a9ade63a4c3ce2e939c4bf16
change-id: 20260611-landlock-621bc1a15305

Best regards,

Signature · 1 line
David Nyström <[email protected]>
#1 lore raw

RFC PATCH 1/1 1/2] utils: Add landlock_restrict_network function

Add landlock_restrict_network() which blocks TCP bind/connect using Landlock LSM (ABI v4+, kernel 6.7+). Designed to stack with the existing disable_network() namespace isolation, covering the case where disable_network() is skipped for non-local UIDs.

Gracefully returns False on older kernels (ABI < 4).

---
 lib/bb/utils.py | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)
lib/bb/utils.py +26 -0
index 181082c95..1347c29d0 100644
@@ -2054,6 +2054,32 @@ def disable_network(uid=None, gid=None):
     with open("/proc/self/gid_map", "w") as f:
         f.write("%s %s 1" % (gid, gid))
 
+def landlock_restrict_network():
+    """Block TCP bind/connect using Landlock LSM (ABI v4+, kernel 6.7+).
+    Gracefully skipped on older kernels. Stacks with disable_network()."""
+
+    NR_CREATE = 444  # landlock_create_ruleset
+    NR_SELF   = 446  # landlock_restrict_self
+    NET_TCP   = 0x3  # BIND_TCP | CONNECT_TCP
+
+    libc = ctypes.CDLL('libc.so.6')
+
+    abi = libc.syscall(NR_CREATE, 0, 0, 1)
+    if abi < 4:
+        return False
+
+    attr = struct.pack("QQ", 0, NET_TCP)
+    buf = ctypes.create_string_buffer(attr)
+    fd = libc.syscall(NR_CREATE, buf, len(attr), 0)
+    if fd < 0:
+        return False
+
+    libc.prctl(38, 1, 0, 0, 0)  # PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
+    r = libc.syscall(NR_SELF, fd, 0)
+    os.close(fd)
+    return r == 0
+
+
 def export_proxies(d):
     from bb.fetch2 import get_fetcher_environment
     """ export common proxies variables from datastore to environment """
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
#2 lore raw

Re: [bitbake-devel] [PATCH [RFC] 1/2] utils: Add landlock_restrict_network function

Quoted 14 lines · David Nyström via lists.openembedded.org
lib/bb/utils.py +14 -0
+def landlock_restrict_network():
+    """Block TCP bind/connect using Landlock LSM (ABI v4+, kernel 6.7+).
+    Gracefully skipped on older kernels. Stacks with disable_network()."""
+
+    NR_CREATE = 444  # landlock_create_ruleset
+    NR_SELF   = 446  # landlock_restrict_self
+    NET_TCP   = 0x3  # BIND_TCP | CONNECT_TCP
+
+    libc = ctypes.CDLL('libc.so.6')
+
+    abi = libc.syscall(NR_CREATE, 0, 0, 1)
+    if abi < 4:
+        return False
+

lib/bb/utils.py def disable_network(uid=None, gid=None): · line 2080

Quoted 10 lines
lib/bb/utils.py +10 -0
+    attr = struct.pack("QQ", 0, NET_TCP)
+    buf = ctypes.create_string_buffer(attr)
+    fd = libc.syscall(NR_CREATE, buf, len(attr), 0)
+    if fd < 0:
+        return False
+
+    libc.prctl(38, 1, 0, 0, 0)  # PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
+    r = libc.syscall(NR_SELF, fd, 0)
+    os.close(fd)
+    return r == 0

Far too many magic numbers. I would really want to do this with an API.

This also needs some kind of test, e.g. that the function indeed has the desired effect.

Alex

#3 lore raw

Re: [bitbake-devel] [PATCH [RFC] 1/2] utils: Add landlock_restrict_network function

Quoted 33 lines · Alexander Kanavin via lists.openembedded.org
Quoted 16 lines · David Nyström via lists.openembedded.org

+def landlock_restrict_network():
+    """Block TCP bind/connect using Landlock LSM (ABI v4+, kernel 6.7+).
+    Gracefully skipped on older kernels. Stacks with disable_network()."""

lib/bb/utils.py +11 -0
+
+    NR_CREATE = 444  # landlock_create_ruleset
+    NR_SELF   = 446  # landlock_restrict_self
+    NET_TCP   = 0x3  # BIND_TCP | CONNECT_TCP
+
+    libc = ctypes.CDLL('libc.so.6')
+
+    abi = libc.syscall(NR_CREATE, 0, 0, 1)
+    if abi < 4:
+        return False
+

lib/bb/utils.py def disable_network(uid=None, gid=None): · line 2080

Quoted 10 lines
lib/bb/utils.py +10 -0
+    attr = struct.pack("QQ", 0, NET_TCP)
+    buf = ctypes.create_string_buffer(attr)
+    fd = libc.syscall(NR_CREATE, buf, len(attr), 0)
+    if fd < 0:
+        return False
+
+    libc.prctl(38, 1, 0, 0, 0)  # PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
+    r = libc.syscall(NR_SELF, fd, 0)
+    os.close(fd)
+    return r == 0

Far too many magic numbers. I would really want to do this with an API.

Quoted 2 lines

This also needs some kind of test, e.g. that the function indeed has the desired effect.

Unfortunately, to use tech like this, we do end up needing to do something like that and utils.py already has quite a bit of it. The plus side is that the kernel is really good about maintaining these APIs so the numbers are unlikely to change.

I wouldn't take something like this unless there was a really good case for using it. Network isolation in more builds probably is a strong enough use case...

Cheers,

Richard

#4 lore raw

Re: [bitbake-devel] [PATCH [RFC] 1/2] utils: Add landlock_restrict_network function

In reply to David Nyström
Quoted 8 lines · David Nyström

Add landlock_restrict_network() which blocks TCP bind/connect using Landlock LSM (ABI v4+, kernel 6.7+). Designed to stack with the existing disable_network() namespace isolation, covering the case where disable_network() is skipped for non-local UIDs.

Gracefully returns False on older kernels (ABI < 4).

Hi David,

I think adding this is a good idea, but the code needs a few changes to ensure it is maintainable.

Quoted 9 lines
---
 lib/bb/utils.py | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)
lib/bb/utils.py +0 -0
index 181082c95..1347c29d0 100644

lib/bb/utils.py def disable_network(uid=None, gid=None): · line 2063

Quoted 10 lines
lib/bb/utils.py +7 -0
@@ -2054,6 +2054,32 @@ def disable_network(uid=None, gid=None):
     with open("/proc/self/gid_map", "w") as f:
         f.write("%s %s 1" % (gid, gid))
 
+def landlock_restrict_network():
+    """Block TCP bind/connect using Landlock LSM (ABI v4+, kernel 6.7+).
+    Gracefully skipped on older kernels. Stacks with disable_network()."""
+
+    NR_CREATE = 444  # landlock_create_ruleset
+    NR_SELF   = 446  # landlock_restrict_self
+    NET_TCP   = 0x3  # BIND_TCP | CONNECT_TCP

We should base these on the names used in the Linux kernel so it's easy to search for things and compare with example C code in the docs. So,

    NR_landlock_create_ruleset = 444
    NR_landlock_add_rule = 445

    LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP = 0x1
    LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP = 0x2

    LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION = 1

lib/bb/utils.py def disable_network(uid=None, gid=None): · line 2069

Quoted 6 lines
lib/bb/utils.py +6 -0
+
+    libc = ctypes.CDLL('libc.so.6')
+
+    abi = libc.syscall(NR_CREATE, 0, 0, 1)
+    if abi < 4:
+        return False

# Check that landlock is enabled and supports network access # restriction (added in ABI version 4)
abi = libc.syscall(NR_landlock_create_ruleset,
0, 0,
LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION)
if abi < 4:
logger.debug("System doesn't support disabling network via landlock") return False

That's a little more verbose, but much clearer.

lib/bb/utils.py def disable_network(uid=None, gid=None): · line 2075

Quoted 6 lines
lib/bb/utils.py +6 -0
+
+    attr = struct.pack("QQ", 0, NET_TCP)
+    buf = ctypes.create_string_buffer(attr)
+    fd = libc.syscall(NR_CREATE, buf, len(attr), 0)
+    if fd < 0:
+        return False

We probably also want a logger.debug() call to log the failure here as well.

lib/bb/utils.py def disable_network(uid=None, gid=None): · line 2077

Quoted 2 lines
lib/bb/utils.py +2 -0
+
+    libc.prctl(38, 1, 0, 0, 0)  # PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS

The commit message only describes use of landlock, not no_new_privs. We need constants for this call as well.

lib/bb/utils.py def disable_network(uid=None, gid=None): · line 2085

Quoted 8 lines
lib/bb/utils.py +5 -0
+    r = libc.syscall(NR_SELF, fd, 0)
+    os.close(fd)
+    return r == 0
+
+
 def export_proxies(d):
     from bb.fetch2 import get_fetcher_environment
     """ export common proxies variables from datastore to environment """

Thanks,

Signature · 1 line
Paul Barker
#5 lore raw

Re: [bitbake-devel] [PATCH [RFC] 1/2] utils: Add landlock_restrict_network function

Quoted 6 lines · Paul Barker
Quoted 5 lines · David Nyström

Add landlock_restrict_network() which blocks TCP bind/connect using Landlock LSM (ABI v4+, kernel 6.7+). Designed to stack with the existing disable_network() namespace isolation, covering the case where disable_network() is skipped for non-local UIDs.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Gracefully returns False on older kernels (ABI < 4).

Hi David,

I think adding this is a good idea, but the code needs a few changes to ensure it is maintainable.

Thanks for the review, and good comments.
My comments below.

Quoted 23 lines
Quoted 9 lines
---
 lib/bb/utils.py | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)
lib/bb/utils.py +0 -0
index 181082c95..1347c29d0 100644

lib/bb/utils.py def disable_network(uid=None, gid=None): · line 2063

Quoted 10 lines
lib/bb/utils.py +7 -0
@@ -2054,6 +2054,32 @@ def disable_network(uid=None, gid=None):
     with open("/proc/self/gid_map", "w") as f:
         f.write("%s %s 1" % (gid, gid))
 
+def landlock_restrict_network():
+    """Block TCP bind/connect using Landlock LSM (ABI v4+, kernel 6.7+).
+    Gracefully skipped on older kernels. Stacks with disable_network()."""
+
+    NR_CREATE = 444  # landlock_create_ruleset
+    NR_SELF   = 446  # landlock_restrict_self
+    NET_TCP   = 0x3  # BIND_TCP | CONNECT_TCP

We should base these on the names used in the Linux kernel so it's easy to search for things and compare with example C code in the docs. So,

Quoted 7 lines
   NR_landlock_create_ruleset = 444
   NR_landlock_add_rule = 445

   LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP = 0x1
   LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP = 0x2

   LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION = 1

+1.

Quoted 16 lines

lib/bb/utils.py def disable_network(uid=None, gid=None): · line 2069

Quoted 6 lines
lib/bb/utils.py +6 -0
+
+    libc = ctypes.CDLL('libc.so.6')
+
+    abi = libc.syscall(NR_CREATE, 0, 0, 1)
+    if abi < 4:
+        return False

# Check that landlock is enabled and supports network access

   # restriction (added in ABI version 4)
   abi = libc.syscall(NR_landlock_create_ruleset,
                      0, 0,
                      LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION)
   if abi < 4:
       logger.debug("System doesn't support disabling network via landlock")
       return False
Quoted 1 line

That's a litte more verbose, but much clearer.

Good point.

Quoted 7 lines

lib/bb/utils.py def disable_network(uid=None, gid=None): · line 2075

Quoted 6 lines
lib/bb/utils.py +6 -0
+
+    attr = struct.pack("QQ", 0, NET_TCP)
+    buf = ctypes.create_string_buffer(attr)
+    fd = libc.syscall(NR_CREATE, buf, len(attr), 0)
+    if fd < 0:
+        return False
Quoted 8 lines

We probably also want a logger.debug() call to log the failure here as well.

lib/bb/utils.py def disable_network(uid=None, gid=None): · line 2077

Quoted 2 lines
lib/bb/utils.py +2 -0
+
+    libc.prctl(38, 1, 0, 0, 0)  # PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS

The commit message only describes use of landlock, not no_new_privs. We need constants for this call as well.

Also a very good point, setuid/gid and setcap:ed binaries will silently run without privs, which should be documented also in the commit message.
This is a landlock requirement for unpriv use, and the main source of potential sideeffects I would expect from this approach.
Since there is no way do disable it, without setting the "network" flag on a failing task, I'd really want to gain more confidence about the potential sideeffects of no_new_privs on various edge cases before I send a non-RFC patch. Testing is ongoing with your comments addressed, but I will not be able to finish before my vacation starts(tomorrow). If considered urgent,
feel free to use idea only.

Quoted 16 lines

lib/bb/utils.py def disable_network(uid=None, gid=None): · line 2085

Quoted 8 lines
lib/bb/utils.py +5 -0
+    r = libc.syscall(NR_SELF, fd, 0)
+    os.close(fd)
+    return r == 0
+
+
 def export_proxies(d):
     from bb.fetch2 import get_fetcher_environment
     """ export common proxies variables from datastore to environment """

Thanks,

Signature · 1 line
Paul Barker
#6 lore raw

RFC PATCH 1/1 2/2] bitbake-worker: Call landlock_restrict_network for tasks without network

In reply to David Nyström

Call bb.utils.landlock_restrict_network() for tasks without the 'network' varflag. This to support basic network restrictions in unprivileged docker containers.

---
 bin/bitbake-worker | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
bin/bitbake-worker +2 -0
index aa14ef191..5f3fd9933 100755
@@ -287,6 +287,8 @@ def fork_off_task(cfg, data, databuilder, workerdata, extraconfigdata, runtask):
                         bb.utils.disable_network(uid, gid)
                     else:
                         logger.debug("Skipping disable network for %s since %s is not a local uid." % (taskname, uid))
+                    if not bb.utils.landlock_restrict_network():
+                        logger.debug("Skipping Landlock network restriction for %s since kernel lacks ABI v4+ support." % taskname)
 
                 # exported_vars() returns a generator which *cannot* be passed to os.environ.update() 
                 # successfully. We also need to unset anything from the environment which shouldn't be there 
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
#7 lore raw

Re: [bitbake-devel] [PATCH [RFC] 2/2] bitbake-worker: Call landlock_restrict_network for tasks without network

Quoted 14 lines · David Nyström

Call bb.utils.landlock_restrict_network() for tasks without the 'network' varflag. This to support basic network restrictions in unprivileged docker containers.

---
 bin/bitbake-worker | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
bin/bitbake-worker +0 -0
index aa14ef191..5f3fd9933 100755

bin/bitbake-worker def fork_off_task(cfg, data, databuilder, workerdata, extraconfigdata, runtask): · line 291

Quoted 5 lines
bin/bitbake-worker +2 -0
@@ -287,6 +287,8 @@ def fork_off_task(cfg, data, databuilder, workerdata, extraconfigdata, runtask):
                         bb.utils.disable_network(uid, gid)
                     else:
                         logger.debug("Skipping disable network for %s since %s is not a local uid." % (taskname, uid))
+                    if not bb.utils.landlock_restrict_network():
+                        logger.debug("Skipping Landlock network restriction for %s since kernel lacks ABI v4+ support." % taskname)

In disable_network, the logger.debug() calls for failure are handled within the function instead of by the caller. We should do the same for landlock_restrict_network() as suggested in my reply to patch 1/2 and drop the debug print from here.

bin/bitbake-worker def fork_off_task(cfg, data, databuilder, workerdata, extraconfigdata, runtask): · line 294

Quoted 3 lines
bin/bitbake-worker +0 -0
                 # exported_vars() returns a generator which *cannot* be passed to os.environ.update() 
                 # successfully. We also need to unset anything from the environment which shouldn't be there 

Best regards,

Signature · 1 line
Paul Barker
#8 lore raw
In reply to David Nyström

Hi David,

Quoted 24 lines · David Nyström via lists.openembedded.org

When current implementation runs in an unprivileged docker container, basic networking will be allowed by default in all steps, ignoring the network varflags intention.
Introduce support for landlock blocking of bind and connect, providing basic support for blocking TCP.
UDP is corrently beeing worked on upstream, but not yet supported.

Landlock requires PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent escape, which is also attempted, this prevents privilege escalation from child. devshell and related are already tagged with network varflag and can sudo at will.

syscall ABI is asm-generic, 5.13+ for all archs except alpha. On alpha, we leak 2 fd:s in the childs context before graceful exit, which is cleaned up at child termination.
Don't have an alpha target, so this is not tested, evaluated via static analysis only.

Landlock also provides a future possibility for filesystem limitations with the purpose of catching bugs, and preventing persistance of supply chain releated payloads. writes to f.ex. .bashrc and friends.

Quoted 8 lines

---
David Nyström (2):
      utils: Add landlock_restrict_network function
      bitbake-worker: Call landlock_restrict_network for tasks without network

 bin/bitbake-worker |  2 ++
 lib/bb/utils.py    | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++

 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+)

I think this has generally has positive comments, we just need to take Paul's review comments into account about the magic numbers. Would you be able to send a version with those tweaks?

Thanks,

Richard

#9 lore raw
Quoted 32 lines · Richard Purdie

Hi David,

Quoted 29 lines · David Nyström via lists.openembedded.org

When current implementation runs in an unprivileged docker container, basic networking will be allowed by default in all steps, ignoring the network varflags intention.
Introduce support for landlock blocking of bind and connect, providing basic support for blocking TCP.
UDP is corrently beeing worked on upstream, but not yet supported.

Landlock requires PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent escape, which is also attempted, this prevents privilege escalation from child. devshell and related are already tagged with network varflag and can sudo at will.

syscall ABI is asm-generic, 5.13+ for all archs except alpha. On alpha, we leak 2 fd:s in the childs context before graceful exit, which is cleaned up at child termination.
Don't have an alpha target, so this is not tested, evaluated via static analysis only.

Landlock also provides a future possibility for filesystem limitations with the purpose of catching bugs, and preventing persistance of supply chain releated payloads. writes to f.ex. .bashrc and friends.

---
David Nyström (2):
      utils: Add landlock_restrict_network function
      bitbake-worker: Call landlock_restrict_network for tasks without network

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

 bin/bitbake-worker |  2 ++
 lib/bb/utils.py    | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++

 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+)

I think this has generally has positive comments, we just need to take Paul's review comments into account about the magic numbers. Would you be able to send a version with those tweaks?

Yes, thanks for the review, and sorry for the late reply. Will reroll with comments.

Quoted 4 lines

Thanks,

Richard

#10 lore raw

Hi David,

Quoted 35 lines · David Nyström
Quoted 34 lines · Richard Purdie
Quoted 32 lines · David Nyström via lists.openembedded.org

When current implementation runs in an unprivileged docker container, basic networking will be allowed by default in all steps, ignoring the network varflags intention.
Introduce support for landlock blocking of bind and connect, providing basic support for blocking TCP.
UDP is corrently beeing worked on upstream, but not yet supported.

Landlock requires PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent escape, which is also attempted, this prevents privilege escalation from child. devshell and related are already tagged with network varflag and can sudo at will.

syscall ABI is asm-generic, 5.13+ for all archs except alpha. On alpha, we leak 2 fd:s in the childs context before graceful exit, which is cleaned up at child termination.
Don't have an alpha target, so this is not tested, evaluated via static analysis only.

Landlock also provides a future possibility for filesystem limitations with the purpose of catching bugs, and preventing persistance of supply chain releated payloads. writes to f.ex. .bashrc and friends.

---
David Nyström (2):
      utils: Add landlock_restrict_network function
      bitbake-worker: Call landlock_restrict_network for tasks without network

 bin/bitbake-worker |  2 ++
 lib/bb/utils.py    | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++

 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines

I think this has generally has positive comments, we just need to take Paul's review comments into account about the magic numbers. Would you be able to send a version with those tweaks?

Yes, thanks for the review, and sorry for the late reply. Will reroll with comments.

These still are in the queue and desired, do you think you'll get a chance to look at them?

Cheers,

Richard

#11 lore raw
Quoted 42 lines · Richard Purdie

Hi David,

Quoted 39 lines · David Nyström
Quoted 37 lines · Richard Purdie
Quoted 24 lines · David Nyström via lists.openembedded.org

When current implementation runs in an unprivileged docker container, basic networking will be allowed by default in all steps, ignoring the network varflags intention.
Introduce support for landlock blocking of bind and connect, providing basic support for blocking TCP.
UDP is corrently beeing worked on upstream, but not yet supported.

Landlock requires PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent escape, which is also attempted, this prevents privilege escalation from child. devshell and related are already tagged with network varflag and can sudo at will.

syscall ABI is asm-generic, 5.13+ for all archs except alpha. On alpha, we leak 2 fd:s in the childs context before graceful exit, which is cleaned up at child termination.
Don't have an alpha target, so this is not tested, evaluated via static analysis only.

Landlock also provides a future possibility for filesystem limitations with the purpose of catching bugs, and preventing persistance of supply chain releated payloads. writes to f.ex. .bashrc and friends.

Quoted 8 lines

---
David Nyström (2):
      utils: Add landlock_restrict_network function
      bitbake-worker: Call landlock_restrict_network for tasks without network

 bin/bitbake-worker |  2 ++
 lib/bb/utils.py    | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++

 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+)

I think this has generally has positive comments, we just need to take Paul's review comments into account about the magic numbers. Would you be able to send a version with those tweaks?

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Yes, thanks for the review, and sorry for the late reply. Will reroll with comments.

These still are in the queue and desired, do you think you'll get a chance to look at them?

I did a v2, but have been hesitating to send a non-RFC, since the test-scope for this is bit overwhelming.

This due to the change of default task behaviour in regards
to no_new_privs. I'm not too worried at about
LSMs running beeing parent to bitbake, but there will likely be unintended fallout for sublayer tasks, where I've managed to test only a tiny subset of them.

Problematic tasks can of course be flagged with "network", to avoid no_new_privs, but that seems a bit wrong, but I failed to find a better solution. f.ex. The only reason the tap setup still works for do_testimage is due to its "network" tag.

Adding Bruce to CC, since I found some fusermount usage in vrunner(meta-virtualization) when probing through sub-layers, which usually is setcap:ed. There are likely other cases downstream.

Whats scope was tested during its time in master-next ?

Quoted 4 lines

Cheers,

Richard