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staging: vme_user: fix heap OOB in buffer_from_user and buffer_to_user

PATCH In review Michael Tautschnig 2 participants 4 messages Jun 14 – Jun 18

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 staging: vme_user: fix heap OOB in buffer_from_user and buffer_to_user

The SLAVE-path read/write helpers buffer_to_user() and buffer_from_user() copy 'count' bytes into/out of the fixed-size kern_buf (PCI_BUF_SIZE = 0x20000 = 128 KiB) without bounding count against size_buf.

The caller vme_user_write()/vme_user_read() only clamps count to the VME window size (image_size = vme_get_size(resource)), which VME_SET_SLAVE sets from user-supplied slave.size — validated against the VME address space (up to VME_A32_MAX = 4 GiB), NOT against PCI_BUF_SIZE. When the window exceeds 128 KiB, a write()/read() copies past the kern_buf allocation.

Fix by clamping count against size_buf in both buffer_from_user() and buffer_to_user(), with an early return when *ppos >= size_buf. This mirrors the existing bounds check in resource_from_user() (the MASTER-path helper).

The bug was found by static analysis (CodeQL taint tracking + CBMC bounded model checking) and dynamically confirmed under KASAN with the vme_fake bridge:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80
  Write of size 262144 at addr ffff888004100000 by task trigger/68
    _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80
    vme_user_write+0x13e/0x240 [vme_user]
    vfs_write+0x1b8/0x7a0
    ksys_write+0xb8/0x150
---
 drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_user.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_user.c +18 -0
index 5829a4141..bacf6a7d6 100644
@@ -156,6 +156,15 @@ static ssize_t buffer_to_user(unsigned int minor, char __user *buf,
 {
 	void *image_ptr;
 
+	/* Clamp to the fixed kern_buf (size_buf): the VME window
+	 * (image_size) may exceed PCI_BUF_SIZE, so *ppos + count can
+	 * run past kern_buf otherwise.
+	 */
+	if (*ppos >= image[minor].size_buf)
+		return 0;
+	if (count > image[minor].size_buf - *ppos)
+		count = image[minor].size_buf - *ppos;
+
 	image_ptr = image[minor].kern_buf + *ppos;
 	if (copy_to_user(buf, image_ptr, (unsigned long)count))
 		return -EFAULT;
@@ -168,6 +177,15 @@ static ssize_t buffer_from_user(unsigned int minor, const char __user *buf,
 {
 	void *image_ptr;
 
+	/* Clamp to the fixed kern_buf (size_buf): the VME window
+	 * (image_size) may exceed PCI_BUF_SIZE, so *ppos + count can
+	 * run past kern_buf otherwise.
+	 */
+	if (*ppos >= image[minor].size_buf)
+		return 0;
+	if (count > image[minor].size_buf - *ppos)
+		count = image[minor].size_buf - *ppos;
+
 	image_ptr = image[minor].kern_buf + *ppos;
 	if (copy_from_user(image_ptr, buf, (unsigned long)count))
 		return -EFAULT;
Signature · 10 lines
2.43.0


Amazon Development Center Austria GmbH
Brueckenkopfgasse 1
8020 Graz
Oesterreich
Sitz in Graz
Firmenbuchnummer: FN 439453 f
Firmenbuchgericht: Landesgericht fuer Zivilrechtssachen Graz
#1 lore raw
Quoted 28 lines · Michael Tautschnig

The SLAVE-path read/write helpers buffer_to_user() and buffer_from_user() copy 'count' bytes into/out of the fixed-size kern_buf (PCI_BUF_SIZE = 0x20000 = 128 KiB) without bounding count against size_buf.

The caller vme_user_write()/vme_user_read() only clamps count to the VME window size (image_size = vme_get_size(resource)), which VME_SET_SLAVE sets from user-supplied slave.size — validated against the VME address space (up to VME_A32_MAX = 4 GiB), NOT against PCI_BUF_SIZE. When the window exceeds 128 KiB, a write()/read() copies past the kern_buf allocation.

Fix by clamping count against size_buf in both buffer_from_user() and buffer_to_user(), with an early return when *ppos >= size_buf. This mirrors the existing bounds check in resource_from_user() (the MASTER-path helper).

The bug was found by static analysis (CodeQL taint tracking + CBMC bounded model checking) and dynamically confirmed under KASAN with the vme_fake bridge:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80
  Write of size 262144 at addr ffff888004100000 by task trigger/68
    _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80
    vme_user_write+0x13e/0x240 [vme_user]
    vfs_write+0x1b8/0x7a0
    ksys_write+0xb8/0x150
Quoted 5 lines
---
 drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_user.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)

Nice, but why did you not use get_maintainers.pl to determine who to send this to? You cut out the staging list?

drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_user.c static ssize_t buffer_to_user(unsigned int minor, char __user *buf, · line 162

Quoted 13 lines
drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_user.c +4 -0
index 5829a4141..bacf6a7d6 100644
@@ -156,6 +156,15 @@ static ssize_t buffer_to_user(unsigned int minor, char __user *buf,
 {
 	void *image_ptr;
 
+	/* Clamp to the fixed kern_buf (size_buf): the VME window
+	 * (image_size) may exceed PCI_BUF_SIZE, so *ppos + count can
+	 * run past kern_buf otherwise.
+	 */

Not a network driver, so you can use normal coding style for comments.

drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_user.c static ssize_t buffer_to_user(unsigned int minor, char __user *buf, · line 164

Quoted 2 lines
drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_user.c +2 -0
+	if (*ppos >= image[minor].size_buf)
+		return 0;

No error?

drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_user.c static ssize_t buffer_to_user(unsigned int minor, char __user *buf, · line 166

Quoted 2 lines
drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_user.c +2 -0
+	if (count > image[minor].size_buf - *ppos)
+		count = image[minor].size_buf - *ppos;

Why are you covering up for userspace errors, shouldn't this just fail?

Quoted 5 lines
drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_user.c +1 -0
+
 	image_ptr = image[minor].kern_buf + *ppos;
 	if (copy_to_user(buf, image_ptr, (unsigned long)count))
 		return -EFAULT;

drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_user.c static ssize_t buffer_from_user(unsigned int minor, const char __user *buf, · line 185

Quoted 9 lines
drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_user.c +6 -0
@@ -168,6 +177,15 @@ static ssize_t buffer_from_user(unsigned int minor, const char __user *buf,
 {
 	void *image_ptr;
 
+	/* Clamp to the fixed kern_buf (size_buf): the VME window
+	 * (image_size) may exceed PCI_BUF_SIZE, so *ppos + count can
+	 * run past kern_buf otherwise.
+	 */
+	if (*ppos >= image[minor].size_buf)
+		return 0;

Again, why not return an error?

drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_user.c static ssize_t buffer_from_user(unsigned int minor, const char __user *buf, · line 187

Quoted 2 lines
drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_user.c +2 -0
+	if (count > image[minor].size_buf - *ppos)
+		count = image[minor].size_buf - *ppos;

Same here, shouldn't this fail?

And no chance for this to wrap again, right?

thanks,

greg k-h

#2 lore raw
Quoted 2 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

Nice, but why did you not use get_maintainers.pl to determine who to send this to? You cut out the staging list?

My fault -- v1 went only to you and stable@. v2 is Cc'd to [email protected] and [email protected] per scripts/get_maintainer.pl (VME is S: Orphan, so that's the full set).

Quoted 6 lines

drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_user.c static ssize_t buffer_to_user(unsigned int minor, char __user *buf, · line 162

Quoted 4 lines
drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_user.c +4 -0
+	/* Clamp to the fixed kern_buf (size_buf): the VME window
+	 * (image_size) may exceed PCI_BUF_SIZE, so *ppos + count can
+	 * run past kern_buf otherwise.
+	 */

Not a network driver, so you can use normal coding style for comments.

Fixed in v2 -- switched to the normal (non-networking) multi-line comment style.

Quoted 4 lines

Review

Quoted 2 lines
(quoted diff) +2 -0
+	if (*ppos >= image[minor].size_buf)
+		return 0;

No error?

[...]

Quoted 1 line

Again, why not return an error?

This is the end-of-buffer case, and returning 0 matches what the driver already does: vme_user_read()/vme_user_write() already "return 0" when *ppos > image_size - 1. A 0-byte return at/after the end of the buffer is the normal read(2)/write(2) convention (EOF for read; for write it mirrors the driver's existing behaviour). Returning an error here would make the SLAVE path diverge from both the existing *ppos check two lines up and the MASTER path, which seemed wrong for a Cc: stable fix.

Quoted 4 lines

Review

Quoted 2 lines
(quoted diff) +2 -0
+	if (count > image[minor].size_buf - *ppos)
+		count = image[minor].size_buf - *ppos;

Why are you covering up for userspace errors, shouldn't this just fail?

[...]

Quoted 1 line

Same here, shouldn't this fail?

The clamp mirrors behaviour that already exists in this driver rather than inventing new policy: vme_user_read()/vme_user_write() already clamp count to image_size - *ppos (a short transfer), and the MASTER-path resource_to_user()/resource_from_user() already clamp count to size_buf. A short transfer is standard read/write semantics -- userspace is expected to loop -- so the SLAVE path was simply missing the size_buf bound that MASTER already has; it clamped to the VME window (image_size, up to 4 GiB from the user-set slave.size) instead of the fixed 128 KiB kern_buf. v2 keeps the established short-transfer contract and just fixes the bound.

That said, you're the maintainer: if you'd rather an over-large request fail outright (e.g. -EFBIG / -ENOSPC) I'm happy to send that, but I'd do it as a separate, clearly-marked behaviour change rather than fold it into the stable fix.

Quoted 1 line

And no chance for this to wrap again, right?

No wrap in the added code: the caller already rejects *ppos < 0, and the early "if (*ppos >= size_buf) return 0;" means 0 <= *ppos < size_buf at the subtraction, so "size_buf - *ppos" is a positive u64 and the "count > size_buf - *ppos" comparison can't overflow.

It also tightens a pre-existing wrap: the caller's
"if (*ppos + count > image_size)" adds loff_t + size_t and can overflow for a huge count; the new "count > size_buf - *ppos" re-bounds count regardless, so the copy stays within kern_buf even if that earlier clamp is bypassed.

v2 also adds Fixes: f00a86d98a1e ("Staging: vme: add VME userspace driver") and keeps the KASAN reproducer in the changelog.

Thanks,
Michael

Amazon Development Center Austria GmbH Brueckenkopfgasse 1
8020 Graz
Oesterreich
Sitz in Graz
Firmenbuchnummer: FN 439453 f
Firmenbuchgericht: Landesgericht fuer Zivilrechtssachen Graz

#3 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 staging: vme_user: bound slave read/write to the kern_buf size

In reply to Michael Tautschnig

The SLAVE-path helpers buffer_to_user() and buffer_from_user() copy 'count' bytes into/out of the fixed-size kern_buf (size_buf == PCI_BUF_SIZE == 0x20000, 128 KiB) using *ppos as the offset, without bounding *ppos + count against size_buf.

vme_user_write()/vme_user_read() only clamp count to the VME window size (image_size = vme_get_size(resource)), which VME_SET_SLAVE sets from the user-supplied slave.size -- validated against the VME address space (up to VME_A32_MAX = 4 GiB), not against PCI_BUF_SIZE. When the window exceeds 128 KiB, a write()/read() copies past the kern_buf allocation.

Clamp count against size_buf in both helpers, with an early return when *ppos is already at/after the buffer end. *ppos is >= 0 here (the caller rejects negative offsets), so size_buf - *ppos cannot wrap. This mirrors the existing clamp in the MASTER-path helpers resource_to_user() / resource_from_user(), and matches the read()/write() convention of a short transfer at end-of-buffer.

Found by static analysis (CodeQL taint tracking + CBMC bounded model checking) and confirmed dynamically under KASAN with the vme_fake bridge:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80
  Write of size 262144 at addr ffff888004100000 by task trigger/68
    _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80
    vme_user_write+0x13e/0x240 [vme_user]
    vfs_write+0x1b8/0x7a0
    ksys_write+0xb8/0x150
Fixes f00a86d98a1e ("Staging: vme: add VME userspace driver")

---
v1 -> v2:
- Cc the staging list and LKML per get_maintainer.pl (v1 reached only Greg KH).
- Switch the added comment to normal (non-networking) kernel style.
- Keep the clamp + early return: this matches the read()/write() short-transfer / EOF convention already used by vme_user_read() / vme_user_write() (which clamp count and return 0 past the window) and by the MASTER-path resource_*() helpers (which clamp count to size_buf). Documented that *ppos >= 0 here, so the subtraction is wrap-free.

Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

 drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_user.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_user.c +22 -0
index 11e25c2f6b0a..a472a38ef613 100644
@@ -156,6 +156,17 @@ static ssize_t buffer_to_user(unsigned int minor, char __user *buf,
 {
 	void *image_ptr;
 
+	/*
+	 * The slave window (image_size) can exceed the fixed kern_buf
+	 * (size_buf == PCI_BUF_SIZE), so bound the copy to kern_buf.
+	 * *ppos is >= 0 here (checked by the caller), so the
+	 * subtraction below cannot wrap.
+	 */
+	if (*ppos >= image[minor].size_buf)
+		return 0;
+	if (count > image[minor].size_buf - *ppos)
+		count = image[minor].size_buf - *ppos;
+
 	image_ptr = image[minor].kern_buf + *ppos;
 	if (copy_to_user(buf, image_ptr, (unsigned long)count))
 		return -EFAULT;
@@ -168,6 +179,17 @@ static ssize_t buffer_from_user(unsigned int minor, const char __user *buf,
 {
 	void *image_ptr;
 
+	/*
+	 * The slave window (image_size) can exceed the fixed kern_buf
+	 * (size_buf == PCI_BUF_SIZE), so bound the copy to kern_buf.
+	 * *ppos is >= 0 here (checked by the caller), so the
+	 * subtraction below cannot wrap.
+	 */
+	if (*ppos >= image[minor].size_buf)
+		return 0;
+	if (count > image[minor].size_buf - *ppos)
+		count = image[minor].size_buf - *ppos;
+
 	image_ptr = image[minor].kern_buf + *ppos;
 	if (copy_from_user(image_ptr, buf, (unsigned long)count))
 		return -EFAULT;
Signature · 11 lines
2.34.1



Amazon Development Center Austria GmbH
Brueckenkopfgasse 1
8020 Graz
Oesterreich
Sitz in Graz
Firmenbuchnummer: FN 439453 f
Firmenbuchgericht: Landesgericht fuer Zivilrechtssachen Graz