perf tools: Fix pre-existing bugs in machine, cs-etm, c2c, bpf, and dso
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
maintainerv2 cover perf tools: Fix pre-existing bugs in machine, cs-etm, c2c, bpf, and dso
Hi,
Nine more pre-existing bugs found by sashiko-bot during AI-assisted code review. All are independent of the perf-data-validation hardening series — they are latent bugs in surrounding code exposed during review.
The fixes are grouped by subsystem:
machine__init() error propagation (patches 1-2):
machine__init() always returns 0 on allocation failure because the error code is never propagated through the return statement. Callers (including machines__init() and __machine__new_host()) proceed with a partially initialized machine struct. The error cleanup also uses zfree() on refcounted kmaps instead of maps__zput(). Additionally, machines__findnew() and get_kernel_version() use sprintf() with unsanitized guestmount paths that can overflow PATH_MAX stack buffers.
CoreSight ETM metadata validation (patches 3-5):
cs_etm__process_auxtrace_info_full() reads num_cpu from untrusted perf.data and uses it directly in a multiplication that can overflow to zero on 32-bit, producing a zero-sized allocation followed by OOB writes. The minimum size check in cs_etm__process_auxtrace_info() doesn't cover the global header fields actually accessed. cs_etm__get_queue() indexes queue_array[] without bounds checking the CPU value from untrusted trace payload, and several queue iteration loops dereference .priv without NULL checks after array growth zero-initializes new entries.
c2c hist entry leaks (patches 6-7):
When c2c_hists__init() fails, dynamically allocated format structures are leaked because the error path frees the container without unregistering them. During resort merges, c2c_he_free() only walks the output-sorted tree (empty before resort), leaking all inner hist_entry objects from entries_in_array[] and entries_collapsed.
BPF prog info pointer validation (patch 8):
Several functions cast bpf_prog_info u64 fields to pointers without checking whether bpil_offs_to_addr() actually converted the file offsets. A crafted perf.data with PERF_BPIL_* bits unset but non-zero counts causes raw file offsets to be dereferenced as pointers.
DSO decompression errno (patch 9):
dso__get_filename() sets errno to a negative custom DSO_LOAD_ERRNO value on decompression failure. __open_dso() computes fd = -errno, producing a large positive value that looks like a valid fd, causing close_data_fd() to close an unrelated file descriptor.
Build-tested with gcc and clang. Passes perf test on x86_64.
Changes in v2 (patch 1 only):
- Move dsos__init()/threads__init() before maps__new() so that machine__exit() is safe to call when machine__init() fails at the first allocation (sashiko-bot).
- Propagate machines__init() error in aslr_tool__init(), which was added by the ASLR patches after v1 was written (sashiko-bot).
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo (9):
perf machine: Propagate machine__init() error to callers perf machine: Use snprintf() for guestmount path construction perf cs-etm: Validate num_cpu before metadata allocation perf cs-etm: Require full global header in auxtrace_info size check perf cs-etm: Bounds-check CPU in cs_etm__get_queue()
perf c2c: Free format list entries when c2c_hists__init() fails perf c2c: Fix hist entry and format list leaks in c2c_he_free() perf bpf: Validate array presence before casting BPF prog info pointers perf dso: Set standard errno on decompression failure
tools/perf/builtin-c2c.c | 3 ++- tools/perf/tests/hists_cumulate.c | 3 ++- tools/perf/tests/hists_filter.c | 3 ++- tools/perf/tests/hists_link.c | 3 ++- tools/perf/tests/hists_output.c | 3 ++- tools/perf/tests/thread-maps-share.c | 2 +- tools/perf/util/aslr.c | 12 +++++++++--- tools/perf/util/bpf-event.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++--- tools/perf/util/bpf-event.h | 4 ++-- tools/perf/util/cs-etm-base.c | 4 +++- tools/perf/util/cs-etm.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- tools/perf/util/dso.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++- tools/perf/util/header.c | 3 +-- tools/perf/util/hist.c | 2 +- tools/perf/util/hist.h | 1 + tools/perf/util/machine.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++-------------- tools/perf/util/machine.h | 2 +- tools/perf/util/session.c | 4 +++- 18 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
Developed with AI assistance (Claude/sashiko), tagged in commits.
Thanks,
- Arnaldo
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
maintainerPATCH v2 1/9 perf machine: Propagate machine__init() error to callers
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
machine__init() always returns 0 even when memory allocation fails, because commit 81f981d7ec43ed93 ("perf machine: Free root_dir in machine__init() error path") introduced 'int err = -ENOMEM' and an error cleanup path but left the final 'return 0' instead of 'return err'.
Fix by returning err, check the return value in __machine__new_host() which was ignoring it, and change machines__init() from void to int so it too can propagate the error to perf_session__new(), aslr_tool__init() and test callers.
The error cleanup also used zfree(&machine->kmaps), but kmaps is a refcounted maps structure — use maps__zput() to properly drop the reference, matching machine__exit().
Move dsos__init() and threads__init() before the first fallible allocation (maps__new) so that machine__exit() is safe to call on any machine struct that machine__init() touched, even on early failure.
--- tools/perf/tests/hists_cumulate.c | 3 ++- tools/perf/tests/hists_filter.c | 3 ++- tools/perf/tests/hists_link.c | 3 ++- tools/perf/tests/hists_output.c | 3 ++- tools/perf/tests/thread-maps-share.c | 2 +- tools/perf/util/aslr.c | 12 +++++++++--- tools/perf/util/machine.c | 24 ++++++++++++++---------- tools/perf/util/machine.h | 2 +- tools/perf/util/session.c | 4 +++- 9 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
tools/perf/tests/hists_cumulate.c +2 -1
@@ -723,7 +723,8 @@ static int test__hists_cumulate(struct test_suite *test __maybe_unused, int subt goto out; err =TEST_FAIL ; -machines__init (&machines); +if (machines__init (&machines)) + goto out;/* setup threads/dso/map/symbols also */ machine =setup_fake_machine (&machines);
tools/perf/tests/hists_filter.c +2 -1
@@ -131,7 +131,8 @@ static int test__hists_filter(struct test_suite *test __maybe_unused, int subtes goto out; err =TEST_FAIL ; -machines__init (&machines); +if (machines__init (&machines)) + goto out;/* setup threads/dso/map/symbols also */ machine =setup_fake_machine (&machines);
tools/perf/tests/hists_link.c +2 -1
@@ -303,7 +303,8 @@ static int test__hists_link(struct test_suite *test __maybe_unused, int subtest goto out; err =TEST_FAIL ; -machines__init (&machines); +if (machines__init (&machines)) + goto out;/* setup threads/dso/map/symbols also */ machine =setup_fake_machine (&machines);
tools/perf/tests/hists_output.c +2 -1
@@ -610,7 +610,8 @@ static int test__hists_output(struct test_suite *test __maybe_unused, int subtes goto out; err =TEST_FAIL ; -machines__init (&machines); +if (machines__init (&machines)) + goto out;/* setup threads/dso/map/symbols also */ machine =setup_fake_machine (&machines);
tools/perf/tests/thread-maps-share.c +1 -1
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static int test__thread_maps_share(struct test_suite *test __maybe_unused, int s* other group (pid: 4, tids: 4, 5) */ -machines__init (&machines); +TEST_ASSERT_VAL ("failed to init machines" ,machines__init (&machines) ==0 ); machine = &machines.host;/* create process with 4 threads */
tools/perf/util/aslr.c +9 -3
@@ -1237,12 +1237,13 @@ void aslr_tool__strip_attr_event(union perf_event *event, struct evlist *evlist) } } -static void aslr_tool__init (struct aslr_tool *aslr,struct perf_tool *delegate) +static int aslr_tool__init (struct aslr_tool *aslr,struct perf_tool *delegate) {delegate_tool__init (&aslr->tool, delegate); aslr->tool.tool.ordered_events = true; -machines__init (&aslr->machines); +if (machines__init (&aslr->machines)) +return -ENOMEM ; hashmap__init(&aslr->remap_addresses, remap_addresses__hash, remap_addresses__equal,
@@ -1276,6 +1277,8 @@ static void aslr_tool__init(struct aslr_tool *aslr, struct perf_tool *delegate) aslr->tool.tool.auxtrace = aslr_tool__process_auxtrace; aslr->tool.tool.auxtrace_info = aslr_tool__process_auxtrace_info; aslr->tool.tool.auxtrace_error = aslr_tool__process_auxtrace_error; + +return 0 ; }struct perf_tool *aslr_tool__new (struct perf_tool *delegate)
@@ -1285,7 +1288,10 @@ struct perf_tool *aslr_tool__new(struct perf_tool *delegate)if (!aslr)return NULL ; -aslr_tool__init (aslr, delegate); +if (aslr_tool__init (aslr, delegate)) { +free (aslr); +return NULL ; + }return &aslr->tool.tool; }
tools/perf/util/machine.c +14 -10
@@ -79,15 +79,14 @@ int machine__init(struct machine *machine, const char *root_dir, pid_t pid)int err = -ENOMEM ;memset (machine,0 ,sizeof (*machine)); - machine->kmaps =maps__new (machine); -if (machine->kmaps ==NULL ) -return -ENOMEM ; -RB_CLEAR_NODE (&machine->rb_node);dsos__init (&machine->dsos); -threads__init (&machine->threads); + machine->kmaps =maps__new (machine); +if (machine->kmaps ==NULL ) + goto out; + machine->vdso_info =NULL ; machine->env =NULL ;
@@ -124,11 +123,11 @@ int machine__init(struct machine *machine, const char *root_dir, pid_t pid) out:if (err) { -zfree (&machine->kmaps); +maps__zput (machine->kmaps);zfree (&machine->root_dir);zfree (&machine->mmap_name); } -return 0 ; +return err; }static struct machine *__machine__new_host (struct perf_env *host_env,bool kernel_maps)
@@ -138,7 +137,10 @@ static struct machine *__machine__new_host(struct perf_env *host_env, bool kerneif (!machine)return NULL ; -machine__init (machine,"" ,HOST_KERNEL_ID ); +if (machine__init (machine,"" ,HOST_KERNEL_ID ) !=0 ) { +free (machine); +return NULL ; + }if (kernel_maps &&machine__create_kernel_maps (machine) <0 ) {free (machine);
@@ -231,10 +233,12 @@ void machine__delete(struct machine *machine) } } -void machines__init (struct machines *machines) +int machines__init (struct machines *machines) { -machine__init (&machines->host,"" ,HOST_KERNEL_ID ); +int err =machine__init (&machines->host,"" ,HOST_KERNEL_ID ); + machines->guests =RB_ROOT_CACHED ; +return err; }void machines__exit (struct machines *machines)
tools/perf/util/machine.h +1 -1
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ struct machines {struct rb_root_cached guests; }; -void machines__init (struct machines *machines); +int machines__init (struct machines *machines);void machines__exit (struct machines *machines); void machines__process_guests(struct machines *machines,
tools/perf/util/session.c +3 -1
@@ -160,7 +160,9 @@ struct perf_session *__perf_session__new(struct perf_data *data, session->decomp_data.zstd_decomp = &session->zstd_data; session->active_decomp = &session->decomp_data;INIT_LIST_HEAD (&session->auxtrace_index); -machines__init (&session->machines); +if (machines__init (&session->machines)) + goto out_delete; +ordered_events__init (&session->ordered_events, ordered_events__deliver_event,NULL );
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH 1/9] perf machine: Propagate machine__init() error to callers
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider: - [Medium] Calling `perf_session__delete()` on early failure before `perf_env__init()` is called attempts…
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Medium] Calling perf_session__delete() on early failure before perf_env__init() is called attempts to lock and destroy uninitialized mutexes and rw_semaphores. --
commit 0e04858ad5c2ebb0c7b3cfa94d694fd312c0bd25
Author: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
perf machine: Propagate machine__init() error to callers
This commit updates machine__init() to return an error code upon failure instead of 0. It modifies callers like machines__init() to check the return value and propagate the error further up the stack.
tools/perf/util/session.c struct perf_session *__perf_session__new(struct perf_data *data, · line 165
Quoted 12 lines
tools/perf/util/session.c +3
-1@@ -160,7 +160,9 @@ struct perf_session *__perf_session__new(struct perf_data *data, session->decomp_data.zstd_decomp = &session->zstd_data; session->active_decomp = &session->decomp_data;INIT_LIST_HEAD (&session->auxtrace_index); -machines__init (&session->machines); +if (machines__init (&session->machines)) + goto out_delete; +
[Severity: Medium]
Will jumping to out_delete here cause a crash when cleaning up the environment?
When this goto is taken, perf_session__delete() is called, which in turn calls perf_env__exit().
However, perf_env__init(&session->header.env) is only called later in __perf_session__new(), meaning the environment is still zero-initialized from the zalloc() of the session.
When perf_env__exit() runs, it does:
perf_env__exit()
mutex_destroy(&env->lock);
perf_env__purge_bpf(env);And perf_env__purge_bpf() calls down_write(&env->bpf_progs.lock).
Could attempting to destroy and lock these uninitialized synchronization primitives lead to undefined behavior depending on the underlying libc implementation?
Quoted 3 lines
tools/perf/util/session.c +0
-0ordered_events__init (&session->ordered_events, ordered_events__deliver_event,NULL );
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
maintainerPATCH v2 2/9 perf machine: Use snprintf() for guestmount path construction
In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de MeloFrom: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
machines__findnew(), machines__create_guest_kernel_maps(), and get_kernel_version() use sprintf() to build paths by prepending symbol_conf.guestmount or root_dir. All write into PATH_MAX stack buffers, but guestmount comes from user configuration and is not length-checked. A guestmount path at or near PATH_MAX causes a stack buffer overflow — and a truncated root_dir propagated to get_kernel_version() would overflow its own version[PATH_MAX] buffer when "/proc/version" is appended.
Switch to snprintf() with sizeof() to prevent overflow. The subsequent access()/fopen() calls will fail on a truncated path.
--- tools/perf/util/machine.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
tools/perf/util/machine.c +4 -4
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ struct machine *machines__findnew(struct machines *machines, pid_t pid)if ((pid !=HOST_KERNEL_ID ) && (pid !=DEFAULT_GUEST_KERNEL_ID ) && (symbol_conf.guestmount)) { -sprintf (path,"%s/%d" , symbol_conf.guestmount, pid); +snprintf (path,sizeof (path),"%s/%d" , symbol_conf.guestmount, pid);if (access (path,R_OK )) {static struct strlist *seen;
@@ -1260,9 +1260,9 @@ int machines__create_guest_kernel_maps(struct machines *machines) namelist[i]->d_name);continue ; } -sprintf (path,"%s/%s/proc/kallsyms" , - symbol_conf.guestmount, - namelist[i]->d_name); +snprintf (path,sizeof (path),"%s/%s/proc/kallsyms" , + symbol_conf.guestmount, + namelist[i]->d_name); ret =access (path,R_OK );if (ret) {pr_debug ("Can't access file %s\n" , path);
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
maintainerPATCH v2 3/9 perf cs-etm: Validate num_cpu before metadata allocation
In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de MeloFrom: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
cs_etm__process_auxtrace_info_full() reads num_cpu from untrusted perf.data and uses it to allocate the metadata pointer array:
metadata = zalloc(sizeof(*metadata) * num_cpu);
On 32-bit, sizeof(*metadata) is 4, so num_cpu = 0x40000000 overflows the multiplication to 0, causing zalloc(0) to return a valid zero-sized allocation followed by out-of-bounds writes in the population loop.
Fix by computing priv_size early and using it to bound num_cpu: each CPU needs at least one u64 metadata entry, so num_cpu cannot exceed the total number of u64 entries in the event's private data area.
--- tools/perf/util/cs-etm.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
tools/perf/util/cs-etm.c +12 -0
@@ -3431,6 +3431,18 @@ int cs_etm__process_auxtrace_info_full(union perf_event *event,/* First the global part */ ptr = (u64 *) auxtrace_info->priv; num_cpu = ptr[CS_PMU_TYPE_CPUS ] &0xffffffff ; + +/* +* Bound num_cpu by the event size: the global header consumes +* CS_ETM_HEADER_SIZE bytes, and each CPU needs at least one u64 +* metadata entry after that. +*/ + priv_size = total_size - event_header_size -INFO_HEADER_SIZE - +CS_ETM_HEADER_SIZE ; +if (num_cpu <=0 || priv_size <=0 || + num_cpu > priv_size / (int )sizeof (u64)) +return -EINVAL ; + metadata =zalloc (sizeof (*metadata) * num_cpu);if (!metadata)return -ENOMEM ;
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH 3/9] perf cs-etm: Validate num_cpu before metadata allocation
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s) to consider:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [Medium] Insufficient bounds check for the CPU metadata parsing loop leading to out-of-bounds memory reads from untrusted data.
- [Medium] Missing bounds validation on num_cpu before printing trace metadata causes out-of-bounds memory reads.
- [Medium] Memory leak of cs_etm_queue structures and RB trees on initialization error paths.
--
commit d0500b50aa50740d3a89612a4e4d97ba8f0c3129
Author: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
perf cs-etm: Validate num_cpu before metadata allocation
This commit bounds num_cpu by checking it against the total available private data size to prevent an integer overflow and subsequent out-of-bounds writes during metadata allocation.
tools/perf/util/cs-etm.c int cs_etm__process_auxtrace_info_full(union perf_event *event, · line 3433
Quoted 8 lines
tools/perf/util/cs-etm.c +0
-0@@ -3431,6 +3431,18 @@ int cs_etm__process_auxtrace_info_full(union perf_event *event,/* First the global part */ ptr = (u64 *) auxtrace_info->priv; num_cpu = ptr[CS_PMU_TYPE_CPUS ] &0xffffffff ;
[Severity: Medium]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does dump_trace in cs_etm__process_auxtrace_info() extract and use num_cpu for cs_etm__print_auxtrace_info() before this new validation occurs?
tools/perf/util/cs-etm-base.c:cs_etm__process_auxtrace_info() {
...
if (dump_trace) {
num_cpu = ptr[CS_PMU_TYPE_CPUS] & 0xffffffff;
cs_etm__print_auxtrace_info(ptr, num_cpu);
...If so, an attacker could still trigger out-of-bounds reads by specifying an excessively large num_cpu when perf report -D is run.
tools/perf/util/cs-etm.c int cs_etm__process_auxtrace_info_full(union perf_event *event, · line 3445
Quoted 12 lines
tools/perf/util/cs-etm.c +12
-0+ +/* +* Bound num_cpu by the event size: the global header consumes +* CS_ETM_HEADER_SIZE bytes, and each CPU needs at least one u64 +* metadata entry after that. +*/ + priv_size = total_size - event_header_size -INFO_HEADER_SIZE - +CS_ETM_HEADER_SIZE ; +if (num_cpu <=0 || priv_size <=0 || + num_cpu > priv_size / (int )sizeof (u64)) +return -EINVAL ; +
[Severity: Medium]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does the metadata parsing loop later in this function lack a bounds check for the buffer size?
While num_cpu is now bounded, the loop iterates j < num_cpu and calls cs_etm__create_meta_blk() which advances the index i:
tools/perf/util/cs-etm.c:cs_etm__create_meta_blk() {
...
nr_in_params = buff_in[i + CS_ETM_NR_TRC_PARAMS];
...
i += nr_in_params + nr_cmn_params;
*buff_in_offset = i;
...Can a crafted nr_in_params bypass the new bounds check and cause an out-of-bounds read on the next iteration?
tools/perf/util/cs-etm.c int cs_etm__process_auxtrace_info_full(union perf_event *event, · line 3448
Quoted 3 lines
tools/perf/util/cs-etm.c +0
-0metadata =zalloc (sizeof (*metadata) * num_cpu);if (!metadata)return -ENOMEM ;
[Severity: Medium]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does the err_free_queues path in this function leak the queue->priv allocations?
If an error occurs later in cs_etm__process_auxtrace_info_full(), it cleans up via:
tools/perf/util/cs-etm.c:cs_etm__process_auxtrace_info_full() {
...
err_free_queues:
auxtrace_queues__free(&etm->queues);
...auxtrace_queues__free() frees the arrays but doesn't free the dynamically allocated cs_etm_queue structures stored in queue->priv from cs_etm__setup_queue(). Is an additional cs_etm__free_events() style cleanup needed to prevent memory leaks?
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=3
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
maintainerPATCH v2 4/9 perf cs-etm: Require full global header in auxtrace_info size check
In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de MeloFrom: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
cs_etm__process_auxtrace_info() checks that header.size covers event_header_size + INFO_HEADER_SIZE (16 bytes total), but then accesses ptr[CS_PMU_TYPE_CPUS] at offset 24 from the start of the event. A crafted 16-byte auxtrace_info event passes the size check but reads out-of-bounds.
Include CS_ETM_HEADER_SIZE in the minimum size check so that the global header entries (version, pmu_type_cpus, snapshot) are guaranteed to fit within the event.
--- tools/perf/util/cs-etm-base.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/perf/util/cs-etm-base.c +3 -1
@@ -170,7 +170,9 @@ int cs_etm__process_auxtrace_info(union perf_event *event,u64 *ptr =NULL ;u64 hdr_version; -if (auxtrace_info->header.size < (event_header_size +INFO_HEADER_SIZE )) +/* Ensure priv[] is large enough for the global header entries */ +if (auxtrace_info->header.size < (event_header_size +INFO_HEADER_SIZE + +CS_ETM_HEADER_SIZE ))return -EINVAL ;/* First the global part */
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH 4/9] perf cs-etm: Require full global header in auxtrace_info size check
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Insufficient bounds checking for per-CPU metadata allows out-of-bounds reads when parsing and printing crafted auxtrace_info events. --
commit 3efe458a25dcafb887e671334329fd63dbfdb114
Author: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
perf cs-etm: Require full global header in auxtrace_info size check
cs_etm__process_auxtrace_info() checks that header.size covers event_header_size + INFO_HEADER_SIZE (16 bytes total), but then accesses ptr[CS_PMU_TYPE_CPUS] at offset 24 from the start of the event. A crafted 16-byte auxtrace_info event passes the size check but reads out-of-bounds. Include CS_ETM_HEADER_SIZE in the minimum size check so that the global header entries are guaranteed to fit.
Quoted 5 lines
tools/perf/util/cs-etm-base.c +0
-0
tools/perf/util/cs-etm-base.c int cs_etm__process_auxtrace_info(union perf_event *event, · line 178
Quoted 10 lines
tools/perf/util/cs-etm-base.c +3
-1@@ -170,7 +170,9 @@ int cs_etm__process_auxtrace_info(union perf_event *event,u64 *ptr =NULL ;u64 hdr_version; -if (auxtrace_info->header.size < (event_header_size +INFO_HEADER_SIZE )) +/* Ensure priv[] is large enough for the global header entries */ +if (auxtrace_info->header.size < (event_header_size +INFO_HEADER_SIZE + +CS_ETM_HEADER_SIZE ))return -EINVAL ;/* First the global part */
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but I have a question about the subsequent parsing of the event payload in cs_etm__process_auxtrace_info().
When dump_trace is enabled, it extracts num_cpu from the payload and passes it to cs_etm__print_auxtrace_info():
tools/perf/util/cs-etm-base.c:cs_etm__process_auxtrace_info() {
...
if (dump_trace) {
num_cpu = ptr[CS_PMU_TYPE_CPUS] & 0xffffffff;
cs_etm__print_auxtrace_info(ptr, num_cpu);
}
...
}Does cs_etm__print_auxtrace_info() or its children validate that the event is actually large enough to contain this many CPUs?
It looks like cs_etm__print_auxtrace_info() iterates num_cpu times, calling cs_etm__print_cpu_metadata_v1(), which accesses array elements directly:
tools/perf/util/cs-etm-base.c:cs_etm__print_cpu_metadata_v1() {
...
magic = val[i + CS_ETM_MAGIC];
/* total params to print is NR_PARAMS + common block size for v1 */
total_params = val[i + CS_ETM_NR_TRC_PARAMS] + CS_ETM_COMMON_BLK_MAX_V1;
...
}Since i is advanced based on the payload-provided parameter count, could these operations read out-of-bounds if a crafted auxtrace_info event has a large num_cpu but a short payload?
Additionally, a similar bounds issue seems to exist in the non-dump_trace path in cs_etm__process_auxtrace_info_full(). While it verifies there is at least one u64 per CPU, the loop processing each CPU reads further into the buffer:
tools/perf/util/cs-etm.c:cs_etm__process_auxtrace_info_full() {
...
for (int j = 0; j < num_cpu; j++) {
if (ptr[i] == __perf_cs_etmv3_magic) {
...
err = cs_etm__create_meta_blk(ptr, &i,
...
}Where cs_etm__create_meta_blk() accesses multiple elements without checking against the total event size:
tools/perf/util/cs-etm.c:cs_etm__create_meta_blk() {
...
nr_in_params = buff_in[i + CS_ETM_NR_TRC_PARAMS];
...
}The strict event size check (i * 8 != priv_size) in cs_etm__process_auxtrace_info_full() only occurs after the loop finishes.
Would it be safer to check the current offset i and the required size against auxtrace_info->header.size before reading elements from ptr[] or buff_in[]?
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=4
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
maintainerPATCH v2 5/9 perf cs-etm: Bounds-check CPU in cs_etm__get_queue()
In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de MeloFrom: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
cs_etm__get_queue() indexes etm->queues.queue_array[cpu] without validating that cpu is within nr_queues. When processing AUX_OUTPUT_HW_ID events, the cpu value comes from untrusted perf.data trace payload and flows through cs_etm__process_trace_id_v0_1() and cs_etm__queue_aux_fragment() without bounds checking, allowing an out-of-bounds read with a crafted file.
Add a bounds check in cs_etm__get_queue() and NULL checks in all callers.
Also add NULL checks for queue_array[i].priv in the queue iteration loops in cs_etm__map_trace_id_v0() and cs_etm__process_trace_id_v0_1() — after auxtrace_queues__grow() new entries are zero-initialized so .priv can be NULL. Add a get_cpu_data() NULL check in cs_etm__process_trace_id_v0_1(), matching the existing check in cs_etm__process_trace_id_v0().
--- tools/perf/util/cs-etm.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
tools/perf/util/cs-etm.c +23 -2
@@ -292,8 +292,11 @@ static struct cs_etm_queue *cs_etm__get_queue(struct cs_etm_auxtrace *etm, int c {if (etm->per_thread_decoding)return etm->queues.queue_array[0 ].priv; -else -return etm->queues.queue_array[cpu].priv; + +if (cpu <0 || cpu >= (int )etm->queues.nr_queues) +return NULL ; + +return etm->queues.queue_array[cpu].priv; } static int cs_etm__map_trace_id_v0(struct cs_etm_auxtrace *etm, u8 trace_chan_id,
@@ -306,6 +309,9 @@ static int cs_etm__map_trace_id_v0(struct cs_etm_auxtrace *etm, u8 trace_chan_id* queue associated with that CPU so only one decoder is made. */ etmq =cs_etm__get_queue (etm, cpu_metadata[CS_ETM_CPU ]); +if (!etmq) +return -EINVAL ; +if (etmq->format ==UNFORMATTED )return cs_etm__insert_trace_id_node (etmq, trace_chan_id, cpu_metadata);
@@ -318,6 +324,9 @@ static int cs_etm__map_trace_id_v0(struct cs_etm_auxtrace *etm, u8 trace_chan_idint ret; etmq = etm->queues.queue_array[i].priv; +if (!etmq) +continue ; + ret =cs_etm__insert_trace_id_node (etmq, trace_chan_id, cpu_metadata);if (ret)
@@ -358,6 +367,9 @@ static int cs_etm__process_trace_id_v0_1(struct cs_etm_auxtrace *etm, int cpu,u32 sink_id =FIELD_GET (CS_AUX_HW_ID_SINK_ID_MASK , hw_id);u8 trace_id =FIELD_GET (CS_AUX_HW_ID_TRACE_ID_MASK , hw_id); +if (!etmq) +return -EINVAL ; +/* * Check sink id hasn't changed in per-cpu mode. In per-thread mode, * let it pass for now until an actual overlapping trace ID is hit. In
@@ -375,6 +387,9 @@ static int cs_etm__process_trace_id_v0_1(struct cs_etm_auxtrace *etm, int cpu,for (unsigned int i =0 ; i < etm->queues.nr_queues; ++i) {struct cs_etm_queue *other_etmq = etm->queues.queue_array[i].priv; +if (!other_etmq) +continue ; +/* Different sinks, skip */ if (other_etmq->sink_id != etmq->sink_id)continue ;
@@ -396,6 +411,9 @@ static int cs_etm__process_trace_id_v0_1(struct cs_etm_auxtrace *etm, int cpu, } cpu_data =get_cpu_data (etm, cpu); +if (!cpu_data) +return -EINVAL ; + ret =cs_etm__insert_trace_id_node (etmq, trace_id, cpu_data);if (ret)return ret;
@@ -3144,6 +3162,9 @@ static int cs_etm__queue_aux_fragment(struct perf_session *session, off_t file_o aux_offset + aux_size <= auxtrace_event->offset + auxtrace_event->size) {struct cs_etm_queue *etmq =cs_etm__get_queue (etm, auxtrace_event->cpu); +if (!etmq) +return -EINVAL ; +/* * If this AUX event was inside this buffer somewhere, create a new auxtrace event * based on the sizes of the aux event, and queue that fragment.
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH 5/9] perf cs-etm: Bounds-check CPU in cs_etm__get_queue()
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Missing NULL checks on etmq and etmq->decoder lead to segmentation faults on malformed or out-of-bounds auxtrace queues. --
commit 97b84b25fe94e957ad4cb91dac4d3e8d49fe5b1d
Author: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
perf cs-etm: Bounds-check CPU in cs_etm__get_queue()
cs_etm__get_queue() indexes etm->queues.queue_array[cpu] without validating that cpu is within nr_queues. When processing AUX_OUTPUT_HW_ID events, the cpu value comes from untrusted perf.data trace payload and flows through cs_etm__process_trace_id_v0_1() and cs_etm__queue_aux_fragment() without bounds checking, allowing an out-of-bounds read with a crafted file. Add a bounds check in cs_etm__get_queue() and NULL checks in all callers.
Quoted 4 lines
tools/perf/util/cs-etm.c +0
-0
[ ... ]
tools/perf/util/cs-etm.c static int cs_etm__map_trace_id_v0(struct cs_etm_auxtrace *etm, u8 trace_chan_id · line 329
Quoted 7 lines
tools/perf/util/cs-etm.c +3
-0@@ -318,6 +324,9 @@ static int cs_etm__map_trace_id_v0(struct cs_etm_auxtrace *etm, u8 trace_chan_idint ret; etmq = etm->queues.queue_array[i].priv; +if (!etmq) +continue ; +
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but since we are adding NULL checks for the priv field here because auxtrace_queues__grow() zero-initializes new entries, are there other places that might still be vulnerable to this?
For example, in cs_etm__process_auxtrace_event(), we index into the queue array and pass the priv field directly to cs_etm__dump_event():
err = auxtrace_queues__add_event(&etm->queues, session,
event, data_offset, &buffer);
if (err)
return err;
if (dump_trace)
if (auxtrace_buffer__get_data(buffer, fd)) {
cs_etm__dump_event(etm->queues.queue_array[idx].priv, buffer);
auxtrace_buffer__put_data(buffer);
}Then cs_etm__dump_event() unconditionally dereferences etmq->decoder, which causes a segmentation fault if etmq is NULL:
static void cs_etm__dump_event(struct cs_etm_queue *etmq,
struct auxtrace_buffer *buffer)
{
...
color_fprintf(stdout, color,
". ... CoreSight %s Trace data: size %#zx bytes\n",
cs_etm_decoder__get_name(etmq->decoder), buffer->size);Additionally, if the queue is empty during decoder creation, etmq->decoder can be NULL. Later in cs_etm__decode_data_block(), etmq->decoder is passed without a NULL check:
ret = cs_etm_decoder__process_data_block(etmq->decoder, etmq->offset,
Could this be triggered by a malformed or out-of-bounds auxtrace index, resulting in a crash?
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=5
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
maintainerPATCH v2 6/9 perf c2c: Free format list entries when c2c_hists__init() fails
In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de MeloFrom: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
When c2c_hists__init() fails partway through hpp_list__parse(), dynamically allocated format structures that were already added to hists->list are leaked because he__get_c2c_hists() frees the hists container without first unregistering the format entries.
Call perf_hpp__reset_output_field() before freeing the hists container on the error path, matching what c2c_he_free() already does on the normal destruction path.
--- tools/perf/builtin-c2c.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
tools/perf/builtin-c2c.c +1 -0
@@ -226,6 +226,7 @@ he__get_c2c_hists(struct hist_entry *he, ret =c2c_hists__init (hists, sort, nr_header_lines, env);if (ret) { +perf_hpp__reset_output_field (&hists->list); c2c_he->hists =NULL ;free (hists);return NULL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
maintainerPATCH v2 7/9 perf c2c: Fix hist entry and format list leaks in c2c_he_free()
In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de MeloFrom: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
c2c_he_free() calls hists__delete_entries() which only walks the output-sorted entries tree. During c2c resort, when cacheline entries are merged and the redundant entry is freed, the inner hists have not been output-resorted yet, so hists->entries is empty. The actual inner hist_entry objects live in entries_in_array[] and entries_collapsed, which are never walked, leaking all inner hist_entry objects for every merged cacheline.
Additionally, the dynamically allocated format entries on hists->list are never unregistered or freed.
Fix both issues by switching to hists__delete_all_entries() which walks all rb_root trees, and calling perf_hpp__reset_output_field() to clean up format entries.
--- tools/perf/builtin-c2c.c | 2 +- tools/perf/util/hist.c | 2 +- tools/perf/util/hist.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
tools/perf/builtin-c2c.c +1 -1
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ static void c2c_he_free(void *he) c2c_he = container_of(he, struct c2c_hist_entry, he);if (c2c_he->hists) { -hists__delete_entries (&c2c_he->hists->hists); +hists__delete_all_entries (&c2c_he->hists->hists);perf_hpp__reset_output_field (&c2c_he->hists->list);zfree (&c2c_he->hists); }
tools/perf/util/hist.c +1 -1
@@ -3041,7 +3041,7 @@ static void hists__delete_remaining_entries(struct rb_root_cached *root) } } -static void hists__delete_all_entries (struct hists *hists) +void hists__delete_all_entries (struct hists *hists) {hists__delete_entries (hists);hists__delete_remaining_entries (&hists->entries_in_array[0 ]);
tools/perf/util/hist.h +1 -0
@@ -391,6 +391,7 @@ int hists__collapse_resort(struct hists *hists, struct ui_progress *prog);void hists__decay_entries (struct hists *hists,bool zap_user,bool zap_kernel);void hists__delete_entries (struct hists *hists); +void hists__delete_all_entries (struct hists *hists);void hists__output_recalc_col_len (struct hists *hists,int max_rows);struct hist_entry *hists__get_entry (struct hists *hists,int idx);
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH 7/9] perf c2c: Fix hist entry and format list leaks in c2c_he_free()
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [Medium] perf_hpp__setup_output_field() and perf_hpp__append_sort_keys() append formats to the global perf_hpp_list instead of the provided local list, polluting global state and causing missing output columns. --
commit a4f0bc9a81bce084555c8dfe98ae2f6675da0ef8
Author: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
perf c2c: Fix hist entry and format list leaks in c2c_he_free()
This commit addresses leaks in c2c_he_free() by replacing hists__delete_entries() with hists__delete_all_entries() to walk and free all inner hist_entry objects across all rb_root trees. It also adds a call to perf_hpp__reset_output_field() to unregister and free dynamically allocated format entries on the hists->list.
tools/perf/builtin-c2c.c static void c2c_he_free(void *he) · line 188
Quoted 11 lines
tools/perf/builtin-c2c.c +1
-1@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ static void c2c_he_free(void *he) c2c_he = container_of(he, struct c2c_hist_entry, he);if (c2c_he->hists) { -hists__delete_entries (&c2c_he->hists->hists); +hists__delete_all_entries (&c2c_he->hists->hists);perf_hpp__reset_output_field (&c2c_he->hists->list);
[Severity: Medium]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but does the setup for these local hpp lists append formats to the global perf_hpp_list by mistake?
Looking at perf_hpp__setup_output_field() in tools/perf/ui/hist.c, it takes a local list argument but uses the global wrapper perf_hpp__column_register(fmt) instead of perf_hpp_list__column_register(list, fmt).
A similar issue appears in perf_hpp__append_sort_keys() in the same file, which uses perf_hpp__register_sort_field(fmt) instead of perf_hpp_list__register_sort_field(list, fmt).
Does this inject sort formats into the global list (polluting global state during processing) while leaving the local list missing those columns and breaking the output display for inner hists?
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=7
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
maintainerPATCH v2 8/9 perf bpf: Validate array presence before casting BPF prog info pointers
In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de MeloFrom: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Several functions cast bpf_prog_info fields (jited_ksyms, jited_func_lens, jited_prog_insns) from u64 to pointers and dereference them. These fields are only valid pointers if bpil_offs_to_addr() converted their file offsets to addresses, which only happens when the corresponding PERF_BPIL_* bits are set in info_linear->arrays.
A crafted perf.data can leave these bits unset while setting non-zero counts and offset values, causing the functions to dereference raw file offsets as pointers.
Add array bitmask validation to all perf.data processing paths:
- __bpf_event__print_bpf_prog_info(): check JITED_KSYMS and JITED_FUNC_LENS (changed to take struct perf_bpil *)
- machine__process_bpf_event_load(): check JITED_KSYMS
- bpf_read(): check JITED_INSNS before memcpy from jited_prog_insns
- dso__disassemble_filename(): check JITED_INSNS before returning jited_prog_insns pointer
--- tools/perf/util/bpf-event.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++--- tools/perf/util/bpf-event.h | 4 ++-- tools/perf/util/dso.c | 10 ++++++++++ tools/perf/util/header.c | 3 +-- 4 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
tools/perf/util/bpf-event.c +17 -3
@@ -59,6 +59,10 @@ static int machine__process_bpf_event_load(struct machine *machine,return 0 ; info_linear = info_node->info_linear; +/* jited_ksyms is only valid if bpil_offs_to_addr() converted it */ +if (!(info_linear->arrays & (1UL <<PERF_BPIL_JITED_KSYMS ))) +return 0 ; +for (i =0 ; i < info_linear->info.nr_jited_ksyms; i++) {u64 *addrs = (u64 *)(uintptr_t )(info_linear->info.jited_ksyms);u64 addr = addrs[i];
@@ -959,12 +963,15 @@ int evlist__add_bpf_sb_event(struct evlist *evlist, struct perf_env *env)return evlist__add_sb_event (evlist, &attr, bpf_event__sb_cb, env); } -void __bpf_event__print_bpf_prog_info (struct bpf_prog_info *info, +void __bpf_event__print_bpf_prog_info (struct perf_bpil *info_linear,struct perf_env *env,FILE *fp) { -__u32 *prog_lens = (__u32 *)(uintptr_t )(info->jited_func_lens); -__u64 *prog_addrs = (__u64 *)(uintptr_t )(info->jited_ksyms); +struct bpf_prog_info *info = &info_linear->info; +__u64 required_arrays = (1UL <<PERF_BPIL_JITED_KSYMS ) | + (1UL <<PERF_BPIL_JITED_FUNC_LENS ); +__u32 *prog_lens; +__u64 *prog_addrs;char name[KSYM_NAME_LEN ];struct btf *btf =NULL ;u32 sub_prog_cnt, i;
@@ -974,6 +981,13 @@ void __bpf_event__print_bpf_prog_info(struct bpf_prog_info *info, sub_prog_cnt != info->nr_jited_func_lens)return ; +/* Ensure the arrays were present and converted by bpil_offs_to_addr() */ +if ((info_linear->arrays & required_arrays) != required_arrays) +return ; + + prog_lens = (__u32 *)(uintptr_t )(info->jited_func_lens); + prog_addrs = (__u64 *)(uintptr_t )(info->jited_ksyms); +if (info->btf_id) {struct btf_node *node;
tools/perf/util/bpf-event.h +2 -2
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ struct btf_node {int machine__process_bpf (struct machine *machine,union perf_event *event,struct perf_sample *sample);int evlist__add_bpf_sb_event (struct evlist *evlist,struct perf_env *env); -void __bpf_event__print_bpf_prog_info (struct bpf_prog_info *info, +void __bpf_event__print_bpf_prog_info (struct perf_bpil *info_linear,struct perf_env *env,FILE *fp);void bpf_metadata_free (struct bpf_metadata *metadata);
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ static inline int evlist__add_bpf_sb_event(struct evlist *evlist __maybe_unused,return 0 ; } -static inline void __bpf_event__print_bpf_prog_info (struct bpf_prog_info *info__maybe_unused , +static inline void __bpf_event__print_bpf_prog_info (struct perf_bpil *info_linear__maybe_unused ,struct perf_env *env__maybe_unused ,FILE *fp__maybe_unused ) {
tools/perf/util/dso.c +10 -0
@@ -880,6 +880,12 @@ static ssize_t bpf_read(struct dso *dso, u64 offset, char *data)return -1 ; } +/* jited_prog_insns is only valid if bpil_offs_to_addr() converted it */ +if (!(node->info_linear->arrays & (1UL <<PERF_BPIL_JITED_INSNS ))) { +dso__data (dso)->status =DSO_DATA_STATUS_ERROR ; +return -1 ; + } + len = node->info_linear->info.jited_prog_len; buf = (u8 *)(uintptr_t )node->info_linear->info.jited_prog_insns;
@@ -1995,6 +2001,10 @@ const u8 *dso__read_symbol(struct dso *dso, const char *symfs_filename,return NULL ; } info_linear = info_node->info_linear; +if (!(info_linear->arrays & (1UL <<PERF_BPIL_JITED_INSNS ))) { + errno =SYMBOL_ANNOTATE_ERRNO__BPF_MISSING_BTF ; +return NULL ; + }assert (len <= info_linear->info.jited_prog_len); *out_buf_len = len;return (const u8 *)(uintptr_t )(info_linear->info.jited_prog_insns);
tools/perf/util/header.c +1 -2
@@ -2107,8 +2107,7 @@ static void print_bpf_prog_info(struct feat_fd *ff __maybe_unused, FILE *fp) node = rb_entry(next, struct bpf_prog_info_node, rb_node); next =rb_next (&node->rb_node); -__bpf_event__print_bpf_prog_info (&node->info_linear->info, - env, fp); +__bpf_event__print_bpf_prog_info (node->info_linear, env, fp); }up_read (&env->bpf_progs.lock);
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH 8/9] perf bpf: Validate array presence before casting BPF prog info pointers
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] The newly added array bitmask validation in __bpf_event__print_bpf_prog_info() is incomplete, missing critical validations for PERF_BPIL_PROG_TAGS and PERF_BPIL_FUNC_INFO arrays.
- [High] The libbfd annotation path completely misses the newly added array bitmask validations, allowing arbitrary file offsets for jited_prog_insns, line_info, and jited_line_info to be dereferenced. --
commit 0cf9a385d10d4f34d342db1cd59a01ae41698542
Author: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
perf bpf: Validate array presence before casting BPF prog info pointers
This commit adds bitmask validations to ensure that BPF program info fields like jited_ksyms and jited_func_lens are actually valid pointers before they are dereferenced. It aims to prevent issues where crafted perf.data files leave these bits unset, causing functions to dereference raw file offsets.
Quoted 5 lines
A crafted perf.data can leave these bits unset while setting non-zero counts and offset values, causing the functions to dereference raw file offsets as pointers.
Add array bitmask validation to all perf.data processing paths:
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does the libbfd annotation path also need similar validation?
The commit message states validations are added to all perf.data processing paths, but symbol__disassemble_bpf_libbfd() in tools/perf/util/libbfd.c accesses info_linear->info.jited_prog_insns and passes it to bpf_prog_linfo__new().
bpf_prog_linfo__new() then casts info->line_info and info->jited_line_info to pointers and calls memcpy():
tools/lib/bpf/bpf_prog_linfo.c:bpf_prog_linfo__new() {
...
memcpy(prog_linfo->raw_linfo, (void *)(long)info->line_info, data_sz);
...
memcpy(prog_linfo->raw_jited_linfo,
(void *)(long)info->jited_line_info, data_sz);
...
}Can a crafted perf.data file omitting PERF_BPIL_JITED_INSNS, PERF_BPIL_LINE_INFO, or PERF_BPIL_JITED_LINE_INFO bits cause an out-of-bounds read or segmentation fault here?
Quoted 6 lines
-
__bpf_event__print_bpf_prog_info(): checkJITED_KSYMSandJITED_FUNC_LENS(changed to take structperf_bpil*)
-machine__process_bpf_event_load(): checkJITED_KSYMS
-bpf_read(): checkJITED_INSNSbefore memcpy fromjited_prog_insns
-dso__disassemble_filename(): checkJITED_INSNSbefore returningjited_prog_insnspointer
[ ... ]
Quoted 4 lines
tools/perf/util/bpf-event.c +0
-0
[ ... ]
Quoted 4 lines
tools/perf/util/bpf-event.c +0
-0@@ -959,12 +963,15 @@ int evlist__add_bpf_sb_event(struct evlist *evlist, struct perf_env *env)return evlist__add_sb_event (evlist, &attr, bpf_event__sb_cb, env); }
tools/perf/util/bpf-event.c int evlist__add_bpf_sb_event(struct evlist *evlist, struct perf_env *env) · line 972
Quoted 10 lines
tools/perf/util/bpf-event.c +4
-3-void __bpf_event__print_bpf_prog_info (struct bpf_prog_info *info, +void __bpf_event__print_bpf_prog_info (struct perf_bpil *info_linear,struct perf_env *env,FILE *fp) { -__u32 *prog_lens = (__u32 *)(uintptr_t )(info->jited_func_lens); -__u64 *prog_addrs = (__u64 *)(uintptr_t )(info->jited_ksyms); +struct bpf_prog_info *info = &info_linear->info; +__u64 required_arrays = (1UL <<PERF_BPIL_JITED_KSYMS ) | + (1UL <<PERF_BPIL_JITED_FUNC_LENS );
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but is this required_arrays bitmask missing validations for PERF_BPIL_PROG_TAGS and PERF_BPIL_FUNC_INFO?
__bpf_event__print_bpf_prog_info() calls synthesize_bpf_prog_name(), which casts info->prog_tags and info->func_info to pointers and dereferences them:
tools/perf/util/bpf-event.c:synthesize_bpf_prog_name() {
...
u8 (*prog_tags)[BPF_TAG_SIZE] = (void *)(uintptr_t)(info->prog_tags);
void *func_infos = (void *)(uintptr_t)(info->func_info);
...
name_len += snprintf_hex(buf + name_len, size - name_len,
prog_tags[sub_id], BPF_TAG_SIZE);
...
}If a crafted perf.data file leaves the PERF_BPIL_PROG_TAGS and PERF_BPIL_FUNC_INFO bits unset but provides non-zero offset values, will untranslated raw offsets be dereferenced here?
Quoted 5 lines
tools/perf/util/bpf-event.c +2
-0+__u32 *prog_lens; +__u64 *prog_addrs;char name[KSYM_NAME_LEN ];struct btf *btf =NULL ;u32 sub_prog_cnt, i;
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=8
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
maintainerPATCH v2 9/9 perf dso: Set standard errno on decompression failure
In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de MeloFrom: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
dso__get_filename() sets errno to a negative custom DSO_LOAD_ERRNO value when kernel module decompression fails:
errno = *dso__load_errno(dso); /* e.g. -9996 */
The caller __open_dso() then computes fd = -errno, producing a large positive value (9996) that looks like a valid file descriptor. This can cause close_data_fd() to close an unrelated fd used by another subsystem.
Set errno to EIO instead. The detailed error code is already stored in dso__load_errno(dso) for diagnostic messages.
--- tools/perf/util/dso.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/perf/util/dso.c +7 -1
@@ -600,7 +600,13 @@ static char *dso__get_filename(struct dso *dso, const char *root_dir,size_t len =sizeof (newpath);if (dso__decompress_kmodule_path (dso, name, newpath, len) <0 ) { - errno = *dso__load_errno (dso); +/* +* Use a standard errno value, not the negative custom +* DSO_LOAD_ERRNO stored in dso__load_errno(dso): +* __open_dso() computes fd = -errno, so a negative +* errno produces a positive fd that looks valid. +*/ + errno =EIO ; goto out; }
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0