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6.12.94-rc1 review

PATCH In review Greg Kroah-Hartman 14 participants 279 messages Jun 16 – Jun 18 Page 2 of 2

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author maintainer
#135 lore raw

PATCH 130/261 rust: arm64: set uwtable llvm module flag for CONFIG_UNWIND_TABLES

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alice Ryhl <[email protected]>

commit ac35b5580ace12e5d0a0b5e61e36d2c4e1ffa29c upstream.

Due to a rustc bug [1] the -Cforce-unwind-tables=y flag only emits the uwtable annotation for functions, but not for the module. This means that compiler-generated functions such as 'asan.module_ctor' do not receive the uwtable annotation.

When CONFIG_UNWIND_PATCH_PAC_INTO_SCS is enabled, this leads to boot failures because the dwarf information emitted for the kasan constructors is wrong, which causes the SCS boot patching code to patch the constructor in an illegal manner. Specifically, the paciasp instruction is patched, but the autiasp instruction is not. This mismatch leads to a crash when the constructor is called during boot.

	==================================================================
	BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in do_basic_setup+0x4c/0x90
	Read of size 8 at addr ffffffe3cc7eb488 by task swapper/0/1

Specifically the faulting instruction is the (*fn)() to invoke the constructor in do_ctors() of the init/main.c file.

Once the fix lands in rustc, this flag can be made conditional on the rustc version. Note that passing the flag on a rustc with the fix present has no effect.

[ The fix [1] has landed for Rust 1.98.0 (expected release on
2026-08-20).

Thus add a version check as discussed.

- Miguel ]

---
 arch/arm64/Makefile |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/Makefile +3 -0
@@ -66,6 +66,9 @@ else
 KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= -fasynchronous-unwind-tables
 KBUILD_AFLAGS	+= -fasynchronous-unwind-tables
 KBUILD_RUSTFLAGS += -Cforce-unwind-tables=y -Zuse-sync-unwind=n
+# Work around rustc bug on compilers without
+# https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/pull/156973.
+KBUILD_RUSTFLAGS += $(if $(call rustc-min-version,109800),,-Zllvm_module_flag=uwtable:u32:2:max)
 endif
 
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_PER_TASK),y)
author maintainer
#136 lore raw

PATCH 131/261 rust: kasan/kbuild: fix rustc-option when cross-compiling

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alice Ryhl <[email protected]>

commit 4a44b17406cb5a93f90af3df9392b3a45eb336fb upstream.

The Makefile version of rustc-option currently checks whether the option exists for the host target instead of the target actually being compiled for. It was done this way in commit 46e24a545cdb ("rust: kasan/kbuild:
fix missing flags on first build") to avoid a circular dependency on target.json. However, because of this, rustc-option currently does not function when cross-compiling from x86_64 to aarch64 if CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK is enabled. This is because KBUILD_RUSTFLAGS contains -Zfixed-x18 under this configuration. Since that flag does not exist on the host target, rustc-option runs into a compilation failure every time, leading to all flags being rejected as unsupported.

To fix this, update rustc-option to pass a --target parameter so that the host target is not used. For targets using target.json, use a built-in target that is as close as possible to the target created with target.json to avoid the circular dependency on target.json.

One scenario where this causes a boot failure:
* Cross-compiled from x86_64 to aarch64.
* With CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK=y
* With CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS=y
* With CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE=n
Then the resulting kernel image will fail to boot when it first calls into Rust code with a crash along the lines of "Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0ffffffc08541796". This is because the call threshold is not specified, so rustc will inline kasan operations, but the kasan shadow offset is not specified, which leads to the inlined kasan instructions being incorrect.

Note that the -Zsanitizer=kernel-hwaddress parameter itself does not lead to a rustc-option failure despite being aarch64-specific because RUSTFLAGS_KASAN has not yet been added to KBUILD_RUSTFLAGS when rustc-option is evaluated by the kasan Makefile.

Fixes 46e24a545cdb ("rust: kasan/kbuild: fix missing flags on first build")

[ Edited slightly:
- Reset variable to avoid using the environment.
- Use a simply expanded variable flavor for simplicity.
- Export variable so that behavior in sub-makes is consistent.

This matches other variables. - Miguel ]

---
 Makefile                  |    3 ++-
 arch/x86/Makefile         |    4 ++++
 arch/x86/Makefile.um      |    8 ++++++++
 scripts/Makefile.compiler |    2 +-
 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Makefile +2 -1
@@ -568,6 +568,7 @@ KBUILD_RUSTFLAGS := $(rust_common_flags)
 		    -Crelocation-model=static \
 		    -Zfunction-sections=n \
 		    -Wclippy::float_arithmetic
+KBUILD_RUSTFLAGS_OPTION_CHKS :=
 
 KBUILD_AFLAGS_KERNEL :=
 KBUILD_CFLAGS_KERNEL :=
@@ -604,7 +605,7 @@ export KBUILD_USERCFLAGS KBUILD_USERLDFL
 
 export KBUILD_CPPFLAGS NOSTDINC_FLAGS LINUXINCLUDE OBJCOPYFLAGS KBUILD_LDFLAGS
 export KBUILD_CFLAGS CFLAGS_KERNEL CFLAGS_MODULE
-export KBUILD_RUSTFLAGS RUSTFLAGS_KERNEL RUSTFLAGS_MODULE
+export KBUILD_RUSTFLAGS RUSTFLAGS_KERNEL RUSTFLAGS_MODULE KBUILD_RUSTFLAGS_OPTION_CHKS
 export KBUILD_AFLAGS AFLAGS_KERNEL AFLAGS_MODULE
 export KBUILD_AFLAGS_MODULE KBUILD_CFLAGS_MODULE KBUILD_RUSTFLAGS_MODULE KBUILD_LDFLAGS_MODULE
 export KBUILD_AFLAGS_KERNEL KBUILD_CFLAGS_KERNEL KBUILD_RUSTFLAGS_KERNEL
arch/x86/Makefile +4 -0
@@ -78,6 +78,10 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += -mno-sse -mno-mmx -mno-
 KBUILD_RUSTFLAGS += --target=$(objtree)/scripts/target.json
 KBUILD_RUSTFLAGS += -Ctarget-feature=-sse,-sse2,-sse3,-ssse3,-sse4.1,-sse4.2,-avx,-avx2
 
+# The target.json file is not available when invoking rustc-option, so use the
+# built-in target when checking whether flags are supported instead.
+KBUILD_RUSTFLAGS_OPTION_CHKS += --target=x86_64-unknown-none
+
 #
 # CFLAGS for compiling floating point code inside the kernel.
 #
arch/x86/Makefile.um +8 -0
@@ -14,6 +14,14 @@ endif
 
 KBUILD_RUSTFLAGS += --target=$(objtree)/scripts/target.json
 
+# The target.json file is not available when invoking rustc-option, so use the
+# built-in target when checking whether flags are supported instead.
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_32),y)
+KBUILD_RUSTFLAGS_OPTION_CHKS += --target=i686-unknown-linux-gnu
+else
+KBUILD_RUSTFLAGS_OPTION_CHKS += --target=x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
+endif
+
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_32),y)
 START := 0x8048000
 
scripts/Makefile.compiler +1 -1
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ ld-option = $(call try-run, $(LD) $(KBUI
 # TODO: remove RUSTC_BOOTSTRAP=1 when we raise the minimum GNU Make version to 4.4
 __rustc-option = $(call try-run,\
 	echo '$(pound)![allow(missing_docs)]$(pound)![feature(no_core)]$(pound)![no_core]' | RUSTC_BOOTSTRAP=1\
-	$(1) --sysroot=/dev/null $(filter-out --sysroot=/dev/null --target=%,$(2)) $(3)\
+	$(1) --sysroot=/dev/null $(KBUILD_RUSTFLAGS_OPTION_CHKS) $(filter-out --sysroot=/dev/null --target=%target.json,$(2)) $(3)\
 	--crate-type=rlib --out-dir=$(TMPOUT) --emit=obj=- - >/dev/null,$(3),$(4))
 
 # rustc-option
author maintainer
#137 lore raw

PATCH 132/261 mmc: litex_mmc: Use DIV_ROUND_UP for more accurate clock calculation

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Inochi Amaoto <[email protected]>

commit b837e38c255dd9f8b53511d52e87f1fda32b3dfe upstream.

The previous clock uses roundup_pow_of_two() to calculate the core clock frequency. It does not meet the actual hardware meaning. The actual frequency is calculated by "ref_clk / ((div >> 1) << 1)".

Fix the clock divider calculation.

Fixes 92e099104729 ("mmc: Add driver for LiteX's LiteSDCard interface")
---
 drivers/mmc/host/litex_mmc.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/mmc/host/litex_mmc.c +3 -3
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
 #include <linux/iopoll.h>
 #include <linux/litex.h>
+#include <linux/math.h>
 #include <linux/mod_devicetable.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/platform_device.h>
@@ -436,11 +437,10 @@ static void litex_mmc_setclk(struct lite
 	struct device *dev = mmc_dev(host->mmc);
 	u32 div;
 
-	div = freq ? host->ref_clk / freq : 256U;
-	div = roundup_pow_of_two(div);
+	div = freq ? DIV_ROUND_UP(host->ref_clk, freq) : 256U;
 	div = clamp(div, 2U, 256U);
 	dev_dbg(dev, "sd_clk_freq=%d: set to %d via div=%d\n",
-		freq, host->ref_clk / div, div);
+		freq, host->ref_clk / ((div + 1) & ~1U), div);
 	litex_write16(host->sdphy + LITEX_PHY_CLOCKERDIV, div);
 	host->sd_clk = freq;
 }
author maintainer
#138 lore raw

PATCH 133/261 KVM: Dont WARN if memory is dirtied without a vCPU when the VM is dying

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

commit 8618004d3e897c0f1b71d9a9ab860461289bb89a upstream.

When marking a page dirty, complain about not having a running/loaded vCPU if and only if the VM is still alive, i.e. its refcount is non-zero. This will allow fixing a memory leak for x86 SEV-ES guests without hitting what is effectively a false positive on the WARN.

For some SEV-ES VM-Exits, KVM keeps a writable mapping of a guest page across an exit to userspace, and typically unmaps the page on the next KVM_RUN. But if userspace never calls KVM_RUN after such an exit, then KVM needs to unmap the page when the vCPU is destroyed, which in turn triggers the WARN about not having a running vCPU.

Alternatively, SEV-ES could temporarily load the vCPU to suppress the WARN, as is done in nested_vmx_free_vcpu() (but for completely unrelated reasons; suppressing WARN from nested_put_vmcs12_pages() is pure happenstance). But loading a vCPU during destruction is gross (ideally nVMX code would be cleaned up), risks complicating the SEV-ES code (KVM would need to ensure the temporarily load()+put() only runs when the vCPU isn't already loaded), and is ultimately pointless.

The motivation for the WARN is to guard against KVM dirtying guest memory without pushing the corresponding GFN to the active vCPU's dirty ring, e.g. to ensure userspace doesn't miss a dirty page. But for the VM's refcount to reach zero, there can't be _any_ userspace mappings to the dirty ring, as mapping the dirty ring requires doing mmap() on the vCPU FD. I.e. if userspace had a valid mapping for the dirty ring, then the vCPU file and thus the owning VM would still be alive. And so since userspace can't possibly reach the dirty ring, whether or not KVM technically "misses" a push to the dirty ring is irrelevant.

Message-ID: <[email protected]>

Message-ID: <[email protected]>

---
 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +2 -1
@@ -3611,7 +3611,8 @@ void mark_page_dirty_in_slot(struct kvm
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu && vcpu->kvm != kvm))
 		return;
 
-	WARN_ON_ONCE(!vcpu && !kvm_arch_allow_write_without_running_vcpu(kvm));
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(!vcpu && refcount_read(&kvm->users_count) &&
+		     !kvm_arch_allow_write_without_running_vcpu(kvm));
 #endif
 
 	if (memslot && kvm_slot_dirty_track_enabled(memslot)) {
author maintainer
#139 lore raw

PATCH 134/261 KVM: SEV: Decouple the need to sync the GHCB SA from the need to free the SA

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

commit f041dc80de4abbdd0909d871bf64f3f87d2350ff upstream.

Decouple synchronizing the GHCB SA from freeing/unpinning the SA, so that the free/unpin path can be reused when freeing a vCPU.

Opportunistically add a WARN to harden KVM against stomping over (and thus leaking) an already-allocated scratch area.

Message-ID: <[email protected]>

Message-ID: <[email protected]>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c |   27 ++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +14 -13
@@ -3451,20 +3451,17 @@ void sev_es_unmap_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *
 	if (!svm->sev_es.ghcb)
 		return;
 
-	if (svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free) {
-		/*
-		 * The scratch area lives outside the GHCB, so there is a
-		 * buffer that, depending on the operation performed, may
-		 * need to be synced, then freed.
-		 */
-		if (svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_sync) {
-			kvm_write_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm,
-					svm->sev_es.sw_scratch,
-					svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa,
-					svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_len);
-			svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_sync = false;
-		}
+	/*
+	 * If the scratch area lives outside the GHCB, there's a buffer that,
+	 * depending on the operation performed, may need to be synced.
+	 */
+	if (svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_sync) {
+		kvm_write_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm, svm->sev_es.sw_scratch,
+				svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa, svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_len);
+		svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_sync = false;
+	}
 
+	if (svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free) {
 		kvfree(svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa);
 		svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa = NULL;
 		svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free = false;
@@ -3525,6 +3522,8 @@ static int setup_vmgexit_scratch(struct
 		goto e_scratch;
 	}
 
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_sync || svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free);
+
 	if ((scratch_gpa_beg & PAGE_MASK) == control->ghcb_gpa) {
 		/* Scratch area begins within GHCB */
 		ghcb_scratch_beg = control->ghcb_gpa +
@@ -3546,6 +3545,8 @@ static int setup_vmgexit_scratch(struct
 		scratch_va = (void *)svm->sev_es.ghcb;
 		scratch_va += (scratch_gpa_beg - control->ghcb_gpa);
 
+		svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_sync = false;
+		svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free = false;
 		svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_len = ghcb_scratch_end - scratch_gpa_beg;
 	} else {
 		/* GHCB v2 requires the scratch area to be within the GHCB. */
author maintainer
#140 lore raw

PATCH 135/261 drm/i915/gem: Fix phys BO pread/pwrite with offset

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Joonas Lahtinen <[email protected]>

commit d21ad938398bca695a511307de38a65889e3b354 upstream.

sg_page() returns struct page pointer not (void *) so the scaling of pread/pwrite is wrong for phys BO and wrong parts of BO would be accessed if non-zero offset is used.

Last impacted platform with overlay or cursor planes using phys mapping was Gen3/945G/Lakeport.

Fixes c6790dc22312 ("drm/i915: Wean off drm_pci_alloc/drm_pci_free")
Cc <[email protected]> # v4.5+
Cc Tvrtko Ursulin <[email protected]>
Cc Simona Vetter <[email protected]>
Cc Jani Nikula <[email protected]>
Cc Rodrigo Vivi <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 3e49a2f85070b2fb672c1e0fdba281a4ea3aebe6)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_phys.c |   19 +++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_phys.c +15 -4
@@ -18,6 +18,17 @@
 #include "i915_gem_tiling.h"
 #include "i915_scatterlist.h"
 
+/* Abuse scatterlist to store pointer instead of struct page. */
+static inline void __set_phys_vaddr(struct scatterlist *sg, void *vaddr)
+{
+	sg_assign_page(sg, (struct page *)vaddr);
+}
+
+static inline void *__get_phys_vaddr(struct scatterlist *sg)
+{
+	return (void *)sg_page(sg);
+}
+
 static int i915_gem_object_get_pages_phys(struct drm_i915_gem_object *obj)
 {
 	struct address_space *mapping = obj->base.filp->f_mapping;
@@ -58,7 +69,7 @@ static int i915_gem_object_get_pages_phy
 	sg->offset = 0;
 	sg->length = obj->base.size;
 
-	sg_assign_page(sg, (struct page *)vaddr);
+	__set_phys_vaddr(sg, vaddr);
 	sg_dma_address(sg) = dma;
 	sg_dma_len(sg) = obj->base.size;
 
@@ -99,7 +110,7 @@ i915_gem_object_put_pages_phys(struct dr
 			       struct sg_table *pages)
 {
 	dma_addr_t dma = sg_dma_address(pages->sgl);
-	void *vaddr = sg_page(pages->sgl);
+	void *vaddr = __get_phys_vaddr(pages->sgl);
 
 	__i915_gem_object_release_shmem(obj, pages, false);
 
@@ -139,7 +150,7 @@ i915_gem_object_put_pages_phys(struct dr
 int i915_gem_object_pwrite_phys(struct drm_i915_gem_object *obj,
 				const struct drm_i915_gem_pwrite *args)
 {
-	void *vaddr = sg_page(obj->mm.pages->sgl) + args->offset;
+	void *vaddr = __get_phys_vaddr(obj->mm.pages->sgl) + args->offset;
 	char __user *user_data = u64_to_user_ptr(args->data_ptr);
 	struct drm_i915_private *i915 = to_i915(obj->base.dev);
 	int err;
@@ -170,7 +181,7 @@ int i915_gem_object_pwrite_phys(struct d
 int i915_gem_object_pread_phys(struct drm_i915_gem_object *obj,
 			       const struct drm_i915_gem_pread *args)
 {
-	void *vaddr = sg_page(obj->mm.pages->sgl) + args->offset;
+	void *vaddr = __get_phys_vaddr(obj->mm.pages->sgl) + args->offset;
 	char __user *user_data = u64_to_user_ptr(args->data_ptr);
 	int err;
 
author maintainer
#141 lore raw

PATCH 136/261 pinctrl: mcp23s08: Initialize mcp->dev and mcp->addr before regmap init

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Judith Mendez <[email protected]>

commit 8473c3a197b57ff01396f7a2ec6ddf65383820d4 upstream.

Regmap initialization triggers regcache_maple_populate() which attempts SPI read to populate cache. SPI read requires mcp->dev and mcp->addr to be set, without them, NULL pointer dereference occurs during probe.

Move initialization before mcp23s08_spi_regmap_init() call.

Fixes f9f4fda15e72 ("pinctrl: mcp23s08: init reg_defaults from HW at probe and switch cache type")
---
 drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-mcp23s08_spi.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-mcp23s08_spi.c +4 -1
index 54f61c8cb1c0..5ed368772adb 100644
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #include "pinctrl-mcp23s08.h"
 
 #define MCP_MAX_DEV_PER_CS	8
+#define MCP23S08_SPI_BASE	0x40
 
 /*
  * A given spi_device can represent up to eight mcp23sxx chips
@@ -173,6 +174,8 @@ static int mcp23s08_probe(struct spi_device *spi)
 	for_each_set_bit(addr, &spi_present_mask, MCP_MAX_DEV_PER_CS) {
 		data->mcp[addr] = &data->chip[--chips];
 		data->mcp[addr]->irq = spi->irq;
+		data->mcp[addr]->dev = dev;
+		data->mcp[addr]->addr = MCP23S08_SPI_BASE | (addr << 1);
 
 		ret = mcp23s08_spi_regmap_init(data->mcp[addr], dev, addr, info);
 		if (ret)
@@ -184,7 +187,7 @@ static int mcp23s08_probe(struct spi_device *spi)
 		if (!data->mcp[addr]->pinctrl_desc.name)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 
-		ret = mcp23s08_probe_one(data->mcp[addr], dev, 0x40 | (addr << 1),
+		ret = mcp23s08_probe_one(data->mcp[addr], dev, MCP23S08_SPI_BASE | (addr << 1),
 					 info->type, -1);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			return ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
author maintainer
#142 lore raw

PATCH 137/261 ksmbd: fix use-after-free of a deferred file_lock on double SMB2_CANCEL

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Gil Portnoy <[email protected]>

commit f580d27e8928828693df44ba2db0fffdbe11dfea upstream.

A deferred byte-range lock (an SMB2_LOCK that blocks) registers an async work on conn->async_requests via setup_async_work(), with cancel_fn = smb2_remove_blocked_lock and cancel_argv[0] pointing at the struct file_lock.

When the request is cancelled, the worker frees the file_lock with locks_free_lock() and takes the cancelled early-exit, which "goto out"s and never reaches release_async_work() -- the only site that unlinks the work from conn->async_requests and clears cancel_fn/cancel_argv. The work therefore stays matchable on async_requests with a live cancel_fn pointing at the freed file_lock, until connection teardown finally runs release_async_work().

smb2_cancel() fires cancel_fn unconditionally with no state guard, so a second SMB2_CANCEL for the same AsyncId, arriving in that window, re-runs smb2_remove_blocked_lock() on the freed file_lock -- a slab use-after-free:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __locks_delete_block
    __locks_delete_block
    locks_delete_block
    ksmbd_vfs_posix_lock_unblock
    smb2_remove_blocked_lock
    smb2_cancel                 <- 2nd SMB2_CANCEL fires cancel_fn
    handle_ksmbd_work
  Allocated by ...: locks_alloc_lock <- smb2_lock
  Freed by ...:     locks_free_lock  <- smb2_lock (cancelled branch)
  ... cache file_lock_cache of size 192

Reproduced on mainline with KASAN by an authenticated SMB client.

Skip a work whose state is already KSMBD_WORK_CANCELLED so its cancel callback cannot be fired a second time.

---
 fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c |   11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +11 -0
@@ -7270,6 +7270,17 @@ int smb2_cancel(struct ksmbd_work *work)
 			    le64_to_cpu(hdr->Id.AsyncId))
 				continue;
 
+			/*
+			 * A cancelled deferred byte-range lock frees its
+			 * file_lock and takes the smb2_lock() early-exit that
+			 * skips release_async_work(), so the work stays on
+			 * conn->async_requests with a live cancel_fn pointing
+			 * at the freed file_lock.  Re-firing it on a second
+			 * SMB2_CANCEL is a use-after-free.
+			 */
+			if (iter->state == KSMBD_WORK_CANCELLED)
+				break;
+
 			ksmbd_debug(SMB,
 				    "smb2 with AsyncId %llu cancelled command = 0x%x\n",
 				    le64_to_cpu(hdr->Id.AsyncId),
author maintainer
#143 lore raw

PATCH 138/261 xfrm: espintcp: do not reuse an in-progress partial send

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wyatt Feng <[email protected]>

commit c381039ade2e161ab08c0eda73c4f8b9a7115928 upstream.

espintcp keeps a single in-flight transmit in ctx->partial. Before building a new sk_msg, espintcp_sendmsg() first tries to flush that state through espintcp_push_msgs().

For blocking callers, espintcp_push_msgs() may return success even when the previous partial send is still pending. espintcp_sendmsg() would then reinitialize emsg->skmsg and reuse ctx->partial while the old transfer still owns that state.

Do not rebuild the send message when ctx->partial is still in progress. If espintcp_push_msgs() returns with emsg->len still set, fail the new send instead of overwriting the live partial state.

This is a memory-safety fix: reusing the live partial-send state can leave a stale offset attached to a new sk_msg and lead to an out-of- bounds read in the send path.

tcp_sendmsg_locked() already handles waiting for send buffer memory, so the fix here is just to preserve espintcp's one-message-at-a-time transmit state.

---
 net/xfrm/espintcp.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
net/xfrm/espintcp.c +4 -0
@@ -349,6 +349,10 @@ static int espintcp_sendmsg(struct sock
 			err = -ENOBUFS;
 		goto unlock;
 	}
+	if (emsg->len) {
+		err = -ENOBUFS;
+		goto unlock;
+	}
 
 	sk_msg_init(&emsg->skmsg);
 	while (1) {
author maintainer
#144 lore raw

PATCH 139/261 USB: serial: io_ti: fix heap overflow in get_manuf_info()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Adrian Korwel <[email protected]>

commit 183c1076eca43bbb3e7bdf597456f91d81c73e74 upstream.

get_manuf_info() reads le16_to_cpu(rom_desc->Size) bytes from the device I2C EEPROM into a buffer allocated with kmalloc_obj(), which is sizeof(struct edge_ti_manuf_descriptor) = 10 bytes.

The Size field comes from the device and is only validated (in check_i2c_image()) to make sure the descriptor fits within TI_MAX_I2C_SIZE (16384 bytes), not against the destination buffer size. A malicious USB device can therefore set Size to any value up to 16377, causing a heap overflow of up to 16367 bytes when plugged into a host running this driver.

valid_csum() is called after read_rom() and also iterates buffer[0..Size-1], compounding the out-of-bounds access.

Fix by rejecting descriptors with unexpected length before calling read_rom().

Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
[ johan: amend commit message; also check for short descriptors ]
---
 drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c +6 -0
@@ -773,6 +773,12 @@ static int get_manuf_info(struct edgepor
 	}
 
 	/* Read the descriptor data */
+	if (le16_to_cpu(rom_desc->Size) != sizeof(struct edge_ti_manuf_descriptor)) {
+		dev_err(dev, "unexpected Edge descriptor length: %u\n",
+			le16_to_cpu(rom_desc->Size));
+		status = -EINVAL;
+		goto exit;
+	}
 	status = read_rom(serial, start_address+sizeof(struct ti_i2c_desc),
 					le16_to_cpu(rom_desc->Size), buffer);
 	if (status)
author maintainer
#145 lore raw

PATCH 140/261 USB: serial: io_ti: fix heap overflow in build_i2c_fw_hdr()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Adrian Korwel <[email protected]>

commit 0fd2b00b2d3d05e3eaa13342b3dfb0fa85c226ae upstream.

build_i2c_fw_hdr() allocates a fixed-size buffer of (16*1024 - 512) + sizeof(struct ti_i2c_firmware_rec) bytes, then copies le16_to_cpu(img_header->Length) bytes into it without validating that Length fits within the available space after the firmware record header.

img_header->Length is a __le16 from the firmware file and can be up to 65535. check_fw_sanity() validates the total firmware size but not img_header->Length specifically.

Fix by rejecting images where img_header->Length exceeds the available destination space.

Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
---
 drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c +5 -0
@@ -844,6 +844,11 @@ static int build_i2c_fw_hdr(u8 *header,
 	/* Pointer to fw_down memory image */
 	img_header = (struct ti_i2c_image_header *)&fw->data[4];
 
+	if (le16_to_cpu(img_header->Length) >
+			buffer_size - sizeof(struct ti_i2c_firmware_rec)) {
+		kfree(buffer);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 	memcpy(buffer + sizeof(struct ti_i2c_firmware_rec),
 		&fw->data[4 + sizeof(struct ti_i2c_image_header)],
 		le16_to_cpu(img_header->Length));
author maintainer
#146 lore raw

PATCH 141/261 USB: serial: option: add usb-id for Dell Wireless DW5826e-m

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jack Wu <[email protected]>

commit 1938fb9fe38c4f04a3f30bea44f8071c80a63be4 upstream.

Add support for Dell DW5826e-m with USB-id 0x413c:0x81ea

T:  Bus=03 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=04 Cnt=01 Dev#=  8 Spd=480  MxCh= 0
D:  Ver= 2.10 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs=  1
P:  Vendor=413c ProdID=81ea Rev= 5.04
S:  Manufacturer=DELL
S:  Product=DW5826e-m Qualcomm Snapdragon X12 Global LTE-A
S:  SerialNumber=358988870177734
C:* #Ifs= 7 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA
A:  FirstIf#=12 IfCount= 2 Cls=02(comm.) Sub=0e Prot=00
I:* If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=30 Driver=option
E:  Ad=01(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=81(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I:* If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=42 Prot=01 Driver=usbfs
E:  Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=82(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I:* If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=60 Driver=option
E:  Ad=84(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS=  10 Ivl=32ms
E:  Ad=83(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=03(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I:* If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option
E:  Ad=86(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS=  10 Ivl=32ms
E:  Ad=85(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=04(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I:* If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=(none)
E:  Ad=87(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS=  64 Ivl=32ms
I:* If#=12 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(comm.) Sub=0e Prot=00 Driver=cdc_mbim
E:  Ad=88(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS=  64 Ivl=32ms
I:  If#=13 Alt= 0 #EPs= 0 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=02 Driver=cdc_mbim
I:* If#=13 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=02 Driver=cdc_mbim
E:  Ad=8e(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E:  Ad=0f(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
---
 drivers/usb/serial/option.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/serial/option.c +3 -0
@@ -202,6 +202,7 @@ static void option_instat_callback(struc
 #define DELL_PRODUCT_5821E_ESIM			0x81e0
 #define DELL_PRODUCT_5829E_ESIM			0x81e4
 #define DELL_PRODUCT_5829E			0x81e6
+#define DELL_PRODUCT_5826E_ESIM			0x81ea
 
 #define DELL_PRODUCT_FM101R_ESIM		0x8213
 #define DELL_PRODUCT_FM101R			0x8215
@@ -1123,6 +1124,8 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option
 	  .driver_info = RSVD(0) | RSVD(6) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(DELL_VENDOR_ID, DELL_PRODUCT_5829E_ESIM),
 	  .driver_info = RSVD(0) | RSVD(6) },
+	{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(DELL_VENDOR_ID, DELL_PRODUCT_5826E_ESIM, 0xff),
+	  .driver_info = RSVD(1) | RSVD(4) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(DELL_VENDOR_ID, DELL_PRODUCT_FM101R, 0xff) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(DELL_VENDOR_ID, DELL_PRODUCT_FM101R_ESIM, 0xff) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(ANYDATA_VENDOR_ID, ANYDATA_PRODUCT_ADU_E100A) },	/* ADU-E100, ADU-310 */
author maintainer
#147 lore raw

PATCH 142/261 USB: serial: kl5kusb105: fix bulk-out buffer overflow

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: HyeongJun An <[email protected]>

commit 96d47e40bf9db4a9efd5c8fb53287a508d165f14 upstream.

klsi_105_prepare_write_buffer() is called by the generic write path with the bulk-out buffer and its size (bulk_out_size, 64 bytes). It stores a two-byte length header at the start of the buffer and copies the payload from the write fifo starting at buf + KLSI_HDR_LEN, but passes the full buffer size as the number of bytes to copy:

count = kfifo_out_locked(&port->write_fifo, buf + KLSI_HDR_LEN,

                           size, &port->lock);

When the fifo holds at least size bytes, size bytes are copied starting two bytes into the size-byte buffer, writing KLSI_HDR_LEN bytes past its end. Copy at most size - KLSI_HDR_LEN bytes instead, leaving room for the header as safe_serial already does.

Writing bulk_out_size or more bytes to the tty triggers a slab out-of-bounds write, observed with KASAN by emulating the device with dummy_hcd and raw-gadget:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kfifo_copy_out+0x83/0xc0
  Write of size 64 at addr ffff888112c62202 by task python3
   kfifo_copy_out
   klsi_105_prepare_write_buffer [kl5kusb105]
   usb_serial_generic_write_start [usbserial]
  Allocated by task 139:
   usb_serial_probe [usbserial]
  The buggy address is located 2 bytes inside of allocated 64-byte region

The out-of-bounds write no longer occurs with this change applied.

Fixes 60b3013cdaf3 ("USB: kl5usb105: reimplement using generic framework")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-8
---
 drivers/usb/serial/kl5kusb105.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/serial/kl5kusb105.c +2 -2
@@ -330,8 +330,8 @@ static int klsi_105_prepare_write_buffer
 	unsigned char *buf = dest;
 	int count;
 
-	count = kfifo_out_locked(&port->write_fifo, buf + KLSI_HDR_LEN, size,
-								&port->lock);
+	count = kfifo_out_locked(&port->write_fifo, buf + KLSI_HDR_LEN,
+				 size - KLSI_HDR_LEN, &port->lock);
 	put_unaligned_le16(count, buf);
 
 	return count + KLSI_HDR_LEN;
author maintainer
#148 lore raw

PATCH 143/261 ALSA: timer: Forcibly close timer instances at closing

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

commit da3039e91d1f835874ed6e9a33ea19ee80c2cb92 upstream.

When snd_timer object is freed via snd_timer_free() and still pending snd_timer_instance objects are assigned to the timer object, it tries to unlink all instances and just set NULL to each ti->timer, then releases the resources immediately. The problem is, however, when there are slave timer instances that are associated with a master instance linked to this timer: namely, those slave instances still point to the freed timer object although the master instance is unlinked, which may lead to user-after-free. The bug can be easily triggered particularly when a new userspace-driven timers (CONFIG_SND_UTIMER) is involved, since it can create and delete the timer object via a simple file open/close, while the other applications may keep accessing to that timer.

This patch is an attempt to paper over the problem above: now instead of just unlinking, call snd_timer_close[_locked]() forcibly for each pending timer instance, so that all assigned slave timer instances are properly detached, too. Since snd_timer_close() might be called later by the driver that created that instance, the check of SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_DEAD is added at the beginning, too.

Fixes 37745918e0e7 ("ALSA: timer: Introduce virtual userspace-driven timers")
---
 sound/core/timer.c |   16 +++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
sound/core/timer.c +9 -7
@@ -422,6 +422,8 @@ static void snd_timer_close_locked(struc
 
 	if (timer) {
 		guard(spinlock_irq)(&timer->lock);
+		if (timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_DEAD)
+			return; /* already closed */
 		timeri->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_DEAD;
 	}
 
@@ -964,18 +966,18 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(snd_timer_new);
 
 static int snd_timer_free(struct snd_timer *timer)
 {
+	struct snd_timer_instance *ti, *n;
+
 	if (!timer)
 		return 0;
 
 	guard(mutex)(&register_mutex);
 	if (! list_empty(&timer->open_list_head)) {
-		struct list_head *p, *n;
-		struct snd_timer_instance *ti;
-		pr_warn("ALSA: timer %p is busy?\n", timer);
-		list_for_each_safe(p, n, &timer->open_list_head) {
-			list_del_init(p);
-			ti = list_entry(p, struct snd_timer_instance, open_list);
-			ti->timer = NULL;
+		list_for_each_entry_safe(ti, n, &timer->open_list_head, open_list) {
+			struct device *card_dev_to_put = NULL;
+
+			snd_timer_close_locked(ti, &card_dev_to_put);
+			put_device(card_dev_to_put);
 		}
 	}
 	list_del(&timer->device_list);
author maintainer
#149 lore raw

PATCH 144/261 ALSA: timer: Fix UAF at snd_timer_user_params()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

commit 053a401b592be424fea9d57c789f66cd5d8cec11 upstream.

At releasing a timer object, e.g. when a userspace timer (CONFIG_SND_UTIMER) gets closed and snd_timer_free() is called, it tries to detach the timer instances and release the resources. However, it's still possible that other in-flight tasks are holding the timer instance where the to-be-deleted timer object is associated, and this may lead to racy accesses.

Fortunately, most of ioctls dealing with the timer instance list already have the protection with register_mutex, and this also avoids such races. But, SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_PARAMS isn't protected, hence the concurrent ioctl may lead to use-after-free.

This patch just adds the guard with register_mutex to protect snd_timer_user_params() for covering the code path as a quick workaround. It's no hot-path but rather a rarely issued ioctl, so the performance penalty doesn't matter.

---
 sound/core/timer.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
sound/core/timer.c +1 -0
@@ -1791,6 +1791,7 @@ static int snd_timer_user_params(struct
 	struct snd_timer *t;
 	int err;
 
+	guard(mutex)(&register_mutex);
 	tu = file->private_data;
 	if (!tu->timeri)
 		return -EBADFD;
author maintainer
#150 lore raw

PATCH 145/261 io_uring/net: inherit IORING_CQE_F_BUF_MORE across bundle recv retries

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Clément Léger <[email protected]>

commit ed46f39c47eb5530a9c161481a2080d3a869cfaf upstream.

When a bundle recv retries inside io_recv_finish(), the merge logic OR the saved cflags from the previous iteration with the cflags returned by the new iteration:
cflags = req->cqe.flags | (cflags & CQE_F_MASK);

Bits listed in CQE_F_MASK are inherited from the new iteration, and all other bits (notably IORING_CQE_F_BUFFER and the buffer ID) come from the saved cflags. Before this change CQE_F_MASK covered only IORING_CQE_F_SOCK_NONEMPTY and IORING_CQE_F_MORE.

When using provided buffer rings (IOU_PBUF_RING_INC) with incremental mode, and bundle recv, io_kbuf_inc_commit() can leave the head ring entry partially consumed, __io_put_kbufs() then sets IORING_CQE_F_BUF_MORE on the returned cflags so userspace knows the buffer ID will be reused for subsequent completions.

Because IORING_CQE_F_BUF_MORE was not in CQE_F_MASK, the merge above silently dropped it whenever the final retry iteration partially consumed the buffer, and the subsequent req->cqe.flags = cflags & ~CQE_F_MASK save would have left a stale IORING_CQE_F_BUF_MORE in the carried-over cflags had one been present. Userspace would then wrongfully advance it ring head past an entry the kernel still uses.

Add IORING_CQE_F_BUF_MORE to CQE_F_MASK so it is both inherited from the new iteration into the user-visible CQE and stripped from the saved cflags between iterations.

Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4.6
Fixes ae98dbf43d75 ("io_uring/kbuf: add support for incremental buffer consumption")
---
 io_uring/net.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
io_uring/net.c +2 -1
@@ -846,7 +846,8 @@ int io_recvmsg_prep(struct io_kiocb *req
 }
 
 /* bits to clear in old and inherit in new cflags on bundle retry */
-#define CQE_F_MASK	(IORING_CQE_F_SOCK_NONEMPTY|IORING_CQE_F_MORE)
+#define CQE_F_MASK	(IORING_CQE_F_SOCK_NONEMPTY|IORING_CQE_F_MORE|\
+			 IORING_CQE_F_BUF_MORE)
 
 /*
  * Finishes io_recv and io_recvmsg.
author maintainer
#151 lore raw

PATCH 146/261 drm/virtio: fix dma_fence refcount leak on error in virtio_gpu_dma_fence_wait()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wentao Liang <[email protected]>

commit 3f26bb732cc136ab20176697c92f32c9c84cb125 upstream.

dma_fence_unwrap_for_each() internally calls dma_fence_unwrap_first() which does cursor->chain = dma_fence_get(head), taking an extra reference. On normal loop completion, dma_fence_unwrap_next() releases this via dma_fence_chain_walk() -> dma_fence_put().

When virtio_gpu_do_fence_wait() fails and the function returns early from inside the loop, the cursor->chain reference is never released. This is the only caller in the entire kernel that does an early return inside dma_fence_unwrap_for_each.

Add dma_fence_put(itr.chain) before the early return.

Fixes eba57fb5498f ("drm/virtio: Wait for each dma-fence of in-fence array individually")
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_submit.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_submit.c +3 -1
@@ -65,8 +65,10 @@ static int virtio_gpu_dma_fence_wait(str
 
 	dma_fence_unwrap_for_each(f, &itr, fence) {
 		err = virtio_gpu_do_fence_wait(submit, f);
-		if (err)
+		if (err) {
+			dma_fence_put(itr.chain);
 			return err;
+		}
 	}
 
 	return 0;
author maintainer
#152 lore raw

PATCH 147/261 drm/amd/display: Reject gpio_bitshift >= 32 in bios_parser_get_gpio_pin_info()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Harry Wentland <[email protected]>

commit 49c3da65961fe9857c831d47fa1989084e87514a upstream.

[Why & How]
gpio_bitshift is a uint8_t read directly from the VBIOS GPIO pin table. If the value is >= 32, the expression "1 << gpio_bitshift" triggers undefined behaviour in C (shift count exceeds type width). On x86 the shift is silently masked to 5 bits, producing an incorrect GPIO mask that may cause wrong MMIO register bits to be toggled.

Validate gpio_bitshift before use and return BP_RESULT_BADBIOSTABLE for out-of-range values.

Fixes ae79c310b1a6 ("drm/amd/display: Add DCE12 bios parser support")
Assisted-by Copilot:claude-opus-4.6
(cherry picked from commit eadf438ab8d370b9d19acee9359918c85afeb80d)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser2.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser2.c +4 -2
@@ -700,8 +700,10 @@ static enum bp_result bios_parser_get_gp
 		info->offset_en = info->offset + 1;
 		info->offset_mask = info->offset - 1;
 
-		info->mask = (uint32_t) (1 <<
-			header->gpio_pin[i].gpio_bitshift);
+		if (header->gpio_pin[i].gpio_bitshift >= 32)
+			return BP_RESULT_BADBIOSTABLE;
+
+		info->mask = 1u << header->gpio_pin[i].gpio_bitshift;
 		info->mask_y = info->mask + 2;
 		info->mask_en = info->mask + 1;
 		info->mask_mask = info->mask - 1;
author maintainer
#153 lore raw

PATCH 148/261 mm/huge_memory: update file PMD counter before folio_put()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yin Tirui <[email protected]>

commit 8d878059924f12c1bc24556a92ec56add74de3c8 upstream.

__split_huge_pmd_locked() updates the file/shmem RSS counter after dropping the PMD mapping's folio reference. If folio_put() drops the last reference, mm_counter_file() can later read freed folio state via folio_test_swapbacked().

Move the counter update before folio_put().

Fixes fadae2953072 ("thp: use mm_file_counter to determine update which rss counter")
Cc Baolin Wang <[email protected]>
Cc Barry Song <[email protected]>
Cc Chen Jun <[email protected]>
Cc Kefeng Wang <[email protected]>
Cc Liam R. Howlett <[email protected]>
Cc Nico Pache <[email protected]>
Cc Ryan Roberts <[email protected]>
Cc Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Cc Yang Shi <[email protected]>
Cc Zi Yan <[email protected]>
---
 mm/huge_memory.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
mm/huge_memory.c +2 -0
@@ -2701,7 +2701,9 @@ static void __split_huge_pmd_locked(stru
 			if (!folio_test_referenced(folio) && pmd_young(old_pmd))
 				folio_set_referenced(folio);
 			folio_remove_rmap_pmd(folio, page, vma);
+			add_mm_counter(mm, mm_counter_file(folio), -HPAGE_PMD_NR);
 			folio_put(folio);
+			return;
 		}
 		add_mm_counter(mm, mm_counter_file(folio), -HPAGE_PMD_NR);
 		return;
author maintainer
#154 lore raw

PATCH 149/261 mm/damon/ops-common: call folio_test_lru() after folio_get()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: SeongJae Park <[email protected]>

commit d6b8b02a27b3dd09ec12144322b3dac46d9bc9ef upstream.

damon_get_folio() speculatively calls folio_test_lru() before folio_try_get(). The folio can get freed and reallocated to a tail page. In the case, VM_BUG_ON_PGFLAGS() in const_folio_flags() can be triggered. Remove the speculative call.

Also mark folio_test_lru() check right after folio_try_get() success as no more unlikely.

The race should be rare. Also the problem can happen only if the kernel has enabled CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_PGFLAGS. No real world report of this issue has been made so far. This fix is based on only theoretical analysis. That said, a bug is a bug. A similar issue was also fixed via commit 3203b3ab0fcf ("mm/filemap: don't call folio_test_locked() without a reference in next_uptodate_folio()"). I don't expect this change will make a meaningful impact to DAMON performance in the real world, though I will be happy to be corrected from the real world reports.

The issue was discovered [1] by Sashiko.

Fixes 3f49584b262c ("mm/damon: implement primitives for the virtual memory address spaces")
Cc Fernand Sieber <[email protected]>
Cc Leonard Foerster <[email protected]>
Cc Shakeel Butt <[email protected]>
Cc <[email protected]> # 5.15.x
---
 mm/damon/ops-common.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
mm/damon/ops-common.c +2 -2
@@ -28,9 +28,9 @@ struct folio *damon_get_folio(unsigned l
 		return NULL;
 
 	folio = page_folio(page);
-	if (!folio_test_lru(folio) || !folio_try_get(folio))
+	if (!folio_try_get(folio))
 		return NULL;
-	if (unlikely(page_folio(page) != folio || !folio_test_lru(folio))) {
+	if (unlikely(page_folio(page) != folio) || !folio_test_lru(folio)) {
 		folio_put(folio);
 		folio = NULL;
 	}
author maintainer
#155 lore raw

PATCH 150/261 RDMA/srp: bound SRP_RSP sense copy by the received length

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>

commit 13e91fd076306f5d0cdfa14f53d69e37274723c4 upstream.

srp_process_rsp() copies sense data from rsp->data + resp_data_len, where resp_data_len is the full 32-bit value supplied by the SRP target and is never checked against the number of bytes actually received (wc->byte_len). The copy length is bounded to SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE, so at most 96 bytes are copied, but the source offset is not bounded.

A malicious or compromised SRP target on the InfiniBand/RoCE fabric that the initiator has logged into can return an SRP_RSP with SRP_RSP_FLAG_SNSVALID set and a large resp_data_len. The receive buffer is allocated at the target-chosen max_ti_iu_len, so the source of the sense copy lands past the bytes actually received; with resp_data_len near 0xFFFFFFFF it is gigabytes past the buffer and the read faults.

Copy the sense data only if it has not been truncated, that is, only if the response header, the response data, and the sense region fit within the bytes actually received; otherwise drop the sense and log. The in-tree iSER and NVMe-RDMA receive paths already bound their parse by wc->byte_len; this brings ib_srp into line with them.

Fixes aef9ec39c47f ("IB: Add SCSI RDMA Protocol (SRP) initiator")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-8
---
 drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c |   30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c +24 -6
@@ -1930,7 +1930,8 @@ static int srp_post_recv(struct srp_rdma
 	return ib_post_recv(ch->qp, &wr, NULL);
 }
 
-static void srp_process_rsp(struct srp_rdma_ch *ch, struct srp_rsp *rsp)
+static void srp_process_rsp(struct srp_rdma_ch *ch, struct srp_rsp *rsp,
+			    u32 byte_len)
 {
 	struct srp_target_port *target = ch->target;
 	struct srp_request *req;
@@ -1971,10 +1972,27 @@ static void srp_process_rsp(struct srp_r
 		scmnd->result = rsp->status;
 
 		if (rsp->flags & SRP_RSP_FLAG_SNSVALID) {
-			memcpy(scmnd->sense_buffer, rsp->data +
-			       be32_to_cpu(rsp->resp_data_len),
-			       min_t(int, be32_to_cpu(rsp->sense_data_len),
-				     SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE));
+			u32 resp_len = be32_to_cpu(rsp->resp_data_len);
+			u32 sense_len = be32_to_cpu(rsp->sense_data_len);
+
+			/*
+			 * The sense data starts resp_data_len bytes past the
+			 * response data area; both lengths come from the
+			 * target-controlled response.  Copy the sense data
+			 * only if it has not been truncated, that is, only if
+			 * the full sense region fits within the bytes actually
+			 * received.  Otherwise the copy source would run past
+			 * the receive buffer (sized to the target-chosen
+			 * max_ti_iu_len), reading out of bounds.
+			 */
+			if (sizeof(*rsp) + (u64)resp_len + sense_len <= byte_len)
+				memcpy(scmnd->sense_buffer,
+				       rsp->data + resp_len,
+				       min(sense_len, SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE));
+			else
+				shost_printk(KERN_ERR, target->scsi_host,
+					     "dropping truncated sense data (resp_data_len %u sense_data_len %u, %u bytes received)\n",
+					     resp_len, sense_len, byte_len);
 		}
 
 		if (unlikely(rsp->flags & SRP_RSP_FLAG_DIUNDER))
@@ -2084,7 +2102,7 @@ static void srp_recv_done(struct ib_cq *
 
 	switch (opcode) {
 	case SRP_RSP:
-		srp_process_rsp(ch, iu->buf);
+		srp_process_rsp(ch, iu->buf, wc->byte_len);
 		break;
 
 	case SRP_CRED_REQ:
author maintainer
#156 lore raw

PATCH 151/261 zram: fix use-after-free in zram_bvec_write_partial()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Cunlong Li <[email protected]>

commit 732fd9f0b9c1cdc6dfd77162ded60df005182cc0 upstream.

zram_read_page() picks the sync or async backing device read path based on whether the parent bio is NULL. zram_bvec_write_partial() passes its parent bio down, so for ZRAM_WB slots the read is dispatched asynchronously and zram_read_page() returns 0 while the bio is still in flight. The caller then runs memcpy_from_bvec(), zram_write_page() and __free_page() on the buffer, leaving the async read to write into a freed page.

zram_bvec_read_partial() was switched to NULL in commit 4e3c87b9421d ("zram: fix synchronous reads") for the same reason; the write_partial counterpart was missed.

---
 drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c +1 -1
@@ -1661,7 +1661,7 @@ static int zram_bvec_write_partial(struc
 	if (!page)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	ret = zram_read_page(zram, page, index, bio);
+	ret = zram_read_page(zram, page, index, NULL);
 	if (!ret) {
 		memcpy_from_bvec(page_address(page) + offset, bvec);
 		ret = zram_write_page(zram, page, index);
author maintainer
#157 lore raw

PATCH 152/261 udp: clear skb->dev before running a sockmap verdict

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sechang Lim <[email protected]>

commit 3c94f241f776562c489876ff506f366224565c21 upstream.

On the UDP receive path skb->dev is repurposed as dev_scratch (the truesize/state cache set by udp_set_dev_scratch()), through the union { struct net_device *dev; unsigned long dev_scratch; } in sk_buff.

When a UDP socket is in a sockmap, sk_data_ready is sk_psock_verdict_data_ready(), which calls udp_read_skb() -> recv_actor() (sk_psock_verdict_recv) to run the attached SK_SKB verdict program in softirq. If that program calls a socket-lookup helper (bpf_sk_lookup_tcp/udp, bpf_skc_lookup_tcp), bpf_skc_lookup() does:

	if (skb->dev)
		caller_net = dev_net(skb->dev);

skb->dev still holds the dev_scratch value (a non-NULL integer), so dev_net() dereferences it as a struct net_device * and the kernel takes a general protection fault on a non-canonical address in softirq:

  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x1010000800004a0
  CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1406 Comm: syz.2.19 Not tainted 7.1.0-rc6 #1 PREEMPT(full)
  RIP: 0010:bpf_skc_lookup net/core/filter.c:7033 [inline]
  RIP: 0010:bpf_sk_lookup+0x45/0x160 net/core/filter.c:7047
  Call Trace:
   <IRQ>
   bpf_prog_4675cb904b7071f8+0x12e/0x14e
   bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu+0xc6/0x1f0
   sk_psock_verdict_recv+0x1ba/0x350
   udp_read_skb+0x31a/0x370
   sk_psock_verdict_data_ready+0x2e3/0x600
   __udp_enqueue_schedule_skb+0x4c8/0x650
   udpv6_queue_rcv_one_skb+0x3ec/0x740
   udp6_unicast_rcv_skb+0x11d/0x140
   ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x61e/0x950
   ip6_input_finish+0xa9/0x150
   NF_HOOK+0x286/0x2f0
   ip6_input+0x117/0x220
   NF_HOOK+0x286/0x2f0
   __netif_receive_skb+0x85/0x200
   process_backlog+0x374/0x9a0
   __napi_poll+0x4f/0x1c0
   net_rx_action+0x3b0/0x770
   handle_softirqs+0x15a/0x460
   do_softirq+0x57/0x80
   </IRQ>

The rmem charge that dev_scratch accounted for is released by skb_recv_udp() on dequeue, just above, so the scratch is dead by the time recv_actor() runs. Clear skb->dev so bpf_skc_lookup() falls back to sock_net(skb->sk), which skb_set_owner_sk_safe() set just above.

---
 net/ipv4/udp.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
net/ipv4/udp.c +8 -0
@@ -1859,6 +1859,14 @@ try_again:
 	}
 
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(!skb_set_owner_sk_safe(skb, sk));
+
+	/*
+	 * skb->dev still aliases the UDP rx dev_scratch (its charge was freed
+	 * on dequeue above); a sockmap verdict program may deref it via
+	 * bpf_sk_lookup_*(), so clear it -> bpf_skc_lookup() uses skb->sk
+	 */
+	skb->dev = NULL;
+
 	return recv_actor(sk, skb);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(udp_read_skb);
author maintainer
#158 lore raw

PATCH 153/261 ARM: socfpga: Fix OF node refcount leak in SMP setup

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yuho Choi <[email protected]>

commit 63838c323924fe4a78b2323bd45aa1030f72ca60 upstream.

socfpga_smp_prepare_cpus() looks up the Cortex-A9 SCU node with of_find_compatible_node(), which returns a node reference that must be released with of_node_put().

The function maps the SCU registers and then returns without dropping that reference, leaking the node on both the success path and the of_iomap() failure path.

Drop the reference once the mapping attempt is complete. The returned MMIO mapping does not depend on keeping the device node reference held.

Fixes 122694a0c712 ("ARM: socfpga: use of_iomap to map the SCU")
---
 arch/arm/mach-socfpga/platsmp.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/arm/mach-socfpga/platsmp.c +1 -0
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ static void __init socfpga_smp_prepare_c
 	}
 
 	socfpga_scu_base_addr = of_iomap(np, 0);
+	of_node_put(np);
 	if (!socfpga_scu_base_addr)
 		return;
 	scu_enable(socfpga_scu_base_addr);
author maintainer
#159 lore raw

PATCH 154/261 ARM: 9474/1: io: avoid KASAN instrumentation of raw halfword I/O

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Karl Mehltretter <[email protected]>

commit d59ed803715a71fb9582e139d648ece8d66dc743 upstream.

For CPUs before ARMv6, __raw_readw() and __raw_writew() are implemented as C volatile halfword accesses so the compiler can generate an access sequence that is safe for those machines. With KASAN enabled, those C accesses are instrumented as normal memory accesses.

That is not valid for MMIO. On ARM926/VersatilePB with KASAN enabled, PL011 probing traps in __asan_store2() while registering the UART, because the instrumented writew() tries to check KASAN shadow for an MMIO address.

Keep the existing volatile halfword access, but move the ARMv5 definitions into __no_kasan_or_inline functions so raw MMIO halfword accesses are not instrumented by KASAN. The ARMv6-and-newer inline assembly path is unchanged.

Fixes 421015713b30 ("ARM: 9017/2: Enable KASan for ARM")
Cc [email protected] # v5.11+
---
 arch/arm/include/asm/io.h |   15 +++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm/include/asm/io.h +13 -2
@@ -56,8 +56,19 @@ void __raw_readsl(const volatile void __
  * the bus. Rather than special-case the machine, just let the compiler
  * generate the access for CPUs prior to ARMv6.
  */
-#define __raw_readw(a)         (__chk_io_ptr(a), *(volatile unsigned short __force *)(a))
-#define __raw_writew(v,a)      ((void)(__chk_io_ptr(a), *(volatile unsigned short __force *)(a) = (v)))
+#define __raw_writew __raw_writew
+static __no_kasan_or_inline void __raw_writew(u16 val, volatile void __iomem *addr)
+{
+	__chk_io_ptr(addr);
+	*(volatile unsigned short __force *)addr = val;
+}
+
+#define __raw_readw __raw_readw
+static __no_kasan_or_inline u16 __raw_readw(const volatile void __iomem *addr)
+{
+	__chk_io_ptr(addr);
+	return *(const volatile unsigned short __force *)addr;
+}
 #else
 /*
  * When running under a hypervisor, we want to avoid I/O accesses with
author maintainer
#160 lore raw

PATCH 155/261 ARM: 9475/1: entry: use byte load for KASAN VMAP stack shadow

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Karl Mehltretter <[email protected]>

commit 77a1f6883dc6e837bb2cb30b9b02e2f94338e2c6 upstream.

Commit 44e9a3bb76e5 ("ARM: 9430/1: entry: Do a dummy read from VMAP shadow") added a dummy read from the KASAN VMAP stack shadow in __switch_to(). The read uses ldr, but the KASAN shadow address is byte-granular and is not guaranteed to be word aligned.

ARMv5 faults unaligned word loads. With CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC and CONFIG_VMAP_STACK enabled, ARM926/VersatilePB crashes in __switch_to() with an alignment exception before reaching init.

Use ldrb for the dummy shadow access. The code only needs to fault in the shadow mapping if the stack shadow is missing, so a byte load is sufficient and matches the granularity of KASAN shadow memory.

Fixes 44e9a3bb76e5 ("ARM: 9430/1: entry: Do a dummy read from VMAP shadow")
Cc [email protected] # v6.13+
---
 arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S +1 -1
@@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to)
 	@ are using KASAN
 	mov_l	r2, KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET
 	add	r2, r2, ip, lsr #KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT
-	ldr	r2, [r2]
+	ldrb	r2, [r2]
 #endif
 #endif
 
author maintainer
#161 lore raw

PATCH 156/261 mptcp: fix retransmission loop when csum is enabled

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>

commit d1918b36edcaed0ec4ef6888b2358c6b1ddcff47 upstream.

Sashiko noted that retransmission with csum enabled can actually transmit new data, but currently the relevant code does not update accordingly snd_nxt.

The may cause incoming ack drop and an endless retransmission loop.

Address the issue incrementing snd_nxt as needed.

---
 net/mptcp/protocol.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
net/mptcp/protocol.c +4 -0
@@ -2810,6 +2810,10 @@ static void __mptcp_retrans(struct sock
 	msk->bytes_retrans += len;
 	dfrag->already_sent = max(dfrag->already_sent, len);
 
+	/* With csum enabled retransmission can send new data. */
+	if (after64(dfrag->already_sent + dfrag->data_seq, msk->snd_nxt))
+		WRITE_ONCE(msk->snd_nxt, dfrag->already_sent + dfrag->data_seq);
+
 reset_timer:
 	mptcp_check_and_set_pending(sk);
 
author maintainer
#162 lore raw

PATCH 157/261 mptcp: close TOCTOU race while computing rcv_wnd

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>

commit 8ab24fdebc369c0dfb90f82c1650b1e66662bb45 upstream.

The MPTCP output path access locklessly the MPTCP-level ack_seq in multiple times, using possibly different values for the data_ack in the DSS option and to compute the announced rcv wnd for the same packet.

Refactor the cote to avoid inconsistencies which may confuse the peer. Also ensure that the MPTCP level rcv wnd is updated only when the egress packet actually contains a DSS ack.

---
 net/mptcp/options.c |   36 ++++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
net/mptcp/options.c +18 -18
@@ -571,7 +571,6 @@ static bool mptcp_established_options_ds
 	struct mptcp_ext *mpext;
 	unsigned int ack_size;
 	bool ret = false;
-	u64 ack_seq;
 
 	opts->csum_reqd = READ_ONCE(msk->csum_enabled);
 	mpext = skb ? mptcp_get_ext(skb) : NULL;
@@ -602,14 +601,11 @@ static bool mptcp_established_options_ds
 		return ret;
 	}
 
-	ack_seq = READ_ONCE(msk->ack_seq);
 	if (READ_ONCE(msk->use_64bit_ack)) {
 		ack_size = TCPOLEN_MPTCP_DSS_ACK64;
-		opts->ext_copy.data_ack = ack_seq;
 		opts->ext_copy.ack64 = 1;
 	} else {
 		ack_size = TCPOLEN_MPTCP_DSS_ACK32;
-		opts->ext_copy.data_ack32 = (uint32_t)ack_seq;
 		opts->ext_copy.ack64 = 0;
 	}
 	opts->ext_copy.use_ack = 1;
@@ -1296,19 +1292,14 @@ bool mptcp_incoming_options(struct sock
 	return true;
 }
 
-static void mptcp_set_rwin(struct tcp_sock *tp, struct tcphdr *th)
+static u64 mptcp_set_rwin(struct mptcp_sock *msk, struct tcp_sock *tp,
+			  struct tcphdr *th, u64 ack_seq)
 {
 	const struct sock *ssk = (const struct sock *)tp;
-	struct mptcp_subflow_context *subflow;
-	u64 ack_seq, rcv_wnd_old, rcv_wnd_new;
-	struct mptcp_sock *msk;
+	u64 rcv_wnd_old, rcv_wnd_new;
 	u32 new_win;
 	u64 win;
 
-	subflow = mptcp_subflow_ctx(ssk);
-	msk = mptcp_sk(subflow->conn);
-
-	ack_seq = READ_ONCE(msk->ack_seq);
 	rcv_wnd_new = ack_seq + tp->rcv_wnd;
 
 	rcv_wnd_old = atomic64_read(&msk->rcv_wnd_sent);
@@ -1360,7 +1351,7 @@ raise_win:
 
 update_wspace:
 	WRITE_ONCE(msk->old_wspace, tp->rcv_wnd);
-	subflow->rcv_wnd_sent = rcv_wnd_new;
+	return rcv_wnd_new;
 }
 
 static void mptcp_track_rwin(struct tcp_sock *tp)
@@ -1472,13 +1463,25 @@ void mptcp_write_options(struct tcphdr *
 		*ptr++ = mptcp_option(MPTCPOPT_DSS, len, 0, flags);
 
 		if (mpext->use_ack) {
+			struct mptcp_sock *msk;
+			u64 ack_seq;
+
+			/* DSS option is set only by mptcp_established_options,
+			 * the caller is __tcp_transmit_skb() and ssk is always
+			 * not NULL.
+			 */
+			subflow = mptcp_subflow_ctx(ssk);
+			msk = mptcp_sk(subflow->conn);
+			ack_seq = READ_ONCE(msk->ack_seq);
 			if (mpext->ack64) {
-				put_unaligned_be64(mpext->data_ack, ptr);
+				put_unaligned_be64(ack_seq, ptr);
 				ptr += 2;
 			} else {
-				put_unaligned_be32(mpext->data_ack32, ptr);
+				put_unaligned_be32(ack_seq, ptr);
 				ptr += 1;
 			}
+			subflow->rcv_wnd_sent = mptcp_set_rwin(msk, tp, th,
+							       ack_seq);
 		}
 
 		if (mpext->use_map) {
@@ -1706,9 +1709,6 @@ mp_capable_done:
 			i += 4;
 		}
 	}
-
-	if (tp)
-		mptcp_set_rwin(tp, th);
 }
 
 __be32 mptcp_get_reset_option(const struct sk_buff *skb)
author maintainer
#163 lore raw

PATCH 158/261 mptcp: allow subflow rcv wnd to shrink

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>

commit da23be77e1292cd611e736c3aa17da633d7ddce7 upstream.

In MPTCP connection, the window field in the TCP header refers to the MPTCP-level rcv_nxt and it's right edge should not move backward. Such constraint is enforced at DSS option generation time.

At the same time, the TCP stack ensures independently that the TCP-level rcv wnd right's edge does not move backward. That in turn causes artificial inflating of the MPTCP rcv window when the incoming data is acked at the TCP level and is OoO in the MPTCP sequence space (or lands in the backlog).

As a consequence, the incoming traffic can exceed the receiver rcvbuf size even when the sender is not misbehaving.

Prevent such scenario forcibly allowing the TCP subflow to shrink the TCP-level rcv wnd regardless of the current netns setting.

---
 net/mptcp/options.c |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
net/mptcp/options.c +7 -0
@@ -567,6 +567,7 @@ static bool mptcp_established_options_ds
 {
 	struct mptcp_subflow_context *subflow = mptcp_subflow_ctx(sk);
 	struct mptcp_sock *msk = mptcp_sk(subflow->conn);
+	struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
 	unsigned int dss_size = 0;
 	struct mptcp_ext *mpext;
 	unsigned int ack_size;
@@ -615,6 +616,12 @@ static bool mptcp_established_options_ds
 	if (dss_size == 0)
 		ack_size += TCPOLEN_MPTCP_DSS_BASE;
 
+	/* The caller is __tcp_transmit_skb(), and will compute the new rcv
+	 * wnd soon: ensure that the window can shrink.
+	 */
+	if (skb)
+		tp->rcv_wnd = tp->rcv_nxt - tp->rcv_wup;
+
 	dss_size += ack_size;
 
 	*size = ALIGN(dss_size, 4);
author maintainer
#164 lore raw

PATCH 159/261 mptcp: sockopt: check timestamping ret value

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <[email protected]>

commit 57132affbc89c02e1bf73fdf5724311bdc9a29da upstream.

sock_set_timestamping() can fail for different reasons. The returned value should then be checked.

If sock_set_timestamping() fails for at least one subflow, the first error is now reported to the userspace, similar to what is done with other socket options.

---
 net/mptcp/sockopt.c |    8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/mptcp/sockopt.c +6 -2
@@ -235,15 +235,19 @@ static int mptcp_setsockopt_sol_socket_t
 
 	mptcp_for_each_subflow(msk, subflow) {
 		struct sock *ssk = mptcp_subflow_tcp_sock(subflow);
+		int err;
 
 		lock_sock(ssk);
-		sock_set_timestamping(ssk, optname, timestamping);
+		err = sock_set_timestamping(ssk, optname, timestamping);
 		release_sock(ssk);
+
+		if (err < 0 && ret == 0)
+			ret = err;
 	}
 
 	release_sock(sk);
 
-	return 0;
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static int mptcp_setsockopt_sol_socket_linger(struct mptcp_sock *msk, sockptr_t optval,
author maintainer
#165 lore raw

PATCH 160/261 selftests: mptcp: add test for extra_subflows underflow on userspace PM

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tao Cui <[email protected]>

commit 06fd2bec7aebf393288e4b78924482fe170caabc upstream.

Add a test to verify that when userspace PM fails to create a subflow (e.g. using an unreachable address), the extra_subflows counter is not decremented below zero.

---
 tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh +4 -0
@@ -3711,6 +3711,10 @@ userspace_tests()
 		chk_rm_nr 0 1
 		chk_mptcp_info subflows 0 subflows 0
 		chk_subflows_total 1 1
+		# check counters are not affected by errors at creation time
+		userspace_pm_add_sf $ns2 10.0.12.2 10 2>/dev/null
+		chk_mptcp_info subflows 0 subflows 0
+		chk_subflows_total 1 1
 		kill_events_pids
 		mptcp_lib_kill_group_wait $tests_pid
 	fi
author maintainer
#166 lore raw

PATCH 161/261 mptcp: add-addr: always drop other suboptions

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <[email protected]>

commit bd34fa0257261b76964df1c98f44b3cb4ee14620 upstream.

When an ADD_ADDR needs to be sent, it could be prepared if there is enough remaining space and even if the packet is not a pure ACK. But it would be dropped soon after.

Indeed, in mptcp_pm_add_addr_signal(), there is enough space to fit a DSS of 20 octets and an ADD_ADDR echo containing an IPv4 address on 8 octets for example. In this case, the packet would be prepared, the MPTCP_ADD_ADDR_ECHO bit would be removed from pm->addr_signal, but the option would be silently dropped in mptcp_established_options_add_addr() not to override DSS info in the union from 'struct mptcp_out_options', and also because mptcp_write_options() will enforce mutually exclusion with DSS.

Instead, don't even try to send an ADD_ADDR if it is not a pure ACK. Retry for each new packet until a pure-ACK is emitted. That's fine to do that, because each time an ADD_ADDR (echo) is scheduled, a pure ACK is queued.

This also simplifies the code, and the skb checks can be done earlier, before the lock.

Note: also, since commit 6d0060f600ad ("mptcp: Write MPTCP DSS headers to outgoing data packets"), opts->ahmac would not have been set to 0 when other suboptions were not dropped, and when sending an ADD_ADDR echo. That would have resulted in sending an ADD_ADDR using garbage info, where there was not enough space, instead of an echo one without the ADD_ADDR HMAC.

---
 net/mptcp/options.c  |   30 +++++++-----------------------
 net/mptcp/pm.c       |   15 ++++-----------
 net/mptcp/protocol.h |    7 +++----
 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
net/mptcp/options.c +7 -23
@@ -662,7 +662,6 @@ static bool mptcp_established_options_ad
 {
 	struct mptcp_subflow_context *subflow = mptcp_subflow_ctx(sk);
 	struct mptcp_sock *msk = mptcp_sk(subflow->conn);
-	bool drop_other_suboptions = false;
 	unsigned int opt_size = *size;
 	struct mptcp_addr_info addr;
 	bool echo;
@@ -673,36 +672,20 @@ static bool mptcp_established_options_ad
 	 */
 	if (!mptcp_pm_should_add_signal(msk) ||
 	    (opts->suboptions & (OPTION_MPTCP_MPJ_ACK | OPTION_MPTCP_MPC_ACK)) ||
-	    !mptcp_pm_add_addr_signal(msk, skb, opt_size, remaining, &addr,
-		    &echo, &drop_other_suboptions))
+	    !skb || !skb_is_tcp_pure_ack(skb) ||
+	    !mptcp_pm_add_addr_signal(msk, opt_size, remaining, &addr, &echo))
 		return false;
 
-	/*
-	 * Later on, mptcp_write_options() will enforce mutually exclusion with
-	 * DSS, bail out if such option is set and we can't drop it.
-	 */
-	if (drop_other_suboptions)
-		remaining += opt_size;
-	else if (opts->suboptions & OPTION_MPTCP_DSS)
-		return false;
+	remaining += opt_size;
 
 	len = mptcp_add_addr_len(addr.family, echo, !!addr.port);
 	if (remaining < len)
 		return false;
 
 	*size = len;
-	if (drop_other_suboptions) {
-		pr_debug("drop other suboptions\n");
-		opts->suboptions = 0;
-
-		/* note that e.g. DSS could have written into the memory
-		 * aliased by ahmac, we must reset the field here
-		 * to avoid appending the hmac even for ADD_ADDR echo
-		 * options
-		 */
-		opts->ahmac = 0;
-		*size -= opt_size;
-	}
+	pr_debug("drop other suboptions\n");
+	opts->suboptions = 0;
+	*size -= opt_size;
 	opts->addr = addr;
 	opts->suboptions |= OPTION_MPTCP_ADD_ADDR;
 	if (!echo) {
@@ -712,6 +695,7 @@ static bool mptcp_established_options_ad
 						     &opts->addr);
 	} else {
 		MPTCP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), MPTCP_MIB_ECHOADDTX);
+		opts->ahmac = 0;
 	}
 	pr_debug("addr_id=%d, ahmac=%llu, echo=%d, port=%d\n",
 		 opts->addr.id, opts->ahmac, echo, ntohs(opts->addr.port));
net/mptcp/pm.c +4 -11
@@ -329,10 +329,9 @@ void mptcp_pm_mp_fail_received(struct so
 
 /* path manager helpers */
 
-bool mptcp_pm_add_addr_signal(struct mptcp_sock *msk, const struct sk_buff *skb,
-			      unsigned int opt_size, unsigned int remaining,
-			      struct mptcp_addr_info *addr, bool *echo,
-			      bool *drop_other_suboptions)
+bool mptcp_pm_add_addr_signal(struct mptcp_sock *msk, unsigned int opt_size,
+			      unsigned int remaining,
+			      struct mptcp_addr_info *addr, bool *echo)
 {
 	bool skip_add_addr = false;
 	int ret = false;
@@ -350,10 +349,7 @@ bool mptcp_pm_add_addr_signal(struct mpt
 	 * plain dup-ack from TCP perspective. The other MPTCP-relevant info,
 	 * if any, will be carried by the 'original' TCP ack
 	 */
-	if (skb && skb_is_tcp_pure_ack(skb)) {
-		remaining += opt_size;
-		*drop_other_suboptions = true;
-	}
+	remaining += opt_size;
 
 	*echo = mptcp_pm_should_add_signal_echo(msk);
 	if (*echo) {
@@ -371,9 +367,6 @@ bool mptcp_pm_add_addr_signal(struct mpt
 	if (remaining < mptcp_add_addr_len(family, *echo, port)) {
 		struct net *net = sock_net((struct sock *)msk);
 
-		if (!*drop_other_suboptions)
-			goto out_unlock;
-
 		if (*echo) {
 			MPTCP_INC_STATS(net, MPTCP_MIB_ECHOADDTXDROP);
 		} else {
net/mptcp/protocol.h +3 -4
@@ -1130,10 +1130,9 @@ static inline int mptcp_rm_addr_len(cons
 	return TCPOLEN_MPTCP_RM_ADDR_BASE + roundup(rm_list->nr - 1, 4) + 1;
 }
 
-bool mptcp_pm_add_addr_signal(struct mptcp_sock *msk, const struct sk_buff *skb,
-			      unsigned int opt_size, unsigned int remaining,
-			      struct mptcp_addr_info *addr, bool *echo,
-			      bool *drop_other_suboptions);
+bool mptcp_pm_add_addr_signal(struct mptcp_sock *msk, unsigned int opt_size,
+			      unsigned int remaining,
+			      struct mptcp_addr_info *addr, bool *echo);
 bool mptcp_pm_rm_addr_signal(struct mptcp_sock *msk, unsigned int remaining,
 			     struct mptcp_rm_list *rm_list);
 int mptcp_pm_get_local_id(struct mptcp_sock *msk, struct sock_common *skc);
author maintainer
#167 lore raw

PATCH 162/261 wifi: nl80211: reject oversized EMA RNR lists

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yuqi Xu <[email protected]>

commit 4cd92957e8f8cc4ebfe8a5d4203c14c592fde6b1 upstream.

nl80211_parse_rnr_elems() stores the parsed element count in a u8-backed cfg80211_rnr_elems::cnt field and uses that count to size the flexible array allocation.

Reject nested NL80211_ATTR_EMA_RNR_ELEMS input once the count reaches 255, before incrementing it again. This keeps the parser aligned with the data structure it fills and matches the existing bound check used by nl80211_parse_mbssid_elems().

---
 net/wireless/nl80211.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
net/wireless/nl80211.c +3 -0
@@ -5591,6 +5591,9 @@ nl80211_parse_rnr_elems(struct wiphy *wi
 		if (ret)
 			return ERR_PTR(ret);
 
+		if (num_elems >= 255)
+			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
 		num_elems++;
 	}
 
author maintainer
#168 lore raw

PATCH 163/261 vsock/vmci: fix sk_ack_backlog leak on failed handshake

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Raf Dickson <[email protected]>

commit c05fa14db43ebef3bd862ca9d073981c0358b3f0 upstream.

When vmci_transport_recv_connecting_server() returns an error, vmci_transport_recv_listen() calls vsock_remove_pending() but never calls sk_acceptq_removed(). This leaves sk_ack_backlog incremented permanently.

Repeated handshake failures (malformed packets, queue pair alloc failure, event subscribe failure) cause sk_ack_backlog to climb toward sk_max_ack_backlog. Once it reaches the limit the listener permanently refuses all new connections with -ECONNREFUSED, a silent denial of service requiring a process restart to recover.

The two existing sk_acceptq_removed() calls in af_vsock.c do not cover this path: line 764 checks vsock_is_pending() which returns false after vsock_remove_pending(), and line 1889 is only reached on successful accept().

Fix by balancing sk_acceptq_added() with sk_acceptq_removed() on the error path.

---
 net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c +3 -1
@@ -972,8 +972,10 @@ static int vmci_transport_recv_listen(st
 			err = -EINVAL;
 		}
 
-		if (err < 0)
+		if (err < 0) {
 			vsock_remove_pending(sk, pending);
+			sk_acceptq_removed(sk);
+		}
 
 		release_sock(pending);
 		vmci_transport_release_pending(pending);
author maintainer
#169 lore raw

PATCH 164/261 timers/migration: Fix livelock in tmigr_handle_remote_up()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Amit Matityahu <[email protected]>

commit d486b4934a8e504376b85cdb3766f306d57aff5b upstream.

tmigr_handle_remote_cpu() skips timer_expire_remote() when cpu == smp_processor_id(), assuming the local softirq path already handled this CPU's timers.

This assumption is wrong because jiffies can advance after the handling of the CPU's global timers in run_timer_base(BASE_GLOBAL) and before tmigr_handle_remote() evaluates the expiry times.

As a consequence a timer which expires after the CPU local timer wheel advanced and becomes expired in the remote handling is ignored and the callback is never invoked and removed from the timer wheel.

What's worse is that fetch_next_timer_interrupt_remote() keeps reporting it as expired, and the event is re-queued with expires == now on each iteration. The goto-again loop spins indefinitely.

Fix this by calling timer_expire_remote() unconditionally. That's minimal overhead for the common case as __run_timer_base() returns immediately if there is nothing to expire in the local wheel.

[ tglx: Amend change log and add a comment ]

---
 kernel/time/timer_migration.c |    8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/time/timer_migration.c +6 -2
@@ -931,8 +931,12 @@ static void tmigr_handle_remote_cpu(unsi
 	/* Drop the lock to allow the remote CPU to exit idle */
 	raw_spin_unlock_irq(&tmc->lock);
 
-	if (cpu != smp_processor_id())
-		timer_expire_remote(cpu);
+	/*
+	 * This can't exclude the local CPU because jiffies might have advanced
+	 * after the timer softirq invoked run_timer_base(BASE_GLOBAL) and the
+	 * point where the jiffies snapshot @jif was taken in tmigr_handle_remote().
+	 */
+	timer_expire_remote(cpu);
 
 	/*
 	 * Lock ordering needs to be preserved - timer_base locks before tmigr
author maintainer
#170 lore raw

PATCH 165/261 ASoC: fsl_sai: Fix 32 slots TDM broken by integer shift UB in xMR write

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Chancel Liu <[email protected]>

commit 4790af1cc2e8871fb31f28c66e42b9a949a23992 upstream.

When configuring 32 slots TDM (channels == slots == 32), the xMR (Mask Register) write used:
~0UL - ((1 << min(channels, slots)) - 1)

The literal "1" is a signed 32-bit int. Shifting it by 32 positions is undefined behaviour which may set this register to 0xFFFFFFFF, masking all 32 slots.

Use GENMASK_U32() macro instead. For 32 slots this produces a zero mask:
~GENMASK_U32(31, 0) = ~0xFFFFFFFF = 0x00000000
Behaviour for fewer than 32 slots is unchanged.

Fixes 770f58d7d2c5 ("ASoC: fsl_sai: Support multiple data channel enable bits")
---
 sound/soc/fsl/fsl_sai.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/soc/fsl/fsl_sai.c +1 -1
@@ -714,7 +714,7 @@ static int fsl_sai_hw_params(struct snd_
 				   FSL_SAI_CR4_FSD_MSTR, FSL_SAI_CR4_FSD_MSTR);
 
 	regmap_write(sai->regmap, FSL_SAI_xMR(tx),
-		     ~0UL - ((1 << min(channels, slots)) - 1));
+		     ~GENMASK_U32(min(channels, slots) - 1, 0));
 
 	return 0;
 }
author maintainer
#171 lore raw

PATCH 166/261 bnxt_en: Fix NULL pointer dereference

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kyle Meyer <[email protected]>

commit d930276f2cddd0b7294cac7a8fe7b877f6d9e08d upstream.

PCIe errors detected by a Root Port or Downstream Port cause error recovery services to run on all subordinate devices regardless of administrative state.

The .error_detected() callback, bnxt_io_error_detected(), disables and synchronizes IRQs via bnxt_disable_int_sync(), which calls bnxt_cp_num_to_irq_num() to map completion rings to IRQs using bp->bnapi.

Since bp->bnapi is allocated on NIC open and freed on NIC close, PCIe error recovery on a closed NIC can dereference a NULL pointer.

Check if bp->bnapi is NULL before disabling and synchronizing IRQs.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c +1 -1
@@ -5419,7 +5419,7 @@ static void bnxt_disable_int_sync(struct
 {
 	int i;
 
-	if (!bp->irq_tbl)
+	if (!bp->irq_tbl || !bp->bnapi)
 		return;
 
 	atomic_inc(&bp->intr_sem);
author maintainer
#172 lore raw

PATCH 167/261 IB/isert: Reject login PDUs shorter than ISER_HEADERS_LEN

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>

commit 29e7b925ae6df64894e82ab6419994dc25580a8a upstream.

In drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c, isert_login_recv_done() computes the login request payload length as wc->byte_len minus ISER_HEADERS_LEN with no lower bound, and login_req_len is a signed int. A remote iSER initiator can post a login Send work request carrying fewer than ISER_HEADERS_LEN (76) bytes, so the subtraction underflows and login_req_len becomes negative.

isert_rx_login_req() then reads that negative length back into a signed int, takes size = min(rx_buflen, MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS), and because the min() is signed it keeps the negative value; the value is then passed as the memcpy() length and sign-extended to a multi-gigabyte size_t. The copy into the 8192-byte login->req_buf runs far out of bounds and faults, crashing the target node. The login phase precedes iSCSI authentication, so no credentials are required to reach this path.

Reject any login PDU shorter than ISER_HEADERS_LEN before the subtraction, mirroring the existing early return on a failed work completion, so login_req_len can never go negative. The upper bound was already safe: a posted login buffer cannot deliver more than ISER_RX_PAYLOAD_SIZE, so the difference stays at or below MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS and the existing min() clamps it; only the missing lower bound needs to be added.

Fixes b8d26b3be8b3 ("iser-target: Add iSCSI Extensions for RDMA (iSER) target driver")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-8
---
 drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c +6 -0
@@ -1385,6 +1385,12 @@ isert_login_recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq,
 	ib_dma_sync_single_for_cpu(ib_dev, isert_conn->login_desc->dma_addr,
 			ISER_RX_SIZE, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
 
+	if (unlikely(wc->byte_len < ISER_HEADERS_LEN)) {
+		isert_dbg("login request length %u is too short\n",
+			  wc->byte_len);
+		return;
+	}
+
 	isert_conn->login_req_len = wc->byte_len - ISER_HEADERS_LEN;
 
 	if (isert_conn->conn) {
author maintainer
#173 lore raw

PATCH 168/261 inet: frags: fix use-after-free caused by the fqdir_pre_exit() flush

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hyunwoo Kim <[email protected]>

commit 32594b09854970d7ba83eb2dc8c69a2edd158c8e upstream.

On netns teardown, fqdir_pre_exit() walks the fqdir rhashtable and flushes every fragment queue that is not yet complete using inet_frag_queue_flush(). That helper frees all the skbs queued on the fragment queue but does not set INET_FRAG_COMPLETE, and leaves q->fragments_tail and q->last_run_head pointing at the freed skbs. The queue itself stays in the rhashtable.

fqdir_pre_exit() first lowers high_thresh to 0 to stop new queue lookups, but it cannot stop a fragment that already obtained the queue through inet_frag_find() earlier and stalled just before taking the queue lock. Once that fragment resumes after the flush and takes the queue lock, it passes the INET_FRAG_COMPLETE check and then dereferences the freed fragments_tail. inet_frag_queue_insert() reads FRAG_CB() and ->len of that pointer and, on the append path, writes ->next_frag, causing a slab use-after-free. IPv6, nf_conntrack_reasm6 and 6lowpan reassembly share the same flush path and are affected as well.

Reset rb_fragments, fragments_tail and last_run_head in inet_frag_queue_flush() so a flushed queue no longer points at the freed skbs. A fragment that resumes after the flush and takes the queue lock then finds an empty queue and starts a new run instead of dereferencing the freed fragments_tail. ip_frag_reinit() already performed this reset after its own flush, so drop the now duplicate code there.

---
 net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c |    3 +++
 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c   |    3 ---
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c +3 -0
@@ -329,6 +329,9 @@ void inet_frag_queue_flush(struct inet_f
 	reason = reason ?: SKB_DROP_REASON_FRAG_REASM_TIMEOUT;
 	sum = inet_frag_rbtree_purge(&q->rb_fragments, reason);
 	sub_frag_mem_limit(q->fqdir, sum);
+	q->rb_fragments = RB_ROOT;
+	q->fragments_tail = NULL;
+	q->last_run_head = NULL;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_frag_queue_flush);
 
net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c +0 -3
@@ -265,9 +265,6 @@ static int ip_frag_reinit(struct ipq *qp
 	qp->q.flags = 0;
 	qp->q.len = 0;
 	qp->q.meat = 0;
-	qp->q.rb_fragments = RB_ROOT;
-	qp->q.fragments_tail = NULL;
-	qp->q.last_run_head = NULL;
 	qp->iif = 0;
 	qp->ecn = 0;
 
author maintainer
#174 lore raw

PATCH 169/261 pidfd: refuse access to tasks that have started exiting harder

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>

commit 62c4d31d78294bd61cf3403626b789e854357177 upstream.

The recent ptrace fix closed a hole where someone could rely on task->mm becoming NULL during do_exit() to bypass dumpability checks. This api here leans on on the very same check and so inherits the fix.

But there is no good reason to let it succeed at all once the target has entered do_exit(). PF_EXITING is set by exit_signals() at the very top of do_exit(), before exit_mm() and exit_files() run. Once we observe it, the task is committed to dying and exit_files() will release the fdtable shortly.

---
 kernel/pid.c |    8 +++++---
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
kernel/pid.c +5 -3
@@ -674,10 +674,12 @@ static struct file *__pidfd_fget(struct
 	if (ret)
 		return ERR_PTR(ret);
 
-	if (ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS))
-		file = fget_task(task, fd);
-	else
+	if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS))
 		file = ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+	else if (task->flags & PF_EXITING)
+		file = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH);
+	else
+		file = fget_task(task, fd);
 
 	up_read(&task->signal->exec_update_lock);
 
author maintainer
#175 lore raw

PATCH 170/261 fs/qnx6: fix pointer arithmetic in directory iteration

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Arpith Kalaginanavoor <[email protected]>

commit 89c4a1167f3a0a0efd2ec3e1801036d2eb65ae1a upstream.

The conversion to qnx6_get_folio() in commit b2aa61556fcf ("qnx6: Convert qnx6_get_page() to qnx6_get_folio()") introduced a regression in directory iteration. The pointer 'de' and the 'limit' address were calculated using byte offsets from a char pointer without scaling by the size of a QNX6 directory entry.

This causes the driver to read from incorrect memory offsets, leading to "invalid direntry size" errors and premature termination of directory scans.

Fix this by casting 'kaddr' to 'struct qnx6_dir_entry *' before applying the offset and last_entry(...) increments. This allows the compiler to correctly scale the pointer arithmetic by the 32-byte stride of the directory entry structure.

---
 fs/qnx6/dir.c |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/qnx6/dir.c +4 -4
@@ -131,16 +131,16 @@ static int qnx6_readdir(struct file *fil
 		struct qnx6_dir_entry *de;
 		struct folio *folio;
 		char *kaddr = qnx6_get_folio(inode, n, &folio);
-		char *limit;
+		struct qnx6_dir_entry *limit;
 
 		if (IS_ERR(kaddr)) {
 			pr_err("%s(): read failed\n", __func__);
 			ctx->pos = (n + 1) << PAGE_SHIFT;
 			return PTR_ERR(kaddr);
 		}
-		de = (struct qnx6_dir_entry *)(kaddr + offset);
-		limit = kaddr + last_entry(inode, n);
-		for (; (char *)de < limit; de++, ctx->pos += QNX6_DIR_ENTRY_SIZE) {
+		de = (struct qnx6_dir_entry *)kaddr + offset;
+		limit = (struct qnx6_dir_entry *)kaddr + last_entry(inode, n);
+		for (; de < limit; de++, ctx->pos += QNX6_DIR_ENTRY_SIZE) {
 			int size = de->de_size;
 			u32 no_inode = fs32_to_cpu(sbi, de->de_inode);
 
author maintainer
#176 lore raw

PATCH 171/261 fuse: reject fuse_notify() pagecache ops on directories

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jann Horn <[email protected]>

commit 9c954499d43aefac01c5dfb57a82b13d2dcf4b94 upstream.

The operations FUSE_NOTIFY_STORE and FUSE_NOTIFY_RETRIEVE allow the FUSE daemon to actively write/read pagecache contents.

For directories with FOPEN_CACHE_DIR, the pagecache is used as kernel-internal cache storage, and userspace is not supposed to have direct access to this cache - in particular, fuse_parse_cache() will hit WARN_ON() if the cache contains bogus data.

Reject FUSE_NOTIFY_STORE and FUSE_NOTIFY_RETRIEVE on anything other than regular files with -EINVAL.

---
 fs/fuse/dev.c |    9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/fuse/dev.c +8 -1
@@ -1644,6 +1644,10 @@ static int fuse_notify_store(struct fuse
 	inode = fuse_ilookup(fc, nodeid,  NULL);
 	if (!inode)
 		goto out_up_killsb;
+	if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) {
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_iput;
+	}
 
 	mapping = inode->i_mapping;
 	index = outarg.offset >> PAGE_SHIFT;
@@ -1815,7 +1819,10 @@ static int fuse_notify_retrieve(struct f
 
 	inode = fuse_ilookup(fc, nodeid, &fm);
 	if (inode) {
-		err = fuse_retrieve(fm, inode, &outarg);
+		if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+			err = -EINVAL;
+		else
+			err = fuse_retrieve(fm, inode, &outarg);
 		iput(inode);
 	}
 	up_read(&fc->killsb);
author maintainer
#177 lore raw

PATCH 172/261 i2c: qcom-cci: Fix NULL pointer dereference in cci_remove()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vladimir Zapolskiy <[email protected]>

commit 729ac5a4b966aac42e08a94dea966f4429008548 upstream.

On all modern platforms Qualcomm CCI controller provides two I2C masters, and on particular boards only one I2C master may be initialized, and in such cases the device unbinding or driver removal causes a NULL pointer dereference, because cci_halt() is called for all two I2C masters, but a completion is initialized only for the single enabled master:

    % rmmod i2c-qcom-cci
    Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
    <snip>
    Call trace:
    __wait_for_common+0x194/0x1a8 (P)
    wait_for_completion_timeout+0x20/0x2c
    cci_remove+0xc4/0x138 [i2c_qcom_cci]
    platform_remove+0x20/0x30
    device_remove+0x4c/0x80
    device_release_driver_internal+0x1c8/0x224
    driver_detach+0x50/0x98
    bus_remove_driver+0x6c/0xbc
    driver_unregister+0x30/0x60
    platform_driver_unregister+0x14/0x20
    qcom_cci_driver_exit+0x18/0x1008 [i2c_qcom_cci]
    ....
---
 drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-qcom-cci.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-qcom-cci.c +1 -1
@@ -683,8 +683,8 @@ static void cci_remove(struct platform_d
 		if (cci->master[i].cci) {
 			i2c_del_adapter(&cci->master[i].adap);
 			of_node_put(cci->master[i].adap.dev.of_node);
+			cci_halt(cci, i);
 		}
-		cci_halt(cci, i);
 	}
 
 	disable_irq(cci->irq);
author maintainer
#178 lore raw

PATCH 173/261 i2c: stm32f7: fix timing computation ignoring i2c-analog-filter

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Guillermo Rodríguez <[email protected]>

commit a124579c0763da7bc408f4cd7e8f606cadc94855 upstream.

stm32f7_i2c_compute_timing() uses i2c_dev->analog_filter to pick the analog filter delay, but i2c_dev->analog_filter is parsed from the "i2c-analog-filter" DT property only after the compute_timing loop in stm32f7_i2c_setup_timing(), so in practice the timing calculations always ignore the analog filter. On an STM32MP1 board with clock-frequency = <400000> and i2c-analog-filter set, measured SCL frequency was ~382 kHz.

This also affects (widens) the computed SDADEL range. At high bus clock speeds, this can select an SDADEL value that violates tVD;DAT (data valid time).

Fix by parsing "i2c-analog-filter" before the compute_timing loop.

Fixes 83c3408f7b9c ("i2c: stm32f7: support DT binding i2c-analog-filter")
Cc <[email protected]> # v5.13+
---
 drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-stm32f7.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-stm32f7.c +3 -3
@@ -693,6 +693,9 @@ static int stm32f7_i2c_setup_timing(stru
 	if (!of_property_read_bool(i2c_dev->dev->of_node, "i2c-digital-filter"))
 		i2c_dev->dnf_dt = STM32F7_I2C_DNF_DEFAULT;
 
+	i2c_dev->analog_filter = of_property_read_bool(i2c_dev->dev->of_node,
+						       "i2c-analog-filter");
+
 	do {
 		ret = stm32f7_i2c_compute_timing(i2c_dev, setup,
 						 &i2c_dev->timing);
@@ -714,9 +717,6 @@ static int stm32f7_i2c_setup_timing(stru
 		return ret;
 	}
 
-	i2c_dev->analog_filter = of_property_read_bool(i2c_dev->dev->of_node,
-						       "i2c-analog-filter");
-
 	dev_dbg(i2c_dev->dev, "I2C Speed(%i), Clk Source(%i)\n",
 		setup->speed_freq, setup->clock_src);
 	dev_dbg(i2c_dev->dev, "I2C Rise(%i) and Fall(%i) Time\n",
author maintainer
#179 lore raw

PATCH 174/261 i2c: tegra: Fix NOIRQ suspend/resume

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Akhil R <[email protected]>

commit 656646b3847ac6a21b074a813223feef2aadd6e2 upstream.

The Tegra I2C driver relies on runtime PM to wake up the controller before each transfer. However, runtime PM is disabled between the system suspend and NOIRQ suspend. If an I2C device initiates a transfer during this window, the I2C controller fails to wake up and the transfer fails. To handle this, the controller must be kept available for this period to allow transfers.

Rework the I2C controller's system PM callbacks such that the controller is resumed from runtime suspend during system suspend and it stays RPM_ACTIVE throughout the suspend-resume cycle until it is runtime suspended back in the system resume. The clocks are disabled in NOIRQ suspend and enabled back in NOIRQ resume by calling the controller's runtime PM functions directly.

Fixes 8ebf15e9c869 ("i2c: tegra: Move suspend handling to NOIRQ phase")
Assisted-by Cursor:claude-4.6-opus
Cc <[email protected]> # v5.4+
---
 drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-tegra.c |   53 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-tegra.c +30 -23
@@ -1887,28 +1887,37 @@ static int __maybe_unused tegra_i2c_runt
 
 static int __maybe_unused tegra_i2c_suspend(struct device *dev)
 {
+	/*
+	 * Bring the controller up and hold a usage count so it stays
+	 * available until the noirq phase.
+	 */
+	return pm_runtime_resume_and_get(dev);
+}
+
+static int __maybe_unused tegra_i2c_suspend_noirq(struct device *dev)
+{
 	struct tegra_i2c_dev *i2c_dev = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
-	int err;
 
 	i2c_mark_adapter_suspended(&i2c_dev->adapter);
 
-	if (!pm_runtime_status_suspended(dev)) {
-		err = tegra_i2c_runtime_suspend(dev);
-		if (err)
-			return err;
-	}
-
-	return 0;
+	/*
+	 * Runtime PM is already disabled at this point, so invoke the
+	 * runtime_suspend callback directly to put the controller down.
+	 */
+	return tegra_i2c_runtime_suspend(dev);
 }
 
-static int __maybe_unused tegra_i2c_resume(struct device *dev)
+static int __maybe_unused tegra_i2c_resume_noirq(struct device *dev)
 {
 	struct tegra_i2c_dev *i2c_dev = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
 	int err;
 
 	/*
-	 * We need to ensure that clocks are enabled so that registers can be
-	 * restored in tegra_i2c_init().
+	 * Runtime PM is still disabled at this point, so invoke the
+	 * runtime_resume callback directly to bring the controller back up
+	 * before re-initializing the hardware. The adapter is then marked
+	 * resumed so that consumers can issue transfers from their own
+	 * resume_noirq() handlers and onwards.
 	 */
 	err = tegra_i2c_runtime_resume(dev);
 	if (err)
@@ -1918,24 +1927,22 @@ static int __maybe_unused tegra_i2c_resu
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	/*
-	 * In case we are runtime suspended, disable clocks again so that we
-	 * don't unbalance the clock reference counts during the next runtime
-	 * resume transition.
-	 */
-	if (pm_runtime_status_suspended(dev)) {
-		err = tegra_i2c_runtime_suspend(dev);
-		if (err)
-			return err;
-	}
-
 	i2c_mark_adapter_resumed(&i2c_dev->adapter);
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int __maybe_unused tegra_i2c_resume(struct device *dev)
+{
+	pm_runtime_put(dev);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static const struct dev_pm_ops tegra_i2c_pm = {
-	SET_NOIRQ_SYSTEM_SLEEP_PM_OPS(tegra_i2c_suspend, tegra_i2c_resume)
+	SET_SYSTEM_SLEEP_PM_OPS(tegra_i2c_suspend, tegra_i2c_resume)
+	SET_NOIRQ_SYSTEM_SLEEP_PM_OPS(tegra_i2c_suspend_noirq,
+				      tegra_i2c_resume_noirq)
 	SET_RUNTIME_PM_OPS(tegra_i2c_runtime_suspend, tegra_i2c_runtime_resume,
 			   NULL)
 };
author maintainer
#180 lore raw

PATCH 175/261 Input: atkbd - add DMI quirk for Lenovo Yoga Air 14 (83QK)

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zeyu WANG <[email protected]>

commit ad0979fe053e9f2db82da82188256ef6eb41095a upstream.

The Lenovo Yoga Air 14 (83QK) laptop keyboard becomes unresponsive after the standard atkbd init sequence. Controlled testing on the actual hardware shows the F5 (ATKBD_CMD_RESET_DIS / deactivate) command specifically corrupts the EC state, causing zero IRQ1 interrupts after init.

Skipping only the deactivate command (while keeping F4 ENABLE) resolves the issue completely: both keystroke input and CapsLock LED toggle work correctly. The reverse test - skipping only F4 while keeping F5 - makes the problem worse (zero keystroke interrupts), confirming F5 is the sole culprit.

Add a DMI quirk entry for LENOVO/83QK using the existing atkbd_deactivate_fixup callback, consistent with the existing entries for LG Electronics and HONOR FMB-P that address the same EC F5 deactivate issue.

---
 drivers/input/keyboard/atkbd.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
drivers/input/keyboard/atkbd.c +8 -0
@@ -1937,6 +1937,14 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id atkbd_
 		},
 		.callback = atkbd_deactivate_fixup,
 	},
+	{
+		/* Lenovo Yoga Air 14 (83QK) */
+		.matches = {
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "LENOVO"),
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "83QK"),
+		},
+		.callback = atkbd_deactivate_fixup,
+	},
 	{ }
 };
 
author maintainer
#181 lore raw

PATCH 176/261 Input: atkbd - skip deactivate for HONOR BCC-Ns internal keyboard

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Cryolitia PukNgae <[email protected]>

commit fb402386af4cdce108ff991a796386de55439735 upstream.

After commit 9cf6e24c9fbf17e52de9fff07f12be7565ea6d61 ("Input: atkbd - do not skip atkbd_deactivate() when skipping ATKBD_CMD_GETID"), HONOR BCC-N, aka HONOR MagicBook 14 2026's internal keyboard stops working. Adding the atkbd_deactivate_fixup quirk fixes it.

DMI: HONOR BCC-N/BCC-N-PCB, BIOS 1.04 04/07/2026

---
 drivers/input/keyboard/atkbd.c |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/input/keyboard/atkbd.c +7 -0
@@ -1945,6 +1945,13 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id atkbd_
 		},
 		.callback = atkbd_deactivate_fixup,
 	},
+	{
+		.matches = {
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "HONOR"),
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "BCC-N"),
+		},
+		.callback = atkbd_deactivate_fixup,
+	},
 	{ }
 };
 
author maintainer
#182 lore raw

PATCH 177/261 ipc/shm: serialize orphan cleanup with shm_nattch updates

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yilin Zhu <[email protected]>

commit 2e5c6f4fd4001562781e99bbfc7f1f0127187542 upstream.

shm_destroy_orphaned() walks the shm idr under shm_ids(ns).rwsem, but that does not serialize all fields tested by shm_may_destroy(). In particular, shm_nattch is updated while holding shm_perm.lock, and attach paths can do that without holding the rwsem.

Do not decide that an orphaned segment is unused before taking the object lock. Move the shm_may_destroy() check under shm_perm.lock, matching the other destroy paths, and unlock the segment when it no longer qualifies for removal.

Fixes 4c677e2eefdb ("shm: optimize locking and ipc_namespace getting")
Cc Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
Cc Jeongjun Park <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc Liam Howlett <[email protected]>
Cc Lorenzo Stoakes <[email protected]>
Cc Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Cc Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>
Cc Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
---
 ipc/shm.c |   10 ++++++----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
ipc/shm.c +6 -4
@@ -416,15 +416,17 @@ static int shm_try_destroy_orphaned(int
 	 * We want to destroy segments without users and with already
 	 * exit'ed originating process.
 	 *
-	 * As shp->* are changed under rwsem, it's safe to skip shp locking.
+	 * shm_nattch can be changed under shm_perm.lock without holding the
+	 * rwsem, so take the object lock before checking shm_may_destroy().
 	 */
 	if (!list_empty(&shp->shm_clist))
 		return 0;
 
-	if (shm_may_destroy(shp)) {
-		shm_lock_by_ptr(shp);
+	shm_lock_by_ptr(shp);
+	if (shm_may_destroy(shp))
 		shm_destroy(ns, shp);
-	}
+	else
+		shm_unlock(shp);
 	return 0;
 }
 
author maintainer
#183 lore raw

PATCH 178/261 misc: fastrpc: fix use-after-free of fastrpc_user in workqueue context

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Anandu Krishnan E <[email protected]>

commit e85eb5feca8e254905ffa6c57a3c99c89a674a0f upstream.

There is a race between fastrpc_device_release() and the workqueue that processes DSP responses. When the user closes the file descriptor, fastrpc_device_release() frees the fastrpc_user structure. Concurrently, an in-flight DSP invocation can complete and fastrpc_rpmsg_callback() schedules context cleanup via schedule_work(&ctx->put_work). If the workqueue runs fastrpc_context_free() in parallel with or after fastrpc_device_release() has freed the user structure, it dereferences the freed fastrpc_user. Depending on the state of the context at the time of the race, any one of the following accesses can be hit:

1. fastrpc_buf_free() calls fastrpc_ipa_to_dma_addr(buf->fl->cctx, ...) to strip the SID bits from the stored IOVA before passing the physical address to dma_free_coherent().

2. fastrpc_free_map() reads map->fl->cctx->vmperms[0].vmid to reconstruct the source permission bitmask needed for the qcom_scm_assign_mem() call that returns memory from the DSP VM back to HLOS.

3. fastrpc_free_map() acquires map->fl->lock to safely remove the

    map node from the fl->maps list.

The resulting use-after-free manifests as:

  pc : fastrpc_buf_free+0x38/0x80 [fastrpc]
  lr : fastrpc_context_free+0xa8/0x1b0 [fastrpc]
  fastrpc_context_free+0xa8/0x1b0 [fastrpc]
  fastrpc_context_put_wq+0x78/0xa0 [fastrpc]
  process_one_work+0x180/0x450
  worker_thread+0x26c/0x388

Add kref-based reference counting to fastrpc_user. Have each invoke context take a reference on the user at allocation time and release it when the context is freed. Release the initial reference in fastrpc_device_release() at file close. Move the teardown of the user structure — freeing pending contexts, maps, mmaps, and the channel context reference — into the kref release callback fastrpc_user_free(), so that it runs only when the last reference is dropped, regardless of whether that happens at device close or after the final in-flight context completes.

---
 drivers/misc/fastrpc.c |   75 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
drivers/misc/fastrpc.c +52 -23
@@ -306,6 +306,8 @@ struct fastrpc_user {
 	spinlock_t lock;
 	/* lock for allocations */
 	struct mutex mutex;
+	/* Reference count */
+	struct kref refcount;
 };
 
 static void fastrpc_free_map(struct kref *ref)
@@ -474,15 +476,57 @@ static void fastrpc_channel_ctx_put(stru
 	kref_put(&cctx->refcount, fastrpc_channel_ctx_free);
 }
 
+static void fastrpc_context_put(struct fastrpc_invoke_ctx *ctx);
+
+static void fastrpc_user_free(struct kref *ref)
+{
+	struct fastrpc_user *fl = container_of(ref, struct fastrpc_user, refcount);
+	struct fastrpc_invoke_ctx *ctx, *n;
+	struct fastrpc_map *map, *m;
+	struct fastrpc_buf *buf, *b;
+
+	if (fl->init_mem)
+		fastrpc_buf_free(fl->init_mem);
+
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(ctx, n, &fl->pending, node) {
+		list_del(&ctx->node);
+		fastrpc_context_put(ctx);
+	}
+
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(map, m, &fl->maps, node)
+		fastrpc_map_put(map);
+
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(buf, b, &fl->mmaps, node) {
+		list_del(&buf->node);
+		fastrpc_buf_free(buf);
+	}
+
+	fastrpc_channel_ctx_put(fl->cctx);
+	mutex_destroy(&fl->mutex);
+	kfree(fl);
+}
+
+static void fastrpc_user_get(struct fastrpc_user *fl)
+{
+	kref_get(&fl->refcount);
+}
+
+static void fastrpc_user_put(struct fastrpc_user *fl)
+{
+	kref_put(&fl->refcount, fastrpc_user_free);
+}
+
 static void fastrpc_context_free(struct kref *ref)
 {
 	struct fastrpc_invoke_ctx *ctx;
 	struct fastrpc_channel_ctx *cctx;
+	struct fastrpc_user *fl;
 	unsigned long flags;
 	int i;
 
 	ctx = container_of(ref, struct fastrpc_invoke_ctx, refcount);
 	cctx = ctx->cctx;
+	fl = ctx->fl;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < ctx->nbufs; i++)
 		fastrpc_map_put(ctx->maps[i]);
@@ -498,6 +542,8 @@ static void fastrpc_context_free(struct
 	kfree(ctx->olaps);
 	kfree(ctx);
 
+	/* Release the reference taken in fastrpc_context_alloc() */
+	fastrpc_user_put(fl);
 	fastrpc_channel_ctx_put(cctx);
 }
 
@@ -607,6 +653,8 @@ static struct fastrpc_invoke_ctx *fastrp
 
 	/* Released in fastrpc_context_put() */
 	fastrpc_channel_ctx_get(cctx);
+	/* Take a reference to user, released in fastrpc_context_free() */
+	fastrpc_user_get(user);
 
 	ctx->sc = sc;
 	ctx->retval = -1;
@@ -637,6 +685,7 @@ err_idr:
 	spin_lock(&user->lock);
 	list_del(&ctx->node);
 	spin_unlock(&user->lock);
+	fastrpc_user_put(user);
 	fastrpc_channel_ctx_put(cctx);
 	kfree(ctx->maps);
 	kfree(ctx->olaps);
@@ -1548,9 +1597,6 @@ static int fastrpc_device_release(struct
 {
 	struct fastrpc_user *fl = (struct fastrpc_user *)file->private_data;
 	struct fastrpc_channel_ctx *cctx = fl->cctx;
-	struct fastrpc_invoke_ctx *ctx, *n;
-	struct fastrpc_map *map, *m;
-	struct fastrpc_buf *buf, *b;
 	unsigned long flags;
 
 	fastrpc_release_current_dsp_process(fl);
@@ -1559,28 +1605,10 @@ static int fastrpc_device_release(struct
 	list_del(&fl->user);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cctx->lock, flags);
 
-	if (fl->init_mem)
-		fastrpc_buf_free(fl->init_mem);
-
-	list_for_each_entry_safe(ctx, n, &fl->pending, node) {
-		list_del(&ctx->node);
-		fastrpc_context_put(ctx);
-	}
-
-	list_for_each_entry_safe(map, m, &fl->maps, node)
-		fastrpc_map_put(map);
-
-	list_for_each_entry_safe(buf, b, &fl->mmaps, node) {
-		list_del(&buf->node);
-		fastrpc_buf_free(buf);
-	}
-
 	fastrpc_session_free(cctx, fl->sctx);
-	fastrpc_channel_ctx_put(cctx);
-
-	mutex_destroy(&fl->mutex);
-	kfree(fl);
 	file->private_data = NULL;
+	/* Release the reference taken in fastrpc_device_open */
+	fastrpc_user_put(fl);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -1625,6 +1653,7 @@ static int fastrpc_device_open(struct in
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&cctx->lock, flags);
 	list_add_tail(&fl->user, &cctx->users);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cctx->lock, flags);
+	kref_init(&fl->refcount);
 
 	return 0;
 }
author maintainer
#184 lore raw

PATCH 179/261 misc: fastrpc: fix use-after-free race in fastrpc_map_create

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhenghang Xiao <[email protected]>

commit 07ebe87915d8accdaba20c4f88c5ae430fe62fbb upstream.

fastrpc_map_lookup returns a raw pointer after releasing fl->lock. The caller fastrpc_map_create then calls fastrpc_map_get (kref_get_unless_zero) on this unprotected pointer. A concurrent MEM_UNMAP can free the map between the lock release and the kref operation, resulting in a use-after-free on the freed slab object.

Restore the take_ref parameter to fastrpc_map_lookup so the reference is acquired atomically under fl->lock before the pointer is exposed to the caller.

---
 drivers/misc/fastrpc.c |   25 +++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
drivers/misc/fastrpc.c +11 -14
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ static int fastrpc_map_get(struct fastrp
 
 
 static int fastrpc_map_lookup(struct fastrpc_user *fl, int fd,
-			    struct fastrpc_map **ppmap)
+			    struct fastrpc_map **ppmap, bool take_ref)
 {
 	struct fastrpc_map *map = NULL;
 	struct dma_buf *buf;
@@ -380,6 +380,12 @@ static int fastrpc_map_lookup(struct fas
 		if (map->fd != fd || map->buf != buf)
 			continue;
 
+		if (take_ref) {
+			ret = fastrpc_map_get(map);
+			if (ret)
+				break;
+		}
+
 		*ppmap = map;
 		ret = 0;
 		break;
@@ -894,19 +900,10 @@ get_err:
 static int fastrpc_map_create(struct fastrpc_user *fl, int fd,
 			      u64 len, u32 attr, struct fastrpc_map **ppmap)
 {
-	struct fastrpc_session_ctx *sess = fl->sctx;
-	int err = 0;
+	if (!fastrpc_map_lookup(fl, fd, ppmap, true))
+		return 0;
 
-	if (!fastrpc_map_lookup(fl, fd, ppmap)) {
-		if (!fastrpc_map_get(*ppmap))
-			return 0;
-		dev_dbg(sess->dev, "%s: Failed to get map fd=%d\n",
-			__func__, fd);
-	}
-
-	err = fastrpc_map_attach(fl, fd, len, attr, ppmap);
-
-	return err;
+	return fastrpc_map_attach(fl, fd, len, attr, ppmap);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1176,7 +1173,7 @@ cleanup_fdlist:
 	for (i = 0; i < FASTRPC_MAX_FDLIST; i++) {
 		if (!fdlist[i])
 			break;
-		if (!fastrpc_map_lookup(fl, (int)fdlist[i], &mmap))
+		if (!fastrpc_map_lookup(fl, (int)fdlist[i], &mmap, false))
 			fastrpc_map_put(mmap);
 	}
 
author maintainer
#185 lore raw

PATCH 180/261 misc: fastrpc: fix DMA address corruption due to find_vma misuse

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Junrui Luo <[email protected]>

commit 464c6ad2aa16e1e1df9d559289199356493d1e00 upstream.

fastrpc_get_args() uses find_vma() to look up the VMA for a user-provided pointer and compute a DMA address offset. When the address falls in a gap before the returned VMA, (ptr & PAGE_MASK) - vma->vm_start underflows, corrupting the DMA address sent to the DSP.

Replace find_vma() with vma_lookup(), which returns NULL when the address is not contained within any VMA.

---
 drivers/misc/fastrpc.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/misc/fastrpc.c +1 -1
@@ -1061,7 +1061,7 @@ static int fastrpc_get_args(u32 kernel,
 			pages[i].addr = ctx->maps[i]->phys;
 
 			mmap_read_lock(current->mm);
-			vma = find_vma(current->mm, ctx->args[i].ptr);
+			vma = vma_lookup(current->mm, ctx->args[i].ptr);
 			if (vma)
 				pages[i].addr += (ctx->args[i].ptr & PAGE_MASK) -
 						 vma->vm_start;
author maintainer
#186 lore raw

PATCH 181/261 misc: fastrpc: Fix NULL pointer dereference in rpmsg callback

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mukesh Ojha <[email protected]>

commit 5401fb4fe10fac6134c308495df18ed74aebb9c4 upstream.

A NULL pointer dereference was observed on Hawi at boot when the DSP sends a glink message before fastrpc_rpmsg_probe() has completed initialization:

  Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000178
  pc : _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x34/0x8c
  lr : fastrpc_rpmsg_callback+0x3c/0xcc [fastrpc]
  ...
  Call trace:
   _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x34/0x8c (P)
   fastrpc_rpmsg_callback+0x3c/0xcc [fastrpc]
   qcom_glink_native_rx+0x538/0x6a4
   qcom_glink_smem_intr+0x14/0x24 [qcom_glink_smem]

The faulting address 0x178 corresponds to the lock variable inside struct fastrpc_channel_ctx, confirming that cctx is NULL when fastrpc_rpmsg_callback() attempts to take the spinlock.

There are two issues here. First, dev_set_drvdata() is called before spin_lock_init() and idr_init(), leaving a window where the callback can retrieve a valid cctx pointer but operate on an uninitialized spinlock. Second, the rpmsg channel becomes live as soon as the driver is bound, so fastrpc_rpmsg_callback() can fire before dev_set_drvdata() is called at all, resulting in dev_get_drvdata() returning NULL.

Fix both issues by moving all cctx initialization ahead of dev_set_drvdata() so the structure is fully initialized before it becomes visible to the callback, and add a NULL check in fastrpc_rpmsg_callback() as a guard against any remaining window.

---
 drivers/misc/fastrpc.c |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/misc/fastrpc.c +4 -1
@@ -2411,7 +2411,6 @@ static int fastrpc_rpmsg_probe(struct rp
 
 	kref_init(&data->refcount);
 
-	dev_set_drvdata(&rpdev->dev, data);
 	rdev->dma_mask = &data->dma_mask;
 	dma_set_mask_and_coherent(rdev, DMA_BIT_MASK(32));
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&data->users);
@@ -2420,6 +2419,7 @@ static int fastrpc_rpmsg_probe(struct rp
 	idr_init(&data->ctx_idr);
 	data->domain_id = domain_id;
 	data->rpdev = rpdev;
+	dev_set_drvdata(&rpdev->dev, data);
 
 	err = of_platform_populate(rdev->of_node, NULL, NULL, rdev);
 	if (err)
@@ -2493,6 +2493,9 @@ static int fastrpc_rpmsg_callback(struct
 	if (len < sizeof(*rsp))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (!cctx)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
 	ctxid = ((rsp->ctx & FASTRPC_CTXID_MASK) >> 4);
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&cctx->lock, flags);
author maintainer
#187 lore raw

PATCH 182/261 net/mlx5: Reorder completion before putting command entry in cmd_work_handler

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Nikolay Kuratov <[email protected]>

commit 02896a7fa4cd3ec61d60ba30136841e4f04bdeac upstream.

Assuming callback != NULL && !page_queue, cmd_work_handler takes command entry with refcnt == 1 from mlx5_cmd_invoke. If either semaphore timeout or index allocation error happens, it does final cmd_ent_put(ent). To avoid access to freed memory, notify slotted completion before cmd_ent_put.

This is theoretical issue found by Svace static analyser.

Fixes 485d65e135712 ("net/mlx5: Add a timeout to acquire the command queue semaphore")
Fixes 0e2909c6bec90 ("net/mlx5: Fix variable not being completed when function returns")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cmd.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cmd.c +4 -2
@@ -996,12 +996,13 @@ static void cmd_work_handler(struct work
 				ent->callback(-EBUSY, ent->context);
 				mlx5_free_cmd_msg(dev, ent->out);
 				free_msg(dev, ent->in);
+				complete(&ent->slotted);
 				cmd_ent_put(ent);
 			} else {
 				ent->ret = -EBUSY;
 				complete(&ent->done);
+				complete(&ent->slotted);
 			}
-			complete(&ent->slotted);
 			return;
 		}
 		alloc_ret = cmd_alloc_index(cmd, ent);
@@ -1011,13 +1012,14 @@ static void cmd_work_handler(struct work
 				ent->callback(-EAGAIN, ent->context);
 				mlx5_free_cmd_msg(dev, ent->out);
 				free_msg(dev, ent->in);
+				complete(&ent->slotted);
 				cmd_ent_put(ent);
 			} else {
 				ent->ret = -EAGAIN;
 				complete(&ent->done);
+				complete(&ent->slotted);
 			}
 			up(&cmd->vars.sem);
-			complete(&ent->slotted);
 			return;
 		}
 	} else {
author maintainer
#188 lore raw

PATCH 183/261 net: bonding: fix NULL pointer dereference in bond_do_ioctl()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: ZhaoJinming <[email protected]>

commit a764b0e8317a863006e05732e1aefe821b9d8c2d upstream.

In bond_do_ioctl(), slave_dev is obtained via __dev_get_by_name() which can return NULL if the requested interface name does not exist. However, the subsequent slave_dbg() call is placed before the NULL check:

    slave_dev = __dev_get_by_name(net, ifr->ifr_slave);
    slave_dbg(bond_dev, slave_dev, "slave_dev=%p:\n", slave_dev); //here
    if (!slave_dev)
        return -ENODEV;

The slave_dbg() macro expands to netdev_dbg(bond_dev, "(slave %s): " fmt, (slave_dev)->name, ...) which unconditionally dereferences slave_dev->name before the NULL check is performed. This results in a NULL pointer dereference kernel oops when a user calls bonding ioctl (e.g. SIOCBONDENSLAVE, SIOCBONDRELEASE, etc.) with a non-existent slave interface name.

This is reachable from userspace via the bonding ioctl interface with CAP_NET_ADMIN capability, making it a potential local denial-of-service vector.

Fix by moving the slave_dbg() call after the NULL check.

Fixes e2a7420df2e0 ("bonding/main: convert to using slave printk macros")
---
 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c +2 -2
@@ -4673,11 +4673,11 @@ static int bond_do_ioctl(struct net_devi
 
 	slave_dev = __dev_get_by_name(net, ifr->ifr_slave);
 
-	slave_dbg(bond_dev, slave_dev, "slave_dev=%p:\n", slave_dev);
-
 	if (!slave_dev)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
+	slave_dbg(bond_dev, slave_dev, "slave_dev=%p:\n", slave_dev);
+
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case SIOCBONDENSLAVE:
 		res = bond_enslave(bond_dev, slave_dev, NULL);
author maintainer
#189 lore raw

PATCH 184/261 net: mv643xx: fix OF node refcount

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bartosz Golaszewski <[email protected]>

commit 4aacf509e537a711fa71bca9f234e5eb6968850e upstream.

Platform devices created with platform_device_alloc() call platform_device_release() when the last reference to the device's kobject is dropped. This function calls of_node_put() unconditionally. This works fine for devices created with platform_device_register_full() but users of the split approach (platform_device_alloc() + platform_device_add()) must bump the reference of the of_node they assign manually. Add the missing call to of_node_get().

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mv643xx_eth.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mv643xx_eth.c +1 -1
@@ -2784,7 +2784,7 @@ static int mv643xx_eth_shared_of_add_por
 		goto put_err;
 	}
 	ppdev->dev.coherent_dma_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(32);
-	ppdev->dev.of_node = pnp;
+	ppdev->dev.of_node = of_node_get(pnp);
 
 	ret = platform_device_add_resources(ppdev, &res, 1);
 	if (ret)
author maintainer
#190 lore raw

PATCH 185/261 net: rds: clear i_sends on setup unwind

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yuqi Xu <[email protected]>

commit 20cf0fb715c41111469577e85e35d15f099473e0 upstream.

The RDS IB connection teardown path is written so it can run during partial startup and on repeated shutdown attempts. It uses NULL pointers to distinguish resources that are still owned from resources that have already been released.

When rds_ib_setup_qp() fails after allocating i_sends but before allocating i_recvs, the sends_out path frees i_sends without clearing the pointer. A later shutdown pass can still treat that stale pointer as a live send ring allocation.

Clear i_sends after vfree() in the error unwind path so the existing shutdown logic continues to use the correct ownership state.

---
 net/rds/ib_cm.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/rds/ib_cm.c +1 -0
@@ -656,6 +656,7 @@ static int rds_ib_setup_qp(struct rds_co
 
 sends_out:
 	vfree(ic->i_sends);
+	ic->i_sends = NULL;
 
 ack_dma_out:
 	rds_dma_hdr_free(rds_ibdev->dev, ic->i_ack, ic->i_ack_dma,
author maintainer
#191 lore raw

PATCH 186/261 nvmem: core: fix use-after-free bugs in error paths

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bartosz Golaszewski <[email protected]>

commit 5b6b6fc491899d583eaa75344e094796ae9b530b upstream.

Fix several instances of error paths in which we call __nvmem_device_put() - which may end up freeing the underlying memory and other resources - and then keep on using the nvmem structure. Always put the reference to the nvmem device as the last step before returning the error code.

Fixes 7ae6478b304b ("nvmem: core: rework nvmem cell instance creation")
Fixes e888d445ac33 ("nvmem: resolve cells from DT at registration time")
---
 drivers/nvmem/core.c |   12 +++++-------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/nvmem/core.c +5 -7
@@ -1501,18 +1501,16 @@ struct nvmem_cell *of_nvmem_cell_get(str
 	cell_entry = nvmem_find_cell_entry_by_node(nvmem, cell_np);
 	of_node_put(cell_np);
 	if (!cell_entry) {
-		__nvmem_device_put(nvmem);
 		nvmem_layout_module_put(nvmem);
-		if (nvmem->layout)
-			return ERR_PTR(-EPROBE_DEFER);
-		else
-			return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
+		ret = nvmem->layout ? -EPROBE_DEFER : -ENOENT;
+		__nvmem_device_put(nvmem);
+		return ERR_PTR(ret);
 	}
 
 	cell = nvmem_create_cell(cell_entry, id, cell_index);
 	if (IS_ERR(cell)) {
-		__nvmem_device_put(nvmem);
 		nvmem_layout_module_put(nvmem);
+		__nvmem_device_put(nvmem);
 	}
 
 	return cell;
@@ -1626,8 +1624,8 @@ void nvmem_cell_put(struct nvmem_cell *c
 		kfree_const(cell->id);
 
 	kfree(cell);
-	__nvmem_device_put(nvmem);
 	nvmem_layout_module_put(nvmem);
+	__nvmem_device_put(nvmem);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvmem_cell_put);
 
author maintainer
#192 lore raw

PATCH 187/261 nvmem: layouts: onie-tlv: fix hang on unknown types

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andre Heider <[email protected]>

commit ea41020b9018e31c2ea7e9d89021e3e6d7470883 upstream.

The EEPROM on my board has a vendor specific entry of type 0x41. When stumbling upon that, this driver hangs in an endless loop.

Fix it by keep incrementing the offset on unknown entries, so the loop will eventually stop.

---
 drivers/nvmem/layouts/onie-tlv.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/nvmem/layouts/onie-tlv.c +2 -1
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ static int onie_tlv_add_cells(struct dev
 
 		cell.name = onie_tlv_cell_name(tlv.type);
 		if (!cell.name)
-			continue;
+			goto next;
 
 		cell.offset = hdr_len + offset + sizeof(tlv.type) + sizeof(tlv.len);
 		cell.bytes = tlv.len;
@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ static int onie_tlv_add_cells(struct dev
 			return ret;
 		}
 
+next:
 		offset += sizeof(tlv) + tlv.len;
 	}
 
author maintainer
#193 lore raw

PATCH 188/261 octeontx2-af: fix memory leak in rvu_setup_hw_resources()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dawei Feng <[email protected]>

commit 09a5bf856aa759513afc4afd233d15bcc711b84e upstream.

If rvu_npc_exact_init() fails in rvu_setup_hw_resources(), the function returns directly instead of jumping to the error handling path. This causes a resource leak for the previously initialized CGX, NPC, fwdata, and MSI-X states.

Fix this by replacing the direct return with goto cgx_err to ensure proper cleanup.

The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still present in v7.1-rc6.

An x86_64 allyesconfig build showed no new warnings. As we do not have access to Marvell OcteonTX2 RVU AF hardware to test with, no runtime testing was able to be performed.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu.c +1 -1
@@ -1135,7 +1135,7 @@ cpt:
 	err = rvu_npc_exact_init(rvu);
 	if (err) {
 		dev_err(rvu->dev, "failed to initialize exact match table\n");
-		return err;
+		goto cgx_err;
 	}
 
 	/* Assign MACs for CGX mapped functions */
author maintainer
#194 lore raw

PATCH 189/261 io_uring/kbuf: dont truncate end buffer for bundles

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>

Commit 70f4886bcbb929e88038c8807f1daf7fc587ae7c upstream.

If buffers have been peeked for a bundle receive, the kernel will truncate the end buffer, if the available length is shorter than the buffer itself. This is unnecessary, as applications iterating bundle receives must always use the minimum size of the buffer length and the remaining number of bytes in the bundle. The examples in liburing do that as well, eg examples/proxy.c.

If the kernel does truncate this buffer AND the current transfer fails, then the buffer will be left with a smaller size than what is otherwise available.

Just remove the buffer truncation, as it's not necessary in the first place.

---
 io_uring/kbuf.c |    1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
io_uring/kbuf.c +0 -1
@@ -293,7 +293,6 @@ static int io_ring_buffers_peek(struct i
 				arg->partial_map = 1;
 				if (iov != arg->iovs)
 					break;
-				WRITE_ONCE(buf->len, len);
 			}
 		}
 
author maintainer
#195 lore raw

PATCH 190/261 io_uring/wait: fix min_timeout behavior

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Christian A. Ehrhardt" <[email protected]>

Commit 29fe1bd01b99714f3136f922230a643c2742cda9 upstream.

The wakeup condition if a min timeout is present and has expired is that at least _one_ CQE was posted. Thus set the cq_tail target to ->cq_min_tail + 1. Without this commit a spurious wakeup can result in a premature wakeup because io_should_wake() will return true even if _no_ CQE was posted at all.

Cc Tip ten Brink <[email protected]>
Fixes e15cb2200b93 ("io_uring: fix min_wait wakeups for SQPOLL")
---
 io_uring/io_uring.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
io_uring/io_uring.c +1 -1
@@ -2414,7 +2414,7 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart io_cqring_mi
 	}
 
 	/* any generated CQE posted past this time should wake us up */
-	iowq->cq_tail = iowq->cq_min_tail;
+	iowq->cq_tail = iowq->cq_min_tail + 1;
 
 	iowq->t.function = io_cqring_timer_wakeup;
 	hrtimer_set_expires(timer, iowq->timeout);
author maintainer
#196 lore raw

PATCH 191/261 mm/hugetlb: restore reservation on error in hugetlb folio copy paths

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Carlier <[email protected]>

commit 40c81856e622a9dc59294a90d169ac07ea25b0b0 upstream.

Two sites in mm/hugetlb.c allocate a hugetlb folio via alloc_hugetlb_folio() (consuming a VMA reservation) and then call copy_user_large_folio(), which became int-returning in commit 1cb9dc4b475c ("mm: hwpoison: support recovery from HugePage copy-on-write faults") and can now fail (e.g. -EHWPOISON on a hwpoisoned source page). On the failure path, folio_put() restores the global hugetlb pool count through free_huge_folio(), but the per-VMA reservation map entry is left marked consumed:

- hugetlb_mfill_atomic_pte() resubmission path (UFFDIO_COPY)
- copy_hugetlb_page_range() fork-time CoW path when hugetlb_try_dup_anon_rmap() fails (rare: pinned hugetlb anon folio under fork)

User-visible effect: on UFFDIO_COPY into a private hugetlb VMA where the resubmission copy fails, the reservation for that address is leaked from the VMA's reserve map. A subsequent fault at the same address takes the no-reservation path, and under hugetlb pool pressure the task is SIGBUSed at an address it had previously reserved. The fork-time CoW path leaks the same way in the child VMA's reserve map, though it requires the much rarer combination of pinned hugetlb anon page + hwpoisoned source.

Add the missing restore_reserve_on_error() call before folio_put() on both error paths.

Fixes 1cb9dc4b475c ("mm: hwpoison: support recovery from HugePage copy-on-write faults")
Cc David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Cc Mina Almasry <[email protected]>
Cc Muchun Song <[email protected]>
Cc Oscar Salvador <[email protected]>
Cc yuehaibing <[email protected]>
---
 mm/hugetlb.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
mm/hugetlb.c +2 -0
@@ -5340,6 +5340,7 @@ again:
 							    addr, dst_vma);
 				folio_put(pte_folio);
 				if (ret) {
+					restore_reserve_on_error(h, dst_vma, addr, new_folio);
 					folio_put(new_folio);
 					break;
 				}
@@ -6639,6 +6640,7 @@ int hugetlb_mfill_atomic_pte(pte_t *dst_
 		folio_put(*foliop);
 		*foliop = NULL;
 		if (ret) {
+			restore_reserve_on_error(h, dst_vma, dst_addr, folio);
 			folio_put(folio);
 			goto out;
 		}
author maintainer
#197 lore raw

PATCH 192/261 mmc: core: Fix host controller programming for fixed driver type

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kamal Dasu <[email protected]>

commit 5a52c5701a67d5176eb1afbf1bdaf7d6dfeec597 upstream.

When using the fixed-emmc-driver-type device tree property, the MMC core correctly selects the driver strength for the card but fails to program the host controller accordingly. This causes a mismatch where the card uses the specified driver type while the host controller defaults to Type B (since ios->drv_type remains zero).

Split the driver type programming logic to handle both fixed and dynamic driver type selection paths. For fixed driver types, program the host controller with the selected drive_strength value. For dynamic selection, use the existing drv_type as before.

This ensures both the eMMC device and host controller use matching driver strengths, preventing potential signal integrity issues.

Fixes 6186d06c519e ("mmc: parse new binding for eMMC fixed driver type")
---
 drivers/mmc/core/mmc.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mmc/core/mmc.c +3 -1
@@ -1348,7 +1348,9 @@ static void mmc_select_driver_type(struc
 
 	card->drive_strength = drive_strength;
 
-	if (drv_type)
+	if (fixed_drv_type >= 0 && drive_strength)
+		mmc_set_driver_type(card->host, drive_strength);
+	else if (drv_type)
 		mmc_set_driver_type(card->host, drv_type);
 }
 
author maintainer
#198 lore raw

PATCH 193/261 mmc: dw_mmc-rockchip: Add missing private data for very old controllers

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Heiko Stuebner <[email protected]>

commit 1e9a4850afa0ceb63984fb1a9f3e86d0fc4fd18f upstream.

The really old controllers (rk2928, rk3066, rk3188) do not support UHS speeds at all, and thus never handled phase data.

For that reason it never had a parse_dt callback and no driver private data at all.

Commit ff6f0286c896 ("mmc: dw_mmc-rockchip: Add memory clock auto-gating support") makes the private data sort of mandatory, because the init function checks whether phases are configured internally or through the clock controller.

This results in the old SoCs then experiencing NULL-pointer dereferences when they try to access that private-data struct.

While we could have if (priv) conditionals in all places, it's way less cluttery to just give the old types their private-data struct.

Fixes ff6f0286c896 ("mmc: dw_mmc-rockchip: Add memory clock auto-gating support")
---
 drivers/mmc/host/dw_mmc-rockchip.c |   17 +++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
drivers/mmc/host/dw_mmc-rockchip.c +17 -0
@@ -433,6 +433,22 @@ static int dw_mci_common_parse_dt(struct
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int dw_mci_rk2928_parse_dt(struct dw_mci *host)
+{
+	struct dw_mci_rockchip_priv_data *priv;
+	int err;
+
+	err = dw_mci_common_parse_dt(host);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	priv = host->priv;
+
+	priv->internal_phase = false;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int dw_mci_rk3288_parse_dt(struct dw_mci *host)
 {
 	struct dw_mci_rockchip_priv_data *priv;
@@ -506,6 +522,7 @@ static int dw_mci_rockchip_init(struct d
 
 static const struct dw_mci_drv_data rk2928_drv_data = {
 	.init			= dw_mci_rockchip_init,
+	.parse_dt		= dw_mci_rk2928_parse_dt,
 };
 
 static const struct dw_mci_drv_data rk3288_drv_data = {
author maintainer
#199 lore raw

PATCH 194/261 mmc: litex_mmc: Set mandatory idle clocks before CMD0

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Inochi Amaoto <[email protected]>

commit 99982b743e5ba72bd1f5de0e03e3b96ae70b1e51 upstream.

The litex_mmc driver assumes the card is already probed in the BIOS and skip the phy initialization. This will cause the command fail like the following when the old card is unplugged and then insert a new card:

[   62.923593] litex-mmc f0004000.mmc: Command (cmd 8) error, status -110
[   62.949717] litex-mmc f0004000.mmc: Command (cmd 55) error, status -110
[   62.976606] litex-mmc f0004000.mmc: Command (cmd 55) error, status -110
[   63.002516] litex-mmc f0004000.mmc: Command (cmd 55) error, status -110
[   63.028442] litex-mmc f0004000.mmc: Command (cmd 55) error, status -110

Add required clock settings and initialization for the CMD 0, so it can probe the new card.

Fixes 92e099104729 ("mmc: Add driver for LiteX's LiteSDCard interface")
---
 drivers/mmc/host/litex_mmc.c |   14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
drivers/mmc/host/litex_mmc.c +14 -0
@@ -69,6 +69,9 @@
 #define SD_SLEEP_US       5
 #define SD_TIMEOUT_US 20000
 
+#define SD_INIT_DELAY_US  1000
+#define SD_INIT_CLK_HZ    400000
+
 #define SDIRQ_CARD_DETECT    1
 #define SDIRQ_SD_TO_MEM_DONE 2
 #define SDIRQ_MEM_TO_SD_DONE 4
@@ -450,6 +453,17 @@ static void litex_mmc_set_ios(struct mmc
 	struct litex_mmc_host *host = mmc_priv(mmc);
 
 	/*
+	 * The SD specification requires at least 74 idle clocks before CMD0.
+	 * These dummy cycles is generated by writing LITEX_PHY_INITIALIZE.
+	 */
+	if (ios->chip_select == MMC_CS_HIGH) {
+		litex_mmc_setclk(host, SD_INIT_CLK_HZ);
+		litex_write8(host->sdphy + LITEX_PHY_INITIALIZE, 1);
+		fsleep(SD_INIT_DELAY_US);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
 	 * NOTE: Ignore any ios->bus_width updates; they occur right after
 	 * the mmc core sends its own acmd6 bus-width change notification,
 	 * which is redundant since we snoop on the command flow and inject
author maintainer
#200 lore raw

PATCH 195/261 mmc: renesas_sdhi: Add OF entry for RZ/G2H SoC

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lad Prabhakar <[email protected]>

commit f48ee49726ee4ab545fd2dc644f169c0809b19b3 upstream.

The RZ/G2H (R8A774E1) SoC was previously handled via the generic "renesas,rcar-gen3-sdhi" fallback compatible string. However, because the SDHI IP on RZ/G2H is identical with the R-Car H3-N (R8A77951), it requires the specific quirks and configuration defined in of_r8a7795_compatible rather than the generic Gen3 data.

Add the explicit "renesas,sdhi-r8a774e1" match entry to map it correctly. Note that the DT binding file renesas,sdhi.yaml does not need an update as the entry for this SoC is already present.

Fixes 31941342888d ("arm64: dts: renesas: r8a774e1: Add SDHI nodes")
---
 drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_internal_dmac.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_internal_dmac.c +1 -0
@@ -278,6 +278,7 @@ static const struct renesas_sdhi_of_data
 static const struct of_device_id renesas_sdhi_internal_dmac_of_match[] = {
 	{ .compatible = "renesas,sdhi-r7s9210", .data = &of_rza2_compatible, },
 	{ .compatible = "renesas,sdhi-mmc-r8a77470", .data = &of_rcar_gen3_compatible, },
+	{ .compatible = "renesas,sdhi-r8a774e1", .data = &of_r8a7795_compatible, },
 	{ .compatible = "renesas,sdhi-r8a7795", .data = &of_r8a7795_compatible, },
 	{ .compatible = "renesas,sdhi-r8a77961", .data = &of_r8a77961_compatible, },
 	{ .compatible = "renesas,sdhi-r8a77965", .data = &of_r8a77965_compatible, },
author maintainer
#201 lore raw

PATCH 196/261 mmc: sdhci: add signal voltage switch in sdhci_resume_host

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jisheng Zhang <[email protected]>

commit f595e8e77a51eee35e331f69321766593a845ef2 upstream.

I met one suspend/resume issue with sdr104 capable sdio wifi card (with "keep-power-in-suspend" set in DT property):
After resuming from suspend to ram, the sdio wifi card stops working. Further debug shows that although ios shows the sdio card is at sdr104 mode, the voltage is still at 3V3. This is due to missing the calling of ->start_signal_voltage_switch() in sdhci_resume_host().

Fix this issue by adding ->start_signal_voltage_switch() in sdhci_resume_host(). This also matches what we do for sdhci_runtime_resume_host().

Then the question is: why this issue hasn't reported and fixed for so long time. IMHO, several reasons: Some host controllers just kick off the runtime resume for system resume, so they benefit from the well supported runtime pm code; Some platforms just use the old sdio wifi card which doesn't need signal voltage switch at all, the default voltage is 3v3 after resuming.

Fixes 6308d2905bd3 ("mmc: sdhci: add quirk for keeping card power during suspend")
---
 drivers/mmc/host/sdhci.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/mmc/host/sdhci.c +1 -0
@@ -3782,6 +3782,7 @@ int sdhci_resume_host(struct sdhci_host
 		host->pwr = 0;
 		host->clock = 0;
 		host->reinit_uhs = true;
+		mmc->ops->start_signal_voltage_switch(mmc, &mmc->ios);
 		mmc->ops->set_ios(mmc, &mmc->ios);
 	} else {
 		sdhci_init(host, (mmc->pm_flags & MMC_PM_KEEP_POWER));
author maintainer
#202 lore raw

PATCH 197/261 pmdomain: imx: fix OF node refcount

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bartosz Golaszewski <[email protected]>

commit fba0510cd62666951dcc0221527edc0c47ae6599 upstream.

for_each_child_of_node_scoped() decrements the reference count of the nod after each iteration. Assigning it without incrementing the refcount to a dynamically allocated platform device will result in a double put in platform_device_release(). Add the missing call to of_node_get().

Fixes 3e4d109ee8fc ("pmdomain: imx: gpc: Simplify with scoped for each OF child loop")
---
 drivers/pmdomain/imx/gpc.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/pmdomain/imx/gpc.c +1 -1
@@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ static int imx_gpc_probe(struct platform
 			domain->ipg_rate_mhz = ipg_rate_mhz;
 
 			pd_pdev->dev.parent = &pdev->dev;
-			pd_pdev->dev.of_node = np;
+			pd_pdev->dev.of_node = of_node_get(np);
 			pd_pdev->dev.fwnode = of_fwnode_handle(np);
 
 			ret = platform_device_add(pd_pdev);
author maintainer
#203 lore raw

PATCH 198/261 rtase: Avoid sleeping in get_stats64()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Justin Lai <[email protected]>

commit 9fc237f8d49f06d05f0f8e80361047b718894e81 upstream.

The .ndo_get_stats64 callback must not sleep because it can be called when reading /proc/net/dev.

rtase_get_stats64() calls rtase_dump_tally_counter(), which polls the tally counter dump bit with read_poll_timeout(). This may sleep while waiting for the hardware counter dump to complete.

Use read_poll_timeout_atomic() instead to avoid sleeping in the get_stats64() path.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/rtase/rtase_main.c |    5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/rtase/rtase_main.c +3 -2
@@ -1548,8 +1548,9 @@ static void rtase_dump_tally_counter(con
 	rtase_w32(tp, RTASE_DTCCR0, cmd);
 	rtase_w32(tp, RTASE_DTCCR0, cmd | RTASE_COUNTER_DUMP);
 
-	err = read_poll_timeout(rtase_r32, val, !(val & RTASE_COUNTER_DUMP),
-				10, 250, false, tp, RTASE_DTCCR0);
+	err = read_poll_timeout_atomic(rtase_r32, val,
+				       !(val & RTASE_COUNTER_DUMP),
+				       10, 250, false, tp, RTASE_DTCCR0);
 
 	if (err == -ETIMEDOUT)
 		netdev_err(tp->dev, "error occurred in dump tally counter\n");
author maintainer
#204 lore raw

PATCH 199/261 rtase: Reset TX subqueue when clearing TX ring

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Justin Lai <[email protected]>

commit ab1ecaabe74b7d86c38ab2ab44bd56cdcc33645a upstream.

rtase_tx_clear() clears the TX ring and resets the ring indexes. However, the TX queue state and BQL accounting are not reset at the same time.

This may leave __QUEUE_STATE_STACK_XOFF asserted after rtase_sw_reset(), preventing new TX packets from being scheduled.

Reset the TX subqueue when clearing the TX ring so the TX queue state and BQL accounting are restored together.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/rtase/rtase_main.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/rtase/rtase_main.c +2 -0
index ef13109c49cf..6ccbefb5acf2 100644
@@ -239,6 +239,8 @@ static void rtase_tx_clear(struct rtase_private *tp)
 		rtase_tx_clear_range(ring, ring->dirty_idx, RTASE_NUM_DESC);
 		ring->cur_idx = 0;
 		ring->dirty_idx = 0;
+
+		netdev_tx_reset_subqueue(tp->dev, i);
 	}
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
author maintainer
#205 lore raw

PATCH 200/261 sctp: diag: reject stale associations in dump_one path

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhao Zhang <[email protected]>

commit 5eba3e48d78edd7551b992cb7ba687019b3a78da upstream.

The SCTP exact sock_diag lookup can hold a transport reference, block on lock_sock(sk), and then resume after sctp_association_free() has marked the association dead and freed its bind address list.

When that happens, inet_assoc_attr_size() and inet_diag_msg_sctpasoc_fill() can still dereference association state that is no longer valid for reporting. In particular, inet_diag_msg_sctpasoc_fill() may read an empty bind-address list as a real sctp_sockaddr_entry and trigger an out-of-bounds read from unrelated association memory.

Reject the association after taking the socket lock if it has been reaped or detached from the endpoint, and report the lookup as stale. This keeps the exact dump-one path from formatting torn association state.

---
 net/sctp/diag.c |   17 +++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
net/sctp/diag.c +9 -8
@@ -266,15 +266,15 @@ static int sctp_sock_dump_one(struct sct
 
 	lock_sock(sk);
 
-	rep = nlmsg_new(inet_assoc_attr_size(sk, assoc), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!rep) {
-		release_sock(sk);
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (ep != assoc->ep || assoc->base.dead) {
+		err = -ESTALE;
+		goto out_unlock;
 	}
 
-	if (ep != assoc->ep) {
-		err = -EAGAIN;
-		goto out;
+	rep = nlmsg_new(inet_assoc_attr_size(sk, assoc), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!rep) {
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out_unlock;
 	}
 
 	err = inet_sctp_diag_fill(sk, assoc, rep, req, sk_user_ns(NETLINK_CB(skb).sk),
@@ -289,8 +289,9 @@ static int sctp_sock_dump_one(struct sct
 	return nlmsg_unicast(sock_net(skb->sk)->diag_nlsk, rep, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid);
 
 out:
-	release_sock(sk);
 	kfree_skb(rep);
+out_unlock:
+	release_sock(sk);
 	return err;
 }
 
author maintainer
#206 lore raw

PATCH 201/261 sctp: stream: fully roll back denied add-stream state

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wyatt Feng <[email protected]>

commit a5f8a90ac9f77c678a9781c0a464b635e0d63e49 upstream.

When ADD_OUT_STREAMS is denied, SCTP only shrinks the queued chunks and then lowers outcnt. That leaves removed stream metadata behind, so a later re-add can reuse a stale ext and hit a null-pointer dereference in the scheduler get path.

Fix the rollback by tearing down the removed stream state the same way other stream resizes do. Unschedule the current scheduler state, drop the removed stream ext state with sctp_stream_outq_migrate(), and then reschedule the remaining streams.

This keeps scheduler-private RR/FC/PRIO lists consistent while fully rolling back denied outgoing stream additions.

---
 net/sctp/stream.c |    6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/sctp/stream.c +5 -1
@@ -1038,6 +1038,7 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_process_strreset
 			stsn, rtsn, GFP_ATOMIC);
 	} else if (req->type == SCTP_PARAM_RESET_ADD_OUT_STREAMS) {
 		struct sctp_strreset_addstrm *addstrm;
+		const struct sctp_sched_ops *sched;
 		__u16 number;
 
 		addstrm = (struct sctp_strreset_addstrm *)req;
@@ -1048,7 +1049,10 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_process_strreset
 			for (i = number; i < stream->outcnt; i++)
 				SCTP_SO(stream, i)->state = SCTP_STREAM_OPEN;
 		} else {
-			sctp_stream_shrink_out(stream, number);
+			sched = sctp_sched_ops_from_stream(stream);
+			sched->unsched_all(stream);
+			sctp_stream_outq_migrate(stream, NULL, number);
+			sched->sched_all(stream);
 			stream->outcnt = number;
 		}
 
author maintainer
#207 lore raw

PATCH 202/261 thunderbolt: Reject zero-length property entries in validator

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>

commit cff8eb65d1eafe7793e54b4d0cf6bf831644630b upstream.

tb_property_entry_valid() accepts entries with length == 0 for DIRECTORY, DATA, and TEXT types. A zero-length TEXT entry passes validation but causes an underflow in the null-termination logic:

  property->value.text[property->length * 4 - 1] = '\0';

When property->length is 0 this writes to offset -1 relative to the allocation.

Reject zero-length entries early in the validator since they have no valid representation in the XDomain property protocol.

Fixes cdae7c07e3e3 ("thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain properties")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-7
---
 drivers/thunderbolt/property.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/thunderbolt/property.c +2 -0
@@ -60,6 +60,8 @@ static bool tb_property_entry_valid(cons
 	case TB_PROPERTY_TYPE_DIRECTORY:
 	case TB_PROPERTY_TYPE_DATA:
 	case TB_PROPERTY_TYPE_TEXT:
+		if (!entry->length)
+			return false;
 		if (entry->length > block_len)
 			return false;
 		if (check_add_overflow(entry->value, entry->length, &end) ||
author maintainer
#208 lore raw

PATCH 203/261 thunderbolt: Bound root directory content to block size

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>

commit 65423079c7420e3dbf9a7aa345c243a3f5752e5d upstream.

__tb_property_parse_dir() does not check that content_offset + content_len fits within block_len for the root directory case. When rootdir->length equals or exceeds block_len - 2, the entry loop reads past the allocated property block.

Add a bounds check after computing content_offset and content_len to reject directories whose content extends past the block.

Fixes cdae7c07e3e3 ("thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain properties")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-7
---
 drivers/thunderbolt/property.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/thunderbolt/property.c +4 -0
@@ -187,6 +187,10 @@ static struct tb_property_dir *__tb_prop
 	if (is_root) {
 		content_offset = dir_offset + 2;
 		content_len = dir_len;
+		if (content_offset + content_len > block_len) {
+			tb_property_free_dir(dir);
+			return NULL;
+		}
 	} else {
 		if (dir_len < 4) {
 			tb_property_free_dir(dir);
author maintainer
#209 lore raw

PATCH 204/261 thunderbolt: Clamp XDomain response data copy to allocation size

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>

commit 322e93448d908434ae5545660fcbe8f5a7a8e141 upstream.

tb_xdp_properties_request() derives the per-packet copy length from the response header without checking that it fits in the previously allocated data buffer. A malicious peer can set its length field larger than the declared data_length, causing memcpy to write past the kcalloc allocation.

Clamp the per-packet copy length so that the cumulative offset never exceeds data_len.

Fixes cdae7c07e3e3 ("thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain properties")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-7
---
 drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c +2 -0
@@ -393,6 +393,8 @@ static int tb_xdp_properties_request(str
 			}
 		}
 
+		if (req.offset + len > data_len)
+			len = data_len - req.offset;
 		memcpy(data + req.offset, res->data, len * 4);
 		req.offset += len;
 	} while (!data_len || req.offset < data_len);
author maintainer
#210 lore raw

PATCH 205/261 thunderbolt: Validate XDomain request packet size before type cast

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>

commit a504b9f2797b739e0304d537e8aa4ce883ecce39 upstream.

tb_xdp_handle_request() casts the received packet buffer to protocol-specific structs without verifying that the allocation is large enough for the target type. A peer can send a minimal XDomain packet that passes the generic header length check but is shorter than the struct accessed after the cast, causing out-of- bounds reads from the kmemdup allocation.

Plumb the packet length through xdomain_request_work and validate it against the expected struct size before each cast.

Fixes 8e1de7042596 ("thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain lane bonding")
Fixes cdae7c07e3e3 ("thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain properties")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-7
---
 drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c |    8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c +6 -2
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ static const char * const state_names[]
 struct xdomain_request_work {
 	struct work_struct work;
 	struct tb_xdp_header *pkg;
+	size_t pkg_len;
 	struct tb *tb;
 };
 
@@ -731,6 +732,7 @@ static void tb_xdp_handle_request(struct
 	struct xdomain_request_work *xw = container_of(work, typeof(*xw), work);
 	const struct tb_xdp_header *pkg = xw->pkg;
 	const struct tb_xdomain_header *xhdr = &pkg->xd_hdr;
+	size_t pkg_len = xw->pkg_len;
 	struct tb *tb = xw->tb;
 	struct tb_ctl *ctl = tb->ctl;
 	struct tb_xdomain *xd;
@@ -762,7 +764,7 @@ static void tb_xdp_handle_request(struct
 	switch (pkg->type) {
 	case PROPERTIES_REQUEST:
 		tb_dbg(tb, "%llx: received XDomain properties request\n", route);
-		if (xd) {
+		if (xd && pkg_len >= sizeof(struct tb_xdp_properties)) {
 			ret = tb_xdp_properties_response(tb, ctl, xd, sequence,
 				(const struct tb_xdp_properties *)pkg);
 		}
@@ -816,7 +818,8 @@ static void tb_xdp_handle_request(struct
 		tb_dbg(tb, "%llx: received XDomain link state change request\n",
 		       route);
 
-		if (xd && xd->state == XDOMAIN_STATE_BONDING_UUID_HIGH) {
+		if (xd && xd->state == XDOMAIN_STATE_BONDING_UUID_HIGH &&
+		    pkg_len >= sizeof(struct tb_xdp_link_state_change)) {
 			const struct tb_xdp_link_state_change *lsc =
 				(const struct tb_xdp_link_state_change *)pkg;
 
@@ -868,6 +871,7 @@ tb_xdp_schedule_request(struct tb *tb, c
 		kfree(xw);
 		return false;
 	}
+	xw->pkg_len = size;
 	xw->tb = tb_domain_get(tb);
 
 	schedule_work(&xw->work);
author maintainer
#211 lore raw

PATCH 206/261 thunderbolt: Limit XDomain response copy to actual frame size

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>

commit 4db2bd2ed4785dbadaeeab9f4e346b21ac5fb8eb upstream.

tb_xdomain_copy() copies req->response_size bytes from the received packet buffer regardless of the actual frame size. When a short response arrives, this reads past the valid frame data in the DMA pool buffer into stale contents from previous transactions.

Use the minimum of frame size and expected response size for the copy length.

Fixes cdae7c07e3e3 ("thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain properties")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-7
---
 drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c +3 -1
@@ -123,7 +123,9 @@ static bool tb_xdomain_match(const struc
 static bool tb_xdomain_copy(struct tb_cfg_request *req,
 			    const struct ctl_pkg *pkg)
 {
-	memcpy(req->response, pkg->buffer, req->response_size);
+	size_t len = min_t(size_t, pkg->frame.size, req->response_size);
+
+	memcpy(req->response, pkg->buffer, len);
 	req->result.err = 0;
 	return true;
 }
author maintainer
#212 lore raw

PATCH 207/261 slimbus: qcom-ngd-ctrl: fix OF node refcount

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bartosz Golaszewski <[email protected]>

commit 120134fe75c6b0ae38f14eb8b548ad1e5761f912 upstream.

Platform devices created with platform_device_alloc() call platform_device_release() when the last reference to the device's kobject is dropped. This function calls of_node_put() unconditionally. This works fine for devices created with platform_device_register_full() but users of the split approach (platform_device_alloc() + platform_device_add()) must bump the reference of the of_node they assign manually. Add the missing call to of_node_get().

---
 drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c +1 -1
@@ -1547,7 +1547,7 @@ static int of_qcom_slim_ngd_register(str
 			of_node_put(node);
 			return ret;
 		}
-		ngd->pdev->dev.of_node = node;
+		ngd->pdev->dev.of_node = of_node_get(node);
 		ctrl->ngd = ngd;
 
 		ret = platform_device_add(ngd->pdev);
author maintainer
#213 lore raw

PATCH 208/261 slimbus: qcom-ngd-ctrl: Fix up platform_driver registration

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bjorn Andersson <[email protected]>

commit 8663e8334d7b6007f5d8a4e5dd270246f35107a6 upstream.

Device drivers should not invoke platform_driver_register()/unregister() in their probe and remove paths. They should further not rely on platform_driver_unregister() as their only means of "deleting" their child devices.

Introduce a helper to unregister the child device and move the platform_driver_register()/unregister() to module_init()/exit().

---
 drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c |   36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c +33 -3
@@ -1566,6 +1566,13 @@ static int of_qcom_slim_ngd_register(str
 	return -ENODEV;
 }
 
+static void qcom_slim_ngd_unregister(struct qcom_slim_ngd_ctrl *ctrl)
+{
+	struct qcom_slim_ngd *ngd = ctrl->ngd;
+
+	platform_device_del(ngd->pdev);
+}
+
 static int qcom_slim_ngd_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 {
 	struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;
@@ -1668,7 +1675,6 @@ static int qcom_slim_ngd_ctrl_probe(stru
 		goto err_pdr_lookup;
 	}
 
-	platform_driver_register(&qcom_slim_ngd_driver);
 	return of_qcom_slim_ngd_register(dev, ctrl);
 
 err_pdr_alloc:
@@ -1682,7 +1688,9 @@ err_pdr_lookup:
 
 static void qcom_slim_ngd_ctrl_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
 {
-	platform_driver_unregister(&qcom_slim_ngd_driver);
+	struct qcom_slim_ngd_ctrl *ctrl = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
+
+	qcom_slim_ngd_unregister(ctrl);
 }
 
 static void qcom_slim_ngd_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
@@ -1758,6 +1766,28 @@ static struct platform_driver qcom_slim_
 	},
 };
 
-module_platform_driver(qcom_slim_ngd_ctrl_driver);
+static int qcom_slim_ngd_init(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = platform_driver_register(&qcom_slim_ngd_driver);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = platform_driver_register(&qcom_slim_ngd_ctrl_driver);
+	if (ret)
+		platform_driver_unregister(&qcom_slim_ngd_driver);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void qcom_slim_ngd_exit(void)
+{
+	platform_driver_unregister(&qcom_slim_ngd_ctrl_driver);
+	platform_driver_unregister(&qcom_slim_ngd_driver);
+}
+
+module_init(qcom_slim_ngd_init);
+module_exit(qcom_slim_ngd_exit);
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
 MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Qualcomm SLIMBus NGD controller");
author maintainer
#214 lore raw

PATCH 209/261 slimbus: qcom-ngd-ctrl: Fix probe error path ordering

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bjorn Andersson <[email protected]>

commit 2c22ff152d380ec3d3af099fa05d0ac5ca9b4c1e upstream.

qcom_slim_ngd_ctrl_probe() first registers the SSR callback then allocates the PDR context, as such the error path needs to come in opposite order to allow us to unroll each step.

---
 drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c |   11 +++++------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c +5 -6
@@ -1666,22 +1666,21 @@ static int qcom_slim_ngd_ctrl_probe(stru
 	if (IS_ERR(ctrl->pdr)) {
 		ret = dev_err_probe(dev, PTR_ERR(ctrl->pdr),
 				    "Failed to init PDR handle\n");
-		goto err_pdr_alloc;
+		goto err_unregister_ssr;
 	}
 
 	pds = pdr_add_lookup(ctrl->pdr, "avs/audio", "msm/adsp/audio_pd");
 	if (IS_ERR(pds) && PTR_ERR(pds) != -EALREADY) {
 		ret = dev_err_probe(dev, PTR_ERR(pds), "pdr add lookup failed\n");
-		goto err_pdr_lookup;
+		goto err_pdr_release;
 	}
 
 	return of_qcom_slim_ngd_register(dev, ctrl);
 
-err_pdr_alloc:
-	qcom_unregister_ssr_notifier(ctrl->notifier, &ctrl->nb);
-
-err_pdr_lookup:
+err_pdr_release:
 	pdr_handle_release(ctrl->pdr);
+err_unregister_ssr:
+	qcom_unregister_ssr_notifier(ctrl->notifier, &ctrl->nb);
 
 	return ret;
 }
author maintainer
#215 lore raw

PATCH 210/261 slimbus: qcom-ngd-ctrl: Register callbacks after creating the ngd

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bjorn Andersson <[email protected]>

commit 2a9d50e9ea406e0c8735938484adc20515ef1b47 upstream.

When the remoteproc starts in parallel with the NGD driver being probed, or the remoteproc is already up when the PDR lookup is being registered, or in the theoretical event that we get an interrupt from the hardware, these callbacks will operate on uninitialized data. This result in issues to boot the affected boards.

One such example can be seen in the following fault, where qcom_slim_ngd_ssr_pdr_notify() schedules work on the NULL ngd_up_work.

[   21.858578] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   21.858745] WARNING: kernel/workqueue.c:2338 at __queue_work+0x5e0/0x790, CPU#2: kworker/2:2/116
...
[   21.859251] Call trace:
[   21.859255]  __queue_work+0x5e0/0x790 (P)
[   21.859265]  queue_work_on+0x6c/0xf0
[   21.859273]  qcom_slim_ngd_ssr_pdr_notify+0x110/0x150 [slim_qcom_ngd_ctrl]
[   21.859304]  qcom_slim_ngd_ssr_notify+0x24/0x40 [slim_qcom_ngd_ctrl]
[   21.859318]  notifier_call_chain+0xa4/0x230
[   21.859329]  srcu_notifier_call_chain+0x64/0xb8
[   21.859338]  ssr_notify_start+0x40/0x78 [qcom_common]
[   21.859355]  rproc_start+0x130/0x230
[   21.859367]  rproc_boot+0x3d4/0x518

...

Move the enablement of interrupts, and the registration of SSR and PDR until after the NGD device has been registered.

This could be further refined by moving initialization to the control driver probe and by removing the platform driver model from the picture.

---
 drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c |   47 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c +27 -20
@@ -1615,6 +1615,7 @@ static int qcom_slim_ngd_ctrl_probe(stru
 {
 	struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;
 	struct qcom_slim_ngd_ctrl *ctrl;
+	int irq;
 	int ret;
 	struct pdr_service *pds;
 
@@ -1628,20 +1629,16 @@ static int qcom_slim_ngd_ctrl_probe(stru
 	if (IS_ERR(ctrl->base))
 		return PTR_ERR(ctrl->base);
 
-	ret = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		return ret;
-
-	ret = devm_request_irq(dev, ret, qcom_slim_ngd_interrupt,
-			       IRQF_TRIGGER_HIGH, "slim-ngd", ctrl);
+	irq = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0);
+	if (irq < 0)
+		return irq;
+
+	ret = devm_request_irq(dev, irq, qcom_slim_ngd_interrupt,
+			       IRQF_TRIGGER_HIGH | IRQF_NO_AUTOEN,
+			       "slim-ngd", ctrl);
 	if (ret)
 		return dev_err_probe(&pdev->dev, ret, "request IRQ failed\n");
 
-	ctrl->nb.notifier_call = qcom_slim_ngd_ssr_notify;
-	ctrl->notifier = qcom_register_ssr_notifier("lpass", &ctrl->nb);
-	if (IS_ERR(ctrl->notifier))
-		return PTR_ERR(ctrl->notifier);
-
 	ctrl->dev = dev;
 	ctrl->framer.rootfreq = SLIM_ROOT_FREQ >> 3;
 	ctrl->framer.superfreq =
@@ -1663,24 +1660,34 @@ static int qcom_slim_ngd_ctrl_probe(stru
 	init_completion(&ctrl->qmi_up);
 
 	ctrl->pdr = pdr_handle_alloc(slim_pd_status, ctrl);
-	if (IS_ERR(ctrl->pdr)) {
-		ret = dev_err_probe(dev, PTR_ERR(ctrl->pdr),
-				    "Failed to init PDR handle\n");
-		goto err_unregister_ssr;
-	}
+	if (IS_ERR(ctrl->pdr))
+		return dev_err_probe(dev, PTR_ERR(ctrl->pdr), "Failed to init PDR handle\n");
+
+	ret = of_qcom_slim_ngd_register(dev, ctrl);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err_pdr_release;
 
 	pds = pdr_add_lookup(ctrl->pdr, "avs/audio", "msm/adsp/audio_pd");
 	if (IS_ERR(pds) && PTR_ERR(pds) != -EALREADY) {
 		ret = dev_err_probe(dev, PTR_ERR(pds), "pdr add lookup failed\n");
-		goto err_pdr_release;
+		goto err_unregister_ngd;
 	}
 
-	return of_qcom_slim_ngd_register(dev, ctrl);
+	ctrl->nb.notifier_call = qcom_slim_ngd_ssr_notify;
+	ctrl->notifier = qcom_register_ssr_notifier("lpass", &ctrl->nb);
+	if (IS_ERR(ctrl->notifier)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(ctrl->notifier);
+		goto err_unregister_ngd;
+	}
+
+	enable_irq(irq);
+
+	return 0;
 
+err_unregister_ngd:
+	qcom_slim_ngd_unregister(ctrl);
 err_pdr_release:
 	pdr_handle_release(ctrl->pdr);
-err_unregister_ssr:
-	qcom_unregister_ssr_notifier(ctrl->notifier, &ctrl->nb);
 
 	return ret;
 }
author maintainer
#216 lore raw

PATCH 211/261 slimbus: qcom-ngd-ctrl: Initialize controller resources in controller

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bjorn Andersson <[email protected]>

commit 07c564ea5fb859b7381429de935d5df4781947c6 upstream.

The work structs and work queue are controller resources, create and destroy them in the controller context. Creating them as part of the child device's probe path seems to be okay now that the controller's probe has been updated, but if for some reason the child does not probe successfully a SSR or PDR notification will schedule_work() on an uninitialized "ngd_up_work".

Move the initialization of these controller resources to the controller probe function to avoid any issues, and to clarify the ownership.

---
 drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c |   38 ++++++++++++++++----------------------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c +16 -22
@@ -1588,25 +1588,8 @@ static int qcom_slim_ngd_probe(struct pl
 	pm_runtime_enable(dev);
 	pm_runtime_get_noresume(dev);
 	ret = qcom_slim_ngd_qmi_svc_event_init(ctrl);
-	if (ret) {
+	if (ret)
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "QMI service registration failed:%d", ret);
-		return ret;
-	}
-
-	INIT_WORK(&ctrl->m_work, qcom_slim_ngd_master_worker);
-	INIT_WORK(&ctrl->ngd_up_work, qcom_slim_ngd_up_worker);
-	ctrl->mwq = create_singlethread_workqueue("ngd_master");
-	if (!ctrl->mwq) {
-		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to start master worker\n");
-		ret = -ENOMEM;
-		goto wq_err;
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-wq_err:
-	qcom_slim_ngd_qmi_svc_event_deinit(&ctrl->qmi);
-	if (ctrl->mwq)
-		destroy_workqueue(ctrl->mwq);
 
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -1659,9 +1642,18 @@ static int qcom_slim_ngd_ctrl_probe(stru
 	init_completion(&ctrl->qmi.qmi_comp);
 	init_completion(&ctrl->qmi_up);
 
+	INIT_WORK(&ctrl->m_work, qcom_slim_ngd_master_worker);
+	INIT_WORK(&ctrl->ngd_up_work, qcom_slim_ngd_up_worker);
+
+	ctrl->mwq = create_singlethread_workqueue("ngd_master");
+	if (!ctrl->mwq)
+		return dev_err_probe(dev, -ENOMEM, "Failed to start master worker\n");
+
 	ctrl->pdr = pdr_handle_alloc(slim_pd_status, ctrl);
-	if (IS_ERR(ctrl->pdr))
-		return dev_err_probe(dev, PTR_ERR(ctrl->pdr), "Failed to init PDR handle\n");
+	if (IS_ERR(ctrl->pdr)) {
+		ret = dev_err_probe(dev, PTR_ERR(ctrl->pdr), "Failed to init PDR handle\n");
+		goto err_destroy_mwq;
+	}
 
 	ret = of_qcom_slim_ngd_register(dev, ctrl);
 	if (ret)
@@ -1688,6 +1680,8 @@ err_unregister_ngd:
 	qcom_slim_ngd_unregister(ctrl);
 err_pdr_release:
 	pdr_handle_release(ctrl->pdr);
+err_destroy_mwq:
+	destroy_workqueue(ctrl->mwq);
 
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -1697,6 +1691,8 @@ static void qcom_slim_ngd_ctrl_remove(st
 	struct qcom_slim_ngd_ctrl *ctrl = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
 
 	qcom_slim_ngd_unregister(ctrl);
+
+	destroy_workqueue(ctrl->mwq);
 }
 
 static void qcom_slim_ngd_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
@@ -1709,8 +1705,6 @@ static void qcom_slim_ngd_remove(struct
 	qcom_slim_ngd_enable(ctrl, false);
 	qcom_slim_ngd_exit_dma(ctrl);
 	qcom_slim_ngd_qmi_svc_event_deinit(&ctrl->qmi);
-	if (ctrl->mwq)
-		destroy_workqueue(ctrl->mwq);
 
 	kfree(ctrl->ngd);
 	ctrl->ngd = NULL;
author maintainer
#217 lore raw

PATCH 212/261 slimbus: qcom-ngd-ctrl: Correct PDR and SSR cleanup ownership

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bjorn Andersson <[email protected]>

commit 960b53a3f76fa214c2fc493734ae7b3c5e713bbf upstream.

PDR and SSR callbacks are registred from the controller probe function, but currently released from the child device's remove function.

The remove() function should only be unwinding what was done in the same device's probe() function.

---
 drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c |    5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c +3 -2
@@ -1690,6 +1690,9 @@ static void qcom_slim_ngd_ctrl_remove(st
 {
 	struct qcom_slim_ngd_ctrl *ctrl = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
 
+	pdr_handle_release(ctrl->pdr);
+	qcom_unregister_ssr_notifier(ctrl->notifier, &ctrl->nb);
+
 	qcom_slim_ngd_unregister(ctrl);
 
 	destroy_workqueue(ctrl->mwq);
@@ -1700,8 +1703,6 @@ static void qcom_slim_ngd_remove(struct
 	struct qcom_slim_ngd_ctrl *ctrl = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
 
 	pm_runtime_disable(&pdev->dev);
-	pdr_handle_release(ctrl->pdr);
-	qcom_unregister_ssr_notifier(ctrl->notifier, &ctrl->nb);
 	qcom_slim_ngd_enable(ctrl, false);
 	qcom_slim_ngd_exit_dma(ctrl);
 	qcom_slim_ngd_qmi_svc_event_deinit(&ctrl->qmi);
author maintainer
#218 lore raw

PATCH 213/261 slimbus: qcom-ngd-ctrl: Balance pm_runtime enablement for NGD

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bjorn Andersson <[email protected]>

commit 6a003446b725c44b9e3ffa111b0effbaa2d43085 upstream.

The pm_runtime_enable() and pm_runtime_use_autosuspend() calls are supposed to be balanced on exit, add these calls.

---
 drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c |    6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c +5 -1
@@ -1588,8 +1588,11 @@ static int qcom_slim_ngd_probe(struct pl
 	pm_runtime_enable(dev);
 	pm_runtime_get_noresume(dev);
 	ret = qcom_slim_ngd_qmi_svc_event_init(ctrl);
-	if (ret)
+	if (ret) {
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "QMI service registration failed:%d", ret);
+		pm_runtime_dont_use_autosuspend(dev);
+		pm_runtime_disable(dev);
+	}
 
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -1702,6 +1705,7 @@ static void qcom_slim_ngd_remove(struct
 {
 	struct qcom_slim_ngd_ctrl *ctrl = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
 
+	pm_runtime_dont_use_autosuspend(&pdev->dev);
 	pm_runtime_disable(&pdev->dev);
 	qcom_slim_ngd_enable(ctrl, false);
 	qcom_slim_ngd_exit_dma(ctrl);
author maintainer
#219 lore raw

PATCH 214/261 slimbus: qcom-ngd-ctrl: Avoid ABBA on tx_lock/ctrl->lock

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bjorn Andersson <[email protected]>

commit 55f2ea9ff83cc27a85526b14bc9b32f96a08d6ec upstream.

During the SSR/PDR down notification the tx_lock is taken with the intent to provide synchronization with active DMA transfers.

But during this period qcom_slim_ngd_down() is invoked, which ends up in slim_report_absent(), which takes the slim_controller lock. In multiple other codepaths these two locks are taken in the opposite order (i.e. slim_controller then tx_lock).

The result is a lockdep splat, and a possible deadlock:

rprocctl/449 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff00009793e620 (&ctrl->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: slim_report_absent (drivers/slimbus/core.c:322) slimbus

but task is already holding lock:
ffff00009793fb50 (&ctrl->tx_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: qcom_slim_ngd_ssr_pdr_notify (drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c:1475) slim_qcom_ngd_ctrl

which lock already depends on the new lock.

  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
        CPU0                    CPU1
        ----                    ----
   lock(&ctrl->tx_lock);
                                lock(&ctrl->lock);
                                lock(&ctrl->tx_lock);

lock(&ctrl->lock);

The assumption is that the comment refers to the desire to not call qcom_slim_ngd_exit_dma() while we have an ongoing DMA TX transaction. But any such transaction is initiated and completed within a single qcom_slim_ngd_xfer_msg().

Prior to calling qcom_slim_ngd_exit_dma() the slim_controller is torn down, all child devices are notified that the slimbus is gone and the child devices are removed.

Stop taking the tx_lock in qcom_slim_ngd_ssr_pdr_notify() to avoid the deadlock.

Fixes a899d324863a ("slimbus: qcom-ngd-ctrl: add Sub System Restart support")
---
 drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c |    3 ---
 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c +0 -3
@@ -1471,15 +1471,12 @@ static int qcom_slim_ngd_ssr_pdr_notify(
 	switch (action) {
 	case QCOM_SSR_BEFORE_SHUTDOWN:
 	case SERVREG_SERVICE_STATE_DOWN:
-		/* Make sure the last dma xfer is finished */
-		mutex_lock(&ctrl->tx_lock);
 		if (ctrl->state != QCOM_SLIM_NGD_CTRL_DOWN) {
 			pm_runtime_get_noresume(ctrl->ctrl.dev);
 			ctrl->state = QCOM_SLIM_NGD_CTRL_DOWN;
 			qcom_slim_ngd_down(ctrl);
 			qcom_slim_ngd_exit_dma(ctrl);
 		}
-		mutex_unlock(&ctrl->tx_lock);
 		break;
 	case QCOM_SSR_AFTER_POWERUP:
 	case SERVREG_SERVICE_STATE_UP:
author maintainer
#220 lore raw

PATCH 215/261 drm/amdkfd: fix NULL dereference in get_queue_ids()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Muhammad Bilal <[email protected]>

commit 2bd550b547deabef98bd3b017ff743b7c34d3a6d upstream.

When usr_queue_id_array is NULL and num_queues is non-zero, get_queue_ids() returns NULL. The callers check only IS_ERR() on the return value; since IS_ERR(NULL) == false the check passes, and suspend_queues() calls q_array_invalidate() which immediately dereferences NULL while iterating num_queues times.

Userspace can trigger this via kfd_ioctl_set_debug_trap() by supplying num_queues > 0 with a zero queue_array_ptr, causing a kernel panic.

A NULL usr_queue_id_array with num_queues == 0 is a legitimate no-op (q_array_invalidate never executes, and resume_queues already guards all queue_ids dereferences behind a NULL check). Return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL) only when num_queues is non-zero and the pointer is absent; both callers already propagate IS_ERR() returns correctly to userspace.

Fixes a70a93fa568b ("drm/amdkfd: add debug suspend and resume process queues operation")
(cherry picked from commit f165a82cdf503884bb1797771c61b2fcc72113d4)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_device_queue_manager.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_device_queue_manager.c +1 -1
@@ -3195,7 +3195,7 @@ static void copy_context_work_handler (s
 static uint32_t *get_queue_ids(uint32_t num_queues, uint32_t *usr_queue_id_array)
 {
 	if (!usr_queue_id_array)
-		return NULL;
+		return num_queues ? ERR_PTR(-EINVAL) : NULL;
 
 	if (num_queues > KFD_MAX_NUM_OF_QUEUES_PER_PROCESS)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
author maintainer
#221 lore raw

PATCH 216/261 drm/amdkfd: Fix buffer overflow in SDMA queue checkpoint/restore on GFX11

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andrew Martin <[email protected]>

commit 352ea59028ea48a6fff77f19ae28f98f71946a80 upstream.

The v11 MQD manager incorrectly assigned the CP-compute variants of checkpoint_mqd/restore_mqd for KFD_MQD_TYPE_SDMA queues. These functions use sizeof(struct v11_compute_mqd) (2048 bytes) instead of sizeof(struct v11_sdma_mqd) (512 bytes), causing a 1536-byte overflow.

During CRIU checkpoint of an SDMA queue on Navi3x:
- checkpoint_mqd() reads 2048 bytes from a 512-byte SDMA MQD buffer, leaking 1536 bytes of adjacent GTT memory to userspace

During CRIU restore:
- restore_mqd() writes 2048 bytes into a 512-byte SDMA MQD buffer, corrupting 1536 bytes of adjacent GTT memory (often the ring buffer or neighboring MQDs)

This is a copy-paste regression unique to v11. All other ASIC backends (cik, vi, v9, v10, v12) correctly use the SDMA-specific variants.

Add checkpoint_mqd_sdma() and restore_mqd_sdma() functions that properly handle the smaller v11_sdma_mqd structure, matching the pattern used in other MQD managers.

Fixes cc009e613de6 ("drm/amdkfd: Add KFD support for soc21 v3")
Assisted-by Claude:Sonnet 4-5
(cherry picked from commit 6fa41db7ffdec97d62433adf03b7b9b759af8c2c)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_mqd_manager_v11.c |   49 +++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_mqd_manager_v11.c +41 -8
@@ -334,8 +334,7 @@ static void checkpoint_mqd(struct mqd_ma
 
 static void restore_mqd(struct mqd_manager *mm, void **mqd,
 			struct kfd_mem_obj *mqd_mem_obj, uint64_t *gart_addr,
-			struct queue_properties *qp,
-			const void *mqd_src,
+			struct queue_properties *qp, const void *mqd_src,
 			const void *ctl_stack_src, const u32 ctl_stack_size)
 {
 	uint64_t addr;
@@ -351,14 +350,48 @@ static void restore_mqd(struct mqd_manag
 		*gart_addr = addr;
 
 	m->cp_hqd_pq_doorbell_control =
-		qp->doorbell_off <<
-			CP_HQD_PQ_DOORBELL_CONTROL__DOORBELL_OFFSET__SHIFT;
-	pr_debug("cp_hqd_pq_doorbell_control 0x%x\n",
-			m->cp_hqd_pq_doorbell_control);
+		qp->doorbell_off << CP_HQD_PQ_DOORBELL_CONTROL__DOORBELL_OFFSET__SHIFT;
+	pr_debug("cp_hqd_pq_doorbell_control 0x%x\n", m->cp_hqd_pq_doorbell_control);
 
 	qp->is_active = 0;
 }
 
+static void checkpoint_mqd_sdma(struct mqd_manager *mm,
+				void *mqd,
+				void *mqd_dst,
+				void *ctl_stack_dst)
+{
+	struct v11_sdma_mqd *m;
+
+	m = get_sdma_mqd(mqd);
+
+	memcpy(mqd_dst, m, sizeof(struct v11_sdma_mqd));
+}
+
+static void restore_mqd_sdma(struct mqd_manager *mm, void **mqd,
+			     struct kfd_mem_obj *mqd_mem_obj, uint64_t *gart_addr,
+			     struct queue_properties *qp,
+			     const void *mqd_src,
+			     const void *ctl_stack_src,
+			     const u32 ctl_stack_size)
+{
+	uint64_t addr;
+	struct v11_sdma_mqd *m;
+
+	m = (struct v11_sdma_mqd *) mqd_mem_obj->cpu_ptr;
+	addr = mqd_mem_obj->gpu_addr;
+
+	memcpy(m, mqd_src, sizeof(*m));
+
+	m->sdmax_rlcx_doorbell_offset =
+		qp->doorbell_off << SDMA0_QUEUE0_DOORBELL_OFFSET__OFFSET__SHIFT;
+
+	*mqd = m;
+	if (gart_addr)
+		*gart_addr = addr;
+
+	qp->is_active = 0;
+}
 
 static void init_mqd_hiq(struct mqd_manager *mm, void **mqd,
 			struct kfd_mem_obj *mqd_mem_obj, uint64_t *gart_addr,
@@ -543,8 +576,8 @@ struct mqd_manager *mqd_manager_init_v11
 		mqd->update_mqd = update_mqd_sdma;
 		mqd->destroy_mqd = kfd_destroy_mqd_sdma;
 		mqd->is_occupied = kfd_is_occupied_sdma;
-		mqd->checkpoint_mqd = checkpoint_mqd;
-		mqd->restore_mqd = restore_mqd;
+		mqd->checkpoint_mqd = checkpoint_mqd_sdma;
+		mqd->restore_mqd = restore_mqd_sdma;
 		mqd->mqd_size = sizeof(struct v11_sdma_mqd);
 		mqd->mqd_stride = kfd_mqd_stride;
 #if defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_FS)
author maintainer
#222 lore raw

PATCH 217/261 drm/xe: Clear pending_disable before signaling suspend fence

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tangudu Tilak Tirumalesh <[email protected]>

commit 54f2a0442a30fe7a0f6bc8345e81f8b2db8effbd upstream.

In the schedule-disable done path for suspend, we signal the suspend fence before clearing pending_disable.

That wakeup can let suspend_wait complete and resume be queued immediately. The resume path may then reach enable_scheduling() while pending_disable is still set and hit the !exec_queue_pending_disable(q) assertion.

Fix this by clearing pending_disable before signaling the suspend fence, so any resumed transition observes a consistent state.

Fixes 87651f31ae4e ("drm/xe/guc_submit: fix race around suspend_pending")
(cherry picked from commit 4b1ae138b0e103d753773956a84eebc2edbf62c4)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_guc_submit.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_guc_submit.c +1 -1
@@ -1907,8 +1907,8 @@ static void handle_sched_done(struct xe_
 		xe_gt_assert(guc_to_gt(guc), exec_queue_pending_disable(q));
 
 		if (q->guc->suspend_pending) {
-			suspend_fence_signal(q);
 			clear_exec_queue_pending_disable(q);
+			suspend_fence_signal(q);
 		} else {
 			if (exec_queue_banned(q) || check_timeout) {
 				smp_wmb();
author maintainer
#223 lore raw

PATCH 218/261 drm/v3d: Fix vaddr leak when indirect CSD has zeroed workgroups

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Maíra Canal <[email protected]>

commit ae7676952790f421c40918e2586a2c9f12a682b6 upstream.

v3d_rewrite_csd_job_wg_counts_from_indirect() maps both the indirect buffer and the workgroup buffer and is expected to release them before returning. When any of the workgroup counts read from the buffer is zero, the function bailed out early and skipped the cleanup, leaking the vaddr mappings of both BOs.

Jump to the cleanup path instead of returning directly, so the mappings are always dropped.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/v3d/v3d_sched.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/v3d/v3d_sched.c +2 -1
@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ v3d_rewrite_csd_job_wg_counts_from_indir
 	wg_counts = (uint32_t *)(bo->vaddr + indirect_csd->offset);
 
 	if (wg_counts[0] == 0 || wg_counts[1] == 0 || wg_counts[2] == 0)
-		return;
+		goto unmap_bo;
 
 	args->cfg[0] = wg_counts[0] << V3D_CSD_CFG012_WG_COUNT_SHIFT;
 	args->cfg[1] = wg_counts[1] << V3D_CSD_CFG012_WG_COUNT_SHIFT;
@@ -434,6 +434,7 @@ v3d_rewrite_csd_job_wg_counts_from_indir
 		}
 	}
 
+unmap_bo:
 	v3d_put_bo_vaddr(indirect);
 	v3d_put_bo_vaddr(bo);
 }
author maintainer
#224 lore raw

PATCH 219/261 drm/amdgpu: restart the CS if some parts of the VM are still invalidated

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian König <[email protected]>

commit 40396ffdf6120e2380706c59e1a84d7e765a37b6 upstream.

Make sure that we only submit work with full up to date VM page tables.

Backport to 7.1 and older.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_cs.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_cs.c +3 -1
@@ -1278,6 +1278,7 @@ static int amdgpu_cs_submit(struct amdgp
 {
 	struct amdgpu_fpriv *fpriv = p->filp->driver_priv;
 	struct amdgpu_job *leader = p->gang_leader;
+	struct amdgpu_vm *vm = &fpriv->vm;
 	struct amdgpu_bo_list_entry *e;
 	struct drm_gem_object *gobj;
 	unsigned long index;
@@ -1323,7 +1324,8 @@ static int amdgpu_cs_submit(struct amdgp
 							e->range);
 		e->range = NULL;
 	}
-	if (r) {
+
+	if (r || !list_empty(&vm->invalidated)) {
 		r = -EAGAIN;
 		mutex_unlock(&p->adev->notifier_lock);
 		return r;
author maintainer
#225 lore raw

PATCH 220/261 drm/amd/pm: fix smu13 power limit default/cap calculation

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yang Wang <[email protected]>

commit bb204f19e4a115f094a6a3c4d82fcf48862d0766 upstream.

smu_v13_0_0_get_power_limit() and smu_v13_0_7_get_power_limit() mix runtime power_limit with PP table limits when reporting default/min/max.

When current power limit query succeeds, default_power_limit was set to the runtime value instead of the PP table default, and min/max could be derived from inconsistent bases (MsgLimits/runtime), leading to incorrect cap info.

Use SocketPowerLimitAc/Dc as the PP default base (pp_limit), keep current_power_limit as runtime value, and derive min/max from pp_limit with OD percentages.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/swsmu/smu13/smu_v13_0_0_ppt.c |   32 ++++++++++---------
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/swsmu/smu13/smu_v13_0_7_ppt.c |   32 ++++++++++---------
 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/swsmu/smu13/smu_v13_0_0_ppt.c +17 -15
@@ -2383,28 +2383,30 @@ static int smu_v13_0_0_enable_mgpu_fan_b
 }
 
 static int smu_v13_0_0_get_power_limit(struct smu_context *smu,
-						uint32_t *current_power_limit,
-						uint32_t *default_power_limit,
-						uint32_t *max_power_limit,
-						uint32_t *min_power_limit)
+				       uint32_t *current_power_limit,
+				       uint32_t *default_power_limit,
+				       uint32_t *max_power_limit,
+				       uint32_t *min_power_limit)
 {
 	struct smu_table_context *table_context = &smu->smu_table;
 	struct smu_13_0_0_powerplay_table *powerplay_table =
 		(struct smu_13_0_0_powerplay_table *)table_context->power_play_table;
 	PPTable_t *pptable = table_context->driver_pptable;
 	SkuTable_t *skutable = &pptable->SkuTable;
-	uint32_t power_limit, od_percent_upper = 0, od_percent_lower = 0;
-	uint32_t msg_limit = skutable->MsgLimits.Power[PPT_THROTTLER_PPT0][POWER_SOURCE_AC];
-
-	if (smu_v13_0_get_current_power_limit(smu, &power_limit))
-		power_limit = smu->adev->pm.ac_power ?
+	uint32_t pp_limit = smu->adev->pm.ac_power ?
 			      skutable->SocketPowerLimitAc[PPT_THROTTLER_PPT0] :
 			      skutable->SocketPowerLimitDc[PPT_THROTTLER_PPT0];
+	uint32_t power_limit = 0, od_percent_upper = 0, od_percent_lower = 0;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (current_power_limit) {
+		ret = smu_v13_0_get_current_power_limit(smu, &power_limit);
+		if (ret)
+			*current_power_limit = pp_limit;
+	}
 
-	if (current_power_limit)
-		*current_power_limit = power_limit;
 	if (default_power_limit)
-		*default_power_limit = power_limit;
+		*default_power_limit = pp_limit;
 
 	if (powerplay_table) {
 		if (smu->od_enabled &&
@@ -2418,15 +2420,15 @@ static int smu_v13_0_0_get_power_limit(s
 	}
 
 	dev_dbg(smu->adev->dev, "od percent upper:%d, od percent lower:%d (default power: %d)\n",
-					od_percent_upper, od_percent_lower, power_limit);
+		od_percent_upper, od_percent_lower, pp_limit);
 
 	if (max_power_limit) {
-		*max_power_limit = msg_limit * (100 + od_percent_upper);
+		*max_power_limit = pp_limit * (100 + od_percent_upper);
 		*max_power_limit /= 100;
 	}
 
 	if (min_power_limit) {
-		*min_power_limit = power_limit * (100 - od_percent_lower);
+		*min_power_limit = pp_limit * (100 - od_percent_lower);
 		*min_power_limit /= 100;
 	}
 
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/swsmu/smu13/smu_v13_0_7_ppt.c +18 -14
@@ -2344,28 +2344,32 @@ static int smu_v13_0_7_enable_mgpu_fan_b
 }
 
 static int smu_v13_0_7_get_power_limit(struct smu_context *smu,
-						uint32_t *current_power_limit,
-						uint32_t *default_power_limit,
-						uint32_t *max_power_limit,
-						uint32_t *min_power_limit)
+				       uint32_t *current_power_limit,
+				       uint32_t *default_power_limit,
+				       uint32_t *max_power_limit,
+				       uint32_t *min_power_limit)
 {
 	struct smu_table_context *table_context = &smu->smu_table;
 	struct smu_13_0_7_powerplay_table *powerplay_table =
 		(struct smu_13_0_7_powerplay_table *)table_context->power_play_table;
 	PPTable_t *pptable = table_context->driver_pptable;
 	SkuTable_t *skutable = &pptable->SkuTable;
-	uint32_t power_limit, od_percent_upper = 0, od_percent_lower = 0;
-	uint32_t msg_limit = skutable->MsgLimits.Power[PPT_THROTTLER_PPT0][POWER_SOURCE_AC];
-
-	if (smu_v13_0_get_current_power_limit(smu, &power_limit))
-		power_limit = smu->adev->pm.ac_power ?
+	uint32_t pp_limit = smu->adev->pm.ac_power ?
 			      skutable->SocketPowerLimitAc[PPT_THROTTLER_PPT0] :
 			      skutable->SocketPowerLimitDc[PPT_THROTTLER_PPT0];
+	uint32_t power_limit = 0, od_percent_upper = 0, od_percent_lower = 0;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (current_power_limit) {
+		ret = smu_v13_0_get_current_power_limit(smu, &power_limit);
+		if (ret)
+			power_limit = pp_limit;
 
-	if (current_power_limit)
 		*current_power_limit = power_limit;
+	}
+
 	if (default_power_limit)
-		*default_power_limit = power_limit;
+		*default_power_limit = pp_limit;
 
 	if (powerplay_table) {
 		if (smu->od_enabled &&
@@ -2379,15 +2383,15 @@ static int smu_v13_0_7_get_power_limit(s
 	}
 
 	dev_dbg(smu->adev->dev, "od percent upper:%d, od percent lower:%d (default power: %d)\n",
-					od_percent_upper, od_percent_lower, power_limit);
+		od_percent_upper, od_percent_lower, pp_limit);
 
 	if (max_power_limit) {
-		*max_power_limit = msg_limit * (100 + od_percent_upper);
+		*max_power_limit = pp_limit * (100 + od_percent_upper);
 		*max_power_limit /= 100;
 	}
 
 	if (min_power_limit) {
-		*min_power_limit = power_limit * (100 - od_percent_lower);
+		*min_power_limit = pp_limit * (100 - od_percent_lower);
 		*min_power_limit /= 100;
 	}
 
author maintainer
#226 lore raw

PATCH 221/261 drm/amd/pm: mark metrics.energy_accumulator is invalid for smu 14.0.2

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yang Wang <[email protected]>

commit ee193c5bbd5e2b56bbeb54ef554414b43a6fc896 upstream.

EnergyAccumulator is unsupported on SMU 14.0.2, mark it invalid.

(cherry picked from commit 646b05043eeed04b51c14aad22a400a8250af4b7)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/swsmu/smu14/smu_v14_0_2_ppt.c |    1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/swsmu/smu14/smu_v14_0_2_ppt.c +0 -1
@@ -2208,7 +2208,6 @@ static ssize_t smu_v14_0_2_get_gpu_metri
 					       metrics->Vcn1ActivityPercentage);
 
 	gpu_metrics->average_socket_power = metrics->AverageSocketPower;
-	gpu_metrics->energy_accumulator = metrics->EnergyAccumulator;
 
 	if (metrics->AverageGfxActivity <= SMU_14_0_2_BUSY_THRESHOLD)
 		gpu_metrics->average_gfxclk_frequency = metrics->AverageGfxclkFrequencyPostDs;
author maintainer
#227 lore raw

PATCH 222/261 drm/amd/pm: smu_v14_0_0: use SoftMin for gfxclk in set_soft_freq_limited_range

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Priya Hosur <[email protected]>

commit 03b70e0d8aa26bab89a0f1394c1c80a871925e42 upstream.

In smu_v14_0_0_set_soft_freq_limited_range(), the gfxclk floor is programmed via SetHardMinGfxClk together with SetSoftMaxGfxClk. Under power_dpm_force_performance_level=high this pins HardMin to peak gfxclk.

In PMFW arbitration HardMin has higher priority than SoftMax, so the firmware thermal/PPT throttler cannot clamp gfxclk via SoftMax once HardMin is set to peak. Replace SetHardMinGfxClk with SetSoftMinGfxclk so the driver still requests peak performance but the firmware throttler retains the ability to clamp gfxclk under thermal/PPT pressure. SoftMax handling is unchanged and no other clock domains are affected.

(cherry picked from commit 3ea273267fd29cbf6d83ee72329f59eb5042605b)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/swsmu/smu14/smu_v14_0_0_ppt.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/swsmu/smu14/smu_v14_0_0_ppt.c +2 -1
@@ -1219,7 +1219,8 @@ static int smu_v14_0_0_set_soft_freq_lim
 	switch (clk_type) {
 	case SMU_GFXCLK:
 	case SMU_SCLK:
-		msg_set_min = SMU_MSG_SetHardMinGfxClk;
+		/* SoftMin lets PMFW throttle gfxclk; HardMin would override SoftMax. */
+		msg_set_min = SMU_MSG_SetSoftMinGfxclk;
 		msg_set_max = SMU_MSG_SetSoftMaxGfxClk;
 		break;
 	case SMU_FCLK:
author maintainer
#228 lore raw

PATCH 223/261 drm/amd/display: Bound VBIOS record-chain walk loops

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Harry Wentland <[email protected]>

commit ff287df16a1a58aca78b08d1f3ee09fc44da0351 upstream.

[Why & How]
All record-chain walk loops in bios_parser.c and bios_parser2.c use for(;;) and only terminate on a 0xFF record_type sentinel or zero record_size. A malformed VBIOS image missing the terminator record causes unbounded iteration at probe time, potentially hundreds of thousands of iterations with record_size=1. In the final iterations near the BIOS image boundary, struct casts beyond the 2-byte header validated by GET_IMAGE can also read out of bounds.

Cap all 14 record-chain walk loops to BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD (256) iterations. The atombios.h defines up to 22 distinct record types and atomfirmware.h has 13. Assuming an average of less than 10 records per type (which is reasonable since most are connector- based) 256 is a generous upper bound.

Fixes 4562236b3bc0 ("drm/amd/dc: Add dc display driver (v2)")
Assisted-by Copilot:claude-opus-4.6 Mythos
(cherry picked from commit 95700a3d660287ed657d6892f7be9ffc0e294a93)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser.c        |   15 +++++---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser2.c       |   27 ++++++++++-----
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser_helper.h |    5 ++
 3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser.c +10 -5
@@ -220,6 +220,7 @@ static enum bp_result bios_parser_get_i2
 	ATOM_COMMON_RECORD_HEADER *header;
 	ATOM_I2C_RECORD *record;
 	struct bios_parser *bp = BP_FROM_DCB(dcb);
+	int i;
 
 	if (!info)
 		return BP_RESULT_BADINPUT;
@@ -232,7 +233,7 @@ static enum bp_result bios_parser_get_i2
 	offset = le16_to_cpu(object->usRecordOffset)
 			+ bp->object_info_tbl_offset;
 
-	for (;;) {
+	for (i = 0; i < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; i++) {
 		header = GET_IMAGE(ATOM_COMMON_RECORD_HEADER, offset);
 
 		if (!header)
@@ -291,11 +292,12 @@ static enum bp_result bios_parser_get_de
 {
 	ATOM_COMMON_RECORD_HEADER *header;
 	uint32_t offset;
+	int i;
 
 	offset = le16_to_cpu(object->usRecordOffset)
 			+ bp->object_info_tbl_offset;
 
-	for (;;) {
+	for (i = 0; i < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; i++) {
 		header = GET_IMAGE(ATOM_COMMON_RECORD_HEADER, offset);
 
 		if (!header)
@@ -868,6 +870,7 @@ static ATOM_HPD_INT_RECORD *get_hpd_reco
 {
 	ATOM_COMMON_RECORD_HEADER *header;
 	uint32_t offset;
+	int i;
 
 	if (!object) {
 		BREAK_TO_DEBUGGER(); /* Invalid object */
@@ -877,7 +880,7 @@ static ATOM_HPD_INT_RECORD *get_hpd_reco
 	offset = le16_to_cpu(object->usRecordOffset)
 			+ bp->object_info_tbl_offset;
 
-	for (;;) {
+	for (i = 0; i < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; i++) {
 		header = GET_IMAGE(ATOM_COMMON_RECORD_HEADER, offset);
 
 		if (!header)
@@ -1572,6 +1575,7 @@ static ATOM_ENCODER_CAP_RECORD_V2 *get_e
 {
 	ATOM_COMMON_RECORD_HEADER *header;
 	uint32_t offset;
+	int i;
 
 	if (!object) {
 		BREAK_TO_DEBUGGER(); /* Invalid object */
@@ -1581,7 +1585,7 @@ static ATOM_ENCODER_CAP_RECORD_V2 *get_e
 	offset = le16_to_cpu(object->usRecordOffset)
 					+ bp->object_info_tbl_offset;
 
-	for (;;) {
+	for (i = 0; i < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; i++) {
 		header = GET_IMAGE(ATOM_COMMON_RECORD_HEADER, offset);
 
 		if (!header)
@@ -2671,6 +2675,7 @@ static enum bp_result update_slot_layout
 					      unsigned int record_offset)
 {
 	unsigned int j;
+	unsigned int n;
 	struct bios_parser *bp;
 	ATOM_BRACKET_LAYOUT_RECORD *record;
 	ATOM_COMMON_RECORD_HEADER *record_header;
@@ -2680,7 +2685,7 @@ static enum bp_result update_slot_layout
 	record = NULL;
 	record_header = NULL;
 
-	for (;;) {
+	for (n = 0; n < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; n++) {
 
 		record_header = GET_IMAGE(ATOM_COMMON_RECORD_HEADER, record_offset);
 		if (record_header == NULL) {
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser2.c +18 -9
@@ -395,6 +395,7 @@ static enum bp_result bios_parser_get_i2
 	struct atom_i2c_record *record;
 	struct atom_i2c_record dummy_record = {0};
 	struct bios_parser *bp = BP_FROM_DCB(dcb);
+	int i;
 
 	if (!info)
 		return BP_RESULT_BADINPUT;
@@ -428,7 +429,7 @@ static enum bp_result bios_parser_get_i2
 		break;
 	}
 
-	for (;;) {
+	for (i = 0; i < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; i++) {
 		header = GET_IMAGE(struct atom_common_record_header, offset);
 
 		if (!header)
@@ -533,6 +534,7 @@ static struct atom_hpd_int_record *get_h
 {
 	struct atom_common_record_header *header;
 	uint32_t offset;
+	int i;
 
 	if (!object) {
 		BREAK_TO_DEBUGGER(); /* Invalid object */
@@ -541,7 +543,7 @@ static struct atom_hpd_int_record *get_h
 
 	offset = object->disp_recordoffset + bp->object_info_tbl_offset;
 
-	for (;;) {
+	for (i = 0; i < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; i++) {
 		header = GET_IMAGE(struct atom_common_record_header, offset);
 
 		if (!header)
@@ -610,6 +612,7 @@ static struct atom_hpd_int_record *get_h
 {
 	struct atom_common_record_header *header;
 	uint32_t offset;
+	int i;
 
 	if (!object) {
 		BREAK_TO_DEBUGGER(); /* Invalid object */
@@ -619,7 +622,7 @@ static struct atom_hpd_int_record *get_h
 	offset = le16_to_cpu(object->disp_recordoffset)
 			+ bp->object_info_tbl_offset;
 
-	for (;;) {
+	for (i = 0; i < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; i++) {
 		header = GET_IMAGE(struct atom_common_record_header, offset);
 
 		if (!header)
@@ -2177,6 +2180,7 @@ static struct atom_encoder_caps_record *
 {
 	struct atom_common_record_header *header;
 	uint32_t offset;
+	int i;
 
 	if (!object) {
 		BREAK_TO_DEBUGGER(); /* Invalid object */
@@ -2185,7 +2189,7 @@ static struct atom_encoder_caps_record *
 
 	offset = object->encoder_recordoffset + bp->object_info_tbl_offset;
 
-	for (;;) {
+	for (i = 0; i < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; i++) {
 		header = GET_IMAGE(struct atom_common_record_header, offset);
 
 		if (!header)
@@ -2214,6 +2218,7 @@ static struct atom_disp_connector_caps_r
 {
 	struct atom_common_record_header *header;
 	uint32_t offset;
+	int i;
 
 	if (!object) {
 		BREAK_TO_DEBUGGER(); /* Invalid object */
@@ -2222,7 +2227,7 @@ static struct atom_disp_connector_caps_r
 
 	offset = object->disp_recordoffset + bp->object_info_tbl_offset;
 
-	for (;;) {
+	for (i = 0; i < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; i++) {
 		header = GET_IMAGE(struct atom_common_record_header, offset);
 
 		if (!header)
@@ -2250,6 +2255,7 @@ static struct atom_connector_caps_record
 {
 	struct atom_common_record_header *header;
 	uint32_t offset;
+	int i;
 
 	if (!object) {
 		BREAK_TO_DEBUGGER(); /* Invalid object */
@@ -2258,7 +2264,7 @@ static struct atom_connector_caps_record
 
 	offset = object->disp_recordoffset + bp->object_info_tbl_offset;
 
-	for (;;) {
+	for (i = 0; i < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; i++) {
 		header = GET_IMAGE(struct atom_common_record_header, offset);
 
 		if (!header)
@@ -2336,6 +2342,7 @@ static struct atom_connector_speed_recor
 {
 	struct atom_common_record_header *header;
 	uint32_t offset;
+	int i;
 
 	if (!object) {
 		BREAK_TO_DEBUGGER(); /* Invalid object */
@@ -2344,7 +2351,7 @@ static struct atom_connector_speed_recor
 
 	offset = object->disp_recordoffset + bp->object_info_tbl_offset;
 
-	for (;;) {
+	for (i = 0; i < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; i++) {
 		header = GET_IMAGE(struct atom_common_record_header, offset);
 
 		if (!header)
@@ -3228,6 +3235,7 @@ static enum bp_result update_slot_layout
 {
 	unsigned int record_offset;
 	unsigned int j;
+	unsigned int n;
 	struct atom_display_object_path_v2 *object;
 	struct atom_bracket_layout_record *record;
 	struct atom_common_record_header *record_header;
@@ -3249,7 +3257,7 @@ static enum bp_result update_slot_layout
 		(object->disp_recordoffset) +
 		(unsigned int)(bp->object_info_tbl_offset);
 
-	for (;;) {
+	for (n = 0; n < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; n++) {
 
 		record_header = (struct atom_common_record_header *)
 			GET_IMAGE(struct atom_common_record_header,
@@ -3343,6 +3351,7 @@ static enum bp_result update_slot_layout
 	struct slot_layout_info *slot_layout_info)
 {
 	unsigned int record_offset;
+	unsigned int n;
 	struct atom_display_object_path_v3 *object;
 	struct atom_bracket_layout_record_v2 *record;
 	struct atom_common_record_header *record_header;
@@ -3365,7 +3374,7 @@ static enum bp_result update_slot_layout
 		(object->disp_recordoffset) +
 		(unsigned int)(bp->object_info_tbl_offset);
 
-	for (;;) {
+	for (n = 0; n < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; n++) {
 
 		record_header = (struct atom_common_record_header *)
 			GET_IMAGE(struct atom_common_record_header,
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser_helper.h +5 -0
@@ -38,4 +38,9 @@ uint32_t bios_get_vga_enabled_displays(s
 
 #define GET_IMAGE(type, offset) ((type *) bios_get_image(&bp->base, offset, sizeof(type)))
 
+/* Upper bound on the number of records in a VBIOS record chain. Prevents
+ * unbounded looping if the VBIOS image is malformed and lacks a terminator.
+ */
+#define BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD 256
+
 #endif
author maintainer
#229 lore raw

PATCH 224/261 drm/amd/display: Clamp HDMI HDCP2 rx_id_list read to buffer size

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Harry Wentland <[email protected]>

commit f0f3981c43b32cadfe373d636d9e9ca522bb3702 upstream.

[Why & How]
During HDCP 2.x repeater authentication over HDMI, the driver reads the sink's RxStatus register and extracts a 10-bit message size field (max value 1023). This value is used as the read length for the ReceiverID list without being clamped to the size of the destination buffer rx_id_list[177]. A malicious HDMI repeater could advertise a message size larger than the buffer, causing an out-of-bounds write during the I2C read.

Clamp the read length in mod_hdcp_read_rx_id_list() to the size of the rx_id_list buffer, matching the approach already used in the DP branch.

Fixes eff682f83c9c ("drm/amd/display: Add DDC handles for HDCP2.2")
Assisted-by Copilot:claude-opus-4.6
(cherry picked from commit 229212219e4247d9486f8ba41ef087358490be09)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/modules/hdcp/hdcp_ddc.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/modules/hdcp/hdcp_ddc.c +2 -1
@@ -529,7 +529,8 @@ enum mod_hdcp_status mod_hdcp_read_rx_id
 	} else {
 		status = read(hdcp, MOD_HDCP_MESSAGE_ID_READ_REPEATER_AUTH_SEND_RECEIVERID_LIST,
 				hdcp->auth.msg.hdcp2.rx_id_list,
-				hdcp->auth.msg.hdcp2.rx_id_list_size);
+				MIN(hdcp->auth.msg.hdcp2.rx_id_list_size,
+				    sizeof(hdcp->auth.msg.hdcp2.rx_id_list)));
 	}
 	return status;
 }
author maintainer
#230 lore raw

PATCH 225/261 drm/amd/display: Clamp VBIOS HDMI retimer register count to array size

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Harry Wentland <[email protected]>

commit fb0707ce00eef4e2d60c3020e1c0432739703e4a upstream.

[Why & How]
The VBIOS integrated info tables (v1_11 and v2_1) contain HdmiRegNum and Hdmi6GRegNum fields that are used as loop bounds when copying retimer I2C register settings into fixed-size arrays (dp*_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[9] and dp*_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings[3]). These u8 fields are not validated before use, so a malformed VBIOS can specify values up to 255, causing an out-of-bounds heap write during driver probe.

Clamp each register count to the destination array size using min_t() before the copy loops, in both get_integrated_info_v11() and get_integrated_info_v2_1().

Assisted-by GitHub Copilot:claude-opus-4.6
(cherry picked from commit 5a7f0ef90195940c54b0f5bb85b87da55f038c69)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser2.c |   48 ++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser2.c +32 -16
@@ -2591,14 +2591,16 @@ static enum bp_result get_integrated_inf
 	info_v11->extdispconninfo.checksum;
 
 	info->dp0_ext_hdmi_slv_addr = info_v11->dp0_retimer_set.HdmiSlvAddr;
-	info->dp0_ext_hdmi_reg_num = info_v11->dp0_retimer_set.HdmiRegNum;
+	info->dp0_ext_hdmi_reg_num = min_t(u8, info_v11->dp0_retimer_set.HdmiRegNum,
+					    ARRAY_SIZE(info->dp0_ext_hdmi_reg_settings));
 	for (i = 0; i < info->dp0_ext_hdmi_reg_num; i++) {
 		info->dp0_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_index =
 				info_v11->dp0_retimer_set.HdmiRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegIndex;
 		info->dp0_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_val =
 				info_v11->dp0_retimer_set.HdmiRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegVal;
 	}
-	info->dp0_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num = info_v11->dp0_retimer_set.Hdmi6GRegNum;
+	info->dp0_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num = min_t(u8, info_v11->dp0_retimer_set.Hdmi6GRegNum,
+					       ARRAY_SIZE(info->dp0_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings));
 	for (i = 0; i < info->dp0_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num; i++) {
 		info->dp0_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_index =
 				info_v11->dp0_retimer_set.Hdmi6GhzRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegIndex;
@@ -2607,14 +2609,16 @@ static enum bp_result get_integrated_inf
 	}
 
 	info->dp1_ext_hdmi_slv_addr = info_v11->dp1_retimer_set.HdmiSlvAddr;
-	info->dp1_ext_hdmi_reg_num = info_v11->dp1_retimer_set.HdmiRegNum;
+	info->dp1_ext_hdmi_reg_num = min_t(u8, info_v11->dp1_retimer_set.HdmiRegNum,
+					    ARRAY_SIZE(info->dp1_ext_hdmi_reg_settings));
 	for (i = 0; i < info->dp1_ext_hdmi_reg_num; i++) {
 		info->dp1_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_index =
 				info_v11->dp1_retimer_set.HdmiRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegIndex;
 		info->dp1_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_val =
 				info_v11->dp1_retimer_set.HdmiRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegVal;
 	}
-	info->dp1_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num = info_v11->dp1_retimer_set.Hdmi6GRegNum;
+	info->dp1_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num = min_t(u8, info_v11->dp1_retimer_set.Hdmi6GRegNum,
+					       ARRAY_SIZE(info->dp1_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings));
 	for (i = 0; i < info->dp1_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num; i++) {
 		info->dp1_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_index =
 				info_v11->dp1_retimer_set.Hdmi6GhzRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegIndex;
@@ -2623,14 +2627,16 @@ static enum bp_result get_integrated_inf
 	}
 
 	info->dp2_ext_hdmi_slv_addr = info_v11->dp2_retimer_set.HdmiSlvAddr;
-	info->dp2_ext_hdmi_reg_num = info_v11->dp2_retimer_set.HdmiRegNum;
+	info->dp2_ext_hdmi_reg_num = min_t(u8, info_v11->dp2_retimer_set.HdmiRegNum,
+					    ARRAY_SIZE(info->dp2_ext_hdmi_reg_settings));
 	for (i = 0; i < info->dp2_ext_hdmi_reg_num; i++) {
 		info->dp2_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_index =
 				info_v11->dp2_retimer_set.HdmiRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegIndex;
 		info->dp2_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_val =
 				info_v11->dp2_retimer_set.HdmiRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegVal;
 	}
-	info->dp2_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num = info_v11->dp2_retimer_set.Hdmi6GRegNum;
+	info->dp2_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num = min_t(u8, info_v11->dp2_retimer_set.Hdmi6GRegNum,
+					       ARRAY_SIZE(info->dp2_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings));
 	for (i = 0; i < info->dp2_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num; i++) {
 		info->dp2_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_index =
 				info_v11->dp2_retimer_set.Hdmi6GhzRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegIndex;
@@ -2639,14 +2645,16 @@ static enum bp_result get_integrated_inf
 	}
 
 	info->dp3_ext_hdmi_slv_addr = info_v11->dp3_retimer_set.HdmiSlvAddr;
-	info->dp3_ext_hdmi_reg_num = info_v11->dp3_retimer_set.HdmiRegNum;
+	info->dp3_ext_hdmi_reg_num = min_t(u8, info_v11->dp3_retimer_set.HdmiRegNum,
+					    ARRAY_SIZE(info->dp3_ext_hdmi_reg_settings));
 	for (i = 0; i < info->dp3_ext_hdmi_reg_num; i++) {
 		info->dp3_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_index =
 				info_v11->dp3_retimer_set.HdmiRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegIndex;
 		info->dp3_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_val =
 				info_v11->dp3_retimer_set.HdmiRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegVal;
 	}
-	info->dp3_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num = info_v11->dp3_retimer_set.Hdmi6GRegNum;
+	info->dp3_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num = min_t(u8, info_v11->dp3_retimer_set.Hdmi6GRegNum,
+					       ARRAY_SIZE(info->dp3_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings));
 	for (i = 0; i < info->dp3_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num; i++) {
 		info->dp3_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_index =
 				info_v11->dp3_retimer_set.Hdmi6GhzRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegIndex;
@@ -2796,14 +2804,16 @@ static enum bp_result get_integrated_inf
 	info->ext_disp_conn_info.checksum =
 		info_v2_1->extdispconninfo.checksum;
 	info->dp0_ext_hdmi_slv_addr = info_v2_1->dp0_retimer_set.HdmiSlvAddr;
-	info->dp0_ext_hdmi_reg_num = info_v2_1->dp0_retimer_set.HdmiRegNum;
+	info->dp0_ext_hdmi_reg_num = min_t(u8, info_v2_1->dp0_retimer_set.HdmiRegNum,
+					    ARRAY_SIZE(info->dp0_ext_hdmi_reg_settings));
 	for (i = 0; i < info->dp0_ext_hdmi_reg_num; i++) {
 		info->dp0_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_index =
 				info_v2_1->dp0_retimer_set.HdmiRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegIndex;
 		info->dp0_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_val =
 				info_v2_1->dp0_retimer_set.HdmiRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegVal;
 	}
-	info->dp0_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num = info_v2_1->dp0_retimer_set.Hdmi6GRegNum;
+	info->dp0_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num = min_t(u8, info_v2_1->dp0_retimer_set.Hdmi6GRegNum,
+					       ARRAY_SIZE(info->dp0_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings));
 	for (i = 0; i < info->dp0_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num; i++) {
 		info->dp0_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_index =
 				info_v2_1->dp0_retimer_set.Hdmi6GhzRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegIndex;
@@ -2811,14 +2821,16 @@ static enum bp_result get_integrated_inf
 				info_v2_1->dp0_retimer_set.Hdmi6GhzRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegVal;
 	}
 	info->dp1_ext_hdmi_slv_addr = info_v2_1->dp1_retimer_set.HdmiSlvAddr;
-	info->dp1_ext_hdmi_reg_num = info_v2_1->dp1_retimer_set.HdmiRegNum;
+	info->dp1_ext_hdmi_reg_num = min_t(u8, info_v2_1->dp1_retimer_set.HdmiRegNum,
+					    ARRAY_SIZE(info->dp1_ext_hdmi_reg_settings));
 	for (i = 0; i < info->dp1_ext_hdmi_reg_num; i++) {
 		info->dp1_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_index =
 				info_v2_1->dp1_retimer_set.HdmiRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegIndex;
 		info->dp1_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_val =
 				info_v2_1->dp1_retimer_set.HdmiRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegVal;
 	}
-	info->dp1_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num = info_v2_1->dp1_retimer_set.Hdmi6GRegNum;
+	info->dp1_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num = min_t(u8, info_v2_1->dp1_retimer_set.Hdmi6GRegNum,
+					       ARRAY_SIZE(info->dp1_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings));
 	for (i = 0; i < info->dp1_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num; i++) {
 		info->dp1_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_index =
 				info_v2_1->dp1_retimer_set.Hdmi6GhzRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegIndex;
@@ -2826,14 +2838,16 @@ static enum bp_result get_integrated_inf
 				info_v2_1->dp1_retimer_set.Hdmi6GhzRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegVal;
 	}
 	info->dp2_ext_hdmi_slv_addr = info_v2_1->dp2_retimer_set.HdmiSlvAddr;
-	info->dp2_ext_hdmi_reg_num = info_v2_1->dp2_retimer_set.HdmiRegNum;
+	info->dp2_ext_hdmi_reg_num = min_t(u8, info_v2_1->dp2_retimer_set.HdmiRegNum,
+					    ARRAY_SIZE(info->dp2_ext_hdmi_reg_settings));
 	for (i = 0; i < info->dp2_ext_hdmi_reg_num; i++) {
 		info->dp2_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_index =
 				info_v2_1->dp2_retimer_set.HdmiRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegIndex;
 		info->dp2_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_val =
 				info_v2_1->dp2_retimer_set.HdmiRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegVal;
 	}
-	info->dp2_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num = info_v2_1->dp2_retimer_set.Hdmi6GRegNum;
+	info->dp2_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num = min_t(u8, info_v2_1->dp2_retimer_set.Hdmi6GRegNum,
+					       ARRAY_SIZE(info->dp2_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings));
 	for (i = 0; i < info->dp2_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num; i++) {
 		info->dp2_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_index =
 				info_v2_1->dp2_retimer_set.Hdmi6GhzRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegIndex;
@@ -2841,14 +2855,16 @@ static enum bp_result get_integrated_inf
 				info_v2_1->dp2_retimer_set.Hdmi6GhzRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegVal;
 	}
 	info->dp3_ext_hdmi_slv_addr = info_v2_1->dp3_retimer_set.HdmiSlvAddr;
-	info->dp3_ext_hdmi_reg_num = info_v2_1->dp3_retimer_set.HdmiRegNum;
+	info->dp3_ext_hdmi_reg_num = min_t(u8, info_v2_1->dp3_retimer_set.HdmiRegNum,
+					    ARRAY_SIZE(info->dp3_ext_hdmi_reg_settings));
 	for (i = 0; i < info->dp3_ext_hdmi_reg_num; i++) {
 		info->dp3_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_index =
 				info_v2_1->dp3_retimer_set.HdmiRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegIndex;
 		info->dp3_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_val =
 				info_v2_1->dp3_retimer_set.HdmiRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegVal;
 	}
-	info->dp3_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num = info_v2_1->dp3_retimer_set.Hdmi6GRegNum;
+	info->dp3_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num = min_t(u8, info_v2_1->dp3_retimer_set.Hdmi6GRegNum,
+					       ARRAY_SIZE(info->dp3_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings));
 	for (i = 0; i < info->dp3_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num; i++) {
 		info->dp3_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_index =
 				info_v2_1->dp3_retimer_set.Hdmi6GhzRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegIndex;
author maintainer
#231 lore raw

PATCH 226/261 drm/amd/display: add missing CSC entries for BT.2020 for DCE IPs

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Leorize <[email protected]>

commit 6590fe323ce2807f5d9454e7fccf3fab875d4352 upstream.

DCE-based hardware does not have the CSC matrices for BT.2020, which causes the driver to fallback to the GPU built-in matrices. This does not appear to cause any issues for RGB sinks, but causes major color artifacts for YCbCr ones (e.g. black becomes green).

This commit adds the missing CSC matrices (taken from DC common) to DCE CSC tables, resolving the issue.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce/dce_transform.c       |   10 +++++++++-
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce110/dce110_opp_csc_v.c |   10 +++++++++-
 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce/dce_transform.c +9 -1
@@ -110,7 +110,15 @@ static const struct out_csc_color_matrix
 { COLOR_SPACE_YCBCR601_LIMITED, { 0xE00, 0xF447, 0xFDB9, 0x1000, 0x991,
 	0x12C9, 0x3A6, 0x200, 0xFB47, 0xF6B9, 0xE00, 0x1000} },
 { COLOR_SPACE_YCBCR709_LIMITED, { 0xE00, 0xF349, 0xFEB7, 0x1000, 0x6CE, 0x16E3,
-	0x24F, 0x200, 0xFCCB, 0xF535, 0xE00, 0x1000} }
+	0x24F, 0x200, 0xFCCB, 0xF535, 0xE00, 0x1000} },
+{ COLOR_SPACE_2020_RGB_FULLRANGE,
+	{ 0x2000, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0x2000, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0x2000, 0} },
+{ COLOR_SPACE_2020_RGB_LIMITEDRANGE,
+	{ 0x1B67, 0, 0, 0x201, 0, 0x1B67, 0, 0x201, 0, 0, 0x1B67, 0x201} },
+{ COLOR_SPACE_2020_YCBCR_LIMITED, { 0x1000, 0xF149, 0xFEB7, 0x1004, 0x0868,
+	0x15B2, 0x01E6, 0x201, 0xFB88, 0xF478, 0x1000, 0x1004} },
+{ COLOR_SPACE_2020_YCBCR_FULL, { 0x1000, 0xF149, 0xFEB7, 0x1004, 0x0868, 0x15B2,
+	0x01E6, 0x201, 0xFB88, 0xF478, 0x1000, 0x1004} }
 };
 
 static bool setup_scaling_configuration(
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce110/dce110_opp_csc_v.c +9 -1
@@ -88,7 +88,15 @@ static const struct out_csc_color_matrix
 { COLOR_SPACE_YCBCR601_LIMITED, { 0xE00, 0xF447, 0xFDB9, 0x1000, 0x991,
 	0x12C9, 0x3A6, 0x200, 0xFB47, 0xF6B9, 0xE00, 0x1000} },
 { COLOR_SPACE_YCBCR709_LIMITED, { 0xE00, 0xF349, 0xFEB7, 0x1000, 0x6CE, 0x16E3,
-	0x24F, 0x200, 0xFCCB, 0xF535, 0xE00, 0x1000} }
+	0x24F, 0x200, 0xFCCB, 0xF535, 0xE00, 0x1000} },
+{ COLOR_SPACE_2020_RGB_FULLRANGE,
+	{ 0x2000, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0x2000, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0x2000, 0} },
+{ COLOR_SPACE_2020_RGB_LIMITEDRANGE,
+	{ 0x1B67, 0, 0, 0x201, 0, 0x1B67, 0, 0x201, 0, 0, 0x1B67, 0x201} },
+{ COLOR_SPACE_2020_YCBCR_LIMITED, { 0x1000, 0xF149, 0xFEB7, 0x1004, 0x0868,
+	0x15B2, 0x01E6, 0x201, 0xFB88, 0xF478, 0x1000, 0x1004} },
+{ COLOR_SPACE_2020_YCBCR_FULL, { 0x1000, 0xF149, 0xFEB7, 0x1004, 0x0868, 0x15B2,
+	0x01E6, 0x201, 0xFB88, 0xF478, 0x1000, 0x1004} }
 };
 
 enum csc_color_mode {
author maintainer
#232 lore raw

PATCH 227/261 drm/amd/display: Fix NULL deref and buffer over-read in SDP debugfs

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Harry Wentland <[email protected]>

commit adf67034b1f61f7119295208085bfd43f85f56af upstream.

[Why & How]
dp_sdp_message_debugfs_write() dereferences connector->base.state->crtc without checking for NULL. A connector can be connected but not bound to any CRTC (e.g. after hot-plug before the next atomic commit), causing a kernel crash when writing to the sdp_message debugfs node.

The function also ignores the user-provided size argument and always passes 36 bytes to copy_from_user(), reading past the user buffer when size < 36.

Fix both issues by:
- Returning -ENODEV when connector->base.state or state->crtc is NULL
- Clamping write_size to min(size, sizeof(data))

Fixes c7ba3653e977 ("drm/amd/display: Generic SDP message access in amdgpu")
Assisted-by Copilot:claude-opus-4.6
(cherry picked from commit 6ab4c36a522842ff70474a1c0af2e40e50fc8300)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_debugfs.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_debugfs.c +5 -0
@@ -1314,8 +1314,13 @@ static ssize_t dp_sdp_message_debugfs_wr
 	if (size == 0)
 		return 0;
 
+	if (!connector->base.state || !connector->base.state->crtc)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
 	acrtc_state = to_dm_crtc_state(connector->base.state->crtc->state);
 
+	write_size = min_t(size_t, size, sizeof(data));
+
 	r = copy_from_user(data, buf, write_size);
 
 	write_size -= r;
author maintainer
#233 lore raw

PATCH 228/261 drm/amd/display: Use krealloc_array() in dal_vector_reserve()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Harry Wentland <[email protected]>

commit da48bc4461b8a5ebfb9264c9b191a701d8e99009 upstream.

[Why & How]
dal_vector_reserve() computes the allocation size as "capacity * vector->struct_size" using uint32_t arithmetic, which can silently wrap to a small value on overflow. This would cause krealloc to return a smaller buffer than expected, leading to heap overflows on subsequent vector appends.

Replace krealloc() with krealloc_array() which performs an internal overflow check and returns NULL on wrap, preventing the issue.

Fixes 2004f45ef83f ("drm/amd/display: Use kernel alloc/free")
Assisted-by Copilot:claude-opus-4.6
(cherry picked from commit 37668568641ccc4cc1dbca4923d0a16609dd5707)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/basics/vector.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/basics/vector.c +2 -2
@@ -288,8 +288,8 @@ bool dal_vector_reserve(struct vector *v
 	if (capacity <= vector->capacity)
 		return true;
 
-	new_container = krealloc(vector->container,
-				 capacity * vector->struct_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	new_container = krealloc_array(vector->container,
+				       capacity, vector->struct_size, GFP_KERNEL);
 
 	if (new_container) {
 		vector->container = new_container;
author maintainer
#234 lore raw

PATCH 229/261 fs/fcntl: fix SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order in fasync signaling

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mingyu Wang <[email protected]>

commit 00633c4683828acd5256fa8d5163f440d74bbe71 upstream.

A SOFTIRQ-safe to SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order deadlock can occur in send_sigio() and send_sigurg() when a process group receives a signal.

When FASYNC is configured for a process group (PIDTYPE_PGID), both functions use read_lock(&tasklist_lock) to traverse the task list. However, they are frequently called from softirq context:
- send_sigio() via input_inject_event -> kill_fasync
- send_sigurg() via tcp_check_urg -> sk_send_sigurg (NET_RX_SOFTIRQ)

The deadlock is caused by the rwlock writer fairness mechanism:
1. CPU 0 (process context) holds read_lock(&tasklist_lock) in do_wait().
2. CPU 1 (process context) attempts write_lock(&tasklist_lock) in fork() or exit() and spins, which blocks all new readers.
3. CPU 0 is interrupted by a softirq (e.g., TCP URG packet reception).
4. The softirq calls send_sigurg() and attempts to acquire read_lock(&tasklist_lock), deadlocking because CPU 1 is waiting.

Since PID hashing and do_each_pid_task() traversals are already RCU-protected, the read_lock on tasklist_lock is no longer strictly required for safe traversal. Fix this by replacing tasklist_lock with rcu_read_lock(), aligning the process group signaling path with the single-PID path. This also mitigates a potential remote denial of service vector via TCP URG packets.

Lockdep splat:
=====================================================
WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected [...]

Chain exists of:
  &dev->event_lock --> &f_owner->lock --> tasklist_lock

Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(tasklist_lock);
                           local_irq_disable();
                           lock(&dev->event_lock);
                           lock(&f_owner->lock);
  <Interrupt>
    lock(&dev->event_lock);

*** DEADLOCK ***

---
 fs/fcntl.c |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/fcntl.c +4 -4
@@ -923,11 +923,11 @@ void send_sigio(struct fown_struct *fown
 			send_sigio_to_task(p, fown, fd, band, type);
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 	} else {
-		read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+		rcu_read_lock();
 		do_each_pid_task(pid, type, p) {
 			send_sigio_to_task(p, fown, fd, band, type);
 		} while_each_pid_task(pid, type, p);
-		read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+		rcu_read_unlock();
 	}
  out_unlock_fown:
 	read_unlock_irqrestore(&fown->lock, flags);
@@ -969,11 +969,11 @@ int send_sigurg(struct file *file)
 			send_sigurg_to_task(p, fown, type);
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 	} else {
-		read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+		rcu_read_lock();
 		do_each_pid_task(pid, type, p) {
 			send_sigurg_to_task(p, fown, type);
 		} while_each_pid_task(pid, type, p);
-		read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+		rcu_read_unlock();
 	}
  out_unlock_fown:
 	read_unlock_irqrestore(&fown->lock, flags);
author maintainer
#235 lore raw

PATCH 230/261 driver core: reject devices with unregistered buses

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

commit 36f35b8df6972167102a1c3d4361e0afb6a84534 upstream.

Trying to register a device on a bus which has not yet been registered used to trigger a NULL-pointer dereference, but since the const bus structure rework registration instead succeeds without the device being added to the bus.

This specifically means that the device will never bind to a driver and that the bus sysfs attributes are not created (i.e. as if the device had no bus).

Reject devices with unregistered buses to catch any callers that get the ordering wrong and to handle bus registration failures more gracefully.

Fixes 5221b82d46f2 ("driver core: bus: bus_add/probe/remove_device() cleanups")
Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/base/bus.c |   11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/base/bus.c +9 -2
@@ -503,10 +503,10 @@ static const struct attribute_group driv
  */
 int bus_add_device(struct device *dev)
 {
-	struct subsys_private *sp = bus_to_subsys(dev->bus);
+	struct subsys_private *sp;
 	int error;
 
-	if (!sp) {
+	if (!dev->bus) {
 		/*
 		 * This is a normal operation for many devices that do not
 		 * have a bus assigned to them, just say that all went
@@ -515,6 +515,13 @@ int bus_add_device(struct device *dev)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	sp = bus_to_subsys(dev->bus);
+	if (!sp) {
+		pr_err("%s: cannot add device '%s' to unregistered bus '%s'\n",
+		       __func__, dev_name(dev), dev->bus->name);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * Reference in sp is now incremented and will be dropped when
 	 * the device is removed from the bus
author maintainer
#236 lore raw

PATCH 231/261 mailbox: Fix NULL message support in mbox_send_message()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jassi Brar <[email protected]>

commit c58e9456e30c7098cbcd9f04571992be8a2e4e63 upstream.

The active_req field serves double duty as both the "is a TX in flight" flag (NULL means idle) and the storage for the in-flight message pointer. When a client sends NULL via mbox_send_message(), active_req is set to NULL, which the framework misinterprets as "no active request". This breaks the TX state machine by:

- tx_tick() short-circuits on (!mssg), skipping the tx_done callback and the tx_complete completion
- txdone_hrtimer() skips the channel entirely since active_req is NULL, so poll-based TX-done detection never fires.

Fix this by introducing a MBOX_NO_MSG sentinel value that means "no active request," freeing NULL to be valid message data. The sentinel is defined in the subsystem-internal mailbox.h so that controller drivers within drivers/mailbox/ can reference it, but it is not exposed to clients outside the subsystem.

Fifteen in-tree callers send NULL (doorbell-style IPCs on Qualcomm, Tegra, TI, Xilinx, i.MX, SCMI, and PCC platforms). All were audited for regression:

- Most already work around the bug via knows_txdone=true with a manual mbox_client_txdone() call, making the framework's tracking irrelevant. These are unaffected.

- Poll-based callers (Xilinx zynqmp/r5) are strictly better off:
the poll timer now correctly detects NULL-active channels instead of silently skipping them.

- irq-qcom-mpm.c was a pre-existing bug -- the only Qualcomm caller that omitted the knows_txdone + mbox_client_txdone() pattern. Fixed in a companion commit ("irqchip/qcom-mpm: Fix missing mailbox TX done acknowledgment").

- No caller sets both a tx_done callback and sends NULL, nor combines tx_block=true with NULL sends, so the newly reachable callback/completion paths are never exercised.

Also update tegra-hsp's flush callback, which directly inspects active_req to wait for the channel to drain: the old "!= NULL" check becomes "!= MBOX_NO_MSG", otherwise flush spins until timeout since the sentinel is non-NULL.

The only tradeoff is that 'MBOX_NO_MSG' can not be used as a message by clients.

---
 drivers/mailbox/mailbox.c          |   15 ++++++++-------
 drivers/mailbox/tegra-hsp.c        |    2 +-
 include/linux/mailbox_controller.h |    3 +++
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/mailbox/mailbox.c +8 -7
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ static void msg_submit(struct mbox_chan
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&chan->lock, flags);
 
-	if (!chan->msg_count || chan->active_req)
+	if (!chan->msg_count || chan->active_req != MBOX_NO_MSG)
 		goto exit;
 
 	count = chan->msg_count;
@@ -97,13 +97,13 @@ static void tx_tick(struct mbox_chan *ch
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&chan->lock, flags);
 	mssg = chan->active_req;
-	chan->active_req = NULL;
+	chan->active_req = MBOX_NO_MSG;
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&chan->lock, flags);
 
 	/* Submit next message */
 	msg_submit(chan);
 
-	if (!mssg)
+	if (mssg == MBOX_NO_MSG)
 		return;
 
 	/* Notify the client */
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart txdone_hrtim
 	for (i = 0; i < mbox->num_chans; i++) {
 		struct mbox_chan *chan = &mbox->chans[i];
 
-		if (chan->active_req && chan->cl) {
+		if (chan->active_req != MBOX_NO_MSG && chan->cl) {
 			txdone = chan->mbox->ops->last_tx_done(chan);
 			if (txdone)
 				tx_tick(chan, 0);
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ int mbox_send_message(struct mbox_chan *
 {
 	int t;
 
-	if (!chan || !chan->cl)
+	if (!chan || !chan->cl || mssg == MBOX_NO_MSG)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	t = add_to_rbuf(chan, mssg);
@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ static int __mbox_bind_client(struct mbo
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&chan->lock, flags);
 	chan->msg_free = 0;
 	chan->msg_count = 0;
-	chan->active_req = NULL;
+	chan->active_req = MBOX_NO_MSG;
 	chan->cl = cl;
 	init_completion(&chan->tx_complete);
 
@@ -492,7 +492,7 @@ void mbox_free_channel(struct mbox_chan
 	/* The queued TX requests are simply aborted, no callbacks are made */
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&chan->lock, flags);
 	chan->cl = NULL;
-	chan->active_req = NULL;
+	chan->active_req = MBOX_NO_MSG;
 	if (chan->txdone_method == TXDONE_BY_ACK)
 		chan->txdone_method = TXDONE_BY_POLL;
 
@@ -548,6 +548,7 @@ int mbox_controller_register(struct mbox
 
 		chan->cl = NULL;
 		chan->mbox = mbox;
+		chan->active_req = MBOX_NO_MSG;
 		chan->txdone_method = txdone;
 		spin_lock_init(&chan->lock);
 	}
drivers/mailbox/tegra-hsp.c +1 -1
@@ -497,7 +497,7 @@ static int tegra_hsp_mailbox_flush(struc
 			mbox_chan_txdone(chan, 0);
 
 			/* Wait until channel is empty */
-			if (chan->active_req != NULL)
+			if (chan->active_req != MBOX_NO_MSG)
 				continue;
 
 			return 0;
include/linux/mailbox_controller.h +3 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
 
 struct mbox_chan;
 
+/* Sentinel value distinguishing "no active request" from "NULL message data" */
+#define MBOX_NO_MSG	((void *)-1)
+
 /**
  * struct mbox_chan_ops - methods to control mailbox channels
  * @send_data:	The API asks the MBOX controller driver, in atomic
author maintainer
#237 lore raw

PATCH 232/261 hv_netvsc: use kmap_local_page in netvsc_copy_to_send_buf

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Anton Leontev <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 004e9ecfe6c5384f9e0b2f6f6389d42ec22789af ]

netvsc_copy_to_send_buf() copies page buffer entries into the VMBus send buffer using phys_to_virt() on the entry PFN. Entries for the RNDIS header and the skb linear data come from kmalloc'd memory and are always in the kernel direct map, but entries for skb fragments reference page cache or user pages, which on 32-bit x86 with CONFIG_HIGHMEM=y can live above the LOWMEM boundary. For such a page phys_to_virt() returns an address outside the direct map and the subsequent memcpy() faults on the transmit softirq path, which is fatal.

Map the pages with kmap_local_page() instead, handling two properties of the page buffer entries:

- pb[i].pfn is a Hyper-V PFN at HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE (4K) granularity, not a native PFN. Reconstruct the physical address first and derive the native page from it, so the mapping stays correct where PAGE_SIZE > HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE (e.g. arm64 with 64K pages).

- Since commit 41a6328b2c55 ("hv_netvsc: Preserve contiguous PFN grouping in the page buffer array"), an entry describes a full physically contiguous fragment and pb[i].len can exceed PAGE_SIZE, while kmap_local_page() maps a single page. Copy page by page, splitting at native page boundaries.

The copy path only handles packets smaller than the send section size (6144 bytes by default); larger packets take the cp_partial path where only the RNDIS header is copied. So entries here are bounded by the section size and a copy is split at most once on 4K-page systems. On !CONFIG_HIGHMEM configs kmap_local_page() folds to page_address() and no mapping work is added.

Fixes c25aaf814a63 ("hyperv: Enable sendbuf mechanism on the send path")
[ adapted `phys_to_page(paddr)` to `pfn_to_page(PHYS_PFN(paddr))` ]
---
 drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc.c |   19 +++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc.c +15 -4
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/wait.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
 #include <linux/delay.h>
 #include <linux/io.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
@@ -964,12 +965,22 @@ static void netvsc_copy_to_send_buf(stru
 	}
 
 	for (i = 0; i < page_count; i++) {
-		char *src = phys_to_virt(pb[i].pfn << HV_HYP_PAGE_SHIFT);
-		u32 offset = pb[i].offset;
+		phys_addr_t paddr = (pb[i].pfn << HV_HYP_PAGE_SHIFT) +
+				    pb[i].offset;
 		u32 len = pb[i].len;
 
-		memcpy(dest, (src + offset), len);
-		dest += len;
+		while (len) {
+			struct page *page = pfn_to_page(PHYS_PFN(paddr));
+			u32 off = offset_in_page(paddr);
+			u32 chunk = min_t(u32, len, PAGE_SIZE - off);
+			char *src = kmap_local_page(page);
+
+			memcpy(dest, src + off, chunk);
+			kunmap_local(src);
+			dest += chunk;
+			paddr += chunk;
+			len -= chunk;
+		}
 	}
 
 	if (padding)
author maintainer
#238 lore raw

PATCH 233/261 sched_ext: Dont warn on NULL cgrp_moving_from in scx_cgroup_move_task()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 02e545c4297a26dbbc41df81b831e7f605bcd306 ]

A WARN fires when systemd's user manager writes "+cpu +memory +pids" to its own subtree_control while a sched_ext scheduler is loaded:

  WARNING: at kernel/sched/ext.c:3227 scx_cgroup_move_task+0xa8/0xb0
   scx_cgroup_move_task+0xa8/0xb0
   sched_move_task+0x134/0x290
   cpu_cgroup_attach+0x39/0x70
   cgroup_migrate_execute+0x37d/0x450
   cgroup_update_dfl_csses+0x1e3/0x270
   cgroup_subtree_control_write+0x3e7/0x440

scx_cgroup_can_attach() arms cgrp_moving_from only when a task's cpu cgroup changes. It can still be NULL when scx_cgroup_move_task() runs, through this sequence:

  Step                               Result
  ---------------------------------  ----------------------------------
  1. cpu enabled on cgroup G         cpu css = A
  2. cpu toggled off then on for G   A killed, B created (same cgroup)
  3. an exiting task keeps A alive   migration skips it, A now stale
  4. +memory migrates G              stale A vs current B pulls cpu in
  5. cpu attach runs for all tasks   hits a live, cpu-unchanged task
  6. scx_cgroup_move_task() on it    cgrp_moving_from NULL -> WARN

The mismatch is that scx_cgroup_can_attach() keys on cgroup identity while migration drives the move on css identity, so a NULL cgrp_moving_from here is a legitimate css-only migration, not a missing prep.

The call is already gated on cgrp_moving_from, so just drop the warning. ops.cgroup_prep_move() and ops.cgroup_move() stay paired.

---
 kernel/sched/ext.c |    9 ++++++---
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
kernel/sched/ext.c +6 -3
@@ -4069,10 +4069,13 @@ void scx_cgroup_move_task(struct task_st
 		return;
 
 	/*
-	 * @p must have ops.cgroup_prep_move() called on it and thus
-	 * cgrp_moving_from set.
+	 * scx_cgroup_can_attach() sets cgrp_moving_from only when the task's
+	 * cgroup changes. Migration keys off css rather than cgroup identity,
+	 * so it can hand an unchanged-cgroup task here with cgrp_moving_from
+	 * NULL. Nothing to report to the BPF scheduler then, so skip it and
+	 * keep prep_move and move paired.
 	 */
-	if (SCX_HAS_OP(cgroup_move) && !WARN_ON_ONCE(!p->scx.cgrp_moving_from))
+	if (SCX_HAS_OP(cgroup_move) && p->scx.cgrp_moving_from)
 		SCX_CALL_OP_TASK(SCX_KF_UNLOCKED, cgroup_move, p,
 			p->scx.cgrp_moving_from, tg_cgrp(task_group(p)));
 	p->scx.cgrp_moving_from = NULL;
author maintainer
#239 lore raw

PATCH 234/261 netfilter: nft_fib: fix stale stack leak via the OIFNAME register

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Davide Ornaghi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ab185e0c4fb82dfba6fb86f8271e06f931d9c64c ]

For NFT_FIB_RESULT_OIFNAME the destination register is declared with len = IFNAMSIZ (four 32-bit registers), but on the lookup-fail, RTN_LOCAL and oif-mismatch paths nft_fib{4,6}_eval() only writes one register via "*dest = 0". The remaining three registers are left as whatever was on the stack in nft_do_chain()'s struct nft_regs, and a downstream expression that loads the register span can leak that uninitialised kernel stack to userspace.

The NFTA_FIB_F_PRESENT existence check has the same shape: it is only meaningful for NFT_FIB_RESULT_OIF, yet it was accepted for any result type while the eval stores a single byte via nft_reg_store8(), leaving the rest of the declared span stale.

Fix both:

- replace the bare "*dest = 0" in the eval with nft_fib_store_result(), which strscpy_pad()s the whole IFNAMSIZ for OIFNAME (and is already used on the other early-return path), and

- restrict NFTA_FIB_F_PRESENT to NFT_FIB_RESULT_OIF and declare its destination as a single u8, so the marked span matches the one byte the eval writes.

Fixes f6d0cbcf09c5 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add fib expression")
[ kept the tree's older `ip6_route_lookup()`/`rt6_info` IPv6 context and changed only `*dest = 0;` to `nft_fib_store_result(dest, priv, NULL);` ]
---
 net/ipv4/netfilter/nft_fib_ipv4.c |    2 +-
 net/ipv6/netfilter/nft_fib_ipv6.c |    2 +-
 net/netfilter/nft_fib.c           |    6 ++++++
 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/netfilter/nft_fib_ipv4.c +1 -1
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ void nft_fib4_eval(const struct nft_expr
 		fl4.saddr = get_saddr(iph->daddr);
 	}
 
-	*dest = 0;
+	nft_fib_store_result(dest, priv, NULL);
 
 	if (fib_lookup(nft_net(pkt), &fl4, &res, FIB_LOOKUP_IGNORE_LINKSTATE))
 		return;
net/ipv6/netfilter/nft_fib_ipv6.c +1 -1
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ void nft_fib6_eval(const struct nft_expr
 
 	lookup_flags = nft_fib6_flowi_init(&fl6, priv, pkt, oif, iph);
 
-	*dest = 0;
+	nft_fib_store_result(dest, priv, NULL);
 	rt = (void *)ip6_route_lookup(nft_net(pkt), &fl6, pkt->skb,
 				      lookup_flags);
 	if (rt->dst.error)
net/netfilter/nft_fib.c +6 -0
@@ -107,6 +107,12 @@ int nft_fib_init(const struct nft_ctx *c
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	if (priv->flags & NFTA_FIB_F_PRESENT) {
+		if (priv->result != NFT_FIB_RESULT_OIF)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		len = sizeof(u8);
+	}
+
 	err = nft_parse_register_store(ctx, tb[NFTA_FIB_DREG], &priv->dreg,
 				       NULL, NFT_DATA_VALUE, len);
 	if (err < 0)
author maintainer
#240 lore raw

PATCH 235/261 mm/memory-failure: fix hugetlb_lock AA deadlock in get_huge_page_for_hwpoison

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wupeng Ma <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3c2d42b8ee345b17a4ba56b0f6492d1ff4c1178e ]

Two concurrent madvise(MADV_HWPOISON) calls on the same hugetlb page can trigger a recursive spinlock self-deadlock (AA deadlock) on hugetlb_lock when racing with a concurrent unmap:

thread#0 thread#1
-------- --------
madvise(folio, MADV_HWPOISON)

    -> poisons the folio successfully
  madvise(folio, MADV_HWPOISON)         unmap(folio)
    try_memory_failure_hugetlb
      get_huge_page_for_hwpoison
        spin_lock_irq(&hugetlb_lock)    <- held
        __get_huge_page_for_hwpoison
          hugetlb_update_hwpoison()
            -> MF_HUGETLB_FOLIO_PRE_POISONED
          goto out:
            folio_put()
              refcount: 1 -> 0
              free_huge_folio()
                spin_lock_irqsave(&hugetlb_lock)
                  -> AA DEADLOCK!

The out: path in __get_huge_page_for_hwpoison() calls folio_put() to drop the GUP reference while the hugetlb_lock is still held by the hugetlb.c wrapper get_huge_page_for_hwpoison(). If concurrent unmap has released the page table mapping reference, folio_put() drops the folio refcount to zero, triggering free_huge_folio() which attempts to re-acquire the non-recursive hugetlb_lock.

Fix this by moving hugetlb_lock acquisition from the hugetlb.c wrapper into get_huge_page_for_hwpoison(). Place spin_unlock_irq() before the folio_put() at the out: label so the folio is always released outside the lock.

[[email protected]: fix race, rename label per Miaohe]
Fixes 405ce051236c ("mm/hwpoison: fix race between hugetlb free/demotion and memory_failure_hugetlb()")
Cc David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Cc Liam Howlett <[email protected]>
Cc Lorenzo Stoakes <[email protected]>
Cc Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Cc Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]>
Cc Suren Baghdasaryan <[email protected]>
Cc Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
---
 include/linux/hugetlb.h |    8 --------
 include/linux/mm.h      |    8 --------
 mm/hugetlb.c            |   11 -----------
 mm/memory-failure.c     |   19 ++++++++++---------
 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
include/linux/hugetlb.h +0 -8
@@ -155,8 +155,6 @@ long hugetlb_unreserve_pages(struct inod
 						long freed);
 bool isolate_hugetlb(struct folio *folio, struct list_head *list);
 int get_hwpoison_hugetlb_folio(struct folio *folio, bool *hugetlb, bool unpoison);
-int get_huge_page_for_hwpoison(unsigned long pfn, int flags,
-				bool *migratable_cleared);
 void folio_putback_active_hugetlb(struct folio *folio);
 void move_hugetlb_state(struct folio *old_folio, struct folio *new_folio, int reason);
 void hugetlb_fix_reserve_counts(struct inode *inode);
@@ -429,12 +427,6 @@ static inline int get_hwpoison_hugetlb_f
 {
 	return 0;
 }
-
-static inline int get_huge_page_for_hwpoison(unsigned long pfn, int flags,
-					bool *migratable_cleared)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
 
 static inline void folio_putback_active_hugetlb(struct folio *folio)
 {
include/linux/mm.h +0 -8
@@ -3995,8 +3995,6 @@ extern int soft_offline_page(unsigned lo
  */
 extern const struct attribute_group memory_failure_attr_group;
 extern void memory_failure_queue(unsigned long pfn, int flags);
-extern int __get_huge_page_for_hwpoison(unsigned long pfn, int flags,
-					bool *migratable_cleared);
 void num_poisoned_pages_inc(unsigned long pfn);
 void num_poisoned_pages_sub(unsigned long pfn, long i);
 #else
@@ -4004,12 +4002,6 @@ static inline void memory_failure_queue(
 {
 }
 
-static inline int __get_huge_page_for_hwpoison(unsigned long pfn, int flags,
-					bool *migratable_cleared)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static inline void num_poisoned_pages_inc(unsigned long pfn)
 {
 }
mm/hugetlb.c +0 -11
@@ -7459,17 +7459,6 @@ int get_hwpoison_hugetlb_folio(struct fo
 	return ret;
 }
 
-int get_huge_page_for_hwpoison(unsigned long pfn, int flags,
-				bool *migratable_cleared)
-{
-	int ret;
-
-	spin_lock_irq(&hugetlb_lock);
-	ret = __get_huge_page_for_hwpoison(pfn, flags, migratable_cleared);
-	spin_unlock_irq(&hugetlb_lock);
-	return ret;
-}
-
 void folio_putback_active_hugetlb(struct folio *folio)
 {
 	spin_lock_irq(&hugetlb_lock);
mm/memory-failure.c +10 -9
@@ -2020,20 +2020,19 @@ void folio_clear_hugetlb_hwpoison(struct
 	folio_free_raw_hwp(folio, true);
 }
 
-/*
- * Called from hugetlb code with hugetlb_lock held.
- */
-int __get_huge_page_for_hwpoison(unsigned long pfn, int flags,
+static int get_huge_page_for_hwpoison(unsigned long pfn, int flags,
 				 bool *migratable_cleared)
 {
 	struct page *page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
-	struct folio *folio = page_folio(page);
+	struct folio *folio;
 	bool count_increased = false;
 	int ret, rc;
 
+	spin_lock_irq(&hugetlb_lock);
+	folio = page_folio(page);
 	if (!folio_test_hugetlb(folio)) {
 		ret = MF_HUGETLB_NON_HUGEPAGE;
-		goto out;
+		goto out_unlock;
 	} else if (flags & MF_COUNT_INCREASED) {
 		ret = MF_HUGETLB_IN_USED;
 		count_increased = true;
@@ -2049,13 +2048,13 @@ int __get_huge_page_for_hwpoison(unsigne
 	} else {
 		ret = MF_HUGETLB_RETRY;
 		if (!(flags & MF_NO_RETRY))
-			goto out;
+			goto out_unlock;
 	}
 
 	rc = hugetlb_update_hwpoison(folio, page);
 	if (rc >= MF_HUGETLB_FOLIO_PRE_POISONED) {
 		ret = rc;
-		goto out;
+		goto out_unlock;
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -2067,8 +2066,10 @@ int __get_huge_page_for_hwpoison(unsigne
 		*migratable_cleared = true;
 	}
 
+	spin_unlock_irq(&hugetlb_lock);
 	return ret;
-out:
+out_unlock:
+	spin_unlock_irq(&hugetlb_lock);
 	if (count_increased)
 		folio_put(folio);
 	return ret;
author maintainer
#241 lore raw

PATCH 236/261 RDMA/umem: Add ib_umem_dmabuf_get_pinned_and_lock helper

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jacob Moroni <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 553dfa8cbd0c6d36adae042d9738ddf8f8765ac7 ]

Move the inner logic of ib_umem_dmabuf_get_pinned_with_dma_device() to a new static function that returns with the lock held upon success.

The intent is to allow reuse for the future get_pinned_revocable_and_lock function.

Stable-dep-of: badad6fad60d ("RDMA: During rereg_mr ensure that REREG_ACCESS is compatible")

---
 drivers/infiniband/core/umem_dmabuf.c |   35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/infiniband/core/umem_dmabuf.c +26 -9
@@ -198,18 +198,19 @@ static struct dma_buf_attach_ops ib_umem
 	.move_notify = ib_umem_dmabuf_unsupported_move_notify,
 };
 
-struct ib_umem_dmabuf *
-ib_umem_dmabuf_get_pinned_with_dma_device(struct ib_device *device,
-					  struct device *dma_device,
-					  unsigned long offset, size_t size,
-					  int fd, int access)
+static struct ib_umem_dmabuf *
+ib_umem_dmabuf_get_pinned_and_lock(struct ib_device *device,
+				   struct device *dma_device,
+				   unsigned long offset,
+				   size_t size, int fd, int access,
+				   const struct dma_buf_attach_ops *ops)
 {
 	struct ib_umem_dmabuf *umem_dmabuf;
 	int err;
 
-	umem_dmabuf = ib_umem_dmabuf_get_with_dma_device(device, dma_device, offset,
-							 size, fd, access,
-							 &ib_umem_dmabuf_attach_pinned_ops);
+	umem_dmabuf =
+		ib_umem_dmabuf_get_with_dma_device(device, dma_device, offset,
+						   size, fd, access, ops);
 	if (IS_ERR(umem_dmabuf))
 		return umem_dmabuf;
 
@@ -222,7 +223,6 @@ ib_umem_dmabuf_get_pinned_with_dma_devic
 	err = ib_umem_dmabuf_map_pages(umem_dmabuf);
 	if (err)
 		goto err_release;
-	dma_resv_unlock(umem_dmabuf->attach->dmabuf->resv);
 
 	return umem_dmabuf;
 
@@ -231,6 +231,23 @@ err_release:
 	ib_umem_release(&umem_dmabuf->umem);
 	return ERR_PTR(err);
 }
+
+struct ib_umem_dmabuf *
+ib_umem_dmabuf_get_pinned_with_dma_device(struct ib_device *device,
+					  struct device *dma_device,
+					  unsigned long offset, size_t size,
+					  int fd, int access)
+{
+	struct ib_umem_dmabuf *umem_dmabuf =
+		ib_umem_dmabuf_get_pinned_and_lock(device, dma_device, offset,
+						   size, fd, access,
+						   &ib_umem_dmabuf_attach_pinned_ops);
+	if (IS_ERR(umem_dmabuf))
+		return umem_dmabuf;
+
+	dma_resv_unlock(umem_dmabuf->attach->dmabuf->resv);
+	return umem_dmabuf;
+}
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ib_umem_dmabuf_get_pinned_with_dma_device);
 
 struct ib_umem_dmabuf *ib_umem_dmabuf_get_pinned(struct ib_device *device,
author maintainer
#242 lore raw

PATCH 237/261 RDMA/umem: Move umem dmabuf revoke logic into helper function

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jacob Moroni <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 797291a66ce346c96114b72222fc290d402da005 ]

This same logic will eventually be reused from within the invalidate_mappings callback which already has the dma_resv_lock held, so break it out into a separate function so it can be reused.

Stable-dep-of: badad6fad60d ("RDMA: During rereg_mr ensure that REREG_ACCESS is compatible")

---
 drivers/infiniband/core/umem_dmabuf.c |   26 +++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/infiniband/core/umem_dmabuf.c +17 -9
@@ -198,6 +198,22 @@ static struct dma_buf_attach_ops ib_umem
 	.move_notify = ib_umem_dmabuf_unsupported_move_notify,
 };
 
+static void ib_umem_dmabuf_revoke_locked(struct dma_buf_attachment *attach)
+{
+	struct ib_umem_dmabuf *umem_dmabuf = attach->importer_priv;
+
+	dma_resv_assert_held(attach->dmabuf->resv);
+
+	if (umem_dmabuf->revoked)
+		return;
+	ib_umem_dmabuf_unmap_pages(umem_dmabuf);
+	if (umem_dmabuf->pinned) {
+		dma_buf_unpin(umem_dmabuf->attach);
+		umem_dmabuf->pinned = 0;
+	}
+	umem_dmabuf->revoked = 1;
+}
+
 static struct ib_umem_dmabuf *
 ib_umem_dmabuf_get_pinned_and_lock(struct ib_device *device,
 				   struct device *dma_device,
@@ -265,15 +281,7 @@ void ib_umem_dmabuf_revoke(struct ib_ume
 	struct dma_buf *dmabuf = umem_dmabuf->attach->dmabuf;
 
 	dma_resv_lock(dmabuf->resv, NULL);
-	if (umem_dmabuf->revoked)
-		goto end;
-	ib_umem_dmabuf_unmap_pages(umem_dmabuf);
-	if (umem_dmabuf->pinned) {
-		dma_buf_unpin(umem_dmabuf->attach);
-		umem_dmabuf->pinned = 0;
-	}
-	umem_dmabuf->revoked = 1;
-end:
+	ib_umem_dmabuf_revoke_locked(umem_dmabuf->attach);
 	dma_resv_unlock(dmabuf->resv);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ib_umem_dmabuf_revoke);
author maintainer
#243 lore raw

PATCH 238/261 RDMA/umem: Add helpers for umem dmabuf revoke lock

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jacob Moroni <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3a0b171302eea1732a168e26db3b8461f51cc1f9 ]

Added helpers to acquire and release the umem dmabuf revoke lock. The intent is to avoid the need for drivers to peek into the ib_umem_dmabuf internals to get the dma_resv_lock and bring us one step closer to abstracting ib_umem_dmabuf away from drivers in general.

Stable-dep-of: badad6fad60d ("RDMA: During rereg_mr ensure that REREG_ACCESS is compatible")

---
 drivers/infiniband/core/umem_dmabuf.c |   16 ++++++++++++++++
 include/rdma/ib_umem.h                |    4 ++++
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+)
drivers/infiniband/core/umem_dmabuf.c +16 -0
@@ -276,6 +276,22 @@ struct ib_umem_dmabuf *ib_umem_dmabuf_ge
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ib_umem_dmabuf_get_pinned);
 
+void ib_umem_dmabuf_revoke_lock(struct ib_umem_dmabuf *umem_dmabuf)
+{
+	struct dma_buf *dmabuf = umem_dmabuf->attach->dmabuf;
+
+	dma_resv_lock(dmabuf->resv, NULL);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ib_umem_dmabuf_revoke_lock);
+
+void ib_umem_dmabuf_revoke_unlock(struct ib_umem_dmabuf *umem_dmabuf)
+{
+	struct dma_buf *dmabuf = umem_dmabuf->attach->dmabuf;
+
+	dma_resv_unlock(dmabuf->resv);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ib_umem_dmabuf_revoke_unlock);
+
 void ib_umem_dmabuf_revoke(struct ib_umem_dmabuf *umem_dmabuf)
 {
 	struct dma_buf *dmabuf = umem_dmabuf->attach->dmabuf;
include/rdma/ib_umem.h +4 -0
@@ -159,6 +159,8 @@ ib_umem_dmabuf_get_pinned_with_dma_devic
 int ib_umem_dmabuf_map_pages(struct ib_umem_dmabuf *umem_dmabuf);
 void ib_umem_dmabuf_unmap_pages(struct ib_umem_dmabuf *umem_dmabuf);
 void ib_umem_dmabuf_release(struct ib_umem_dmabuf *umem_dmabuf);
+void ib_umem_dmabuf_revoke_lock(struct ib_umem_dmabuf *umem_dmabuf);
+void ib_umem_dmabuf_revoke_unlock(struct ib_umem_dmabuf *umem_dmabuf);
 void ib_umem_dmabuf_revoke(struct ib_umem_dmabuf *umem_dmabuf);
 
 #else /* CONFIG_INFINIBAND_USER_MEM */
@@ -219,6 +221,8 @@ static inline int ib_umem_dmabuf_map_pag
 }
 static inline void ib_umem_dmabuf_unmap_pages(struct ib_umem_dmabuf *umem_dmabuf) { }
 static inline void ib_umem_dmabuf_release(struct ib_umem_dmabuf *umem_dmabuf) { }
+static inline void ib_umem_dmabuf_revoke_lock(struct ib_umem_dmabuf *umem_dmabuf) {}
+static inline void ib_umem_dmabuf_revoke_unlock(struct ib_umem_dmabuf *umem_dmabuf) {}
 static inline void ib_umem_dmabuf_revoke(struct ib_umem_dmabuf *umem_dmabuf) {}
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_INFINIBAND_USER_MEM */
author maintainer
#244 lore raw

PATCH 239/261 RDMA: During rereg_mr ensure that REREG_ACCESS is compatible

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit badad6fad60def1b9805559dd81dbab3d97b82aa ]

If IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS changes from RO to RW then the umem has to be re-evaluated to ensure it is properly pinned as RW. Since the umem is hidden inside each driver's mr struct add a ib_umem_check_rereg() function that each driver has to call before processing IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS.

mlx4 has to retain its duplicate ib_access_writable check because it implements IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS | IB_MR_REREG_TRANS by changing both items in place sequentially while the MR is live, so it will continue to not support this combination.

---
 drivers/infiniband/core/umem.c          |   16 ++++++++++++++++
 drivers/infiniband/hw/hns/hns_roce_mr.c |    4 ++++
 drivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c     |    4 ++++
 drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/mr.c         |    4 ++++
 drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mr.c         |    4 ++++
 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_verbs.c   |    5 +++++
 include/rdma/ib_umem.h                  |    8 ++++++++
 7 files changed, 45 insertions(+)
drivers/infiniband/core/umem.c +16 -0
@@ -326,3 +326,19 @@ int ib_umem_copy_from(void *dst, struct
 		return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ib_umem_copy_from);
+
+/*
+ * Called during rereg mr if the driver is able to re-use a umem for
+ * IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS.
+ */
+int ib_umem_check_rereg(struct ib_umem *umem, int flags, int new_access_flags)
+{
+	if (!umem)
+		return 0;
+
+	if ((flags & IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS) && !(flags & IB_MR_REREG_TRANS))
+		if (ib_access_writable(new_access_flags) && !umem->writable)
+			return -EACCES;
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ib_umem_check_rereg);
drivers/infiniband/hw/hns/hns_roce_mr.c +4 -0
@@ -292,6 +292,10 @@ struct ib_mr *hns_roce_rereg_user_mr(str
 		goto err_out;
 	}
 
+	ret = ib_umem_check_rereg(mr->pbl_mtr.umem, flags, mr_access_flags);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err_out;
+
 	mailbox = hns_roce_alloc_cmd_mailbox(hr_dev);
 	ret = PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(mailbox);
 	if (ret)
drivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c +4 -0
@@ -3245,6 +3245,10 @@ static struct ib_mr *irdma_rereg_user_mr
 	if (flags & ~(IB_MR_REREG_TRANS | IB_MR_REREG_PD | IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS))
 		return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
 
+	ret = ib_umem_check_rereg(iwmr->region, flags, new_access);
+	if (ret)
+		return ERR_PTR(ret);
+
 	ret = irdma_hwdereg_mr(ib_mr);
 	if (ret)
 		return ERR_PTR(ret);
drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/mr.c +4 -0
@@ -466,6 +466,10 @@ struct ib_mr *mlx4_ib_rereg_user_mr(stru
 	struct mlx4_mpt_entry **pmpt_entry = &mpt_entry;
 	int err;
 
+	err = ib_umem_check_rereg(mmr->umem, flags, mr_access_flags);
+	if (err)
+		return ERR_PTR(err);
+
 	/* Since we synchronize this call and mlx4_ib_dereg_mr via uverbs,
 	 * we assume that the calls can't run concurrently. Otherwise, a
 	 * race exists.
drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mr.c +4 -0
@@ -1829,6 +1829,10 @@ struct ib_mr *mlx5_ib_rereg_user_mr(stru
 	if (flags & ~(IB_MR_REREG_TRANS | IB_MR_REREG_PD | IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS))
 		return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
 
+	err = ib_umem_check_rereg(mr->umem, flags, new_access_flags);
+	if (err)
+		return ERR_PTR(err);
+
 	if (!(flags & IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS))
 		new_access_flags = mr->access_flags;
 	if (!(flags & IB_MR_REREG_PD))
drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_verbs.c +5 -0
@@ -1312,6 +1312,7 @@ static struct ib_mr *rxe_rereg_user_mr(s
 	struct rxe_mr *mr = to_rmr(ibmr);
 	struct rxe_pd *old_pd = to_rpd(ibmr->pd);
 	struct rxe_pd *pd = to_rpd(ibpd);
+	int err;
 
 	/* for now only support the two easy cases:
 	 * rereg_pd and rereg_access
@@ -1321,6 +1322,10 @@ static struct ib_mr *rxe_rereg_user_mr(s
 		return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
 	}
 
+	err = ib_umem_check_rereg(mr->umem, flags, access);
+	if (err)
+		return ERR_PTR(err);
+
 	if (flags & IB_MR_REREG_PD) {
 		rxe_put(old_pd);
 		rxe_get(pd);
include/rdma/ib_umem.h +8 -0
@@ -163,6 +163,8 @@ void ib_umem_dmabuf_revoke_lock(struct i
 void ib_umem_dmabuf_revoke_unlock(struct ib_umem_dmabuf *umem_dmabuf);
 void ib_umem_dmabuf_revoke(struct ib_umem_dmabuf *umem_dmabuf);
 
+int ib_umem_check_rereg(struct ib_umem *umem, int flags, int new_access_flags);
+
 #else /* CONFIG_INFINIBAND_USER_MEM */
 
 #include <linux/err.h>
@@ -225,5 +227,11 @@ static inline void ib_umem_dmabuf_revoke
 static inline void ib_umem_dmabuf_revoke_unlock(struct ib_umem_dmabuf *umem_dmabuf) {}
 static inline void ib_umem_dmabuf_revoke(struct ib_umem_dmabuf *umem_dmabuf) {}
 
+static inline int ib_umem_check_rereg(struct ib_umem *umem, int flags,
+				      int new_access_flags)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_INFINIBAND_USER_MEM */
 #endif /* IB_UMEM_H */
author maintainer
#245 lore raw

PATCH 240/261 RDMA/umem: fix kernel-doc warnings

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ff46d1392750444fab5ae5a0194764ffdc4ac0d2 ]

Add or correct kernel-doc comments to eliminate warnings:

Warning: include/rdma/ib_umem.h:104 function parameter 'biter' not
described in 'rdma_umem_for_each_dma_block'
Warning: include/rdma/ib_umem.h:140 function parameter 'pgsz_bitmap' not
described in 'ib_umem_find_best_pgoff'
Warning: include/rdma/ib_umem.h:141 No description found for return
value of 'ib_umem_find_best_pgoff'

Stable-dep-of: 15fe76e23615 ("RDMA/umem: Fix truncation for block sizes >= 4G")

---
 include/rdma/ib_umem.h |    6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/rdma/ib_umem.h +5 -1
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ static inline bool __rdma_umem_block_ite
 /**
  * rdma_umem_for_each_dma_block - iterate over contiguous DMA blocks of the umem
  * @umem: umem to iterate over
+ * @biter: block iterator variable
  * @pgsz: Page size to split the list into
  *
  * pgsz must be <= PAGE_SIZE or computed by ib_umem_find_best_pgsz(). The
@@ -117,7 +118,7 @@ unsigned long ib_umem_find_best_pgsz(str
  * ib_umem_find_best_pgoff - Find best HW page size
  *
  * @umem: umem struct
- * @pgsz_bitmap bitmap of HW supported page sizes
+ * @pgsz_bitmap: bitmap of HW supported page sizes
  * @pgoff_bitmask: Mask of bits that can be represented with an offset
  *
  * This is very similar to ib_umem_find_best_pgsz() except instead of accepting
@@ -130,6 +131,9 @@ unsigned long ib_umem_find_best_pgsz(str
  *
  * If the pgoff_bitmask requires either alignment in the low bit or an
  * unavailable page size for the high bits, this function returns 0.
+ *
+ * Returns: best HW page size for the parameters or 0 if none available
+ *   for the given parameters.
  */
 static inline unsigned long ib_umem_find_best_pgoff(struct ib_umem *umem,
 						    unsigned long pgsz_bitmap,
author maintainer
#246 lore raw

PATCH 241/261 RDMA: Move DMA block iterator logic into dedicated files

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6094ea64c69520ed1e770e7c79c43412de202bfa ]

The DMA iterator logic was mixed into verbs and umem-specific code, forcing all users to include rdma/ib_umem.h. Move the block iterator logic into iter.c and rdma/iter.h so that rdma/ib_umem.h and rdma/ib_verbs.h can be separated in a follow-up patch.

Stable-dep-of: 15fe76e23615 ("RDMA/umem: Fix truncation for block sizes >= 4G")

---
 drivers/infiniband/core/Makefile             |    2 
 drivers/infiniband/core/iter.c               |   43 +++++++++++++
 drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c              |   38 -----------
 drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_res.c    |    2 
 drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/mem.c            |    2 
 drivers/infiniband/hw/efa/efa_verbs.c        |    2 
 drivers/infiniband/hw/erdma/erdma_verbs.c    |    2 
 drivers/infiniband/hw/hns/hns_roce_alloc.c   |    2 
 drivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/main.h           |    2 
 drivers/infiniband/hw/mana/mana_ib.h         |    2 
 drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/mr.c              |    1 
 drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mem.c             |    1 
 drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/umr.c             |    1 
 drivers/infiniband/hw/mthca/mthca_provider.c |    2 
 drivers/infiniband/hw/ocrdma/ocrdma_verbs.c  |    2 
 drivers/infiniband/hw/qedr/verbs.c           |    2 
 drivers/infiniband/hw/vmw_pvrdma/pvrdma.h    |    2 
 include/rdma/ib_umem.h                       |   32 ---------
 include/rdma/ib_verbs.h                      |   48 --------------
 include/rdma/iter.h                          |   88 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 20 files changed, 146 insertions(+), 130 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 drivers/infiniband/core/iter.c
 create mode 100644 include/rdma/iter.h
drivers/infiniband/core/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ ib_core-y :=			packer.o ud_header.o verb
 				roce_gid_mgmt.o mr_pool.o addr.o sa_query.o \
 				multicast.o mad.o smi.o agent.o mad_rmpp.o \
 				nldev.o restrack.o counters.o ib_core_uverbs.o \
-				trace.o lag.o
+				trace.o lag.o iter.o
 
 ib_core-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND) += security.o
 ib_core-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_RDMA) += cgroup.o
drivers/infiniband/core/iter.c new file +43 -0

43 lines not on this page · raw message

drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c +0 -38
@@ -3093,44 +3093,6 @@ int rdma_init_netdev(struct ib_device *d
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(rdma_init_netdev);
 
-void __rdma_block_iter_start(struct ib_block_iter *biter,
-			     struct scatterlist *sglist, unsigned int nents,
-			     unsigned long pgsz)
-{
-	memset(biter, 0, sizeof(struct ib_block_iter));
-	biter->__sg = sglist;
-	biter->__sg_nents = nents;
-
-	/* Driver provides best block size to use */
-	biter->__pg_bit = __fls(pgsz);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(__rdma_block_iter_start);
-
-bool __rdma_block_iter_next(struct ib_block_iter *biter)
-{
-	unsigned int block_offset;
-	unsigned int delta;
-
-	if (!biter->__sg_nents || !biter->__sg)
-		return false;
-
-	biter->__dma_addr = sg_dma_address(biter->__sg) + biter->__sg_advance;
-	block_offset = biter->__dma_addr & (BIT_ULL(biter->__pg_bit) - 1);
-	delta = BIT_ULL(biter->__pg_bit) - block_offset;
-
-	while (biter->__sg_nents && biter->__sg &&
-	       sg_dma_len(biter->__sg) - biter->__sg_advance <= delta) {
-		delta -= sg_dma_len(biter->__sg) - biter->__sg_advance;
-		biter->__sg_advance = 0;
-		biter->__sg = sg_next(biter->__sg);
-		biter->__sg_nents--;
-	}
-	biter->__sg_advance += delta;
-
-	return true;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(__rdma_block_iter_next);
-
 /**
  * rdma_alloc_hw_stats_struct - Helper function to allocate dynamic struct
  *   for the drivers.
drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_res.c +1 -1
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@
 #include <linux/if_vlan.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <rdma/ib_verbs.h>
-#include <rdma/ib_umem.h>
+#include <rdma/iter.h>
 
 #include "roce_hsi.h"
 #include "qplib_res.h"
drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/mem.c +1 -1
@@ -32,9 +32,9 @@
 
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/moduleparam.h>
-#include <rdma/ib_umem.h>
 #include <linux/atomic.h>
 #include <rdma/ib_user_verbs.h>
+#include <rdma/iter.h>
 
 #include "iw_cxgb4.h"
 
drivers/infiniband/hw/efa/efa_verbs.c +1 -1
@@ -9,9 +9,9 @@
 #include <linux/log2.h>
 
 #include <rdma/ib_addr.h>
-#include <rdma/ib_umem.h>
 #include <rdma/ib_user_verbs.h>
 #include <rdma/ib_verbs.h>
+#include <rdma/iter.h>
 #include <rdma/uverbs_ioctl.h>
 #define UVERBS_MODULE_NAME efa_ib
 #include <rdma/uverbs_named_ioctl.h>
drivers/infiniband/hw/erdma/erdma_verbs.c +1 -1
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <net/addrconf.h>
 #include <rdma/erdma-abi.h>
-#include <rdma/ib_umem.h>
+#include <rdma/iter.h>
 #include <rdma/uverbs_ioctl.h>
 
 #include "erdma.h"
drivers/infiniband/hw/hns/hns_roce_alloc.c +1 -1
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
  */
 
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
-#include <rdma/ib_umem.h>
+#include <rdma/iter.h>
 #include "hns_roce_device.h"
 
 void hns_roce_buf_free(struct hns_roce_dev *hr_dev, struct hns_roce_buf *buf)
drivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/main.h +1 -1
@@ -37,8 +37,8 @@
 #include <rdma/rdma_cm.h>
 #include <rdma/iw_cm.h>
 #include <rdma/ib_user_verbs.h>
-#include <rdma/ib_umem.h>
 #include <rdma/ib_cache.h>
+#include <rdma/iter.h>
 #include <rdma/uverbs_ioctl.h>
 #include "osdep.h"
 #include "defs.h"
drivers/infiniband/hw/mana/mana_ib.h +1 -1
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 
 #include <rdma/ib_verbs.h>
 #include <rdma/ib_mad.h>
-#include <rdma/ib_umem.h>
+#include <rdma/iter.h>
 #include <rdma/mana-abi.h>
 #include <rdma/uverbs_ioctl.h>
 
drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/mr.c +1 -0
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <rdma/ib_user_verbs.h>
+#include <rdma/iter.h>
 
 #include "mlx4_ib.h"
 
drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mem.c +1 -0
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
  */
 
 #include <rdma/ib_umem_odp.h>
+#include <rdma/iter.h>
 #include "mlx5_ib.h"
 
 /*
drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/umr.c +1 -0
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 /* Copyright (c) 2022, NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. */
 
 #include <rdma/ib_umem_odp.h>
+#include <rdma/iter.h>
 #include "mlx5_ib.h"
 #include "umr.h"
 #include "wr.h"
drivers/infiniband/hw/mthca/mthca_provider.c +1 -1
@@ -35,8 +35,8 @@
  */
 
 #include <rdma/ib_smi.h>
-#include <rdma/ib_umem.h>
 #include <rdma/ib_user_verbs.h>
+#include <rdma/iter.h>
 #include <rdma/uverbs_ioctl.h>
 
 #include <linux/sched.h>
drivers/infiniband/hw/ocrdma/ocrdma_verbs.c +1 -1
@@ -45,9 +45,9 @@
 #include <rdma/ib_verbs.h>
 #include <rdma/ib_user_verbs.h>
 #include <rdma/iw_cm.h>
-#include <rdma/ib_umem.h>
 #include <rdma/ib_addr.h>
 #include <rdma/ib_cache.h>
+#include <rdma/iter.h>
 #include <rdma/uverbs_ioctl.h>
 
 #include "ocrdma.h"
drivers/infiniband/hw/qedr/verbs.c +1 -1
@@ -39,9 +39,9 @@
 #include <rdma/ib_verbs.h>
 #include <rdma/ib_user_verbs.h>
 #include <rdma/iw_cm.h>
-#include <rdma/ib_umem.h>
 #include <rdma/ib_addr.h>
 #include <rdma/ib_cache.h>
+#include <rdma/iter.h>
 #include <rdma/uverbs_ioctl.h>
 
 #include <linux/qed/common_hsi.h>
drivers/infiniband/hw/vmw_pvrdma/pvrdma.h +1 -1
@@ -53,8 +53,8 @@
 #include <linux/pci.h>
 #include <linux/semaphore.h>
 #include <linux/workqueue.h>
-#include <rdma/ib_umem.h>
 #include <rdma/ib_verbs.h>
+#include <rdma/iter.h>
 #include <rdma/vmw_pvrdma-abi.h>
 
 #include "pvrdma_ring.h"
include/rdma/ib_umem.h +0 -32
@@ -71,38 +71,6 @@ static inline size_t ib_umem_num_pages(s
 {
 	return ib_umem_num_dma_blocks(umem, PAGE_SIZE);
 }
-
-static inline void __rdma_umem_block_iter_start(struct ib_block_iter *biter,
-						struct ib_umem *umem,
-						unsigned long pgsz)
-{
-	__rdma_block_iter_start(biter, umem->sgt_append.sgt.sgl,
-				umem->sgt_append.sgt.nents, pgsz);
-	biter->__sg_advance = ib_umem_offset(umem) & ~(pgsz - 1);
-	biter->__sg_numblocks = ib_umem_num_dma_blocks(umem, pgsz);
-}
-
-static inline bool __rdma_umem_block_iter_next(struct ib_block_iter *biter)
-{
-	return __rdma_block_iter_next(biter) && biter->__sg_numblocks--;
-}
-
-/**
- * rdma_umem_for_each_dma_block - iterate over contiguous DMA blocks of the umem
- * @umem: umem to iterate over
- * @biter: block iterator variable
- * @pgsz: Page size to split the list into
- *
- * pgsz must be <= PAGE_SIZE or computed by ib_umem_find_best_pgsz(). The
- * returned DMA blocks will be aligned to pgsz and span the range:
- * ALIGN_DOWN(umem->address, pgsz) to ALIGN(umem->address + umem->length, pgsz)
- *
- * Performs exactly ib_umem_num_dma_blocks() iterations.
- */
-#define rdma_umem_for_each_dma_block(umem, biter, pgsz)                        \
-	for (__rdma_umem_block_iter_start(biter, umem, pgsz);                  \
-	     __rdma_umem_block_iter_next(biter);)
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_INFINIBAND_USER_MEM
 
 struct ib_umem *ib_umem_get(struct ib_device *device, unsigned long addr,
include/rdma/ib_verbs.h +0 -48

60 lines not on this page · raw message

include/rdma/iter.h new file +88 -0

88 lines not on this page · raw message

author maintainer
#247 lore raw

PATCH 242/261 RDMA/umem: Fix truncation for block sizes >= 4G

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 15fe76e23615f502d051ef0768f86babaf08746c ]

When the iommu is used the linearization of the mapping can give a single block that is very large split across multiple SG entries.

When __rdma_block_iter_next() reassembles the split SG entries it is overflowing the 32 bit stack values and computed the wrong DMA addresses for blocks after the truncation.

Use the right types to hold DMA addresses.

Fixes a808273a495c ("RDMA/verbs: Add a DMA iterator to return aligned contiguous memory blocks")
---
 drivers/infiniband/core/iter.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/infiniband/core/iter.c +2 -2
@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__rdma_block_iter_start);
 
 bool __rdma_block_iter_next(struct ib_block_iter *biter)
 {
-	unsigned int block_offset;
-	unsigned int delta;
+	dma_addr_t block_offset;
+	dma_addr_t delta;
 
 	if (!biter->__sg_nents || !biter->__sg)
 		return false;
author maintainer
#248 lore raw

PATCH 243/261 mm/hugetlb: avoid false positive lockdep assertion

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lorenzo Stoakes <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b4aea43cd37afad714b5684fe9fdfcb0e78dba26 ]

Commit 081056dc00a2 ("mm/hugetlb: unshare page tables during VMA split, not before") changed the locking model around hugetlbfs PMD unsharing on VMA split, but did not update the function which asserts the locks, hugetlb_vma_assert_locked().

This function asserts that either the hugetlb VMA lock is held (if a shared mapping) or that the reservation map lock is held (if private).

If you get an unfortunate race between something which results in one of these locks being released and a hugetlb VMA split and you have CONFIG_LOCKDEP enabled, you can therefore see a false positive assertion arise when there is in fact no issue.

Since this change introduced a new take_locks parameter to hugetlb_unshare_pmds(), which, when set to false, indicates that locking is sufficient, simply pass this to the unsharing logic and predicate the lock assertions on this.

This is safe, as we already asserted the file rmap lock and the VMA write lock prior to this (implying exclusive mmap write lock), so we cannot be raced by either rmap or page fault page table walkers which the asserted locks are intended to protect against (we don't mind GUP-fast).

Separate out huge_pmd_unshare() into __huge_pmd_unshare() to add a check_locks parameter, and update hugetlb_unshare_pmds() to pass this parameter to it.

This leaves all other callers of huge_pmd_unshare() still correctly asserting the locks.

The below reproducer will trigger the assert in a kernel with CONFIG_LOCKDEP enabled by racing process teardown (which will release the hugetlb lock) against a hugetlb split.

void execute_one(void)

{
	void *ptr;
	pid_t pid;

	/*
	 * Create a hugetlb mapping spanning a PUD entry.
	 *
	 * We force the hugetlb page allocation with populate and
	 * noreserve.
	 *
	 * |---------------------|
	 * |                     |
	 * |---------------------|
	 * 0                 PUD boundary
	 */
	ptr = mmap(0, PUD_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
		   MAP_FIXED | MAP_SHARED | MAP_ANON |
		   MAP_NORESERVE | MAP_HUGETLB | MAP_POPULATE,
		   -1, 0);
	if (ptr == MAP_FAILED) {
		perror("mmap");
		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
	}

	/*
	 * Fork but with a bogus stack pointer so we try to execute code in
	 * a non-VM_EXEC VMA, causing segfault + teardown via exit_mmap().
	 *
	 * The clone will cause PMD page table sharing between the
	 * processes first via:
	 * copy_process() -> ... -> huge_pte_alloc() -> huge_pmd_share()
	 *
	 * Then tear down and release the hugetlb 'VMA' lock via:
	 * exit_mmap() -> ... -> vma_close() -> hugetlb_vma_lock_free()
	 */
	pid = syscall(__NR_clone, 0, 2 * PMD_SIZE, 0, 0, 0);
	if (pid < 0) {
		perror("clone");
		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
	} if (pid == 0) {
		/* Pop stack... */
		return;
	}

	/*
	 * We are the parent process.
	 *
	 * Race the child process's teardown with a PMD unshare.
	 *
	 * We do this by triggering:
	 *
	 * __split_vma() -> hugetlb_split() -> hugetlb_unshare_pmds()
	 *
	 * Which, importantly, doesn't hold the hugetlb VMA lock (nor can
	 * it), meaning we assert in hugetlb_vma_assert_locked().
	 *
	 *            .
	 * |----------.----------|
	 * |          .          |
	 * |----------.----------|
	 * 0          .     PUD boundary
	 */
	mmap(0, PUD_SIZE / 2, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
	     MAP_FIXED | MAP_ANON | MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
}

int main(void)

{
	int i;

	/* Kick off fork children. */
	for (i = 0; i < NUM_FORKS; i++) {
		pid_t pid = fork();

		if (pid < 0) {
			perror("fork");
			exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
		}

		/* Fork children do their work and exit. */
		if (!pid) {
			int j;

			for (j = 0; j < NUM_ITERS; j++)
				execute_one();
			return EXIT_SUCCESS;
		}
	}

	/* If we succeeded, wait on children. */
	for (i = 0; i < NUM_FORKS; i++)
		wait(NULL);

	return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
[[email protected]: account for the !CONFIG_HUGETLB_PMD_PAGE_TABLE_SHARING case]
Fixes 081056dc00a2 ("mm/hugetlb: unshare page tables during VMA split, not before")
Cc Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Cc Muchun Song <[email protected]>
---
 mm/hugetlb.c |   57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
mm/hugetlb.c +37 -20
@@ -86,6 +86,9 @@ static int hugetlb_acct_memory(struct hs
 static void hugetlb_vma_lock_free(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
 static void hugetlb_vma_lock_alloc(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
 static void __hugetlb_vma_unlock_write_free(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
+static int __huge_pmd_unshare(struct mmu_gather *tlb,
+		struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep,
+		bool check_locks);
 static void hugetlb_unshare_pmds(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 		unsigned long start, unsigned long end, bool take_locks);
 static struct resv_map *vma_resv_map(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
@@ -7225,6 +7228,31 @@ out:
 	return pte;
 }
 
+static int __huge_pmd_unshare(struct mmu_gather *tlb,
+		struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep,
+		bool check_locks)
+{
+	unsigned long sz = huge_page_size(hstate_vma(vma));
+	struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
+	pgd_t *pgd = pgd_offset(mm, addr);
+	p4d_t *p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, addr);
+	pud_t *pud = pud_offset(p4d, addr);
+
+	if (sz != PMD_SIZE)
+		return 0;
+	if (!ptdesc_pmd_is_shared(virt_to_ptdesc(ptep)))
+		return 0;
+	i_mmap_assert_write_locked(vma->vm_file->f_mapping);
+	if (check_locks)
+		hugetlb_vma_assert_locked(vma);
+	pud_clear(pud);
+
+	tlb_unshare_pmd_ptdesc(tlb, virt_to_ptdesc(ptep), addr);
+
+	mm_dec_nr_pmds(mm);
+	return 1;
+}
+
 /**
  * huge_pmd_unshare - Unmap a pmd table if it is shared by multiple users
  * @tlb: the current mmu_gather.
@@ -7244,25 +7272,7 @@ out:
 int huge_pmd_unshare(struct mmu_gather *tlb, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 		unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep)
 {
-	unsigned long sz = huge_page_size(hstate_vma(vma));
-	struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
-	pgd_t *pgd = pgd_offset(mm, addr);
-	p4d_t *p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, addr);
-	pud_t *pud = pud_offset(p4d, addr);
-
-	i_mmap_assert_write_locked(vma->vm_file->f_mapping);
-	hugetlb_vma_assert_locked(vma);
-	if (sz != PMD_SIZE)
-		return 0;
-	if (!ptdesc_pmd_is_shared(virt_to_ptdesc(ptep)))
-		return 0;
-
-	pud_clear(pud);
-
-	tlb_unshare_pmd_ptdesc(tlb, virt_to_ptdesc(ptep), addr);
-
-	mm_dec_nr_pmds(mm);
-	return 1;
+	return __huge_pmd_unshare(tlb, vma, addr, ptep, /*check_locks=*/true);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -7296,6 +7306,13 @@ pte_t *huge_pmd_share(struct mm_struct *
 	return NULL;
 }
 
+static int __huge_pmd_unshare(struct mmu_gather *tlb,
+		struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep,
+		bool check_locks)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 int huge_pmd_unshare(struct mmu_gather *tlb, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 		unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep)
 {
@@ -7555,7 +7572,7 @@ static void hugetlb_unshare_pmds(struct
 		if (!ptep)
 			continue;
 		ptl = huge_pte_lock(h, mm, ptep);
-		huge_pmd_unshare(&tlb, vma, address, ptep);
+		__huge_pmd_unshare(&tlb, vma, address, ptep, take_locks);
 		spin_unlock(ptl);
 	}
 	huge_pmd_unshare_flush(&tlb, vma);
author maintainer
#249 lore raw

PATCH 244/261 mptcp: fix missing wakeups in edge scenarios

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9d8d28738f24b75616d6ca7a27cb4aed88520343 ]

The mptcp_recvmsg() can fill MPTCP socket receive queue via mptcp_move_skbs(), but currently does not try to wakeup any listener, because the same process is going to check the receive queue soon.

When multiple threads are reading from the same fd, the above can cause stall. Add the missing wakeup.

---
 net/mptcp/protocol.c |    6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/mptcp/protocol.c +5 -1
@@ -2242,7 +2242,11 @@ static bool __mptcp_move_skbs(struct mpt
 	}
 	if (ret)
 		mptcp_check_data_fin((struct sock *)msk);
-	return !skb_queue_empty(&msk->receive_queue);
+
+	ret = !skb_queue_empty(&msk->receive_queue);
+	if (ret && mptcp_epollin_ready(sk))
+		sk->sk_data_ready(sk);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static unsigned int mptcp_inq_hint(const struct sock *sk)
author maintainer
#250 lore raw

PATCH 245/261 ipmi:ssif: Remove unnecessary indention

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Corey Minyard <[email protected]>

commit 91eb7ec7261254b6875909df767185838598e21e upstream.

A section was in {} that didn't need to be, move the variable definition to the top and set th eindentino properly.

---
 drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c |   28 ++++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c +12 -16
@@ -1681,6 +1681,7 @@ static int ssif_probe(struct i2c_client
 	int               len = 0;
 	int               i;
 	u8		  slave_addr = 0;
+	unsigned int      thread_num;
 	struct ssif_addr_info *addr_info = NULL;
 
 	mutex_lock(&ssif_infos_mutex);
@@ -1899,22 +1900,17 @@ static int ssif_probe(struct i2c_client
 	ssif_info->handlers.request_events = request_events;
 	ssif_info->handlers.set_need_watch = ssif_set_need_watch;
 
-	{
-		unsigned int thread_num;
-
-		thread_num = ((i2c_adapter_id(ssif_info->client->adapter)
-			       << 8) |
-			      ssif_info->client->addr);
-		init_completion(&ssif_info->wake_thread);
-		ssif_info->thread = kthread_run(ipmi_ssif_thread, ssif_info,
-					       "kssif%4.4x", thread_num);
-		if (IS_ERR(ssif_info->thread)) {
-			rv = PTR_ERR(ssif_info->thread);
-			dev_notice(&ssif_info->client->dev,
-				   "Could not start kernel thread: error %d\n",
-				   rv);
-			goto out;
-		}
+	thread_num = ((i2c_adapter_id(ssif_info->client->adapter) << 8) |
+		      ssif_info->client->addr);
+	init_completion(&ssif_info->wake_thread);
+	ssif_info->thread = kthread_run(ipmi_ssif_thread, ssif_info,
+					"kssif%4.4x", thread_num);
+	if (IS_ERR(ssif_info->thread)) {
+		rv = PTR_ERR(ssif_info->thread);
+		dev_notice(&ssif_info->client->dev,
+			   "Could not start kernel thread: error %d\n",
+			   rv);
+		goto out;
 	}
 
 	dev_set_drvdata(&ssif_info->client->dev, ssif_info);
author maintainer
#251 lore raw

PATCH 246/261 ipmi:ssif: NULL thread on error

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Corey Minyard <[email protected]>

commit a8aebe93a4938c0ca1941eeaae821738f869be3d upstream.

Cleanup code was checking the thread for NULL, but it was possibly a PTR_ERR() in one spot.

Spotted with static analysis.

Fixes 75c486cb1bca ("ipmi:ssif: Clean up kthread on errors")
Cc <[email protected]> # 91eb7ec72612: ipmi:ssif: Remove unnecessary indention
---
 drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c +1 -0
@@ -1907,6 +1907,7 @@ static int ssif_probe(struct i2c_client
 					"kssif%4.4x", thread_num);
 	if (IS_ERR(ssif_info->thread)) {
 		rv = PTR_ERR(ssif_info->thread);
+		ssif_info->thread = NULL;
 		dev_notice(&ssif_info->client->dev,
 			   "Could not start kernel thread: error %d\n",
 			   rv);
author maintainer
#252 lore raw

PATCH 247/261 ipvs: skip ipv6 extension headers for csum checks

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>

commit 05cfe9863ef049d98141dc2969eefde72fb07625 upstream.

Protocol checksum validation fails for IPv6 if there are extension headers before the protocol header. iph->len already contains its offset, so use it to fix the problem.

Fixes 2906f66a5682 ("ipvs: SCTP Trasport Loadbalancing Support")
Fixes 0bbdd42b7efa ("IPVS: Extend protocol DNAT/SNAT and state handlers")
---
 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_proto_sctp.c |   18 ++++++------------
 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_proto_tcp.c  |   21 +++++++--------------
 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_proto_udp.c  |   20 +++++++-------------
 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_proto_sctp.c +6 -12
@@ -10,7 +10,8 @@
 #include <net/ip_vs.h>
 
 static int
-sctp_csum_check(int af, struct sk_buff *skb, struct ip_vs_protocol *pp);
+sctp_csum_check(int af, struct sk_buff *skb, struct ip_vs_protocol *pp,
+		unsigned int sctphoff);
 
 static int
 sctp_conn_schedule(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, int af, struct sk_buff *skb,
@@ -108,7 +109,7 @@ sctp_snat_handler(struct sk_buff *skb, s
 		int ret;
 
 		/* Some checks before mangling */
-		if (!sctp_csum_check(cp->af, skb, pp))
+		if (!sctp_csum_check(cp->af, skb, pp, sctphoff))
 			return 0;
 
 		/* Call application helper if needed */
@@ -156,7 +157,7 @@ sctp_dnat_handler(struct sk_buff *skb, s
 		int ret;
 
 		/* Some checks before mangling */
-		if (!sctp_csum_check(cp->af, skb, pp))
+		if (!sctp_csum_check(cp->af, skb, pp, sctphoff))
 			return 0;
 
 		/* Call application helper if needed */
@@ -185,19 +186,12 @@ sctp_dnat_handler(struct sk_buff *skb, s
 }
 
 static int
-sctp_csum_check(int af, struct sk_buff *skb, struct ip_vs_protocol *pp)
+sctp_csum_check(int af, struct sk_buff *skb, struct ip_vs_protocol *pp,
+		unsigned int sctphoff)
 {
-	unsigned int sctphoff;
 	struct sctphdr *sh;
 	__le32 cmp, val;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_IP_VS_IPV6
-	if (af == AF_INET6)
-		sctphoff = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
-	else
-#endif
-		sctphoff = ip_hdrlen(skb);
-
 	sh = (struct sctphdr *)(skb->data + sctphoff);
 	cmp = sh->checksum;
 	val = sctp_compute_cksum(skb, sctphoff);
net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_proto_tcp.c +7 -14
@@ -29,7 +29,8 @@
 #include <net/ip_vs.h>
 
 static int
-tcp_csum_check(int af, struct sk_buff *skb, struct ip_vs_protocol *pp);
+tcp_csum_check(int af, struct sk_buff *skb, struct ip_vs_protocol *pp,
+	       unsigned int tcphoff);
 
 static int
 tcp_conn_schedule(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, int af, struct sk_buff *skb,
@@ -166,7 +167,7 @@ tcp_snat_handler(struct sk_buff *skb, st
 		int ret;
 
 		/* Some checks before mangling */
-		if (!tcp_csum_check(cp->af, skb, pp))
+		if (!tcp_csum_check(cp->af, skb, pp, tcphoff))
 			return 0;
 
 		/* Call application helper if needed */
@@ -244,7 +245,7 @@ tcp_dnat_handler(struct sk_buff *skb, st
 		int ret;
 
 		/* Some checks before mangling */
-		if (!tcp_csum_check(cp->af, skb, pp))
+		if (!tcp_csum_check(cp->af, skb, pp, tcphoff))
 			return 0;
 
 		/*
@@ -301,17 +302,9 @@ tcp_dnat_handler(struct sk_buff *skb, st
 
 
 static int
-tcp_csum_check(int af, struct sk_buff *skb, struct ip_vs_protocol *pp)
+tcp_csum_check(int af, struct sk_buff *skb, struct ip_vs_protocol *pp,
+	       unsigned int tcphoff)
 {
-	unsigned int tcphoff;
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_IP_VS_IPV6
-	if (af == AF_INET6)
-		tcphoff = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
-	else
-#endif
-		tcphoff = ip_hdrlen(skb);
-
 	switch (skb->ip_summed) {
 	case CHECKSUM_NONE:
 		skb->csum = skb_checksum(skb, tcphoff, skb->len - tcphoff, 0);
@@ -322,7 +315,7 @@ tcp_csum_check(int af, struct sk_buff *s
 			if (csum_ipv6_magic(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr,
 					    &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr,
 					    skb->len - tcphoff,
-					    ipv6_hdr(skb)->nexthdr,
+					    IPPROTO_TCP,
 					    skb->csum)) {
 				IP_VS_DBG_RL_PKT(0, af, pp, skb, 0,
 						 "Failed checksum for");
net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_proto_udp.c +7 -13
@@ -25,7 +25,8 @@
 #include <net/ip6_checksum.h>
 
 static int
-udp_csum_check(int af, struct sk_buff *skb, struct ip_vs_protocol *pp);
+udp_csum_check(int af, struct sk_buff *skb, struct ip_vs_protocol *pp,
+	       unsigned int udphoff);
 
 static int
 udp_conn_schedule(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, int af, struct sk_buff *skb,
@@ -155,7 +156,7 @@ udp_snat_handler(struct sk_buff *skb, st
 		int ret;
 
 		/* Some checks before mangling */
-		if (!udp_csum_check(cp->af, skb, pp))
+		if (!udp_csum_check(cp->af, skb, pp, udphoff))
 			return 0;
 
 		/*
@@ -238,7 +239,7 @@ udp_dnat_handler(struct sk_buff *skb, st
 		int ret;
 
 		/* Some checks before mangling */
-		if (!udp_csum_check(cp->af, skb, pp))
+		if (!udp_csum_check(cp->af, skb, pp, udphoff))
 			return 0;
 
 		/*
@@ -297,17 +298,10 @@ udp_dnat_handler(struct sk_buff *skb, st
 
 
 static int
-udp_csum_check(int af, struct sk_buff *skb, struct ip_vs_protocol *pp)
+udp_csum_check(int af, struct sk_buff *skb, struct ip_vs_protocol *pp,
+	       unsigned int udphoff)
 {
 	struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
-	unsigned int udphoff;
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_IP_VS_IPV6
-	if (af == AF_INET6)
-		udphoff = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
-	else
-#endif
-		udphoff = ip_hdrlen(skb);
 
 	uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, udphoff, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
 	if (uh == NULL)
@@ -325,7 +319,7 @@ udp_csum_check(int af, struct sk_buff *s
 				if (csum_ipv6_magic(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr,
 						    &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr,
 						    skb->len - udphoff,
-						    ipv6_hdr(skb)->nexthdr,
+						    IPPROTO_UDP,
 						    skb->csum)) {
 					IP_VS_DBG_RL_PKT(0, af, pp, skb, 0,
 							 "Failed checksum for");
author maintainer
#253 lore raw

PATCH 248/261 vsock/virtio: fix potential unbounded skb queue

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

commit 059b7dbd20a6f0c539a45ddff1573cb8946685b5 upstream.

virtio_transport_inc_rx_pkt() checks vvs->rx_bytes + len > vvs->buf_alloc.

virtio_transport_recv_enqueue() skips coalescing for packets with VIRTIO_VSOCK_SEQ_EOM.

If fed with packets with len == 0 and VIRTIO_VSOCK_SEQ_EOM, a very large number of packets can be queued because vvs->rx_bytes stays at 0.

Fix this by estimating the skb metadata size:

(Number of skbs in the queue) * SKB_TRUESIZE(0)

Fixes 077706165717 ("virtio/vsock: don't use skbuff state to account credit")
Cc Arseniy Krasnov <[email protected]>
Cc Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>
Cc Stefano Garzarella <[email protected]>
Cc "Michael S. Tsirkin" <[email protected]>
Cc Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Cc Xuan Zhuo <[email protected]>
Cc "Eugenio Pérez" <[email protected]>
---
 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c +3 -1
@@ -430,7 +430,9 @@ static int virtio_transport_send_pkt_inf
 static bool virtio_transport_inc_rx_pkt(struct virtio_vsock_sock *vvs,
 					u32 len)
 {
-	if (vvs->buf_used + len > vvs->buf_alloc)
+	u64 skb_overhead = (skb_queue_len(&vvs->rx_queue) + 1) * SKB_TRUESIZE(0);
+
+	if (skb_overhead + vvs->buf_used + len > vvs->buf_alloc)
 		return false;
 
 	vvs->rx_bytes += len;
author maintainer
#254 lore raw

PATCH 249/261 vsock/virtio: fix skb overhead accounting to preserve full buf_alloc

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Stefano Garzarella <[email protected]>

commit c6087c5aaad6d1b8be1a1a641e0a422218ade911 upstream.

After commit 059b7dbd20a6 ("vsock/virtio: fix potential unbounded skb queue"), virtio_transport_inc_rx_pkt() subtracts per-skb overhead from buf_alloc when checking whether a new packet fits. This reduces the effective receive buffer below what the user configured via SO_VM_SOCKETS_BUFFER_SIZE, causing legitimate data packets to be silently dropped and applications that rely on the full buffer size to deadlock.

Also, the reduced space is not communicated to the remote peer, so its credit calculation accounts more credit than the receiver will actually accept, causing data loss (there is no retransmission).

With this approach we currently have failures in tools/testing/vsock/vsock_test.c. Test 18 sometimes fails, while test 22 always fails in this way:
18 - SOCK_STREAM MSG_ZEROCOPY...hash mismatch

22 - SOCK_STREAM virtio credit update + SO_RCVLOWAT...send failed:
Resource temporarily unavailable

Fix by allowing at most buf_alloc * 2 as the total budget for payload plus skb overhead in virtio_transport_inc_rx_pkt(), similar to how SO_RCVBUF is doubled to reserve space for sk_buff metadata. This preserves the full buf_alloc for payload under normal operation, while still bounding the skb queue growth.

With this patch, all tests in tools/testing/vsock/vsock_test.c are now passing again.

Fixes 059b7dbd20a6 ("vsock/virtio: fix potential unbounded skb queue")
---
 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c |    9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c +8 -1
@@ -432,7 +432,14 @@ static bool virtio_transport_inc_rx_pkt(
 {
 	u64 skb_overhead = (skb_queue_len(&vvs->rx_queue) + 1) * SKB_TRUESIZE(0);
 
-	if (skb_overhead + vvs->buf_used + len > vvs->buf_alloc)
+	/* Allow at most buf_alloc * 2 total budget (payload + overhead),
+	 * similar to how SO_RCVBUF is doubled to reserve space for sk_buff
+	 * metadata. Check payload against buf_alloc to be sure the other
+	 * peer is respecting the credit, and sk_buff overhead to bound
+	 * queue growth.
+	 */
+	if ((u64)vvs->buf_used + len > vvs->buf_alloc ||
+	    skb_overhead > vvs->buf_alloc)
 		return false;
 
 	vvs->rx_bytes += len;
author maintainer
#255 lore raw

PATCH 250/261 block: fix handling of dead zone write plugs

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]>

commit 836efd35c472d89c838d7b17ef339ddb3286ffc5 upstream.

Shin'ichiro reported hard to reproduce unaligned write errors with zoned block devices. Under normal operation conditions (e.g. running XFS on an SMR disk), these errors are nearly impossible to trigger. But using a "slow" kernel with many debug options enables and some specific use cases (e.g. fio zbd test case 46), the errors can be reproduced fairly easily.

The unaligned write errors come from mishandling a valid reference counting pattern of zone write plugs. Such pattern triggers for instance if a process A writes a zone (not necessarilly to the full state), another process B immediately resets the zone and immediately following the completion of the zone reset, starts issuing writes to the zone. With such pattern, in some cases, the zone write plugs worker thread of the device may still be holding a reference to the zone write plug of the zone taken when process A was writing to the zone. The following zone reset from process B marks the zone as dead but does not remove the zone write plug from the device hash table as a reference to the plug still exist. Once process B starts issuing new writes, the zone write plug is seen as dead and the writes from process B are immediately failed, despite this write pattern being perfectly legal.

Fix this by allowing restoring a dead zone write plug to a live state if a write is issued to the zone when the zone is: marked as dead, empty and the write sector corresponds to the first sector of the zone (that is, the write is aligned to the zone write pointer). This is done with the new helper function disk_check_zone_wplug_dead(), which restores a dead zone write plug to a live state by clearing the BLK_ZONE_WPLUG_DEAD flag and restoring the initial reference to the zone write plug taken when the plug was added to the device hash table.

Fixes b7d4ffb51037 ("block: fix zone write plug removal")
[ context conflict due to different line offsets in blk-zoned.c ]
---
 block/blk-zoned.c |   32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
block/blk-zoned.c +27 -5
@@ -517,6 +517,28 @@ static void disk_mark_zone_wplug_dead(st
 	}
 }
 
+static inline bool disk_check_zone_wplug_dead(struct blk_zone_wplug *zwplug)
+{
+	if (!(zwplug->flags & BLK_ZONE_WPLUG_DEAD))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * If a new write is received right after a zone reset completes and
+	 * while the disk_zone_wplugs_worker() thread has not yet released the
+	 * reference on the zone write plug after processing the last write to
+	 * the zone, then the new write BIO will see the zone write plug marked
+	 * as dead. This case is however a false positive and a perfectly valid
+	 * pattern. In such case, restore the zone write plug to a live one.
+	 */
+	if (!zwplug->wp_offset && bio_list_empty(&zwplug->bio_list)) {
+		zwplug->flags &= ~BLK_ZONE_WPLUG_DEAD;
+		refcount_inc(&zwplug->ref);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
 static void blk_zone_wplug_bio_work(struct work_struct *work);
 
 /*
@@ -1037,12 +1059,12 @@ static bool blk_zone_wplug_handle_write(
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * If we got a zone write plug marked as dead, then the user is issuing
-	 * writes to a full zone, or without synchronizing with zone reset or
-	 * zone finish operations. In such case, fail the BIO to signal this
-	 * invalid usage.
+	 * Check if we got a zone write plug marked as dead. If yes, then the
+	 * user is likely issuing writes to a full zone, or without
+	 * synchronizing with zone reset or zone finish operations. In such
+	 * case, fail the BIO to signal this invalid usage.
 	 */
-	if (zwplug->flags & BLK_ZONE_WPLUG_DEAD) {
+	if (disk_check_zone_wplug_dead(zwplug)) {
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&zwplug->lock, flags);
 		disk_put_zone_wplug(zwplug);
 		bio_io_error(bio);
author maintainer
#256 lore raw

PATCH 251/261 arm64: cputype: Add NVIDIA Olympus definitions

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shanker Donthineni <[email protected]>

commit e185c8a0d84236d14af61faff8147c953a878a77 upstream.

Add cpu part and model macro definitions for NVIDIA Olympus core.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h +2 -0
@@ -129,6 +129,7 @@
 
 #define NVIDIA_CPU_PART_DENVER		0x003
 #define NVIDIA_CPU_PART_CARMEL		0x004
+#define NVIDIA_CPU_PART_OLYMPUS		0x010
 
 #define FUJITSU_CPU_PART_A64FX		0x001
 
@@ -209,6 +210,7 @@
 #define MIDR_QCOM_KRYO_4XX_SILVER MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_QCOM, QCOM_CPU_PART_KRYO_4XX_SILVER)
 #define MIDR_NVIDIA_DENVER MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_NVIDIA, NVIDIA_CPU_PART_DENVER)
 #define MIDR_NVIDIA_CARMEL MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_NVIDIA, NVIDIA_CPU_PART_CARMEL)
+#define MIDR_NVIDIA_OLYMPUS MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_NVIDIA, NVIDIA_CPU_PART_OLYMPUS)
 #define MIDR_FUJITSU_A64FX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_FUJITSU, FUJITSU_CPU_PART_A64FX)
 #define MIDR_HISI_TSV110 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_HISI, HISI_CPU_PART_TSV110)
 #define MIDR_HISI_HIP09 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_HISI, HISI_CPU_PART_HIP09)
author maintainer
#257 lore raw

PATCH 252/261 arm64: cputype: Add C1-Ultra definitions

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>

commit 60349e64a6c65f9f0aa118af711b3c7e137f07ff upstream.

Add cputype definitions for C1-Ultra. These will be used for errata detection in subsequent patches.

These values can be found in the C1-Ultra TRM:

https://developer.arm.com/documentation/108014/0100/

... in section A.5.1 ("MIDR_EL1, Main ID Register").

Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
[Mark: backport to v6.12.y]
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h +2 -0
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V3	0xD84
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X925	0xD85
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A725	0xD87
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_C1_ULTRA		0xD8C
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N3	0xD8E
 
 #define APM_CPU_PART_XGENE		0x000
@@ -186,6 +187,7 @@
 #define MIDR_NEOVERSE_V3 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V3)
 #define MIDR_CORTEX_X925 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X925)
 #define MIDR_CORTEX_A725 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A725)
+#define MIDR_C1_ULTRA MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_C1_ULTRA)
 #define MIDR_NEOVERSE_N3 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N3)
 #define MIDR_THUNDERX	MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX)
 #define MIDR_THUNDERX_81XX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX_81XX)
author maintainer
#258 lore raw

PATCH 253/261 arm64: cputype: Add C1-Premium definitions

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>

commit d28413bfc5a255957241f1df5d7fd0c2cd74fe18 upstream.

Add cputype definitions for C1-Premium. These will be used for errata detection in subsequent patches.

These values can be found in the C1-Premium TRM:

https://developer.arm.com/documentation/109416/0100/

... in section A.5.1 ("MIDR_EL1, Main ID Register").

Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
[Mark: backport to v6.12.y]
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h +2 -0
@@ -99,6 +99,7 @@
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A725	0xD87
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_C1_ULTRA		0xD8C
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N3	0xD8E
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_C1_PREMIUM		0xD90
 
 #define APM_CPU_PART_XGENE		0x000
 #define APM_CPU_VAR_POTENZA		0x00
@@ -189,6 +190,7 @@
 #define MIDR_CORTEX_A725 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A725)
 #define MIDR_C1_ULTRA MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_C1_ULTRA)
 #define MIDR_NEOVERSE_N3 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N3)
+#define MIDR_C1_PREMIUM MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_C1_PREMIUM)
 #define MIDR_THUNDERX	MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX)
 #define MIDR_THUNDERX_81XX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX_81XX)
 #define MIDR_THUNDERX_83XX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX_83XX)
author maintainer
#259 lore raw

PATCH 254/261 arm64: errata: Mitigate TLBI errata on various Arm CPUs

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>

commit cfd391e74134db664feb499d43af286380b10ba8 upstream.

A number of CPUs developed by Arm suffer from errata whereby a broadcast TLBI;DSB sequence may complete before the global observation of writes which are translated by an affected TLB entry.

These errata ONLY affect the completion of memory accesses which have been translated by an invalidated TLB entry, and these errata DO NOT affect the actual invalidation of TLB entries. TLB entries are removed correctly.

This issue has been assigned CVE ID CVE-2025-10263.

To mitigate this issue, Arm recommends that software follows any affected TLBI;DSB sequence with an additional TLBI;DSB, which will ensure that all memory write effects affected by the first TLBI have been globally observed. The additional TLBI can use any operation that is broadcast to affected CPUs, and the additional DSB can use any option that is sufficient to complete the additional TLBI.

The ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI workaround is sufficient to mitigate the issue. Enable this workaround for affected CPUs, and update the silicon errata documentation accordingly.

Note that due to the manner in which Arm develops IP and tracks errata, some CPUs share a common erratum number.

Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
[Mark: backport to v6.12.y]
---
 Documentation/arch/arm64/silicon-errata.rst |   44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/Kconfig                          |   48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c              |   32 +++++++++++++++++-
 3 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Documentation/arch/arm64/silicon-errata.rst +44 -0
@@ -126,16 +126,28 @@ stable kernels.
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | ARM            | Cortex-A76      | #3324349        | ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386       |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
+| ARM            | Cortex-A76      | #4193800        | ARM64_ERRATUM_4118414       |
++----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
+| ARM            | Cortex-A76AE    | #4193801        | ARM64_ERRATUM_4118414       |
++----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | ARM            | Cortex-A77      | #1491015        | N/A                         |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | ARM            | Cortex-A77      | #1508412        | ARM64_ERRATUM_1508412       |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | ARM            | Cortex-A77      | #3324348        | ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386       |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
+| ARM            | Cortex-A77      | #4193798        | ARM64_ERRATUM_4118414       |
++----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | ARM            | Cortex-A78      | #3324344        | ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386       |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
+| ARM            | Cortex-A78      | #4193791        | ARM64_ERRATUM_4118414       |
++----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
+| ARM            | Cortex-A78AE    | #4193793        | ARM64_ERRATUM_4118414       |
++----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | ARM            | Cortex-A78C     | #3324346,3324347| ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386       |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
+| ARM            | Cortex-A78C     | #4193794        | ARM64_ERRATUM_4118414       |
++----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | ARM            | Cortex-A710     | #2119858        | ARM64_ERRATUM_2119858       |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | ARM            | Cortex-A710     | #2054223        | ARM64_ERRATUM_2054223       |
@@ -144,6 +156,8 @@ stable kernels.
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | ARM            | Cortex-A710     | #3324338        | ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386       |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
+| ARM            | Cortex-A710     | #4193788        | ARM64_ERRATUM_4118414       |
++----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | ARM            | Cortex-A715     | #2645198        | ARM64_ERRATUM_2645198       |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | ARM            | Cortex-A715     | #3456084        | ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386       |
@@ -156,20 +170,32 @@ stable kernels.
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | ARM            | Cortex-X1       | #3324344        | ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386       |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
+| ARM            | Cortex-X1       | #4193791        | ARM64_ERRATUM_4118414       |
++----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | ARM            | Cortex-X1C      | #3324346        | ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386       |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
+| ARM            | Cortex-X1C      | #4193792        | ARM64_ERRATUM_4118414       |
++----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | ARM            | Cortex-X2       | #2119858        | ARM64_ERRATUM_2119858       |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | ARM            | Cortex-X2       | #2224489        | ARM64_ERRATUM_2224489       |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | ARM            | Cortex-X2       | #3324338        | ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386       |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
+| ARM            | Cortex-X2       | #4193788        | ARM64_ERRATUM_4118414       |
++----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | ARM            | Cortex-X3       | #3324335        | ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386       |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
+| ARM            | Cortex-X3       | #4193786        | ARM64_ERRATUM_4118414       |
++----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | ARM            | Cortex-X4       | #3194386        | ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386       |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
+| ARM            | Cortex-X4       | #4118414        | ARM64_ERRATUM_4118414       |
++----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | ARM            | Cortex-X925     | #3324334        | ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386       |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
+| ARM            | Cortex-X925     | #4193781        | ARM64_ERRATUM_4118414       |
++----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | ARM            | Neoverse-N1     | #1188873,1418040| ARM64_ERRATUM_1418040       |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | ARM            | Neoverse-N1     | #1349291        | N/A                         |
@@ -180,6 +206,8 @@ stable kernels.
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | ARM            | Neoverse-N1     | #3324349        | ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386       |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
+| ARM            | Neoverse-N1     | #4193800        | ARM64_ERRATUM_4118414       |
++----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | ARM            | Neoverse-N2     | #2139208        | ARM64_ERRATUM_2139208       |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | ARM            | Neoverse-N2     | #2067961        | ARM64_ERRATUM_2067961       |
@@ -188,18 +216,34 @@ stable kernels.
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | ARM            | Neoverse-N2     | #3324339        | ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386       |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
+| ARM            | Neoverse-N2     | #4193789        | ARM64_ERRATUM_4118414       |
++----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | ARM            | Neoverse-N3     | #3456111        | ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386       |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | ARM            | Neoverse-V1     | #1619801        | N/A                         |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | ARM            | Neoverse-V1     | #3324341        | ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386       |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
+| ARM            | Neoverse-V1     | #4193790        | ARM64_ERRATUM_4118414       |
++----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | ARM            | Neoverse-V2     | #3324336        | ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386       |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
+| ARM            | Neoverse-V2     | #4193787        | ARM64_ERRATUM_4118414       |
++----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | ARM            | Neoverse-V3     | #3312417        | ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386       |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
+| ARM            | Neoverse-V3     | #4193784        | ARM64_ERRATUM_4118414       |
++----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | ARM            | Neoverse-V3AE   | #3312417        | ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386       |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
+| ARM            | Neoverse-V3AE   | #4193784        | ARM64_ERRATUM_4118414       |
++----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
+| ARM            | C1-Premium      | #4193780        | ARM64_ERRATUM_4118414       |
++----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
+| ARM            | C1-Pro          | #4193714        | ARM64_ERRATUM_4193714       |
++----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
+| ARM            | C1-Ultra        | #4193780        | ARM64_ERRATUM_4118414       |
++----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | ARM            | MMU-500         | #841119,826419  | N/A                         |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | ARM            | MMU-600         | #1076982,1209401| N/A                         |
arch/arm64/Kconfig +48 -0

54 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +30 -2
@@ -225,7 +225,35 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti
 		ERRATA_MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A510, 0, 0, 1, 1),
 	},
 #endif
-	{},
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_4118414
+	{
+		ERRATA_MIDR_RANGE_LIST(((const struct midr_range[]) {
+			MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_C1_PREMIUM),
+			MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_C1_ULTRA),
+			MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A76),
+			MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A76AE),
+			MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A77),
+			MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A78),
+			MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A78AE),
+			MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A78C),
+			MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A710),
+			MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_X1),
+			MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_X1C),
+			MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_X2),
+			MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_X3),
+			MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_X4),
+			MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_X925),
+			MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_N1),
+			MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_N2),
+			MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_V1),
+			MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_V2),
+			MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_V3),
+			MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_V3AE),
+			{}
+		})),
+	},
+#endif
+	{}
 };
 #endif
 
@@ -553,7 +581,7 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm6
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI
 	{
-		.desc = "Qualcomm erratum 1009, or ARM erratum 1286807, 2441009",
+		.desc = "Broken broadcast TLBI completion",
 		.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI,
 		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
 		.matches = cpucap_multi_entry_cap_matches,
author maintainer
#260 lore raw

PATCH 255/261 arm64: errata: Mitigate TLBI errata on NVIDIA Olympus CPU

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shanker Donthineni <[email protected]>

commit ec7216f92e4ebd485b1c6dc6aa3f6064b71a5768 upstream.

NVIDIA Olympus cores are affected by the TLBI completion issue tracked as CVE-2025-10263. The existing ARM64_ERRATUM_4118414 handling already uses ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI to issue an additional broadcast TLBI;DSB sequence and ensure affected memory write effects are globally observed.

Add MIDR_NVIDIA_OLYMPUS to the repeat-TLBI match list so the same mitigation is enabled on affected Olympus systems. Also document the NVIDIA Olympus erratum in the arm64 silicon errata table and list it in the Kconfig help text.

---
 Documentation/arch/arm64/silicon-errata.rst |    2 ++
 arch/arm64/Kconfig                          |    3 ++-
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c              |    1 +
 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Documentation/arch/arm64/silicon-errata.rst +2 -0
@@ -285,6 +285,8 @@ stable kernels.
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | NVIDIA         | Carmel Core     | N/A             | NVIDIA_CARMEL_CNP_ERRATUM   |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
+| NVIDIA         | Olympus core    | T410-OLY-1029   | ARM64_ERRATUM_4118414       |
++----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | NVIDIA         | T241 GICv3/4.x  | T241-FABRIC-4   | N/A                         |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
arch/arm64/Kconfig +2 -1
@@ -1139,7 +1139,7 @@ config ARM64_ERRATUM_4193714
 	  If unsure, say Y.
 
 config ARM64_ERRATUM_4118414
-	bool "Cortex-*/Neoverse-*/C1-*: Completion of affected memory accesses might not be guaranteed by completion of a TLBI"
+	bool "Various: Completion of affected memory accesses might not be guaranteed by completion of a TLBI"
 	default y
 	select ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI
 	help
@@ -1166,6 +1166,7 @@ config ARM64_ERRATUM_4118414
 	  * ARM Neoverse-V2 erratum 4193787
 	  * ARM Neoverse-V3 erratum 4193784
 	  * ARM Neoverse-V3AE erratum 4193784
+	  * NVIDIA Olympus erratum T410-OLY-1029
 
 	  On affected cores, some memory accesses might not be completed by
 	  broadcast TLB invalidation.
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +1 -0
@@ -249,6 +249,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti
 			MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_V2),
 			MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_V3),
 			MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_V3AE),
+			MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NVIDIA_OLYMPUS),
 			{}
 		})),
 	},
author maintainer
#261 lore raw

PATCH 256/261 arm64: errata: Mitigate TLBI errata on Microsoft Azure Cobalt 100 CPU

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Will Deacon <[email protected]>

commit 1940e70a8144bf75e6df26bf6f600862ea7f7ea1 upstream.

Commit fb091ff39479 ("arm64: Subscribe Microsoft Azure Cobalt 100 to ARM Neoverse N2 errata") states that Microsoft Azure Cobalt 100 CPU "is a Microsoft implemented CPU based on r0p0 of the ARM Neoverse N2 CPU, and therefore suffers from all the same errata.".

So enable the workaround for the latest broadcast TLB invalidation bug on these parts.

---
 Documentation/arch/arm64/silicon-errata.rst |    2 ++
 arch/arm64/Kconfig                          |    1 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c              |    1 +
 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
Documentation/arch/arm64/silicon-errata.rst +2 -0
@@ -346,3 +346,5 @@ stable kernels.
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | Microsoft      | Azure Cobalt 100| #3324339        | ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386       |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
+| Microsoft      | Azure Cobalt 100| #4193789        | ARM64_ERRATUM_4118414       |
++----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
arch/arm64/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -1166,6 +1166,7 @@ config ARM64_ERRATUM_4118414
 	  * ARM Neoverse-V2 erratum 4193787
 	  * ARM Neoverse-V3 erratum 4193784
 	  * ARM Neoverse-V3AE erratum 4193784
+	  * Microsoft Azure Cobalt 100 4193789
 	  * NVIDIA Olympus erratum T410-OLY-1029
 
 	  On affected cores, some memory accesses might not be completed by
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +1 -0
@@ -250,6 +250,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti
 			MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_V3),
 			MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_V3AE),
 			MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NVIDIA_OLYMPUS),
+			MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_MICROSOFT_AZURE_COBALT_100),
 			{}
 		})),
 	},
author maintainer
#262 lore raw

PATCH 257/261 net: introduce EXPORT_IPV6_MOD() and EXPORT_IPV6_MOD_GPL()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 54568a84c95bdea20227cf48d41f198d083e78dd ]

We have many EXPORT_SYMBOL(x) in networking tree because IPv6 can be built as a module.

CONFIG_IPV6=y is becoming the norm.

Define a EXPORT_IPV6_MOD(x) which only exports x
for modular IPv6.

Same principle applies to EXPORT_IPV6_MOD_GPL()

(cherry picked from commit 54568a84c95bdea20227cf48d41f198d083e78dd)
[needed as dependency for tcp: secure_seq: add back ports to TS offset]
---
 include/net/ip.h |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
include/net/ip.h +8 -0
@@ -675,6 +675,14 @@ static inline void ip_ipgre_mc_map(__be3
 		memcpy(buf, &naddr, sizeof(naddr));
 }
 
+#if IS_MODULE(CONFIG_IPV6)
+#define EXPORT_IPV6_MOD(X) EXPORT_SYMBOL(X)
+#define EXPORT_IPV6_MOD_GPL(X) EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(X)
+#else
+#define EXPORT_IPV6_MOD(X)
+#define EXPORT_IPV6_MOD_GPL(X)
+#endif
+
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
 #include <linux/ipv6.h>
 #endif
author maintainer
#263 lore raw

PATCH 258/261 tcp: use EXPORT_IPV6_MOD[_GPL]()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6dc4c2526f6d11f36c4e26d0231b345eabab584c ]

Use EXPORT_IPV6_MOD[_GPL]() for symbols that don't need to be exported unless CONFIG_IPV6=m

tcp_hashinfo and tcp_openreq_init_rwin() are no longer used from any module anyway.

(cherry picked from commit 6dc4c2526f6d11f36c4e26d0231b345eabab584c)
[needed as dependency for tcp: secure_seq: add back ports to TS offset]
---
 net/core/secure_seq.c    |    2 +-
 net/ipv4/syncookies.c    |    8 ++++----
 net/ipv4/tcp.c           |   44 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c  |    2 +-
 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c     |   14 +++++++-------
 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c      |   47 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
 net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c |   11 +++++------
 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c    |   12 ++++++------
 net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c     |    4 ++--
 9 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-)
net/core/secure_seq.c +1 -1
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ u32 secure_tcpv6_ts_off(const struct net
 	return siphash(&combined, offsetofend(typeof(combined), daddr),
 		       &ts_secret);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcpv6_ts_off);
+EXPORT_IPV6_MOD(secure_tcpv6_ts_off);
 
 u32 secure_tcpv6_seq(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
 		     __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
net/ipv4/syncookies.c +4 -4
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ struct sock *tcp_get_cookie_sock(struct
 
 	return NULL;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_get_cookie_sock);
+EXPORT_IPV6_MOD(tcp_get_cookie_sock);
 
 /*
  * when syncookies are in effect and tcp timestamps are enabled we stored
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ bool cookie_timestamp_decode(const struc
 
 	return READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_window_scaling) != 0;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(cookie_timestamp_decode);
+EXPORT_IPV6_MOD(cookie_timestamp_decode);
 
 static int cookie_tcp_reqsk_init(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 				 struct request_sock *req)
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ struct request_sock *cookie_bpf_check(st
 
 	return req;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cookie_bpf_check);
+EXPORT_IPV6_MOD_GPL(cookie_bpf_check);
 #endif
 
 struct request_sock *cookie_tcp_reqsk_alloc(const struct request_sock_ops *ops,
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ struct request_sock *cookie_tcp_reqsk_al
 
 	return req;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cookie_tcp_reqsk_alloc);
+EXPORT_IPV6_MOD_GPL(cookie_tcp_reqsk_alloc);
 
 static struct request_sock *cookie_tcp_check(struct net *net, struct sock *sk,
 					     struct sk_buff *skb)
net/ipv4/tcp.c +22 -22

169 lines not on this page · raw message

net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c +1 -1
@@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ bool tcp_fastopen_defer_connect(struct s
 	}
 	return false;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_fastopen_defer_connect);
+EXPORT_IPV6_MOD(tcp_fastopen_defer_connect);
 
 /*
  * The following code block is to deal with middle box issues with TFO:
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +7 -7
@@ -649,7 +649,7 @@ void tcp_initialize_rcv_mss(struct sock
 
 	inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ack.rcv_mss = hint;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_initialize_rcv_mss);
+EXPORT_IPV6_MOD(tcp_initialize_rcv_mss);
 
 /* Receiver "autotuning" code.
  *
@@ -2911,7 +2911,7 @@ void tcp_simple_retransmit(struct sock *
 	 */
 	tcp_non_congestion_loss_retransmit(sk);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_simple_retransmit);
+EXPORT_IPV6_MOD(tcp_simple_retransmit);
 
 void tcp_enter_recovery(struct sock *sk, bool ece_ack)
 {
@@ -4540,7 +4540,7 @@ void tcp_done_with_error(struct sock *sk
 	if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
 		sk_error_report(sk);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_done_with_error);
+EXPORT_IPV6_MOD(tcp_done_with_error);
 
 /* When we get a reset we do this. */
 void tcp_reset(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
@@ -6302,7 +6302,7 @@ csum_error:
 discard:
 	tcp_drop_reason(sk, skb, reason);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_rcv_established);
+EXPORT_IPV6_MOD(tcp_rcv_established);
 
 void tcp_init_transfer(struct sock *sk, int bpf_op, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
@@ -7016,7 +7016,7 @@ consume:
 	__kfree_skb(skb);
 	return 0;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_rcv_state_process);
+EXPORT_IPV6_MOD(tcp_rcv_state_process);
 
 static inline void pr_drop_req(struct request_sock *req, __u16 port, int family)
 {
@@ -7198,7 +7198,7 @@ u16 tcp_get_syncookie_mss(struct request
 
 	return mss;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tcp_get_syncookie_mss);
+EXPORT_IPV6_MOD_GPL(tcp_get_syncookie_mss);
 
 int tcp_conn_request(struct request_sock_ops *rsk_ops,
 		     const struct tcp_request_sock_ops *af_ops,
@@ -7378,4 +7378,4 @@ drop:
 	tcp_listendrop(sk);
 	return 0;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_conn_request);
+EXPORT_IPV6_MOD(tcp_conn_request);
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +23 -24

191 lines not on this page · raw message

net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c +5 -6
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ kill:
 	inet_twsk_put(tw);
 	return TCP_TW_SUCCESS;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_timewait_state_process);
+EXPORT_IPV6_MOD(tcp_timewait_state_process);
 
 static void tcp_time_wait_init(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_timewait_sock *tcptw)
 {
@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ void tcp_twsk_destructor(struct sock *sk
 #endif
 	tcp_ao_destroy_sock(sk, true);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tcp_twsk_destructor);
+EXPORT_IPV6_MOD_GPL(tcp_twsk_destructor);
 
 void tcp_twsk_purge(struct list_head *net_exit_list)
 {
@@ -448,7 +448,6 @@ void tcp_openreq_init_rwin(struct reques
 		rcv_wnd);
 	ireq->rcv_wscale = rcv_wscale;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_openreq_init_rwin);
 
 static void tcp_ecn_openreq_child(struct tcp_sock *tp,
 				  const struct request_sock *req)
@@ -483,7 +482,7 @@ void tcp_ca_openreq_child(struct sock *s
 
 	tcp_set_ca_state(sk, TCP_CA_Open);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tcp_ca_openreq_child);
+EXPORT_IPV6_MOD_GPL(tcp_ca_openreq_child);
 
 static void smc_check_reset_syn_req(const struct tcp_sock *oldtp,
 				    struct request_sock *req,
@@ -899,7 +898,7 @@ embryonic_reset:
 	}
 	return NULL;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_check_req);
+EXPORT_IPV6_MOD(tcp_check_req);
 
 /*
  * Queue segment on the new socket if the new socket is active,
@@ -941,4 +940,4 @@ enum skb_drop_reason tcp_child_process(s
 	sock_put(child);
 	return reason;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_child_process);
+EXPORT_IPV6_MOD(tcp_child_process);
net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +6 -6
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ void tcp_select_initial_window(const str
 	WRITE_ONCE(*__window_clamp,
 		   min_t(__u32, U16_MAX << (*rcv_wscale), window_clamp));
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_select_initial_window);
+EXPORT_IPV6_MOD(tcp_select_initial_window);
 
 /* Chose a new window to advertise, update state in tcp_sock for the
  * socket, and return result with RFC1323 scaling applied.  The return
@@ -1171,7 +1171,7 @@ void tcp_release_cb(struct sock *sk)
 	if ((flags & TCPF_ACK_DEFERRED) && inet_csk_ack_scheduled(sk))
 		tcp_send_ack(sk);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_release_cb);
+EXPORT_IPV6_MOD(tcp_release_cb);
 
 void __init tcp_tasklet_init(void)
 {
@@ -1785,7 +1785,7 @@ int tcp_mtu_to_mss(struct sock *sk, int
 	return __tcp_mtu_to_mss(sk, pmtu) -
 	       (tcp_sk(sk)->tcp_header_len - sizeof(struct tcphdr));
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_mtu_to_mss);
+EXPORT_IPV6_MOD(tcp_mtu_to_mss);
 
 /* Inverse of above */
 int tcp_mss_to_mtu(struct sock *sk, int mss)
@@ -1859,7 +1859,7 @@ unsigned int tcp_sync_mss(struct sock *s
 
 	return mss_now;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_sync_mss);
+EXPORT_IPV6_MOD(tcp_sync_mss);
 
 /* Compute the current effective MSS, taking SACKs and IP options,
  * and even PMTU discovery events into account.
@@ -3869,7 +3869,7 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_make_synack(const st
 
 	return skb;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_make_synack);
+EXPORT_IPV6_MOD(tcp_make_synack);
 
 static void tcp_ca_dst_init(struct sock *sk, const struct dst_entry *dst)
 {
@@ -4443,4 +4443,4 @@ int tcp_rtx_synack(const struct sock *sk
 	}
 	return res;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_rtx_synack);
+EXPORT_IPV6_MOD(tcp_rtx_synack);
net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c +2 -2
@@ -736,7 +736,7 @@ void tcp_syn_ack_timeout(const struct re
 
 	__NET_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_TCPTIMEOUTS);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_syn_ack_timeout);
+EXPORT_IPV6_MOD(tcp_syn_ack_timeout);
 
 void tcp_set_keepalive(struct sock *sk, int val)
 {
@@ -748,7 +748,7 @@ void tcp_set_keepalive(struct sock *sk,
 	else if (!val)
 		inet_csk_delete_keepalive_timer(sk);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tcp_set_keepalive);
+EXPORT_IPV6_MOD_GPL(tcp_set_keepalive);
 
 
 static void tcp_keepalive_timer (struct timer_list *t)
author maintainer
#264 lore raw

PATCH 259/261 tcp: secure_seq: add back ports to TS offset

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 165573e41f2f66ef98940cf65f838b2cb575d9d1 ]

This reverts 28ee1b746f49 ("secure_seq: downgrade to per-host timestamp offsets")

tcp_tw_recycle went away in 2017.

Zhouyan Deng reported off-path TCP source port leakage via SYN cookie side-channel that can be fixed in multiple ways.

One of them is to bring back TCP ports in TS offset randomization.

As a bonus, we perform a single siphash() computation to provide both an ISN and a TS offset.

Fixes 28ee1b746f49 ("secure_seq: downgrade to per-host timestamp offsets")
(cherry picked from commit 165573e41f2f66ef98940cf65f838b2cb575d9d1)

[kept the DCCP functions in the header, as DCCP was not retired yet
in 6.12]

---
 include/net/secure_seq.h |   45 ++++++++++++++++++++++----
 include/net/tcp.h        |    6 ++-
 net/core/secure_seq.c    |   80 +++++++++++++++++------------------------------
 net/ipv4/syncookies.c    |   11 ++++--
 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c     |    8 +++-
 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c      |   37 +++++++++------------
 net/ipv6/syncookies.c    |   11 ++++--
 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c      |   37 +++++++++------------
 8 files changed, 127 insertions(+), 108 deletions(-)
include/net/secure_seq.h +38 -7
@@ -5,20 +5,51 @@
 #include <linux/types.h>
 
 struct net;
+extern struct net init_net;
+
+union tcp_seq_and_ts_off {
+	struct {
+		u32 seq;
+		u32 ts_off;
+	};
+	u64 hash64;
+};
 
 u64 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport);
 u64 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
 			       __be16 dport);
-u32 secure_tcp_seq(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
-		   __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
-u32 secure_tcp_ts_off(const struct net *net, __be32 saddr, __be32 daddr);
-u32 secure_tcpv6_seq(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
-		     __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
-u32 secure_tcpv6_ts_off(const struct net *net,
-			const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr);
+union tcp_seq_and_ts_off
+secure_tcp_seq_and_ts_off(const struct net *net, __be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
+			  __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
 u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
 				__be16 sport, __be16 dport);
 u64 secure_dccpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
 				  __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
 
+static inline u32 secure_tcp_seq(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
+				 __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
+{
+	union tcp_seq_and_ts_off ts;
+
+	ts = secure_tcp_seq_and_ts_off(&init_net, saddr, daddr,
+				       sport, dport);
+
+	return ts.seq;
+}
+
+union tcp_seq_and_ts_off
+secure_tcpv6_seq_and_ts_off(const struct net *net, const __be32 *saddr,
+			    const __be32 *daddr,
+			    __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
+
+static inline u32 secure_tcpv6_seq(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
+				   __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
+{
+	union tcp_seq_and_ts_off ts;
+
+	ts = secure_tcpv6_seq_and_ts_off(&init_net, saddr, daddr,
+					 sport, dport);
+
+	return ts.seq;
+}
 #endif /* _NET_SECURE_SEQ */
include/net/tcp.h +4 -2
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
 #include <net/dst.h>
 #include <net/mptcp.h>
 #include <net/xfrm.h>
+#include <net/secure_seq.h>
 
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/memcontrol.h>
@@ -2307,8 +2308,9 @@ struct tcp_request_sock_ops {
 				       struct flowi *fl,
 				       struct request_sock *req,
 				       u32 tw_isn);
-	u32 (*init_seq)(const struct sk_buff *skb);
-	u32 (*init_ts_off)(const struct net *net, const struct sk_buff *skb);
+	union tcp_seq_and_ts_off (*init_seq_and_ts_off)(
+					const struct net *net,
+					const struct sk_buff *skb);
 	int (*send_synack)(const struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst,
 			   struct flowi *fl, struct request_sock *req,
 			   struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *foc,
net/core/secure_seq.c +29 -51

122 lines not on this page · raw message

net/ipv4/syncookies.c +8 -3
@@ -376,9 +376,14 @@ static struct request_sock *cookie_tcp_c
 	tcp_parse_options(net, skb, &tcp_opt, 0, NULL);
 
 	if (tcp_opt.saw_tstamp && tcp_opt.rcv_tsecr) {
-		tsoff = secure_tcp_ts_off(net,
-					  ip_hdr(skb)->daddr,
-					  ip_hdr(skb)->saddr);
+		union tcp_seq_and_ts_off st;
+
+		st = secure_tcp_seq_and_ts_off(net,
+					       ip_hdr(skb)->daddr,
+					       ip_hdr(skb)->saddr,
+					       tcp_hdr(skb)->dest,
+					       tcp_hdr(skb)->source);
+		tsoff = st.ts_off;
 		tcp_opt.rcv_tsecr -= tsoff;
 	}
 
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +6 -2
@@ -7209,6 +7209,7 @@ int tcp_conn_request(struct request_sock
 	struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
 	struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
 	struct sock *fastopen_sk = NULL;
+	union tcp_seq_and_ts_off st;
 	struct request_sock *req;
 	bool want_cookie = false;
 	struct dst_entry *dst;
@@ -7278,9 +7279,12 @@ int tcp_conn_request(struct request_sock
 	if (!dst)
 		goto drop_and_free;
 
+	if (tmp_opt.tstamp_ok || (!want_cookie && !isn))
+		st = af_ops->init_seq_and_ts_off(net, skb);
+
 	if (tmp_opt.tstamp_ok) {
 		tcp_rsk(req)->req_usec_ts = dst_tcp_usec_ts(dst);
-		tcp_rsk(req)->ts_off = af_ops->init_ts_off(net, skb);
+		tcp_rsk(req)->ts_off = st.ts_off;
 	}
 	if (!want_cookie && !isn) {
 		int max_syn_backlog = READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_max_syn_backlog);
@@ -7302,7 +7306,7 @@ int tcp_conn_request(struct request_sock
 			goto drop_and_release;
 		}
 
-		isn = af_ops->init_seq(skb);
+		isn = st.seq;
 	}
 
 	tcp_ecn_create_request(req, skb, sk, dst);
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +17 -20
@@ -100,17 +100,14 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct sock_bh_loc
 
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(tcp_exit_batch_mutex);
 
-static u32 tcp_v4_init_seq(const struct sk_buff *skb)
+static union tcp_seq_and_ts_off
+tcp_v4_init_seq_and_ts_off(const struct net *net, const struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	return secure_tcp_seq(ip_hdr(skb)->daddr,
-			      ip_hdr(skb)->saddr,
-			      tcp_hdr(skb)->dest,
-			      tcp_hdr(skb)->source);
-}
-
-static u32 tcp_v4_init_ts_off(const struct net *net, const struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
-	return secure_tcp_ts_off(net, ip_hdr(skb)->daddr, ip_hdr(skb)->saddr);
+	return secure_tcp_seq_and_ts_off(net,
+					 ip_hdr(skb)->daddr,
+					 ip_hdr(skb)->saddr,
+					 tcp_hdr(skb)->dest,
+					 tcp_hdr(skb)->source);
 }
 
 int tcp_twsk_unique(struct sock *sk, struct sock *sktw, void *twp)
@@ -320,15 +317,16 @@ int tcp_v4_connect(struct sock *sk, stru
 	rt = NULL;
 
 	if (likely(!tp->repair)) {
+		union tcp_seq_and_ts_off st;
+
+		st = secure_tcp_seq_and_ts_off(net,
+					       inet->inet_saddr,
+					       inet->inet_daddr,
+					       inet->inet_sport,
+					       usin->sin_port);
 		if (!tp->write_seq)
-			WRITE_ONCE(tp->write_seq,
-				   secure_tcp_seq(inet->inet_saddr,
-						  inet->inet_daddr,
-						  inet->inet_sport,
-						  usin->sin_port));
-		WRITE_ONCE(tp->tsoffset,
-			   secure_tcp_ts_off(net, inet->inet_saddr,
-					     inet->inet_daddr));
+			WRITE_ONCE(tp->write_seq, st.seq);
+		WRITE_ONCE(tp->tsoffset, st.ts_off);
 	}
 
 	atomic_set(&inet->inet_id, get_random_u16());
@@ -1712,8 +1710,7 @@ const struct tcp_request_sock_ops tcp_re
 	.cookie_init_seq =	cookie_v4_init_sequence,
 #endif
 	.route_req	=	tcp_v4_route_req,
-	.init_seq	=	tcp_v4_init_seq,
-	.init_ts_off	=	tcp_v4_init_ts_off,
+	.init_seq_and_ts_off	=	tcp_v4_init_seq_and_ts_off,
 	.send_synack	=	tcp_v4_send_synack,
 };
 
net/ipv6/syncookies.c +8 -3
@@ -150,9 +150,14 @@ static struct request_sock *cookie_tcp_c
 	tcp_parse_options(net, skb, &tcp_opt, 0, NULL);
 
 	if (tcp_opt.saw_tstamp && tcp_opt.rcv_tsecr) {
-		tsoff = secure_tcpv6_ts_off(net,
-					    ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr.s6_addr32,
-					    ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr.s6_addr32);
+		union tcp_seq_and_ts_off st;
+
+		st = secure_tcpv6_seq_and_ts_off(net,
+						 ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr.s6_addr32,
+						 ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr.s6_addr32,
+						 tcp_hdr(skb)->dest,
+						 tcp_hdr(skb)->source);
+		tsoff = st.ts_off;
 		tcp_opt.rcv_tsecr -= tsoff;
 	}
 
net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +17 -20
@@ -104,18 +104,14 @@ static void inet6_sk_rx_dst_set(struct s
 	}
 }
 
-static u32 tcp_v6_init_seq(const struct sk_buff *skb)
+static union tcp_seq_and_ts_off
+tcp_v6_init_seq_and_ts_off(const struct net *net, const struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	return secure_tcpv6_seq(ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr.s6_addr32,
-				ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr.s6_addr32,
-				tcp_hdr(skb)->dest,
-				tcp_hdr(skb)->source);
-}
-
-static u32 tcp_v6_init_ts_off(const struct net *net, const struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
-	return secure_tcpv6_ts_off(net, ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr.s6_addr32,
-				   ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr.s6_addr32);
+	return secure_tcpv6_seq_and_ts_off(net,
+					   ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr.s6_addr32,
+					   ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr.s6_addr32,
+					   tcp_hdr(skb)->dest,
+					   tcp_hdr(skb)->source);
 }
 
 static int tcp_v6_pre_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
@@ -316,14 +312,16 @@ static int tcp_v6_connect(struct sock *s
 	sk_set_txhash(sk);
 
 	if (likely(!tp->repair)) {
+		union tcp_seq_and_ts_off st;
+
+		st = secure_tcpv6_seq_and_ts_off(net,
+						 np->saddr.s6_addr32,
+						 sk->sk_v6_daddr.s6_addr32,
+						 inet->inet_sport,
+						 inet->inet_dport);
 		if (!tp->write_seq)
-			WRITE_ONCE(tp->write_seq,
-				   secure_tcpv6_seq(np->saddr.s6_addr32,
-						    sk->sk_v6_daddr.s6_addr32,
-						    inet->inet_sport,
-						    inet->inet_dport));
-		tp->tsoffset = secure_tcpv6_ts_off(net, np->saddr.s6_addr32,
-						   sk->sk_v6_daddr.s6_addr32);
+			WRITE_ONCE(tp->write_seq, st.seq);
+		tp->tsoffset = st.ts_off;
 	}
 
 	if (tcp_fastopen_defer_connect(sk, &err))
@@ -855,8 +853,7 @@ const struct tcp_request_sock_ops tcp_re
 	.cookie_init_seq =	cookie_v6_init_sequence,
 #endif
 	.route_req	=	tcp_v6_route_req,
-	.init_seq	=	tcp_v6_init_seq,
-	.init_ts_off	=	tcp_v6_init_ts_off,
+	.init_seq_and_ts_off	= tcp_v6_init_seq_and_ts_off,
 	.send_synack	=	tcp_v6_send_synack,
 };
 
author maintainer
#265 lore raw

PATCH 260/261 mptcp: pm: fix extra_subflows underflow on userspace PM subflow creation

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tao Cui <[email protected]>

commit 14e9fea30b68fc75b2b3d97396a7e6adb544bd2a upstream.

The userspace PM increments extra_subflows after __mptcp_subflow_connect() succeeds, but __mptcp_subflow_connect() calls mptcp_pm_close_subflow() on failure to roll back the pre-increment done by the kernel PM's fill_*() helpers. Because the userspace PM hasn't incremented yet at that point, this decrement is spurious and causes extra_subflows to underflow.

Fix it by aligning the userspace PM with the kernel PM: increment extra_subflows before calling __mptcp_subflow_connect(), so the existing error path in subflow.c correctly rolls it back on failure. Also simplify the error handling by taking pm.lock only when needed for cleanup.

---
 net/mptcp/pm_userspace.c |   13 ++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/mptcp/pm_userspace.c +8 -5
@@ -402,16 +402,19 @@ int mptcp_pm_nl_subflow_create_doit(stru
 	local.flags = entry.flags;
 	local.ifindex = entry.ifindex;
 
+	spin_lock_bh(&msk->pm.lock);
+	msk->pm.subflows++;
+	spin_unlock_bh(&msk->pm.lock);
+
 	lock_sock(sk);
 	err = __mptcp_subflow_connect(sk, &local, &addr_r);
 	release_sock(sk);
 
-	spin_lock_bh(&msk->pm.lock);
-	if (err)
+	if (err) {
+		spin_lock_bh(&msk->pm.lock);
 		mptcp_userspace_pm_delete_local_addr(msk, &entry);
-	else
-		msk->pm.subflows++;
-	spin_unlock_bh(&msk->pm.lock);
+		spin_unlock_bh(&msk->pm.lock);
+	}
 
  create_err:
 	sock_put(sk);
author maintainer
#266 lore raw

PATCH 261/261 Revert "selftest/ptp: update ptp selftest to exercise the gettimex options"

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Petr Machata <[email protected]>

This reverts commit fa361565a7275cc43c6ca1abec9ec4fcc9ec51f1, which is commit 3d07b691ee707c00afaf365440975e81bb96cd9b upstream.

The cited commit allows testptp to set a configurable clock_id. That is done via a PTP_SYS_OFFSET_EXTENDED ioctl call, whose argument is struct ptp_sys_offset_extended, where the clock_id is set. However, this Linux version does not support the ptp_sys_offset_extended.clockid field, and the test case cannot be built against this tree's own UAPI headers.

The reverted commit was introduced to resolve a missing dependency of commit c6dc458227a3 ("testptp: Add option to open PHC in readonly mode"), which is 76868642e427 upstream. My suspicion is that the only conflict between the two is the getopt string, and there is otherwise no direct dependency between the two.

This patch therefore reverts the cited commit, with hand-resolving the getopt string to include 'r' (as introduced by c6dc458227a3), but not 'y' (introduced by 06954f715deb).

---
 tools/testing/selftests/ptp/testptp.c |   62 ++--------------------------------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/ptp/testptp.c +5 -57
@@ -147,7 +147,6 @@ static void usage(char *progname)
 		" -T val     set the ptp clock time to 'val' seconds\n"
 		" -x val     get an extended ptp clock time with the desired number of samples (up to %d)\n"
 		" -X         get a ptp clock cross timestamp\n"
-		" -y val     pre/post tstamp timebase to use {realtime|monotonic|monotonic-raw}\n"
 		" -z         test combinations of rising/falling external time stamp flags\n",
 		progname, PTP_MAX_SAMPLES);
 }
@@ -192,7 +191,6 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 	int readonly = 0;
 	int settime = 0;
 	int channel = -1;
-	clockid_t ext_clockid = CLOCK_REALTIME;
 
 	int64_t t1, t2, tp;
 	int64_t interval, offset;
@@ -202,7 +200,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 
 	progname = strrchr(argv[0], '/');
 	progname = progname ? 1+progname : argv[0];
-	while (EOF != (c = getopt(argc, argv, "cd:e:f:F:ghH:i:k:lL:n:o:p:P:rsSt:T:w:x:Xy:z"))) {
+	while (EOF != (c = getopt(argc, argv, "cd:e:f:F:ghH:i:k:lL:n:o:p:P:rsSt:T:w:x:Xz"))) {
 		switch (c) {
 		case 'c':
 			capabilities = 1;
@@ -285,21 +283,6 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 		case 'X':
 			getcross = 1;
 			break;
-		case 'y':
-			if (!strcasecmp(optarg, "realtime"))
-				ext_clockid = CLOCK_REALTIME;
-			else if (!strcasecmp(optarg, "monotonic"))
-				ext_clockid = CLOCK_MONOTONIC;
-			else if (!strcasecmp(optarg, "monotonic-raw"))
-				ext_clockid = CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW;
-			else {
-				fprintf(stderr,
-					"type needs to be realtime, monotonic or monotonic-raw; was given %s\n",
-					optarg);
-				return -1;
-			}
-			break;
-
 		case 'z':
 			flagtest = 1;
 			break;
@@ -592,7 +575,6 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 		}
 
 		soe->n_samples = getextended;
-		soe->clockid = ext_clockid;
 
 		if (ioctl(fd, PTP_SYS_OFFSET_EXTENDED, soe)) {
 			perror("PTP_SYS_OFFSET_EXTENDED");
@@ -601,46 +583,12 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 			       getextended);
 
 			for (i = 0; i < getextended; i++) {
-				switch (ext_clockid) {
-				case CLOCK_REALTIME:
-					printf("sample #%2d: real time before: %lld.%09u\n",
-					       i, soe->ts[i][0].sec,
-					       soe->ts[i][0].nsec);
-					break;
-				case CLOCK_MONOTONIC:
-					printf("sample #%2d: monotonic time before: %lld.%09u\n",
-					       i, soe->ts[i][0].sec,
-					       soe->ts[i][0].nsec);
-					break;
-				case CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW:
-					printf("sample #%2d: monotonic-raw time before: %lld.%09u\n",
-					       i, soe->ts[i][0].sec,
-					       soe->ts[i][0].nsec);
-					break;
-				default:
-					break;
-				}
+				printf("sample #%2d: system time before: %lld.%09u\n",
+				       i, soe->ts[i][0].sec, soe->ts[i][0].nsec);
 				printf("            phc time: %lld.%09u\n",
 				       soe->ts[i][1].sec, soe->ts[i][1].nsec);
-				switch (ext_clockid) {
-				case CLOCK_REALTIME:
-					printf("            real time after: %lld.%09u\n",
-					       soe->ts[i][2].sec,
-					       soe->ts[i][2].nsec);
-					break;
-				case CLOCK_MONOTONIC:
-					printf("            monotonic time after: %lld.%09u\n",
-					       soe->ts[i][2].sec,
-					       soe->ts[i][2].nsec);
-					break;
-				case CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW:
-					printf("            monotonic-raw time after: %lld.%09u\n",
-					       soe->ts[i][2].sec,
-					       soe->ts[i][2].nsec);
-					break;
-				default:
-					break;
-				}
+				printf("            system time after: %lld.%09u\n",
+				       soe->ts[i][2].sec, soe->ts[i][2].nsec);
 			}
 		}
 
Tested-by on the v1 series
#268 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 7 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.12.94 release. There are 261 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Thu, 18 Jun 2026 14:49:57 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

test_progs, test_progs-no_alu32, test_progs-cpuv4, test_maps, test_verifier in BPF selftests all passes[1] on x86_64.

1: https://github.com/shunghsiyu/libbpf/actions/runs/27647340765/job/81762433321

[...]

Tested-by on the v1 series
#269 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote on Tue, Jun 16, 2026 at 08:27:18PM +0530:

Quoted 5 lines

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.12.94 release. There are 261 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Quoted 8 lines

Responses should be made by Thu, 18 Jun 2026 14:49:57 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.12.94-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.12.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

Tested 32a7ec09e340 ("Linux 6.12.94-rc1") on:
- arm i.MX6ULL (Armadillo 640)
- arm64 i.MX8ULP (Armadillo IoT A9E)

No obvious regression in dmesg or basic tests:

Signature · 1 line
Dominique Martinet
Tested-by on the v1 series
#270 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 8 lines · On Tue, 16 Jun 2026 20:27:18 +0530 Greg Kroah-Hartman…

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.12.94 release. There are 261 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Thu, 18 Jun 2026 14:49:57 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

Boot-tested under QEMU for Rust x86_64, arm64 and riscv64; built-tested for loongarch64:

Thanks!

Cheers,
Miguel

Tested-by on the v1 series
#273 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

Am 16.06.2026 um 16:57 schrieb Greg Kroah-Hartman:

Quoted 4 lines

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.12.94 release. There are 261 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Builds, boots and works on my 2-socket Ivy Bridge Xeon E5-2697 v2 server. No dmesg oddities or regressions found.

Beste Grüße,
Peter Schneider

Signature · 8 lines
Climb the mountain not to plant your flag, but to embrace the challenge,
enjoy the air and behold the view. Climb it so you can see the world,
not so the world can see you.                    -- David McCullough Jr.

OpenPGP:  0xA3828BD796CCE11A8CADE8866E3A92C92C3FF244
Download: https://www.peters-netzplatz.de/download/pschneider1968_pub.asc
https://keys.mailvelope.com/pks/lookup?op=get&[email protected]
https://keys.mailvelope.com/pks/lookup?op=get&[email protected]
Tested-by on the v1 series
#274 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.12.94 release. There are 261 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Thu, 18 Jun 2026 14:49:57 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 9 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.12.94-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.12.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

thanks,
-- Shuah

Tested-by on the v1 series
#275 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.12.94 release. There are 261 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Thu, 18 Jun 2026 14:49:57 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.12.94-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.12.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Built and booted successfully on RISC-V RV64 (HiFive Unmatched).

Tested-by on the v1 series
#276 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

Hi!

Quoted 4 lines

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.12.94 release. There are 261 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

CIP testing did not find any problems here:

https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-testing/linux-stable-rc-ci/-/tree/linux-6.12.y

Best regards,
Pavel

Tested-by on the v1 series
#277 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

Hi Greg,

Quoted 7 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.12.94 release. There are 261 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Thu, 18 Jun 2026 14:49:57 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

No problems seen on x86_64 and aarch64 with our testing.

Have a few AI spotted problems will respond to corresponding threads now.

Thanks,
Harshit

Tested-by on the v1 series
#278 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.12.94 release. There are 261 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Thu, 18 Jun 2026 14:49:57 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.12.94-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.12.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

On ARCH_BRCMSTB using 32-bit and 64-bit ARM kernels, build tested on BMIPS_GENEIRC:

--
Florian