5.15.210-rc1 review
Subsystems (5)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 133/411 serial: zs: Fix bootconsole handover lockup
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maciej W. Rozycki <[email protected]>
commit 6c05cf72e13314ce9b770b5951695dc5a2152920 upstream.
Calling zs_reset() in the course of setting up the serial device causes line parameters to be reset and the transmitter disabled. We've been lucky in that no message is usually produced to the kernel log between this call and the later call to uart_set_options() in the course of console setup done by zs_serial_console_init(), or the system would hang as the console output handler in the firmware tried to access a port the transmitter of which has been disabled and line parameters messed up.
This will change with the next change to the driver, so fix zs_reset() such that line parameters are set for 9600n8 console operation as with the system firmware and the transmitter re-enabled after reset. This also means zs_pm() serves no purpose anymore, so drop it.
--- drivers/tty/serial/zs.c | 29 ++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
drivers/tty/serial/zs.c +8 -21
@@ -105,18 +105,24 @@ struct zs_parms {static struct zs_scc zs_sccs[ZS_NUM_SCCS ]; +/* +* Set parameters in WR5, WR12, WR13 such as not to interfere +* with the initial PROM-based console. Otherwise any output +* produced before the console handover would cause the system +* firmware to hang (TxENAB) or produce rubbish (Tx8, B9600). +*/ static u8 zs_init_regs[ZS_NUM_REGS ]__initdata = {0 ,/* write 0 */ PAR_SPEC ,/* write 1 */ 0 ,/* write 2 */ 0 ,/* write 3 */ X16CLK |SB1 ,/* write 4 */ -0 ,/* write 5 */ + Tx8 | TxENAB,/* write 5 */ 0 ,0 ,0 ,/* write 6, 7, 8 */ MIE |DLC |NV ,/* write 9 */ NRZ ,/* write 10 */ TCBR |RCBR ,/* write 11 */ -0 ,0 ,/* BRG time constant, write 12 + 13 */ +0x16 ,0x00 ,/* BRG time constant, write 12 + 13 */ BRSRC |BRENABL ,/* write 14 */ 0 ,/* write 15 */ };
@@ -955,23 +961,6 @@ static void zs_set_termios(struct uart_pspin_unlock_irqrestore (&scc->zlock, flags); } -/* -* Hack alert! -* Required solely so that the initial PROM-based console -* works undisturbed in parallel with this one. -*/ -static void zs_pm (struct uart_port *uport,unsigned int state, -unsigned int oldstate) -{ -struct zs_port *zport =to_zport (uport); - -if (state <3 ) - zport->regs[5 ] |= TxENAB; -else - zport->regs[5 ] &= ~TxENAB; -write_zsreg (zport,R5 , zport->regs[5 ]); -} -static const char *zs_type (struct uart_port *uport) {
@@ -1054,7 +1043,6 @@ static const struct uart_ops zs_ops = { .startup = zs_startup, .shutdown = zs_shutdown, .set_termios = zs_set_termios, - .pm = zs_pm, .type = zs_type, .release_port = zs_release_port, .request_port = zs_request_port,
@@ -1209,7 +1197,6 @@ static int __init zs_console_setup(strucreturn ret;zs_reset (zport); -zs_pm (uport,0 ,-1 );if (options)uart_parse_options (options, &baud, &parity, &bits, &flow);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 134/411 serial: zs: Switch to using channel reset
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maciej W. Rozycki <[email protected]>
commit 8572955630f30948837088aa98bcbe0532d1ceac upstream.
Switch the driver to using the channel reset rather than hardware reset, simplifying handling by removing an interference between channels that causes the other channel to become uninitialised afterwards.
There is little difference between the two kinds of reset in terms of register settings that result, and we initialise the whole register set right away anyway. However this prevents a hang from happening should the console output handler in the firmware try to access the other port whose transmitter has been disabled and line parameters messed up.
For example this will happen if the keyboard port (port A) is chosen for the system console, unusually but not insanely for a headless system, as the port is wired to a standard DA-15 connector and an adapter can be easily made. Or with the next change in place this would happen for the regular console port (port B), since the keyboard port (port A) will be initialised first.
Just remove the unnecessary complication then, a channel reset is good enough. We still need the initialisation marker, now per channel rather than per SCC, as for the console port zs_reset() will be called twice:
once early on via zs_serial_console_init() for the console setup only, and then again via zs_config_port() as the port is associated with a TTY device.
--- drivers/tty/serial/zs.c | 7 ++++--- drivers/tty/serial/zs.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/tty/serial/zs.c +4 -3
@@ -831,21 +831,22 @@ static void zs_shutdown(struct uart_portstatic void zs_reset (struct zs_port *zport) { +struct zs_port *zport_a = &zport->scc->zport[ZS_CHAN_A ];struct zs_scc *scc = zport->scc;int irq;unsigned long flags;spin_lock_irqsave (&scc->zlock, flags); irq = !irqs_disabled_flags (flags); -if (!scc->initialised) { +if (!zport->initialised) {/* Reset the pointer first, just in case... */ read_zsreg (zport,R0 );/* And let the current transmission finish. */ zs_line_drain (zport, irq); -write_zsreg (zport,R9 ,FHWRES ); +write_zsreg (zport,R9 , zport == zport_a ?CHRA :CHRB );udelay (10 );write_zsreg (zport,R9 ,0 ); - scc->initialised =1 ; + zport->initialised =1 ; }load_zsregs (zport, zport->regs, irq);spin_unlock_irqrestore (&scc->zlock, flags);
drivers/tty/serial/zs.h +1 -1
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@struct zs_port {struct zs_scc *scc;/* Containing SCC. */ struct uart_port port;/* Underlying UART. */ +int initialised;/* For the console port. */ int clk_mode;/* May be 1, 16, 32, or 64. */
@@ -41,7 +42,6 @@ struct zs_scc {struct zs_port zport[2 ];spinlock_t zlock; atomic_t irq_guard; - int initialised; };#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 135/411 USB: serial: cypress_m8: fix memory corruption with small endpoint
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
commit e1a9d791fd66ab2431b9e6f6f835823809869047 upstream.
Make sure that the interrupt-out endpoint max packet size is at least eight bytes to avoid user-controlled slab corruption or NULL-pointer dereference should a malicious device report a smaller size.
--- drivers/usb/serial/cypress_m8.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/serial/cypress_m8.c +8 -0
@@ -447,6 +447,14 @@ static int cypress_generic_port_probe(struct usb_serial_port *port)return -ENODEV ; } +/* +* The buffer must be large enough for the one or two-byte header (and +* following data), but assume anything smaller than eight bytes is +* broken. +*/ +if (port->interrupt_out_size <8 ) +return -EINVAL ; + priv =kzalloc (sizeof (struct cypress_private ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!priv)return -ENOMEM ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 136/411 HID: core: Add printk_ratelimited variants to hid_warn() etc
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vicki Pfau <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1d64624243af8329b4b219d8c39e28ea448f9929 ]
hid_warn_ratelimited() is needed. Add the others as part of the block.
--- include/linux/hid.h | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
include/linux/hid.h +11 -0
@@ -1248,4 +1248,15 @@ do { \#define hid_dbg_once (hid, fmt, ...) \ dev_dbg_once(&(hid)->dev, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__) +#define hid_err_ratelimited (hid, fmt, ...) \ + dev_err_ratelimited(&(hid)->dev, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__) +#define hid_notice_ratelimited (hid, fmt, ...) \ + dev_notice_ratelimited(&(hid)->dev, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__) +#define hid_warn_ratelimited (hid, fmt, ...) \ + dev_warn_ratelimited(&(hid)->dev, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__) +#define hid_info_ratelimited (hid, fmt, ...) \ + dev_info_ratelimited(&(hid)->dev, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__) +#define hid_dbg_ratelimited (hid, fmt, ...) \ + dev_dbg_ratelimited(&(hid)->dev, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__) +#endif
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 137/411 HID: pass the buffer size to hid_report_raw_event
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2c85c61d1332e1e16f020d76951baf167dcb6f7a ]
commit 0a3fe972a7cb ("HID: core: Mitigate potential OOB by removing bogus memset()") enforced the provided data to be at least the size of the declared buffer in the report descriptor to prevent a buffer overflow. However, we can try to be smarter by providing both the buffer size and the data size, meaning that hid_report_raw_event() can make better decision whether we should plaining reject the buffer (buffer overflow attempt) or if we can safely memset it to 0 and pass it to the rest of the stack.
Stable-dep-of: 206342541fc8 ("HID: core: introduce hid_safe_input_report()")
--- drivers/hid/hid-core.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++------- drivers/hid/hid-gfrm.c | 4 ++-- drivers/hid/hid-logitech-hidpp.c | 2 +- drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c | 2 +- drivers/hid/hid-primax.c | 2 +- drivers/hid/hid-vivaldi.c | 2 +- drivers/hid/wacom_sys.c | 6 +++--- drivers/staging/greybus/hid.c | 2 +- include/linux/hid.h | 4 ++-- 9 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
drivers/hid/hid-core.c +22 -7
@@ -1775,8 +1775,8 @@ int __hid_request(struct hid_device *hid, struct hid_report *report, }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (__hid_request); -int hid_report_raw_event (struct hid_device *hid,int type,u8 *data,u32 size, -int interrupt) +int hid_report_raw_event (struct hid_device *hid,int type,u8 *data, +size_t bufsize,u32 size,int interrupt) {struct hid_report_enum *report_enum = hid->report_enum + type;struct hid_report *report;
@@ -1784,16 +1784,24 @@ int hid_report_raw_event(struct hid_device *hid, int type, u8 *data, u32 size,int max_buffer_size =HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE ;unsigned int a;u32 rsize, csize = size; +size_t bsize = bufsize;u8 *cdata = data;int ret =0 ; report =hid_get_report (report_enum, data);if (!report) - goto out; +return 0 ; + +if (unlikely (bsize < csize)) { +hid_warn_ratelimited (hid,"Event data for report %d is incorrect (%d vs %ld)\n" , + report->id, csize, bsize); +return -EINVAL ; + }if (report_enum->numbered) { cdata++; csize--; + bsize--; } rsize =hid_compute_report_size (report);
@@ -1806,9 +1814,15 @@ int hid_report_raw_event(struct hid_device *hid, int type, u8 *data, u32 size,else if (rsize > max_buffer_size) rsize = max_buffer_size; +if (bsize < rsize) { +hid_warn_ratelimited (hid,"Event data for report %d was too short (%d vs %ld)\n" , + report->id, rsize, bsize); +return -EINVAL ; + } +if (csize < rsize) {dbg_hid ("report %d is too short, (%d < %d)\n" , report->id, - csize, rsize); + csize, rsize);memset (cdata + csize,0 , rsize - csize); }
@@ -1817,7 +1831,7 @@ int hid_report_raw_event(struct hid_device *hid, int type, u8 *data, u32 size,if (hid->claimed &HID_CLAIMED_HIDRAW ) { ret =hidraw_report_event (hid, data, size);if (ret) - goto out; +return ret; }if (hid->claimed !=HID_CLAIMED_HIDRAW && report->maxfield) {
@@ -1830,7 +1844,7 @@ int hid_report_raw_event(struct hid_device *hid, int type, u8 *data, u32 size,if (hid->claimed &HID_CLAIMED_INPUT )hidinput_report_event (hid, report); -out: +return ret; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (hid_report_raw_event);
@@ -1851,6 +1865,7 @@ int hid_input_report(struct hid_device *hid, int type, u8 *data, u32 size, int istruct hid_report_enum *report_enum;struct hid_driver *hdrv;struct hid_report *report; +size_t bufsize = size;int ret =0 ;if (!hid)
@@ -1889,7 +1904,7 @@ int hid_input_report(struct hid_device *hid, int type, u8 *data, u32 size, int i goto unlock; } - ret =hid_report_raw_event (hid, type, data, size, interrupt); + ret =hid_report_raw_event (hid, type, data, bufsize, size, interrupt); unlock:up (&hid->driver_input_lock);
drivers/hid/hid-gfrm.c +2 -2
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static int gfrm_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev, struct hid_report *report,switch (data[1 ]) {case GFRM100_SEARCH_KEY_DOWN : ret =hid_report_raw_event (hdev,HID_INPUT_REPORT , search_key_dn, -sizeof (search_key_dn),1 ); +sizeof (search_key_dn),sizeof (search_key_dn),1 );break ;case GFRM100_SEARCH_KEY_AUDIO_DATA :
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static int gfrm_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev, struct hid_report *report,case GFRM100_SEARCH_KEY_UP : ret =hid_report_raw_event (hdev,HID_INPUT_REPORT , search_key_up, -sizeof (search_key_up),1 ); +sizeof (search_key_up),sizeof (search_key_up),1 );break ;default :
drivers/hid/hid-logitech-hidpp.c +1 -1
@@ -3440,7 +3440,7 @@ static int hidpp10_consumer_keys_raw_event(struct hidpp_device *hidpp,memcpy (&consumer_report[1 ], &data[3 ],4 );/* We are called from atomic context */ hid_report_raw_event (hidpp->hid_dev,HID_INPUT_REPORT , - consumer_report,5 ,1 ); + consumer_report,sizeof (consumer_report),5 ,1 );return 1 ; }
drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c +1 -1
@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ static void mt_get_feature(struct hid_device *hdev, struct hid_report *report) } ret =hid_report_raw_event (hdev,HID_FEATURE_REPORT , buf, - size,0 ); + size, size,0 );if (ret)dev_warn (&hdev->dev,"failed to report feature\n" ); }
drivers/hid/hid-primax.c +1 -1
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static int px_raw_event(struct hid_device *hid, struct hid_report *report, data[0 ] |= (1 << (data[idx] -0xE0 )); data[idx] =0 ; } -hid_report_raw_event (hid,HID_INPUT_REPORT , data, size,0 ); +hid_report_raw_event (hid,HID_INPUT_REPORT , data, size, size,0 );return 1 ;default :/* unknown report */
drivers/hid/hid-vivaldi.c +1 -1
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ static void vivaldi_feature_mapping(struct hid_device *hdev, } ret =hid_report_raw_event (hdev,HID_FEATURE_REPORT , report_data, - report_len,0 ); + report_len, report_len,0 );if (ret) {dev_warn (&hdev->dev,"failed to report feature %d\n" , field->report->id);
drivers/hid/wacom_sys.c +3 -3
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static void wacom_wac_queue_flush(struct hid_device *hdev,int err; size =kfifo_out (fifo, buf,sizeof (buf)); - err =hid_report_raw_event (hdev,HID_INPUT_REPORT , buf, size, false); + err =hid_report_raw_event (hdev,HID_INPUT_REPORT , buf, size, size, false);if (err) {hid_warn (hdev,"%s: unable to flush event due to error %d\n" , __func__, err);
@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ static void wacom_feature_mapping(struct hid_device *hdev, data, n, WAC_CMD_RETRIES);if (ret == n && features->type ==HID_GENERIC ) { ret =hid_report_raw_event (hdev, -HID_FEATURE_REPORT , data, n,0 ); +HID_FEATURE_REPORT , data, n, n,0 ); }else if (ret ==2 && features->type !=HID_GENERIC ) { features->touch_max = data[1 ]; }else {
@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ static void wacom_feature_mapping(struct hid_device *hdev, data, n, WAC_CMD_RETRIES);if (ret == n) { ret =hid_report_raw_event (hdev,HID_FEATURE_REPORT , - data, n,0 ); + data, n, n,0 ); }else {hid_warn (hdev,"%s: could not retrieve sensor offsets\n" , __func__);
drivers/staging/greybus/hid.c +1 -1
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ static void gb_hid_init_report(struct gb_hid *ghid, struct hid_report *report)* we just need to setup the input fields, so using * hid_report_raw_event is safe. */ -hid_report_raw_event (ghid->hid, report->type, ghid->inbuf, size,1 ); +hid_report_raw_event (ghid->hid, report->type, ghid->inbuf, ghid->bufsize, size,1 ); }static void gb_hid_init_reports (struct gb_hid *ghid)
include/linux/hid.h +2 -2
@@ -1206,8 +1206,8 @@ static inline u32 hid_report_len(struct hid_report *report)return DIV_ROUND_UP (report->size,8 ) + (report->id >0 ); } -int hid_report_raw_event (struct hid_device *hid,int type,u8 *data,u32 size, -int interrupt); +int hid_report_raw_event (struct hid_device *hid,int type,u8 *data, +size_t bufsize,u32 size,int interrupt);/* HID quirks API */ unsigned long hid_lookup_quirk (const struct hid_device *hdev);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 138/411 HID: core: Fix size_t specifier in hid_report_raw_event()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4d3a2a466b8d68d852a1f3bbf11204b718428dc4 ]
When building for 32-bit platforms, for which 'size_t' is 'unsigned int', there are warnings around using the incorrect format specifier to print bsize in hid_report_raw_event():
drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2054:29: error: format specifies type 'long' but the argument has type 'size_t' (aka 'unsigned int') [-Werror,-Wformat]
2053 | hid_warn_ratelimited(hid, "Event data for report %d is incorrect (%d vs %ld)\n",
| ~~~
| %zu
2054 | report->id, csize, bsize);
| ^~~~~
drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2076:29: error: format specifies type 'long' but the argument has type 'size_t' (aka 'unsigned int') [-Werror,-Wformat]
2075 | hid_warn_ratelimited(hid, "Event data for report %d was too short (%d vs %ld)\n",
| ~~~
| %zu
2076 | report->id, rsize, bsize);
| ^~~~~Use the proper 'size_t' format specifier, '%zu', to clear up the warnings.
--- drivers/hid/hid-core.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/hid/hid-core.c +2 -2
@@ -1793,7 +1793,7 @@ int hid_report_raw_event(struct hid_device *hid, int type, u8 *data,return 0 ;if (unlikely (bsize < csize)) { -hid_warn_ratelimited (hid,"Event data for report %d is incorrect (%d vs %ld)\n" , +hid_warn_ratelimited (hid,"Event data for report %d is incorrect (%d vs %zu)\n" , report->id, csize, bsize);return -EINVAL ; }
@@ -1815,7 +1815,7 @@ int hid_report_raw_event(struct hid_device *hid, int type, u8 *data, rsize = max_buffer_size;if (bsize < rsize) { -hid_warn_ratelimited (hid,"Event data for report %d was too short (%d vs %ld)\n" , +hid_warn_ratelimited (hid,"Event data for report %d was too short (%d vs %zu)\n" , report->id, rsize, bsize);return -EINVAL ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 139/411 USB: serial: digi_acceleport: fix memory corruption with small endpoints
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
commit cb3560e8eab1dfa1cac1ed52631adf8ec6ff2cd5 upstream.
Add the missing bulk-out buffer size sanity checks to avoid out-of-bounds memory accesses or slab corruption should a malicious device report smaller buffers than expected.
--- drivers/usb/serial/digi_acceleport.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/serial/digi_acceleport.c +21 -2
@@ -1228,15 +1228,34 @@ static int digi_port_init(struct usb_serial_port *port, unsigned port_num)static int digi_startup (struct usb_serial *serial) {struct digi_serial *serial_priv; +int oob_port_num;int ret; +int i; + +/* +* The port bulk-out buffers must be large enough for header and +* buffered data. +*/ +for (i =0 ; i < serial->type->num_ports; i++) { +if (serial->port[i]->bulk_out_size <DIGI_OUT_BUF_SIZE +2 ) +return -EINVAL ; + } + +/* +* The OOB port bulk-out buffer must be large enough for the two +* commands in digi_set_modem_signals(). +*/ + oob_port_num = serial->type->num_ports; +if (serial->port[oob_port_num]->bulk_out_size <8 ) +return -EINVAL ; serial_priv =kzalloc (sizeof (*serial_priv),GFP_KERNEL );if (!serial_priv)return -ENOMEM ;spin_lock_init (&serial_priv->ds_serial_lock); - serial_priv->ds_oob_port_num = serial->type->num_ports; - serial_priv->ds_oob_port = serial->port[serial_priv->ds_oob_port_num]; + serial_priv->ds_oob_port_num = oob_port_num; + serial_priv->ds_oob_port = serial->port[oob_port_num]; ret =digi_port_init (serial_priv->ds_oob_port, serial_priv->ds_oob_port_num);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 140/411 xhci: tegra: Fix ghost USB device on dual-role port unplug
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wei-Cheng Chen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5a4c828b8b29b47534814ade26d9aee09d5101fc ]
When a USB device is unplugged from the dual-role port, the device-mode path in tegra_xhci_id_work() explicitly clears both SS and HS port power via direct hub_control ClearPortFeature(POWER) calls. This preempts the xHCI controller's normal disconnect processing -- PORT_CSC is never generated, the USB core never sees the disconnect, and the device remains in its internal tree as a ghost visible in lsusb.
Add an otg_set_port_power flag to control whether the dual-role switch path performs explicit port power management. SoCs that need it (Tegra124 / Tegra210 / Tegra186) set the flag; later SoCs (Tegra194 and beyond) rely on the PHY mode change to handle disconnect naturally and skip all port power calls.
Within the port power path, otg_reset_sspi additionally gates the SSPI reset sequence on host-mode entry for SoCs that require it.
Flags set per SoC:
Tegra124, Tegra186 -> otg_set_port_power Tegra210 -> otg_set_port_power, otg_reset_sspi Tegra194 and later -> (none)
[ Backport to 5.15.y: keep the host-mode snapshot in the existing
tegra->lock section, retain pm_runtime_mark_last_busy() in the host port-power path, and omit the newer Tegra234 entry. ]
--- drivers/usb/host/xhci-tegra.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/host/xhci-tegra.c +44 -34
@@ -210,6 +210,7 @@ struct tegra_xusb_soc {bool has_ipfs;bool lpm_support;bool otg_reset_sspi; +bool otg_set_port_power; };struct tegra_xusb_context {
@@ -1211,14 +1212,17 @@ static void tegra_xhci_id_work(struct work_struct *work)struct tegra_xusb_mbox_msg msg;struct phy *phy =tegra_xusb_get_phy (tegra,"usb2" , tegra->otg_usb2_port); +bool host_mode;u32 status;int ret; -dev_dbg (tegra->dev,"host mode %s\n" , tegra->host_mode ?"on" :"off" ); -mutex_lock (&tegra->lock); -if (tegra->host_mode) + host_mode = tegra->host_mode; + +dev_dbg (tegra->dev,"host mode %s\n" , host_mode ?"on" :"off" ); + +if (host_mode)phy_set_mode_ext (phy,PHY_MODE_USB_OTG ,USB_ROLE_HOST );else phy_set_mode_ext (phy,PHY_MODE_USB_OTG ,USB_ROLE_NONE );
@@ -1229,42 +1233,44 @@ static void tegra_xhci_id_work(struct work_struct *work) tegra->otg_usb2_port);pm_runtime_get_sync (tegra->dev); -if (tegra->host_mode) { -/* switch to host mode */ -if (tegra->otg_usb3_port >=0 ) { -if (tegra->soc->otg_reset_sspi) { -/* set PP=0 */ - tegra_xhci_hc_driver.hub_control ( - xhci->shared_hcd, GetPortStatus, -0 , tegra->otg_usb3_port+1 , - (char *) &status,sizeof (status)); -if (status &USB_SS_PORT_STAT_POWER ) -tegra_xhci_set_port_power (tegra, false, - false); - -/* reset OTG port SSPI */ - msg.cmd =MBOX_CMD_RESET_SSPI ; - msg.data = tegra->otg_usb3_port+1 ; - - ret =tegra_xusb_mbox_send (tegra, &msg); -if (ret <0 ) { -dev_info (tegra->dev, -"failed to RESET_SSPI %d\n" , - ret); +if (tegra->soc->otg_set_port_power) { +if (host_mode) { +/* switch to host mode */ +if (tegra->otg_usb3_port >=0 ) { +if (tegra->soc->otg_reset_sspi) { +/* set PP=0 */ + tegra_xhci_hc_driver.hub_control ( + xhci->shared_hcd, GetPortStatus, +0 , tegra->otg_usb3_port+1 , + (char *) &status,sizeof (status)); +if (status &USB_SS_PORT_STAT_POWER ) +tegra_xhci_set_port_power (tegra, false, + false); + +/* reset OTG port SSPI */ + msg.cmd =MBOX_CMD_RESET_SSPI ; + msg.data = tegra->otg_usb3_port+1 ; + + ret =tegra_xusb_mbox_send (tegra, &msg); +if (ret <0 ) { +dev_info (tegra->dev, +"failed to RESET_SSPI %d\n" , + ret); + } } - } -tegra_xhci_set_port_power (tegra, false, true); - } +tegra_xhci_set_port_power (tegra, false, true); + } -tegra_xhci_set_port_power (tegra, true, true); -pm_runtime_mark_last_busy (tegra->dev); +tegra_xhci_set_port_power (tegra, true, true); +pm_runtime_mark_last_busy (tegra->dev); - }else { -if (tegra->otg_usb3_port >=0 ) -tegra_xhci_set_port_power (tegra, false, false); + }else { +if (tegra->otg_usb3_port >=0 ) +tegra_xhci_set_port_power (tegra, false, false); -tegra_xhci_set_port_power (tegra, true, false); +tegra_xhci_set_port_power (tegra, true, false); + } }pm_runtime_put_autosuspend (tegra->dev); }
@@ -2289,6 +2295,7 @@ static const struct tegra_xusb_soc tegra124_soc = { .scale_ss_clock = true, .has_ipfs = true, .otg_reset_sspi = false, + .otg_set_port_power = true, .mbox = { .cmd = 0xe4, .data_in = 0xe8,
@@ -2325,6 +2332,7 @@ static const struct tegra_xusb_soc tegra210_soc = { .scale_ss_clock = false, .has_ipfs = true, .otg_reset_sspi = true, + .otg_set_port_power = true, .mbox = { .cmd = 0xe4, .data_in = 0xe8,
@@ -2366,6 +2374,7 @@ static const struct tegra_xusb_soc tegra186_soc = { .scale_ss_clock = false, .has_ipfs = false, .otg_reset_sspi = false, + .otg_set_port_power = true, .mbox = { .cmd = 0xe4, .data_in = 0xe8,
@@ -2397,6 +2406,7 @@ static const struct tegra_xusb_soc tegra194_soc = { .scale_ss_clock = false, .has_ipfs = false, .otg_reset_sspi = false, + .otg_set_port_power = false, .mbox = { .cmd = 0x68, .data_in = 0x6c,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 141/411 serial: dz: Fix bootconsole handover lockup
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maciej W. Rozycki <[email protected]>
commit 7f127b2208e5e2b817243cad41fe4211a6d5a7a3 upstream.
Calling dz_reset() in the course of setting up the serial device causes line parameters to be reset and the transmitter disabled. We've been lucky in that no message is usually produced to the kernel log between this call and the later call to uart_set_options() in the course of console setup done by dz_serial_console_init(), or the system would hang as the console output handler in the firmware tried to access a port the transmitter of which has been disabled and line parameters messed up.
This will change with the next change to the driver, so fix dz_reset() such that line parameters are set for 9600n8 console operation as with the system firmware and the transmitter re-enabled after reset. This also means dz_pm() serves no purpose anymore, so drop it.
--- drivers/tty/serial/dz.c | 37 +++++++++++++------------------------ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
drivers/tty/serial/dz.c +13 -24
@@ -546,6 +546,7 @@ static void dz_reset(struct dz_port *dport)struct dz_mux *mux = dport->mux;unsigned short tcr;int loops =10000 ; +int line;if (mux->initialised)return ;
@@ -573,6 +574,18 @@ static void dz_reset(struct dz_port *dport)while (dz_in (dport,DZ_CSR ) &DZ_CLR );iob (); +/* +* Set parameters across all lines such as not to interfere +* with the initial PROM-based console. Otherwise any output +* produced before the console handover would cause the system +* firmware to produce rubbish. +*/ +for (line =0 ; line <DZ_NB_PORT ; line++) +dz_out (dport,DZ_LPR ,DZ_B9600 |DZ_CS8 | line); + +/* Re-enable transmission for the initial PROM-based console. */ +dz_out (dport,DZ_TCR , tcr); +/* Enable scanning. */ dz_out (dport,DZ_CSR ,DZ_MSE );
@@ -653,26 +666,6 @@ static void dz_set_termios(struct uart_port *uport, struct ktermios *termios,spin_unlock_irqrestore (&dport->port.lock, flags); } -/* -* Hack alert! -* Required solely so that the initial PROM-based console -* works undisturbed in parallel with this one. -*/ -static void dz_pm (struct uart_port *uport,unsigned int state, -unsigned int oldstate) -{ -struct dz_port *dport =to_dport (uport); -unsigned long flags; - -spin_lock_irqsave (&dport->port.lock, flags); -if (state <3 ) -dz_start_tx (&dport->port); -else -dz_stop_tx (&dport->port); -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&dport->port.lock, flags); -} - -static const char *dz_type (struct uart_port *uport) {return "DZ" ;
@@ -768,7 +761,6 @@ static const struct uart_ops dz_ops = { .startup = dz_startup, .shutdown = dz_shutdown, .set_termios = dz_set_termios, - .pm = dz_pm, .type = dz_type, .release_port = dz_release_port, .request_port = dz_request_port,
@@ -893,10 +885,7 @@ static int __init dz_console_setup(struct console *co, char *options)if (ret)return ret; -spin_lock_init (&dport->port.lock);/* For dz_pm(). */ -dz_reset (dport); -dz_pm (uport,0 ,-1 );if (options)uart_parse_options (options, &baud, &parity, &bits, &flow);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 142/411 usb: core: Fix SuperSpeed root hub wMaxPacketSize
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michal Pecio <[email protected]>
commit d1e280334b7f0a1df441e08bd1f6a1bcc36b3bbb upstream.
There is no good reason to have wBytesPerInterval < wMaxPacketSize - either one is too low or the other too high, and we may want to warn about such descriptors. Start with cleaning up our own root hubs.
USB 3.2 section 10.15.1 sets wMaxPacketSize and wBytesPerInterval of SuperSpeed hub status endpoints at 2 bytes, so reduce wMaxPacketSize from its former value of 4, which was derived from USB 2.0 spec and the kernel's USB_MAXCHILDREN limit. They don't apply because USB 3.2 10.15.2.1 specifies SuperSpeed hubs to have up to 15 ports.
--- drivers/usb/core/hcd.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/core/hcd.c +1 -3
@@ -353,9 +353,7 @@ static const u8 ss_rh_config_descriptor[USB_DT_ENDPOINT ,/* __u8 ep_bDescriptorType; Endpoint */ 0x81 ,/* __u8 ep_bEndpointAddress; IN Endpoint 1 */ 0x03 ,/* __u8 ep_bmAttributes; Interrupt */ -/* __le16 ep_wMaxPacketSize; 1 + (MAX_ROOT_PORTS / 8) -* see hub.c:hub_configure() for details. */ - (USB_MAXCHILDREN +1 +7 ) /8 ,0x00 , +0x02 ,0x00 ,/* __le16 ep_wMaxPacketSize; 2 bytes per USB3 10.15.1 */ 0x0c ,/* __u8 ep_bInterval; (256ms -- usb 2.0 spec) */ /* one SuperSpeed endpoint companion descriptor */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 143/411 bpf: Free reuseport cBPF prog after RCU grace period.
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 18fc650ccd7fe3376eca89203668cfb8268f60df ]
Eulgyu Kim reported the splat below with a repro. [0]
The repro sets up a UDP reuseport group with a cBPF prog and replaces it with a new one while another thread is sending a UDP packet to the group.
The reuseport prog is freed by sk_reuseport_prog_free(). bpf_prog_put() is called for "e"BPF prog to destruct through multiple stages while cBPF prog is freed immediately by bpf_release_orig_filter() and bpf_prog_free().
If a reuseport prog is detached from the setsockopt() path (reuseport_attach_prog() or reuseport_detach_prog()), sk_reuseport_prog_free() is called without waiting for RCU readers to complete, resulting in various bugs.
Let's defer freeing the reuseport cBPF prog after one RCU grace period.
Note "e"BPF prog is safe as is unless the fast path starts to touch fields destroyed in bpf_prog_put_deferred() and __bpf_prog_put_noref().
[0]:
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in reuseport_select_sock+0xedc/0x1220 net/core/sock_reuseport.c:596 Read of size 4 at addr ffffc9000051e004 by task slowme/10208 CPU: 6 UID: 1000 PID: 10208 Comm: slowme Not tainted 7.0.0-geb7ac95ff75e #32 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xca/0x240 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595 reuseport_select_sock+0xedc/0x1220 net/core/sock_reuseport.c:596 udp4_lib_lookup2+0x3bc/0x950 net/ipv4/udp.c:495 __udp4_lib_lookup+0x768/0xe20 net/ipv4/udp.c:723 __udp4_lib_lookup_skb+0x297/0x390 net/ipv4/udp.c:752 __udp4_lib_rcv+0x1312/0x2620 net/ipv4/udp.c:2752 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x282/0x440 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:207 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x3bb/0x6f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:241 NF_HOOK+0x30c/0x3a0 include/linux/netfilter.h:318 NF_HOOK+0x30c/0x3a0 include/linux/netfilter.h:318 __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:6181 [inline] __netif_receive_skb net/core/dev.c:6294 [inline] process_backlog+0xaa4/0x1960 net/core/dev.c:6645 __napi_poll+0xae/0x340 net/core/dev.c:7709 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:7772 [inline] net_rx_action+0x5d7/0xf50 net/core/dev.c:7929 handle_softirqs+0x22b/0x870 kernel/softirq.c:622 do_softirq+0x76/0xd0 kernel/softirq.c:523 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0xf8/0x130 kernel/softirq.c:450 local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 [inline] rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:924 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1dd7/0x3710 net/core/dev.c:4890 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:556 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0xca9/0x1070 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:237 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:307 [inline] ip_output+0x29f/0x450 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:438 ip_send_skb+0x45/0xc0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1508 udp_send_skb+0xb04/0x1510 net/ipv4/udp.c:1195 udp_sendmsg+0x1a71/0x2350 net/ipv4/udp.c:1485 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:727 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:742 [inline] __sys_sendto+0x554/0x680 net/socket.c:2206 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2213 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2209 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xde/0x100 net/socket.c:2209 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x160/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x415a2d Code: b3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f6bc31e41e8 EFLAGS: 00000212 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f6bc31e4cdc RCX: 0000000000415a2d RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007f6bc31e421f RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f6bc31e4240 R08: 00007f6bc31e4220 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000212 R12: 00007f6bc31e46c0 R13: ffffffffffffffb8 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffc9b0d70b0 </TASK>
--- net/core/filter.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/core/filter.c +12 -3
@@ -1641,15 +1641,24 @@ int sk_reuseport_attach_bpf(u32 ufd, struct sock *sk)return err; } +static void sk_reuseport_prog_free_rcu (struct rcu_head *rcu) +{ + struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = container_of(rcu, struct bpf_prog_aux, rcu); +struct bpf_prog *prog = aux->prog; + +bpf_release_orig_filter (prog); +bpf_prog_free (prog); +} +void sk_reuseport_prog_free (struct bpf_prog *prog) {if (!prog)return ; -if (prog->type ==BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT ) -bpf_prog_put (prog); +if (bpf_prog_was_classic (prog)) +call_rcu (&prog->aux->rcu, sk_reuseport_prog_free_rcu);else -bpf_prog_destroy (prog); +bpf_prog_put (prog); }struct bpf_scratchpad {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 144/411 USB: serial: mct_u232: fix memory corruption with small endpoint
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
commit 915b36d701950503c4ea0f6e314b10868e59fce3 upstream.
The driver overrides the maximum transfer size for a specific device which only accepts 16 byte packets for its 32 byte bulk-out endpoint.
Make sure to never increase the maximum transfer size to prevent slab corruption should a malicious device report a smaller endpoint max packet size than expected.
--- drivers/usb/serial/mct_u232.c | 21 +++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/serial/mct_u232.c +11 -10
@@ -378,6 +378,7 @@ static int mct_u232_port_probe(struct usb_serial_port *port) {struct usb_serial *serial = port->serial;struct mct_u232_private *priv; +u16 pid;/* check first to simplify error handling */ if (!serial->port[1 ] || !serial->port[1 ]->interrupt_in_urb) {
@@ -385,6 +386,16 @@ static int mct_u232_port_probe(struct usb_serial_port *port)return -ENODEV ; } +/* +* Compensate for a hardware bug: although the Sitecom U232-P25 +* device reports a maximum output packet size of 32 bytes, +* it seems to be able to accept only 16 bytes (and that's what +* SniffUSB says too...) +*/ + pid =le16_to_cpu (serial->dev->descriptor.idProduct); +if (pid ==MCT_U232_SITECOM_PID ) + port->bulk_out_size =min (16 , port->bulk_out_size); + priv =kzalloc (sizeof (*priv),GFP_KERNEL );if (!priv)return -ENOMEM ;
@@ -410,7 +421,6 @@ static void mct_u232_port_remove(struct usb_serial_port *port)static int mct_u232_open (struct tty_struct *tty,struct usb_serial_port *port) { -struct usb_serial *serial = port->serial;struct mct_u232_private *priv =usb_get_serial_port_data (port);int retval =0 ;unsigned int control_state;
@@ -418,15 +428,6 @@ static int mct_u232_open(struct tty_struct *tty, struct usb_serial_port *port)unsigned char last_lcr;unsigned char last_msr; -/* Compensate for a hardware bug: although the Sitecom U232-P25 -* device reports a maximum output packet size of 32 bytes, -* it seems to be able to accept only 16 bytes (and that's what -* SniffUSB says too...) -*/ -if (le16_to_cpu (serial->dev->descriptor.idProduct) - ==MCT_U232_SITECOM_PID ) - port->bulk_out_size =16 ; -/* Do a defined restart: the normal serial device seems to * always turn on DTR and RTS here, so do the same. I'm not * sure if this is really necessary. But it should not harm
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 145/411 compiler-clang.h: Add __diag infrastructure for clang
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
commit f014a00bbeb09cea16017b82448d32a468a6b96f upstream.
Add __diag macros similar to those in compiler-gcc.h, so that warnings that need to be adjusted for specific cases but not globally can be ignored when building with clang.
[ Kartikeya: wrote commit message ]
--- include/linux/compiler-clang.h | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
include/linux/compiler-clang.h +22 -0
@@ -119,3 +119,25 @@#define __nocfi __attribute__((__no_sanitize__("cfi")))#define __cficanonical __attribute__((__cfi_canonical_jump_table__)) + +/* +* Turn individual warnings and errors on and off locally, depending +* on version. +*/ +#define __diag_clang (version, severity, s) \ + __diag_clang_ ## version(__diag_clang_ ## severity s) + +/* Severity used in pragma directives */ +#define __diag_clang_ignore ignored +#define __diag_clang_warn warning +#define __diag_clang_error error + +#define __diag_str1 (s) #s +#define __diag_str (s) __diag_str1(s) +#define __diag (s) _Pragma(__diag_str(clang diagnostic s)) + +#if CONFIG_CLANG_VERSION >=110000 +#define __diag_clang_11 (s) __diag(s) +#else +#define __diag_clang_11 (s) +#endif
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 146/411 Disable -Wattribute-alias for clang-23 and newer
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
commit 175db11786bde9061db526bf1ac5107d915f5163 upstream.
Clang recently added support for -Wattribute-alias [1], which results in the same warnings that necessitated commit bee20031772a ("disable -Wattribute-alias warning for SYSCALL_DEFINEx()") for GCC.
kernel/time/itimer.c:325:1: error: alias and aliasee have different types 'long (unsigned int)' and 'long (typeof (__builtin_choose_expr((__builtin_types_compatible_p(typeof ((unsigned int)0), typeof (0LL)) || __builtin_types_compatible_p(typeof ((unsigned int)0), typeof (0ULL))), 0LL, 0L)))' (aka 'long (long)') [-Werror,-Wattribute-alias]
325 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(alarm, unsigned int, seconds)
| ^
include/linux/syscalls.h:225:36: note: expanded from macro 'SYSCALL_DEFINE1'
225 | #define SYSCALL_DEFINE1(name, ...) SYSCALL_DEFINEx(1, _##name, __VA_ARGS__)
| ^
include/linux/syscalls.h:236:2: note: expanded from macro 'SYSCALL_DEFINEx'
236 | __SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, sname, __VA_ARGS__)
| ^
include/linux/syscalls.h:251:18: note: expanded from macro '__SYSCALL_DEFINEx'
251 | __attribute__((alias(__stringify(__se_sys##name)))); \
| ^
kernel/time/itimer.c:325:1: note: aliasee is declared here
include/linux/syscalls.h:225:36: note: expanded from macro 'SYSCALL_DEFINE1'
225 | #define SYSCALL_DEFINE1(name, ...) SYSCALL_DEFINEx(1, _##name, __VA_ARGS__)
| ^
include/linux/syscalls.h:236:2: note: expanded from macro 'SYSCALL_DEFINEx'
236 | __SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, sname, __VA_ARGS__)
| ^
include/linux/syscalls.h:255:18: note: expanded from macro '__SYSCALL_DEFINEx'
255 | asmlinkage long __se_sys##name(__MAP(x,__SC_LONG,__VA_ARGS__)) \
| ^
<scratch space>:16:1: note: expanded from here
16 | __se_sys_alarm
| ^Disable the warnings in the same way for clang-23 and newer. Disable the warning about unknown warning options to avoid breaking the build for versions of clang-23 that do not have -Wattribute-alias, such as ones deployed by vendors like Android or CI systems or when bisecting LLVM between llvmorg-23-init and release/23.x.
--- include/linux/compat.h | 4 ++++ include/linux/compiler-clang.h | 6 ++++++ include/linux/compiler_types.h | 4 ++++ include/linux/syscalls.h | 4 ++++ 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+)
include/linux/compat.h +4 -0
@@ -72,6 +72,10 @@__diag_push (); \__diag_ignore (GCC ,8 ,"-Wattribute-alias" , \"Type aliasing is used to sanitize syscall arguments" );\ +__diag_ignore (clang,23 ,"-Wunknown-warning-option" , \ +"Avoid breaking versions without -Wattribute-alias" ); \ +__diag_ignore (clang,23 ,"-Wattribute-alias" , \ +"Type aliasing is used to sanitize syscall arguments" ); \ asmlinkage long compat_sys##name(__MAP(x,__SC_DECL,__VA_ARGS__)) \ __attribute__((alias(__stringify(__se_compat_sys##name)))); \ ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION(compat_sys##name, ERRNO); \
include/linux/compiler-clang.h +6 -0
@@ -141,3 +141,9 @@#else #define __diag_clang_11 (s)#endif + +#if CONFIG_CLANG_VERSION >=230000 +#define __diag_clang_23 (s) __diag(s) +#else +#define __diag_clang_23 (s) +#endif
include/linux/compiler_types.h +4 -0
@@ -345,6 +345,10 @@ struct ftrace_likely_data {#define __diag_GCC (version, severity, string)#endif +#ifndef __diag_clang +#define __diag_clang (version, severity, string) +#endif +#define __diag_push () __diag(push)#define __diag_pop () __diag(pop)
include/linux/syscalls.h +4 -0
@@ -239,6 +239,10 @@ static inline int is_syscall_trace_event(struct trace_event_call *tp_event)__diag_push (); \__diag_ignore (GCC ,8 ,"-Wattribute-alias" , \"Type aliasing is used to sanitize syscall arguments" );\ +__diag_ignore (clang,23 ,"-Wunknown-warning-option" , \ +"Avoid breaking versions without -Wattribute-alias" );\ +__diag_ignore (clang,23 ,"-Wattribute-alias" , \ +"Type aliasing is used to sanitize syscall arguments" );\ asmlinkage long sys##name(__MAP(x,__SC_DECL,__VA_ARGS__)) \ __attribute__((alias(__stringify(__se_sys##name)))); \ ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION(sys##name, ERRNO); \
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 147/411 i2c: dev: prevent integer overflow in I2C_TIMEOUT ioctl
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mingyu Wang <[email protected]>
commit 617eb7c0961a8dfcfc811844a6396e406b2923ea upstream.
While fuzzing with Syzkaller, a persistent schedule_timeout: wrong timeout value warning was observed, accompanied by SMBus controller state machine corruption.
The I2C_TIMEOUT ioctl accepts a user-provided timeout in multiples of 10 ms. The user argument is checked against INT_MAX, but it is subsequently multiplied by 10 before being passed to msecs_to_jiffies().
A malicious user can pass a large value (e.g., 429496729) that passes the arg > INT_MAX check but overflows when multiplied by 10. This results in a truncated 32-bit unsigned value that bypasses the internal (int)m < 0 check in msecs_to_jiffies().
The truncated value is then assigned to client->adapter->timeout (a signed 32-bit int), which is reinterpreted as a negative number. When passed to wait_for_completion_timeout(), this negative value undergoes sign extension to a 64-bit unsigned long, triggering the schedule_timeout warning and causing premature returns. This leaves the SMBus state machine in an unrecoverable state, constituting a local Denial of Service (DoS).
Fix this by bounding the user argument to INT_MAX / 10.
--- drivers/i2c/i2c-dev.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/i2c/i2c-dev.c +5 -4
@@ -476,12 +476,13 @@ static long i2cdev_ioctl(struct file *fi client->adapter->retries = arg;break ;case I2C_TIMEOUT : -if (arg >INT_MAX ) +/* +* For historical reasons, user-space sets the timeout value in +* units of 10 ms. +*/ +if (arg >INT_MAX /10 )return -EINVAL ; -/* For historical reasons, user-space sets the timeout -* value in units of 10 ms. -*/ client->adapter->timeout =msecs_to_jiffies (arg *10 );break ;default :
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 148/411 ipv6: mcast: Fix use-after-free when processing MLD queries
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]>
commit 791c91dc7a9dfb2457d5e29b8216a6484b9c4b40 upstream.
When processing an MLD query, a pointer to the multicast group address is retrieved when initially parsing the packet. This pointer is later dereferenced without being reloaded despite the fact that the skb header might have been reallocated following the pskb_may_pull() calls, leading to a use-after-free [1].
Fix by copying the multicast group address when the packet is initially parsed.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __mld_query_work (net/ipv6/mcast.c:1512) Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881154b8e90 by task kworker/4:1/118 Workqueue: mld mld_query_work Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120)
print_address_description.constprop.0 (mm/kasan/report.c:378) print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:482)kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)__mld_query_work (net/ipv6/mcast.c:1512) mld_query_work (net/ipv6/mcast.c:1563) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3397 kernel/workqueue.c:3478) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)
</TASK>
[...]
Freed by task 118: kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:57) kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:78) kasan_save_free_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:584) __kasan_slab_free (mm/kasan/common.c:253 mm/kasan/common.c:285) kfree (./include/linux/kasan.h:235 mm/slub.c:2689 mm/slub.c:6251 mm/slub.c:6566) pskb_expand_head (net/core/skbuff.c:2335) __pskb_pull_tail (net/core/skbuff.c:2878 (discriminator 4)) __mld_query_work (net/ipv6/mcast.c:1495 (discriminator 1))
mld_query_work (net/ipv6/mcast.c:1563) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3397 kernel/workqueue.c:3478) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)
--- net/ipv6/mcast.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/mcast.c +4 -4
@@ -1392,9 +1392,9 @@ out:static void __mld_query_work (struct sk_buff *skb) {struct mld2_query *mlh2 =NULL ; -const struct in6_addr *group;unsigned long max_delay;struct inet6_dev *idev; +struct in6_addr group;struct ifmcaddr6 *ma;struct mld_msg *mld;int group_type;
@@ -1426,8 +1426,8 @@ static void __mld_query_work(struct sk_b goto kfree_skb; mld = (struct mld_msg *)icmp6_hdr (skb); - group = &mld->mld_mca; - group_type =ipv6_addr_type (group); + group = mld->mld_mca; + group_type =ipv6_addr_type (&group);if (group_type !=IPV6_ADDR_ANY && !(group_type&IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST ))
@@ -1477,7 +1477,7 @@ static void __mld_query_work(struct sk_b } }else {for_each_mc_mclock (idev, ma) { -if (!ipv6_addr_equal (group, &ma->mca_addr)) +if (!ipv6_addr_equal (&group, &ma->mca_addr))continue ;if (ma->mca_flags &MAF_TIMER_RUNNING ) {/* gsquery <- gsquery && mark */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 149/411 tee: optee: prevent use-after-free when the client exits before the supplicant
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Amirreza Zarrabi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 387a926ee166814611acecb960207fe2f3c4fd3e ]
Commit 70b0d6b0a199 ("tee: optee: Fix supplicant wait loop") made the client wait as killable so it can be interrupted during shutdown or after a supplicant crash. This changes the original lifetime expectations:
the client task can now terminate while the supplicant is still processing its request.
If the client exits first it removes the request from its queue and kfree()s it, while the request ID remains in supp->idr. A subsequent lookup on the supplicant path then dereferences freed memory, leading to a use-after-free.
Serialise access to the request with supp->mutex:
* Hold supp->mutex in optee_supp_recv() and optee_supp_send() while looking up and touching the request.
* Let optee_supp_thrd_req() notice that the client has terminated and signal optee_supp_send() accordingly.
With these changes the request cannot be freed while the supplicant still has a reference, eliminating the race.
--- drivers/tee/optee/supp.c | 107 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 74 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
drivers/tee/optee/supp.c +74 -33
@@ -10,7 +10,11 @@struct optee_supp_req {struct list_head link; +int id; +bool in_queue; +bool processed; +u32 func;u32 ret;size_t num_params;
@@ -19,6 +23,9 @@ struct optee_supp_req {struct completion c; }; +/* It is temporary request used for revoked pending request in supp->idr. */ +#define INVALID_REQ_PTR ((struct optee_supp_req *)ERR_PTR(-EBADF)) +void optee_supp_init (struct optee_supp *supp) {memset (supp,0 ,sizeof (*supp));
@@ -39,21 +46,23 @@ void optee_supp_release(struct optee_supp *supp) {int id;struct optee_supp_req *req; -struct optee_supp_req *req_tmp;mutex_lock (&supp->mutex); -/* Abort all request retrieved by supplicant */ +/* Abort all request */ idr_for_each_entry (&supp->idr, req, id) {idr_remove (&supp->idr, id); - req->ret =TEEC_ERROR_COMMUNICATION ; -complete (&req->c); - } +/* Skip if request was already marked invalid */ +if (IS_ERR (req)) +continue ; -/* Abort all queued requests */ -list_for_each_entry_safe (req, req_tmp, &supp->reqs, link) { -list_del (&req->link); - req->in_queue = false; +/* For queued requests where supplicant has not seen it */ +if (req->in_queue) { +list_del (&req->link); + req->in_queue = false; + } + + req->processed = true; req->ret =TEEC_ERROR_COMMUNICATION ;complete (&req->c); }
@@ -100,8 +109,16 @@ u32 optee_supp_thrd_req(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 func, size_t num_params,/* Insert the request in the request list */ mutex_lock (&supp->mutex); + req->id =idr_alloc (&supp->idr, req,1 ,0 ,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (req->id <0 ) { +mutex_unlock (&supp->mutex); +kfree (req); +return TEEC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ; + } +list_add_tail (&req->link, &supp->reqs); req->in_queue = true; + req->processed = false;mutex_unlock (&supp->mutex);/* Tell an eventual waiter there's a new request */
@@ -117,21 +134,43 @@ u32 optee_supp_thrd_req(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 func, size_t num_params,if (wait_for_completion_killable (&req->c)) {mutex_lock (&supp->mutex);if (req->in_queue) { +/* Supplicant has not seen this request yet. */ +idr_remove (&supp->idr, req->id);list_del (&req->link); req->in_queue = false; + + ret =TEEC_ERROR_COMMUNICATION ; + }else if (req->processed) { +/* +* Supplicant has processed this request. Ignore the +* kill signal for now and submit the result. req is not +* in supp->reqs (removed by supp_pop_entry()) nor in +* supp->idr (removed by supp_pop_req()). +*/ + ret = req->ret; + }else { +/* +* Supplicant is in the middle of processing this +* request. Replace req with INVALID_REQ_PTR so that +* the ID remains busy, causing optee_supp_send() to +* fail on the next call to supp_pop_req() with this ID. +*/ +idr_replace (&supp->idr,INVALID_REQ_PTR , req->id); + ret =TEEC_ERROR_COMMUNICATION ; } +mutex_unlock (&supp->mutex); - req->ret =TEEC_ERROR_COMMUNICATION ; + }else { + ret = req->ret; } - ret = req->ret;kfree (req);return ret; }static struct optee_supp_req *supp_pop_entry (struct optee_supp *supp, -int num_params,int *id) +int num_params) {struct optee_supp_req *req;
@@ -153,10 +192,6 @@ static struct optee_supp_req *supp_pop_entry(struct optee_supp *supp,return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); } - *id =idr_alloc (&supp->idr, req,1 ,0 ,GFP_KERNEL ); -if (*id <0 ) -return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); -list_del (&req->link); req->in_queue = false;
@@ -214,7 +249,6 @@ int optee_supp_recv(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 *func, u32 *num_params,struct optee *optee =tee_get_drvdata (teedev);struct optee_supp *supp = &optee->supp;struct optee_supp_req *req =NULL ; -int id;size_t num_meta;int rc;
@@ -224,15 +258,11 @@ int optee_supp_recv(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 *func, u32 *num_params,while (true) {mutex_lock (&supp->mutex); - req =supp_pop_entry (supp, *num_params - num_meta, &id); + req =supp_pop_entry (supp, *num_params - num_meta); +if (req) +break ;/* Keep mutex held. */ mutex_unlock (&supp->mutex); -if (req) { -if (IS_ERR (req)) -return PTR_ERR (req); -break ; - } -/* * If we didn't get a request we'll block in * wait_for_completion() to avoid needless spinning.
@@ -245,6 +275,13 @@ int optee_supp_recv(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 *func, u32 *num_params,return -ERESTARTSYS ; } +/* supp->mutex held and req != NULL. */ + +if (IS_ERR (req)) { +mutex_unlock (&supp->mutex); +return PTR_ERR (req); + } +if (num_meta) {/* * tee-supplicant support meta parameters -> requsts can be
@@ -252,13 +289,11 @@ int optee_supp_recv(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 *func, u32 *num_params,*/ param->attr =TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_VALUE_INOUT |TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_META ; - param->u.value.a = id; + param->u.value.a = req->id; param->u.value.b =0 ; param->u.value.c =0 ; }else { -mutex_lock (&supp->mutex); - supp->req_id = id; -mutex_unlock (&supp->mutex); + supp->req_id = req->id; } *func = req->func;
@@ -266,6 +301,7 @@ int optee_supp_recv(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 *func, u32 *num_params,memcpy (param + num_meta, req->param,sizeof (struct tee_param ) * req->num_params); +mutex_unlock (&supp->mutex);return 0 ; }
@@ -297,12 +333,17 @@ static struct optee_supp_req *supp_pop_req(struct optee_supp *supp,if (!req)return ERR_PTR (-ENOENT ); +/* optee_supp_thrd_req() already returned to optee. */ +if (IS_ERR (req)) + goto failed_req; +if ((num_params - nm) != req->num_params)return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); + *num_meta = nm; +failed_req:idr_remove (&supp->idr, id); supp->req_id =-1 ; - *num_meta = nm;return req; }
@@ -328,10 +369,9 @@ int optee_supp_send(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 ret, u32 num_params,mutex_lock (&supp->mutex); req =supp_pop_req (supp, num_params, param, &num_meta); -mutex_unlock (&supp->mutex); -if (IS_ERR (req)) { -/* Something is wrong, let supplicant restart. */ +mutex_unlock (&supp->mutex); +/* Something is wrong, let supplicant handel it. */ return PTR_ERR (req); }
@@ -355,9 +395,10 @@ int optee_supp_send(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 ret, u32 num_params, } } req->ret = ret; - + req->processed = true;/* Let the requesting thread continue */ complete (&req->c); +mutex_unlock (&supp->mutex);return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 150/411 netfilter: xt_NFQUEUE: prefer raw_smp_processor_id
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c6c5327dd18bec1e1bbf139b2cf5ae53608a9d30 ]
With PREEMPT_RCU this triggers a splat because smp_processor_id() can be preempted while inside a RCU critical section. If xt_NFQUEUE target is invoked via nft_compat_eval() path, we are inside a RCU critical section.
Just use the raw version instead.
--- net/netfilter/xt_NFQUEUE.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/netfilter/xt_NFQUEUE.c +1 -1
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ nfqueue_tg_v3(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)if (info->queues_total >1 ) {if (info->flags &NFQ_FLAG_CPU_FANOUT ) { -int cpu =smp_processor_id (); +int cpu =raw_smp_processor_id (); queue = info->queuenum + cpu % info->queues_total; }else {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 151/411 ipvs: clear the svc scheduler ptr early on edit
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 193989cc6d80dd8e0460fb3992e69fa03bf0ff9b ]
ip_vs_edit_service() while unbinding the old scheduler clears the svc->scheduler ptr after the scheduler module initiates RCU callbacks. This can cause packets to use the old scheduler at the time when svc->sched_data is already freed after RCU grace period.
Fix it by clearing the ptr early in ip_vs_unbind_scheduler(), before the done_service method schedules any RCU callbacks.
Also, if the new scheduler fails to initialize when replacing the old scheduler, try to restore the old scheduler while still returning the error code.
--- include/net/ip_vs.h | 3 +-- net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c | 13 ++++++++----- net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sched.c | 14 +++++++------- 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
include/net/ip_vs.h +1 -2
@@ -1396,8 +1396,7 @@ int register_ip_vs_scheduler(struct ip_vs_scheduler *scheduler);int unregister_ip_vs_scheduler (struct ip_vs_scheduler *scheduler);int ip_vs_bind_scheduler (struct ip_vs_service *svc,struct ip_vs_scheduler *scheduler); -void ip_vs_unbind_scheduler (struct ip_vs_service *svc, -struct ip_vs_scheduler *sched); +void ip_vs_unbind_scheduler (struct ip_vs_service *svc);struct ip_vs_scheduler *ip_vs_scheduler_get (const char *sched_name);void ip_vs_scheduler_put (struct ip_vs_scheduler *scheduler); struct ip_vs_conn *
net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c +8 -5
@@ -1417,7 +1417,7 @@ ip_vs_add_service(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, struct ip_vs_service_user_kern *u,if (ret_hooks >=0 )ip_vs_unregister_hooks (ipvs, u->af);if (svc !=NULL ) { -ip_vs_unbind_scheduler (svc, sched); +ip_vs_unbind_scheduler (svc);ip_vs_service_free (svc); }ip_vs_scheduler_put (sched);
@@ -1479,9 +1479,8 @@ ip_vs_edit_service(struct ip_vs_service *svc, struct ip_vs_service_user_kern *u) old_sched =rcu_dereference_protected (svc->scheduler,1 );if (sched != old_sched) {if (old_sched) { -ip_vs_unbind_scheduler (svc, old_sched); -RCU_INIT_POINTER (svc->scheduler,NULL ); -/* Wait all svc->sched_data users */ +ip_vs_unbind_scheduler (svc); +/* Wait all svc->scheduler/sched_data users */ synchronize_rcu (); }/* Bind the new scheduler */
@@ -1489,6 +1488,10 @@ ip_vs_edit_service(struct ip_vs_service *svc, struct ip_vs_service_user_kern *u) ret =ip_vs_bind_scheduler (svc, sched);if (ret) {ip_vs_scheduler_put (sched); +/* Try to restore the old_sched */ +if (old_sched && + !ip_vs_bind_scheduler (svc, old_sched)) + old_sched =NULL ; goto out; } }
@@ -1545,7 +1548,7 @@ static void __ip_vs_del_service(struct ip_vs_service *svc, bool cleanup)/* Unbind scheduler */ old_sched =rcu_dereference_protected (svc->scheduler,1 ); -ip_vs_unbind_scheduler (svc, old_sched); +ip_vs_unbind_scheduler (svc);ip_vs_scheduler_put (old_sched);/* Unbind persistence engine, keep svc->pe */
net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sched.c +7 -7
@@ -57,19 +57,19 @@ int ip_vs_bind_scheduler(struct ip_vs_service *svc,/* * Unbind a service with its scheduler */ -void ip_vs_unbind_scheduler (struct ip_vs_service *svc, -struct ip_vs_scheduler *sched) +void ip_vs_unbind_scheduler (struct ip_vs_service *svc) { -struct ip_vs_scheduler *cur_sched; +struct ip_vs_scheduler *sched; - cur_sched =rcu_dereference_protected (svc->scheduler,1 ); -/* This check proves that old 'sched' was installed */ -if (!cur_sched) + sched =rcu_dereference_protected (svc->scheduler,1 ); +if (!sched)return ; +/* Reset the scheduler before initiating any RCU callbacks */ +rcu_assign_pointer (svc->scheduler,NULL ); +smp_wmb ();/* paired with smp_rmb() in ip_vs_schedule() */ if (sched->done_service) sched->done_service (svc); -/* svc->scheduler can be set to NULL only by caller */ }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 152/411 netfilter: synproxy: add mutex to guard hook reference counting
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2fcba19caaeb2a33017459d3430f057967bb91b6 ]
As the synproxy infrastructure register netfilter hooks on-demand when a user adds the first iptables target or nftables expression, if done concurrently they can race each other.
Introduce a mutex to serialize the refcount control blocks access from both frontends. While a per namespace mutex might be more efficient, it is not needed for target/expression like SYNPROXY.
--- net/netfilter/nf_synproxy_core.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nf_synproxy_core.c +18 -6
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@#include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_zones.h> #include <net/netfilter/nf_synproxy.h> +static DEFINE_MUTEX (synproxy_mutex); +unsigned int synproxy_net_id;EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (synproxy_net_id);
@@ -790,26 +792,31 @@ static const struct nf_hook_ops ipv4_synproxy_ops[] = {int nf_synproxy_ipv4_init (struct synproxy_net *snet,struct net *net) { -int err; +int err =0 ; +mutex_lock (&synproxy_mutex);if (snet->hook_ref4 ==0 ) { err =nf_register_net_hooks (net, ipv4_synproxy_ops,ARRAY_SIZE (ipv4_synproxy_ops));if (err) -return err; + goto out; } snet->hook_ref4++; -return 0 ; +out: +mutex_unlock (&synproxy_mutex); +return err; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (nf_synproxy_ipv4_init);void nf_synproxy_ipv4_fini (struct synproxy_net *snet,struct net *net) { +mutex_lock (&synproxy_mutex); snet->hook_ref4--;if (snet->hook_ref4 ==0 )nf_unregister_net_hooks (net, ipv4_synproxy_ops,ARRAY_SIZE (ipv4_synproxy_ops)); +mutex_unlock (&synproxy_mutex); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (nf_synproxy_ipv4_fini);
@@ -1214,27 +1221,32 @@ static const struct nf_hook_ops ipv6_synproxy_ops[] = {int nf_synproxy_ipv6_init (struct synproxy_net *snet,struct net *net) { -int err; +int err =0 ; +mutex_lock (&synproxy_mutex);if (snet->hook_ref6 ==0 ) { err =nf_register_net_hooks (net, ipv6_synproxy_ops,ARRAY_SIZE (ipv6_synproxy_ops));if (err) -return err; + goto out; } snet->hook_ref6++; -return 0 ; +out: +mutex_unlock (&synproxy_mutex); +return err; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (nf_synproxy_ipv6_init);void nf_synproxy_ipv6_fini (struct synproxy_net *snet,struct net *net) { +mutex_lock (&synproxy_mutex); snet->hook_ref6--;if (snet->hook_ref6 ==0 )nf_unregister_net_hooks (net, ipv6_synproxy_ops,ARRAY_SIZE (ipv6_synproxy_ops)); +mutex_unlock (&synproxy_mutex); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (nf_synproxy_ipv6_fini);#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 153/411 netfilter: conntrack_irc: fix possible out-of-bounds read
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 66eba0ffce3b7e11449946b4cbbef8ea36112f56 ]
When parsing fails after we've matched the command string we should bail out instead of trying to match a different command.
This helper should be deprecated, given prevalence of TLS I doubt it has any relevance in 2026.
--- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_irc.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_irc.c +2 -2
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ static int help(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff,if (parse_dcc (data, data_limit, &dcc_ip, &dcc_port, &addr_beg_p, &addr_end_p)) {pr_debug ("unable to parse dcc command\n" ); -continue ; + goto out; } pr_debug("DCC bound ip/port: %pI4:%u\n",
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ static int help(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff,net_warn_ratelimited ("Forged DCC command from %pI4: %pI4:%u\n" , &tuple->src.u3.ip, &dcc_ip, dcc_port); -continue ; + goto out; } exp =nf_ct_expect_alloc (ct);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 154/411 netfilter: bridge: make ebt_snat ARP rewrite writable
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yiming Qian <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 67ba971ae02514d85818fe0c32549ab4bfa3bf49 ]
The ebtables SNAT target keeps the Ethernet source address rewrite behind skb_ensure_writable(skb, 0). This is intentional: at the bridge ebtables hooks the Ethernet header is addressed through skb_mac_header()/eth_hdr(), while skb->data points at the Ethernet payload. Asking skb_ensure_writable() for ETH_HLEN bytes would check the payload, not the Ethernet header, and would reintroduce the small packet regression fixed by commit 63137bc5882a.
However, the optional ARP sender hardware address rewrite is different. It writes through skb_store_bits() at an offset relative to skb->data:
skb_store_bits(skb, sizeof(struct arphdr), info->mac, ETH_ALEN)
skb_header_pointer() only safely reads the ARP header; it does not make the later sender hardware address range writable. If that range is still held in a nonlinear skb fragment backed by a splice-imported file page, skb_store_bits() maps the frag page and copies the new MAC address directly into it.
Ensure the ARP SHA range is writable before reading the ARP header and before calling skb_store_bits().
--- net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_snat.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_snat.c +3 -0
@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@ ebt_snat_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)const struct arphdr *ap;struct arphdr _ah; +if (skb_ensure_writable (skb,sizeof (_ah) +ETH_ALEN )) +return EBT_DROP ; + ap =skb_header_pointer (skb,0 ,sizeof (_ah), &_ah);if (ap ==NULL )return EBT_DROP ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 155/411 dm cache policy smq: check allocation under invalidate lock
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Guangshuo Li <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d3f0a606b9f278ece8a0df626ded9c4044071235 ]
commit 2d1f7b65f5de ("dm cache policy smq: fix missing locks in invalidating cache blocks") added mq->lock around the destructive part of smq_invalidate_mapping(), but left the e->allocated check outside the critical section.
That leaves a check-then-act race. Two concurrent invalidators can both observe e->allocated as true before either of them takes mq->lock. The first invalidator that acquires the lock removes the entry from the queues and hash table and then calls free_entry(), which clears e->allocated and puts the entry back on the free list. The second invalidator can then acquire mq->lock and continue with the stale result of the unlocked check.
This can corrupt the SMQ queues or hash table by deleting an entry that is no longer on those structures. It can also hit the allocation check in free_entry() when the same entry is freed again.
Move the allocation check under mq->lock so the predicate and the destructive operations are serialized by the same lock.
--- drivers/md/dm-cache-policy-smq.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/md/dm-cache-policy-smq.c +8 -4
@@ -1585,18 +1585,22 @@ static int smq_invalidate_mapping(struct dm_cache_policy *p, dm_cblock_t cblock)struct smq_policy *mq =to_smq_policy (p);struct entry *e =get_entry (&mq->cache_alloc,from_cblock (cblock));unsigned long flags; - -if (!e->allocated) -return -ENODATA ; +int r =0 ;spin_lock_irqsave (&mq->lock, flags); +if (!e->allocated) { + r = -ENODATA ; + goto out; + }// FIXME: what if this block has pending background work? del_queue (mq, e);h_remove (&mq->table, e);free_entry (&mq->cache_alloc, e); + +out:spin_unlock_irqrestore (&mq->lock, flags); -return 0 ; +return r; }static uint32_t smq_get_hint (struct dm_cache_policy *p,dm_cblock_t cblock)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 156/411 net/sched: act_api: use RCU with deferred freeing for action lifecycle
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jamal Hadi Salim <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5057e1aca011e51ef51498c940ef96f3d3e8a305 ]
When NEWTFILTER and DELFILTER are run concurrently it is possible to create a race with an associated action.
Let's illustrate with CPU0 running NEWTFILTER and CPU1 running DELFILTER:
0: mutex_lock() <-- holds the idr lock
0: rcu_read_lock()
0: p = idr_find(idr, index) <-- action p is valid (RCU protects IDR) 0: mutex_unlock() <-- releases the idr lock
1: refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock() <-- refcnt 1->0, mutex held
1: idr_remove(idr, index) <-- Action removed from IDR
1: mutex_unlock() <-- mutex released allowing us to delete the action 1: tcf_action_cleanup(p); kfree(p) <-- Kfrees p immediately, no deferral 0: refcount_inc_not_zero(&p->tcfa_refcnt) <-- ouch, UAF p points to freed memory
This patch fixes the race condition between NEWTFILTER and DELFILTER by adding struct rcu_head to tc_action used in the deferral and introducing a call_rcu() in the delete path to defer the final kfree().
Note: this is a revert of commit d7fb60b9cafb ("net_sched: get rid of tcfa_rcu") but also modernization/simplification to directly use kfree_rcu().
Let's illustrate the new restored code path:
0: rcu_read_lock()
1: refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock() <-- refcnt 1->0, mutex held
1: idr_remove(idr, index)
1: mutex_unlock()
1: call_rcu(&p->tcfa_rcu, tcf_action_rcu_free) <-- defer kfree after grace period 0: p = idr_find(idr, index)
0: refcount_inc_not_zero(&p->tcfa_refcnt) <-- fails, refcnt already 0 1: rcu_read_unlock() <-- release so freeing can run after grace period
After CPU1 calls idr_remove(), the object is no longer reachable through the IDR. CPU0's subsequent idr_find() will return NULL, and even if it still held a stale pointer, the immediate kfree() is now deferred until after the RCU grace period, so no UAF can occur.
--- include/net/act_api.h | 1 + net/sched/act_api.c | 7 +------ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
include/net/act_api.h +1 -0
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ struct tc_action {struct tc_cookie __rcu *act_cookie;struct tcf_chain __rcu *goto_chain;u32 tcfa_flags; +struct rcu_head tcfa_rcu;u8 hw_stats;u8 used_hw_stats;bool used_hw_stats_valid;
net/sched/act_api.c +1 -6
@@ -109,11 +109,6 @@ struct tcf_chain *tcf_action_set_ctrlact(struct tc_action *a, int action, }EXPORT_SYMBOL (tcf_action_set_ctrlact); -/* XXX: For standalone actions, we don't need a RCU grace period either, because -* actions are always connected to filters and filters are already destroyed in -* RCU callbacks, so after a RCU grace period actions are already disconnected -* from filters. Readers later can not find us. -*/ static void free_tcf (struct tc_action *p) {struct tcf_chain *chain =rcu_dereference_protected (p->goto_chain,1 );
@@ -126,7 +121,7 @@ static void free_tcf(struct tc_action *p)if (chain)tcf_chain_put_by_act (chain); -kfree (p); +kfree_rcu (p, tcfa_rcu); }static void tcf_action_cleanup (struct tc_action *p)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 157/411 6lowpan: fix off-by-one in multicast context address compression
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yizhou Zhao <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2a58899d11009bffc7b4b32a571858f381121837 ]
The second memcpy in lowpan_iphc_mcast_ctx_addr_compress() uses &data[1] as destination and &ipaddr->s6_addr[11] as source, but both should be offset by one: &data[2] and &ipaddr->s6_addr[12] respectively.
This off-by-one has two consequences:
1. data[1] is overwritten with s6_addr[11], corrupting the RIID field in the compressed multicast address
2. data[5] is never written, so uninitialized kernel stack memory is transmitted over the network via lowpan_push_hc_data(), leaking kernel stack contents
The correct inline data layout must match what the decompression function lowpan_uncompress_multicast_ctx_daddr() expects:
data[0..1] = s6_addr[1..2] (flags/scope + RIID) data[2..5] = s6_addr[12..15] (group ID)
Also zero-initialize the data array as a defensive measure against similar bugs in the future.
--- net/6lowpan/iphc.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/6lowpan/iphc.c +2 -2
@@ -1086,12 +1086,12 @@ static u8 lowpan_iphc_mcast_ctx_addr_compress(u8 **hc_ptr,const struct lowpan_iphc_ctx *ctx, const struct in6_addr *ipaddr) { - u8 data[6]; + u8 data[6] = {};/* flags/scope, reserved (RIID) */ memcpy (data, &ipaddr->s6_addr[1 ],2 );/* group ID */ -memcpy (&data[1 ], &ipaddr->s6_addr[11 ],4 ); +memcpy (&data[2 ], &ipaddr->s6_addr[12 ],4 );lowpan_push_hc_data (hc_ptr, data,6 );return LOWPAN_IPHC_DAM_00 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 158/411 drm/imx: Fix three kernel-doc warnings in dcss-scaler.c
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yicong Hui <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ae0383e5a9a4b12d68c76c4769857def4665deff ]
Fix the following W=1 kerneldoc warnings by adding the missing parameter descriptions for @phase0_identity and @nn_interpolation in dcss_scaler_filter_design() and @phase0_identity in dcss_scaler_gaussian_filter()
Warning: drivers/gpu/drm/imx/dcss/dcss-scaler.c:173 function parameter 'phase0_identity' not described in 'dcss_scaler_gaussian_filter'
Warning: drivers/gpu/drm/imx/dcss/dcss-scaler.c:270 function parameter 'phase0_identity' not described in 'dcss_scaler_filter_design'
Warning: drivers/gpu/drm/imx/dcss/dcss-scaler.c:270 function parameter 'nn_interpolation' not described in 'dcss_scaler_filter_design'
--- drivers/gpu/drm/imx/dcss/dcss-scaler.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/imx/dcss/dcss-scaler.c +3 -0
@@ -166,6 +166,7 @@ static int exp_approx_q(int x)* dcss_scaler_gaussian_filter() - Generate gaussian prototype filter. * @fc_q: fixed-point cutoff frequency normalized to range [0, 1] * @use_5_taps: indicates whether to use 5 taps or 7 taps +* @phase0_identity: whether to override phase 0 coefficients with identity filter * @coef: output filter coefficients */ static void dcss_scaler_gaussian_filter(int fc_q, bool use_5_taps,
@@ -262,7 +263,9 @@ static void dcss_scaler_nearest_neighbor_filter(bool use_5_taps,* @src_length: length of input * @dst_length: length of output * @use_5_taps: 0 for 7 taps per phase, 1 for 5 taps +* @phase0_identity: whether to override phase 0 coefficients with identity filter * @coef: output coefficients +* @nn_interpolation: whether to use nearest neighbor instead of gaussian filter */ static void dcss_scaler_filter_design(int src_length, int dst_length, bool use_5_taps, bool phase0_identity,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 159/411 pcnet32: stop holding device spin lock during napi_complete_done
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Oscar Maes <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 73bf3cca7de6a73f53b6a52dc3b1c82ae5667a4d ]
napi_complete_done may call gro_flush_normal (though not currently, as GRO is unsupported at the moment), which may result in packet TX. This will eventually result in calling pcnet32_start_xmit - resulting in a deadlock while trying to re-acquire the already locked spin lock.
It is safe to split the spinlock block into two, because the hardware registers are still protected from concurrent access, and the two blocks perform unrelated operations that don't need to happen atomically.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/amd/pcnet32.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/amd/pcnet32.c +3 -1
@@ -1399,8 +1399,10 @@ static int pcnet32_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget)pcnet32_restart (dev,CSR0_START );netif_wake_queue (dev); } +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&lp->lock, flags);if (work_done < budget &&napi_complete_done (napi, work_done)) { +spin_lock_irqsave (&lp->lock, flags);/* clear interrupt masks */ val = lp->a->read_csr (ioaddr,CSR3 ); val &=0x00ff ;
@@ -1408,9 +1410,9 @@ static int pcnet32_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget)/* Set interrupt enable. */ lp->a->write_csr (ioaddr,CSR0 ,CSR0_INTEN ); +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&lp->lock, flags); } -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&lp->lock, flags);return work_done; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 160/411 net: garp: fix unsigned integer underflow in garp_pdu_parse_attr
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yizhou Zhao <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 16e408e607a94b646fb14a2a98422c6877ae4b3c ]
The receive-side GARP attribute parser computes dlen with reversed operands:
dlen = sizeof(*ga) - ga->len;
ga->len is the on-wire attribute length and includes the GARP attribute header. For normal attributes with data, ga->len is larger than sizeof(*ga), so the subtraction underflows in unsigned arithmetic.
The resulting value is later passed to garp_attr_lookup(), whose length argument is u8. After truncation, the parsed data length usually no longer matches the length stored for locally registered attributes, so received Join/Leave events are ignored. This breaks the GARP receive path for common attributes, such as GVRP VLAN registration attributes.
Compute the data length as the attribute length minus the header length.
--- net/802/garp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/802/garp.c +1 -1
@@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ static int garp_pdu_parse_attr(struct garp_applicant *app, struct sk_buff *skb,if (!pskb_may_pull (skb, ga->len))return -1 ;skb_pull (skb, ga->len); - dlen =sizeof (*ga) - ga->len; + dlen = ga->len -sizeof (*ga);if (attrtype > app->app->maxattr)return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 161/411 net: lan743x: permit VLAN-tagged packets up to configured MTU
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Thompson <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8173d22b211f615015f7b35f48ab11a6dd78dc99 ]
VLAN-tagged interfaces on lan743x devices were previously unreachable via SSH and failed to respond to large ping packets (e.g. "ping -s 1469" given MTU=1500). In these scenarios, "ethtool -S" reports non-zero "RX Oversize Frame Errors". According to Microchip AN2948, the MAC_RX FSE (VLAN field size enforcement) bit determines whether frames with VLAN tags exceeding the base MTU plus tag length are discarded.
The driver must set the MAC_RX.FSE bit before setting MAC_RX.RXEN to allow VLAN-tagged frames up to the interface MTU, preventing them from being treated as oversized. As a result, both the base and VLAN-tagged interfaces can use the same MTU without receive errors.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++ drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.c +32 -0
@@ -792,6 +792,36 @@ static void lan743x_mac_set_address(struct lan743x_adapter *adapter, "MAC address set to %pM\n", addr); } +static void lan743x_mac_rx_enable_fse (struct lan743x_adapter *adapter) +{ +u32 mac_rx; +bool rxen; + + mac_rx =lan743x_csr_read (adapter,MAC_RX ); +if (mac_rx &MAC_RX_FSE_ ) +return ; + + rxen = mac_rx &MAC_RX_RXEN_ ; +if (rxen) { + mac_rx &= ~MAC_RX_RXEN_ ; +lan743x_csr_write (adapter,MAC_RX , mac_rx); +lan743x_csr_wait_for_bit (adapter,MAC_RX ,MAC_RX_RXD_ , +1 ,1000 ,20000 ,100 ); + } + +/* Per AN2948, hardware prevents modification of the FSE bit while the +* MAC receiver is enabled (RXEN bit set). Use separate register write +* to assert the FSE bit before enabling the RXEN bit in MAC_RX +*/ + mac_rx |=MAC_RX_FSE_ ; +lan743x_csr_write (adapter,MAC_RX , mac_rx); + +if (rxen) { + mac_rx |=MAC_RX_RXEN_ ; +lan743x_csr_write (adapter,MAC_RX , mac_rx); + } +} +static int lan743x_mac_init (struct lan743x_adapter *adapter) {bool mac_address_valid = true;
@@ -831,6 +861,8 @@ static int lan743x_mac_init(struct lan743x_adapter *adapter)lan743x_mac_set_address (adapter, adapter->mac_address);eth_hw_addr_set (netdev, adapter->mac_address); +lan743x_mac_rx_enable_fse (adapter); +return 0 ; }
drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.h +1 -0
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@#define MAC_RX (0x104)#define MAC_RX_MAX_SIZE_SHIFT_ (16)#define MAC_RX_MAX_SIZE_MASK_ (0x3FFF0000) +#define MAC_RX_FSE_ BIT(2)#define MAC_RX_RXD_ BIT(1)#define MAC_RX_RXEN_ BIT(0)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 162/411 Bluetooth: RFCOMM: hold listener socket in rfcomm_connect_ind()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zhang Cen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 43c441edacf953b39517a44f5e5e10a93618b226 ]
rfcomm_get_sock_by_channel() scans rfcomm_sk_list under the list lock, but returns the selected listener after dropping that lock without taking a reference. rfcomm_connect_ind() then locks the listener, queues a child socket on it, and may notify it after unlocking it.
The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order within that path:
rfcomm_connect_ind(): listener close:
1. Find parent in 1. close() enters
rfcomm_get_sock_by_channel() rfcomm_sock_release().
2. Drop rfcomm_sk_list.lock 2. rfcomm_sock_shutdown()
without pinning parent. closes the listener.
3. Call lock_sock(parent) and 3. rfcomm_sock_kill()
bt_accept_enqueue(parent, unlinks and puts parent.
sk, true).
4. Read parent flags and may 4. parent can be freed.
call sk_state_change().
If close wins the race, parent can be freed before rfcomm_connect_ind() reaches lock_sock(), bt_accept_enqueue(), or the deferred-setup callback.
Take a reference on the listener before leaving rfcomm_sk_list.lock. After lock_sock() succeeds, recheck that it is still in BT_LISTEN before queueing a child, cache the deferred-setup bit while the parent is locked, and drop the reference after the last parent use.
KASAN reported a slab-use-after-free in lock_sock_nested() from rfcomm_connect_ind(), with the freeing stack going through rfcomm_sock_kill() and rfcomm_sock_release().
--- net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c +22 -4
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static struct sock *__rfcomm_get_listen_sock_by_addr(u8 channel, bdaddr_t *src) }/* Find socket with channel and source bdaddr. -* Returns closest match. +* Returns closest match with an extra reference held. */ static struct sock *rfcomm_get_sock_by_channel (int state,u8 channel,bdaddr_t *src) {
@@ -136,15 +136,25 @@ static struct sock *rfcomm_get_sock_by_channel(int state, u8 channel, bdaddr_t *if (rfcomm_pi (sk)->channel == channel) {/* Exact match. */ -if (!bacmp (&rfcomm_pi (sk)->src, src)) +if (!bacmp (&rfcomm_pi (sk)->src, src)) { +sock_hold (sk);break ; + }/* Closest match */ -if (!bacmp (&rfcomm_pi (sk)->src,BDADDR_ANY )) +if (!bacmp (&rfcomm_pi (sk)->src,BDADDR_ANY )) { +if (sk1) +sock_put (sk1); + sk1 = sk; +sock_hold (sk1); + } } } +if (sk && sk1) +sock_put (sk1); +read_unlock (&rfcomm_sk_list.lock);return sk ? sk : sk1;
@@ -941,6 +951,7 @@ int rfcomm_connect_ind(struct rfcomm_session *s, u8 channel, struct rfcomm_dlc * {struct sock *sk, *parent;bdaddr_t src, dst; +bool defer_setup = false;int result =0 ;BT_DBG ("session %p channel %d" , s, channel);
@@ -954,6 +965,11 @@ int rfcomm_connect_ind(struct rfcomm_session *s, u8 channel, struct rfcomm_dlc *lock_sock (parent); +if (parent->sk_state !=BT_LISTEN ) + goto done; + + defer_setup =test_bit (BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP , &bt_sk (parent)->flags); +/* Check for backlog size */ if (sk_acceptq_is_full (parent)) {BT_DBG ("backlog full %d" , parent->sk_ack_backlog);
@@ -981,9 +997,11 @@ int rfcomm_connect_ind(struct rfcomm_session *s, u8 channel, struct rfcomm_dlc * done:release_sock (parent); -if (test_bit (BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP , &bt_sk (parent)->flags)) +if (defer_setup) parent->sk_state_change (parent); +sock_put (parent); +return result; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 163/411 Bluetooth: MGMT: validate advertising TLV before type checks
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zhang Cen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit de23fb62259aa01d294f77238ae3b835eb674413 ]
tlv_data_is_valid() reads each advertising data field length from data[i], then inspects data[i + 1] for managed EIR types before checking that the current field still fits inside the supplied buffer.
A malformed field whose length byte is the last byte of the buffer can therefore make the parser read one byte past the advertising data.
KASAN reported the following when a malformed MGMT_OP_ADD_ADVERTISING request reached that path:
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in tlv_data_is_valid()
Read of size 1
Call trace:
tlv_data_is_valid()
add_advertising()
hci_mgmt_cmd()
hci_sock_sendmsg()Move the existing element-length check before any type-octet inspection so each non-empty element is proven to contain its type byte before the parser looks at data[i + 1].
--- net/bluetooth/mgmt.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/mgmt.c +6 -6
@@ -7635,6 +7635,12 @@ static bool tlv_data_is_valid(struct hci_dev *hdev, u32 adv_flags, u8 *data,if (!cur_len)continue ; +/* If the current field length would exceed the total data +* length, then it's invalid. +*/ +if (i + cur_len >= len) +return false; +if (data[i +1 ] ==EIR_FLAGS && (!is_adv_data ||flags_managed (adv_flags)))return false;
@@ -7651,12 +7657,6 @@ static bool tlv_data_is_valid(struct hci_dev *hdev, u32 adv_flags, u8 *data,if (data[i +1 ] ==EIR_APPEARANCE &&appearance_managed (adv_flags))return false; - -/* If the current field length would exceed the total data -* length, then it's invalid. -*/ -if (i + cur_len >= len) -return false; }return true;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 164/411 Bluetooth: RFCOMM: validate skb length in MCC handlers
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: SeungJu Cheon <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 23882b828c3c8c51d0c946446a396b10abb3b16b ]
The RFCOMM MCC handlers cast skb->data to protocol-specific structs without validating skb->len first. A malicious remote device can send truncated MCC frames and trigger out-of-bounds reads in these handlers.
Fix this by using skb_pull_data() to validate and access the required data before dereferencing it.
rfcomm_recv_rpn() requires special handling since ETSI TS 07.10 allows 1-byte RPN requests. Handle this by validating only the DLCI byte first, and validating the full struct only when len > 1.
--- net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c +49 -18
@@ -1427,10 +1427,15 @@ static int rfcomm_apply_pn(struct rfcomm_dlc *d, int cr, struct rfcomm_pn *pn)static int rfcomm_recv_pn (struct rfcomm_session *s,int cr,struct sk_buff *skb) { -struct rfcomm_pn *pn = (void *) skb->data; +struct rfcomm_pn *pn;struct rfcomm_dlc *d; -u8 dlci = pn->dlci; +u8 dlci; + + pn =skb_pull_data (skb,sizeof (*pn)); +if (!pn) +return -EILSEQ ; + dlci = pn->dlci;BT_DBG ("session %p state %ld dlci %d" , s, s->state, dlci);if (!dlci)
@@ -1479,8 +1484,8 @@ static int rfcomm_recv_pn(struct rfcomm_session *s, int cr, struct sk_buff *skb)static int rfcomm_recv_rpn (struct rfcomm_session *s,int cr,int len,struct sk_buff *skb) { -struct rfcomm_rpn *rpn = (void *) skb->data; -u8 dlci =__get_dlci (rpn->dlci); +struct rfcomm_rpn *rpn; +u8 dlci;u8 bit_rate =0 ;u8 data_bits =0 ;
@@ -1491,15 +1496,16 @@ static int rfcomm_recv_rpn(struct rfcomm_session *s, int cr, int len, struct sk_u8 xoff_char =0 ;u16 rpn_mask =RFCOMM_RPN_PM_ALL ; -BT_DBG ("dlci %d cr %d len 0x%x bitr 0x%x line 0x%x flow 0x%x xonc 0x%x xoffc 0x%x pm 0x%x" , - dlci, cr, len, rpn->bit_rate, rpn->line_settings, rpn->flow_ctrl, - rpn->xon_char, rpn->xoff_char, rpn->param_mask); +if (len ==1 ) { + rpn =skb_pull_data (skb,1 ); +if (!rpn) +return -EILSEQ ; -if (!cr) -return 0 ; + dlci =__get_dlci (rpn->dlci); + +if (!cr) +return 0 ; -if (len ==1 ) { -/* This is a request, return default (according to ETSI TS 07.10) settings */ bit_rate =RFCOMM_RPN_BR_9600 ; data_bits =RFCOMM_RPN_DATA_8 ; stop_bits =RFCOMM_RPN_STOP_1 ;
@@ -1510,6 +1516,19 @@ static int rfcomm_recv_rpn(struct rfcomm_session *s, int cr, int len, struct sk_ goto rpn_out; } + rpn =skb_pull_data (skb,sizeof (*rpn)); +if (!rpn) +return -EILSEQ ; + + dlci =__get_dlci (rpn->dlci); + +BT_DBG ("dlci %d cr %d len 0x%x bitr 0x%x line 0x%x flow 0x%x xonc 0x%x xoffc 0x%x pm 0x%x" , + dlci, cr, len, rpn->bit_rate, rpn->line_settings, rpn->flow_ctrl, + rpn->xon_char, rpn->xoff_char, rpn->param_mask); + +if (!cr) +return 0 ; +/* Check for sane values, ignore/accept bit_rate, 8 bits, 1 stop bit, * no parity, no flow control lines, normal XON/XOFF chars */
@@ -1585,9 +1604,14 @@ static int rfcomm_recv_rpn(struct rfcomm_session *s, int cr, int len, struct sk_static int rfcomm_recv_rls (struct rfcomm_session *s,int cr,struct sk_buff *skb) { -struct rfcomm_rls *rls = (void *) skb->data; -u8 dlci =__get_dlci (rls->dlci); +struct rfcomm_rls *rls; +u8 dlci; + rls =skb_pull_data (skb,sizeof (*rls)); +if (!rls) +return -EILSEQ ; + + dlci =__get_dlci (rls->dlci);BT_DBG ("dlci %d cr %d status 0x%x" , dlci, cr, rls->status);if (!cr)
@@ -1604,10 +1628,15 @@ static int rfcomm_recv_rls(struct rfcomm_session *s, int cr, struct sk_buff *skbstatic int rfcomm_recv_msc (struct rfcomm_session *s,int cr,struct sk_buff *skb) { -struct rfcomm_msc *msc = (void *) skb->data; +struct rfcomm_msc *msc;struct rfcomm_dlc *d; -u8 dlci =__get_dlci (msc->dlci); +u8 dlci; + + msc =skb_pull_data (skb,sizeof (*msc)); +if (!msc) +return -EILSEQ ; + dlci =__get_dlci (msc->dlci);BT_DBG ("dlci %d cr %d v24 0x%x" , dlci, cr, msc->v24_sig); d =rfcomm_dlc_get (s, dlci);
@@ -1640,17 +1669,19 @@ static int rfcomm_recv_msc(struct rfcomm_session *s, int cr, struct sk_buff *skbstatic int rfcomm_recv_mcc (struct rfcomm_session *s,struct sk_buff *skb) { -struct rfcomm_mcc *mcc = (void *) skb->data; +struct rfcomm_mcc *mcc;u8 type, cr, len; + mcc =skb_pull_data (skb,sizeof (*mcc)); +if (!mcc) +return -EILSEQ ; + cr =__test_cr (mcc->type); type =__get_mcc_type (mcc->type); len =__get_mcc_len (mcc->len);BT_DBG ("%p type 0x%x cr %d" , s, type, cr); -skb_pull (skb,2 ); -switch (type) {case RFCOMM_PN :rfcomm_recv_pn (s, cr, skb);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 165/411 Bluetooth: bnep: fix incorrect length parsing in bnep_rx_frame() extension handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dudu Lu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 72b8deccff17a7644e0367e1aaf1a36cfb014324 ]
In bnep_rx_frame(), the BNEP_FILTER_NET_TYPE_SET and BNEP_FILTER_MULTI_ADDR_SET extension header parsing has two bugs:
1) The 2-byte length field is read with *(u16 *)(skb->data + 1), which performs a native-endian read. The BNEP protocol specifies this field in big-endian (network byte order), and the same file correctly uses get_unaligned_be16() for the identical fields in bnep_ctrl_set_netfilter() and bnep_ctrl_set_mcfilter().
2) The length is multiplied by 2, but unlike BNEP_SETUP_CONN_REQ where the length byte counts UUID pairs (requiring * 2 for two UUIDs per entry), the filter extension length field already represents the total data size in bytes. This is confirmed by bnep_ctrl_set_netfilter() which reads the same field as a byte count and divides by 4 to get the number of filter entries.
The bogus * 2 means skb_pull advances twice as far as it should, either dropping valid data from the next header or causing the pull to fail entirely when the doubled length exceeds the remaining skb.
Fix by splitting the pull into two steps: first use skb_pull_data() to safely pull and validate the 3-byte fixed header (ctrl type + length), then pull the variable-length data using the properly decoded length.
--- net/bluetooth/bnep/core.c | 13 ++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/bnep/core.c +10 -3
@@ -330,11 +330,18 @@ static int bnep_rx_frame(struct bnep_session *s, struct sk_buff *skb) goto badframe;break ;case BNEP_FILTER_MULTI_ADDR_SET : -case BNEP_FILTER_NET_TYPE_SET : -/* Pull: ctrl type (1 b), len (2 b), data (len bytes) */ -if (!skb_pull (skb,3 + *(u16 *)(skb->data +1 ) *2 )) +case BNEP_FILTER_NET_TYPE_SET : { +u8 *hdr; + +/* Pull ctrl type (1 b) + len (2 b) */ + hdr =skb_pull_data (skb,3 ); +if (!hdr) + goto badframe; +/* Pull data (len bytes); length is big-endian */ +if (!skb_pull (skb,get_unaligned_be16 (&hdr[1 ]))) goto badframe;break ; + }default :kfree_skb (skb);return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 166/411 Bluetooth: bnep: reject short frames before parsing
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zhang Cen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6770d3a8acdf9151769180cc3710346c4cfbe6f0 ]
A BNEP peer can send a short BNEP SDU. bnep_rx_frame() reads the packet type byte immediately and, for control packets, reads the control opcode and setup UUID-size byte before proving that those bytes are present. bnep_rx_control() also dereferences the control opcode without rejecting an empty control payload.
Use skb_pull_data() for the fixed fields in bnep_rx_frame() so a NULL return gates each dereference. Split the control handler so the frame path can pass an opcode that has already been pulled, and keep the byte-buffer wrapper for extension control payloads.
For BNEP_SETUP_CONN_REQ, name the UUID-size byte before pulling the setup payload. struct bnep_setup_conn_req carries destination and source service UUIDs after that byte, each uuid_size bytes, so the parser now documents that tuple explicitly instead of leaving the pull length as an opaque multiplication.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in bnep_rx_frame.isra.0+0x130c/0x1790
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800c0f7908 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 1-byte region [ffff88800c0f7908, ffff88800c0f7909) Read of size 1 Call trace: dump_stack_lvl+0xb3/0x140 (?:?) print_address_description+0x57/0x3a0 (?:?) bnep_rx_frame+0x130c/0x1790 (net/bluetooth/bnep/core.c:306) print_report+0xb9/0x2b0 (?:?) __virt_addr_valid+0x1ba/0x3a0 (?:?) srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?) kasan_addr_to_slab+0x21/0x60 (?:?) kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 (?:?) process_one_work+0xfce/0x17e0 (kernel/workqueue.c:3200) worker_thread+0x65c/0xe40 (?:?) __kthread_parkme+0x184/0x230 (?:?) kthread+0x35e/0x470 (?:?) _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x50 (?:?) ret_from_fork+0x586/0x870 (?:?) __switch_to+0x74f/0xdc0 (?:?) ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 (?:?)
--- net/bluetooth/bnep/core.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/bnep/core.c +36 -21
@@ -206,14 +206,11 @@ static int bnep_ctrl_set_mcfilter(struct bnep_session *s, u8 *data, int len)return 0 ; } -static int bnep_rx_control (struct bnep_session *s,void *data,int len) +static int bnep_rx_control_cmd (struct bnep_session *s,u8 cmd,void *data, +int len) { -u8 cmd = *(u8 *)data;int err =0 ; - data++; - len--; -switch (cmd) {case BNEP_CMD_NOT_UNDERSTOOD :case BNEP_SETUP_CONN_RSP :
@@ -254,6 +251,14 @@ static int bnep_rx_control(struct bnep_session *s, void *data, int len)return err; } +static int bnep_rx_control (struct bnep_session *s,void *data,int len) +{ +if (len <1 ) +return -EILSEQ ; + +return bnep_rx_control_cmd (s, *(u8 *)data, data +1 , len -1 ); +} +static int bnep_rx_extension (struct bnep_session *s,struct sk_buff *skb) {struct bnep_ext_hdr *h;
@@ -299,19 +304,26 @@ static int bnep_rx_frame(struct bnep_session *s, struct sk_buff *skb) {struct net_device *dev = s->dev;struct sk_buff *nskb; +u8 *data;u8 type, ctrl_type; dev->stats.rx_bytes += skb->len; - type = *(u8 *) skb->data; -skb_pull (skb,1 ); - ctrl_type = *(u8 *)skb->data; + data =skb_pull_data (skb,sizeof (type)); +if (!data) + goto badframe; + type = *data;if ((type &BNEP_TYPE_MASK ) >=sizeof (__bnep_rx_hlen)) goto badframe;if ((type &BNEP_TYPE_MASK ) ==BNEP_CONTROL ) { -if (bnep_rx_control (s, skb->data, skb->len) <0 ) { + data =skb_pull_data (skb,sizeof (ctrl_type)); +if (!data) + goto badframe; + ctrl_type = *data; + +if (bnep_rx_control_cmd (s, ctrl_type, skb->data, skb->len) <0 ) { dev->stats.tx_errors++;kfree_skb (skb);return 0 ;
@@ -324,24 +336,27 @@ static int bnep_rx_frame(struct bnep_session *s, struct sk_buff *skb)/* Verify and pull ctrl message since it's already processed */ switch (ctrl_type) { -case BNEP_SETUP_CONN_REQ : -/* Pull: ctrl type (1 b), len (1 b), data (len bytes) */ -if (!skb_pull (skb,2 + *(u8 *)(skb->data +1 ) *2 )) +case BNEP_SETUP_CONN_REQ : { +u8 uuid_size; + +/* Pull uuid_size and the dst/src service UUIDs. */ + data =skb_pull_data (skb,sizeof (uuid_size)); +if (!data) + goto badframe; + uuid_size = *data; +if (!skb_pull (skb, uuid_size + uuid_size)) goto badframe;break ; + }case BNEP_FILTER_MULTI_ADDR_SET : -case BNEP_FILTER_NET_TYPE_SET : { -u8 *hdr; - -/* Pull ctrl type (1 b) + len (2 b) */ - hdr =skb_pull_data (skb,3 ); -if (!hdr) +case BNEP_FILTER_NET_TYPE_SET : +/* Pull: len (2 b), data (len bytes) */ + data =skb_pull_data (skb,sizeof (u16)); +if (!data) goto badframe; -/* Pull data (len bytes); length is big-endian */ -if (!skb_pull (skb,get_unaligned_be16 (&hdr[1 ]))) +if (!skb_pull (skb,get_unaligned_be16 (data))) goto badframe;break ; - }default :kfree_skb (skb);return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 167/411 Bluetooth: fix memory leak in error path of hci_alloc_dev()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bharath Reddy <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 37b3009bf5976e8ab77c8b9a9bc3bbd7ff49e37f ]
Early failures in Bluetooth HCI UART configuration leak SRCU percpu memory.
When device initialization fails before hci_register_dev() completes, the HCI_UNREGISTER flag is never set. As a result, when the device reference count reaches zero, bt_host_release() evaluates this flag as false and falls back to a direct kfree(hdev).
Because hci_release_dev() is bypassed, the SRCU struct initialized early in hci_alloc_dev() is never cleaned up, resulting in a leak of percpu memory.
Fix the leak by explicitly calling cleanup_srcu_struct() in the fallback (unregistered) branch of bt_host_release() before freeing the device.
--- net/bluetooth/hci_sysfs.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/hci_sysfs.c +4 -2
@@ -81,10 +81,12 @@ static void bt_host_release(struct device *dev) {struct hci_dev *hdev =to_hci_dev (dev); -if (hci_dev_test_flag (hdev,HCI_UNREGISTER )) +if (hci_dev_test_flag (hdev,HCI_UNREGISTER )) {hci_release_dev (hdev); -else + }else { +cleanup_srcu_struct (&hdev->srcu);kfree (hdev); + }module_put (THIS_MODULE ); }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 168/411 ipv4: restrict IPOPT_SSRR and IPOPT_LSRR options
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d3915a1f5a4bc0ac911032903c3c6ab8df9fcc7c ]
This patch restricts setting Loose Source and Record Route (LSRR) and Strict Source and Record Route (SSRR) IP options to users with CAP_NET_RAW capability.
This prevents unprivileged applications from forcing packets to route through attacker-controlled nodes to leak TCP ISN and possibly other protocol information.
While LSRR and SSRR are commonly filtered in many network environments, they may still be supported and forwarded along some network paths.
RFC 7126 (Recommendations on Filtering of IPv4 Packets Containing IPv4 Options) recommend to drop these options in 4.3 and 4.4.
--- net/ipv4/ip_options.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
net/ipv4/ip_options.c +4 -0
@@ -543,6 +543,10 @@ int ip_options_get(struct net *net, struct ip_options_rcu **optp,kfree (opt);return -EINVAL ; } +if (opt->opt.srr && !ns_capable (net->user_ns,CAP_NET_RAW )) { +kfree (opt); +return -EPERM ; + }kfree (*optp); *optp = opt;return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 169/411 ieee802154: 6lowpan: only accept IPv6 packets in lowpan_xmit()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3a5f3f7aff18bcc36a57839cf50cf0cc8de707f3 ]
The aoe driver (or similar) generates a non-IPv6 packet (e.g., ETH_P_AOE) and queues it for transmission via dev_queue_xmit() on a 6LoWPAN interface (configured by the user or test case).
Since the packet is not IPv6, the 6LoWPAN header_ops->create function (lowpan_header_create or header_create) returns early without initializing the lowpan_addr_info structure in the skb headroom.
In the transmit function (lowpan_xmit), the driver calls lowpan_header (or setup_header) which unconditionally copies and uses the lowpan_addr_info from the headroom, which contains uninitialized data.
Fix this by dropping non IPv6 packets.
A similar fix is needed in net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c bt_xmit().
--- net/ieee802154/6lowpan/tx.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
net/ieee802154/6lowpan/tx.c +5 -0
@@ -255,6 +255,11 @@ netdev_tx_t lowpan_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *ldev)pr_debug ("package xmit\n" ); +if (skb->protocol !=htons (ETH_P_IPV6 )) { +kfree_skb (skb); +return NET_XMIT_DROP ; + } +WARN_ON_ONCE (skb->len >IPV6_MIN_MTU );/* We must take a copy of the skb before we modify/replace the ipv6
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 170/411 net/802/mrp: fix vector attribute parsing in mrp_pdu_parse_vecattr
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yizhou Zhao <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7561c7fbc694308da73300f036719e63e42bf0b4 ]
In mrp_pdu_parse_vecattr(), vector attribute events are encoded three per byte and valen tracks the number of events left to process.
The parser decrements valen after processing the first and second events from each event byte, but not after processing the third one. When valen is exactly a multiple of three, the loop continues after the last valid event and consumes the next byte as a new event byte, applying a spurious event to the MRP applicant state.
Additionally, when valen is zero the parser unconditionally consumes attrlen bytes as FirstValue and advances the offset, even though per IEEE 802.1ak a VectorAttribute with only a LeaveAllEvent has valen of zero and no FirstValue or Vector fields. This corrupts the offset for subsequent PDU parsing.
Also, when valen exceeds three the loop crosses byte boundaries but the attribute value is not incremented between the last event of one byte and the first event of the next. This causes the first event of the next byte to use the same attribute value as the third event rather than the next consecutive value.
Decrement valen after processing the third event, skip FirstValue consumption when valen is zero, and increment the attribute value at the end of each loop iteration.
--- net/802/mrp.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
net/802/mrp.c +9 -0
@@ -702,6 +702,12 @@ static int mrp_pdu_parse_vecattr(struct mrp_applicant *app, valen =be16_to_cpu (get_unaligned (&mrp_cb (skb)->vah->lenflags) &MRP_VECATTR_HDR_LEN_MASK ); +/* If valen is 0, only a LeaveAllEvent is present; FirstValue and +* Vector fields are absent per IEEE 802.1ak. +*/ +if (valen ==0 ) +return 0 ; +/* The VectorAttribute structure in a PDU carries event information * about one or more attributes having consecutive values. Only the * value for the first attribute is contained in the structure. So
@@ -752,6 +758,9 @@ static int mrp_pdu_parse_vecattr(struct mrp_applicant *app, vaevents %= __MRP_VECATTR_EVENT_MAX; vaevent = vaevents;mrp_pdu_parse_vecattr_event (app, skb, vaevent); + valen--; +mrp_attrvalue_inc (mrp_cb (skb)->attrvalue, +mrp_cb (skb)->mh->attrlen); }return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 171/411 sctp: purge outqueue on stale COOKIE-ECHO handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Xin Long <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e374b22e9b07b72a25909621464ff74096151bfb ]
sctp_stream_update() is only invoked when the association is moved into COOKIE_WAIT during association setup/reconfiguration. In this path, the outbound stream scheduler state (stream->out_curr) is expected to be clean, since no user data should have been transmitted yet unless the state machine has already partially progressed.
However, a corner case exists in sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(): when a Stale Cookie ERROR is received, the association is rolled back from COOKIE_ECHOED to COOKIE_WAIT. In this scenario, user data may already have been queued and even bundled with the COOKIE-ECHO chunk.
During the rollback, sctp_stream_update() frees the old stream table and installs a new one, but it does not invalidate stream->out_curr. As a result, out_curr may still point to a freed sctp_stream_out entry from the previous stream state.
Later, SCTP scheduler dequeue paths (FCFS, RR, PRIO, etc.) rely on stream->out_curr->ext, which can lead to use-after-free once the old stream state has been released via sctp_stream_free().
This results in crashes such as (reported by Yuqi):
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sctp_sched_fcfs_dequeue+0x13a/0x140
Read of size 8 at addr ff1100004d4d3208 by task mini_poc/9312
CPU: 1 UID: 1001 PID: 9312 Comm: mini_poc Not tainted
7.1.0-rc1-00305-gbd3a4795d574 #5 PREEMPT(full)
sctp_sched_fcfs_dequeue+0x13a/0x140
sctp_outq_flush+0x1603/0x33e0
sctp_do_sm+0x31c9/0x5d30
sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x392/0x6f0
sctp_inq_push+0x1db/0x270
sctp_rcv+0x138d/0x3c10Fix this by fully purging the association outqueue when handling the Stale Cookie case. This ensures all pending transmit and retransmit state is dropped, and any scheduler cached pointers are invalidated, making it safe to rebuild stream state during COOKIE_WAIT restart.
Updating only stream->out_curr would be insufficient, since queued and retransmittable data would still reference the old stream state and trigger later use-after-free in dequeue paths.
--- net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 6 +----- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +1 -5
@@ -2583,11 +2583,7 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(*/ sctp_add_cmd_sf (commands,SCTP_CMD_DEL_NON_PRIMARY ,SCTP_NULL ()); -/* If we've sent any data bundled with COOKIE-ECHO we will need to -* resend -*/ -sctp_add_cmd_sf (commands,SCTP_CMD_T1_RETRAN , -SCTP_TRANSPORT (asoc->peer.primary_path)); +sctp_add_cmd_sf (commands,SCTP_CMD_PURGE_OUTQUEUE ,SCTP_NULL ());/* Cast away the const modifier, as we want to just * rerun it through as a sideffect.
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 172/411 signal: clear JOBCTL_PENDING_MASK for caller in zap_other_threads()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Aleksandr Nogikh <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 90918794a4e2c3b440f8fcf3847765a8b1d81b25 ]
When a multi-threaded process receives a stop signal (e.g., SIGSTOP), do_signal_stop() sets JOBCTL_STOP_PENDING and JOBCTL_STOP_CONSUME on all threads and sets signal->group_stop_count to the number of threads. If one of the threads concurrently calls execve(), de_thread() invokes zap_other_threads() to kill all other threads. zap_other_threads() aborts the pending group stop by resetting signal->group_stop_count to 0 and clears the JOBCTL_PENDING_MASK for all other threads. However, it fails to clear the job control flags for the calling thread.
When execve() completes, the calling thread returns to user mode and checks for pending signals. Seeing the stale JOBCTL_STOP_PENDING flag, it calls do_signal_stop(), which invokes task_participate_group_stop(). Since JOBCTL_STOP_CONSUME is still set, it attempts to decrement the already-zero signal->group_stop_count, triggering a warning:
sig->group_stop_count == 0
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 6475 at kernel/signal.c:373 task_participate_group_stop+0x215/0x2d0 Call Trace: <TASK> do_signal_stop+0x3be/0x5c0 kernel/signal.c:2619 get_signal+0xa8c/0x1330 kernel/signal.c:2884 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0xbc/0x840 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337 exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x8c/0x4d0 kernel/entry/common.c:98 do_syscall_64+0x33e/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK>
Fix this race condition by clearing the JOBCTL_PENDING_MASK for the calling thread in zap_other_threads(), ensuring it does not retain any stale job control state after the thread group is destroyed. This aligns with other functions that tear down a thread group and abort group stops, such as zap_process() and complete_signal(), which correctly clear these flags for all threads including the current one.
--- kernel/signal.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
kernel/signal.c +1 -0
@@ -1364,6 +1364,7 @@ int zap_other_threads(struct task_struct *p)int count =0 ; p->signal->group_stop_count =0 ; +task_clear_jobctl_pending (p,JOBCTL_PENDING_MASK ); while_each_thread(p, t) {task_clear_jobctl_pending (t,JOBCTL_PENDING_MASK );
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 173/411 time: Fix off-by-one in settimeofday() usec validation
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Naveen Kumar Chaudhary <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ce4abda5e12622f33450159e76c8f56d28d7f03d ]
The validation check uses '>' instead of '>=' when comparing tv_usec against USEC_PER_SEC, allowing the value 1000000 through. After conversion to nanoseconds (*= 1000), this produces tv_nsec == NSEC_PER_SEC, violating the timespec invariant that tv_nsec must be less than NSEC_PER_SEC.
Use '>=' to reject tv_usec values that are not in the valid range of 0 to 999999.
--- kernel/time/time.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/time/time.c +1 -1
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(settimeofday, struct __kernel_old_timeval __user *, tv, get_user(new_ts.tv_nsec, &tv->tv_usec))return -EFAULT ; -if (new_ts.tv_nsec >USEC_PER_SEC || new_ts.tv_nsec <0 ) +if (new_ts.tv_nsec >=USEC_PER_SEC || new_ts.tv_nsec <0 )return -EINVAL ; new_ts.tv_nsec *=NSEC_PER_USEC ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 174/411 ext4: validate p_idx bounds in ext4_ext_correct_indexes
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tejas Bharambe <[email protected]>
commit 2acb5c12ebd860f30e4faf67e6cc8c44ddfe5fe8 upstream.
ext4_ext_correct_indexes() walks up the extent tree correcting index entries when the first extent in a leaf is modified. Before accessing path[k].p_idx->ei_block, there is no validation that p_idx falls within the valid range of index entries for that level.
If the on-disk extent header contains a corrupted or crafted eh_entries value, p_idx can point past the end of the allocated buffer, causing a slab-out-of-bounds read.
Fix this by validating path[k].p_idx against EXT_LAST_INDEX() at both access sites: before the while loop and inside it. Return -EFSCORRUPTED if the index pointer is out of range, consistent with how other bounds violations are handled in the ext4 extent tree code.
[ Alexey: Adapt goto clean to break because the clean error path is not
present in linux-5.10.y and linux-5.15.y. ]
--- fs/ext4/extents.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
fs/ext4/extents.c +15 -0
@@ -1736,6 +1736,13 @@ static int ext4_ext_correct_indexes(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, err =ext4_ext_get_access (handle, inode, path + k);if (err)return err; +if (unlikely (path[k].p_idx >EXT_LAST_INDEX (path[k].p_hdr))) { +EXT4_ERROR_INODE (inode, +"path[%d].p_idx %p > EXT_LAST_INDEX %p" , + k, path[k].p_idx, +EXT_LAST_INDEX (path[k].p_hdr)); +return -EFSCORRUPTED ; + } path[k].p_idx->ei_block = border; err =ext4_ext_dirty (handle, inode, path + k);if (err)
@@ -1748,6 +1755,14 @@ static int ext4_ext_correct_indexes(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, err =ext4_ext_get_access (handle, inode, path + k);if (err)break ; +if (unlikely (path[k].p_idx >EXT_LAST_INDEX (path[k].p_hdr))) { +EXT4_ERROR_INODE (inode, +"path[%d].p_idx %p > EXT_LAST_INDEX %p" , + k, path[k].p_idx, +EXT_LAST_INDEX (path[k].p_hdr)); + err = -EFSCORRUPTED ; +break ; + } path[k].p_idx->ei_block = border; err =ext4_ext_dirty (handle, inode, path + k);if (err)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 175/411 fs/ntfs3: Return error for inconsistent extended attributes
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Edward Lo <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c9db0ff04649aa0b45f497183c957fe260f229f6 ]
ntfs_read_ea is called when we want to read extended attributes. There are some sanity checks for the validity of the EAs. However, it fails to return a proper error code for the inconsistent attributes, which might lead to unpredicted memory accesses after return.
[ 138.916927] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ntfs_set_ea+0x453/0xbf0 [ 138.923876] Write of size 4 at addr ffff88800205cfac by task poc/199 [ 138.931132] [ 138.933016] CPU: 0 PID: 199 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.2.0-rc1+ #4 [ 138.938070] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 138.947327] Call Trace: [ 138.949557] <TASK> [ 138.951539] dump_stack_lvl+0x4d/0x67 [ 138.956834] print_report+0x16f/0x4a6 [ 138.960798] ? ntfs_set_ea+0x453/0xbf0 [ 138.964437] ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x7d/0x200 [ 138.969793] ? ntfs_set_ea+0x453/0xbf0 [ 138.973523] kasan_report+0xb8/0x140 [ 138.976740] ? ntfs_set_ea+0x453/0xbf0 [ 138.980578] __asan_store4+0x76/0xa0 [ 138.984669] ntfs_set_ea+0x453/0xbf0 [ 138.988115] ? __pfx_ntfs_set_ea+0x10/0x10 [ 138.993390] ? kernel_text_address+0xd3/0xe0 [ 138.998270] ? __kernel_text_address+0x16/0x50 [ 139.002121] ? unwind_get_return_address+0x3e/0x60 [ 139.005659] ? __pfx_stack_trace_consume_entry+0x10/0x10 [ 139.010177] ? arch_stack_walk+0xa2/0x100 [ 139.013657] ? filter_irq_stacks+0x27/0x80 [ 139.017018] ntfs_setxattr+0x405/0x440 [ 139.022151] ? __pfx_ntfs_setxattr+0x10/0x10 [ 139.026569] ? kvmalloc_node+0x2d/0x120 [ 139.030329] ? kasan_save_stack+0x41/0x60 [ 139.033883] ? kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x60 [ 139.037338] ? kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40 [ 139.040163] ? kasan_save_alloc_info+0x1f/0x30 [ 139.043588] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x8b/0xa0 [ 139.047255] ? __kmalloc_node+0x68/0x150 [ 139.051264] ? kvmalloc_node+0x2d/0x120 [ 139.055301] ? vmemdup_user+0x2b/0xa0 [ 139.058584] __vfs_setxattr+0x121/0x170 [ 139.062617] ? __pfx___vfs_setxattr+0x10/0x10 [ 139.066282] __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x97/0x300 [ 139.070061] __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x145/0x170 [ 139.073580] vfs_setxattr+0x137/0x2a0 [ 139.076641] ? __pfx_vfs_setxattr+0x10/0x10 [ 139.080223] ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20 [ 139.084234] do_setxattr+0xce/0x150 [ 139.087768] setxattr+0x126/0x140 [ 139.091250] ? __pfx_setxattr+0x10/0x10 [ 139.094948] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xcb/0x140 [ 139.097838] ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x1c7/0x330 [ 139.102688] ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x1b/0x30 [ 139.105985] ? kasan_quarantine_put+0x5b/0x190 [ 139.109980] ? putname+0x84/0xa0 [ 139.113886] ? __kasan_slab_free+0x11e/0x1b0 [ 139.117961] ? putname+0x84/0xa0 [ 139.121316] ? preempt_count_sub+0x1c/0xd0 [ 139.124427] ? __mnt_want_write+0xae/0x100 [ 139.127836] ? mnt_want_write+0x8f/0x150 [ 139.130954] path_setxattr+0x164/0x180 [ 139.133998] ? __pfx_path_setxattr+0x10/0x10 [ 139.137853] ? __pfx_ksys_pwrite64+0x10/0x10 [ 139.141299] ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x1b/0x30 [ 139.145714] ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x6b/0x80 [ 139.150796] __x64_sys_setxattr+0x71/0x90 [ 139.155407] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [ 139.159035] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc [ 139.163843] RIP: 0033:0x7f108cae4469 [ 139.166481] Code: 00 f3 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 088 [ 139.183764] RSP: 002b:00007fff87588388 EFLAGS: 00000286 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000bc [ 139.190657] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f108cae4469 [ 139.196586] RDX: 00007fff875883b0 RSI: 00007fff875883d1 RDI: 00007fff875883b6 [ 139.201716] RBP: 00007fff8758c530 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007fff8758c618 [ 139.207940] R10: 0000000000000006 R11: 0000000000000286 R12: 00000000004004c0 [ 139.214007] R13: 00007fff8758c610 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
--- fs/ntfs3/xattr.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/ntfs3/xattr.c +1 -0
@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ static int ntfs_read_ea(struct ntfs_inode *ni, struct EA_FULL **ea,memset (Add2Ptr (ea_p, size),0 , add_bytes); + err = -EINVAL ;/* Check all attributes for consistency. */ for (off =0 ; off < size; off += ea_size) {const struct EA_FULL *ef =Add2Ptr (ea_p, off);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 176/411 nfsd: dont ignore the return code of svc_proc_register()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
commit 930b64ca0c511521f0abdd1d57ce52b2a6e3476b upstream.
Currently, nfsd_proc_stat_init() ignores the return value of svc_proc_register(). If the procfile creation fails, then the kernel will WARN when it tries to remove the entry later.
Fix nfsd_proc_stat_init() to return the same type of pointer as svc_proc_register(), and fix up nfsd_net_init() to check that and fail the nfsd_net construction if it occurs.
svc_proc_register() can fail if the dentry can't be allocated, or if an identical dentry already exists. The second case is pretty unlikely in the nfsd_net construction codepath, so if this happens, return -ENOMEM.
--- fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c | 9 ++++++++- fs/nfsd/stats.c | 4 ++-- fs/nfsd/stats.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c +8 -1
@@ -1460,17 +1460,24 @@ static __net_init int nfsd_init_net(struct net *net) retval =nfsd_stat_counters_init (nn);if (retval) goto out_repcache_error; +memset (&nn->nfsd_svcstats,0 ,sizeof (nn->nfsd_svcstats)); nn->nfsd_svcstats.program = &nfsd_program; +if (!nfsd_proc_stat_init (net)) { + retval = -ENOMEM ; + goto out_proc_error; + } + nn->nfsd_versions =NULL ; nn->nfsd4_minorversions =NULL ;nfsd4_init_leases_net (nn);get_random_bytes (&nn->siphash_key,sizeof (nn->siphash_key));seqlock_init (&nn->writeverf_lock); -nfsd_proc_stat_init (net);return 0 ; +out_proc_error: +nfsd_stat_counters_destroy (nn); out_repcache_error:nfsd_idmap_shutdown (net); out_idmap_error:
fs/nfsd/stats.c +2 -2
@@ -113,11 +113,11 @@ void nfsd_stat_counters_destroy(struct nfsd_net *nn)nfsd_percpu_counters_destroy (nn->counter,NFSD_STATS_COUNTERS_NUM ); } -void nfsd_proc_stat_init (struct net *net) +struct proc_dir_entry *nfsd_proc_stat_init (struct net *net) {struct nfsd_net *nn =net_generic (net, nfsd_net_id); -svc_proc_register (net, &nn->nfsd_svcstats, &nfsd_proc_ops); +return svc_proc_register (net, &nn->nfsd_svcstats, &nfsd_proc_ops); }void nfsd_proc_stat_shutdown (struct net *net)
fs/nfsd/stats.h +1 -1
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ void nfsd_percpu_counters_reset(struct percpu_counter *counters, int num);void nfsd_percpu_counters_destroy (struct percpu_counter *counters,int num);int nfsd_stat_counters_init (struct nfsd_net *nn);void nfsd_stat_counters_destroy (struct nfsd_net *nn); -void nfsd_proc_stat_init (struct net *net); +struct proc_dir_entry *nfsd_proc_stat_init (struct net *net);void nfsd_proc_stat_shutdown (struct net *net);static inline void nfsd_stats_rc_hits_inc (struct nfsd_net *nn)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 177/411 tap: free page on error paths in tap_get_user_xdp()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Weiming Shi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3bcf7aec6a9d16438f2cec29f5d7c8d5b8edf9b2 ]
tap_get_user_xdp() rejects a frame shorter than ETH_HLEN with -EINVAL, and returns -ENOMEM when build_skb() fails. Both paths jump to the err label without freeing the page that vhost_net_build_xdp() allocated for the frame. tap_sendmsg() discards the per-buffer return value and always returns 0, so vhost_tx_batch() takes the success path and never frees the page; each rejected frame in a batch leaks one page-frag chunk.
Free the page on both error paths, before the skb is built. This is the tap counterpart of the same leak in tun_xdp_one().
--- drivers/net/tap.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/net/tap.c +2 -0
@@ -1143,6 +1143,7 @@ static int tap_get_user_xdp(struct tap_queue *q, struct xdp_buff *xdp)int err, depth;if (unlikely (xdp->data_end - xdp->data <ETH_HLEN )) { +put_page (virt_to_head_page (xdp->data)); err = -EINVAL ; goto err; }
@@ -1152,6 +1153,7 @@ static int tap_get_user_xdp(struct tap_queue *q, struct xdp_buff *xdp) skb =build_skb (xdp->data_hard_start, buflen);if (!skb) { +put_page (virt_to_head_page (xdp->data)); err = -ENOMEM ; goto err; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 178/411 tun: free page on build_skb failure in tun_xdp_one()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Weiming Shi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit aa8963fdce667a42fb7f0bdd2909fadcab02f9a8 ]
When build_skb() fails in tun_xdp_one(), the function sets ret to -ENOMEM and jumps to the out label, which returns without freeing the page that vhost_net_build_xdp() allocated for the frame. As with the short-frame rejection path, tun_sendmsg() discards the per-buffer error and still returns total_len, so vhost_tx_batch() takes the success path and never frees the page. Each build_skb() failure in a batch leaks one page-frag chunk.
Free the page before taking the error path, matching the put_page() the other error exits of tun_xdp_one() already perform.
[Harshit: Backport to 5.15.y/5.10.y, use err instead of ret, no change needed]
--- drivers/net/tun.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/tun.c +1 -0
@@ -2468,6 +2468,7 @@ static int tun_xdp_one(struct tun_struct *tun, build: skb =build_skb (xdp->data_hard_start, buflen);if (!skb) { +put_page (virt_to_head_page (xdp->data)); err = -ENOMEM ; goto out; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 179/411 KVM: arm64: Remove VPIPT I-cache handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
commit ced242ba9d7cb3571f6e0f165f643cb832d52148 upstream.
We have some special handling for VPIPT I-cache in critical parts of the cache and TLB maintenance. Remove it.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h | 4 ++-- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/tlb.c | 35 -------------------------------- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/tlb.c | 13 ------------ 3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h +2 -2
@@ -207,8 +207,8 @@ static inline void __invalidate_icache_guest_page(void *va, size_t size)if (icache_is_aliasing ()) {/* any kind of VIPT cache */ icache_inval_all_pou (); - }else if (is_kernel_in_hyp_mode () || !icache_is_vpipt ()) { -/* PIPT or VPIPT at EL2 (see comment in __kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_ipa) */ + }else { +/* PIPT */ icache_inval_pou ((unsigned long )va, (unsigned long )va + size); } }
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/tlb.c +0 -35
@@ -84,28 +84,6 @@ void __kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_ipa(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu,dsb (ish);isb (); -/* -* If the host is running at EL1 and we have a VPIPT I-cache, -* then we must perform I-cache maintenance at EL2 in order for -* it to have an effect on the guest. Since the guest cannot hit -* I-cache lines allocated with a different VMID, we don't need -* to worry about junk out of guest reset (we nuke the I-cache on -* VMID rollover), but we do need to be careful when remapping -* executable pages for the same guest. This can happen when KSM -* takes a CoW fault on an executable page, copies the page into -* a page that was previously mapped in the guest and then needs -* to invalidate the guest view of the I-cache for that page -* from EL1. To solve this, we invalidate the entire I-cache when -* unmapping a page from a guest if we have a VPIPT I-cache but -* the host is running at EL1. As above, we could do better if -* we had the VA. -* -* The moral of this story is: if you have a VPIPT I-cache, then -* you should be running with VHE enabled. -*/ -if (icache_is_vpipt ()) -icache_inval_all_pou (); -__tlb_switch_to_host (&cxt); }
@@ -144,18 +122,5 @@ void __kvm_flush_vm_context(void) {dsb (ishst);__tlbi (alle1is); - -/* -* VIPT and PIPT caches are not affected by VMID, so no maintenance -* is necessary across a VMID rollover. -* -* VPIPT caches constrain lookup and maintenance to the active VMID, -* so we need to invalidate lines with a stale VMID to avoid an ABA -* race after multiple rollovers. -* -*/ -if (icache_is_vpipt ()) - asmvolatile ("ic ialluis" ); -dsb (ish); }
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/tlb.c +0 -13
@@ -146,18 +146,5 @@ void __kvm_flush_vm_context(void) {dsb (ishst);__tlbi (alle1is); - -/* -* VIPT and PIPT caches are not affected by VMID, so no maintenance -* is necessary across a VMID rollover. -* -* VPIPT caches constrain lookup and maintenance to the active VMID, -* so we need to invalidate lines with a stale VMID to avoid an ABA -* race after multiple rollovers. -* -*/ -if (icache_is_vpipt ()) - asmvolatile ("ic ialluis" ); -dsb (ish); }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 180/411 arm64: tlb: Allow XZR argument to TLBI ops
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
commit bfd9c931d19aa59fb8371d557774fa169b15db9a upstream.
The TLBI instruction accepts XZR as a register argument, and for TLBI operations with a register argument, there is no functional difference between using XZR or another GPR which contains zeroes. Operations without a register argument are encoded as if XZR were used.
Allow the __TLBI_1() macro to use XZR when a register argument is all zeroes.
Today this only results in a trivial code saving in __do_compat_cache_op()'s workaround for Neoverse-N1 erratum #1542419. In subsequent patches this pattern will be used more generally.
There should be no functional change as a result of this patch.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/tlbflush.h +3 -3
@@ -37,12 +37,12 @@ : : )#define __TLBI_1 (op, arg) asm (ARM64_ASM_PREAMBLE \ - "tlbi " #op ", %0\n" \ + "tlbi " #op ", %x0\n" \ ALTERNATIVE("nop\n nop", \ - "dsb ish\n tlbi " #op ", %0", \ + "dsb ish\n tlbi " #op ", %x0", \ ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI, \ CONFIG_ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI) \ - : : "r" (arg)) + : : "rZ" (arg))#define __TLBI_N (op, arg, n, ...) __TLBI_##n(op, arg)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 181/411 arm64: tlb: Optimize ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
commit a8f78680ee6bf795086384e8aea159a52814f827 upstream.
The ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI workaround is used to mitigate several errata where broadcast TLBI;DSB sequences don't provide all the architecturally required synchronization. The workaround performs more work than necessary, and can have significant overhead. This patch optimizes the workaround, as explained below.
The workaround was originally added for Qualcomm Falkor erratum 1009 in commit:
d9ff80f83ecb ("arm64: Work around Falkor erratum 1009")
As noted in the message for that commit, the workaround is applied even in cases where it is not strictly necessary.
The workaround was later reused without changes for:
* Arm Cortex-A76 erratum #1286807
SDEN v33: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN-885749/33-0/
* Arm Cortex-A55 erratum #2441007
SDEN v16: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN-859338/1600/
* Arm Cortex-A510 erratum #2441009
SDEN v19: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN-1873351/1900/
The important details to note are as follows:
1. All relevant errata only affect the ordering and/or completion of memory accesses which have been translated by an invalidated TLB entry. The actual invalidation of TLB entries is unaffected.
2. The existing workaround is applied to both broadcast and local TLB invalidation, whereas for all relevant errata it is only necessary to apply a workaround for broadcast invalidation.
3. The existing workaround replaces every TLBI with a TLBI;DSB;TLBI sequence, whereas for all relevant errata it is only necessary to execute a single additional TLBI;DSB sequence after any number of TLBIs are completed by a DSB.
For example, for a sequence of batched TLBIs:
TLBI <op1>[, <arg1>]
TLBI <op2>[, <arg2>]
TLBI <op3>[, <arg3>]
DSB ISH... the existing workaround will expand this to:
TLBI <op1>[, <arg1>]
DSB ISH // additional
TLBI <op1>[, <arg1>] // additional
TLBI <op2>[, <arg2>]
DSB ISH // additional
TLBI <op2>[, <arg2>] // additional
TLBI <op3>[, <arg3>]
DSB ISH // additional
TLBI <op3>[, <arg3>] // additional
DSB ISH... whereas it is sufficient to have:
TLBI <op1>[, <arg1>]
TLBI <op2>[, <arg2>]
TLBI <op3>[, <arg3>]
DSB ISH
TLBI <opX>[, <argX>] // additional
DSB ISH // additionalUsing a single additional TBLI and DSB at the end of the sequence can have significantly lower overhead as each DSB which completes a TLBI must synchronize with other PEs in the system, with potential performance effects both locally and system-wide.
4. The existing workaround repeats each specific TLBI operation, whereas for all relevant errata it is sufficient for the additional TLBI to use *any* operation which will be broadcast, regardless of which translation regime or stage of translation the operation applies to.
For example, for a single TLBI:
TLBI ALLE2IS
DSB ISH
... the existing workaround will expand this to:
TLBI ALLE2IS
DSB ISH
TLBI ALLE2IS // additional
DSB ISH // additional
... whereas it is sufficient to have:
TLBI ALLE2IS
DSB ISH
TLBI VALE1IS, XZR // additional
DSB ISH // additional
As the additional TLBI doesn't have to match a specific earlier TLBI, the additional TLBI can be implemented in separate code, with no memory of the earlier TLBIs. The additional TLBI can also use a cheaper TLBI operation.
5. The existing workaround is applied to both Stage-1 and Stage-2 TLB invalidation, whereas for all relevant errata it is only necessary to apply a workaround for Stage-1 invalidation.
Architecturally, TLBI operations which invalidate only Stage-2 information (e.g. IPAS2E1IS) are not required to invalidate TLB entries which combine information from Stage-1 and Stage-2 translation table entries, and consequently may not complete memory accesses translated by those combined entries. In these cases, completion of memory accesses is only guaranteed after subsequent invalidation of Stage-1 information (e.g. VMALLE1IS).
Taking the above points into account, this patch reworks the workaround logic to reduce overhead:
* New __tlbi_sync_s1ish() and __tlbi_sync_s1ish_hyp() functions are added and used in place of any dsb(ish) which is used to complete broadcast Stage-1 TLB maintenance. When the ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI workaround is enabled, these helpers will execute an additional TLBI;DSB sequence.
For consistency, it might make sense to add __tlbi_sync_*() helpers for local and stage 2 maintenance. For now I've left those with open-coded dsb() to keep the diff small.
* The duplication of TLBIs in __TLBI_0() and __TLBI_1() is removed. This is no longer needed as the necessary synchronization will happen in __tlbi_sync_s1ish() or __tlbi_sync_s1ish_hyp().
* The additional TLBI operation is chosen to have minimal impact:
- __tlbi_sync_s1ish() uses "TLBI VALE1IS, XZR". This is only used at EL1 or at EL2 with {E2H,TGE}=={1,1}, where it will target an unused entry for the reserved ASID in the kernel's own translation regime, and have no adverse affect.
- __tlbi_sync_s1ish_hyp() uses "TLBI VALE2IS, XZR". This is only used in hyp code, where it will target an unused entry in the hyp code's TTBR0 mapping, and should have no adverse effect.
* As __TLBI_0() and __TLBI_1() no longer replace each TLBI with a TLBI;DSB;TLBI sequence, batching TLBIs is worthwhile, and there's no need for arch_tlbbatch_should_defer() to consider ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI.
When building defconfig with GCC 15.1.0, compared to v6.19-rc1, this patch saves ~1KiB of text, makes the vmlinux ~42KiB smaller, and makes the resulting Image 64KiB smaller:
| [mark@lakrids:~/src/linux]% size vmlinux-* | text data bss dec hex filename | 21179831 19660919 708216 41548966 279fca6 vmlinux-after | 21181075 19660903 708216 41550194 27a0172 vmlinux-before | [mark@lakrids:~/src/linux]% ls -l vmlinux-* | -rwxr-xr-x 1 mark mark 157771472 Feb 4 12:05 vmlinux-after | -rwxr-xr-x 1 mark mark 157815432 Feb 4 12:05 vmlinux-before | [mark@lakrids:~/src/linux]% ls -l Image-* | -rw-r--r-- 1 mark mark 41007616 Feb 4 12:05 Image-after | -rw-r--r-- 1 mark mark 41073152 Feb 4 12:05 Image-before
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------- arch/arm64/kernel/sys_compat.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/tlb.c | 6 ++-- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/tlb.c | 6 ++-- 4 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/tlbflush.h +37 -14
@@ -30,18 +30,10 @@*/ #define __TLBI_0 (op, arg) asm (ARM64_ASM_PREAMBLE \ "tlbi " #op "\n" \ - ALTERNATIVE("nop\n nop", \ - "dsb ish\n tlbi " #op, \ - ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI, \ - CONFIG_ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI) \ : : )#define __TLBI_1 (op, arg) asm (ARM64_ASM_PREAMBLE \ "tlbi " #op ", %x0\n" \ - ALTERNATIVE("nop\n nop", \ - "dsb ish\n tlbi " #op ", %x0", \ - ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI, \ - CONFIG_ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI) \ : : "rZ" (arg))#define __TLBI_N (op, arg, n, ...) __TLBI_##n(op, arg)
@@ -158,6 +150,37 @@ static inline unsigned long get_trans_granule(void)#define __TLBI_RANGE_NUM (pages, scale) \ ((((pages) >> (5 * (scale) + 1)) & TLBI_RANGE_MASK) - 1) +#define __repeat_tlbi_sync (op, arg) \ +do { \ + asm volatile( \ + ALTERNATIVE("nop\n nop", \ + "tlbi " #op ", %x0\n dsb ish", \ + ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI, \ + CONFIG_ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI) \ + : \ + : "rZ" (arg)); \ +} while (0) + +/* +* Complete broadcast TLB maintenance issued by the host which invalidates +* stage 1 information in the host's own translation regime. +*/ +static inline void __tlbi_sync_s1ish (void ) +{ +dsb (ish); +__repeat_tlbi_sync (vale1is,0 ); +} + +/* +* Complete broadcast TLB maintenance issued by hyp code which invalidates +* stage 1 translation information in any translation regime. +*/ +static inline void __tlbi_sync_s1ish_hyp (void ) +{ +dsb (ish); +__repeat_tlbi_sync (vale2is,0 ); +} +/* * TLB Invalidation * ================
@@ -239,7 +262,7 @@ static inline void flush_tlb_all(void) {dsb (ishst);__tlbi (vmalle1is); -dsb (ish); +__tlbi_sync_s1ish ();isb (); }
@@ -251,7 +274,7 @@ static inline void flush_tlb_mm(struct mm_struct *mm) asid =__TLBI_VADDR (0 ,ASID (mm));__tlbi (aside1is, asid);__tlbi_user (aside1is, asid); -dsb (ish); +__tlbi_sync_s1ish (); } static inline void flush_tlb_page_nosync(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
@@ -269,7 +292,7 @@ static inline void flush_tlb_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long uaddr) {flush_tlb_page_nosync (vma, uaddr); -dsb (ish); +__tlbi_sync_s1ish (); }/*
@@ -357,7 +380,7 @@ static inline void __flush_tlb_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma, } scale++; } -dsb (ish); +__tlbi_sync_s1ish (); } static inline void flush_tlb_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
@@ -386,7 +409,7 @@ static inline void flush_tlb_kernel_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long enddsb (ishst);for (addr = start; addr < end; addr +=1 << (PAGE_SHIFT -12 ))__tlbi (vaale1is, addr); -dsb (ish); +__tlbi_sync_s1ish ();isb (); }
@@ -400,7 +423,7 @@ static inline void __flush_tlb_kernel_pgtable(unsigned long kaddr)dsb (ishst);__tlbi (vaae1is, addr); -dsb (ish); +__tlbi_sync_s1ish (); isb(); }#endif
arch/arm64/kernel/sys_compat.c +1 -1
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ __do_compat_cache_op(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)* We pick the reserved-ASID to minimise the impact. */ __tlbi (aside1is,__TLBI_VADDR (0 ,0 )); -dsb (ish); +__tlbi_sync_s1ish (); } ret =caches_clean_inval_user_pou (start, start + chunk);
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/tlb.c +3 -3
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ void __kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_ipa(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu,*/ dsb (ish);__tlbi (vmalle1is); -dsb (ish); +__tlbi_sync_s1ish_hyp ();isb ();__tlb_switch_to_host (&cxt);
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ void __kvm_tlb_flush_vmid(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu)__tlb_switch_to_guest (mmu, &cxt);__tlbi (vmalls12e1is); -dsb (ish); +__tlbi_sync_s1ish_hyp ();isb ();__tlb_switch_to_host (&cxt);
@@ -122,5 +122,5 @@ void __kvm_flush_vm_context(void) {dsb (ishst);__tlbi (alle1is); -dsb (ish); +__tlbi_sync_s1ish_hyp (); }
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/tlb.c +3 -3
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ void __kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_ipa(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu,*/ dsb (ish);__tlbi (vmalle1is); -dsb (ish); +__tlbi_sync_s1ish_hyp ();isb ();__tlb_switch_to_host (&cxt);
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ void __kvm_tlb_flush_vmid(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu)__tlb_switch_to_guest (mmu, &cxt);__tlbi (vmalls12e1is); -dsb (ish); +__tlbi_sync_s1ish_hyp ();isb ();__tlb_switch_to_host (&cxt);
@@ -146,5 +146,5 @@ void __kvm_flush_vm_context(void) {dsb (ishst);__tlbi (alle1is); -dsb (ish); +__tlbi_sync_s1ish_hyp (); }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 182/411 xfrm: policy: fix use-after-free on inexact bin in xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sanghyun Park <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7f2d76c9c03257c0782afef9d95321fa04096f60 ]
Fix the race by pruning the bin while still holding xfrm_policy_lock, before dropping it. Use __xfrm_policy_inexact_prune_bin() directly since the lock is already held. The wrapper xfrm_policy_inexact_prune_bin() becomes unused and is removed.
Race:
CPU0 (XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY) CPU1 (XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO)
========================== ==========================
xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx():
spin_lock_bh(xfrm_policy_lock)
bin = xfrm_policy_inexact_lookup()
__xfrm_policy_unlink(pol)
spin_unlock_bh(xfrm_policy_lock)
xfrm_policy_kill(ret)
// wide window, lock not held
xfrm_hash_rebuild():
spin_lock_bh(xfrm_policy_lock)
__xfrm_policy_inexact_flush():
kfree_rcu(bin) // bin freed
spin_unlock_bh(xfrm_policy_lock)
xfrm_policy_inexact_prune_bin(bin)
// UAF: bin is freed--- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 13 ++----------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +2 -11
@@ -1124,15 +1124,6 @@ static void __xfrm_policy_inexact_prune_bin(struct xfrm_pol_inexact_bin *b, bool } } -static void xfrm_policy_inexact_prune_bin (struct xfrm_pol_inexact_bin *b) -{ -struct net *net =read_pnet (&b->k.net); - -spin_lock_bh (&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock); -__xfrm_policy_inexact_prune_bin (b, false); -spin_unlock_bh (&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock); -} -static void __xfrm_policy_inexact_flush (struct net *net) {struct xfrm_pol_inexact_bin *bin, *t;
@@ -1720,12 +1711,12 @@ xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(struct net *net, const struct xfrm_mark *mark, u32 if_id, } ret = pol; } +if (bin && delete) +__xfrm_policy_inexact_prune_bin (bin, false);spin_unlock_bh (&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);if (ret && delete)xfrm_policy_kill (ret); -if (bin && delete) -xfrm_policy_inexact_prune_bin (bin);return ret; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 183/411 netlabel: validate unlabeled address and mask attribute lengths
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chenguang Zhao <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9772589b57e44aedc240211c5c3f7a684a034d3a ]
netlbl_unlabel_addrinfo_get() used the address attribute length to determine whether the attribute data could be read as an IPv4 or IPv6 address, but did not independently validate the corresponding mask attribute length. A crafted Generic Netlink request could therefore provide a valid IPv4/IPv6 address attribute with a shorter mask attribute, which would later be read as a full struct in_addr or struct in6_addr.
NLA_BINARY policy lengths are maximum lengths by default, so use NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN() for the unlabeled IPv4/IPv6 address and mask attributes. This rejects short attributes during policy validation and also exposes the exact length requirements through policy introspection.
--- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 30 ++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +10 -20
@@ -114,14 +114,14 @@ static struct genl_family netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family;/* NetLabel Netlink attribute policy */ static const struct nla_policy netlbl_unlabel_genl_policy[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_MAX +1 ] = { [NLBL_UNLABEL_A_ACPTFLG ] = { .type =NLA_U8 }, - [NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR ] = { .type =NLA_BINARY , - .len =sizeof (struct in6_addr ) }, - [NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6MASK ] = { .type =NLA_BINARY , - .len =sizeof (struct in6_addr ) }, - [NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4ADDR ] = { .type =NLA_BINARY , - .len =sizeof (struct in_addr ) }, - [NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4MASK ] = { .type =NLA_BINARY , - .len =sizeof (struct in_addr ) }, + [NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR ] = +NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN (sizeof (struct in6_addr )), + [NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6MASK ] = +NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN (sizeof (struct in6_addr )), + [NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4ADDR ] = +NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN (sizeof (struct in_addr )), + [NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4MASK ] = +NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN (sizeof (struct in_addr )), [NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IFACE ] = { .type =NLA_NUL_STRING , .len =IFNAMSIZ -1 }, [NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX ] = { .type =NLA_BINARY }
@@ -764,24 +764,14 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_addrinfo_get(struct genl_info *info, void **mask, u32 *len) { - u32 addr_len; -if (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4ADDR ] && info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4MASK ]) { - addr_len =nla_len (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4ADDR ]); -if (addr_len !=sizeof (struct in_addr ) && - addr_len !=nla_len (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4MASK ])) -return -EINVAL ; - *len = addr_len; + *len =sizeof (struct in_addr ); *addr =nla_data (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4ADDR ]); *mask =nla_data (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV4MASK ]);return 0 ; }else if (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR ]) { - addr_len =nla_len (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR ]); -if (addr_len !=sizeof (struct in6_addr ) && - addr_len !=nla_len (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6MASK ])) -return -EINVAL ; - *len = addr_len; + *len =sizeof (struct in6_addr ); *addr =nla_data (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR ]); *mask =nla_data (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6MASK ]);return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 184/411 net: qrtr: fix refcount saturation and potential UAF in qrtr_port_remove
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mingyu Wang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a2171131ecda1ed61a594a1eb715e75fdad0fef5 ]
In qrtr_port_remove(), the socket reference count is decremented via __sock_put() before the port is removed from the qrtr_ports XArray and before the RCU grace period elapses.
This breaks the fundamental RCU update paradigm. It exposes a race window where a concurrent RCU reader (such as qrtr_reset_ports() or qrtr_port_lookup()) can obtain a pointer to the socket from the XArray, and attempt to call sock_hold() on a socket whose reference count has already dropped to zero.
This exact race condition was hit during syzkaller fuzzing, leading to the following refcount saturation warning and a potential Use-After-Free:
refcount_t: saturated; leaking memory.
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1273 at lib/refcount.c:22 refcount_warn_saturate+0xae/0x1d0 Modules linked in: qrtr(+) bochs drm_shmem_helper ... Call Trace: <TASK> qrtr_reset_ports net/qrtr/af_qrtr.c:768 [inline] [qrtr] __qrtr_bind.isra.0+0x48b/0x570 net/qrtr/af_qrtr.c:805 [qrtr] qrtr_bind+0x17d/0x210 net/qrtr/af_qrtr.c:901 [qrtr] kernel_bind+0xe4/0x120 net/socket.c:3592 qrtr_ns_init+0x1a6/0x380 net/qrtr/ns.c:715 [qrtr] qrtr_proto_init+0x3b/0xff0 net/qrtr/af_qrtr.c:169 [qrtr] do_one_initcall+0xf5/0x5e0 init/main.c:1283 ... </TASK>
Fix this by deferring the reference count decrement until after the xa_erase() and the synchronize_rcu() complete.
(Note: The v1 of this patch incorrectly replaced __sock_put() with sock_put(). As Simon Horman pointed out, the callers of qrtr_port_remove() still hold a reference to the socket, so freeing the socket memory here would lead to a subsequent UAF in the caller. Thus, the __sock_put() is kept, but only repositioned to close the RCU race.)
--- net/qrtr/af_qrtr.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/qrtr/af_qrtr.c +2 -2
@@ -702,13 +702,13 @@ static void qrtr_port_remove(struct qrtr_sock *ipc)if (port ==QRTR_PORT_CTRL ) port =0 ; -__sock_put (&ipc->sk); -xa_erase (&qrtr_ports, port);/* Ensure that if qrtr_port_lookup() did enter the RCU read section we * wait for it to up increment the refcount */ synchronize_rcu (); + +__sock_put (&ipc->sk); }/* Assign port number to socket.
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 185/411 ipv6: sit: reload inner IPv6 header after GSO offloads
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kyle Zeng <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f0e42f0c4337b1f220de1ddd63f47197c7dee4de ]
ipip6_tunnel_xmit() caches the inner IPv6 header pointer at function entry and continues using it after iptunnel_handle_offloads().
For GSO skbs, iptunnel_handle_offloads() calls skb_header_unclone(). When the skb header is cloned, skb_header_unclone() can call pskb_expand_head(), which may move the skb head. The pskb_expand_head() contract requires pointers into the skb header to be reloaded after the call.
If the later skb_realloc_headroom() branch is not taken, SIT uses the stale iph6 pointer to read the inner hop limit and DS field. That can read from a freed skb head after the old head's remaining clone is released.
Reload iph6 after the offload helper succeeds and before subsequent reads from the inner IPv6 header. Keep the existing reload after skb_realloc_headroom(), since that branch can also replace the skb.
--- net/ipv6/sit.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/ipv6/sit.c +1 -0
@@ -971,6 +971,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t ipip6_tunnel_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb,ip_rt_put (rt); goto tx_error; } + iph6 =ipv6_hdr (skb);if (df) { mtu =dst_mtu (&rt->dst) - t_hlen;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 186/411 net: openvswitch: fix possible kfree_skb of ERR_PTR
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Adrian Moreno <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ee30dd2909d8b98619f4341c70ec8dc8e155ab02 ]
After the patch in the "Fixes" tag, the allocation of the "reply" skb can happen either before or after locking the ovs_mutex.
However, error cleanups still follow the classical reversed order, assuming "reply" is allocated before locking: it is freed after unlocking.
If "reply" allocation happens after locking the mutex and it fails, "reply" is left with an ERR_PTR, and execution jumps to the correspondent cleanup stage which will try to free an invalid pointer.
Fix this by setting the pointer to NULL after having saved its error value.
--- net/openvswitch/datapath.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/openvswitch/datapath.c +1 -0
@@ -1261,6 +1261,7 @@ static int ovs_flow_cmd_set(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)if (IS_ERR (reply)) { error =PTR_ERR (reply); + reply =NULL ; goto err_unlock_ovs; } }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 187/411 sctp: fix uninit-value in __sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f8373d7090b745728de66308deeecc67e8d319ce ]
__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup() in net/sctp/input.c only checks that the ASCONF chunk can hold the ADDIP header and a parameter header, then calls af->from_addr_param(), which reads the full address (16 bytes for IPv6) trusting the parameter's declared length.
An unauthenticated peer can send a truncated trailing ASCONF chunk that declares an IPv6 address parameter but stops after the 4-byte parameter header; reached from the no-association lookup path, from_addr_param() then reads uninitialized bytes past the parameter.
Impact: an unauthenticated SCTP peer makes the receive path read up to 16 bytes of uninitialized memory past a truncated ASCONF address parameter.
The sibling __sctp_rcv_init_lookup() bounds parameters with sctp_walk_params(); this path open-codes the fetch and omits the bound. Verify the whole address parameter lies within the chunk before from_addr_param() reads it, the same class of fix as commit 51e5ad549c43 ("net: sctp: fix KMSAN uninit-value in sctp_inq_pop").
--- net/sctp/input.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
net/sctp/input.c +8 -0
@@ -1197,6 +1197,14 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup(/* Skip over the ADDIP header and find the Address parameter */ param = (union sctp_addr_param *)(asconf +1 ); +/* The whole address parameter must lie within the chunk before +* af->from_addr_param() reads the variable-length address; otherwise a +* truncated trailing ASCONF chunk lets it read uninitialized bytes past +* the parameter. +*/ +if (sizeof (*asconf) +ntohs (param->p.length) >ntohs (ch->length)) +return NULL ; + af =sctp_get_af_specific (param_type2af (param->p.type));if (unlikely (!af))return NULL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 188/411 net: guard timestamp cmsgs to real error queue skbs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kyle Zeng <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1ee90b77b727df903033db873c75caac5c27ec98 ]
skb_is_err_queue() treats PACKET_OUTGOING as the sole marker for an skb from sk_error_queue. That assumption is not true for AF_PACKET sockets:
outgoing packet taps are also delivered to packet sockets with skb->pkt_type == PACKET_OUTGOING, but their skb->cb is owned by AF_PACKET instead of struct sock_exterr_skb.
If such an skb is received with timestamping enabled, the generic timestamp cmsg path can read AF_PACKET control-buffer state as sock_exterr_skb::opt_stats. With SO_RXQ_OVFL enabled, the packet drop counter overlaps opt_stats. An odd drop count makes the path emit SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS with skb->len and skb->data. For non-linear skbs this copies past the linear head and can trigger hardened usercopy or disclose adjacent heap contents.
Keep skb_is_err_queue() local to net/socket.c, but make it verify that the PACKET_OUTGOING marker is paired with the sock_rmem_free destructor installed by sock_queue_err_skb(). AF_PACKET receive skbs use normal receive ownership and no longer pass as error-queue skbs, while legitimate sk_error_queue entries keep the PACKET_OUTGOING marker and sock_rmem_free ownership.
--- include/net/sock.h | 1 + net/core/skbuff.c | 6 +++--- net/socket.c | 11 ++++++----- 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
include/net/sock.h +1 -0
@@ -1868,6 +1868,7 @@ struct sk_buff *sock_omalloc(struct sock *sk, unsigned long size, gfp_t priority);void skb_orphan_partial (struct sk_buff *skb);void sock_rfree (struct sk_buff *skb); +void sock_rmem_free (struct sk_buff *skb);void sock_efree (struct sk_buff *skb);#ifdef CONFIG_INET void sock_edemux (struct sk_buff *skb);
net/core/skbuff.c +3 -3
@@ -4814,7 +4814,7 @@ int skb_cow_data(struct sk_buff *skb, int tailbits, struct sk_buff **trailer) }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (skb_cow_data); -static void sock_rmem_free (struct sk_buff *skb) +void sock_rmem_free (struct sk_buff *skb) {struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
@@ -4823,8 +4823,8 @@ static void sock_rmem_free(struct sk_buff *skb)static void skb_set_err_queue (struct sk_buff *skb) { -/* pkt_type of skbs received on local sockets is never PACKET_OUTGOING. -* So, it is safe to (mis)use it to mark skbs on the error queue. +/* The error-queue test in skb_is_err_queue() matches this marker +* with the sock_rmem_free destructor installed by sock_queue_err_skb(). */ skb->pkt_type =PACKET_OUTGOING ;BUILD_BUG_ON (PACKET_OUTGOING ==0 );
net/socket.c +6 -5
@@ -795,12 +795,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_sendmsg_locked);static bool skb_is_err_queue (const struct sk_buff *skb) { -/* pkt_type of skbs enqueued on the error queue are set to -* PACKET_OUTGOING in skb_set_err_queue(). This is only safe to do -* in recvmsg, since skbs received on a local socket will never -* have a pkt_type of PACKET_OUTGOING. +/* Error-queue skbs are marked as PACKET_OUTGOING in +* skb_set_err_queue() and use the destructor installed by +* sock_queue_err_skb(). PACKET_OUTGOING alone is not unique: +* AF_PACKET outgoing taps use the same pkt_type. */ -return skb->pkt_type ==PACKET_OUTGOING ; +return skb->pkt_type ==PACKET_OUTGOING && + skb->destructor == sock_rmem_free; }/* On transmit, software and hardware timestamps are returned independently.
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 189/411 net/rds: fix NULL deref in rds_ib_send_cqe_handler() on masked atomic completion
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Weiming Shi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 34080db3e70ddf94c38512ad2331e3c3afca6cc1 ]
rds_ib_xmit_atomic() always programs a masked atomic opcode (IB_WR_MASKED_ATOMIC_CMP_AND_SWP or IB_WR_MASKED_ATOMIC_FETCH_AND_ADD) for every RDS atomic cmsg. But the completion-side switch in rds_ib_send_unmap_op() only handles the non-masked opcodes, so a masked atomic completion falls through to default and returns rm == NULL while send->s_op is left set. rds_ib_send_cqe_handler() then dereferences the NULL rm via rm->m_final_op, oopsing in softirq context. An unprivileged AF_RDS sendmsg() of an atomic cmsg over an active RDS/IB connection triggers it; on hardware that natively accepts masked atomics (mlx4, mlx5) no extra setup is needed.
RDS/IB: rds_ib_send_unmap_op: unexpected opcode 0xd in WR!
Oops: general protection fault [#1] SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000190-0x0000000000000197] RIP: rds_ib_send_cqe_handler+0x25c/0xb10 (net/rds/ib_send.c:282) Call Trace: <IRQ> rds_ib_send_cqe_handler (net/rds/ib_send.c:282) poll_scq (net/rds/ib_cm.c:274) rds_ib_tasklet_fn_send (net/rds/ib_cm.c:294) tasklet_action_common (kernel/softirq.c:943) handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:573) run_ksoftirqd (kernel/softirq.c:479) </IRQ> Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
Handle the masked atomic opcodes in the same case as the non-masked
ones: they map to the same struct rds_message.atomic union member, so the existing container_of()/rds_ib_send_unmap_atomic() body is correct for them.
--- net/rds/ib_send.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/rds/ib_send.c +2 -0
@@ -170,6 +170,8 @@ static struct rds_message *rds_ib_send_unmap_op(struct rds_ib_connection *ic,break ;case IB_WR_ATOMIC_FETCH_AND_ADD :case IB_WR_ATOMIC_CMP_AND_SWP : +case IB_WR_MASKED_ATOMIC_FETCH_AND_ADD : +case IB_WR_MASKED_ATOMIC_CMP_AND_SWP :if (send->s_op) { rm = container_of(send->s_op, struct rds_message, atomic);rds_ib_send_unmap_atomic (ic, send->s_op, wc_status);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 190/411 ip6_vti: fix incorrect tunnel matching in vti6_tnl_lookup()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a5c0359f5cbc51a2e2b114d6041e0f3c73f903e9 ]
In vti6_tnl_lookup(), when an exact match for a tunnel fails, the code falls back to searching for wildcard tunnels:
- Tunnels matching the packet's local address, with any remote address wildcard remote).
- Tunnels matching the packet's remote address, with any local address (wildcard local).
However, vti6 stores all these different types of tunnels in the same hash table (ip6n->tnls_r_l) prone to hash collisions.
The bug is that the fallback search loops in vti6_tnl_lookup() were missing checks to ensure that the candidate tunnel actually has a wildcard address.
--- net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c +2 -0
@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ vti6_tnl_lookup(struct net *net, const struct in6_addr *remote, hash =HASH (&any, local);for_each_vti6_tunnel_rcu (ip6n->tnls_r_l[hash]) {if (ipv6_addr_equal (local, &t->parms.laddr) && +ipv6_addr_any (&t->parms.raddr) && (t->dev->flags &IFF_UP ))return t; }
@@ -112,6 +113,7 @@ vti6_tnl_lookup(struct net *net, const struct in6_addr *remote, hash =HASH (remote, &any);for_each_vti6_tunnel_rcu (ip6n->tnls_r_l[hash]) {if (ipv6_addr_equal (remote, &t->parms.raddr) && +ipv6_addr_any (&t->parms.laddr) && (t->dev->flags &IFF_UP ))return t; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 191/411 rds: mark snapshot pages dirty in rds_info_getsockopt()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Breno Leitao <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 512db8267b73a220a64180d95ab5eebe7c4964a8 ]
rds_info_getsockopt() pins the destination user pages with FOLL_WRITE and the RDS_INFO_* producers memcpy the snapshot into them through kmap_atomic(). Because that copy goes through the kernel direct map, the dirty bit on the user PTE is never set, so unpin_user_pages() releases the pages without marking them dirty. A file-backed destination page can then be reclaimed without writeback, silently discarding the copied data.
Use unpin_user_pages_dirty_lock() with make_dirty=true so the modified pages are marked dirty before they are unpinned.
--- net/rds/info.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/rds/info.c +1 -1
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ int rds_info_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int optname, char __user *optval, out:if (pages) -unpin_user_pages (pages, nr_pages); +unpin_user_pages_dirty_lock (pages, nr_pages, true);kfree (pages);return ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 192/411 netfilter: x_tables: avoid leaking percpu counter pointers
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kyle Zeng <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f7f2fbb0e893a0238dc464f8d8c0f5609bec584f ]
The native and compat get-entries paths copy the fixed rule entry header from the kernelized rule blob to userspace before overwriting the entry's counter fields with a sanitized counter snapshot.
On SMP kernels, entry->counters.pcnt contains the percpu allocation address used by x_tables rule counters. A caller can provide a userspace buffer that faults during the initial fixed-header copy after pcnt has been copied but before the later sanitized counter copy runs. The syscall then returns -EFAULT while leaving the raw percpu pointer in userspace.
Copy only the fixed entry prefix before counters from the kernelized rule blob, then copy the sanitized counter snapshot into the counter field. Apply this ordering to the IPv4, IPv6, and ARP native and compat get-entries implementations so a fault cannot expose the internal percpu counter pointer.
--- net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 15 ++++++--------- net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 15 ++++++--------- net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 15 ++++++--------- 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +6 -9
@@ -701,14 +701,12 @@ static int copy_entries_to_user(unsigned int total_size,const struct xt_entry_target *t; e = loc_cpu_entry + off; -if (copy_to_user (userptr + off, e,sizeof (*e))) { - ret = -EFAULT ; - goto free_counters; - } -if (copy_to_user (userptr + off +if (copy_to_user (userptr + off, e, + offsetof(struct arpt_entry , counters)) || +copy_to_user (userptr + off + offsetof(struct arpt_entry , counters), &counters[num], -sizeof (counters[num])) !=0 ) { +sizeof (counters[num]))) { ret = -EFAULT ; goto free_counters; }
@@ -1326,9 +1324,8 @@ static int compat_copy_entry_to_user(struct arpt_entry *e, void __user **dstptr, origsize = *size; ce = *dstptr; -if (copy_to_user (ce, e,sizeof (struct arpt_entry )) !=0 || -copy_to_user (&ce->counters, &counters[i], -sizeof (counters[i])) !=0 ) +if (copy_to_user (ce, e, offsetof(struct compat_arpt_entry , counters)) || +copy_to_user (&ce->counters, &counters[i],sizeof (counters[i])))return -EFAULT ; *dstptr +=sizeof (struct compat_arpt_entry );
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +6 -9
@@ -833,14 +833,12 @@ copy_entries_to_user(unsigned int total_size,const struct xt_entry_target *t; e = loc_cpu_entry + off; -if (copy_to_user (userptr + off, e,sizeof (*e))) { - ret = -EFAULT ; - goto free_counters; - } -if (copy_to_user (userptr + off +if (copy_to_user (userptr + off, e, + offsetof(struct ipt_entry , counters)) || +copy_to_user (userptr + off + offsetof(struct ipt_entry , counters), &counters[num], -sizeof (counters[num])) !=0 ) { +sizeof (counters[num]))) { ret = -EFAULT ; goto free_counters; }
@@ -1229,9 +1227,8 @@ compat_copy_entry_to_user(struct ipt_entry *e, void __user **dstptr, origsize = *size; ce = *dstptr; -if (copy_to_user (ce, e,sizeof (struct ipt_entry )) !=0 || -copy_to_user (&ce->counters, &counters[i], -sizeof (counters[i])) !=0 ) +if (copy_to_user (ce, e, offsetof(struct compat_ipt_entry , counters)) || +copy_to_user (&ce->counters, &counters[i],sizeof (counters[i])))return -EFAULT ; *dstptr +=sizeof (struct compat_ipt_entry );
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +6 -9
@@ -850,14 +850,12 @@ copy_entries_to_user(unsigned int total_size,const struct xt_entry_target *t; e = loc_cpu_entry + off; -if (copy_to_user (userptr + off, e,sizeof (*e))) { - ret = -EFAULT ; - goto free_counters; - } -if (copy_to_user (userptr + off +if (copy_to_user (userptr + off, e, + offsetof(struct ip6t_entry , counters)) || +copy_to_user (userptr + off + offsetof(struct ip6t_entry , counters), &counters[num], -sizeof (counters[num])) !=0 ) { +sizeof (counters[num]))) { ret = -EFAULT ; goto free_counters; }
@@ -1246,9 +1244,8 @@ compat_copy_entry_to_user(struct ip6t_entry *e, void __user **dstptr, origsize = *size; ce = *dstptr; -if (copy_to_user (ce, e,sizeof (struct ip6t_entry )) !=0 || -copy_to_user (&ce->counters, &counters[i], -sizeof (counters[i])) !=0 ) +if (copy_to_user (ce, e, offsetof(struct compat_ip6t_entry , counters)) || +copy_to_user (&ce->counters, &counters[i],sizeof (counters[i])))return -EFAULT ; *dstptr +=sizeof (struct compat_ip6t_entry );
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 193/411 netfilter: nf_log: validate MAC header was set before dumping it
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Xiang Mei <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a84b6fedbc97078788be78dbdd7517d143ad1a77 ]
The fallback path of dump_mac_header() guards the MAC header access only with "skb->mac_header != skb->network_header", without checking skb_mac_header_was_set(). When the MAC header is unset, mac_header is 0xffff, so the test passes and skb_mac_header(skb) returns skb->head + 0xffff, ~64 KiB past the buffer; the loop then reads dev->hard_header_len bytes out of bounds into the kernel log.
This is reachable via the netdev logger: nf_log_unknown_packet() calls dump_mac_header() unconditionally, and an skb sent through AF_PACKET with PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS reaches the egress hook with mac_header still unset (__dev_queue_xmit(), which would reset it, is bypassed).
Add the skb_mac_header_was_set() check the ARPHRD_ETHER path already uses, and replace the open-coded MAC header length test with skb_mac_header_len(). Only skbs with an unset MAC header are affected; valid ones are dumped as before.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dump_mac_header (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:831) Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800ea49d3f by task exploit/148 Call Trace: kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) dump_mac_header (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:831) nf_log_netdev_packet (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:938 net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:963) nf_log_packet (net/netfilter/nf_log.c:260) nft_log_eval (net/netfilter/nft_log.c:60) nft_do_chain (net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:285) nft_do_chain_netdev (net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c:307) nf_hook_slow (net/netfilter/core.c:619) nf_hook_direct_egress (net/packet/af_packet.c:257) packet_xmit (net/packet/af_packet.c:280) packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3114) __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2265)
--- net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c +2 -2
@@ -793,8 +793,8 @@ static void dump_ipv4_mac_header(struct nf_log_buf *m, fallback:nf_log_buf_add (m,"MAC=" ); -if (dev->hard_header_len && - skb->mac_header != skb->network_header) { +if (dev->hard_header_len &&skb_mac_header_was_set (skb) && +skb_mac_header_len (skb) !=0 ) {const unsigned char *p =skb_mac_header (skb);unsigned int i;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Re: [PATCH 5.15 193/411] netfilter: nf_log: validate MAC header was set before dumping it
Hi Greg/Sasha,
Quoted 41 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Xiang Mei <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit
a84b6fedbc97078788be78dbdd7517d143ad1a77]The fallback path of
dump_mac_header()guards the MAC header access only with "skb->mac_header!=skb->network_header", without checkingskb_mac_header_was_set(). When the MAC header is unset,mac_headeris0xffff, so the test passes andskb_mac_header(skb)returnsskb->head+0xffff, ~64 KiB past the buffer; the loop then readsdev->hard_header_lenbytes out of bounds into the kernel log.This is reachable via the netdev logger:
nf_log_unknown_packet()callsdump_mac_header()unconditionally, and an skb sent throughAF_PACKETwithPACKET_QDISC_BYPASSreaches the egress hook withmac_headerstill unset (__dev_queue_xmit(), which would reset it, is bypassed).Add the
skb_mac_header_was_set()check theARPHRD_ETHERpath already uses, and replace the open-coded MAC header length test withskb_mac_header_len(). Only skbs with an unset MAC header are affected; valid ones are dumped as before.BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dump_mac_header (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:831) Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800ea49d3f by task exploit/148 Call Trace: kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) dump_mac_header (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:831) nf_log_netdev_packet (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:938 net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:963) nf_log_packet (net/netfilter/nf_log.c:260) nft_log_eval (net/netfilter/nft_log.c:60) nft_do_chain (net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:285) nft_do_chain_netdev (net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c:307) nf_hook_slow (net/netfilter/core.c:619) nf_hook_direct_egress (net/packet/af_packet.c:257) packet_xmit (net/packet/af_packet.c:280) packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3114) __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2265)
Quoted 6 lines
Fixes 7eb9282cd0ef ("netfilter: ipt_LOG/ip6t_LOG: add option to print decoded MAC header")Reported-by Weiming Shi <[email protected]>Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-8Signed-off-by Xiang Mei <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
I ran an AI assisted backport review over the 5.15.210 queue, and thr report looks valid to me:
this 5.15.y backport fixed the IPv4 split helper but missed the equivalent IPv6 helper.
So we would need a 5.15.y backport slightly deviate from upstream patch.
Upstream a84b6fedbc97 uses this guard before dumping fallback MAC bytes:
if (dev->hard_header_len && skb_mac_header_was_set(skb) &&
skb_mac_header_len(skb) != 0) {
const unsigned char *p = skb_mac_header(skb);The 5.15.y IPv4 helper has that guard, but final 5.15.y still has this in dump_ipv6_mac_header():
if (dev->hard_header_len &&
skb->mac_header != skb->network_header) {
const unsigned char *p = skb_mac_header(skb);Upstream has one shared helper, so the new guard covers both IPv4 and IPv6. 5.15.y still has split helpers, and the backport mapped the fix only to the IPv4 side. The IPv6 netdev logging path can therefore still call skb_mac_header(skb) after the old unsafe fallback predicate.
I think 5.15.y needs the same skb_mac_header_was_set() / skb_mac_header_len() guard added to dump_ipv6_mac_header(), thoughts?
And this is because 5.15.y doesn't have commit: 39ab798fc14d ("netfilter: nf_log_syslog: Merge MAC header dumpers") so we need a similar adaption in 5.15.y
I am still thinking having a TODO for these sorts of things might be worth it, particularly because we will miss these easily where upstream commit is backported(so nothing to backport from a git perspective) but that doesn't fit downstream perfectly(so more work to do). Btw, its just a thought :)
Thanks,
Harshit
Quoted 19 lines
--- net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c +2
-2@@ -793,8 +793,8 @@ static void dump_ipv4_mac_header(struct nf_log_buf *m, fallback:nf_log_buf_add (m,"MAC=" ); -if (dev->hard_header_len && - skb->mac_header != skb->network_header) { +if (dev->hard_header_len &&skb_mac_header_was_set (skb) && +skb_mac_header_len (skb) !=0 ) {const unsigned char *p =skb_mac_header (skb);unsigned int i;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerRe: [PATCH 5.15 193/411] netfilter: nf_log: validate MAC header was set before dumping it
Quoted 82 lines · Harshit Mogalapalli
Hi Greg/Sasha,
Quoted 41 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Xiang Mei <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit
a84b6fedbc97078788be78dbdd7517d143ad1a77]The fallback path of
dump_mac_header()guards the MAC header access only with "skb->mac_header!=skb->network_header", without checkingskb_mac_header_was_set(). When the MAC header is unset,mac_headeris0xffff, so the test passes andskb_mac_header(skb)returnsskb->head+0xffff, ~64 KiB past the buffer; the loop then readsdev->hard_header_lenbytes out of bounds into the kernel log.This is reachable via the netdev logger:
nf_log_unknown_packet()callsdump_mac_header()unconditionally, and an skb sent throughAF_PACKETwithPACKET_QDISC_BYPASSreaches the egress hook withmac_headerstill unset (__dev_queue_xmit(), which would reset it, is bypassed).Add the
skb_mac_header_was_set()check theARPHRD_ETHERpath already uses, and replace the open-coded MAC header length test withskb_mac_header_len(). Only skbs with an unset MAC header are affected; valid ones are dumped as before.BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dump_mac_header (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:831) Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800ea49d3f by task exploit/148 Call Trace: kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) dump_mac_header (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:831) nf_log_netdev_packet (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:938 net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:963) nf_log_packet (net/netfilter/nf_log.c:260) nft_log_eval (net/netfilter/nft_log.c:60) nft_do_chain (net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:285) nft_do_chain_netdev (net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c:307) nf_hook_slow (net/netfilter/core.c:619) nf_hook_direct_egress (net/packet/af_packet.c:257) packet_xmit (net/packet/af_packet.c:280) packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3114) __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2265)Quoted 6 lines
Fixes 7eb9282cd0ef ("netfilter: ipt_LOG/ip6t_LOG: add option to print decoded MAC header")Reported-by Weiming Shi <[email protected]>Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-8Signed-off-by Xiang Mei <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sasha Levin <[email protected]>I ran an AI assisted backport review over the 5.15.210 queue, and thr report looks valid to me:
this 5.15.y backport fixed the IPv4 split helper but missed the equivalent IPv6 helper.
So we would need a 5.15.y backport slightly deviate from upstream patch.
Upstream
a84b6fedbc97uses this guard before dumping fallback MAC bytes:if (dev->hard_header_len && skb_mac_header_was_set(skb) && skb_mac_header_len(skb) != 0) { const unsigned char *p = skb_mac_header(skb);The 5.15.y IPv4 helper has that guard, but final 5.15.y still has this in
dump_ipv6_mac_header():if (dev->hard_header_len && skb->mac_header != skb->network_header) { const unsigned char *p = skb_mac_header(skb);Upstream has one shared helper, so the new guard covers both IPv4 and IPv6. 5.15.y still has split helpers, and the backport mapped the fix only to the IPv4 side. The IPv6 netdev logging path can therefore still call
skb_mac_header(skb)after the old unsafe fallback predicate.I think 5.15.y needs the same
skb_mac_header_was_set()/skb_mac_header_len()guard added todump_ipv6_mac_header(), thoughts?
Quoted 8 lines
And this is because 5.15.y doesn't have commit:
39ab798fc14d("netfilter:nf_log_syslog: Merge MAC header dumpers") so we need a similar adaption in 5.15.yI am still thinking having a TODO for these sorts of things might be worth it, particularly because we will miss these easily where upstream commit is backported(so nothing to backport from a git perspective) but that doesn't fit downstream perfectly(so more work to do). Btw, its just a thought :)
Yes, a TODO would be great for this type of thing, if you can come up with a way it can be tracked/handled, I'd be all for it.
tanks,
greg k-h
Re: [PATCH 5.15 193/411] netfilter: nf_log: validate MAC header was set before dumping it
Hi Greg,
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
I think 5.15.y needs the same
skb_mac_header_was_set()/skb_mac_header_len()guard added todump_ipv6_mac_header(), thoughts?And this is because 5.15.y doesn't have commit:
39ab798fc14d("netfilter:nf_log_syslog: Merge MAC header dumpers") so we need a similar adaption in 5.15.y
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
I am still thinking having a TODO for these sorts of things might be worth it, particularly because we will miss these easily where upstream commit is backported(so nothing to backport from a git perspective) but that doesn't fit downstream perfectly(so more work to do). Btw, its just a thought :)
Yes, a TODO would be great for this type of thing, if you can come up with a way it can be tracked/handled, I'd be all for it.
I can't think of an automated way, but can we have something like stable-5.15.todo here:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git/tree/
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git/tree/TODO/stable-5.15.todo <-- something like this as location.
Report: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Report: Link2
And then when someone fixes it they could use Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
And we could search for "Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/" and remove entries from the TODO list ?
thanks,
Harshit
Quoted 3 lines
tanks,
greg k-h
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 194/411 netfilter: nft_exthdr: fix register tracking for F_PRESENT flag
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 772cecf198da732faebb5dcfc46d66a505be8495 ]
nft_exthdr_init() passes user-controlled priv->len to nft_parse_register_store(), which marks that many bytes in the register bitmap as initialized. However, when NFT_EXTHDR_F_PRESENT is set, the eval paths write only 1 byte (nft_reg_store8) or 4 bytes (*dest = 0 on TCP/DCCP error path). When len > 4, registers beyond the first are never written, retaining uninitialized stack data from nft_regs.
Bail out if userspace requests too much data when F_PRESENT is set.
--- net/netfilter/nft_exthdr.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
net/netfilter/nft_exthdr.c +3 -0
@@ -454,6 +454,9 @@ static int nft_exthdr_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,return err; } +if ((flags &NFT_EXTHDR_F_PRESENT ) && len !=1 ) +return -EINVAL ; + priv->type =nla_get_u8 (tb[NFTA_EXTHDR_TYPE ]); priv->offset = offset; priv->len = len;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 195/411 net: mvpp2: sync RX data at the hardware packet offset
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Til Kaiser <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 180235600934bef6add3be637c296d6cf3272e67 ]
mvpp2 programs the RX queue packet offset, so hardware writes received data at dma_addr + MVPP2_SKB_HEADROOM. The current CPU sync starts at dma_addr and only covers rx_bytes + MVPP2_MH_SIZE bytes, which syncs the unused headroom and misses the same number of bytes at the packet tail.
On non-coherent DMA systems this can leave the CPU reading stale cache contents for the end of the received frame.
Use dma_sync_single_range_for_cpu() with MVPP2_SKB_HEADROOM as the range offset so the sync covers the Marvell header and packet data actually written by hardware.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mvpp2/mvpp2_main.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mvpp2/mvpp2_main.c +4 -3
@@ -3945,9 +3945,10 @@ static int mvpp2_rx(struct mvpp2_port *port, struct napi_struct *napi, dma_dir =DMA_FROM_DEVICE ; } -dma_sync_single_for_cpu (dev->dev.parent, dma_addr, - rx_bytes +MVPP2_MH_SIZE , - dma_dir); +dma_sync_single_range_for_cpu (dev->dev.parent, dma_addr, +MVPP2_SKB_HEADROOM , + rx_bytes +MVPP2_MH_SIZE , + dma_dir);/* Buffer header not supported */ if (rx_status &MVPP2_RXD_BUF_HDR )
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 196/411 net: mvpp2: limit XDP frame size to the RX buffer
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Til Kaiser <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f3c6aa078927e6fe8121c9c591ddee8716c5305a ]
mvpp2 has short and long BM pools, and short pool buffers can be smaller than PAGE_SIZE. The XDP path nevertheless initializes every xdp_buff with PAGE_SIZE as frame size.
XDP helpers use frame_sz to validate tail growth and to derive the hard end of the data area. Advertising PAGE_SIZE for short buffers can let bpf_xdp_adjust_tail() grow a packet past the real allocation, corrupting memory or later tripping skb tailroom checks.
Initialize the XDP buffer with bm_pool->frag_size so XDP tailroom matches the actual buffer backing the packet.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mvpp2/mvpp2_main.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mvpp2/mvpp2_main.c +1 -1
@@ -3978,7 +3978,7 @@ static int mvpp2_rx(struct mvpp2_port *port, struct napi_struct *napi,else xdp_rxq = &rxq->xdp_rxq_long; -xdp_init_buff (&xdp,PAGE_SIZE , xdp_rxq); +xdp_init_buff (&xdp, bm_pool->frag_size, xdp_rxq);xdp_prepare_buff (&xdp, data,MVPP2_MH_SIZE +MVPP2_SKB_HEADROOM , rx_bytes, false);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 197/411 net: mvpp2: Add metadata support for xdp mode
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lorenzo Bianconi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9a45e193c88a55a536d7fd0ebfa29823d588c2cf ]
Set metadata size building the skb from xdp_buff in mvpp2 driver mvpp2 driver sets xdp headroom to:
MVPP2_MH_SIZE + MVPP2_SKB_HEADROOM
where
MVPP2_MH_SIZE 2MVPP2_SKB_HEADROOM min(max(XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM, NET_SKB_PAD), 224)
so the headroom is large enough to contain xdp_frame and xdp metadata. Please note this patch is just compiled tested.
Stable-dep-of: 77a6b90ce56b ("net: mvpp2: build skb from XDP-adjusted data on XDP_PASS")
--- drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mvpp2/mvpp2_main.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mvpp2/mvpp2_main.c +6 -2
@@ -3912,13 +3912,13 @@ static int mvpp2_rx(struct mvpp2_port *port, struct napi_struct *napi,while (rx_done < rx_todo) {struct mvpp2_rx_desc *rx_desc =mvpp2_rxq_next_desc_get (rxq); +u32 rx_status, timestamp, metasize =0 ;struct mvpp2_bm_pool *bm_pool;struct page_pool *pp =NULL ;struct sk_buff *skb;unsigned int frag_size;dma_addr_t dma_addr;phys_addr_t phys_addr; -u32 rx_status, timestamp;int pool, rx_bytes, err, ret;struct page *page;void *data;
@@ -3981,7 +3981,7 @@ static int mvpp2_rx(struct mvpp2_port *port, struct napi_struct *napi,xdp_init_buff (&xdp, bm_pool->frag_size, xdp_rxq);xdp_prepare_buff (&xdp, data,MVPP2_MH_SIZE +MVPP2_SKB_HEADROOM , - rx_bytes, false); + rx_bytes, true); ret =mvpp2_run_xdp (port, xdp_prog, &xdp, pp, &ps);
@@ -3997,6 +3997,8 @@ static int mvpp2_rx(struct mvpp2_port *port, struct napi_struct *napi, ps.rx_bytes += rx_bytes;continue ; } + + metasize = xdp.data - xdp.data_meta; } skb =build_skb (data, frag_size);
@@ -4033,6 +4035,8 @@ static int mvpp2_rx(struct mvpp2_port *port, struct napi_struct *napi,skb_reserve (skb,MVPP2_MH_SIZE +MVPP2_SKB_HEADROOM );skb_put (skb, rx_bytes); +if (metasize) +skb_metadata_set (skb, metasize); skb->ip_summed =mvpp2_rx_csum (port, rx_status); skb->protocol =eth_type_trans (skb, dev);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 198/411 net: mvpp2: refill RX buffers before XDP or skb use
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Til Kaiser <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5e8e2a9624df72fca7c736b2966b2cbf6c9c3ff6 ]
The RX error path returns the current descriptor buffer to the hardware BM pool. That is only valid while the driver still owns the buffer.
mvpp2_rx_refill() can fail after the current buffer has been handed to XDP or attached to an skb. In those cases mvpp2_run_xdp() may have recycled, redirected, or queued the page for XDP_TX, and an skb free also retires the data buffer. Returning such a buffer to BM lets hardware DMA into memory that is no longer owned by the RX ring.
Refill the BM pool before handing the current buffer to XDP or to the skb. If the allocation fails there, drop the packet and return the still-owned current buffer to BM, preserving the pool depth. Once the refill succeeds, later local drops retire/free the current buffer instead of returning it to BM.
Stable-dep-of: 77a6b90ce56b ("net: mvpp2: build skb from XDP-adjusted data on XDP_PASS")
--- .../net/ethernet/marvell/mvpp2/mvpp2_main.c | 43 +++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mvpp2/mvpp2_main.c +24 -19
@@ -3970,6 +3970,12 @@ static int mvpp2_rx(struct mvpp2_port *port, struct napi_struct *napi,else frag_size = bm_pool->frag_size; + err =mvpp2_rx_refill (port, bm_pool, pp, pool); +if (err) { +netdev_err (port->dev,"failed to refill BM pools\n" ); + goto err_drop_frame; + } +if (xdp_prog) {struct xdp_rxq_info *xdp_rxq;
@@ -3987,12 +3993,6 @@ static int mvpp2_rx(struct mvpp2_port *port, struct napi_struct *napi,if (ret) { xdp_ret |= ret; - err =mvpp2_rx_refill (port, bm_pool, pp, pool); -if (err) { -netdev_err (port->dev,"failed to refill BM pools\n" ); - goto err_drop_frame; - } - ps.rx_packets++; ps.rx_bytes += rx_bytes;continue ;
@@ -4004,8 +4004,21 @@ static int mvpp2_rx(struct mvpp2_port *port, struct napi_struct *napi, skb =build_skb (data, frag_size);if (!skb) {netdev_warn (port->dev,"skb build failed\n" ); - goto err_drop_frame; +if (pp) { +page_pool_put_page (pp,virt_to_head_page (data), + rx_bytes +MVPP2_MH_SIZE , + true); + }else { +dma_unmap_single_attrs (dev->dev.parent, dma_addr, + bm_pool->buf_size, +DMA_FROM_DEVICE , +DMA_ATTR_SKIP_CPU_SYNC ); +mvpp2_frag_free (bm_pool, pp, data); + } + goto err_drop_frame_retired; } +if (pp) +skb_mark_for_recycle (skb);/* If we have RX hardware timestamping enabled, grab the * timestamp from the queue and convert.
@@ -4016,16 +4029,7 @@ static int mvpp2_rx(struct mvpp2_port *port, struct napi_struct *napi, skb_hwtstamps(skb)); } - err =mvpp2_rx_refill (port, bm_pool, pp, pool); -if (err) { -netdev_err (port->dev,"failed to refill BM pools\n" ); -dev_kfree_skb_any (skb); - goto err_drop_frame; - } - -if (pp) -skb_mark_for_recycle (skb); -else +if (!pp)dma_unmap_single_attrs (dev->dev.parent, dma_addr, bm_pool->buf_size,DMA_FROM_DEVICE ,DMA_ATTR_SKIP_CPU_SYNC );
@@ -4044,13 +4048,14 @@ static int mvpp2_rx(struct mvpp2_port *port, struct napi_struct *napi,continue ; err_drop_frame: - dev->stats.rx_errors++; -mvpp2_rx_error (port, rx_desc);/* Return the buffer to the pool */ if (rx_status &MVPP2_RXD_BUF_HDR )mvpp2_buff_hdr_pool_put (port, rx_desc, pool, rx_status);else mvpp2_bm_pool_put (port, pool, dma_addr, phys_addr); +err_drop_frame_retired: + dev->stats.rx_errors++; +mvpp2_rx_error (port, rx_desc); }if (xdp_ret &MVPP2_XDP_REDIR )
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 199/411 net: mvpp2: build skb from XDP-adjusted data on XDP_PASS
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Til Kaiser <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 77a6b90ce56bc982dcfa94229b8e28e6abb16e95 ]
When an XDP program uses bpf_xdp_adjust_head() or bpf_xdp_adjust_tail() and then returns XDP_PASS, mvpp2 still builds the skb from fixed offsets derived from the original RX descriptor. Packet geometry changes made by the XDP program are therefore discarded before the skb reaches the stack.
Update rx_offset and rx_bytes from xdp.data and xdp.data_end for XDP_PASS. This makes skb_reserve() and skb_put() reflect the packet seen by XDP, and makes RX byte accounting for XDP_PASS follow the length of the skb passed to the network stack.
Keep a separate rx_sync_size for page-pool recycling on skb allocation failure, which must stay tied to the received buffer range.
Non-PASS verdicts continue to account the descriptor length because no skb is passed up in those cases.
--- .../net/ethernet/marvell/mvpp2/mvpp2_main.c | 21 +++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mvpp2/mvpp2_main.c +15 -6
@@ -3916,10 +3916,10 @@ static int mvpp2_rx(struct mvpp2_port *port, struct napi_struct *napi,struct mvpp2_bm_pool *bm_pool;struct page_pool *pp =NULL ;struct sk_buff *skb; -unsigned int frag_size; +unsigned int frag_size, rx_sync_size;dma_addr_t dma_addr;phys_addr_t phys_addr; -int pool, rx_bytes, err, ret; +int pool, rx_bytes, rx_offset, err, ret;struct page *page;void *data;
@@ -3932,6 +3932,8 @@ static int mvpp2_rx(struct mvpp2_port *port, struct napi_struct *napi, rx_status =mvpp2_rxdesc_status_get (port, rx_desc); rx_bytes =mvpp2_rxdesc_size_get (port, rx_desc); rx_bytes -=MVPP2_MH_SIZE ; + rx_sync_size = rx_bytes +MVPP2_MH_SIZE ; + rx_offset =MVPP2_MH_SIZE +MVPP2_SKB_HEADROOM ; dma_addr =mvpp2_rxdesc_dma_addr_get (port, rx_desc); pool = (rx_status & MVPP2_RXD_BM_POOL_ID_MASK) >>
@@ -3947,7 +3949,7 @@ static int mvpp2_rx(struct mvpp2_port *port, struct napi_struct *napi,dma_sync_single_range_for_cpu (dev->dev.parent, dma_addr,MVPP2_SKB_HEADROOM , - rx_bytes +MVPP2_MH_SIZE , + rx_sync_size, dma_dir);/* Buffer header not supported */
@@ -3998,6 +4000,14 @@ static int mvpp2_rx(struct mvpp2_port *port, struct napi_struct *napi,continue ; } + rx_sync_size = max_t(unsigned int, rx_sync_size, + xdp.data_end - xdp.data_hard_start - +MVPP2_SKB_HEADROOM ); + +/* Update offset and length to reflect any XDP adjustments. */ + rx_offset = xdp.data - data; + rx_bytes = xdp.data_end - xdp.data; + metasize = xdp.data - xdp.data_meta; }
@@ -4006,8 +4016,7 @@ static int mvpp2_rx(struct mvpp2_port *port, struct napi_struct *napi,netdev_warn (port->dev,"skb build failed\n" );if (pp) {page_pool_put_page (pp,virt_to_head_page (data), - rx_bytes +MVPP2_MH_SIZE , - true); + rx_sync_size, true); }else { dma_unmap_single_attrs(dev->dev.parent, dma_addr, bm_pool->buf_size,
@@ -4037,7 +4046,7 @@ static int mvpp2_rx(struct mvpp2_port *port, struct napi_struct *napi, ps.rx_packets++; ps.rx_bytes += rx_bytes; -skb_reserve (skb,MVPP2_MH_SIZE +MVPP2_SKB_HEADROOM ); +skb_reserve (skb, rx_offset);skb_put (skb, rx_bytes);if (metasize)skb_metadata_set (skb, metasize);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 200/411 drm/vc4: fix krealloc() memory leak
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alexander A. Klimov <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5d563a5da8717629ae72f9eadf1e0e340bd1658b ]
Don't just overwrite the original pointer passed to krealloc() with its return value without checking latter:
MEM = krealloc(MEM, SZ, GFP);
If krealloc() returns NULL, that erases the pointer to the still allocated memory, hence leaks this memory. Instead, use a temporary variable, check it's not NULL and only then assign it to the original pointer:
TMP = krealloc(MEM, SZ, GFP);
if (!TMP) return;
MEM = TMP;While on it, use krealloc_array().
--- drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_validate_shaders.c | 13 +++++++------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_validate_shaders.c +7 -6
@@ -288,15 +288,16 @@ static bool require_uniform_address_uniform(struct vc4_validated_shader_info *va {uint32_t o = validated_shader->num_uniform_addr_offsets;uint32_t num_uniforms = validated_shader->uniforms_size /4 ; +u32 *offsets; - validated_shader->uniform_addr_offsets = -krealloc (validated_shader->uniform_addr_offsets, - (o +1 ) * -sizeof (*validated_shader->uniform_addr_offsets), -GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!validated_shader->uniform_addr_offsets) + offsets =krealloc_array (validated_shader->uniform_addr_offsets, + o +1 , +sizeof (*validated_shader->uniform_addr_offsets), +GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!offsets)return false; + validated_shader->uniform_addr_offsets = offsets; validated_shader->uniform_addr_offsets[o] = num_uniforms; validated_shader->num_uniform_addr_offsets++;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 201/411 netfilter: nft_tunnel: fix use-after-free on object destroy
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tristan Madani <[email protected]>
commit c32b26aaa2f9216520a38b3f4bfeec846eb3eb8a upstream.
nft_tunnel_obj_destroy() calls metadata_dst_free() which directly kfree()s the metadata_dst, ignoring the dst_entry refcount. Packets that took a reference via dst_hold() in nft_tunnel_obj_eval() and are still queued (e.g. in a netem qdisc) are left with a dangling pointer. When these packets are eventually dequeued, dst_release() operates on freed memory.
Replace metadata_dst_free() with dst_release() so the metadata_dst is freed only after all references are dropped. The dst subsystem already handles metadata_dst cleanup in dst_destroy() when DST_METADATA is set.
--- net/netfilter/nft_tunnel.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/netfilter/nft_tunnel.c +1 -1
@@ -669,7 +669,7 @@ static void nft_tunnel_obj_destroy(const {struct nft_tunnel_obj *priv =nft_obj_data (obj); -metadata_dst_free (priv->md); +dst_release (&priv->md->dst); }static struct nft_object_type nft_tunnel_obj_type;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 202/411 Bluetooth: L2CAP: reject BR/EDR signaling packets over MTUsig
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>
commit dd214733544427587a95f66dbf3adff072568990 upstream.
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:l2cap_sig_channel() accepts BR/EDR signaling packets up to the channel MTU and dispatches each command without enforcing the signaling MTU (MTUsig). A Bluetooth BR/EDR peer within radio range can send a fixed-channel CID 0x0001 packet that is larger than MTUsig and contains many L2CAP_ECHO_REQ commands before pairing. In a real-radio stock-kernel run, one 681-byte signaling packet containing 168 zero-length ECHO_REQ commands made the target transmit 168 ECHO_RSP frames over about 220 ms.
Impact: a Bluetooth BR/EDR peer within radio range, before pairing, can force 168 ECHO_RSP frames from one 681-byte fixed-channel signaling packet containing packed ECHO_REQ commands.
Define Linux's BR/EDR signaling MTU as the spec minimum of 48 bytes and reject any larger signaling packet with one L2CAP_COMMAND_REJECT_RSP carrying L2CAP_REJ_MTU_EXCEEDED before any command is dispatched.
The Bluetooth Core spec wording for MTUExceeded says the reject identifier shall match the first request command in the packet, and that packets containing only responses shall be silently discarded. Linux intentionally deviates from that prescription: silently discarding desynchronizes the peer because the remote stack never learns its responses were dropped, and locating the first request command requires walking command headers past MTUsig, i.e. processing bytes from a packet we have already decided is too large to process. We therefore always emit one reject and use the identifier from the first command header, a single fixed-offset byte read.
The unrestricted BR/EDR signaling parser and ECHO_REQ response path both trace to the initial git import; no later introducing commit is available for a Fixes tag.
--- include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h | 1 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 47 insertions(+)
include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h +1 -0
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@/* L2CAP defaults */ #define L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU 672#define L2CAP_DEFAULT_MIN_MTU 48 +#define L2CAP_SIG_MTU 48/* BR/EDR signaling MTU */ #define L2CAP_DEFAULT_FLUSH_TO 0xFFFF#define L2CAP_EFS_DEFAULT_FLUSH_TO 0xFFFFFFFF#define L2CAP_DEFAULT_TX_WINDOW 63
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +46 -0
58 lines not on this page · raw message
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 203/411 drm/i915/gem: Fix phys BO pread/pwrite with offset
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Joonas Lahtinen <[email protected]>
commit d21ad938398bca695a511307de38a65889e3b354 upstream.
sg_page() returns struct page pointer not (void *) so the scaling of pread/pwrite is wrong for phys BO and wrong parts of BO would be accessed if non-zero offset is used.
Last impacted platform with overlay or cursor planes using phys mapping was Gen3/945G/Lakeport.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_phys.c | 19 +++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_phys.c +15 -4
@@ -16,6 +16,17 @@#include "i915_gem_region.h" #include "i915_scatterlist.h" +/* Abuse scatterlist to store pointer instead of struct page. */ +static inline void __set_phys_vaddr (struct scatterlist *sg,void *vaddr) +{ +sg_assign_page (sg, (struct page *)vaddr); +} + +static inline void *__get_phys_vaddr (struct scatterlist *sg) +{ +return (void *)sg_page (sg); +} +static int i915_gem_object_get_pages_phys (struct drm_i915_gem_object *obj) {struct address_space *mapping = obj->base.filp->f_mapping;
@@ -51,7 +62,7 @@ static int i915_gem_object_get_pages_phy sg->offset =0 ; sg->length = obj->base.size; -sg_assign_page (sg, (struct page *)vaddr); +__set_phys_vaddr (sg, vaddr);sg_dma_address (sg) = dma;sg_dma_len (sg) = obj->base.size;
@@ -95,7 +106,7 @@ i915_gem_object_put_pages_phys(struct dr struct sg_table *pages) {dma_addr_t dma =sg_dma_address (pages->sgl); -void *vaddr =sg_page (pages->sgl); +void *vaddr =__get_phys_vaddr (pages->sgl);__i915_gem_object_release_shmem (obj, pages, false);
@@ -138,7 +149,7 @@ i915_gem_object_put_pages_phys(struct drint i915_gem_object_pwrite_phys (struct drm_i915_gem_object *obj,const struct drm_i915_gem_pwrite *args) { -void *vaddr =sg_page (obj->mm.pages->sgl) + args->offset; +void *vaddr =__get_phys_vaddr (obj->mm.pages->sgl) + args->offset;char __user *user_data =u64_to_user_ptr (args->data_ptr);int err;
@@ -168,7 +179,7 @@ int i915_gem_object_pwrite_phys(struct dint i915_gem_object_pread_phys (struct drm_i915_gem_object *obj,const struct drm_i915_gem_pread *args) { -void *vaddr =sg_page (obj->mm.pages->sgl) + args->offset; +void *vaddr =__get_phys_vaddr (obj->mm.pages->sgl) + args->offset;char __user *user_data =u64_to_user_ptr (args->data_ptr);int err;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 204/411 xfrm: espintcp: do not reuse an in-progress partial send
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wyatt Feng <[email protected]>
commit c381039ade2e161ab08c0eda73c4f8b9a7115928 upstream.
espintcp keeps a single in-flight transmit in ctx->partial. Before building a new sk_msg, espintcp_sendmsg() first tries to flush that state through espintcp_push_msgs().
For blocking callers, espintcp_push_msgs() may return success even when the previous partial send is still pending. espintcp_sendmsg() would then reinitialize emsg->skmsg and reuse ctx->partial while the old transfer still owns that state.
Do not rebuild the send message when ctx->partial is still in progress. If espintcp_push_msgs() returns with emsg->len still set, fail the new send instead of overwriting the live partial state.
This is a memory-safety fix: reusing the live partial-send state can leave a stale offset attached to a new sk_msg and lead to an out-of- bounds read in the send path.
tcp_sendmsg_locked() already handles waiting for send buffer memory, so the fix here is just to preserve espintcp's one-message-at-a-time transmit state.
--- net/xfrm/espintcp.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
net/xfrm/espintcp.c +4 -0
@@ -342,6 +342,10 @@ static int espintcp_sendmsg(struct sock err = -ENOBUFS ; goto unlock; } +if (emsg->len) { + err = -ENOBUFS ; + goto unlock; + }sk_msg_init (&emsg->skmsg);while (1 ) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 205/411 USB: serial: io_ti: fix heap overflow in get_manuf_info()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Adrian Korwel <[email protected]>
commit 183c1076eca43bbb3e7bdf597456f91d81c73e74 upstream.
get_manuf_info() reads le16_to_cpu(rom_desc->Size) bytes from the device I2C EEPROM into a buffer allocated with kmalloc_obj(), which is sizeof(struct edge_ti_manuf_descriptor) = 10 bytes.
The Size field comes from the device and is only validated (in check_i2c_image()) to make sure the descriptor fits within TI_MAX_I2C_SIZE (16384 bytes), not against the destination buffer size. A malicious USB device can therefore set Size to any value up to 16377, causing a heap overflow of up to 16367 bytes when plugged into a host running this driver.
valid_csum() is called after read_rom() and also iterates buffer[0..Size-1], compounding the out-of-bounds access.
Fix by rejecting descriptors with unexpected length before calling read_rom().
--- drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c +6 -0
@@ -772,6 +772,12 @@ static int get_manuf_info(struct edgepor }/* Read the descriptor data */ +if (le16_to_cpu (rom_desc->Size) !=sizeof (struct edge_ti_manuf_descriptor )) { +dev_err (dev,"unexpected Edge descriptor length: %u\n" , +le16_to_cpu (rom_desc->Size)); + status = -EINVAL ; + goto exit; + } status =read_rom (serial, start_address+sizeof (struct ti_i2c_desc ),le16_to_cpu (rom_desc->Size), buffer);if (status)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 206/411 USB: serial: io_ti: fix heap overflow in build_i2c_fw_hdr()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Adrian Korwel <[email protected]>
commit 0fd2b00b2d3d05e3eaa13342b3dfb0fa85c226ae upstream.
build_i2c_fw_hdr() allocates a fixed-size buffer of (16*1024 - 512) + sizeof(struct ti_i2c_firmware_rec) bytes, then copies le16_to_cpu(img_header->Length) bytes into it without validating that Length fits within the available space after the firmware record header.
img_header->Length is a __le16 from the firmware file and can be up to 65535. check_fw_sanity() validates the total firmware size but not img_header->Length specifically.
Fix by rejecting images where img_header->Length exceeds the available destination space.
--- drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c +5 -0
@@ -843,6 +843,11 @@ static int build_i2c_fw_hdr(u8 *header,/* Pointer to fw_down memory image */ img_header = (struct ti_i2c_image_header *)&fw->data[4 ]; +if (le16_to_cpu (img_header->Length) > + buffer_size -sizeof (struct ti_i2c_firmware_rec )) { +kfree (buffer); +return -EINVAL ; + }memcpy (buffer +sizeof (struct ti_i2c_firmware_rec ), &fw->data[4 +sizeof (struct ti_i2c_image_header )],le16_to_cpu (img_header->Length));
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 207/411 USB: serial: option: add usb-id for Dell Wireless DW5826e-m
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jack Wu <[email protected]>
commit 1938fb9fe38c4f04a3f30bea44f8071c80a63be4 upstream.
Add support for Dell DW5826e-m with USB-id 0x413c:0x81ea
T: Bus=03 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=04 Cnt=01 Dev#= 8 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.10 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=413c ProdID=81ea Rev= 5.04 S: Manufacturer=DELL S: Product=DW5826e-m Qualcomm Snapdragon X12 Global LTE-A S: SerialNumber=358988870177734 C:* #Ifs= 7 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA A: FirstIf#=12 IfCount= 2 Cls=02(comm.) Sub=0e Prot=00 I:* If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=30 Driver=option E: Ad=01(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=81(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I:* If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=42 Prot=01 Driver=usbfs E: Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=82(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I:* If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=60 Driver=option E: Ad=84(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms E: Ad=83(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=03(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I:* If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option E: Ad=86(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms E: Ad=85(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=04(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I:* If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=(none) E: Ad=87(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 64 Ivl=32ms I:* If#=12 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(comm.) Sub=0e Prot=00 Driver=cdc_mbim E: Ad=88(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 64 Ivl=32ms I: If#=13 Alt= 0 #EPs= 0 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=02 Driver=cdc_mbim I:* If#=13 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=02 Driver=cdc_mbim E: Ad=8e(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=0f(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
--- drivers/usb/serial/option.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/serial/option.c +3 -0
@@ -202,6 +202,7 @@ static void option_instat_callback(struc#define DELL_PRODUCT_5821E_ESIM 0x81e0#define DELL_PRODUCT_5829E_ESIM 0x81e4#define DELL_PRODUCT_5829E 0x81e6 +#define DELL_PRODUCT_5826E_ESIM 0x81ea#define DELL_PRODUCT_FM101R_ESIM 0x8213#define DELL_PRODUCT_FM101R 0x8215
@@ -1123,6 +1124,8 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option .driver_info = RSVD(0) | RSVD(6) }, { USB_DEVICE(DELL_VENDOR_ID, DELL_PRODUCT_5829E_ESIM), .driver_info = RSVD(0) | RSVD(6) }, + { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(DELL_VENDOR_ID, DELL_PRODUCT_5826E_ESIM, 0xff), + .driver_info = RSVD(1) | RSVD(4) }, { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(DELL_VENDOR_ID, DELL_PRODUCT_FM101R, 0xff) }, { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(DELL_VENDOR_ID, DELL_PRODUCT_FM101R_ESIM, 0xff) }, { USB_DEVICE(ANYDATA_VENDOR_ID, ANYDATA_PRODUCT_ADU_E100A) }, /* ADU-E100, ADU-310 */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 208/411 USB: serial: kl5kusb105: fix bulk-out buffer overflow
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: HyeongJun An <[email protected]>
commit 96d47e40bf9db4a9efd5c8fb53287a508d165f14 upstream.
klsi_105_prepare_write_buffer() is called by the generic write path with the bulk-out buffer and its size (bulk_out_size, 64 bytes). It stores a two-byte length header at the start of the buffer and copies the payload from the write fifo starting at buf + KLSI_HDR_LEN, but passes the full buffer size as the number of bytes to copy:
count = kfifo_out_locked(&port->write_fifo, buf + KLSI_HDR_LEN,
size, &port->lock);
When the fifo holds at least size bytes, size bytes are copied starting two bytes into the size-byte buffer, writing KLSI_HDR_LEN bytes past its end. Copy at most size - KLSI_HDR_LEN bytes instead, leaving room for the header as safe_serial already does.
Writing bulk_out_size or more bytes to the tty triggers a slab out-of-bounds write, observed with KASAN by emulating the device with dummy_hcd and raw-gadget:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kfifo_copy_out+0x83/0xc0 Write of size 64 at addr ffff888112c62202 by task python3 kfifo_copy_out klsi_105_prepare_write_buffer [kl5kusb105] usb_serial_generic_write_start [usbserial] Allocated by task 139: usb_serial_probe [usbserial] The buggy address is located 2 bytes inside of allocated 64-byte region
The out-of-bounds write no longer occurs with this change applied.
--- drivers/usb/serial/kl5kusb105.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/serial/kl5kusb105.c +2 -2
@@ -357,8 +357,8 @@ static int klsi_105_prepare_write_bufferunsigned char *buf = dest;int count; - count =kfifo_out_locked (&port->write_fifo, buf +KLSI_HDR_LEN , size, - &port->lock); + count =kfifo_out_locked (&port->write_fifo, buf +KLSI_HDR_LEN , + size -KLSI_HDR_LEN , &port->lock);put_unaligned_le16 (count, buf);return count +KLSI_HDR_LEN ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 209/411 ALSA: timer: Fix UAF at snd_timer_user_params()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit 053a401b592be424fea9d57c789f66cd5d8cec11 upstream.
At releasing a timer object, e.g. when a userspace timer (CONFIG_SND_UTIMER) gets closed and snd_timer_free() is called, it tries to detach the timer instances and release the resources. However, it's still possible that other in-flight tasks are holding the timer instance where the to-be-deleted timer object is associated, and this may lead to racy accesses.
Fortunately, most of ioctls dealing with the timer instance list already have the protection with register_mutex, and this also avoids such races. But, SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_PARAMS isn't protected, hence the concurrent ioctl may lead to use-after-free.
This patch just adds the guard with register_mutex to protect snd_timer_user_params() for covering the code path as a quick workaround. It's no hot-path but rather a rarely issued ioctl, so the performance penalty doesn't matter.
--- sound/core/timer.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
sound/core/timer.c +1 -0
@@ -1842,6 +1842,7 @@ static int snd_timer_user_params(structstruct snd_timer *t;int err; +guard (mutex)(®ister_mutex); tu = file->private_data;if (!tu->timeri)return -EBADFD ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 210/411 drm/amd/display: Reject gpio_bitshift >= 32 in bios_parser_get_gpio_pin_info()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Harry Wentland <[email protected]>
commit 49c3da65961fe9857c831d47fa1989084e87514a upstream.
[Why & How]gpio_bitshift is a uint8_t read directly from the VBIOS GPIO pin table. If the value is >= 32, the expression "1 << gpio_bitshift" triggers undefined behaviour in C (shift count exceeds type width). On x86 the shift is silently masked to 5 bits, producing an incorrect GPIO mask that may cause wrong MMIO register bits to be toggled.
Validate gpio_bitshift before use and return BP_RESULT_BADBIOSTABLE for out-of-range values.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser2.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser2.c +4 -2
@@ -547,8 +547,10 @@ static enum bp_result bios_parser_get_gp info->offset_en = info->offset +1 ; info->offset_mask = info->offset -1 ; - info->mask = (uint32_t ) (1 << - header->gpio_pin[i].gpio_bitshift); +if (header->gpio_pin[i].gpio_bitshift >=32 ) +return BP_RESULT_BADBIOSTABLE ; + + info->mask =1u << header->gpio_pin[i].gpio_bitshift; info->mask_y = info->mask +2 ; info->mask_en = info->mask +1 ; info->mask_mask = info->mask -1 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 211/411 RDMA/srp: bound SRP_RSP sense copy by the received length
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>
commit 13e91fd076306f5d0cdfa14f53d69e37274723c4 upstream.
srp_process_rsp() copies sense data from rsp->data + resp_data_len, where resp_data_len is the full 32-bit value supplied by the SRP target and is never checked against the number of bytes actually received (wc->byte_len). The copy length is bounded to SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE, so at most 96 bytes are copied, but the source offset is not bounded.
A malicious or compromised SRP target on the InfiniBand/RoCE fabric that the initiator has logged into can return an SRP_RSP with SRP_RSP_FLAG_SNSVALID set and a large resp_data_len. The receive buffer is allocated at the target-chosen max_ti_iu_len, so the source of the sense copy lands past the bytes actually received; with resp_data_len near 0xFFFFFFFF it is gigabytes past the buffer and the read faults.
Copy the sense data only if it has not been truncated, that is, only if the response header, the response data, and the sense region fit within the bytes actually received; otherwise drop the sense and log. The in-tree iSER and NVMe-RDMA receive paths already bound their parse by wc->byte_len; this brings ib_srp into line with them.
--- drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c +24 -6
@@ -1929,7 +1929,8 @@ static int srp_post_recv(struct srp_rdmareturn ib_post_recv (ch->qp, &wr,NULL ); } -static void srp_process_rsp (struct srp_rdma_ch *ch,struct srp_rsp *rsp) +static void srp_process_rsp (struct srp_rdma_ch *ch,struct srp_rsp *rsp, +u32 byte_len) {struct srp_target_port *target = ch->target;struct srp_request *req;
@@ -1970,10 +1971,27 @@ static void srp_process_rsp(struct srp_r scmnd->result = rsp->status;if (rsp->flags &SRP_RSP_FLAG_SNSVALID ) { -memcpy (scmnd->sense_buffer, rsp->data + -be32_to_cpu (rsp->resp_data_len), -min_t (int,be32_to_cpu (rsp->sense_data_len), -SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE )); +u32 resp_len =be32_to_cpu (rsp->resp_data_len); +u32 sense_len =be32_to_cpu (rsp->sense_data_len); + +/* +* The sense data starts resp_data_len bytes past the +* response data area; both lengths come from the +* target-controlled response. Copy the sense data +* only if it has not been truncated, that is, only if +* the full sense region fits within the bytes actually +* received. Otherwise the copy source would run past +* the receive buffer (sized to the target-chosen +* max_ti_iu_len), reading out of bounds. +*/ +if (sizeof (*rsp) + (u64 )resp_len + sense_len <= byte_len) +memcpy (scmnd->sense_buffer, + rsp->data + resp_len, +min (sense_len,SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE )); +else +shost_printk (KERN_ERR , target->scsi_host, +"dropping truncated sense data (resp_data_len %u sense_data_len %u, %u bytes received)\n" , + resp_len, sense_len, byte_len); }if (unlikely (rsp->flags &SRP_RSP_FLAG_DIUNDER ))
@@ -2083,7 +2101,7 @@ static void srp_recv_done(struct ib_cq *switch (opcode) {case SRP_RSP : -srp_process_rsp (ch, iu->buf); +srp_process_rsp (ch, iu->buf, wc->byte_len);break ;case SRP_CRED_REQ :
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 212/411 ARM: socfpga: Fix OF node refcount leak in SMP setup
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yuho Choi <[email protected]>
commit 63838c323924fe4a78b2323bd45aa1030f72ca60 upstream.
socfpga_smp_prepare_cpus() looks up the Cortex-A9 SCU node with of_find_compatible_node(), which returns a node reference that must be released with of_node_put().
The function maps the SCU registers and then returns without dropping that reference, leaking the node on both the success path and the of_iomap() failure path.
Drop the reference once the mapping attempt is complete. The returned MMIO mapping does not depend on keeping the device node reference held.
--- arch/arm/mach-socfpga/platsmp.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/arm/mach-socfpga/platsmp.c +1 -0
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ static void __init socfpga_smp_prepare_c } socfpga_scu_base_addr =of_iomap (np,0 ); +of_node_put (np);if (!socfpga_scu_base_addr)return ;scu_enable (socfpga_scu_base_addr);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 213/411 ARM: 9474/1: io: avoid KASAN instrumentation of raw halfword I/O
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Karl Mehltretter <[email protected]>
commit d59ed803715a71fb9582e139d648ece8d66dc743 upstream.
For CPUs before ARMv6, __raw_readw() and __raw_writew() are implemented as C volatile halfword accesses so the compiler can generate an access sequence that is safe for those machines. With KASAN enabled, those C accesses are instrumented as normal memory accesses.
That is not valid for MMIO. On ARM926/VersatilePB with KASAN enabled, PL011 probing traps in __asan_store2() while registering the UART, because the instrumented writew() tries to check KASAN shadow for an MMIO address.
Keep the existing volatile halfword access, but move the ARMv5 definitions into __no_kasan_or_inline functions so raw MMIO halfword accesses are not instrumented by KASAN. The ARMv6-and-newer inline assembly path is unchanged.
--- arch/arm/include/asm/io.h | 15 +++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm/include/asm/io.h +13 -2
@@ -56,8 +56,19 @@ void __raw_readsl(const volatile void __* the bus. Rather than special-case the machine, just let the compiler * generate the access for CPUs prior to ARMv6. */ -#define __raw_readw (a) (__chk_io_ptr(a), *(volatile unsigned short __force *)(a)) -#define __raw_writew (v,a) ((void)(__chk_io_ptr(a), *(volatile unsigned short __force *)(a) = (v))) +#define __raw_writew __raw_writew +static __no_kasan_or_inline void __raw_writew(u16 val, volatile void __iomem *addr) +{ +__chk_io_ptr (addr); + *(volatile unsigned short __force *)addr = val; +} + +#define __raw_readw __raw_readw +static __no_kasan_or_inline u16 __raw_readw(const volatile void __iomem *addr) +{ +__chk_io_ptr (addr); +return *(const volatile unsigned short __force *)addr; +}#else /* * When running under a hypervisor, we want to avoid I/O accesses with
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 214/411 mptcp: fix retransmission loop when csum is enabled
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
commit d1918b36edcaed0ec4ef6888b2358c6b1ddcff47 upstream.
Sashiko noted that retransmission with csum enabled can actually transmit new data, but currently the relevant code does not update accordingly snd_nxt.
The may cause incoming ack drop and an endless retransmission loop.
Address the issue incrementing snd_nxt as needed.
--- net/mptcp/protocol.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
net/mptcp/protocol.c +4 -0
@@ -2539,6 +2539,10 @@ static void __mptcp_retrans(struct sockrelease_sock (ssk); +/* With csum enabled retransmission can send new data. */ +if (after64 (dfrag->already_sent + dfrag->data_seq, msk->snd_nxt)) +WRITE_ONCE (msk->snd_nxt, dfrag->already_sent + dfrag->data_seq); + reset_timer:if (!mptcp_rtx_timer_pending (sk))mptcp_reset_rtx_timer (sk);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 215/411 mptcp: sockopt: check timestamping ret value
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <[email protected]>
commit 57132affbc89c02e1bf73fdf5724311bdc9a29da upstream.
sock_set_timestamping() can fail for different reasons. The returned value should then be checked.
If sock_set_timestamping() fails for at least one subflow, the first error is now reported to the userspace, similar to what is done with other socket options.
--- net/mptcp/sockopt.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/mptcp/sockopt.c +6 -2
@@ -231,15 +231,19 @@ static int mptcp_setsockopt_sol_socket_tmptcp_for_each_subflow (msk, subflow) {struct sock *ssk =mptcp_subflow_tcp_sock (subflow); +int err;lock_sock (ssk); -sock_set_timestamping (ssk, optname, timestamping); + err =sock_set_timestamping (ssk, optname, timestamping);release_sock (ssk); + +if (err <0 && ret ==0 ) + ret = err; }release_sock (sk); -return 0 ; +return ret; } static int mptcp_setsockopt_sol_socket_linger(struct mptcp_sock *msk, sockptr_t optval,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 216/411 vsock/vmci: fix sk_ack_backlog leak on failed handshake
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Raf Dickson <[email protected]>
commit c05fa14db43ebef3bd862ca9d073981c0358b3f0 upstream.
When vmci_transport_recv_connecting_server() returns an error, vmci_transport_recv_listen() calls vsock_remove_pending() but never calls sk_acceptq_removed(). This leaves sk_ack_backlog incremented permanently.
Repeated handshake failures (malformed packets, queue pair alloc failure, event subscribe failure) cause sk_ack_backlog to climb toward sk_max_ack_backlog. Once it reaches the limit the listener permanently refuses all new connections with -ECONNREFUSED, a silent denial of service requiring a process restart to recover.
The two existing sk_acceptq_removed() calls in af_vsock.c do not cover this path: line 764 checks vsock_is_pending() which returns false after vsock_remove_pending(), and line 1889 is only reached on successful accept().
Fix by balancing sk_acceptq_added() with sk_acceptq_removed() on the error path.
--- net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c +3 -1
@@ -972,8 +972,10 @@ static int vmci_transport_recv_listen(st err = -EINVAL ; } -if (err <0 ) +if (err <0 ) {vsock_remove_pending (sk, pending); +sk_acceptq_removed (sk); + }release_sock (pending);vmci_transport_release_pending (pending);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 217/411 bnxt_en: Fix NULL pointer dereference
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kyle Meyer <[email protected]>
commit d930276f2cddd0b7294cac7a8fe7b877f6d9e08d upstream.
PCIe errors detected by a Root Port or Downstream Port cause error recovery services to run on all subordinate devices regardless of administrative state.
The .error_detected() callback, bnxt_io_error_detected(), disables and synchronizes IRQs via bnxt_disable_int_sync(), which calls bnxt_cp_num_to_irq_num() to map completion rings to IRQs using bp->bnapi.
Since bp->bnapi is allocated on NIC open and freed on NIC close, PCIe error recovery on a closed NIC can dereference a NULL pointer.
Check if bp->bnapi is NULL before disabling and synchronizing IRQs.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c +1 -1
@@ -4552,7 +4552,7 @@ static void bnxt_disable_int_sync(struct {int i; -if (!bp->irq_tbl) +if (!bp->irq_tbl || !bp->bnapi)return ;atomic_inc (&bp->intr_sem);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 218/411 IB/isert: Reject login PDUs shorter than ISER_HEADERS_LEN
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>
commit 29e7b925ae6df64894e82ab6419994dc25580a8a upstream.
In drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c, isert_login_recv_done() computes the login request payload length as wc->byte_len minus ISER_HEADERS_LEN with no lower bound, and login_req_len is a signed int. A remote iSER initiator can post a login Send work request carrying fewer than ISER_HEADERS_LEN (76) bytes, so the subtraction underflows and login_req_len becomes negative.
isert_rx_login_req() then reads that negative length back into a signed int, takes size = min(rx_buflen, MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS), and because the min() is signed it keeps the negative value; the value is then passed as the memcpy() length and sign-extended to a multi-gigabyte size_t. The copy into the 8192-byte login->req_buf runs far out of bounds and faults, crashing the target node. The login phase precedes iSCSI authentication, so no credentials are required to reach this path.
Reject any login PDU shorter than ISER_HEADERS_LEN before the subtraction, mirroring the existing early return on a failed work completion, so login_req_len can never go negative. The upper bound was already safe: a posted login buffer cannot deliver more than ISER_RX_PAYLOAD_SIZE, so the difference stays at or below MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS and the existing min() clamps it; only the missing lower bound needs to be added.
--- drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c +6 -0
@@ -1388,6 +1388,12 @@ isert_login_recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq,ib_dma_sync_single_for_cpu (ib_dev, isert_conn->login_desc->dma_addr,ISER_RX_SIZE ,DMA_FROM_DEVICE ); +if (unlikely (wc->byte_len <ISER_HEADERS_LEN )) { +isert_dbg ("login request length %u is too short\n" , + wc->byte_len); +return ; + } + isert_conn->login_req_len = wc->byte_len -ISER_HEADERS_LEN ;if (isert_conn->conn) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 219/411 pidfd: refuse access to tasks that have started exiting harder
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
commit 62c4d31d78294bd61cf3403626b789e854357177 upstream.
The recent ptrace fix closed a hole where someone could rely on task->mm becoming NULL during do_exit() to bypass dumpability checks. This api here leans on on the very same check and so inherits the fix.
But there is no good reason to let it succeed at all once the target has entered do_exit(). PF_EXITING is set by exit_signals() at the very top of do_exit(), before exit_mm() and exit_files() run. Once we observe it, the task is committed to dying and exit_files() will release the fdtable shortly.
--- kernel/pid.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
kernel/pid.c +5 -3
@@ -637,10 +637,12 @@ static struct file *__pidfd_fget(structif (ret)return ERR_PTR (ret); -if (ptrace_may_access (task,PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS )) - file =fget_task (task, fd); -else +if (!ptrace_may_access (task,PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS )) file =ERR_PTR (-EPERM ); +else if (task->flags &PF_EXITING ) + file =ERR_PTR (-ESRCH ); +else + file =fget_task (task, fd);up_read (&task->signal->exec_update_lock);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 220/411 fuse: reject fuse_notify() pagecache ops on directories
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
commit 9c954499d43aefac01c5dfb57a82b13d2dcf4b94 upstream.
The operations FUSE_NOTIFY_STORE and FUSE_NOTIFY_RETRIEVE allow the FUSE daemon to actively write/read pagecache contents.
For directories with FOPEN_CACHE_DIR, the pagecache is used as kernel-internal cache storage, and userspace is not supposed to have direct access to this cache - in particular, fuse_parse_cache() will hit WARN_ON() if the cache contains bogus data.
Reject FUSE_NOTIFY_STORE and FUSE_NOTIFY_RETRIEVE on anything other than regular files with -EINVAL.
--- fs/fuse/dev.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/fuse/dev.c +8 -1
@@ -1599,6 +1599,10 @@ static int fuse_notify_store(struct fuse inode =fuse_ilookup (fc, nodeid,NULL );if (!inode) goto out_up_killsb; +if (!S_ISREG (inode->i_mode)) { + err = -EINVAL ; + goto out_iput; + } mapping = inode->i_mapping; index = outarg.offset >>PAGE_SHIFT ;
@@ -1770,7 +1774,10 @@ static int fuse_notify_retrieve(struct f inode =fuse_ilookup (fc, nodeid, &fm);if (inode) { - err =fuse_retrieve (fm, inode, &outarg); +if (!S_ISREG (inode->i_mode)) + err = -EINVAL ; +else + err =fuse_retrieve (fm, inode, &outarg);iput (inode); }up_read (&fc->killsb);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 221/411 i2c: qcom-cci: Fix NULL pointer dereference in cci_remove()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vladimir Zapolskiy <[email protected]>
commit 729ac5a4b966aac42e08a94dea966f4429008548 upstream.
On all modern platforms Qualcomm CCI controller provides two I2C masters, and on particular boards only one I2C master may be initialized, and in such cases the device unbinding or driver removal causes a NULL pointer dereference, because cci_halt() is called for all two I2C masters, but a completion is initialized only for the single enabled master:
% rmmod i2c-qcom-cci
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
<snip>
Call trace:
__wait_for_common+0x194/0x1a8 (P)
wait_for_completion_timeout+0x20/0x2c
cci_remove+0xc4/0x138 [i2c_qcom_cci]
platform_remove+0x20/0x30
device_remove+0x4c/0x80
device_release_driver_internal+0x1c8/0x224
driver_detach+0x50/0x98
bus_remove_driver+0x6c/0xbc
driver_unregister+0x30/0x60
platform_driver_unregister+0x14/0x20
qcom_cci_driver_exit+0x18/0x1008 [i2c_qcom_cci]
....--- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-qcom-cci.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-qcom-cci.c +1 -1
@@ -683,8 +683,8 @@ static int cci_remove(struct platform_deif (cci->master[i].cci) {i2c_del_adapter (&cci->master[i].adap);of_node_put (cci->master[i].adap.dev.of_node); +cci_halt (cci, i); } -cci_halt (cci, i); }disable_irq (cci->irq);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 222/411 i2c: stm32f7: fix timing computation ignoring i2c-analog-filter
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Guillermo Rodríguez <[email protected]>
commit a124579c0763da7bc408f4cd7e8f606cadc94855 upstream.
stm32f7_i2c_compute_timing() uses i2c_dev->analog_filter to pick the analog filter delay, but i2c_dev->analog_filter is parsed from the "i2c-analog-filter" DT property only after the compute_timing loop in stm32f7_i2c_setup_timing(), so in practice the timing calculations always ignore the analog filter. On an STM32MP1 board with clock-frequency = <400000> and i2c-analog-filter set, measured SCL frequency was ~382 kHz.
This also affects (widens) the computed SDADEL range. At high bus clock speeds, this can select an SDADEL value that violates tVD;DAT (data valid time).
Fix by parsing "i2c-analog-filter" before the compute_timing loop.
--- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-stm32f7.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-stm32f7.c +3 -3
@@ -673,6 +673,9 @@ static int stm32f7_i2c_setup_timing(struif (!of_property_read_bool (i2c_dev->dev->of_node,"i2c-digital-filter" )) i2c_dev->dnf_dt =STM32F7_I2C_DNF_DEFAULT ; + i2c_dev->analog_filter =of_property_read_bool (i2c_dev->dev->of_node, +"i2c-analog-filter" ); + do { ret = stm32f7_i2c_compute_timing(i2c_dev, setup, &i2c_dev->timing);
@@ -694,9 +697,6 @@ static int stm32f7_i2c_setup_timing(strureturn ret; } - i2c_dev->analog_filter =of_property_read_bool (i2c_dev->dev->of_node, -"i2c-analog-filter" ); -dev_dbg (i2c_dev->dev,"I2C Speed(%i), Clk Source(%i)\n" , setup->speed_freq, setup->clock_src); dev_dbg(i2c_dev->dev, "I2C Rise(%i) and Fall(%i) Time\n",
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 223/411 i2c: tegra: Fix NOIRQ suspend/resume
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Akhil R <[email protected]>
commit 656646b3847ac6a21b074a813223feef2aadd6e2 upstream.
The Tegra I2C driver relies on runtime PM to wake up the controller before each transfer. However, runtime PM is disabled between the system suspend and NOIRQ suspend. If an I2C device initiates a transfer during this window, the I2C controller fails to wake up and the transfer fails. To handle this, the controller must be kept available for this period to allow transfers.
Rework the I2C controller's system PM callbacks such that the controller is resumed from runtime suspend during system suspend and it stays RPM_ACTIVE throughout the suspend-resume cycle until it is runtime suspended back in the system resume. The clocks are disabled in NOIRQ suspend and enabled back in NOIRQ resume by calling the controller's runtime PM functions directly.
--- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-tegra.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-tegra.c +30 -23
@@ -1874,28 +1874,37 @@ static int __maybe_unused tegra_i2c_runtstatic int __maybe_unused tegra_i2c_suspend (struct device *dev) { +/* +* Bring the controller up and hold a usage count so it stays +* available until the noirq phase. +*/ +return pm_runtime_resume_and_get (dev); +} + +static int __maybe_unused tegra_i2c_suspend_noirq (struct device *dev) +{struct tegra_i2c_dev *i2c_dev =dev_get_drvdata (dev); -int err;i2c_mark_adapter_suspended (&i2c_dev->adapter); -if (!pm_runtime_status_suspended (dev)) { - err =tegra_i2c_runtime_suspend (dev); -if (err) -return err; - } - -return 0 ; +/* +* Runtime PM is already disabled at this point, so invoke the +* runtime_suspend callback directly to put the controller down. +*/ +return tegra_i2c_runtime_suspend (dev); } -static int __maybe_unused tegra_i2c_resume (struct device *dev) +static int __maybe_unused tegra_i2c_resume_noirq (struct device *dev) {struct tegra_i2c_dev *i2c_dev =dev_get_drvdata (dev);int err;/* -* We need to ensure that clocks are enabled so that registers can be -* restored in tegra_i2c_init(). +* Runtime PM is still disabled at this point, so invoke the +* runtime_resume callback directly to bring the controller back up +* before re-initializing the hardware. The adapter is then marked +* resumed so that consumers can issue transfers from their own +* resume_noirq() handlers and onwards. */ err =tegra_i2c_runtime_resume (dev);if (err)
@@ -1905,24 +1914,22 @@ static int __maybe_unused tegra_i2c_resuif (err)return err; -/* -* In case we are runtime suspended, disable clocks again so that we -* don't unbalance the clock reference counts during the next runtime -* resume transition. -*/ -if (pm_runtime_status_suspended (dev)) { - err =tegra_i2c_runtime_suspend (dev); -if (err) -return err; - } -i2c_mark_adapter_resumed (&i2c_dev->adapter);return 0 ; } +static int __maybe_unused tegra_i2c_resume (struct device *dev) +{ +pm_runtime_put (dev); + +return 0 ; +} +static const struct dev_pm_ops tegra_i2c_pm = { - SET_NOIRQ_SYSTEM_SLEEP_PM_OPS(tegra_i2c_suspend, tegra_i2c_resume) + SET_SYSTEM_SLEEP_PM_OPS(tegra_i2c_suspend, tegra_i2c_resume) + SET_NOIRQ_SYSTEM_SLEEP_PM_OPS(tegra_i2c_suspend_noirq, + tegra_i2c_resume_noirq)SET_RUNTIME_PM_OPS (tegra_i2c_runtime_suspend, tegra_i2c_runtime_resume,NULL ) };
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 224/411 Input: atkbd - add DMI quirk for Lenovo Yoga Air 14 (83QK)
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zeyu WANG <[email protected]>
commit ad0979fe053e9f2db82da82188256ef6eb41095a upstream.
The Lenovo Yoga Air 14 (83QK) laptop keyboard becomes unresponsive after the standard atkbd init sequence. Controlled testing on the actual hardware shows the F5 (ATKBD_CMD_RESET_DIS / deactivate) command specifically corrupts the EC state, causing zero IRQ1 interrupts after init.
Skipping only the deactivate command (while keeping F4 ENABLE) resolves the issue completely: both keystroke input and CapsLock LED toggle work correctly. The reverse test - skipping only F4 while keeping F5 - makes the problem worse (zero keystroke interrupts), confirming F5 is the sole culprit.
Add a DMI quirk entry for LENOVO/83QK using the existing atkbd_deactivate_fixup callback, consistent with the existing entries for LG Electronics and HONOR FMB-P that address the same EC F5 deactivate issue.
--- drivers/input/keyboard/atkbd.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
drivers/input/keyboard/atkbd.c +8 -0
@@ -1939,6 +1939,14 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id atkbd_ }, .callback = atkbd_deactivate_fixup, }, + { + /* Lenovo Yoga Air 14 (83QK) */ + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "LENOVO"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "83QK"), + }, + .callback = atkbd_deactivate_fixup, + }, { } };
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 225/411 Input: atkbd - skip deactivate for HONOR BCC-Ns internal keyboard
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cryolitia PukNgae <[email protected]>
commit fb402386af4cdce108ff991a796386de55439735 upstream.
After commit 9cf6e24c9fbf17e52de9fff07f12be7565ea6d61 ("Input: atkbd - do not skip atkbd_deactivate() when skipping ATKBD_CMD_GETID"), HONOR BCC-N, aka HONOR MagicBook 14 2026's internal keyboard stops working. Adding the atkbd_deactivate_fixup quirk fixes it.
DMI: HONOR BCC-N/BCC-N-PCB, BIOS 1.04 04/07/2026
--- drivers/input/keyboard/atkbd.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/input/keyboard/atkbd.c +7 -0
@@ -1947,6 +1947,13 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id atkbd_ }, .callback = atkbd_deactivate_fixup, }, + { + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "HONOR"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "BCC-N"), + }, + .callback = atkbd_deactivate_fixup, + }, { } };
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 226/411 ipc/shm: serialize orphan cleanup with shm_nattch updates
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yilin Zhu <[email protected]>
commit 2e5c6f4fd4001562781e99bbfc7f1f0127187542 upstream.
shm_destroy_orphaned() walks the shm idr under shm_ids(ns).rwsem, but that does not serialize all fields tested by shm_may_destroy(). In particular, shm_nattch is updated while holding shm_perm.lock, and attach paths can do that without holding the rwsem.
Do not decide that an orphaned segment is unused before taking the object lock. Move the shm_may_destroy() check under shm_perm.lock, matching the other destroy paths, and unlock the segment when it no longer qualifies for removal.
--- ipc/shm.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
ipc/shm.c +6 -4
@@ -402,15 +402,17 @@ static int shm_try_destroy_orphaned(int* We want to destroy segments without users and with already * exit'ed originating process. * -* As shp->* are changed under rwsem, it's safe to skip shp locking. +* shm_nattch can be changed under shm_perm.lock without holding the +* rwsem, so take the object lock before checking shm_may_destroy(). */ if (!list_empty (&shp->shm_clist))return 0 ; -if (shm_may_destroy (shp)) { -shm_lock_by_ptr (shp); +shm_lock_by_ptr (shp); +if (shm_may_destroy (shp))shm_destroy (ns, shp); - } +else +shm_unlock (shp);return 0 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 227/411 misc: fastrpc: fix use-after-free of fastrpc_user in workqueue context
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Anandu Krishnan E <[email protected]>
commit e85eb5feca8e254905ffa6c57a3c99c89a674a0f upstream.
There is a race between fastrpc_device_release() and the workqueue that processes DSP responses. When the user closes the file descriptor, fastrpc_device_release() frees the fastrpc_user structure. Concurrently, an in-flight DSP invocation can complete and fastrpc_rpmsg_callback() schedules context cleanup via schedule_work(&ctx->put_work). If the workqueue runs fastrpc_context_free() in parallel with or after fastrpc_device_release() has freed the user structure, it dereferences the freed fastrpc_user. Depending on the state of the context at the time of the race, any one of the following accesses can be hit:
1. fastrpc_buf_free() calls fastrpc_ipa_to_dma_addr(buf->fl->cctx, ...) to strip the SID bits from the stored IOVA before passing the physical address to dma_free_coherent().
2. fastrpc_free_map() reads map->fl->cctx->vmperms[0].vmid to reconstruct the source permission bitmask needed for the qcom_scm_assign_mem() call that returns memory from the DSP VM back to HLOS.
3. fastrpc_free_map() acquires map->fl->lock to safely remove the
map node from the fl->maps list.
The resulting use-after-free manifests as:
pc : fastrpc_buf_free+0x38/0x80 [fastrpc] lr : fastrpc_context_free+0xa8/0x1b0 [fastrpc] fastrpc_context_free+0xa8/0x1b0 [fastrpc] fastrpc_context_put_wq+0x78/0xa0 [fastrpc] process_one_work+0x180/0x450 worker_thread+0x26c/0x388
Add kref-based reference counting to fastrpc_user. Have each invoke context take a reference on the user at allocation time and release it when the context is freed. Release the initial reference in fastrpc_device_release() at file close. Move the teardown of the user structure — freeing pending contexts, maps, mmaps, and the channel context reference — into the kref release callback fastrpc_user_free(), so that it runs only when the last reference is dropped, regardless of whether that happens at device close or after the final in-flight context completes.
--- drivers/misc/fastrpc.c | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
drivers/misc/fastrpc.c +52 -23
@@ -232,6 +232,8 @@ struct fastrpc_user {spinlock_t lock;/* lock for allocations */ struct mutex mutex; +/* Reference count */ +struct kref refcount; };static void fastrpc_free_map (struct kref *ref)
@@ -352,15 +354,57 @@ static void fastrpc_channel_ctx_put(strukref_put (&cctx->refcount, fastrpc_channel_ctx_free); } +static void fastrpc_context_put (struct fastrpc_invoke_ctx *ctx); + +static void fastrpc_user_free (struct kref *ref) +{ + struct fastrpc_user *fl = container_of(ref, struct fastrpc_user, refcount); +struct fastrpc_invoke_ctx *ctx, *n; +struct fastrpc_map *map, *m; +struct fastrpc_buf *buf, *b; + +if (fl->init_mem) +fastrpc_buf_free (fl->init_mem); + +list_for_each_entry_safe (ctx, n, &fl->pending, node) { +list_del (&ctx->node); +fastrpc_context_put (ctx); + } + +list_for_each_entry_safe (map, m, &fl->maps, node) +fastrpc_map_put (map); + +list_for_each_entry_safe (buf, b, &fl->mmaps, node) { +list_del (&buf->node); +fastrpc_buf_free (buf); + } + +fastrpc_channel_ctx_put (fl->cctx); +mutex_destroy (&fl->mutex); +kfree (fl); +} + +static void fastrpc_user_get (struct fastrpc_user *fl) +{ +kref_get (&fl->refcount); +} + +static void fastrpc_user_put (struct fastrpc_user *fl) +{ +kref_put (&fl->refcount, fastrpc_user_free); +} +static void fastrpc_context_free (struct kref *ref) {struct fastrpc_invoke_ctx *ctx;struct fastrpc_channel_ctx *cctx; +struct fastrpc_user *fl;unsigned long flags;int i; ctx = container_of(ref, struct fastrpc_invoke_ctx, refcount); cctx = ctx->cctx; + fl = ctx->fl;for (i =0 ; i < ctx->nscalars; i++)fastrpc_map_put (ctx->maps[i]);
@@ -376,6 +420,8 @@ static void fastrpc_context_free(structkfree (ctx->olaps);kfree (ctx); +/* Release the reference taken in fastrpc_context_alloc() */ +fastrpc_user_put (fl);fastrpc_channel_ctx_put (cctx); }
@@ -485,6 +531,8 @@ static struct fastrpc_invoke_ctx *fastrp/* Released in fastrpc_context_put() */ fastrpc_channel_ctx_get (cctx); +/* Take a reference to user, released in fastrpc_context_free() */ +fastrpc_user_get (user); ctx->sc = sc; ctx->retval =-1 ;
@@ -515,6 +563,7 @@ err_idr:spin_lock (&user->lock);list_del (&ctx->node);spin_unlock (&user->lock); +fastrpc_user_put (user);fastrpc_channel_ctx_put (cctx);kfree (ctx->maps);kfree (ctx->olaps);
@@ -1181,9 +1230,6 @@ static int fastrpc_device_release(struct {struct fastrpc_user *fl = (struct fastrpc_user *)file->private_data;struct fastrpc_channel_ctx *cctx = fl->cctx; -struct fastrpc_invoke_ctx *ctx, *n; -struct fastrpc_map *map, *m; -struct fastrpc_buf *buf, *b;unsigned long flags;fastrpc_release_current_dsp_process (fl);
@@ -1192,28 +1238,10 @@ static int fastrpc_device_release(structlist_del (&fl->user);spin_unlock_irqrestore (&cctx->lock, flags); -if (fl->init_mem) -fastrpc_buf_free (fl->init_mem); - -list_for_each_entry_safe (ctx, n, &fl->pending, node) { -list_del (&ctx->node); -fastrpc_context_put (ctx); - } - -list_for_each_entry_safe (map, m, &fl->maps, node) -fastrpc_map_put (map); - -list_for_each_entry_safe (buf, b, &fl->mmaps, node) { -list_del (&buf->node); -fastrpc_buf_free (buf); - } -fastrpc_session_free (cctx, fl->sctx); -fastrpc_channel_ctx_put (cctx); - -mutex_destroy (&fl->mutex); -kfree (fl); file->private_data =NULL ; +/* Release the reference taken in fastrpc_device_open */ +fastrpc_user_put (fl);return 0 ; }
@@ -1253,6 +1281,7 @@ static int fastrpc_device_open(struct inspin_lock_irqsave (&cctx->lock, flags);list_add_tail (&fl->user, &cctx->users);spin_unlock_irqrestore (&cctx->lock, flags); +kref_init (&fl->refcount);return 0 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 228/411 misc: fastrpc: fix DMA address corruption due to find_vma misuse
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Junrui Luo <[email protected]>
commit 464c6ad2aa16e1e1df9d559289199356493d1e00 upstream.
fastrpc_get_args() uses find_vma() to look up the VMA for a user-provided pointer and compute a DMA address offset. When the address falls in a gap before the returned VMA, (ptr & PAGE_MASK) - vma->vm_start underflows, corrupting the DMA address sent to the DSP.
Replace find_vma() with vma_lookup(), which returns NULL when the address is not contained within any VMA.
--- drivers/misc/fastrpc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/misc/fastrpc.c +1 -1
@@ -875,7 +875,7 @@ static int fastrpc_get_args(u32 kernel, pages[i].addr = ctx->maps[i]->phys;mmap_read_lock (current->mm); - vma =find_vma (current->mm, ctx->args[i].ptr); + vma =vma_lookup (current->mm, ctx->args[i].ptr);if (vma) pages[i].addr += (ctx->args[i].ptr &PAGE_MASK ) - vma->vm_start;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 229/411 net: bonding: fix NULL pointer dereference in bond_do_ioctl()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: ZhaoJinming <[email protected]>
commit a764b0e8317a863006e05732e1aefe821b9d8c2d upstream.
In bond_do_ioctl(), slave_dev is obtained via __dev_get_by_name() which can return NULL if the requested interface name does not exist. However, the subsequent slave_dbg() call is placed before the NULL check:
slave_dev = __dev_get_by_name(net, ifr->ifr_slave);
slave_dbg(bond_dev, slave_dev, "slave_dev=%p:\n", slave_dev); //here
if (!slave_dev)
return -ENODEV;The slave_dbg() macro expands to netdev_dbg(bond_dev, "(slave %s): " fmt, (slave_dev)->name, ...) which unconditionally dereferences slave_dev->name before the NULL check is performed. This results in a NULL pointer dereference kernel oops when a user calls bonding ioctl (e.g. SIOCBONDENSLAVE, SIOCBONDRELEASE, etc.) with a non-existent slave interface name.
This is reachable from userspace via the bonding ioctl interface with CAP_NET_ADMIN capability, making it a potential local denial-of-service vector.
Fix by moving the slave_dbg() call after the NULL check.
--- drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c +2 -2
@@ -4250,11 +4250,11 @@ static int bond_do_ioctl(struct net_devi slave_dev =__dev_get_by_name (net, ifr->ifr_slave); -slave_dbg (bond_dev, slave_dev,"slave_dev=%p:\n" , slave_dev); -if (!slave_dev)return -ENODEV ; +slave_dbg (bond_dev, slave_dev,"slave_dev=%p:\n" , slave_dev); +switch (cmd) {case SIOCBONDENSLAVE : res =bond_enslave (bond_dev, slave_dev,NULL );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 230/411 net: mv643xx: fix OF node refcount
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bartosz Golaszewski <[email protected]>
commit 4aacf509e537a711fa71bca9f234e5eb6968850e upstream.
Platform devices created with platform_device_alloc() call platform_device_release() when the last reference to the device's kobject is dropped. This function calls of_node_put() unconditionally. This works fine for devices created with platform_device_register_full() but users of the split approach (platform_device_alloc() + platform_device_add()) must bump the reference of the of_node they assign manually. Add the missing call to of_node_get().
--- drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mv643xx_eth.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mv643xx_eth.c +1 -1
@@ -2777,7 +2777,7 @@ static int mv643xx_eth_shared_of_add_por goto put_err; } ppdev->dev.coherent_dma_mask =DMA_BIT_MASK (32 ); - ppdev->dev.of_node = pnp; + ppdev->dev.of_node =of_node_get (pnp); ret =platform_device_add_resources (ppdev, &res,1 );if (ret)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 231/411 net: rds: clear i_sends on setup unwind
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yuqi Xu <[email protected]>
commit 20cf0fb715c41111469577e85e35d15f099473e0 upstream.
The RDS IB connection teardown path is written so it can run during partial startup and on repeated shutdown attempts. It uses NULL pointers to distinguish resources that are still owned from resources that have already been released.
When rds_ib_setup_qp() fails after allocating i_sends but before allocating i_recvs, the sends_out path frees i_sends without clearing the pointer. A later shutdown pass can still treat that stale pointer as a live send ring allocation.
Clear i_sends after vfree() in the error unwind path so the existing shutdown logic continues to use the correct ownership state.
--- net/rds/ib_cm.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/rds/ib_cm.c +1 -0
@@ -656,6 +656,7 @@ static int rds_ib_setup_qp(struct rds_co sends_out:vfree (ic->i_sends); + ic->i_sends =NULL ; ack_dma_out: rds_dma_hdr_free(rds_ibdev->dev, ic->i_ack, ic->i_ack_dma,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 232/411 mmc: core: Fix host controller programming for fixed driver type
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kamal Dasu <[email protected]>
commit 5a52c5701a67d5176eb1afbf1bdaf7d6dfeec597 upstream.
When using the fixed-emmc-driver-type device tree property, the MMC core correctly selects the driver strength for the card but fails to program the host controller accordingly. This causes a mismatch where the card uses the specified driver type while the host controller defaults to Type B (since ios->drv_type remains zero).
Split the driver type programming logic to handle both fixed and dynamic driver type selection paths. For fixed driver types, program the host controller with the selected drive_strength value. For dynamic selection, use the existing drv_type as before.
This ensures both the eMMC device and host controller use matching driver strengths, preventing potential signal integrity issues.
--- drivers/mmc/core/mmc.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mmc/core/mmc.c +3 -1
@@ -1339,7 +1339,9 @@ static void mmc_select_driver_type(struc card->drive_strength = drive_strength; -if (drv_type) +if (fixed_drv_type >=0 && drive_strength) +mmc_set_driver_type (card->host, drive_strength); +else if (drv_type)mmc_set_driver_type (card->host, drv_type); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 233/411 mmc: renesas_sdhi: Add OF entry for RZ/G2H SoC
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lad Prabhakar <[email protected]>
commit f48ee49726ee4ab545fd2dc644f169c0809b19b3 upstream.
The RZ/G2H (R8A774E1) SoC was previously handled via the generic "renesas,rcar-gen3-sdhi" fallback compatible string. However, because the SDHI IP on RZ/G2H is identical with the R-Car H3-N (R8A77951), it requires the specific quirks and configuration defined in of_r8a7795_compatible rather than the generic Gen3 data.
Add the explicit "renesas,sdhi-r8a774e1" match entry to map it correctly. Note that the DT binding file renesas,sdhi.yaml does not need an update as the entry for this SoC is already present.
--- drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_internal_dmac.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_internal_dmac.c +1 -0
@@ -231,6 +231,7 @@ static const struct renesas_sdhi_of_datastatic const struct of_device_id renesas_sdhi_internal_dmac_of_match[] = { { .compatible ="renesas,sdhi-r7s9210" , .data = &of_rza2_compatible, }, { .compatible ="renesas,sdhi-mmc-r8a77470" , .data = &of_rcar_gen3_compatible, }, + { .compatible ="renesas,sdhi-r8a774e1" , .data = &of_r8a7795_compatible, }, { .compatible ="renesas,sdhi-r8a7795" , .data = &of_r8a7795_compatible, }, { .compatible ="renesas,sdhi-r8a7796" , .data = &of_rcar_gen3_compatible, }, { .compatible ="renesas,sdhi-r8a77961" , .data = &of_r8a77961_compatible, },
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 234/411 mmc: sdhci: add signal voltage switch in sdhci_resume_host
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jisheng Zhang <[email protected]>
commit f595e8e77a51eee35e331f69321766593a845ef2 upstream.
I met one suspend/resume issue with sdr104 capable sdio wifi card (with "keep-power-in-suspend" set in DT property):
After resuming from suspend to ram, the sdio wifi card stops working. Further debug shows that although ios shows the sdio card is at sdr104 mode, the voltage is still at 3V3. This is due to missing the calling of ->start_signal_voltage_switch() in sdhci_resume_host().
Fix this issue by adding ->start_signal_voltage_switch() in sdhci_resume_host(). This also matches what we do for sdhci_runtime_resume_host().
Then the question is: why this issue hasn't reported and fixed for so long time. IMHO, several reasons: Some host controllers just kick off the runtime resume for system resume, so they benefit from the well supported runtime pm code; Some platforms just use the old sdio wifi card which doesn't need signal voltage switch at all, the default voltage is 3v3 after resuming.
--- drivers/mmc/host/sdhci.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/mmc/host/sdhci.c +1 -0
@@ -3760,6 +3760,7 @@ int sdhci_resume_host(struct sdhci_host host->pwr =0 ; host->clock =0 ; host->reinit_uhs = true; + mmc->ops->start_signal_voltage_switch (mmc, &mmc->ios); mmc->ops->set_ios (mmc, &mmc->ios); }else {sdhci_init (host, (mmc->pm_flags &MMC_PM_KEEP_POWER ));
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 235/411 sctp: diag: reject stale associations in dump_one path
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zhao Zhang <[email protected]>
commit 5eba3e48d78edd7551b992cb7ba687019b3a78da upstream.
The SCTP exact sock_diag lookup can hold a transport reference, block on lock_sock(sk), and then resume after sctp_association_free() has marked the association dead and freed its bind address list.
When that happens, inet_assoc_attr_size() and inet_diag_msg_sctpasoc_fill() can still dereference association state that is no longer valid for reporting. In particular, inet_diag_msg_sctpasoc_fill() may read an empty bind-address list as a real sctp_sockaddr_entry and trigger an out-of-bounds read from unrelated association memory.
Reject the association after taking the socket lock if it has been reaped or detached from the endpoint, and report the lookup as stale. This keeps the exact dump-one path from formatting torn association state.
--- net/sctp/diag.c | 17 +++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
net/sctp/diag.c +9 -8
@@ -266,15 +266,15 @@ static int sctp_sock_dump_one(struct sctlock_sock (sk); - rep =nlmsg_new (inet_assoc_attr_size (sk, assoc),GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!rep) { -release_sock (sk); -return -ENOMEM ; +if (ep != assoc->ep || assoc->base.dead) { + err = -ESTALE ; + goto out_unlock; } -if (ep != assoc->ep) { - err = -EAGAIN ; - goto out; + rep =nlmsg_new (inet_assoc_attr_size (sk, assoc),GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!rep) { + err = -ENOMEM ; + goto out_unlock; } err = inet_sctp_diag_fill(sk, assoc, rep, req, sk_user_ns(NETLINK_CB(skb).sk),
@@ -289,8 +289,9 @@ static int sctp_sock_dump_one(struct sctreturn nlmsg_unicast (sock_net (skb->sk)->diag_nlsk, rep,NETLINK_CB (skb).portid); out: -release_sock (sk);kfree_skb (rep); +out_unlock: +release_sock (sk);return err; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 236/411 sctp: stream: fully roll back denied add-stream state
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wyatt Feng <[email protected]>
commit a5f8a90ac9f77c678a9781c0a464b635e0d63e49 upstream.
When ADD_OUT_STREAMS is denied, SCTP only shrinks the queued chunks and then lowers outcnt. That leaves removed stream metadata behind, so a later re-add can reuse a stale ext and hit a null-pointer dereference in the scheduler get path.
Fix the rollback by tearing down the removed stream state the same way other stream resizes do. Unschedule the current scheduler state, drop the removed stream ext state with sctp_stream_outq_migrate(), and then reschedule the remaining streams.
This keeps scheduler-private RR/FC/PRIO lists consistent while fully rolling back denied outgoing stream additions.
--- net/sctp/stream.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/sctp/stream.c +5 -1
@@ -1038,6 +1038,7 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_process_strreset stsn, rtsn, GFP_ATOMIC); }else if (req->type ==SCTP_PARAM_RESET_ADD_OUT_STREAMS ) {struct sctp_strreset_addstrm *addstrm; +const struct sctp_sched_ops *sched;__u16 number; addstrm = (struct sctp_strreset_addstrm *)req;
@@ -1048,7 +1049,10 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_process_strresetfor (i = number; i < stream->outcnt; i++)SCTP_SO (stream, i)->state =SCTP_STREAM_OPEN ; }else { -sctp_stream_shrink_out (stream, number); + sched =sctp_sched_ops_from_stream (stream); + sched->unsched_all (stream); +sctp_stream_outq_migrate (stream,NULL , number); + sched->sched_all (stream); stream->outcnt = number; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 237/411 thunderbolt: Reject zero-length property entries in validator
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>
commit cff8eb65d1eafe7793e54b4d0cf6bf831644630b upstream.
tb_property_entry_valid() accepts entries with length == 0 for DIRECTORY, DATA, and TEXT types. A zero-length TEXT entry passes validation but causes an underflow in the null-termination logic:
property->value.text[property->length * 4 - 1] = '\0';
When property->length is 0 this writes to offset -1 relative to the allocation.
Reject zero-length entries early in the validator since they have no valid representation in the XDomain property protocol.
--- drivers/thunderbolt/property.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/thunderbolt/property.c +2 -0
@@ -59,6 +59,8 @@ static bool tb_property_entry_valid(conscase TB_PROPERTY_TYPE_DIRECTORY :case TB_PROPERTY_TYPE_DATA :case TB_PROPERTY_TYPE_TEXT : +if (!entry->length) +return false;if (entry->length > block_len)return false; if (check_add_overflow(entry->value, entry->length, &end) ||
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 238/411 thunderbolt: Bound root directory content to block size
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>
commit 65423079c7420e3dbf9a7aa345c243a3f5752e5d upstream.
__tb_property_parse_dir() does not check that content_offset + content_len fits within block_len for the root directory case. When rootdir->length equals or exceeds block_len - 2, the entry loop reads past the allocated property block.
Add a bounds check after computing content_offset and content_len to reject directories whose content extends past the block.
--- drivers/thunderbolt/property.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/thunderbolt/property.c +4 -0
@@ -181,6 +181,10 @@ static struct tb_property_dir *__tb_propif (is_root) { content_offset = dir_offset +2 ; content_len = dir_len; +if (content_offset + content_len > block_len) { +tb_property_free_dir (dir); +return NULL ; + } }else {if (dir_len <4 ) {tb_property_free_dir (dir);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 239/411 thunderbolt: Clamp XDomain response data copy to allocation size
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>
commit 322e93448d908434ae5545660fcbe8f5a7a8e141 upstream.
tb_xdp_properties_request() derives the per-packet copy length from the response header without checking that it fits in the previously allocated data buffer. A malicious peer can set its length field larger than the declared data_length, causing memcpy to write past the kcalloc allocation.
Clamp the per-packet copy length so that the cumulative offset never exceeds data_len.
--- drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c +2 -0
@@ -370,6 +370,8 @@ static int tb_xdp_properties_request(str } } +if (req.offset + len > data_len) + len = data_len - req.offset;memcpy (data + req.offset, res->data, len *4 ); req.offset += len; }while (!data_len || req.offset < data_len);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 240/411 thunderbolt: Limit XDomain response copy to actual frame size
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>
commit 4db2bd2ed4785dbadaeeab9f4e346b21ac5fb8eb upstream.
tb_xdomain_copy() copies req->response_size bytes from the received packet buffer regardless of the actual frame size. When a short response arrives, this reads past the valid frame data in the DMA pool buffer into stale contents from previous transactions.
Use the minimum of frame size and expected response size for the copy length.
--- drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c +3 -1
@@ -96,7 +96,9 @@ static bool tb_xdomain_match(const strucstatic bool tb_xdomain_copy (struct tb_cfg_request *req,const struct ctl_pkg *pkg) { -memcpy (req->response, pkg->buffer, req->response_size); +size_t len =min_t (size_t, pkg->frame.size, req->response_size); + +memcpy (req->response, pkg->buffer, len); req->result.err =0 ;return true; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 241/411 slimbus: qcom-ngd-ctrl: Avoid ABBA on tx_lock/ctrl->lock
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bjorn Andersson <[email protected]>
commit 55f2ea9ff83cc27a85526b14bc9b32f96a08d6ec upstream.
During the SSR/PDR down notification the tx_lock is taken with the intent to provide synchronization with active DMA transfers.
But during this period qcom_slim_ngd_down() is invoked, which ends up in slim_report_absent(), which takes the slim_controller lock. In multiple other codepaths these two locks are taken in the opposite order (i.e. slim_controller then tx_lock).
The result is a lockdep splat, and a possible deadlock:
rprocctl/449 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff00009793e620 (&ctrl->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: slim_report_absent (drivers/slimbus/core.c:322) slimbus
but task is already holding lock:
ffff00009793fb50 (&ctrl->tx_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: qcom_slim_ngd_ssr_pdr_notify (drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c:1475) slim_qcom_ngd_ctrl
which lock already depends on the new lock.
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&ctrl->tx_lock);
lock(&ctrl->lock);
lock(&ctrl->tx_lock); lock(&ctrl->lock);
The assumption is that the comment refers to the desire to not call qcom_slim_ngd_exit_dma() while we have an ongoing DMA TX transaction. But any such transaction is initiated and completed within a single qcom_slim_ngd_xfer_msg().
Prior to calling qcom_slim_ngd_exit_dma() the slim_controller is torn down, all child devices are notified that the slimbus is gone and the child devices are removed.
Stop taking the tx_lock in qcom_slim_ngd_ssr_pdr_notify() to avoid the deadlock.
--- drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c +0 -3
@@ -1394,15 +1394,12 @@ static int qcom_slim_ngd_ssr_pdr_notify(switch (action) {case QCOM_SSR_BEFORE_SHUTDOWN :case SERVREG_SERVICE_STATE_DOWN : -/* Make sure the last dma xfer is finished */ -mutex_lock (&ctrl->tx_lock);if (ctrl->state !=QCOM_SLIM_NGD_CTRL_DOWN ) {pm_runtime_get_noresume (ctrl->ctrl.dev); ctrl->state =QCOM_SLIM_NGD_CTRL_DOWN ;qcom_slim_ngd_down (ctrl);qcom_slim_ngd_exit_dma (ctrl); } -mutex_unlock (&ctrl->tx_lock);break ;case QCOM_SSR_AFTER_POWERUP :case SERVREG_SERVICE_STATE_UP :
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 242/411 drm/amd/display: Clamp HDMI HDCP2 rx_id_list read to buffer size
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Harry Wentland <[email protected]>
commit f0f3981c43b32cadfe373d636d9e9ca522bb3702 upstream.
[Why & How]
During HDCP 2.x repeater authentication over HDMI, the driver reads the sink's RxStatus register and extracts a 10-bit message size field (max value 1023). This value is used as the read length for the ReceiverID list without being clamped to the size of the destination buffer rx_id_list[177]. A malicious HDMI repeater could advertise a message size larger than the buffer, causing an out-of-bounds write during the I2C read.
Clamp the read length in mod_hdcp_read_rx_id_list() to the size of the rx_id_list buffer, matching the approach already used in the DP branch.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/modules/hdcp/hdcp_ddc.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/modules/hdcp/hdcp_ddc.c +2 -1
@@ -533,7 +533,8 @@ enum mod_hdcp_status mod_hdcp_read_rx_id }else { status =read (hdcp,MOD_HDCP_MESSAGE_ID_READ_REPEATER_AUTH_SEND_RECEIVERID_LIST , hdcp->auth.msg.hdcp2.rx_id_list, - hdcp->auth.msg.hdcp2.rx_id_list_size); +MIN (hdcp->auth.msg.hdcp2.rx_id_list_size, +sizeof (hdcp->auth.msg.hdcp2.rx_id_list))); }return status; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 243/411 drm/amd/display: Clamp VBIOS HDMI retimer register count to array size
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Harry Wentland <[email protected]>
commit fb0707ce00eef4e2d60c3020e1c0432739703e4a upstream.
[Why & How]
The VBIOS integrated info tables (v1_11 and v2_1) contain HdmiRegNum and Hdmi6GRegNum fields that are used as loop bounds when copying retimer I2C register settings into fixed-size arrays (dp*_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[9] and dp*_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings[3]). These u8 fields are not validated before use, so a malformed VBIOS can specify values up to 255, causing an out-of-bounds heap write during driver probe.
Clamp each register count to the destination array size using min_t() before the copy loops, in both get_integrated_info_v11() and get_integrated_info_v2_1().
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser2.c | 48 ++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser2.c +32 -16
@@ -1858,14 +1858,16 @@ static enum bp_result get_integrated_inf info_v11->extdispconninfo.checksum; info->dp0_ext_hdmi_slv_addr = info_v11->dp0_retimer_set.HdmiSlvAddr; - info->dp0_ext_hdmi_reg_num = info_v11->dp0_retimer_set.HdmiRegNum; + info->dp0_ext_hdmi_reg_num =min_t (u8, info_v11->dp0_retimer_set.HdmiRegNum, +ARRAY_SIZE (info->dp0_ext_hdmi_reg_settings));for (i =0 ; i < info->dp0_ext_hdmi_reg_num; i++) { info->dp0_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_index = info_v11->dp0_retimer_set.HdmiRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegIndex; info->dp0_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_val = info_v11->dp0_retimer_set.HdmiRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegVal; } - info->dp0_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num = info_v11->dp0_retimer_set.Hdmi6GRegNum; + info->dp0_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num =min_t (u8, info_v11->dp0_retimer_set.Hdmi6GRegNum, +ARRAY_SIZE (info->dp0_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings));for (i =0 ; i < info->dp0_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num; i++) { info->dp0_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_index = info_v11->dp0_retimer_set.Hdmi6GhzRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegIndex;
@@ -1874,14 +1876,16 @@ static enum bp_result get_integrated_inf } info->dp1_ext_hdmi_slv_addr = info_v11->dp1_retimer_set.HdmiSlvAddr; - info->dp1_ext_hdmi_reg_num = info_v11->dp1_retimer_set.HdmiRegNum; + info->dp1_ext_hdmi_reg_num =min_t (u8, info_v11->dp1_retimer_set.HdmiRegNum, +ARRAY_SIZE (info->dp1_ext_hdmi_reg_settings));for (i =0 ; i < info->dp1_ext_hdmi_reg_num; i++) { info->dp1_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_index = info_v11->dp1_retimer_set.HdmiRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegIndex; info->dp1_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_val = info_v11->dp1_retimer_set.HdmiRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegVal; } - info->dp1_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num = info_v11->dp1_retimer_set.Hdmi6GRegNum; + info->dp1_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num =min_t (u8, info_v11->dp1_retimer_set.Hdmi6GRegNum, +ARRAY_SIZE (info->dp1_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings));for (i =0 ; i < info->dp1_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num; i++) { info->dp1_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_index = info_v11->dp1_retimer_set.Hdmi6GhzRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegIndex;
@@ -1890,14 +1894,16 @@ static enum bp_result get_integrated_inf } info->dp2_ext_hdmi_slv_addr = info_v11->dp2_retimer_set.HdmiSlvAddr; - info->dp2_ext_hdmi_reg_num = info_v11->dp2_retimer_set.HdmiRegNum; + info->dp2_ext_hdmi_reg_num =min_t (u8, info_v11->dp2_retimer_set.HdmiRegNum, +ARRAY_SIZE (info->dp2_ext_hdmi_reg_settings));for (i =0 ; i < info->dp2_ext_hdmi_reg_num; i++) { info->dp2_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_index = info_v11->dp2_retimer_set.HdmiRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegIndex; info->dp2_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_val = info_v11->dp2_retimer_set.HdmiRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegVal; } - info->dp2_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num = info_v11->dp2_retimer_set.Hdmi6GRegNum; + info->dp2_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num =min_t (u8, info_v11->dp2_retimer_set.Hdmi6GRegNum, +ARRAY_SIZE (info->dp2_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings));for (i =0 ; i < info->dp2_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num; i++) { info->dp2_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_index = info_v11->dp2_retimer_set.Hdmi6GhzRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegIndex;
@@ -1906,14 +1912,16 @@ static enum bp_result get_integrated_inf } info->dp3_ext_hdmi_slv_addr = info_v11->dp3_retimer_set.HdmiSlvAddr; - info->dp3_ext_hdmi_reg_num = info_v11->dp3_retimer_set.HdmiRegNum; + info->dp3_ext_hdmi_reg_num =min_t (u8, info_v11->dp3_retimer_set.HdmiRegNum, +ARRAY_SIZE (info->dp3_ext_hdmi_reg_settings));for (i =0 ; i < info->dp3_ext_hdmi_reg_num; i++) { info->dp3_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_index = info_v11->dp3_retimer_set.HdmiRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegIndex; info->dp3_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_val = info_v11->dp3_retimer_set.HdmiRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegVal; } - info->dp3_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num = info_v11->dp3_retimer_set.Hdmi6GRegNum; + info->dp3_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num =min_t (u8, info_v11->dp3_retimer_set.Hdmi6GRegNum, +ARRAY_SIZE (info->dp3_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings));for (i =0 ; i < info->dp3_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num; i++) { info->dp3_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_index = info_v11->dp3_retimer_set.Hdmi6GhzRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegIndex;
@@ -2061,14 +2069,16 @@ static enum bp_result get_integrated_inf info->ext_disp_conn_info.checksum = info_v2_1->extdispconninfo.checksum; info->dp0_ext_hdmi_slv_addr = info_v2_1->dp0_retimer_set.HdmiSlvAddr; - info->dp0_ext_hdmi_reg_num = info_v2_1->dp0_retimer_set.HdmiRegNum; + info->dp0_ext_hdmi_reg_num =min_t (u8, info_v2_1->dp0_retimer_set.HdmiRegNum, +ARRAY_SIZE (info->dp0_ext_hdmi_reg_settings));for (i =0 ; i < info->dp0_ext_hdmi_reg_num; i++) { info->dp0_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_index = info_v2_1->dp0_retimer_set.HdmiRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegIndex; info->dp0_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_val = info_v2_1->dp0_retimer_set.HdmiRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegVal; } - info->dp0_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num = info_v2_1->dp0_retimer_set.Hdmi6GRegNum; + info->dp0_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num =min_t (u8, info_v2_1->dp0_retimer_set.Hdmi6GRegNum, +ARRAY_SIZE (info->dp0_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings));for (i =0 ; i < info->dp0_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num; i++) { info->dp0_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_index = info_v2_1->dp0_retimer_set.Hdmi6GhzRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegIndex;
@@ -2076,14 +2086,16 @@ static enum bp_result get_integrated_inf info_v2_1->dp0_retimer_set.Hdmi6GhzRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegVal; } info->dp1_ext_hdmi_slv_addr = info_v2_1->dp1_retimer_set.HdmiSlvAddr; - info->dp1_ext_hdmi_reg_num = info_v2_1->dp1_retimer_set.HdmiRegNum; + info->dp1_ext_hdmi_reg_num =min_t (u8, info_v2_1->dp1_retimer_set.HdmiRegNum, +ARRAY_SIZE (info->dp1_ext_hdmi_reg_settings));for (i =0 ; i < info->dp1_ext_hdmi_reg_num; i++) { info->dp1_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_index = info_v2_1->dp1_retimer_set.HdmiRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegIndex; info->dp1_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_val = info_v2_1->dp1_retimer_set.HdmiRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegVal; } - info->dp1_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num = info_v2_1->dp1_retimer_set.Hdmi6GRegNum; + info->dp1_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num =min_t (u8, info_v2_1->dp1_retimer_set.Hdmi6GRegNum, +ARRAY_SIZE (info->dp1_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings));for (i =0 ; i < info->dp1_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num; i++) { info->dp1_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_index = info_v2_1->dp1_retimer_set.Hdmi6GhzRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegIndex;
@@ -2091,14 +2103,16 @@ static enum bp_result get_integrated_inf info_v2_1->dp1_retimer_set.Hdmi6GhzRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegVal; } info->dp2_ext_hdmi_slv_addr = info_v2_1->dp2_retimer_set.HdmiSlvAddr; - info->dp2_ext_hdmi_reg_num = info_v2_1->dp2_retimer_set.HdmiRegNum; + info->dp2_ext_hdmi_reg_num =min_t (u8, info_v2_1->dp2_retimer_set.HdmiRegNum, +ARRAY_SIZE (info->dp2_ext_hdmi_reg_settings));for (i =0 ; i < info->dp2_ext_hdmi_reg_num; i++) { info->dp2_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_index = info_v2_1->dp2_retimer_set.HdmiRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegIndex; info->dp2_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_val = info_v2_1->dp2_retimer_set.HdmiRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegVal; } - info->dp2_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num = info_v2_1->dp2_retimer_set.Hdmi6GRegNum; + info->dp2_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num =min_t (u8, info_v2_1->dp2_retimer_set.Hdmi6GRegNum, +ARRAY_SIZE (info->dp2_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings));for (i =0 ; i < info->dp2_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num; i++) { info->dp2_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_index = info_v2_1->dp2_retimer_set.Hdmi6GhzRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegIndex;
@@ -2106,14 +2120,16 @@ static enum bp_result get_integrated_inf info_v2_1->dp2_retimer_set.Hdmi6GhzRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegVal; } info->dp3_ext_hdmi_slv_addr = info_v2_1->dp3_retimer_set.HdmiSlvAddr; - info->dp3_ext_hdmi_reg_num = info_v2_1->dp3_retimer_set.HdmiRegNum; + info->dp3_ext_hdmi_reg_num =min_t (u8, info_v2_1->dp3_retimer_set.HdmiRegNum, +ARRAY_SIZE (info->dp3_ext_hdmi_reg_settings));for (i =0 ; i < info->dp3_ext_hdmi_reg_num; i++) { info->dp3_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_index = info_v2_1->dp3_retimer_set.HdmiRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegIndex; info->dp3_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_val = info_v2_1->dp3_retimer_set.HdmiRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegVal; } - info->dp3_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num = info_v2_1->dp3_retimer_set.Hdmi6GRegNum; + info->dp3_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num =min_t (u8, info_v2_1->dp3_retimer_set.Hdmi6GRegNum, +ARRAY_SIZE (info->dp3_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings));for (i =0 ; i < info->dp3_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_num; i++) { info->dp3_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings[i].i2c_reg_index = info_v2_1->dp3_retimer_set.Hdmi6GhzRegSetting[i].ucI2cRegIndex;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 244/411 drm/amd/display: Fix NULL deref and buffer over-read in SDP debugfs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Harry Wentland <[email protected]>
commit adf67034b1f61f7119295208085bfd43f85f56af upstream.
[Why & How]dp_sdp_message_debugfs_write() dereferences connector->base.state->crtc without checking for NULL. A connector can be connected but not bound to any CRTC (e.g. after hot-plug before the next atomic commit), causing a kernel crash when writing to the sdp_message debugfs node.
The function also ignores the user-provided size argument and always passes 36 bytes to copy_from_user(), reading past the user buffer when size < 36.
Fix both issues by:
- Returning -ENODEV when connector->base.state or state->crtc is NULL
- Clamping write_size to min(size, sizeof(data))
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_debugfs.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_debugfs.c +5 -0
@@ -1016,8 +1016,13 @@ static ssize_t dp_sdp_message_debugfs_wrif (size ==0 )return 0 ; +if (!connector->base.state || !connector->base.state->crtc) +return -ENODEV ; + acrtc_state =to_dm_crtc_state (connector->base.state->crtc->state); + write_size =min_t (size_t, size,sizeof (data)); + r =copy_from_user (data, buf, write_size); write_size -= r;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 245/411 drm/amd/display: Use krealloc_array() in dal_vector_reserve()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Harry Wentland <[email protected]>
commit da48bc4461b8a5ebfb9264c9b191a701d8e99009 upstream.
[Why & How]dal_vector_reserve() computes the allocation size as "capacity * vector->struct_size" using uint32_t arithmetic, which can silently wrap to a small value on overflow. This would cause krealloc to return a smaller buffer than expected, leading to heap overflows on subsequent vector appends.
Replace krealloc() with krealloc_array() which performs an internal overflow check and returns NULL on wrap, preventing the issue.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/basics/vector.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/basics/vector.c +2 -2
@@ -291,8 +291,8 @@ bool dal_vector_reserve(struct vector *vif (capacity <= vector->capacity)return true; - new_container =krealloc (vector->container, - capacity * vector->struct_size,GFP_KERNEL ); + new_container =krealloc_array (vector->container, + capacity, vector->struct_size,GFP_KERNEL );if (new_container) { vector->container = new_container;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 246/411 fs/fcntl: fix SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order in fasync signaling
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mingyu Wang <[email protected]>
commit 00633c4683828acd5256fa8d5163f440d74bbe71 upstream.
A SOFTIRQ-safe to SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order deadlock can occur in send_sigio() and send_sigurg() when a process group receives a signal.
When FASYNC is configured for a process group (PIDTYPE_PGID), both functions use read_lock(&tasklist_lock) to traverse the task list. However, they are frequently called from softirq context:
- send_sigio() via input_inject_event -> kill_fasync
- send_sigurg() via tcp_check_urg -> sk_send_sigurg (NET_RX_SOFTIRQ)
The deadlock is caused by the rwlock writer fairness mechanism:
1. CPU 0 (process context) holds read_lock(&tasklist_lock) in do_wait().
2. CPU 1 (process context) attempts write_lock(&tasklist_lock) in fork() or exit() and spins, which blocks all new readers.
3. CPU 0 is interrupted by a softirq (e.g., TCP URG packet reception).
4. The softirq calls send_sigurg() and attempts to acquire read_lock(&tasklist_lock), deadlocking because CPU 1 is waiting.
Since PID hashing and do_each_pid_task() traversals are already RCU-protected, the read_lock on tasklist_lock is no longer strictly required for safe traversal. Fix this by replacing tasklist_lock with rcu_read_lock(), aligning the process group signaling path with the single-PID path. This also mitigates a potential remote denial of service vector via TCP URG packets.
Lockdep splat:
=====================================================
WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected [...]
Chain exists of: &dev->event_lock --> &f_owner->lock --> tasklist_lock
Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(tasklist_lock);
local_irq_disable();
lock(&dev->event_lock);
lock(&f_owner->lock);
<Interrupt>
lock(&dev->event_lock);*** DEADLOCK ***
--- fs/fcntl.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/fcntl.c +4 -4
@@ -801,11 +801,11 @@ void send_sigio(struct fown_struct *fownsend_sigio_to_task (p, fown, fd, band, type);rcu_read_unlock (); }else { -read_lock (&tasklist_lock); +rcu_read_lock (); do_each_pid_task(pid, type, p) {send_sigio_to_task (p, fown, fd, band, type); }while_each_pid_task (pid, type, p); -read_unlock (&tasklist_lock); +rcu_read_unlock (); } out_unlock_fown:read_unlock_irqrestore (&fown->lock, flags);
@@ -842,11 +842,11 @@ int send_sigurg(struct fown_struct *fownsend_sigurg_to_task (p, fown, type);rcu_read_unlock (); }else { -read_lock (&tasklist_lock); +rcu_read_lock (); do_each_pid_task(pid, type, p) {send_sigurg_to_task (p, fown, type); }while_each_pid_task (pid, type, p); -read_unlock (&tasklist_lock); +rcu_read_unlock (); } out_unlock_fown:read_unlock_irqrestore (&fown->lock, flags);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 247/411 mm/damon/ops-common: call folio_test_lru() after folio_get()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: SeongJae Park <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d6b8b02a27b3dd09ec12144322b3dac46d9bc9ef ]
damon_get_folio() speculatively calls folio_test_lru() before folio_try_get(). The folio can get freed and reallocated to a tail page. In the case, VM_BUG_ON_PGFLAGS() in const_folio_flags() can be triggered. Remove the speculative call.
Also mark folio_test_lru() check right after folio_try_get() success as no more unlikely.
The race should be rare. Also the problem can happen only if the kernel has enabled CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_PGFLAGS. No real world report of this issue has been made so far. This fix is based on only theoretical analysis. That said, a bug is a bug. A similar issue was also fixed via commit 3203b3ab0fcf ("mm/filemap: don't call folio_test_locked() without a reference in next_uptodate_folio()"). I don't expect this change will make a meaningful impact to DAMON performance in the real world, though I will be happy to be corrected from the real world reports.
The issue was discovered [1] by Sashiko.
--- mm/damon/vaddr.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
mm/damon/vaddr.c +2 -2
@@ -383,10 +383,10 @@ static struct page *damon_get_page(unsigned long pfn) {struct page *page =pfn_to_online_page (pfn); -if (!page || !PageLRU (page) || !get_page_unless_zero (page)) +if (!page || !get_page_unless_zero (page))return NULL ; -if (unlikely (!PageLRU (page))) { +if (!PageLRU (page)) {put_page (page); page =NULL ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 248/411 io_uring/poll: fix signed comparison in io_poll_get_ownership()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Longxuan Yu <[email protected]>
Commit 326941b22806cbf2df1fbfe902b7908b368cce42 usptream.
io_poll_get_ownership() uses a signed comparison to check whether poll_refs has reached the threshold for the slowpath:
if (unlikely(atomic_read(&req->poll_refs) >= IO_POLL_REF_BIAS))
atomic_read() returns int (signed). When IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG (BIT(31)) is set in poll_refs, the value becomes negative in signed arithmetic, so the >= 128 comparison always evaluates to false and the slowpath is never taken.
Fix this by casting the atomic_read() result to unsigned int before the comparison, so that the cancel flag is treated as a large positive value and correctly triggers the slowpath.
--- io_uring/io_uring.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
io_uring/io_uring.c +1 -1
@@ -5525,7 +5525,7 @@ static bool io_poll_get_ownership_slowpa*/ static inline bool io_poll_get_ownership (struct io_kiocb *req) { -if (unlikely (atomic_read (&req->poll_refs) >=IO_POLL_REF_BIAS )) +if (unlikely ((unsigned int )atomic_read (&req->poll_refs) >=IO_POLL_REF_BIAS ))return io_poll_get_ownership_slowpath (req);return !(atomic_fetch_inc (&req->poll_refs) &IO_POLL_REF_MASK ); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 249/411 net/tcp-md5: Fix MAC comparison to be constant-time
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit 46d0d6f50dab706637f4c18a470aac20a21900d3 upstream.
To prevent timing attacks, MACs need to be compared in constant time. Use the appropriate helper function for this.
--- net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 5 +++-- net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 5 +++-- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +3 -2
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@#include <linux/inetdevice.h> #include <linux/btf_ids.h> +#include <crypto/algapi.h> #include <crypto/hash.h> #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
@@ -763,7 +764,7 @@ static void tcp_v4_send_reset(const stru genhash =tcp_v4_md5_hash_skb (newhash, key,NULL , skb); -if (genhash ||memcmp (hash_location, newhash,16 ) !=0 ) +if (genhash ||crypto_memneq (hash_location, newhash,16 )) goto out; }
@@ -1467,7 +1468,7 @@ static bool tcp_v4_inbound_md5_hash(cons hash_expected, NULL, skb); -if (genhash ||memcmp (hash_location, newhash,16 ) !=0 ) { +if (genhash ||crypto_memneq (hash_location, newhash,16 )) {NET_INC_STATS (sock_net (sk),LINUX_MIB_TCPMD5FAILURE ); net_info_ratelimited("MD5 Hash failed for (%pI4, %d)->(%pI4, %d)%s L3 index %d\n", &iph->saddr, ntohs(th->source),
net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +3 -2
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@#include <linux/proc_fs.h> #include <linux/seq_file.h> +#include <crypto/algapi.h> #include <crypto/hash.h> #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
@@ -810,7 +811,7 @@ static bool tcp_v6_inbound_md5_hash(cons hash_expected, NULL, skb); -if (genhash ||memcmp (hash_location, newhash,16 ) !=0 ) { +if (genhash ||crypto_memneq (hash_location, newhash,16 )) {NET_INC_STATS (sock_net (sk),LINUX_MIB_TCPMD5FAILURE ); net_info_ratelimited("MD5 Hash %s for [%pI6c]:%u->[%pI6c]:%u L3 index %d\n", genhash ? "failed" : "mismatch",
@@ -1088,7 +1089,7 @@ static void tcp_v6_send_reset(const stru goto out; genhash =tcp_v6_md5_hash_skb (newhash, key,NULL , skb); -if (genhash ||memcmp (hash_location, newhash,16 ) !=0 ) +if (genhash ||crypto_memneq (hash_location, newhash,16 )) goto out; }#endif
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 250/411 lib/crypto: mpi: Fix integer underflow in mpi_read_raw_from_sgl()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lukas Wunner <[email protected]>
commit 8c2f1288250a90a4b5cabed5d888d7e3aeed4035 upstream.
Yiming reports an integer underflow in mpi_read_raw_from_sgl() when subtracting "lzeros" from the unsigned "nbytes".
For this to happen, the scatterlist "sgl" needs to occupy more bytes than the "nbytes" parameter and the first "nbytes + 1" bytes of the scatterlist must be zero. Under these conditions, the while loop iterating over the scatterlist will count more zeroes than "nbytes", subtract the number of zeroes from "nbytes" and cause the underflow.
When commit 2d4d1eea540b ("lib/mpi: Add mpi sgl helpers") originally introduced the bug, it couldn't be triggered because all callers of mpi_read_raw_from_sgl() passed a scatterlist whose length was equal to "nbytes".
However since commit 63ba4d67594a ("KEYS: asymmetric: Use new crypto interface without scatterlists"), the underflow can now actually be triggered. When invoking a KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT system call with a larger "out_len" than "in_len" and filling the "in" buffer with zeroes, crypto_akcipher_sync_prep() will create an all-zero scatterlist used for both the "src" and "dst" member of struct akcipher_request and thereby fulfil the conditions to trigger the bug:
sys_keyctl()
keyctl_pkey_e_d_s()
asymmetric_key_eds_op()
software_key_eds_op()
crypto_akcipher_sync_encrypt()
crypto_akcipher_sync_prep()
crypto_akcipher_encrypt()
rsa_enc()
mpi_read_raw_from_sgl()To the user this will be visible as a DoS as the kernel spins forever, causing soft lockup splats as a side effect.
Fix it.
--- lib/mpi/mpicoder.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
lib/mpi/mpicoder.c +1 -1
@@ -453,7 +453,7 @@ MPI mpi_read_raw_from_sgl(struct scatter lzeros =0 ; len =0 ;while (nbytes >0 ) { -while (len && !*buff) { +while (len && !*buff && lzeros < nbytes) { lzeros++; len--; buff++;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 251/411 f2fs: fix to do sanity check on dcc->discard_cmd_cnt conditionally
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6af249c996f7d73a3435f9e577956fa259347d18 ]
Syzbot reported a f2fs bug as below:
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.c:1900!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6527 Comm: syz.5.110 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT_{RT,(full)}
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2026
RIP: 0010:f2fs_issue_discard_timeout+0x59b/0x5a0 fs/f2fs/segment.c:1900
Code: d9 80 e1 07 80 c1 03 38 c1 0f 8c d6 fe ff ff 48 89 df e8 a8 5e fa fd e9 c9 fe ff ff e8 4e 46 94 fd 90 0f 0b e8 46 46 94 fd 90 <0f> 0b 0f 1f 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000494f940 EFLAGS: 00010283
RAX: ffffffff843009ca RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000080000
RDX: ffffc9001ca78000 RSI: 00000000000029f3 RDI: 00000000000029f4
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100893a431 R12: 1ffff1100893a430
R13: 1ffff1100c2b702c R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff8880449d2160
FS: 00007ffa35fed6c0(0000) GS:ffff88812643d000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f2b68634000 CR3: 0000000039f62000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__f2fs_remount fs/f2fs/super.c:2960 [inline]
f2fs_reconfigure+0x108a/0x1710 fs/f2fs/super.c:5443
reconfigure_super+0x227/0x8a0 fs/super.c:1080
do_remount fs/namespace.c:3391 [inline]
path_mount+0xdc5/0x10e0 fs/namespace.c:4151
do_mount fs/namespace.c:4172 [inline]
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4361 [inline]
__se_sys_mount+0x31d/0x420 fs/namespace.c:4338
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x14d/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7ffa37dbda0aThe root cause is there will be race condition in between f2fs_ioc_fitrim() and f2fs_remount():
- f2fs_remount - f2fs_ioc_fitrim
- f2fs_issue_discard_timeout
- __issue_discard_cmd
- __drop_discard_cmd
- __wait_all_discard_cmd
- f2fs_trim_fs
- f2fs_write_checkpoint
- f2fs_clear_prefree_segments
- f2fs_issue_discard
- __issue_discard_async
- __queue_discard_cmd
- __update_discard_tree_range
- __insert_discard_cmd
- __create_discard_cmd
: atomic_inc(&dcc->discard_cmd_cnt);
- sanity check on dcc->discard_cmd_cnt (expect discard_cmd_cnt to be zero)
This will only happen when fitrim races w/ remount rw, if we remount to readonly filesystem, remount will wait until mnt_pcp.mnt_writers to zero, that means fitrim is not in process at that time.
--- fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 2 +- fs/f2fs/segment.c | 6 +++--- fs/f2fs/super.c | 9 +++++++-- 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h +1 -1
@@ -3467,7 +3467,7 @@ bool f2fs_is_checkpointed_data(struct f2int f2fs_start_discard_thread (struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi);void f2fs_drop_discard_cmd (struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi);void f2fs_stop_discard_thread (struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi); -bool f2fs_issue_discard_timeout (struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi); +bool f2fs_issue_discard_timeout (struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,bool need_check);void f2fs_clear_prefree_segments (struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,struct cp_control *cpc);void f2fs_dirty_to_prefree (struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi);
fs/f2fs/segment.c +3 -3
@@ -1741,7 +1741,7 @@ void f2fs_stop_discard_thread(struct f2f }/* This comes from f2fs_put_super */ -bool f2fs_issue_discard_timeout (struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi) +bool f2fs_issue_discard_timeout (struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,bool need_check) {struct discard_cmd_control *dcc =SM_I (sbi)->dcc_info;struct discard_policy dpolicy;
@@ -1755,7 +1755,7 @@ bool f2fs_issue_discard_timeout(struct f/* just to make sure there is no pending discard commands */ __wait_all_discard_cmd (sbi,NULL ); -f2fs_bug_on (sbi,atomic_read (&dcc->discard_cmd_cnt)); +f2fs_bug_on (sbi, need_check &&atomic_read (&dcc->discard_cmd_cnt));return dropped; }
@@ -2197,7 +2197,7 @@ static void destroy_discard_cmd_control(* fill_super(), it needs to give a chance to handle them. */ if (unlikely (atomic_read (&dcc->discard_cmd_cnt))) -f2fs_issue_discard_timeout (sbi); +f2fs_issue_discard_timeout (sbi, true);kfree (dcc);SM_I (sbi)->dcc_info =NULL ;
fs/f2fs/super.c +7 -2
@@ -1600,7 +1600,7 @@ static void f2fs_put_super(struct super_ }/* be sure to wait for any on-going discard commands */ - dropped =f2fs_issue_discard_timeout (sbi); + dropped =f2fs_issue_discard_timeout (sbi, true);if ((f2fs_hw_support_discard (sbi) ||f2fs_hw_should_discard (sbi)) && !sbi->discard_blks && !dropped) {
@@ -2409,8 +2409,13 @@ static int f2fs_remount(struct super_blo }else { dcc =SM_I (sbi)->dcc_info;f2fs_stop_discard_thread (sbi); +/* +* f2fs_ioc_fitrim() won't race w/ "remount ro" +* so it's safe to check discard_cmd_cnt in +* f2fs_issue_discard_timeout(). +*/ if (atomic_read (&dcc->discard_cmd_cnt)) -f2fs_issue_discard_timeout (sbi); +f2fs_issue_discard_timeout (sbi, *flags &SB_RDONLY ); need_restart_discard = true; } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 252/411 f2fs: fix UAF caused by decrementing sbi->nr_pages[] in f2fs_write_end_io()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yongpeng Yang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2d9c4a4ed4eef1f82c5b16b037aee8bad819fd53 ]
The xfstests case "generic/107" and syzbot have both reported a NULL pointer dereference.
The concurrent scenario that triggers the panic is as follows:
F2FS_WB_CP_DATA write callback umount
- f2fs_write_checkpoint
- f2fs_wait_on_all_pages(sbi, F2FS_WB_CP_DATA)
- blk_mq_end_request
- bio_endio
- f2fs_write_end_io
: dec_page_count(sbi, F2FS_WB_CP_DATA)
: wake_up(&sbi->cp_wait)
- kill_f2fs_super
- kill_block_super
- f2fs_put_super
: iput(sbi->node_inode)
: sbi->node_inode = NULL
: f2fs_in_warm_node_list
- is_node_folio // sbi->node_inode is NULL and panic
The root cause is that f2fs_put_super() calls iput(sbi->node_inode) and sets sbi->node_inode to NULL after sbi->nr_pages[F2FS_WB_CP_DATA] is decremented to zero. As a result, f2fs_in_warm_node_list() may dereference a NULL node_inode when checking whether a folio belongs to the node inode, leading to a panic.
This patch fixes the issue by calling f2fs_in_warm_node_list() before decrementing sbi->nr_pages[F2FS_WB_CP_DATA], thus preventing the use-after-free condition.
--- fs/f2fs/data.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/data.c +2 -2
@@ -339,6 +339,8 @@ static void f2fs_write_end_io(struct biof2fs_bug_on (sbi, page->mapping ==NODE_MAPPING (sbi) && page->index !=nid_of_node (page)); +if (f2fs_in_warm_node_list (sbi, page)) +f2fs_del_fsync_node_entry (sbi, page);dec_page_count (sbi, type);
@@ -350,8 +352,6 @@ static void f2fs_write_end_io(struct bio wq_has_sleeper(&sbi->cp_wait))wake_up (&sbi->cp_wait); -if (f2fs_in_warm_node_list (sbi, page)) -f2fs_del_fsync_node_entry (sbi, page);clear_page_private_gcing (page);end_page_writeback (page); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 253/411 smb: server: fix active_num_conn leak on transport allocation failure
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6551300dc452ac16a855a83dbd1e74899542d3b3 ]
Commit 77ffbcac4e56 ("smb: server: fix leak of active_num_conn in ksmbd_tcp_new_connection()") addressed the kthread_run() failure path. The earlier alloc_transport() == NULL path in the same function has the same leak, is reachable pre-authentication via any TCP connect to port 445, and was empirically reproduced on UML (ARCH=um, v7.0-rc7): a small number of forced allocation failures were sufficient to put ksmbd into a state where every subsequent connection attempt was rejected for the remainder of the boot.
ksmbd_kthread_fn() increments active_num_conn before calling ksmbd_tcp_new_connection() and discards the return value, so when alloc_transport() returns NULL the socket is released and -ENOMEM returned without decrementing the counter. Each such failure permanently consumes one slot from the max_connections pool; once cumulative failures reach the cap, atomic_inc_return() hits the threshold on every subsequent accept and every new connection is rejected. The counter is only reset by module reload.
An unauthenticated remote attacker can drive the server toward the memory pressure that makes alloc_transport() fail by holding open connections with large RFC1002 lengths up to MAX_STREAM_PROT_LEN (0x00FFFFFF); natural transient allocation failures on a loaded host produce the same drift more slowly.
Mirror the existing rollback pattern in ksmbd_kthread_fn(): on the alloc_transport() failure path, decrement active_num_conn gated on server_conf.max_connections.
Repro details: with the patch reverted, forced alloc_transport() NULL returns leaked counter slots and subsequent connection attempts -- including legitimate connects issued after the forced-fail window had closed -- were all rejected with "Limit the maximum number of connections". With this patch applied, the same connect sequence produces no rejections and the counter cycles cleanly between zero and one on every accept.
--- fs/ksmbd/transport_tcp.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
fs/ksmbd/transport_tcp.c +2 -0
@@ -191,6 +191,8 @@ static int ksmbd_tcp_new_connection(stru t =alloc_transport (client_sk);if (!t) {sock_release (client_sk); +if (server_conf.max_connections) +atomic_dec (&active_num_conn);return -ENOMEM ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 254/411 smb: server: fix max_connections off-by-one in tcp accept path
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: DaeMyung Kang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ce23158bfe584bd90d1918f279fdf9de57802012 ]
The global max_connections check in ksmbd's TCP accept path counts the newly accepted connection with atomic_inc_return(), but then rejects the connection when the result is greater than or equal to server_conf.max_connections.
That makes the effective limit one smaller than configured. For example:
- max_connections=1 rejects the first connection
- max_connections=2 allows only one connection
The per-IP limit in the same function uses <= correctly because it counts only pre-existing connections. The global limit instead checks the post-increment total, so it should reject only when that total exceeds the configured maximum.
Fix this by changing the comparison from >= to >, so exactly max_connections simultaneous connections are allowed and the next one is rejected. This matches the documented meaning of max_connections in fs/smb/server/ksmbd_netlink.h as the "Number of maximum simultaneous connections".
--- fs/ksmbd/transport_tcp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ksmbd/transport_tcp.c +1 -1
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ static int ksmbd_kthread_fn(void *p) }if (server_conf.max_connections && -atomic_inc_return (&active_num_conn) >= server_conf.max_connections) { +atomic_inc_return (&active_num_conn) > server_conf.max_connections) {pr_info_ratelimited ("Limit the maximum number of connections(%u)\n" ,atomic_read (&active_num_conn));atomic_dec (&active_num_conn);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 255/411 smb: client: require a full NFS mode SID before reading mode bits
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2757ad3e4b6f9e0fed4c7739594e702abc5cab21 ]
parse_dacl() treats an ACE SID matching sid_unix_NFS_mode as an NFS mode SID and reads sid.sub_auth[2] to recover the mode bits.
That assumes the ACE carries three subauthorities, but compare_sids() only compares min(a, b) subauthorities. A malicious server can return an ACE with num_subauth = 2 and sub_auth[] = {88, 3}, which still matches sid_unix_NFS_mode and then drives the sub_auth[2] read four bytes past the end of the ACE.
Require num_subauth >= 3 before treating the ACE as an NFS mode SID. This keeps the fix local to the special-SID mode path without changing compare_sids() semantics for the rest of cifsacl.
--- fs/cifs/cifsacl.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/cifs/cifsacl.c +1 -0
@@ -807,6 +807,7 @@ static void parse_dacl(struct cifs_acl *dump_ace (ppace[i], end_of_acl);#endif if (mode_from_special_sid && + ppace[i]->sid.num_subauth >=3 && (compare_sids (&(ppace[i]->sid), &sid_unix_NFS_mode) ==0 )) {/*
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 256/411 smb: client: fix OOB read in smb2_ioctl_query_info QUERY_INFO path
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a58c5af19ff0d6f44f6e9fe31e33a2c92223f77e ]
smb2_ioctl_query_info() has two response-copy branches: PASSTHRU_FSCTL and the default QUERY_INFO path. The QUERY_INFO branch clamps qi.input_buffer_length to the server-reported OutputBufferLength and then copies qi.input_buffer_length bytes from qi_rsp->Buffer to userspace, but it never verifies that the flexible-array payload actually fits within rsp_iov[1].iov_len.
A malicious server can return OutputBufferLength larger than the actual QUERY_INFO response, causing copy_to_user() to walk past the response buffer and expose adjacent kernel heap to userspace.
Guard the QUERY_INFO copy with a bounds check on the actual Buffer payload. Use struct_size(qi_rsp, Buffer, qi.input_buffer_length) rather than an open-coded addition so the guard cannot overflow on 32-bit builds.
--- fs/cifs/smb2ops.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
fs/cifs/smb2ops.c +6 -0
@@ -1826,6 +1826,12 @@ smb2_ioctl_query_info(const unsigned int qi_rsp = (struct smb2_query_info_rsp *)rsp_iov[1 ].iov_base;if (le32_to_cpu (qi_rsp->OutputBufferLength) < qi.input_buffer_length) qi.input_buffer_length =le32_to_cpu (qi_rsp->OutputBufferLength); +if (qi.input_buffer_length >0 && +struct_size (qi_rsp, Buffer, qi.input_buffer_length) > + rsp_iov[1 ].iov_len) { + rc = -EFAULT ; + goto out; + }if (copy_to_user (&pqi->input_buffer_length, &qi.input_buffer_length,sizeof (qi.input_buffer_length))) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 257/411 ksmbd: require minimum ACE size in smb_check_perm_dacl()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d07b26f39246a82399661936dd0c853983cfade7 ]
Both ACE-walk loops in smb_check_perm_dacl() only guard against an under-sized remaining buffer, not against an ACE whose declared ace->size is smaller than the struct it claims to describe:
if (offsetof(struct smb_ace, access_req) > aces_size)
break;
ace_size = le16_to_cpu(ace->size);
if (ace_size > aces_size)
break;The first check only requires the 4-byte ACE header to be in bounds; it does not require access_req (4 bytes at offset 4) to be readable. An attacker who has set a crafted DACL on a file they own can declare ace->size == 4 with aces_size == 4, pass both checks, and then
granted |= le32_to_cpu(ace->access_req); /* upper loop */
compare_sids(&sid, &ace->sid); /* lower loop */
reads access_req at offset 4 (OOB by up to 4 bytes) and ace->sid at offset 8 (OOB by up to CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE + SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES
* 4 bytes).
Tighten both loops to require
ace_size >= offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) + CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE
which is the smallest valid on-wire ACE layout (4-byte header + 4-byte access_req + 8-byte sid base with zero sub-auths). Also reject ACEs whose sid.num_subauth exceeds SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES before letting compare_sids() dereference sub_auth[] entries.
parse_sec_desc() already enforces an equivalent check (lines 441-448); smb_check_perm_dacl() simply grew weaker validation over time.
Reachability: authenticated SMB client with permission to set an ACL on a file. On a subsequent CREATE against that file, the kernel walks the stored DACL via smb_check_perm_dacl() and triggers the OOB read. Not pre-auth, and the OOB read is not reflected to the attacker, but KASAN reports and kernel state corruption are possible.
--- fs/ksmbd/smbacl.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/ksmbd/smbacl.c +13 -4
@@ -1265,10 +1265,13 @@ int smb_check_perm_dacl(struct ksmbd_con ace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)pdacl +sizeof (struct smb_acl )); aces_size = acl_size -sizeof (struct smb_acl );for (i =0 ; i <le32_to_cpu (pdacl->num_aces); i++) { -if (offsetof(struct smb_ace , access_req) > aces_size) +if (offsetof(struct smb_ace , sid) + + aces_size <CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE )break ; ace_size =le16_to_cpu (ace->size); -if (ace_size > aces_size) +if (ace_size > aces_size || + ace_size < offsetof(struct smb_ace , sid) + +CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE )break ; aces_size -= ace_size; granted |=le32_to_cpu (ace->access_req);
@@ -1286,13 +1289,19 @@ int smb_check_perm_dacl(struct ksmbd_con ace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)pdacl +sizeof (struct smb_acl )); aces_size = acl_size -sizeof (struct smb_acl );for (i =0 ; i <le32_to_cpu (pdacl->num_aces); i++) { -if (offsetof(struct smb_ace , access_req) > aces_size) +if (offsetof(struct smb_ace , sid) + + aces_size <CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE )break ; ace_size =le16_to_cpu (ace->size); -if (ace_size > aces_size) +if (ace_size > aces_size || + ace_size < offsetof(struct smb_ace , sid) + +CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE )break ; aces_size -= ace_size; +if (ace->sid.num_subauth >SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES ) +break ; +if (!compare_sids (&sid, &ace->sid) || !compare_sids (&sid_unix_NFS_mode, &ace->sid)) { found =1 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 258/411 net/packet: fix TOCTOU race on mmapd vnet_hdr in tpacket_snd()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bingquan Chen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2c054e17d9d41f1020376806c7f750834ced4dc5 ]
In tpacket_snd(), when PACKET_VNET_HDR is enabled, vnet_hdr points directly into the mmap'd TX ring buffer shared with userspace. The kernel validates the header via __packet_snd_vnet_parse() but then re-reads all fields later in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(). A concurrent userspace thread can modify the vnet_hdr fields between validation and use, bypassing all safety checks.
The non-TPACKET path (packet_snd()) already correctly copies vnet_hdr to a stack-local variable. All other vnet_hdr consumers in the kernel (tun.c, tap.c, virtio_net.c) also use stack copies. The TPACKET TX path is the only caller of virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() that reads directly from user-controlled shared memory.
Fix this by copying vnet_hdr from the mmap'd ring buffer to a stack-local variable before validation and use, consistent with the approach used in packet_snd() and all other callers.
--- net/packet/af_packet.c | 25 +++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
net/packet/af_packet.c +15 -10
@@ -2729,7 +2729,8 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_soc {struct sk_buff *skb =NULL ;struct net_device *dev; -struct virtio_net_hdr *vnet_hdr =NULL ; +struct virtio_net_hdr vnet_hdr; +bool has_vnet_hdr = false;struct sockcm_cookie sockc;__be16 proto;int err, reserve =0 ;
@@ -2829,16 +2830,20 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_soc hlen =LL_RESERVED_SPACE (dev); tlen = dev->needed_tailroom;if (po->has_vnet_hdr) { - vnet_hdr = data; - data +=sizeof (*vnet_hdr); - tp_len -=sizeof (*vnet_hdr); -if (tp_len <0 || -__packet_snd_vnet_parse (vnet_hdr, tp_len)) { + data +=sizeof (vnet_hdr); + tp_len -=sizeof (vnet_hdr); +if (tp_len <0 ) { + tp_len = -EINVAL ; + goto tpacket_error; + } +memcpy (&vnet_hdr, data -sizeof (vnet_hdr),sizeof (vnet_hdr)); +if (__packet_snd_vnet_parse (&vnet_hdr, tp_len)) { tp_len = -EINVAL ; goto tpacket_error; } copylen =__virtio16_to_cpu (vio_le (), - vnet_hdr->hdr_len); + vnet_hdr.hdr_len); + has_vnet_hdr = true; } copylen =max_t (int, copylen, dev->hard_header_len); skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(&po->sk,
@@ -2875,12 +2880,12 @@ tpacket_error: } } -if (po->has_vnet_hdr) { -if (virtio_net_hdr_to_skb (skb, vnet_hdr,vio_le ())) { +if (has_vnet_hdr) { +if (virtio_net_hdr_to_skb (skb, &vnet_hdr,vio_le ())) { tp_len = -EINVAL ; goto tpacket_error; } -virtio_net_hdr_set_proto (skb, vnet_hdr); +virtio_net_hdr_set_proto (skb, &vnet_hdr); } skb->destructor = tpacket_destruct_skb;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 259/411 arm64/mm: Enable batched TLB flush in unmap_hotplug_range()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 48478b9f791376b4b89018d7afdfd06865498f65 ]
During a memory hot remove operation, both linear and vmemmap mappings for the memory range being removed, get unmapped via unmap_hotplug_range() but mapped pages get freed only for vmemmap mapping. This is just a sequential operation where each table entry gets cleared, followed by a leaf specific TLB flush, and then followed by memory free operation when applicable.
This approach was simple and uniform both for vmemmap and linear mappings. But linear mapping might contain CONT marked block memory where it becomes necessary to first clear out all entire in the range before a TLB flush. This is as per the architecture requirement. Hence batch all TLB flushes during the table tear down walk and finally do it in unmap_hotplug_range().
Prior to this fix, it was hypothetically possible for a speculative access to a higher address in the contiguous block to fill the TLB with shattered entries for the entire contiguous range after a lower address had already been cleared and invalidated. Due to the table entries being shattered, the subsequent TLB invalidation for the higher address would not then clear the TLB entries for the lower address, meaning stale TLB entries could persist.
Besides it also helps in improving the performance via TLBI range operation along with reduced synchronization instructions. The time spent executing unmap_hotplug_range() improved 97% measured over a 2GB memory hot removal in KVM guest.
This scheme is not applicable during vmemmap mapping tear down where memory needs to be freed and hence a TLB flush is required after clearing out page table entry.
--- arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c +20 -16
@@ -886,10 +886,14 @@ static void unmap_hotplug_pte_range(pmd_WARN_ON (!pte_present (pte));pte_clear (&init_mm, addr, ptep); -flush_tlb_kernel_range (addr, addr +PAGE_SIZE ); -if (free_mapped) +if (free_mapped) { +/* CONT blocks are not supported in the vmemmap */ +WARN_ON (pte_cont (pte)); +flush_tlb_kernel_range (addr, addr +PAGE_SIZE );free_hotplug_page_range (pte_page (pte),PAGE_SIZE , altmap); + } +/* unmap_hotplug_range() flushes TLB for !free_mapped */ }while (addr +=PAGE_SIZE , addr < end); }
@@ -910,15 +914,14 @@ static void unmap_hotplug_pmd_range(pud_WARN_ON (!pmd_present (pmd));if (pmd_sect (pmd)) {pmd_clear (pmdp); - -/* -* One TLBI should be sufficient here as the PMD_SIZE -* range is mapped with a single block entry. -*/ -flush_tlb_kernel_range (addr, addr +PAGE_SIZE ); -if (free_mapped) +if (free_mapped) { +/* CONT blocks are not supported in the vmemmap */ +WARN_ON (pmd_cont (pmd)); +flush_tlb_kernel_range (addr, addr +PMD_SIZE );free_hotplug_page_range (pmd_page (pmd),PMD_SIZE , altmap); + } +/* unmap_hotplug_range() flushes TLB for !free_mapped */ continue ; }WARN_ON (!pmd_table (pmd));
@@ -943,15 +946,12 @@ static void unmap_hotplug_pud_range(p4d_WARN_ON (!pud_present (pud));if (pud_sect (pud)) {pud_clear (pudp); - -/* -* One TLBI should be sufficient here as the PUD_SIZE -* range is mapped with a single block entry. -*/ -flush_tlb_kernel_range (addr, addr +PAGE_SIZE ); -if (free_mapped) +if (free_mapped) { +flush_tlb_kernel_range (addr, addr +PUD_SIZE );free_hotplug_page_range (pud_page (pud),PUD_SIZE , altmap); + } +/* unmap_hotplug_range() flushes TLB for !free_mapped */ continue ; }WARN_ON (!pud_table (pud));
@@ -981,6 +981,7 @@ static void unmap_hotplug_p4d_range(pgd_static void unmap_hotplug_range (unsigned long addr,unsigned long end,bool free_mapped,struct vmem_altmap *altmap) { +unsigned long start = addr;unsigned long next;pgd_t *pgdp, pgd;
@@ -1002,6 +1003,9 @@ static void unmap_hotplug_range(unsignedWARN_ON (!pgd_present (pgd));unmap_hotplug_p4d_range (pgdp, addr, next, free_mapped, altmap); }while (addr = next, addr < end); + +if (!free_mapped) +flush_tlb_kernel_range (start, end); } static void free_empty_pte_table(pmd_t *pmdp, unsigned long addr,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 260/411 rtw88: 8821ce: Disable PCIe ASPM L1 for 8821CE using chip ID
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jimmy Hon <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b9eb5f0742d107ca9c0f33da58f61ce83e3ce2fc ]
Make workaround work for other 8821CE devices with different PCI ID
Stable-dep-of: eb101d2abdcc ("wifi: rtw88: check for PCI upstream bridge existence")
--- drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/pci.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/pci.c +1 -1
@@ -1766,7 +1766,7 @@ int rtw_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, }/* Disable PCIe ASPM L1 while doing NAPI poll for 8821CE */ -if (pdev->device ==0xc821 && bridge->vendor ==PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL ) +if (rtwdev->chip->id ==RTW_CHIP_TYPE_8821C && bridge->vendor ==PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL ) rtwpci->rx_no_aspm = true;rtw_pci_phy_cfg (rtwdev);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 261/411 wifi: rtw88: check for PCI upstream bridge existence
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Fedor Pchelkin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit eb101d2abdcccb514ca4fccd3b278dd8267374f6 ]
pci_upstream_bridge() returns NULL if the device is on a root bus. If 8821CE is installed in the system with such a PCI topology, the probing routine will crash. This has probably been unnoticed as 8821CE is mostly supplied in laptops where there is a PCI-to-PCI bridge located upstream from the device. However the card might be installed on a system with different configuration.
Check if the bridge does exist for the specific workaround to be applied.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Svace static analysis tool.
--- drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/pci.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/pci.c +2 -1
@@ -1766,7 +1766,8 @@ int rtw_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, }/* Disable PCIe ASPM L1 while doing NAPI poll for 8821CE */ -if (rtwdev->chip->id ==RTW_CHIP_TYPE_8821C && bridge->vendor ==PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL ) +if (rtwdev->chip->id ==RTW_CHIP_TYPE_8821C && + bridge && bridge->vendor ==PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL ) rtwpci->rx_no_aspm = true;rtw_pci_phy_cfg (rtwdev);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 262/411 thermal: core: Fix thermal zone governor cleanup issues
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 41ff66baf81c6541f4f985dd7eac4494d03d9440 ]
If thermal_zone_device_register_with_trips() fails after adding a thermal governor to the thermal zone being registered, the governor is not removed from it as appropriate which may lead to a memory leak.
In turn, thermal_zone_device_unregister() calls thermal_set_governor() without acquiring the thermal zone lock beforehand which may race with a governor update via sysfs and may lead to a use-after-free in that case.
Address these issues by adding two thermal_set_governor() calls, one to thermal_release() to remove the governor from the given thermal zone, and one to the thermal zone registration error path to cover failures preceding the thermal zone device registration.
--- drivers/thermal/thermal_core.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/thermal/thermal_core.c +4 -3
@@ -778,6 +778,7 @@ static void thermal_release(struct devic sizeof("thermal_zone") - 1)) { tz =to_thermal_zone (dev);thermal_zone_destroy_device_groups (tz); +thermal_set_governor (tz,NULL );kfree (tz); } else if (!strncmp(dev_name(dev), "cooling_device", sizeof("cooling_device") - 1)) {
@@ -1260,8 +1261,10 @@ thermal_zone_device_register(const char/* sys I/F */ /* Add nodes that are always present via .groups */ result =thermal_zone_create_device_groups (tz, mask); -if (result) +if (result) { +thermal_set_governor (tz,NULL ); goto remove_id; + }/* A new thermal zone needs to be updated anyway. */ atomic_set (&tz->need_update,1 );
@@ -1385,8 +1388,6 @@ void thermal_zone_device_unregister(strucancel_delayed_work_sync (&tz->poll_queue); -thermal_set_governor (tz,NULL ); -thermal_remove_hwmon_sysfs (tz);ida_simple_remove (&thermal_tz_ida, tz->id);ida_destroy (&tz->ida);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 263/411 wifi: mwifiex: fix use-after-free in mwifiex_adapter_cleanup()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Daniel Hodges <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ae5e95d4157481693be2317e3ffcd84e36010cbb ]
The mwifiex_adapter_cleanup() function uses timer_delete() (non-synchronous) for the wakeup_timer before the adapter structure is freed. This is incorrect because timer_delete() does not wait for any running timer callback to complete.
If the wakeup_timer callback (wakeup_timer_fn) is executing when mwifiex_adapter_cleanup() is called, the callback will continue to access adapter fields (adapter->hw_status, adapter->if_ops.card_reset, etc.) which may be freed by mwifiex_free_adapter() called later in the mwifiex_remove_card() path.
Use timer_delete_sync() instead to ensure any running timer callback has completed before returning.
--- drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/init.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/init.c +1 -1
@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ static void mwifiex_invalidate_lists(strstatic void mwifiex_adapter_cleanup (struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter) { -del_timer (&adapter->wakeup_timer); +del_timer_sync (&adapter->wakeup_timer);del_timer_sync (&adapter->devdump_timer);mwifiex_cancel_all_pending_cmd (adapter);wake_up_interruptible (&adapter->cmd_wait_q.wait);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 264/411 ALSA: aoa: Use guard() for mutex locks
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1cb6ecbb372002ef9e531c5377e5f60122411e40 ]
Replace the manual mutex lock/unlock pairs with guard() for code simplification.
Only code refactoring, and no behavior change.
Stable-dep-of: 5ed060d54915 ("ALSA: aoa: i2sbus: clear stale prepared state")
--- sound/aoa/codecs/onyx.c | 104 +++++++++++------------------------- sound/aoa/codecs/tas.c | 113 +++++++++++++--------------------------- sound/aoa/core/gpio-feature.c | 20 ++----- sound/aoa/core/gpio-pmf.c | 26 +++------ sound/aoa/soundbus/i2sbus/pcm.c | 76 ++++++++------------------ 5 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 227 deletions(-)
sound/aoa/codecs/onyx.c +32 -72
@@ -121,10 +121,9 @@ static int onyx_snd_vol_get(struct snd_kstruct onyx *onyx =snd_kcontrol_chip (kcontrol);s8 l, r; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex);onyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DAC_ATTEN_LEFT , &l);onyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DAC_ATTEN_RIGHT , &r); -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex); ucontrol->value.integer.value[0 ] = l +VOLUME_RANGE_SHIFT ; ucontrol->value.integer.value[1 ] = r +VOLUME_RANGE_SHIFT ;
@@ -145,15 +144,13 @@ static int onyx_snd_vol_put(struct snd_k ucontrol->value.integer.value[1] > -1 + VOLUME_RANGE_SHIFT)return -EINVAL ; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex);onyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DAC_ATTEN_LEFT , &l);onyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DAC_ATTEN_RIGHT , &r);if (l +VOLUME_RANGE_SHIFT == ucontrol->value.integer.value[0 ] && - r +VOLUME_RANGE_SHIFT == ucontrol->value.integer.value[1 ]) { -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex); + r +VOLUME_RANGE_SHIFT == ucontrol->value.integer.value[1 ])return 0 ; - }onyx_write_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DAC_ATTEN_LEFT , ucontrol->value.integer.value[0]
@@ -161,7 +158,6 @@ static int onyx_snd_vol_put(struct snd_konyx_write_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DAC_ATTEN_RIGHT , ucontrol->value.integer.value[1 ] -VOLUME_RANGE_SHIFT ); -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex);return 1 ; }
@@ -197,9 +193,8 @@ static int onyx_snd_inputgain_get(structstruct onyx *onyx =snd_kcontrol_chip (kcontrol);u8 ig; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex);onyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_ADC_CONTROL , &ig); -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex); ucontrol->value.integer.value[0 ] = (ig &ONYX_ADC_PGA_GAIN_MASK ) +INPUTGAIN_RANGE_SHIFT ;
@@ -216,14 +211,13 @@ static int onyx_snd_inputgain_put(structif (ucontrol->value.integer.value[0 ] <3 +INPUTGAIN_RANGE_SHIFT || ucontrol->value.integer.value[0 ] >28 +INPUTGAIN_RANGE_SHIFT )return -EINVAL ; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex);onyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_ADC_CONTROL , &v); n = v; n &= ~ONYX_ADC_PGA_GAIN_MASK ; n |= (ucontrol->value.integer.value[0 ] -INPUTGAIN_RANGE_SHIFT ) &ONYX_ADC_PGA_GAIN_MASK ;onyx_write_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_ADC_CONTROL , n); -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex);return n != v; }
@@ -251,9 +245,8 @@ static int onyx_snd_capture_source_get(sstruct onyx *onyx =snd_kcontrol_chip (kcontrol);s8 v; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex);onyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_ADC_CONTROL , &v); -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex); ucontrol->value.enumerated.item[0 ] = !!(v&ONYX_ADC_INPUT_MIC );
@@ -264,13 +257,12 @@ static void onyx_set_capture_source(stru {s8 v; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex);onyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_ADC_CONTROL , &v); v &= ~ONYX_ADC_INPUT_MIC ;if (mic) v |=ONYX_ADC_INPUT_MIC ;onyx_write_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_ADC_CONTROL , v); -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex); } static int onyx_snd_capture_source_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol,
@@ -311,9 +303,8 @@ static int onyx_snd_mute_get(struct snd_struct onyx *onyx =snd_kcontrol_chip (kcontrol);u8 c; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex);onyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DAC_CONTROL , &c); -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex); ucontrol->value.integer.value[0 ] = !(c &ONYX_MUTE_LEFT ); ucontrol->value.integer.value[1 ] = !(c &ONYX_MUTE_RIGHT );
@@ -328,9 +319,9 @@ static int onyx_snd_mute_put(struct snd_u8 v =0 , c =0 ;int err = -EBUSY ; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex);if (onyx->analog_locked) - goto out_unlock; +return -EBUSY ;onyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DAC_CONTROL , &v); c = v;
@@ -341,9 +332,6 @@ static int onyx_snd_mute_put(struct snd_ c |=ONYX_MUTE_RIGHT ; err =onyx_write_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DAC_CONTROL , c); - out_unlock: -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex); -return !err ? (v != c) : err; }
@@ -372,9 +360,8 @@ static int onyx_snd_single_bit_get(strucu8 address = (pv >>8 ) &0xff ;u8 mask = pv &0xff ; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex);onyx_read_register (onyx, address, &c); -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex); ucontrol->value.integer.value[0 ] = !!(c & mask) ^ polarity;
@@ -393,11 +380,10 @@ static int onyx_snd_single_bit_put(strucu8 address = (pv >>8 ) &0xff ;u8 mask = pv &0xff ; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex);if (spdiflock && onyx->spdif_locked) {/* even if alsamixer doesn't care.. */ - err = -EBUSY ; - goto out_unlock; +return -EBUSY ; }onyx_read_register (onyx, address, &v); c = v;
@@ -406,9 +392,6 @@ static int onyx_snd_single_bit_put(struc c |= mask; err =onyx_write_register (onyx, address, c); - out_unlock: -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex); -return !err ? (v != c) : err; }
@@ -489,7 +472,7 @@ static int onyx_spdif_get(struct snd_kcostruct onyx *onyx =snd_kcontrol_chip (kcontrol);u8 v; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex);onyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DIG_INFO1 , &v); ucontrol->value.iec958.status[0 ] = v &0x3e ;
@@ -501,7 +484,6 @@ static int onyx_spdif_get(struct snd_kcoonyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DIG_INFO4 , &v); ucontrol->value.iec958.status[4 ] = v &0x0f ; -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex);return 0 ; }
@@ -512,7 +494,7 @@ static int onyx_spdif_put(struct snd_kcostruct onyx *onyx =snd_kcontrol_chip (kcontrol);u8 v; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex);onyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DIG_INFO1 , &v); v = (v & ~0x3e ) | (ucontrol->value.iec958.status[0 ] &0x3e );onyx_write_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DIG_INFO1 , v);
@@ -527,7 +509,6 @@ static int onyx_spdif_put(struct snd_kcoonyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DIG_INFO4 , &v); v = (v & ~0x0f ) | (ucontrol->value.iec958.status[4 ] &0x0f );onyx_write_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DIG_INFO4 , v); -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex);return 1 ; }
@@ -672,14 +653,13 @@ static int onyx_usable(struct codec_infostruct onyx *onyx = cii->codec_data;int spdif_enabled, analog_enabled; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex);onyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DIG_INFO4 , &v); spdif_enabled = !!(v &ONYX_SPDIF_ENABLE );onyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DAC_CONTROL , &v); analog_enabled = (v & (ONYX_MUTE_RIGHT |ONYX_MUTE_LEFT )) != (ONYX_MUTE_RIGHT |ONYX_MUTE_LEFT ); -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex);switch (ti->tag) {case 0 :return 1 ;
@@ -695,9 +675,8 @@ static int onyx_prepare(struct codec_inf {u8 v;struct onyx *onyx = cii->codec_data; -int err = -EBUSY ; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex);#ifdef SNDRV_PCM_FMTBIT_COMPRESSED_16BE if (substream->runtime->format ==SNDRV_PCM_FMTBIT_COMPRESSED_16BE ) {
@@ -706,10 +685,9 @@ static int onyx_prepare(struct codec_infif (onyx_write_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DAC_CONTROL , v |ONYX_MUTE_RIGHT |ONYX_MUTE_LEFT )) - goto out_unlock; +return -EBUSY ; onyx->analog_locked =1 ; - err =0 ; - goto out_unlock; + return 0; }#endif switch (substream->runtime->rate) {
@@ -719,8 +697,7 @@ static int onyx_prepare(struct codec_inf/* these rates are ok for all outputs */ /* FIXME: program spdif channel control bits here so that * userspace doesn't have to if it only plays pcm! */ - err =0 ; - goto out_unlock; +return 0 ;default :/* got some rate that the digital output can't do, * so disable and lock it */
@@ -728,16 +705,12 @@ static int onyx_prepare(struct codec_infif (onyx_write_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_DIG_INFO4 , v & ~ONYX_SPDIF_ENABLE )) - goto out_unlock; +return -EBUSY ; onyx->spdif_locked =1 ; - err =0 ; - goto out_unlock; +return 0 ; } - out_unlock: -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex); - -return err; +return -EBUSY ; } static int onyx_open(struct codec_info_item *cii,
@@ -745,9 +718,8 @@ static int onyx_open(struct codec_info_i {struct onyx *onyx = cii->codec_data; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex); onyx->open_count++; -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex);return 0 ; }
@@ -757,11 +729,10 @@ static int onyx_close(struct codec_info_ {struct onyx *onyx = cii->codec_data; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex); onyx->open_count--;if (!onyx->open_count) onyx->spdif_locked = onyx->analog_locked =0 ; -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex);return 0 ; }
@@ -771,7 +742,7 @@ static int onyx_switch_clock(struct code {struct onyx *onyx = cii->codec_data; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex);/* this *MUST* be more elaborate later... */ switch (what) {case CLOCK_SWITCH_PREPARE_SLAVE :
@@ -783,7 +754,6 @@ static int onyx_switch_clock(struct codedefault :/* silence warning */ break ; } -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex);return 0 ; }
@@ -794,27 +764,21 @@ static int onyx_suspend(struct codec_inf {struct onyx *onyx = cii->codec_data;u8 v; -int err = -ENXIO ; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex);if (onyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_CONTROL , &v)) - goto out_unlock; +return -ENXIO ;onyx_write_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_CONTROL , v |ONYX_ADPSV |ONYX_DAPSV );/* Apple does a sleep here but the datasheet says to do it on resume */ - err =0 ; - out_unlock: -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex); - -return err; +return 0 ; }static int onyx_resume (struct codec_info_item *cii) {struct onyx *onyx = cii->codec_data;u8 v; -int err = -ENXIO ; -mutex_lock (&onyx->mutex); +guard (mutex)(&onyx->mutex);/* reset codec */ onyx->codec.gpio->methods->set_hw_reset (onyx->codec.gpio,0 );
@@ -826,17 +790,13 @@ static int onyx_resume(struct codec_info/* take codec out of suspend (if it still is after reset) */ if (onyx_read_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_CONTROL , &v)) - goto out_unlock; +return -ENXIO ;onyx_write_register (onyx,ONYX_REG_CONTROL , v & ~(ONYX_ADPSV |ONYX_DAPSV ));/* FIXME: should divide by sample rate, but 8k is the lowest we go */ msleep (2205000 /8000 );/* reset all values */ onyx_register_init (onyx); - err =0 ; - out_unlock: -mutex_unlock (&onyx->mutex); - - return err; + return 0; }#endif /* CONFIG_PM */
sound/aoa/codecs/tas.c +39 -74
303 lines not on this page · raw message
sound/aoa/core/gpio-feature.c +7 -13
@@ -212,10 +212,9 @@ static void ftr_handle_notify(struct worstruct gpio_notification *notif = container_of(work, struct gpio_notification, work.work); -mutex_lock (¬if->mutex); +guard (mutex)(¬if->mutex);if (notif->notify) notif->notify (notif->data); -mutex_unlock (¬if->mutex); }static void gpio_enable_dual_edge (int gpio)
@@ -341,19 +340,17 @@ static int ftr_set_notify(struct gpio_ruif (!irq)return -ENODEV ; -mutex_lock (¬if->mutex); +guard (mutex)(¬if->mutex); old = notif->notify; -if (!old && !notify) { - err =0 ; - goto out_unlock; - } +if (!old && !notify) +return 0 ;if (old && notify) {if (old == notify && notif->data == data) err =0 ; - goto out_unlock; +return err; }if (old && !notify)
@@ -362,16 +359,13 @@ static int ftr_set_notify(struct gpio_ruif (!old && notify) { err =request_irq (irq, ftr_handle_notify_irq,0 , name, notif);if (err) - goto out_unlock; +return err; } notif->notify = notify; notif->data = data; - err =0 ; - out_unlock: -mutex_unlock (¬if->mutex); -return err; +return 0 ; } static int ftr_get_detect(struct gpio_runtime *rt,
sound/aoa/core/gpio-pmf.c +9 -17
@@ -74,10 +74,9 @@ static void pmf_handle_notify(struct worstruct gpio_notification *notif = container_of(work, struct gpio_notification, work.work); -mutex_lock (¬if->mutex); +guard (mutex)(¬if->mutex);if (notif->notify) notif->notify (notif->data); -mutex_unlock (¬if->mutex); }static void pmf_gpio_init (struct gpio_runtime *rt)
@@ -154,19 +153,17 @@ static int pmf_set_notify(struct gpio_rureturn -EINVAL ; } -mutex_lock (¬if->mutex); +guard (mutex)(¬if->mutex); old = notif->notify; -if (!old && !notify) { - err =0 ; - goto out_unlock; - } +if (!old && !notify) +return 0 ;if (old && notify) {if (old == notify && notif->data == data) err =0 ; - goto out_unlock; +return err; }if (old && !notify) {
@@ -178,10 +175,8 @@ static int pmf_set_notify(struct gpio_ruif (!old && notify) { irq_client =kzalloc (sizeof (struct pmf_irq_client ),GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!irq_client) { - err = -ENOMEM ; - goto out_unlock; - } +if (!irq_client) +return -ENOMEM ; irq_client->data = notif; irq_client->handler = pmf_handle_notify_irq; irq_client->owner =THIS_MODULE ;
@@ -192,17 +187,14 @@ static int pmf_set_notify(struct gpio_ruprintk (KERN_ERR "snd-aoa: gpio layer failed to" " register %s irq (%d)\n" , name, err);kfree (irq_client); - goto out_unlock; +return err; } notif->gpio_private = irq_client; } notif->notify = notify; notif->data = data; - err =0 ; - out_unlock: -mutex_unlock (¬if->mutex); -return err; +return 0 ; } static int pmf_get_detect(struct gpio_runtime *rt,
sound/aoa/soundbus/i2sbus/pcm.c +25 -51
184 lines not on this page · raw message
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 265/411 ALSA: aoa: i2sbus: clear stale prepared state
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5ed060d5491597490fb53ec69da3edc4b1e8c165 ]
The i2sbus PCM code uses pi->active to constrain the sibling stream to an already prepared duplex format and rate in i2sbus_pcm_open().
That state is set from i2sbus_pcm_prepare(), but the current code only clears it on close. As a result, the sibling stream can inherit stale constraints after the prepared state has been torn down.
Clear pi->active when hw_params() or hw_free() tears down the prepared state, and set it again only after prepare succeeds.
Replace the stale FIXME in the duplex constraint comment with a description of the current driver behavior: i2sbus still programs a single shared transport configuration for both directions, so mixed formats are not supported in duplex mode.
--- sound/aoa/soundbus/i2sbus/pcm.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
sound/aoa/soundbus/i2sbus/pcm.c +44 -11
@@ -165,17 +165,16 @@ static int i2sbus_pcm_open(struct i2sbus* currently in use (if any). */ hw->rate_min =5512 ; hw->rate_max =192000 ; -/* if the other stream is active, then we can only -* support what it is currently using. -* FIXME: I lied. This comment is wrong. We can support -* anything that works with the same serial format, ie. -* when recording 24 bit sound we can well play 16 bit -* sound at the same time iff using the same transfer mode. +/* If the other stream is already prepared, keep this stream +* on the same duplex format and rate. +* +* i2sbus_pcm_prepare() still programs one shared transport +* configuration for both directions, so mixed duplex formats +* are not supported here. */ if (other->active) { -/* FIXME: is this guaranteed by the alsa api? */ hw->formats &=pcm_format_to_bits (i2sdev->format); -/* see above, restrict rates to the one we already have */ +/* Restrict rates to the one already in use. */ hw->rate_min = i2sdev->rate; hw->rate_max = i2sdev->rate; }
@@ -283,6 +282,23 @@ void i2sbus_wait_for_stop_both(struct i2 }#endif +static void i2sbus_pcm_clear_active (struct i2sbus_dev *i2sdev,int in) +{ +struct pcm_info *pi; + +guard (mutex)(&i2sdev->lock); + +get_pcm_info (i2sdev, in, &pi,NULL ); + pi->active =0 ; +} + +static inline int i2sbus_hw_params (struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, +struct snd_pcm_hw_params *params,int in) +{ +i2sbus_pcm_clear_active (snd_pcm_substream_chip (substream), in); +return 0 ; +} +static inline int i2sbus_hw_free (struct snd_pcm_substream *substream,int in) {struct i2sbus_dev *i2sdev =snd_pcm_substream_chip (substream);
@@ -291,14 +307,27 @@ static inline int i2sbus_hw_free(structget_pcm_info (i2sdev, in, &pi,NULL );if (pi->dbdma_ring.stopping)i2sbus_wait_for_stop (i2sdev, pi); +i2sbus_pcm_clear_active (i2sdev, in);return 0 ; } +static int i2sbus_playback_hw_params (struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, +struct snd_pcm_hw_params *params) +{ +return i2sbus_hw_params (substream, params,0 ); +} +static int i2sbus_playback_hw_free (struct snd_pcm_substream *substream) {return i2sbus_hw_free (substream,0 ); } +static int i2sbus_record_hw_params (struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, +struct snd_pcm_hw_params *params) +{ +return i2sbus_hw_params (substream, params,1 ); +} +static int i2sbus_record_hw_free (struct snd_pcm_substream *substream) {return i2sbus_hw_free (substream,1 );
@@ -335,7 +364,6 @@ static int i2sbus_pcm_prepare(struct i2sreturn -EINVAL ; runtime = pi->substream->runtime; - pi->active =1 ;if (other->active && ((i2sdev->format != runtime->format) || (i2sdev->rate != runtime->rate)))
@@ -450,9 +478,11 @@ static int i2sbus_pcm_prepare(struct i2s/* early exit if already programmed correctly */ /* not locking these is fine since we touch them only in this function */ -if (in_le32 (&i2sdev->intfregs->serial_format) == sfr - &&in_le32 (&i2sdev->intfregs->data_word_sizes) == dws) +if (in_le32 (&i2sdev->intfregs->serial_format) == sfr && +in_le32 (&i2sdev->intfregs->data_word_sizes) == dws) { + pi->active =1 ;return 0 ; + }/* let's notify the codecs about clocks going away. * For now we only do mastering on the i2s cell... */
@@ -490,6 +520,7 @@ static int i2sbus_pcm_prepare(struct i2sif (cii->codec->switch_clock) cii->codec->switch_clock (cii,CLOCK_SWITCH_SLAVE ); + pi->active =1 ;return 0 ; }
@@ -746,6 +777,7 @@ static snd_pcm_uframes_t i2sbus_playbackstatic const struct snd_pcm_ops i2sbus_playback_ops = { .open = i2sbus_playback_open, .close = i2sbus_playback_close, + .hw_params = i2sbus_playback_hw_params, .hw_free = i2sbus_playback_hw_free, .prepare = i2sbus_playback_prepare, .trigger = i2sbus_playback_trigger,
@@ -814,6 +846,7 @@ static snd_pcm_uframes_t i2sbus_record_pstatic const struct snd_pcm_ops i2sbus_record_ops = { .open = i2sbus_record_open, .close = i2sbus_record_close, + .hw_params = i2sbus_record_hw_params, .hw_free = i2sbus_record_hw_free, .prepare = i2sbus_record_prepare, .trigger = i2sbus_record_trigger,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 266/411 media: rc: ttusbir: respect DMA coherency rules
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 50acaad3d202c064779db8dc3d010007347f59c7 ]
Buffers must not share a cache line with other data structures. Allocate separately.
--- drivers/media/rc/ttusbir.c | 13 +++++++++---- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/media/rc/ttusbir.c +9 -4
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ struct ttusbir {struct led_classdev led;struct urb *bulk_urb; -uint8_t bulk_buffer[5 ]; +u8 *bulk_buffer;int bulk_out_endp, iso_in_endp;bool led_on, is_led_on;atomic_t led_complete;
@@ -188,13 +188,16 @@ static int ttusbir_probe(struct usb_intestruct rc_dev *rc;int i, j, ret;int altsetting =-1 ; +u8 *buffer; tt =kzalloc (sizeof (*tt),GFP_KERNEL ); + buffer =kzalloc (5 ,GFP_KERNEL ); rc =rc_allocate_device (RC_DRIVER_IR_RAW ); -if (!tt || !rc) { +if (!tt || !rc || buffer) { ret = -ENOMEM ; goto out; } + tt->bulk_buffer = buffer;/* find the correct alt setting */ for (i =0 ; i < intf->num_altsetting && altsetting ==-1 ; i++) {
@@ -283,8 +286,8 @@ static int ttusbir_probe(struct usb_inte tt->bulk_buffer[3 ] =0x01 ;usb_fill_bulk_urb (tt->bulk_urb, tt->udev,usb_sndbulkpipe (tt->udev, - tt->bulk_out_endp), tt->bulk_buffer,sizeof (tt->bulk_buffer), - ttusbir_bulk_complete, tt); + tt->bulk_out_endp), tt->bulk_buffer,5 , + ttusbir_bulk_complete, tt); tt->led.name ="ttusbir:green:power" ; tt->led.default_trigger ="rc-feedback" ;
@@ -353,6 +356,7 @@ out:kfree (tt); }rc_free_device (rc); +kfree (buffer);return ret; }
@@ -375,6 +379,7 @@ static void ttusbir_disconnect(struct us }usb_kill_urb (tt->bulk_urb);usb_free_urb (tt->bulk_urb); +kfree (tt->bulk_buffer);usb_set_intfdata (intf,NULL );kfree (tt); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 267/411 ALSA: aoa: Skip devices with no codecs in i2sbus_resume()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit fd7df93013c5118812e63a52635dc6c3a805a1de ]
In i2sbus_resume(), skip devices with an empty codec list, which avoids using an uninitialized 'sysclock_factor' in the 32-bit format path in i2sbus_pcm_prepare().
In i2sbus_pcm_prepare(), replace two list_for_each_entry() loops with a single list_first_entry() now that the codec list is guaranteed to be non-empty by all callers.
--- sound/aoa/soundbus/i2sbus/core.c | 3 +++ sound/aoa/soundbus/i2sbus/pcm.c | 16 +++++----------- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
sound/aoa/soundbus/i2sbus/core.c +3 -0
@@ -411,6 +411,9 @@ static int i2sbus_resume(struct macio_deint err, ret =0 ;list_for_each_entry (i2sdev, &control->list, item) { +if (list_empty (&i2sdev->sound.codec_list)) +continue ; +/* reset i2s bus format etc. */ i2sbus_pcm_prepare_both (i2sdev);
sound/aoa/soundbus/i2sbus/pcm.c +5 -11
@@ -411,6 +411,9 @@ static int i2sbus_pcm_prepare(struct i2s/* set stop command */ command->command =cpu_to_le16 (DBDMA_STOP ); + cii =list_first_entry (&i2sdev->sound.codec_list, + struct codec_info_item, list); +/* ok, let's set the serial format and stuff */ switch (runtime->format) {/* 16 bit formats */
@@ -418,13 +421,7 @@ static int i2sbus_pcm_prepare(struct i2scase SNDRV_PCM_FORMAT_U16_BE :/* FIXME: if we add different bus factors we need to * do more here!! */ - bi.bus_factor =0 ; -list_for_each_entry (cii, &i2sdev->sound.codec_list, list) { - bi.bus_factor = cii->codec->bus_factor; -break ; - } -if (!bi.bus_factor) -return -ENODEV ; + bi.bus_factor = cii->codec->bus_factor; input_16bit =1 ;break ;case SNDRV_PCM_FORMAT_S32_BE :
@@ -438,10 +435,7 @@ static int i2sbus_pcm_prepare(struct i2sreturn -EINVAL ; }/* we assume all sysclocks are the same! */ -list_for_each_entry (cii, &i2sdev->sound.codec_list, list) { - bi.sysclock_factor = cii->codec->sysclock_factor; -break ; - } + bi.sysclock_factor = cii->codec->sysclock_factor; if (clock_and_divisors(bi.sysclock_factor, bi.bus_factor,