efi_loader: check efi_deserialize_load_option() in get_dp_device()
PATCH 1/1 efi_loader: check efi_deserialize_load_option() in get_dp_device()
From: Hem Parekh <[email protected]>
get_dp_device() reads a Boot#### variable and passes its contents to efi_deserialize_load_option() but ignores the return value. On failure efi_deserialize_load_option() may return without having initialised the caller's struct efi_load_option, and even on a malformed device path it sets lo.file_path before validating it with efi_dp_check_length().
As a result get_dp_device() can proceed to walk lo.file_path with efi_dp_split_file_path() (via efi_dp_dup()/efi_dp_size()) on a device path that was never validated, or on an uninitialised pointer when the variable is too short to be parsed. A device-path node with a length of zero makes the walk loop forever, and a length below the 4-byte node header leads to an out-of-bounds read. The Boot#### variable is attacker-controlled in threat models where writing EFI variables does not imply the ability to execute firmware code, so this is reachable during capsule-on-disk processing at boot.
Check the return value and bail out, as every other caller of efi_deserialize_load_option() already does.
--- lib/efi_loader/efi_capsule.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
lib/efi_loader/efi_capsule.c +6 -1
@@ -860,7 +860,12 @@ static efi_status_t get_dp_device(u16 *boot_var,if (!buf)return EFI_NOT_FOUND ; -efi_deserialize_load_option (&lo, buf, &size); + ret =efi_deserialize_load_option (&lo, buf, &size); +if (ret !=EFI_SUCCESS ) { +log_err ("Invalid load option for %ls\n" , boot_var); +free (buf); +return ret; + }if (lo.attributes &LOAD_OPTION_ACTIVE ) {efi_dp_split_file_path (lo.file_path, device_dp, &file_dp);
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0