scsi: ch: publish changer devices after probe setup
PATCH 1/1 scsi: ch: publish changer devices after probe setup
ch_probe() inserts the new changer into ch_index_idr before initializing the kref, lock and scsi_device pointer. ch_open() looks up the object directly from the IDR by minor, so a racing open can observe a partially initialized changer.
Reserve the minor with a NULL IDR entry, finish device setup and element discovery, then publish the initialized changer with idr_replace(). Early opens continue to fail with -ENXIO until the object is ready.
--- drivers/scsi/ch.c | 14 +++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/scsi/ch.c +13 -1
@@ -897,6 +897,7 @@ static int ch_probe(struct scsi_device *sd) {struct device *dev = &sd->sdev_gendev;struct device *class_dev; +void *old;int ret;scsi_changer *ch;
@@ -909,7 +910,7 @@ static int ch_probe(struct scsi_device *sd)idr_preload (GFP_KERNEL );spin_lock (&ch_index_lock); - ret =idr_alloc (&ch_index_idr, ch,0 ,CH_MAX_DEVS +1 ,GFP_NOWAIT ); + ret =idr_alloc (&ch_index_idr,NULL ,0 ,CH_MAX_DEVS +1 ,GFP_NOWAIT );spin_unlock (&ch_index_lock);idr_preload_end ();
@@ -951,6 +952,15 @@ static int ch_probe(struct scsi_device *sd)ch_init_elem (ch);mutex_unlock (&ch->lock); + +spin_lock (&ch_index_lock); + old =idr_replace (&ch_index_idr, ch, ch->minor); +spin_unlock (&ch_index_lock); +if (IS_ERR (old)) { + ret =PTR_ERR (old); + goto destroy_dev; + } +dev_set_drvdata (dev, ch);sdev_printk (KERN_INFO , sd,"Attached scsi changer %s\n" , ch->name);
@@ -960,7 +970,9 @@ destroy_dev: put_device:scsi_device_put (sd); remove_idr: +spin_lock (&ch_index_lock);idr_remove (&ch_index_idr, ch->minor); +spin_unlock (&ch_index_lock); free_ch:kfree (ch);return ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
[email protected]
AI reviewThank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 4 potential issue(s) to consider:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 4 potential issue(s) to consider:
New issues:
- [High] Spurious udev open failures (Regression) due to deferred idr_replace().
- [Medium] Memory leak of the dynamically allocated ch->dt array in the idr_replace() error path.
Pre-existing issues:
- [Critical] Race condition between ch_open() and ch_remove() leads to a Use-After-Free of the scsi_device structure.
- [High] Information leak of uninitialized kernel heap memory in the CHIOGELEM ioctl handler.
--
commit 63eb67253a3c4a6ab60f598a1642027bbd386913
Author: Ruoyu Wang <[email protected]>
scsi: ch: publish changer devices after probe setup
ch_probe() inserts the new changer into ch_index_idr before initializing the kref, lock and scsi_device pointer. ch_open() looks up the object directly from the IDR by minor, so a racing open can observe a partially initialized changer.
Reserve the minor with a NULL IDR entry, finish device setup and element discovery, then publish the initialized changer with idr_replace(). Early opens continue to fail with -ENXIO until the object is ready.
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/scsi/ch.c +0
-0
[ ... ]
drivers/scsi/ch.c static int ch_probe(struct scsi_device *sd) · line 958
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/scsi/ch.c +4
-0@@ -951,6 +952,15 @@ static int ch_probe(struct scsi_device *sd)ch_init_elem (ch);mutex_unlock (&ch->lock); + +spin_lock (&ch_index_lock); + old =idr_replace (&ch_index_idr, ch, ch->minor); +spin_unlock (&ch_index_lock);
[Severity: High]
Does this change introduce spurious udev open failures?
Looking at ch_probe(), device_create() is called earlier which emits a KOBJ_ADD uevent, prompting udev to immediately create the device node and attempt to open it.
Because idr_replace() is now deferred until here, ch_open() will observe a NULL IDR entry during the udev open attempt and return -ENXIO. Since udev rules do not automatically retry on -ENXIO, won't this permanently fail userspace device initialization, whereas previously it would gracefully block on mutex_lock(&ch->lock)?
drivers/scsi/ch.c static int ch_probe(struct scsi_device *sd) · line 961
Quoted 3 lines
drivers/scsi/ch.c +3
-0+if (IS_ERR (old)) { + ret =PTR_ERR (old); + goto destroy_dev;
[Severity: Medium]
Does this error path leak the ch->dt array?
If idr_replace() fails, we jump to destroy_dev and eventually to free_ch where kfree(ch) is called directly. Since ch_readconfig(ch) was successfully executed earlier in this function, it allocates the ch->dt array. Does bypassing ch_destroy() leave the ch->dt array permanently leaked?
drivers/scsi/ch.c static int ch_probe(struct scsi_device *sd) · line 965
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/scsi/ch.c +2
-0+ } +dev_set_drvdata (dev, ch);sdev_printk (KERN_INFO , sd,"Attached scsi changer %s\n" , ch->name);
[ ... ]
[Severity: Critical]
This is a pre-existing issue, but can a race condition between ch_open() and ch_remove() lead to a use-after-free of the scsi_device structure?
In ch_open(), after the ch structure is found via the IDR and its kref is incremented, the ch_index_lock is released:
ch_open() {
...
ch = idr_find(&ch_index_idr, minor);
if (ch == NULL || !kref_get_unless_zero(&ch->ref)) {
spin_unlock(&ch_index_lock);
return -ENXIO;
}
spin_unlock(&ch_index_lock);
if (scsi_device_get(ch->device)) {
...
}Concurrently, if a device removal occurs, ch_remove() drops the driver's reference to the scsi_device:
ch_remove() {
...
scsi_device_put(ch->device);
kref_put(&ch->ref, ch_destroy);
...
}If this drops the final reference to the scsi_device, it can be freed before the preempted ch_open() resumes and calls scsi_device_get(ch->device). Could this be triggered by userspace repeatedly opening the device while it is being hot-unplugged?
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does the CHIOGELEM ioctl leak uninitialized kernel heap memory to userspace?
The CHIOGELEM ioctl allocates a buffer using kmalloc() without the __GFP_ZERO flag:
ch_ioctl() {
...
buffer = kmalloc(512, GFP_KERNEL);
...
result = ch_do_scsi(ch, ch_cmd, 12, buffer, 256, REQ_OP_DRV_IN);
...
memcpy(cge.cge_pvoltag,buffer+28,36);
...
if (copy_to_user(argp, &cge, sizeof (cge)))
...
}If the SCSI device returns a short read, the trailing bytes of the buffer retain uninitialized kernel heap memory. The driver then copies from this buffer into the cge structure and calls copy_to_user(). Can this leak up to 72 bytes of potentially sensitive uninitialized memory to userspace?
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1