HID: roccat: bound device-supplied profile index
Subsystems (2)
cover HID: roccat: bound device-supplied profile index
The Roccat Kone driver uses an 8-bit value taken straight from a USB HID interrupt report as an index into a fixed 5-element profiles[] array, without any range check. A malicious or counterfeit device that claims the Roccat Kone VID/PID can send a "switch profile" report with an out-of-range value and make the driver read out of bounds; the same unbounded index is also reachable at probe time from a device-supplied startup_profile field. The read result is stored in actual_dpi and exposed to user space through the actual_dpi sysfs attribute.
Michael Bommarito (2):
HID: roccat: bound device-supplied profile index
HID: roccat: add KUnit test for kone profile-index bounds
drivers/hid/Kconfig | 9 +++++ drivers/hid/hid-roccat-kone.c | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH 1/2 HID: roccat: bound device-supplied profile index
kone_keep_values_up_to_date() and kone_profile_activated() use an 8-bit, device-supplied profile value as an index into the 5-element kone->profiles[] array without a range check. A malicious USB device claiming the Roccat Kone id can send a switch-profile event (or a startup_profile read at probe) with an out-of-range value and make the driver read out of bounds; the result is exposed via the actual_dpi sysfs attribute.
Reject out-of-range indices in both paths.
This was found with static analysis and confirmed with the KUnit test added in the following patch (KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds).
--- drivers/hid/hid-roccat-kone.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/hid/hid-roccat-kone.c +6 -2
@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ static uint profile_numbers[5] = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4};static void kone_profile_activated (struct kone_device *kone,uint new_profile) { +if (new_profile <1 || new_profile >ARRAY_SIZE (kone->profiles)) + new_profile =1 ; kone->actual_profile = new_profile; kone->actual_dpi = kone->profiles[new_profile -1 ].startup_dpi; }
@@ -793,8 +795,10 @@ static void kone_keep_values_up_to_date(struct kone_device *kone, {switch (event->event) {case kone_mouse_event_switch_profile: - kone->actual_dpi = kone->profiles[event->value -1 ]. - startup_dpi; +if (event->value >=1 && + event->value <=ARRAY_SIZE (kone->profiles)) + kone->actual_dpi = + kone->profiles[event->value -1 ].startup_dpi; fallthrough;case kone_mouse_event_osd_profile: kone->actual_profile = event->value;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
[email protected]
AI reviewThank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Closing a stale roccat character device file descriptor after device removal causes a memory leak, state corruption and Use-After-Free.
- [High] kone_get_profile() uses an embedded, unaligned struct field (&kone->profiles[i]) as a DMA buffer for inbound USB control messages, leading to cache-line sharing corruption. --
commit cda04d8cb7b50c97cbcee76f405a2121b1b4c56d
Author: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>
HID: roccat: bound device-supplied profile index
kone_keep_values_up_to_date() and kone_profile_activated() use an 8-bit, device-supplied profile value as an index into the 5-element kone->profiles[] array without a range check. A malicious USB device claiming the Roccat Kone id can send a switch-profile event (or a startup_profile read at probe) with an out-of-range value and make the driver read out of bounds; the result is exposed via the actual_dpi sysfs attribute.
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/hid/hid-roccat-kone.c +0
-0
[ ... ]
drivers/hid/hid-roccat-kone.c static void kone_keep_values_up_to_date(struct kone_device *kone, · line 804
Quoted 13 lines
drivers/hid/hid-roccat-kone.c +4
-2@@ -793,8 +795,10 @@ static void kone_keep_values_up_to_date(struct kone_device *kone, {switch (event->event) {case kone_mouse_event_switch_profile: - kone->actual_dpi = kone->profiles[event->value -1 ]. - startup_dpi; +if (event->value >=1 && + event->value <=ARRAY_SIZE (kone->profiles)) + kone->actual_dpi = + kone->profiles[event->value -1 ].startup_dpi; fallthrough;case kone_mouse_event_osd_profile: kone->actual_profile = event->value;
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does kone_get_profile() use an embedded, unaligned array element as a DMA buffer?
In kone_init_kone_device_struct(), we call kone_get_profile() passing a pointer to the embedded array element:
drivers/hid/hid-roccat-kone.c:kone_init_kone_device_struct() {
...
retval = kone_get_profile(usb_dev, &kone->profiles[i], i + 1);
...
}Which then passes the unaligned buffer directly to usb_control_msg() for a USB_DIR_IN transfer:
drivers/hid/hid-roccat-kone.c:kone_get_profile() {
...
len = usb_control_msg(usb_dev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(usb_dev, 0),
USB_REQ_CLEAR_FEATURE,
USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_RECIP_INTERFACE | USB_DIR_IN, kone_command_profile, number, buf, sizeof(struct kone_profile), USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
...
}
Since sizeof(struct kone_profile) is 975 bytes, the array elements are not cache-line aligned and share cache lines with other struct kone_device members. Because hid_hw_start() is called earlier, the device can generate interrupts and concurrent writes to these shared fields may occur.
On architectures with non-coherent DMA caches, won't the cache invalidation required for the inbound USB DMA wipe out these concurrent CPU writes, leading to state corruption?
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but can roccat_release() cause a memory leak, list corruption, and Use-After-Free if a stale file descriptor is closed after device removal?
When closing the file descriptor, roccat_release() retrieves the device from the global array instead of using the local reader->device:
drivers/hid/hid-roccat.c:roccat_release() {
...
device = devices[minor];
if (!device) {
mutex_unlock(&devices_lock);
pr_emerg("roccat device with minor %d doesn't exist\n", minor);
return -ENODEV;
}
...
}If the original device was disconnected, devices[minor] is cleared, causing roccat_release() to return -ENODEV and permanently leak the roccat_reader allocation and the original roccat_device.
If a new device is plugged in before the stale file descriptor is closed, devices[minor] resolves to the new device. roccat_release() then operates on the new device, locking its readers_lock while modifying the old device's list:
drivers/hid/hid-roccat.c:roccat_release() {
...
list_del(&reader->node);
...
if (!--device->open) {
...
}Could this lead to list corruption and incorrectly decrement the new device's open count, causing premature shutdown and a Use-After-Free of the new device when legitimate users close their descriptors?
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
PATCH 2/2 HID: roccat: add KUnit test for kone profile-index bounds
In reply to Michael BommaritoDrive kone_keep_values_up_to_date() with a crafted switch-profile event; an out-of-range value reads past profiles[] (KASAN slab-out-of-bounds on an unpatched tree). A benign control with an in-range value exercises the same path. The test object is sized to end at profiles[] so the over-read lands in the KASAN redzone.
--- drivers/hid/Kconfig | 9 ++++++ drivers/hid/hid-roccat-kone.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 66 insertions(+)
drivers/hid/Kconfig +9 -0
@@ -1057,6 +1057,15 @@ config HID_ROCCAT Say Y here if you have a Roccat mouse or keyboard and want support for its special functionalities. +config HID_ROCCAT_KONE_KUNIT_TEST + bool "KUnit tests for the Roccat Kone driver" if !KUNIT_ALL_TESTS + depends on HID_ROCCAT=y && KUNIT=y + default KUNIT_ALL_TESTS + help + Enable the KUnit regression tests for the Roccat Kone driver, + covering bounds checking of device-supplied profile indices. + If unsure, say N. + config HID_SAITEK tristate "Saitek (Mad Catz) non-fully HID-compliant devices" help
drivers/hid/hid-roccat-kone.c +57 -0
60 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH 2/2] HID: roccat: add KUnit test for kone profile-index bounds
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] A Use-After-Free vulnerability occurs because the kone_device structure is freed while hardware interrupts are still active, leaving a dangling pointer in hid_drvdata.
- [High] Uninitialized kernel memory is copied to the persistent kone->settings structure on a failed USB control message, leading to a heap information leak via sysfs. --
commit e8aee21a8be54aaf776b4d76c32eeaefd255b5aa
Author: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>
HID: roccat: add KUnit test for kone profile-index bounds
This commit adds a KUnit test for the Roccat Kone driver to verify bounds checking on profile indices. It simulates a crafted switch-profile event to ensure the driver does not read out-of-bounds.
Quoted 24 lines
drivers/hid/Kconfig +9
-0@@ -1057,6 +1057,15 @@ config HID_ROCCAT Say Y here if you have a Roccat mouse or keyboard and want support for its special functionalities. +config HID_ROCCAT_KONE_KUNIT_TEST + bool "KUnit tests for the Roccat Kone driver" if !KUNIT_ALL_TESTS + depends on HID_ROCCAT=y && KUNIT=y + default KUNIT_ALL_TESTS + help + Enable the KUnit regression tests for the Roccat Kone driver, + covering bounds checking of device-supplied profile indices. + If unsure, say N. + config HID_SAITEK tristate "Saitek (Mad Catz) non-fully HID-compliant devices" helpdrivers/hid/hid-roccat-kone.c +0
-0
[ ... ]
Quoted 20 lines
drivers/hid/hid-roccat-kone.c +16
-0@@ -919,3 +919,60 @@ module_exit(kone_exit);MODULE_AUTHOR ("Stefan Achatz" );MODULE_DESCRIPTION ("USB Roccat Kone driver" );MODULE_LICENSE ("GPL v2" ); + +#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_HID_ROCCAT_KONE_KUNIT_TEST ) +#include <kunit/test.h> + +/* +* Regression test for the out-of-bounds read in +* kone_keep_values_up_to_date(): a malicious USB device sends a +* "switch profile" HID event (event == kone_mouse_event_switch_profile) +* with an attacker-chosen value in 0..255, which is used unbounded as +* profiles[value - 1]. On an unpatched kernel the attack case triggers a +* KASAN slab-out-of-bounds read; the fix must leave actual_dpi unchanged. +*/ +static void kone_profile_index_oob_test (struct kunit *test) +{ +struct kone_device *kone; +struct kone_mouse_event ev = {};
[ ... ]
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/hid/hid-roccat-kone.c +10
-0+/* attack: value == ARRAY_SIZE(profiles) + 1 reads profiles[5], one +* element past the array end -> KASAN slab-out-of-bounds read on an +* unpatched kernel. The fix must reject it (actual_dpi unchanged). +*/ + ev.value =ARRAY_SIZE (kone->profiles) +1 ; +kone_keep_values_up_to_date (kone, &ev); +KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ (test, kone->actual_dpi,0x42 ); +} + +static struct kunit_case kone_test_cases[] = {
drivers/hid/hid-roccat-kone.c module_exit(kone_exit); · line 978
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/hid/hid-roccat-kone.c +10
-0+ KUNIT_CASE(kone_profile_index_oob_test), + {} +}; + +static struct kunit_suite kone_test_suite = { + .name ="hid-roccat-kone" , + .test_cases = kone_test_cases, +}; +kunit_test_suite (kone_test_suite); +#endif /* CONFIG_HID_ROCCAT_KONE_KUNIT_TEST */
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but while reviewing I noticed a potential use-after-free vulnerability in the driver initialization and teardown paths.
In kone_probe(), hid_hw_start() is called before kone_init_specials(), starting the hardware and enabling USB interrupts. If initialization fails, the error path frees the driver data but does not clear the pointer:
drivers/hid/hid-roccat-kone.c:kone_init_specials() {
...exit_free:
kfree(kone); return retval; }
Between kfree() and hid_hw_stop(), an incoming USB interrupt will trigger kone_raw_event(), which dereferences the dangling pointer:
drivers/hid/hid-roccat-kone.c:kone_raw_event() {
...
struct kone_device *kone = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
...
}
The same window exists in the teardown path, where the driver state is freed before stopping the hardware:
drivers/hid/hid-roccat-kone.c:kone_remove() {
...
kone_remove_specials(hdev); hid_hw_stop(hdev); }
Is it possible for an attacker to trigger this use-after-free by disconnecting the device or simulating a device error while hardware interrupts are active?
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but there appears to be a potential heap information leak when copying uninitialized memory after a failed USB transfer.
In kone_receive(), a bounce buffer is allocated with kmalloc() and unconditionally copied to the target even if the USB transfer fails:
drivers/hid/hid-roccat-kone.c:kone_receive() {
buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
...
retval = usb_control_msg(usb_dev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(usb_dev, 0), ...
...
memcpy(data, buf, size);
kfree(buf);
return retval;
}When called via kone_get_settings(), the uninitialized kernel heap memory is copied to the persistent settings structure. If this occurs during a sysfs operation where the error is handled, the corrupted structure remains intact:
drivers/hid/hid-roccat-kone.c:kone_sysfs_set_tcu() {
...
retval = kone_get_settings(usb_dev, &kone->settings); if (retval) goto exit_no_settings;
...
}
A subsequent read of the settings sysfs attribute exposes this memory directly to userspace:
drivers/hid/hid-roccat-kone.c:kone_sysfs_read_settings() {
...
memcpy(buf, ((char const *)&kone->settings) + off, count);
...
}
Could a malicious USB device intentionally fail the transfer to exploit this leak? Should we check the return value of usb_control_msg() before calling memcpy() in kone_receive()?
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=2
Quoted 9 lines · Michael Bommarito
The Roccat Kone driver uses an 8-bit value taken straight from a USB HID interrupt report as an index into a fixed 5-element profiles[] array, without any range check. A malicious or counterfeit device that claims the Roccat Kone VID/PID can send a "switch profile" report with an out-of-range value and make the driver read out of bounds; the same unbounded index is also reachable at probe time from a device-supplied
startup_profilefield. The read result is stored inactual_dpiand exposed to user space through theactual_dpisysfs attribute.
Quoted 3 lines
Michael Bommarito (2):
HID: roccat: bound device-supplied profile index
HID: roccat: add KUnit test for kone profile-index bounds
Applied, thanks.
Signature · 2 lines
Jiri Kosina SUSE Labs