Skip to contentSkip to conversation

net: add missing ns_capable check for peer netns

PATCH New Maximilian Heyne 2 participants 2 messages Jun 17 – Jun 18

Subsystems (4)
lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 net: add missing ns_capable check for peer netns

The upstream commit 7b735ef81286 ("rtnetlink: add missing netlink_ns_capable() check for peer netns") doesn't apply on older stable kernels due to refactoring. Therefore, this patch is an attempt to implement the same capability check just directly in the respective interface types.

Approximate the netlink_ns_capable check with an ns_capable check. As the newlink operation is synchronous this should result in the same behavior.

Without this commit, for example, the following command creating a veth device in network namespace of pid 1 succeeds:

$ unshare -U -r -n -- bash -c '
  ip link add veth0 type veth peer name foobar netns 1
  sleep 60' &
$ ip link show foobar
13: foobar@if2: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST> mtu 1500 qdisc noop state DOWN mode DEFAULT group default qlen 1000
    link/ether 96:09:69:92:92:cc brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff link-netnsid 1

With this patch, it's returning -EPERM.

This fixes CVE-2026-31692

Fixes 81adee47dfb6 ("net: Support specifying the network namespace upon device creation.")
Assisted-by Kiro:claude
---
 drivers/net/can/vxcan.c | 5 +++++
 drivers/net/veth.c      | 5 +++++
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
drivers/net/can/vxcan.c +5 -0
index afd9060c5421c..8a61011fdaeef 100644
@@ -198,6 +198,11 @@ static int vxcan_newlink(struct net *net, struct net_device *dev,
 	if (IS_ERR(peer_net))
 		return PTR_ERR(peer_net);
 
+	if (!ns_capable(peer_net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
+		put_net(peer_net);
+		return -EPERM;
+	}
+
 	peer = rtnl_create_link(peer_net, ifname, name_assign_type,
 				&vxcan_link_ops, tbp, extack);
 	if (IS_ERR(peer)) {
drivers/net/veth.c +5 -0
index cfacf8965bc59..c644d59d70900 100644
@@ -1664,6 +1664,11 @@ static int veth_newlink(struct net *src_net, struct net_device *dev,
 	if (IS_ERR(net))
 		return PTR_ERR(net);
 
+	if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
+		put_net(net);
+		return -EPERM;
+	}
+
 	peer = rtnl_create_link(net, ifname, name_assign_type,
 				&veth_link_ops, tbp, extack);
 	if (IS_ERR(peer)) {
Signature · 12 lines
2.50.1




Amazon Web Services Development Center Germany GmbH
Tamara-Danz-Str. 13
10243 Berlin
Geschaeftsfuehrung: Christof Hellmis, Andreas Stieger
Eingetragen am Amtsgericht Charlottenburg unter HRB 257764 B
Sitz: Berlin
Ust-ID: DE 365 538 597
#1 lore raw
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider: - [High] Approximating `netlink_ns_capable()` with `ns_capable()` introduces a confused deputy…

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] Approximating netlink_ns_capable() with ns_capable() introduces a confused deputy vulnerability by omitting the netlink socket opener credential check. --

commit a7cbbc451870d23c0dbb2059e0abb94c500f495c
Author: Maximilian Heyne <[email protected]>

net: add missing ns_capable check for peer netns

This commit attempts to fix CVE-2026-31692 by approximating netlink_ns_capable() with ns_capable() directly in the vxcan and veth interface types, as the upstream fix doesn't apply cleanly to older stable kernels.

drivers/net/can/vxcan.c static int vxcan_newlink(struct net *net, struct net_device *dev, · line 201

Quoted 9 lines
drivers/net/can/vxcan.c +1 -0
index afd9060c5421c..8a61011fdaeef 100644
@@ -198,6 +198,11 @@ static int vxcan_newlink(struct net *net, struct net_device *dev,
 	if (IS_ERR(peer_net))
 		return PTR_ERR(peer_net);
 
+	if (!ns_capable(peer_net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {

[Severity: High]
Does approximating netlink_ns_capable() with ns_capable() here introduce a confused deputy vulnerability?

netlink_ns_capable() ensures that both the opener of the netlink socket and the current sender have the required capability. By directly using ns_capable() in vxcan_newlink(), the netlink socket opener credential check appears to be bypassed.

Could an unprivileged attacker open a netlink socket, connect it, and trick a privileged SUID process into writing a crafted RTM_NEWLINK payload to it?

Since the SUID process performs the write, ns_capable() would see the privileged credentials and succeed, potentially allowing the unprivileged attacker to bypass the security fix and create devices in arbitrary privileged network namespaces.

Quoted 6 lines
drivers/net/can/vxcan.c +4 -0
+		put_net(peer_net);
+		return -EPERM;
+	}
+
 	peer = rtnl_create_link(peer_net, ifname, name_assign_type,
 				&vxcan_link_ops, tbp, extack);

[ ... ]

drivers/net/veth.c static int veth_newlink(struct net *src_net, struct net_device *dev, · line 1667

Quoted 9 lines
drivers/net/veth.c +1 -0
index cfacf8965bc59..c644d59d70900 100644
@@ -1664,6 +1664,11 @@ static int veth_newlink(struct net *src_net, struct net_device *dev,
 	if (IS_ERR(net))
 		return PTR_ERR(net);
 
+	if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {

[Severity: High]
Does this ns_capable() check in veth_newlink() have the same confused deputy vulnerability as the one in vxcan_newlink(), allowing a bypass of the socket opener credential check?

Quoted 6 lines
drivers/net/veth.c +4 -0
+		put_net(net);
+		return -EPERM;
+	}
+
 	peer = rtnl_create_link(net, ifname, name_assign_type,
 				&veth_link_ops, tbp, extack);
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260617-forgot-manic-27dda774@mheyne-amazon?part=1