wifi: carl9170: clamp command response copy to the read buffer size
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 wifi: carl9170: clamp command response copy to the read buffer size
carl9170_cmd_callback() copies len - 4 bytes from the device command response into ar->readbuf, which was allocated by the caller with ar->readlen bytes. When the firmware/device returns a response whose payload is larger than the requested ar->readlen, the mismatch is only logged (and the device is restarted via carl9170_restart()); the code then still performs the full-length memcpy(), writing past the end of ar->readbuf -- an out-of-bounds write driven by an attacker-controlled (malicious/compromised) carl9170 USB device.
Clamp the copy to ar->readlen so an over-sized response can never write past the caller's buffer. A response that fails the length check is already discarded by the restart, so copying only the buffer-sized prefix changes nothing for the valid path.
---
Verified with syzbot via "#syz test" against the public C reproducer (Tested-by above); I do not have carl9170 hardware locally.
drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/rx.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/rx.c +2 -1
@@ -150,7 +150,8 @@ static void carl9170_cmd_callback(struct ar9170 *ar, u32 len, void *buffer)spin_lock (&ar->cmd_lock);if (ar->readbuf) {if (len >=4 ) -memcpy (ar->readbuf, buffer +4 , len -4 ); +memcpy (ar->readbuf, buffer +4 , + min_t(unsigned int, len - 4, ar->readlen)); ar->readbuf =NULL ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Hi,
Quoted 9 lines · Doruk Tan Ozturk
carl9170_cmd_callback()copies len - 4 bytes from the device command response intoar->readbuf, which was allocated by the caller withar->readlenbytes. When thefirmware/devicereturns a response whose payload is larger than the requestedar->readlen, the mismatch is only logged (and the device is restarted viacarl9170_restart()); the code then still performs the full-lengthmemcpy(), writing past the end ofar->readbuf-- an out-of-bounds write driven by an attacker-controlled (malicious/compromised) carl9170 USB device.
Quoted 4 lines
Clamp the copy to
ar->readlenso an over-sized response can never write past the caller's buffer. A response that fails the length check is already discarded by the restart, so copying only the buffer-sized prefix changes nothing for the valid path.
This is contested territory.
<https://lore.kernel.org/linux-wireless/[email protected]/>
Original patch (as part of a series is from Tristan Madani)
<https://lore.kernel.org/linux-wireless/[email protected]/>
Yes, I do think each came up with the patch individually. But I have no idea how this works with three authors / tools? Does anyone? I don't think this will get any better though.
Quoted 18 lines
Reported-by [email protected]Tested-by [email protected]Fixes a84fab3cbfdc ("carl9170: 802.11 rx/tx processing and usb backend")Signed-off-by Doruk Tan Ozturk <[email protected]>---
Verified with syzbot via "#syz test" against the public C reproducer (Tested-by above); I do not have carl9170 hardware locally.drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/rx.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/rx.c +0
-0
drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/rx.c static void carl9170_cmd_callback(struct ar9170 *ar, u32 len, void *buffer) · line 157
Quoted 9 lines
drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/rx.c +2
-1@@ -150,7 +150,8 @@ static void carl9170_cmd_callback(struct ar9170 *ar, u32 len, void *buffer)spin_lock (&ar->cmd_lock);if (ar->readbuf) {if (len >=4 ) -memcpy (ar->readbuf, buffer +4 , len -4 ); +memcpy (ar->readbuf, buffer +4 , + min_t(unsigned int, len - 4, ar->readlen)); ar->readbuf =NULL ; }
Regards,
Christian
Hi Christian
sorry for the dup, didn't see Tristan's version; feel free to ignore mine :)
cheers
Doruk
DORUK TAN ÖZTÜRK
Co-Founder
0sec
Universitätstrasse 33
8006 Zürich, Switzerland
www.0sec.ai | [email protected] | Linkedin
Quoted 58 lines · Christian Lamparter
Hi,
Quoted 9 lines · Doruk Tan Ozturk
carl9170_cmd_callback()copies len - 4 bytes from the device command response intoar->readbuf, which was allocated by the caller withar->readlenbytes. When thefirmware/devicereturns a response whose payload is larger than the requestedar->readlen, the mismatch is only logged (and the device is restarted viacarl9170_restart()); the code then still performs the full-lengthmemcpy(), writing past the end ofar->readbuf-- an out-of-bounds write driven by an attacker-controlled (malicious/compromised) carl9170 USB device.Quoted 4 lines
Clamp the copy to
ar->readlenso an over-sized response can never write past the caller's buffer. A response that fails the length check is already discarded by the restart, so copying only the buffer-sized prefix changes nothing for the valid path.This is contested territory.
<https://lore.kernel.org/linux-wireless/[email protected]/>Original patch (as part of a series is from Tristan Madani)
<https://lore.kernel.org/linux-wireless/[email protected]/>Yes, I do think each came up with the patch individually. But I have no idea how this works with three authors / tools? Does anyone? I don't think this will get any better though.
Quoted 18 lines
Reported-by [email protected]Tested-by [email protected]Fixes a84fab3cbfdc ("carl9170: 802.11 rx/tx processing and usb backend")Signed-off-by Doruk Tan Ozturk <[email protected]>---
Verified with syzbot via "#syz test" against the public C reproducer (Tested-by above); I do not have carl9170 hardware locally.drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/rx.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/rx.c +0
-0drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/rx.c static void carl9170_cmd_callback(struct ar9170 *ar, u32 len, void *buffer) · line 157
Quoted 9 lines
drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/rx.c +2
-1@@ -150,7 +150,8 @@ static void carl9170_cmd_callback(struct ar9170 *ar, u32 len, void *buffer)spin_lock (&ar->cmd_lock);if (ar->readbuf) {if (len >=4 ) -memcpy (ar->readbuf, buffer +4 , len -4 ); +memcpy (ar->readbuf, buffer +4 , + min_t(unsigned int, len - 4, ar->readlen)); ar->readbuf =NULL ; }Regards,
Christian
Hi Christian, Doruk,
No worries at all, these things happen. Both patches address the same underlying issue from different angles -- mine returns early after carl9170_restart() to skip the invalid response entirely, Doruk's clamps the memcpy to ar->readlen.
Either approach works. If it helps, I'm happy to respin my 3-patch series (the other two patches fix the TX status off-by-two and rx_stream failover overflow in the same driver).
Let me know if you'd prefer a fresh resend or if you'd rather pick from what's already on the list.
Thanks,
Tristan