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selinux: replace strlcat() with seq_buf in selinux_ima_collect_state()

PATCH Superseded Ian Bridges 3 participants 4 messages Jun 22 SELinux security module

v1 of 2 Superseded Latest is v2 →

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 selinux: replace strlcat() with seq_buf in selinux_ima_collect_state()

In preparation for removing the deprecated strlcat() API[1], replace the strscpy()/strlcat() chain in selinux_ima_collect_state() with a struct seq_buf, which tracks the write position and remaining space internally.

The seven open-coded WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len) truncation checks become a single seq_buf_has_overflowed() check after the string is built. The kzalloc() and its exact-size computation are unchanged, so the measurement string passed to IMA is unchanged.

---
 security/selinux/ima.c | 35 ++++++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
security/selinux/ima.c +14 -21
index aa34da9b0aeb..3d81093d16aa 100644
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
  */
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <linux/seq_buf.h>
 #include "security.h"
 #include "ima.h"
 
@@ -21,8 +22,9 @@
 static char *selinux_ima_collect_state(void)
 {
 	const char *on = "=1;", *off = "=0;";
+	struct seq_buf s;
 	char *buf;
-	int buf_len, len, i, rc;
+	int buf_len, len, i;
 
 	buf_len = strlen("initialized=0;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=0;") + 1;
 
@@ -34,33 +36,24 @@ static char *selinux_ima_collect_state(void)
 	if (!buf)
 		return NULL;
 
-	rc = strscpy(buf, "initialized", buf_len);
-	WARN_ON(rc < 0);
+	seq_buf_init(&s, buf, buf_len);
 
-	rc = strlcat(buf, selinux_initialized() ? on : off, buf_len);
-	WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
+	seq_buf_puts(&s, "initialized");
+	seq_buf_puts(&s, selinux_initialized() ? on : off);
 
-	rc = strlcat(buf, "enforcing", buf_len);
-	WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
+	seq_buf_puts(&s, "enforcing");
+	seq_buf_puts(&s, enforcing_enabled() ? on : off);
 
-	rc = strlcat(buf, enforcing_enabled() ? on : off, buf_len);
-	WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
-
-	rc = strlcat(buf, "checkreqprot", buf_len);
-	WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
-
-	rc = strlcat(buf, checkreqprot_get() ? on : off, buf_len);
-	WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
+	seq_buf_puts(&s, "checkreqprot");
+	seq_buf_puts(&s, checkreqprot_get() ? on : off);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAP_MAX; i++) {
-		rc = strlcat(buf, selinux_policycap_names[i], buf_len);
-		WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
-
-		rc = strlcat(buf, selinux_state.policycap[i] ? on : off,
-			buf_len);
-		WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
+		seq_buf_puts(&s, selinux_policycap_names[i]);
+		seq_buf_puts(&s, selinux_state.policycap[i] ? on : off);
 	}
 
+	WARN_ON(seq_buf_has_overflowed(&s));
+
 	return buf;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.47.3
#1 lore raw
Quoted 39 lines · On Mon, 22 Jun 2026 10:00:07 -0500 Ian Bridges <[email protected]> wrote:

In preparation for removing the deprecated strlcat() API[1], replace the strscpy()/strlcat() chain in selinux_ima_collect_state() with a struct seq_buf, which tracks the write position and remaining space internally.

The seven open-coded WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len) truncation checks become a single seq_buf_has_overflowed() check after the string is built. The kzalloc() and its exact-size computation are unchanged, so the measurement string passed to IMA is unchanged.

---
 security/selinux/ima.c | 35 ++++++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
security/selinux/ima.c +3 -1
index aa34da9b0aeb..3d81093d16aa 100644
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
  */
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <linux/seq_buf.h>
 #include "security.h"
 #include "ima.h"
 
@@ -21,8 +22,9 @@
 static char *selinux_ima_collect_state(void)
 {
 	const char *on = "=1;", *off = "=0;";
+	struct seq_buf s;
 	char *buf;
-	int buf_len, len, i, rc;
+	int buf_len, len, i;
 
 	buf_len = strlen("initialized=0;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=0;") + 1;
 

security/selinux/ima.c static char *selinux_ima_collect_state(void) · line 39

Quoted 6 lines
security/selinux/ima.c +1 -2
@@ -34,33 +36,24 @@ static char *selinux_ima_collect_state(void)
 	if (!buf)
 		return NULL;
 
-	rc = strscpy(buf, "initialized", buf_len);
-	WARN_ON(rc < 0);
+	seq_buf_init(&s, buf, buf_len);

That is silly, you need the length of the buffer not the length of a string that is the expected length of the output.

Quoted 11 lines
security/selinux/ima.c +4 -4
-	rc = strlcat(buf, selinux_initialized() ? on : off, buf_len);
-	WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
+	seq_buf_puts(&s, "initialized");
+	seq_buf_puts(&s, selinux_initialized() ? on : off);
 
-	rc = strlcat(buf, "enforcing", buf_len);
-	WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
+	seq_buf_puts(&s, "enforcing");
+	seq_buf_puts(&s, enforcing_enabled() ? on : off);
 

security/selinux/ima.c static char *selinux_ima_collect_state(void) · line 48

Quoted 10 lines
security/selinux/ima.c +2 -8
-	rc = strlcat(buf, enforcing_enabled() ? on : off, buf_len);
-	WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
-
-	rc = strlcat(buf, "checkreqprot", buf_len);
-	WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
-
-	rc = strlcat(buf, checkreqprot_get() ? on : off, buf_len);
-	WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
+	seq_buf_puts(&s, "checkreqprot");
+	seq_buf_puts(&s, checkreqprot_get() ? on : off);

That lot would be easier to read as a seq_printf() - with %d and kill 'on' and 'off'.
Why does 'security' code so often look like c**p.

David

Quoted 17 lines
security/selinux/ima.c +4 -6
 	for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAP_MAX; i++) {
-		rc = strlcat(buf, selinux_policycap_names[i], buf_len);
-		WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
-
-		rc = strlcat(buf, selinux_state.policycap[i] ? on : off,
-			buf_len);
-		WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
+		seq_buf_puts(&s, selinux_policycap_names[i]);
+		seq_buf_puts(&s, selinux_state.policycap[i] ? on : off);
 	}
 
+	WARN_ON(seq_buf_has_overflowed(&s));
+
 	return buf;
 }
 
#2 lore raw
Quoted 62 lines · David Laight
Quoted 39 lines · On Mon, 22 Jun 2026 10:00:07 -0500 Ian Bridges <[email protected]> wrote:

In preparation for removing the deprecated strlcat() API[1], replace the strscpy()/strlcat() chain in selinux_ima_collect_state() with a struct seq_buf, which tracks the write position and remaining space internally.

The seven open-coded WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len) truncation checks become a single seq_buf_has_overflowed() check after the string is built. The kzalloc() and its exact-size computation are unchanged, so the measurement string passed to IMA is unchanged.

---
 security/selinux/ima.c | 35 ++++++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
security/selinux/ima.c +3 -1
index aa34da9b0aeb..3d81093d16aa 100644
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
  */
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <linux/seq_buf.h>
 #include "security.h"
 #include "ima.h"
 
@@ -21,8 +22,9 @@
 static char *selinux_ima_collect_state(void)
 {
 	const char *on = "=1;", *off = "=0;";
+	struct seq_buf s;
 	char *buf;
-	int buf_len, len, i, rc;
+	int buf_len, len, i;
 
 	buf_len = strlen("initialized=0;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=0;") + 1;
 

security/selinux/ima.c static char *selinux_ima_collect_state(void) · line 39

Quoted 6 lines
security/selinux/ima.c +1 -2
@@ -34,33 +36,24 @@ static char *selinux_ima_collect_state(void)
 	if (!buf)
 		return NULL;
 
-	rc = strscpy(buf, "initialized", buf_len);
-	WARN_ON(rc < 0);
+	seq_buf_init(&s, buf, buf_len);

That is silly, you need the length of the buffer not the length of a string that is the expected length of the output.

Quoted 11 lines
security/selinux/ima.c +4 -4
-	rc = strlcat(buf, selinux_initialized() ? on : off, buf_len);
-	WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
+	seq_buf_puts(&s, "initialized");
+	seq_buf_puts(&s, selinux_initialized() ? on : off);
 
-	rc = strlcat(buf, "enforcing", buf_len);
-	WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
+	seq_buf_puts(&s, "enforcing");
+	seq_buf_puts(&s, enforcing_enabled() ? on : off);
 
Quoted 13 lines

security/selinux/ima.c static char *selinux_ima_collect_state(void) · line 48

Quoted 10 lines
security/selinux/ima.c +2 -8
-	rc = strlcat(buf, enforcing_enabled() ? on : off, buf_len);
-	WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
-
-	rc = strlcat(buf, "checkreqprot", buf_len);
-	WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
-
-	rc = strlcat(buf, checkreqprot_get() ? on : off, buf_len);
-	WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
+	seq_buf_puts(&s, "checkreqprot");
+	seq_buf_puts(&s, checkreqprot_get() ? on : off);

That lot would be easier to read as a seq_printf() - with %d and kill 'on' and 'off'.
Why does 'security' code so often look like c**p.

Sturgeon's Law.

Also, it's pretty rare that developers outside the security community look at the security code. It usually only happens when there's a global change, like this one. And to be clear, reviews like this *are* appreciated.

#3 lore raw
In reply to David Laight
Quoted 45 lines · David Laight
Quoted 42 lines · On Mon, 22 Jun 2026 10:00:07 -0500 Ian Bridges <[email protected]> wrote:

In preparation for removing the deprecated strlcat() API[1], replace the strscpy()/strlcat() chain in selinux_ima_collect_state() with a struct seq_buf, which tracks the write position and remaining space internally.

The seven open-coded WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len) truncation checks become a single seq_buf_has_overflowed() check after the string is built. The kzalloc() and its exact-size computation are unchanged, so the measurement string passed to IMA is unchanged.

---
 security/selinux/ima.c | 35 ++++++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
security/selinux/ima.c +3 -1
index aa34da9b0aeb..3d81093d16aa 100644
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
  */
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <linux/seq_buf.h>
 #include "security.h"
 #include "ima.h"
 
@@ -21,8 +22,9 @@
 static char *selinux_ima_collect_state(void)
 {
 	const char *on = "=1;", *off = "=0;";
+	struct seq_buf s;
 	char *buf;
-	int buf_len, len, i, rc;
+	int buf_len, len, i;
 
 	buf_len = strlen("initialized=0;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=0;") + 1;
 
@@ -34,33 +36,24 @@ static char *selinux_ima_collect_state(void)
 	if (!buf)
 		return NULL;
 
Quoted 7 lines

security/selinux/ima.c static char *selinux_ima_collect_state(void) · line 39

Quoted 3 lines
security/selinux/ima.c +1 -2
-	rc = strscpy(buf, "initialized", buf_len);
-	WARN_ON(rc < 0);
+	seq_buf_init(&s, buf, buf_len);

That is silly, you need the length of the buffer not the length of a string that is the expected length of the output.

Is buf_len not the correct value to use here? buf_len is passed as the size argument to the earlier kzalloc() call (not shown in the patch diff) that allocates buf.

Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
security/selinux/ima.c +4 -4
-	rc = strlcat(buf, selinux_initialized() ? on : off, buf_len);
-	WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
+	seq_buf_puts(&s, "initialized");
+	seq_buf_puts(&s, selinux_initialized() ? on : off);
 
-	rc = strlcat(buf, "enforcing", buf_len);
-	WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
+	seq_buf_puts(&s, "enforcing");
+	seq_buf_puts(&s, enforcing_enabled() ? on : off);
 
Quoted 13 lines

security/selinux/ima.c static char *selinux_ima_collect_state(void) · line 48

Quoted 10 lines
security/selinux/ima.c +2 -8
-	rc = strlcat(buf, enforcing_enabled() ? on : off, buf_len);
-	WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
-
-	rc = strlcat(buf, "checkreqprot", buf_len);
-	WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
-
-	rc = strlcat(buf, checkreqprot_get() ? on : off, buf_len);
-	WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
+	seq_buf_puts(&s, "checkreqprot");
+	seq_buf_puts(&s, checkreqprot_get() ? on : off);

That lot would be easier to read as a seq_printf() - with %d and kill 'on' and 'off'.

This is a good suggestion, I'll use this approach in the v2.

Quoted 22 lines

Why does 'security' code so often look like c**p.

David

Quoted 17 lines
security/selinux/ima.c +4 -6
 	for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAP_MAX; i++) {
-		rc = strlcat(buf, selinux_policycap_names[i], buf_len);
-		WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
-
-		rc = strlcat(buf, selinux_state.policycap[i] ? on : off,
-			buf_len);
-		WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len);
+		seq_buf_puts(&s, selinux_policycap_names[i]);
+		seq_buf_puts(&s, selinux_state.policycap[i] ? on : off);
 	}
 
+	WARN_ON(seq_buf_has_overflowed(&s));
+
 	return buf;
 }