lib: Rust implementation of SPDM

index 654b5ede2fe2..c1282fcc9e65 100644
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 //! Traits for transmuting types.
 
 use core::mem::size_of;
+use core::slice;
 
 /// Types for which any bit pattern is valid.
 ///

@@ -227,3 +228,61 @@ macro_rules! impl_asbytes {
     {<T: AsBytes>} [T],
     {<T: AsBytes, const N: usize>} [T; N],
 }
+
+/// Casts the type of a slice to another.
+///
+/// Also see [`cast_slice_mut`].
+///
+/// # Examples
+///
+/// ```rust
+/// # use kernel::transmute::cast_slice;
+/// #[repr(transparent)]
+/// #[derive(Debug)]
+/// struct Container<T>(T);
+///
+/// let array = [0u32; 42];
+/// let slice = &array;
+/// // SAFETY: `Container<u32>` transparently wraps a `u32`.
+/// let container_slice = unsafe { cast_slice::<u32, Container<u32>>(slice) };
+/// pr_info!("{container_slice:?}");
+/// ```
+///
+/// # Safety
+///
+/// - `T` and `U` must have the same layout.
+pub unsafe fn cast_slice<T, U>(slice: &[T]) -> &[U] {
+    // CAST: by the safety requirements, `T` and `U` have the same layout.
+    let ptr = slice.as_ptr().cast::<U>();
+    // SAFETY: `ptr` and `len` come from the same slice reference.
+    unsafe { slice::from_raw_parts(ptr, slice.len()) }
+}
+
+/// Casts the type of a slice to another.
+///
+/// Also see [`cast_slice`].
+///
+/// # Examples
+///
+/// ```rust
+/// # use kernel::transmute::cast_slice_mut;
+/// #[repr(transparent)]
+/// #[derive(Debug)]
+/// struct Container<T>(T);
+///
+/// let mut array = [0u32; 42];
+/// let slice = &mut array;
+/// // SAFETY: `Container<u32>` transparently wraps a `u32`.
+/// let container_slice = unsafe { cast_slice_mut::<u32, Container<u32>>(slice) };
+/// pr_info!("{container_slice:?}");
+/// ```
+///
+/// # Safety
+///
+/// - `T` and `U` must have the same layout.
+pub unsafe fn cast_slice_mut<T, U>(slice: &mut [T]) -> &mut [U] {
+    // CAST: by the safety requirements, `T` and `U` have the same layout.
+    let ptr = slice.as_mut_ptr().cast::<U>();
+    // SAFETY: `ptr` and `len` come from the same slice reference.
+    unsafe { slice::from_raw_parts_mut(ptr, slice.len()) }
+}

index 9512af7156df..af7a7558cde2 100644
@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@
 pub mod uaccess;
 #[cfg(CONFIG_USB = "y")]
 pub mod usb;
+pub mod validate;
 pub mod workqueue;
 pub mod xarray;
 

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index 2b28625c25ef..663681b633c8 100644
@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
 //! APIs that write back into userspace usually allow writing untrusted bytes directly, allowing
 //! direct copying of untrusted user data back into userspace without validation.
 //!
+//! The only way to access untrusted data is to [`Validate::validate`] it. This is facilitated by
+//! the [`Validate`] trait.
+//!
 //! # Rationale
 //!
 //! When reading data from an untrusted source, it must be validated before it can be used for

@@ -52,7 +55,7 @@
 /// untrusted, as it would otherwise violate normal Rust rules. For this reason, one can easily
 /// convert that reference to `&[Untrusted<u8>]`. Another such example is `Untrusted<KVec<T>>`, it
 /// derefs to `KVec<Untrusted<T>>`. Raw bytes however do not behave in this way, `Untrusted<u8>` is
-/// totally opaque.
+/// totally opaque and one can only access its value by calling [`Untrusted::validate()`].
 ///
 /// # Usage in API Design
 ///

@@ -107,6 +110,30 @@ pub fn new(value: T) -> Self
     {
         Self(value)
     }
+
+    /// Validate the underlying untrusted data.
+    ///
+    /// See the [`Validate`] trait for more information.
+    pub fn validate<V: Validate<Self>>(self) -> Result<V, V::Err>
+    where
+        T: Sized,
+    {
+        V::validate(self.0)
+    }
+
+    /// Validate the underlying untrusted data.
+    ///
+    /// See the [`Validate`] trait for more information.
+    pub fn validate_ref<'a, V: Validate<&'a Self>>(&'a self) -> Result<V, V::Err> {
+        V::validate(&self.0)
+    }
+
+    /// Validate the underlying untrusted data.
+    ///
+    /// See the [`Validate`] trait for more information.
+    pub fn validate_mut<'a, V: Validate<&'a mut Self>>(&'a mut self) -> Result<V, V::Err> {
+        V::validate(&mut self.0)
+    }
 }
 
 impl<T> Deref for Untrusted<[T]> {

@@ -146,3 +173,44 @@ fn deref_mut(&mut self) -> &mut Self::Target {
         unsafe { &mut *ptr }
     }
 }
+
+/// Marks valid input for the [`Validate`] trait.
+pub trait ValidateInput: private::Sealed {
+    /// Type of the inner data.
+    type Inner: ?Sized;
+}
+
+impl<T: ?Sized> ValidateInput for Untrusted<T> {
+    type Inner = T;
+}
+
+impl<'a, T: ?Sized> ValidateInput for &'a Untrusted<T> {
+    type Inner = &'a T;
+}
+
+impl<'a, T: ?Sized> ValidateInput for &'a mut Untrusted<T> {
+    type Inner = &'a mut T;
+}
+
+mod private {
+    use super::Untrusted;
+
+    pub trait Sealed {}
+
+    impl<T: ?Sized> Sealed for Untrusted<T> {}
+    impl<'a, T: ?Sized> Sealed for &'a Untrusted<T> {}
+    impl<'a, T: ?Sized> Sealed for &'a mut Untrusted<T> {}
+}
+
+/// Validate [`Untrusted`] data.
+///
+/// Care must be taken when implementing this trait, as unprotected access to unvalidated data is
+/// given to the [`Validate::validate`] function. The implementer must ensure that the data is only
+/// used for logic after successful validation.
+pub trait Validate<Input: ValidateInput>: Sized {
+    /// Validation error.
+    type Err;
+
+    /// Validate the raw input.
+    fn validate(raw: Input::Inner) -> Result<Self, Self::Err>;
+}

index b7aeebdddb36..39f1521b773d 100644
@@ -5,51 +5,11 @@
  * Written by David Howells ([email protected])
  */
 
-#include <linux/cleanup.h>
-#include <linux/time.h>
-#include <crypto/public_key.h>
-#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
-#include <crypto/sha2.h>
-
-struct x509_certificate {
-	struct x509_certificate *next;
-	struct x509_certificate *signer;	/* Certificate that signed this one */
-	struct public_key *pub;			/* Public key details */
-	struct public_key_signature *sig;	/* Signature parameters */
-	u8		sha256[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; /* Hash for blacklist purposes */
-	char		*issuer;		/* Name of certificate issuer */
-	char		*subject;		/* Name of certificate subject */
-	struct asymmetric_key_id *id;		/* Issuer + Serial number */
-	struct asymmetric_key_id *skid;		/* Subject + subjectKeyId (optional) */
-	time64_t	valid_from;
-	time64_t	valid_to;
-	const void	*tbs;			/* Signed data */
-	unsigned	tbs_size;		/* Size of signed data */
-	unsigned	raw_sig_size;		/* Size of signature */
-	const void	*raw_sig;		/* Signature data */
-	const void	*raw_serial;		/* Raw serial number in ASN.1 */
-	unsigned	raw_serial_size;
-	unsigned	raw_issuer_size;
-	const void	*raw_issuer;		/* Raw issuer name in ASN.1 */
-	const void	*raw_subject;		/* Raw subject name in ASN.1 */
-	unsigned	raw_subject_size;
-	unsigned	raw_skid_size;
-	const void	*raw_skid;		/* Raw subjectKeyId in ASN.1 */
-	unsigned	index;
-	bool		seen;			/* Infinite recursion prevention */
-	bool		verified;
-	bool		self_signed;		/* T if self-signed (check unsupported_sig too) */
-	bool		unsupported_sig;	/* T if signature uses unsupported crypto */
-	bool		blacklisted;
-};
+#include <keys/x509-parser.h>
 
 /*
  * x509_cert_parser.c
  */
-extern void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert);
-DEFINE_FREE(x509_free_certificate, struct x509_certificate *,
-	    if (!IS_ERR(_T)) x509_free_certificate(_T))
-extern struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen);
 extern int x509_decode_time(time64_t *_t,  size_t hdrlen,
 			    unsigned char tag,
 			    const unsigned char *value, size_t vlen);

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index bfd10f0195e0..c3ec2846695a 100644
@@ -596,6 +596,15 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	if (ctx->last_oid == OID_subjectAltName) {
+		if (ctx->cert->raw_san)
+			return -EBADMSG;
+
+		ctx->cert->raw_san = v;
+		ctx->cert->raw_san_size = vlen;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	if (ctx->last_oid == OID_keyUsage) {
 		/*
 		 * Get hold of the keyUsage bit string

index 8b68e720693a..4e6a05a8c7a6 100644
@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ struct x509_certificate {
 	unsigned	raw_subject_size;
 	unsigned	raw_skid_size;
 	const void	*raw_skid;		/* Raw subjectKeyId in ASN.1 */
+	const void	*raw_san;		/* Raw subjectAltName in ASN.1 */
+	unsigned	raw_san_size;
 	unsigned	index;
 	bool		seen;			/* Infinite recursion prevention */
 	bool		verified;

index 0d516c77cc26..174451b93eda 100644
@@ -4,28 +4,42 @@
 #include <linux/key.h>
 #include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
 
+ssize_t x509_get_certificate_length(const u8 *p, unsigned long buflen)
+{
+	ssize_t plen;
+
+	/* Each cert begins with an ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag and must be more
+	 * than 256 bytes in size.
+	 */
+	if (buflen < 4)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (p[0] != 0x30 ||
+	    p[1] != 0x82)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	plen = (p[2] << 8) | p[3];
+	plen += 4;
+	if (plen > buflen)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return plen;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_get_certificate_length);
+
 int x509_load_certificate_list(const u8 cert_list[],
 			       const unsigned long list_size,
 			       const struct key *keyring)
 {
 	key_ref_t key;
 	const u8 *p, *end;
-	size_t plen;
+	ssize_t plen;
 
 	p = cert_list;
 	end = p + list_size;
 	while (p < end) {
-		/* Each cert begins with an ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag and must be more
-		 * than 256 bytes in size.
-		 */
-		if (end - p < 4)
-			goto dodgy_cert;
-		if (p[0] != 0x30 ||
-		    p[1] != 0x82)
-			goto dodgy_cert;
-		plen = (p[2] << 8) | p[3];
-		plen += 4;
-		if (plen > end - p)
+		plen = x509_get_certificate_length(p, end - p);
+		if (plen < 0)
 			goto dodgy_cert;
 
 		key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(keyring, 1),

index 1b91c8f98688..301efa952e26 100644
@@ -84,6 +84,8 @@ extern struct key *find_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
 				       const struct asymmetric_key_id *id_2,
 				       bool partial);
 
+ssize_t x509_get_certificate_length(const u8 *p, unsigned long buflen);
+
 int x509_load_certificate_list(const u8 cert_list[], const unsigned long list_size,
 			       const struct key *keyring);
 

index 1124785e210b..1cce0176e4b5 100644
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/acpi.h>
 #include <linux/gpu_buddy.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
 #include <drm/drm_device.h>
 #include <drm/drm_drv.h>
 #include <drm/drm_file.h>

new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..23a63618a370
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+
+__rust_helper unsigned int rust_helper_crypto_shash_descsize(struct crypto_shash *tfm)
+{
+	return crypto_shash_descsize(tfm);
+}
+
+__rust_helper unsigned int rust_helper_crypto_shash_digestsize(struct crypto_shash *tfm)
+{
+	return crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+}
+
+__rust_helper void rust_helper_crypto_free_shash(struct crypto_shash *tfm)
+{
+	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+}

index 998e31052e66..ca2884f6446e 100644
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
 #include "drm.c"
 #include "drm_gpuvm.c"
 #include "err.c"
+#include "hash.c"
 #include "irq.c"
 #include "fs.c"
 #include "gpu.c"

index a56ba6309594..1a7221fe5682 100644
@@ -12,9 +12,14 @@
     str::CStr,
 };
 
-use core::num::NonZeroI32;
-use core::num::TryFromIntError;
-use core::str::Utf8Error;
+use core::{
+    ffi::FromBytesWithNulError,
+    num::{
+        NonZeroI32,
+        TryFromIntError, //
+    },
+    str::Utf8Error, //
+};
 
 /// Contains the C-compatible error codes.
 #[rustfmt::skip]

@@ -256,6 +261,13 @@ fn from(e: core::convert::Infallible) -> Error {
     }
 }
 
+impl From<FromBytesWithNulError> for Error {
+    #[inline]
+    fn from(_: FromBytesWithNulError) -> Error {
+        code::EINVAL
+    }
+}
+
 /// A [`Result`] with an [`Error`] error type.
 ///
 /// To be used as the return type for functions that may fail.

index b3caa9a1c898..a556788bcc5e 100644
@@ -433,13 +433,6 @@ macro_rules! c_str {
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
 
-    impl From<core::ffi::FromBytesWithNulError> for Error {
-        #[inline]
-        fn from(_: core::ffi::FromBytesWithNulError) -> Error {
-            EINVAL
-        }
-    }
-
     macro_rules! format {
         ($($f:tt)*) => ({
             CString::try_from_fmt(fmt!($($f)*))?.to_str()?

new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1f7207b584a8
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * DMTF Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM)
+ * https://www.dmtf.org/dsp/DSP0274
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2021-22 Huawei
+ *     Jonathan Cameron <[email protected]>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2022-24 Intel Corporation
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SPDM_H_
+#define _SPDM_H_
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+struct key;
+struct device;
+struct spdm_state;
+struct x509_certificate;
+
+typedef int (spdm_transport)(void *priv, struct device *dev,
+			     const void *request, size_t request_sz,
+			     void *response, size_t response_sz);
+
+typedef int (spdm_validate)(struct device *dev, u8 slot,
+			    struct x509_certificate *leaf_cert);
+
+struct spdm_state *spdm_create(struct device *dev, spdm_transport *transport,
+			       void *transport_priv, u32 transport_sz,
+			       spdm_validate *validate);
+
+int spdm_authenticate(struct spdm_state *spdm_state);
+
+void spdm_destroy(struct spdm_state *spdm_state);
+
+#endif

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index 1cce0176e4b5..d63ad2b03362 100644
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/spdm.h>
 #include <linux/sys_soc.h>
 #include <linux/task_work.h>
 #include <linux/tracepoint.h>

index 1a7221fe5682..e71f65eb1d40 100644
@@ -91,6 +91,9 @@ macro_rules! declare_err {
     declare_err!(EIOCBQUEUED, "iocb queued, will get completion event.");
     declare_err!(ERECALLCONFLICT, "Conflict with recalled state.");
     declare_err!(ENOGRACE, "NFS file lock reclaim refused.");
+    declare_err!(ECONNRESET, "Connection reset by peer.");
+    declare_err!(EINPROGRESS, "Operation now in progress.");
+    declare_err!(EPROTO, "Protocol error");
 }
 
 /// Generic integer kernel error.

index 67512b3dbc53..78d598686487 100644
@@ -53,9 +53,9 @@ struct tsm_dsm_tio {
 	struct pci_ide *ide[TIO_IDE_MAX_TC];
 };
 
-/* Describes TSM structure for PF0 pointed by pci_dev->tsm */
+/* Describes TSM structure for the link host pointed by pci_dev->tsm */
 struct tio_dsm {
-	struct pci_tsm_pf0 tsm;
+	struct pci_tsm_host tsm;
 	struct tsm_dsm_tio data;
 	struct sev_device *sev;
 };

index 46f2539d2d5a..a900fd22eac9 100644
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ static int stream_alloc(struct pci_dev *pdev, struct pci_ide **ide,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static struct pci_tsm *tio_pf0_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, struct sev_device *sev)
+static struct pci_tsm *tio_host_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, struct sev_device *sev)
 {
 	struct tio_dsm *dsm __free(kfree) = kzalloc_obj(*dsm);
 	int rc;

@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ static struct pci_tsm *tio_pf0_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, struct sev_device *se
 	if (!dsm)
 		return NULL;
 
-	rc = pci_tsm_pf0_constructor(pdev, &dsm->tsm, sev->tsmdev);
+	rc = pci_tsm_host_constructor(pdev, &dsm->tsm, sev->tsmdev);
 	if (rc)
 		return NULL;
 

@@ -226,8 +226,8 @@ static struct pci_tsm *dsm_probe(struct tsm_dev *tsmdev, struct pci_dev *pdev)
 {
 	struct sev_device *sev = tsm_dev_to_sev(tsmdev);
 
-	if (is_pci_tsm_pf0(pdev))
-		return tio_pf0_probe(pdev, sev);
+	if (is_pci_tsm_host(pdev))
+		return tio_host_probe(pdev, sev);
 	return NULL;
 }
 

@@ -237,10 +237,10 @@ static void dsm_remove(struct pci_tsm *tsm)
 
 	pci_dbg(pdev, "TSM disabled\n");
 
-	if (is_pci_tsm_pf0(pdev)) {
+	if (is_pci_tsm_host(pdev)) {
 		struct tio_dsm *dsm = container_of(tsm, struct tio_dsm, tsm.base_tsm);
 
-		pci_tsm_pf0_destructor(&dsm->tsm);
+		pci_tsm_host_destructor(&dsm->tsm);
 		kfree(dsm);
 	}
 }

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index a6435aba03f9..950e2c36a4ca 100644
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ struct pci_tsm_ops {
 	 * pci_tsm_rwsem held for write to sync with TSM unregistration and
 	 * mutual exclusion of @connect and @disconnect. @connect and
 	 * @disconnect additionally run under the DSM lock (struct
-	 * pci_tsm_pf0::lock) as well as @probe and @remove of the subfunctions.
+	 * pci_tsm_host::lock) as well as @probe and @remove of the subfunctions.
 	 * @bind, @unbind, and @guest_req run under pci_tsm_rwsem held for read
 	 * and the DSM lock.
 	 */

@@ -115,19 +115,23 @@ struct pci_tsm {
 };
 
 /**
- * struct pci_tsm_pf0 - Physical Function 0 TDISP link context
+ * struct pci_tsm_host - TSM host link context (CMA, IDE, or TDISP)
  * @base_tsm: generic core "tsm" context
  * @lock: mutual exclustion for pci_tsm_ops invocation
  * @doe_mb: PCIe Data Object Exchange mailbox
+ *
+ * The host of a TSM link is the device that knows how to speak
+ * CMA, IDE, or TDISP. For TDISP / IDE that is a Physical Function 0.
+ * For CMA-only it is a CMA DOE mailbox.
  */
-struct pci_tsm_pf0 {
+struct pci_tsm_host {
 	struct pci_tsm base_tsm;
 	struct mutex lock;
 	struct pci_doe_mb *doe_mb;
 };
 
 /* physical function0 and capable of 'connect' */
-static inline bool is_pci_tsm_pf0(struct pci_dev *pdev)
+static inline bool is_pci_tsm_host(struct pci_dev *pdev)
 {
 	if (!pdev)
 		return false;

@@ -204,9 +208,9 @@ int pci_tsm_register(struct tsm_dev *tsm_dev);
 void pci_tsm_unregister(struct tsm_dev *tsm_dev);
 int pci_tsm_link_constructor(struct pci_dev *pdev, struct pci_tsm *tsm,
 			     struct tsm_dev *tsm_dev);
-int pci_tsm_pf0_constructor(struct pci_dev *pdev, struct pci_tsm_pf0 *tsm,
-			    struct tsm_dev *tsm_dev);
-void pci_tsm_pf0_destructor(struct pci_tsm_pf0 *tsm);
+int pci_tsm_host_constructor(struct pci_dev *pdev, struct pci_tsm_host *tsm,
+			     struct tsm_dev *tsm_dev);
+void pci_tsm_host_destructor(struct pci_tsm_host *tsm);
 int pci_tsm_doe_transfer(struct pci_dev *pdev, u8 type, const void *req,
 			 size_t req_sz, void *resp, size_t resp_sz);
 int pci_tsm_bind(struct pci_dev *pdev, struct kvm *kvm, u32 tdi_id);

index 950e2c36a4ca..80e76ecefe71 100644
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 #define __PCI_TSM_H
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
 #include <linux/pci.h>
+#include <linux/pci-doe.h>
 #include <linux/sockptr.h>
 
 struct pci_tsm;

@@ -130,7 +131,7 @@ struct pci_tsm_host {
 	struct pci_doe_mb *doe_mb;
 };
 
-/* physical function0 and capable of 'connect' */
+/* device is a TSM host and capable of 'connect' */
 static inline bool is_pci_tsm_host(struct pci_dev *pdev)
 {
 	if (!pdev)

@@ -142,6 +143,14 @@ static inline bool is_pci_tsm_host(struct pci_dev *pdev)
 	if (pdev->is_virtfn)
 		return false;
 
+	/*
+	 * Report capable if CMA is supported, which can be supported on any PCIe
+	 * device.
+	 */
+	if (pci_find_doe_mailbox(pdev, PCI_VENDOR_ID_PCI_SIG,
+				 PCI_DOE_FEATURE_CMA))
+		return true;
+
 	/*
 	 * Allow for a Device Security Manager (DSM) associated with function0
 	 * of an Endpoint to coordinate TDISP requests for other functions

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index 7b41da4ec11a..f236942660a3 100644
@@ -31,9 +31,6 @@
 #define PCI_DOE_FLAG_CANCEL	0
 #define PCI_DOE_FLAG_DEAD	1
 
-/* Max data object length is 2^18 dwords */
-#define PCI_DOE_MAX_LENGTH	(1 << 18)
-
 /**
  * struct pci_doe_mb - State for a single DOE mailbox
  *

index bd4346a7c4e7..7540396336de 100644
@@ -19,6 +19,10 @@ struct pci_doe_mb;
 #define PCI_DOE_FEATURE_CMA 1
 #define PCI_DOE_FEATURE_SSESSION 2
 
+/* Max data object length is 2^18 dwords (including 2 dwords for header) */
+#define PCI_DOE_MAX_LENGTH	(1 << 18)
+#define PCI_DOE_MAX_PAYLOAD	((PCI_DOE_MAX_LENGTH - 2) * sizeof(u32))
+
 struct pci_doe_mb *pci_find_doe_mailbox(struct pci_dev *pdev, u16 vendor,
 					u8 type);
 

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index ebce402854de..113f4e802ec4 100644
@@ -150,6 +150,9 @@ enum OID {
 	OID_id_ml_dsa_65,			/* 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.18 */
 	OID_id_ml_dsa_87,			/* 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.19 */
 
+	/* PCI */
+	OID_CMA,			/* 2.23.147 */
+
 	OID__NR
 };
 

index 01f008958a1f..055671d43abd 100644
@@ -7,16 +7,24 @@
 //! Rust implementation of the DMTF Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM)
 //! <https://www.dmtf.org/dsp/DSP0274>
 
+use crate::validator::GetVersionRsp;
+use core::mem;
 use kernel::error::{code::EINVAL, Error};
 
 // SPDM versions supported by this implementation
 pub(crate) const SPDM_VER_10: u8 = 0x10;
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+pub(crate) const SPDM_VER_11: u8 = 0x11;
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+pub(crate) const SPDM_VER_12: u8 = 0x12;
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+pub(crate) const SPDM_VER_13: u8 = 0x13;
+pub(crate) const SPDM_VER_14: u8 = 0x14;
 
 pub(crate) const SPDM_MIN_VER: u8 = SPDM_VER_10;
+pub(crate) const SPDM_MAX_VER: u8 = SPDM_VER_14;
 
-#[allow(dead_code)]
 pub(crate) const SPDM_REQ: u8 = 0x80;
-#[allow(dead_code)]
 pub(crate) const SPDM_ERROR: u8 = 0x7f;
 
 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]

@@ -90,3 +98,7 @@ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> core::fmt::Result {
         write!(f, "{:#x}", *self as u8)
     }
 }
+
+pub(crate) const SPDM_GET_VERSION: u8 = 0x84;
+pub(crate) const SPDM_GET_VERSION_LEN: usize =
+    mem::size_of::<GetVersionRsp>() + (u8::MAX as usize) * mem::size_of::<u16>();

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index 055671d43abd..15d69631ed8c 100644
@@ -9,13 +9,12 @@
 
 use crate::validator::GetVersionRsp;
 use core::mem;
+use kernel::bits::bit_u32;
 use kernel::error::{code::EINVAL, Error};
 
 // SPDM versions supported by this implementation
 pub(crate) const SPDM_VER_10: u8 = 0x10;
-#[allow(dead_code)]
 pub(crate) const SPDM_VER_11: u8 = 0x11;
-#[allow(dead_code)]
 pub(crate) const SPDM_VER_12: u8 = 0x12;
 #[allow(dead_code)]
 pub(crate) const SPDM_VER_13: u8 = 0x13;

@@ -102,3 +101,19 @@ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> core::fmt::Result {
 pub(crate) const SPDM_GET_VERSION: u8 = 0x84;
 pub(crate) const SPDM_GET_VERSION_LEN: usize =
     mem::size_of::<GetVersionRsp>() + (u8::MAX as usize) * mem::size_of::<u16>();
+
+pub(crate) const SPDM_GET_CAPABILITIES: u8 = 0xe1;
+pub(crate) const SPDM_MIN_DATA_TRANSFER_SIZE: u32 = 42;
+
+// SPDM cryptographic timeout of this implementation:
+// Assume calculations may take up to 1 sec on a busy machine, which equals
+// roughly 1 << 20.  That's within the limits mandated for responders by CMA
+// (1 << 23 usec, PCIe r6.2 sec 6.31.3) and DOE (1 sec, PCIe r6.2 sec 6.30.2).
+// Used in GET_CAPABILITIES exchange.
+pub(crate) const SPDM_CTEXPONENT: u8 = 20;
+
+pub(crate) const SPDM_CERT_CAP: u32 = bit_u32(1);
+pub(crate) const SPDM_CHAL_CAP: u32 = bit_u32(2);
+
+pub(crate) const SPDM_REQ_CAPS: u32 = SPDM_CERT_CAP | SPDM_CHAL_CAP;
+pub(crate) const SPDM_RSP_MIN_CAPS: u32 = SPDM_CERT_CAP | SPDM_CHAL_CAP;

index 58d86ea06fd9..76325babdff2 100644
@@ -102,6 +102,10 @@ pub extern "C" fn spdm_authenticate(state_ptr: *mut spdm_state) -> c_int {
         return e.to_errno() as c_int;
     }
 
+    if let Err(e) = state.get_capabilities() {
+        return e.to_errno() as c_int;
+    }
+
     -(EPROTONOSUPPORT as i32)
 }
 

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index e71f65eb1d40..6413de18df80 100644
@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ macro_rules! declare_err {
     declare_err!(ECONNRESET, "Connection reset by peer.");
     declare_err!(EINPROGRESS, "Operation now in progress.");
     declare_err!(EPROTO, "Protocol error");
+    declare_err!(EPROTONOSUPPORT, "Protocol not supported");
 }
 
 /// Generic integer kernel error.

index 15d69631ed8c..e222821bad5d 100644
@@ -9,7 +9,10 @@
 
 use crate::validator::GetVersionRsp;
 use core::mem;
-use kernel::bits::bit_u32;
+use kernel::bits::{
+    bit_u32,
+    bit_u8, //
+};
 use kernel::error::{code::EINVAL, Error};
 
 // SPDM versions supported by this implementation

@@ -114,6 +117,57 @@ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> core::fmt::Result {
 
 pub(crate) const SPDM_CERT_CAP: u32 = bit_u32(1);
 pub(crate) const SPDM_CHAL_CAP: u32 = bit_u32(2);
+pub(crate) const SPDM_KEY_EX_CAP: u32 = bit_u32(9);
 
 pub(crate) const SPDM_REQ_CAPS: u32 = SPDM_CERT_CAP | SPDM_CHAL_CAP;
 pub(crate) const SPDM_RSP_MIN_CAPS: u32 = SPDM_CERT_CAP | SPDM_CHAL_CAP;
+
+pub(crate) const SPDM_NEGOTIATE_ALGS: u8 = 0xe3;
+
+pub(crate) const SPDM_MEAS_SPEC_DMTF: u8 = bit_u8(0);
+
+pub(crate) const SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_2048: u32 = bit_u32(0);
+pub(crate) const _SPDM_ASYM_RSAPSS_2048: u32 = bit_u32(1);
+pub(crate) const SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_3072: u32 = bit_u32(2);
+pub(crate) const _SPDM_ASYM_RSAPSS_3072: u32 = bit_u32(3);
+pub(crate) const SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P256: u32 = bit_u32(4);
+pub(crate) const SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_4096: u32 = bit_u32(5);
+pub(crate) const _SPDM_ASYM_RSAPSS_4096: u32 = bit_u32(6);
+pub(crate) const SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P384: u32 = bit_u32(7);
+pub(crate) const SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P521: u32 = bit_u32(8);
+pub(crate) const _SPDM_ASYM_SM2_ECC_SM2_P256: u32 = bit_u32(9);
+pub(crate) const _SPDM_ASYM_EDDSA_ED25519: u32 = bit_u32(10);
+pub(crate) const _SPDM_ASYM_EDDSA_ED448: u32 = bit_u32(11);
+
+pub(crate) const SPDM_HASH_SHA_256: u32 = bit_u32(0);
+pub(crate) const SPDM_HASH_SHA_384: u32 = bit_u32(1);
+pub(crate) const SPDM_HASH_SHA_512: u32 = bit_u32(2);
+
+// If the crypto support isn't enabled don't offer the algorithms
+// to the responder
+#[cfg(CONFIG_CRYPTO_RSA)]
+pub(crate) const SPDM_ASYM_RSA: u32 =
+    SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_2048 | SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_3072 | SPDM_ASYM_RSASSA_4096;
+#[cfg(not(CONFIG_CRYPTO_RSA))]
+pub(crate) const SPDM_ASYM_RSA: u32 = 0;
+
+#[cfg(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECDSA)]
+pub(crate) const SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA: u32 =
+    SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P256 | SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P384 | SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P521;
+#[cfg(not(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECDSA))]
+pub(crate) const SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA: u32 = 0;
+
+#[cfg(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256)]
+pub(crate) const SPDM_HASH_SHA2_256: u32 = SPDM_HASH_SHA_256;
+#[cfg(not(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256))]
+pub(crate) const SPDM_HASH_SHA2_256: u32 = 0;
+
+#[cfg(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512)]
+pub(crate) const SPDM_HASH_SHA2_384_512: u32 = SPDM_HASH_SHA_384 | SPDM_HASH_SHA_512;
+#[cfg(not(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512))]
+pub(crate) const SPDM_HASH_SHA2_384_512: u32 = 0;
+
+pub(crate) const SPDM_ASYM_ALGOS: u32 = SPDM_ASYM_RSA | SPDM_ASYM_ECDSA;
+pub(crate) const SPDM_HASH_ALGOS: u32 = SPDM_HASH_SHA2_256 | SPDM_HASH_SHA2_384_512;
+
+pub(crate) const SPDM_OPAQUE_DATA_FMT_GENERAL: u8 = bit_u8(1);

index 76325babdff2..d418d15e4c70 100644
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ pub extern "C" fn spdm_authenticate(state_ptr: *mut spdm_state) -> c_int {
     // exclusive `&mut SpdmState` lives entirely inside the lock guard, so
     // concurrent FFI callers serialize on the mutex and can never form
     // aliased `&mut SpdmState` references.
-    let mutex: &Mutex<SpdmState> = unsafe { &*(state_ptr as *const Mutex<SpdmState>) };
+    let mutex: &Mutex<SpdmState<'_>> = unsafe { &*(state_ptr as *const Mutex<SpdmState<'_>>) };
 
     let mut state = mutex.lock();
 

@@ -106,6 +106,10 @@ pub extern "C" fn spdm_authenticate(state_ptr: *mut spdm_state) -> c_int {
         return e.to_errno() as c_int;
     }
 
+    if let Err(e) = state.negotiate_algs() {
+        return e.to_errno() as c_int;
+    }
+
     -(EPROTONOSUPPORT as i32)
 }
 

@@ -117,11 +121,12 @@ pub extern "C" fn spdm_destroy(state_ptr: *mut spdm_state) {
     if state_ptr.is_null() {
         return;
     }
+
     // SAFETY: `state_ptr` was returned from `spdm_create()`, which leaked a
     // `Pin<KBox<Mutex<SpdmState>>>` via `KBox::into_raw`.  The caller
     // guarantees the state is no longer in use.  Reconstructing the pinned
     // box and dropping it runs `Drop` for the `Mutex` and `SpdmState` and
     // frees the allocation.
-    let b = unsafe { KBox::from_raw(state_ptr as *mut Mutex<SpdmState>) };
+    let b = unsafe { KBox::from_raw(state_ptr as *mut Mutex<SpdmState<'_>>) };
     drop(unsafe { Pin::new_unchecked(b) });
 }

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index e222821bad5d..c4d9521866af 100644
@@ -19,10 +19,11 @@
 pub(crate) const SPDM_VER_10: u8 = 0x10;
 pub(crate) const SPDM_VER_11: u8 = 0x11;
 pub(crate) const SPDM_VER_12: u8 = 0x12;
-#[allow(dead_code)]
 pub(crate) const SPDM_VER_13: u8 = 0x13;
 pub(crate) const SPDM_VER_14: u8 = 0x14;
 
+pub(crate) const SPDM_SLOTS: usize = 8;
+
 pub(crate) const SPDM_MIN_VER: u8 = SPDM_VER_10;
 pub(crate) const SPDM_MAX_VER: u8 = SPDM_VER_14;
 

@@ -106,7 +107,7 @@ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> core::fmt::Result {
     mem::size_of::<GetVersionRsp>() + (u8::MAX as usize) * mem::size_of::<u16>();
 
 pub(crate) const SPDM_GET_CAPABILITIES: u8 = 0xe1;
-pub(crate) const SPDM_MIN_DATA_TRANSFER_SIZE: u32 = 42;
+pub(crate) const SPDM_MIN_DATA_TRANSFER_SIZE: u32 = 42; // SPDM 1.2.0 margin no 226
 
 // SPDM cryptographic timeout of this implementation:
 // Assume calculations may take up to 1 sec on a busy machine, which equals

@@ -143,6 +144,8 @@ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> core::fmt::Result {
 pub(crate) const SPDM_HASH_SHA_384: u32 = bit_u32(1);
 pub(crate) const SPDM_HASH_SHA_512: u32 = bit_u32(2);
 
+pub(crate) const SPDM_GET_DIGESTS: u8 = 0x81;
+
 // If the crypto support isn't enabled don't offer the algorithms
 // to the responder
 #[cfg(CONFIG_CRYPTO_RSA)]

index d418d15e4c70..bda5f91ca13c 100644
@@ -110,6 +110,10 @@ pub extern "C" fn spdm_authenticate(state_ptr: *mut spdm_state) -> c_int {
         return e.to_errno() as c_int;
     }
 
+    if let Err(e) = state.get_digests() {
+        return e.to_errno() as c_int;
+    }
+
     -(EPROTONOSUPPORT as i32)
 }
 

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index c4d9521866af..2fbc4ab41869 100644
@@ -146,6 +146,8 @@ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> core::fmt::Result {
 
 pub(crate) const SPDM_GET_DIGESTS: u8 = 0x81;
 
+pub(crate) const SPDM_GET_CERTIFICATE: u8 = 0x82;
+
 // If the crypto support isn't enabled don't offer the algorithms
 // to the responder
 #[cfg(CONFIG_CRYPTO_RSA)]

index bda5f91ca13c..488203be821d 100644
@@ -114,6 +114,21 @@ pub extern "C" fn spdm_authenticate(state_ptr: *mut spdm_state) -> c_int {
         return e.to_errno() as c_int;
     }
 
+    if state.provisioned_slots == 0 {
+        return -(bindings::EIO as c_int);
+    }
+
+    let mut provisioned_slots = state.provisioned_slots;
+    while (provisioned_slots as usize) > 0 {
+        let slot = provisioned_slots.trailing_zeros() as u8;
+
+        if let Err(e) = state.get_certificate(slot) {
+            return e.to_errno() as c_int;
+        }
+
+        provisioned_slots &= !(1 << slot);
+    }
+
     -(EPROTONOSUPPORT as i32)
 }
 

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index 488203be821d..fa5513e8bd4e 100644
@@ -129,6 +129,18 @@ pub extern "C" fn spdm_authenticate(state_ptr: *mut spdm_state) -> c_int {
         provisioned_slots &= !(1 << slot);
     }
 
+    let mut provisioned_slots = state.provisioned_slots;
+    while (provisioned_slots as usize) > 0 {
+        let slot = provisioned_slots.trailing_zeros() as u8;
+
+        if let Err(e) = state.validate_cert_chain(slot) {
+            pr_err!("Certificate in slot {slot} failed to verify: {e:?}\n");
+            return e.to_errno() as c_int;
+        }
+
+        provisioned_slots &= !(1 << slot);
+    }
+
     -(EPROTONOSUPPORT as i32)
 }
 

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index d63ad2b03362..e9736162c904 100644
@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@
 #include <drm/drm_gem_shmem_helper.h>
 #include <drm/drm_gpuvm.h>
 #include <drm/drm_ioctl.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+#include <keys/x509-parser.h>
 #include <kunit/test.h>
 #include <linux/auxiliary_bus.h>
 #include <linux/bitmap.h>

index 6413de18df80..10700a17eedc 100644
@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ macro_rules! declare_err {
     declare_err!(EINPROGRESS, "Operation now in progress.");
     declare_err!(EPROTO, "Protocol error");
     declare_err!(EPROTONOSUPPORT, "Protocol not supported");
+    declare_err!(EKEYREJECTED, "Key was rejected by service");
 }
 
 /// Generic integer kernel error.

index a556788bcc5e..3fd8a218547f 100644
@@ -870,6 +870,12 @@ pub fn try_from_fmt(args: fmt::Arguments<'_>) -> Result<Self, Error> {
         // exist in the buffer.
         Ok(Self { buf })
     }
+
+    /// Return the internal buffer while consuming the original [`CString`]
+    #[inline]
+    pub fn into_vec(self) -> KVec<u8> {
+        self.buf
+    }
 }
 
 impl Deref for CString {

index 2fbc4ab41869..e67be8e6b057 100644
@@ -148,6 +148,8 @@ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> core::fmt::Result {
 
 pub(crate) const SPDM_GET_CERTIFICATE: u8 = 0x82;
 
+pub(crate) const SPDM_CHALLENGE: u8 = 0x83;
+
 // If the crypto support isn't enabled don't offer the algorithms
 // to the responder
 #[cfg(CONFIG_CRYPTO_RSA)]

@@ -176,3 +178,7 @@ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> core::fmt::Result {
 pub(crate) const SPDM_HASH_ALGOS: u32 = SPDM_HASH_SHA2_256 | SPDM_HASH_SHA2_384_512;
 
 pub(crate) const SPDM_OPAQUE_DATA_FMT_GENERAL: u8 = bit_u8(1);
+
+pub(crate) const SPDM_PREFIX_SZ: usize = 64;
+pub(crate) const SPDM_COMBINED_PREFIX_SZ: usize = 100;
+pub(crate) const SPDM_MAX_OPAQUE_DATA: usize = 1024;

index fa5513e8bd4e..33c16f7ffb46 100644
@@ -11,8 +11,7 @@
 //! from other subsytems.
 
 use crate::bindings::{
-    spdm_state,
-    EPROTONOSUPPORT, //
+    spdm_state, //
 };
 use core::ffi::{
     c_int,

@@ -141,7 +140,12 @@ pub extern "C" fn spdm_authenticate(state_ptr: *mut spdm_state) -> c_int {
         provisioned_slots &= !(1 << slot);
     }
 
-    -(EPROTONOSUPPORT as i32)
+    let provisioned_slots = state.provisioned_slots.trailing_zeros();
+    if let Err(e) = state.challenge(provisioned_slots as u8) {
+        return e.to_errno() as c_int;
+    }
+
+    0
 }
 
 /// spdm_destroy() - Destroy SPDM session

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index e9736162c904..1479f9c6604a 100644
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #include <linux/acpi.h>
 #include <linux/gpu_buddy.h>
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
 #include <drm/drm_device.h>
 #include <drm/drm_drv.h>
 #include <drm/drm_file.h>