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netfilter: nf_log: validate MAC header was set before dumping it

PATCH Superseded Alexander Martyniuk 4 participants 8 messages Jun 24 – Jun 26

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 netfilter: nf_log: validate MAC header was set before dumping it

From: Xiang Mei <[email protected]>

commit a84b6fedbc97078788be78dbdd7517d143ad1a77 upstream

The fallback path of dump_mac_header() guards the MAC header access only with "skb->mac_header != skb->network_header", without checking skb_mac_header_was_set(). When the MAC header is unset, mac_header is 0xffff, so the test passes and skb_mac_header(skb) returns skb->head + 0xffff, ~64 KiB past the buffer; the loop then reads dev->hard_header_len bytes out of bounds into the kernel log.

This is reachable via the netdev logger: nf_log_unknown_packet() calls dump_mac_header() unconditionally, and an skb sent through AF_PACKET with PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS reaches the egress hook with mac_header still unset (__dev_queue_xmit(), which would reset it, is bypassed).

Add the skb_mac_header_was_set() check the ARPHRD_ETHER path already uses, and replace the open-coded MAC header length test with skb_mac_header_len(). Only skbs with an unset MAC header are affected; valid ones are dumped as before.

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dump_mac_header (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:831)
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800ea49d3f by task exploit/148
 Call Trace:
  kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
  dump_mac_header (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:831)
  nf_log_netdev_packet (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:938 net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:963)
  nf_log_packet (net/netfilter/nf_log.c:260)
  nft_log_eval (net/netfilter/nft_log.c:60)
  nft_do_chain (net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:285)
  nft_do_chain_netdev (net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c:307)
  nf_hook_slow (net/netfilter/core.c:619)
  nf_hook_direct_egress (net/packet/af_packet.c:257)
  packet_xmit (net/packet/af_packet.c:280)
  packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3114)
  __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2265)
Fixes 7eb9282cd0ef ("netfilter: ipt_LOG/ip6t_LOG: add option to print decoded MAC header")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-8

---
Backport fix for CVE-2026-52942

 net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_log_ipv4.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_log_ipv4.c +2 -2
index d07583fac8f8..d6164e8e2c73 100644
@@ -296,8 +296,8 @@ static void dump_ipv4_mac_header(struct nf_log_buf *m,
 
 fallback:
 	nf_log_buf_add(m, "MAC=");
-	if (dev->hard_header_len &&
-	    skb->mac_header != skb->network_header) {
+	if (dev->hard_header_len && skb_mac_header_was_set(skb) &&
+	    skb_mac_header_len(skb) != 0) {
 		const unsigned char *p = skb_mac_header(skb);
 		unsigned int i;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#1 lore raw

Hi,

Thanks but why only 5.10?

Quoted 66 lines · Alexander Martyniuk

From: Xiang Mei <[email protected]>

commit a84b6fedbc97078788be78dbdd7517d143ad1a77 upstream

The fallback path of dump_mac_header() guards the MAC header access only with "skb->mac_header != skb->network_header", without checking skb_mac_header_was_set(). When the MAC header is unset, mac_header is 0xffff, so the test passes and skb_mac_header(skb) returns skb->head + 0xffff, ~64 KiB past the buffer; the loop then reads dev->hard_header_len bytes out of bounds into the kernel log.

This is reachable via the netdev logger: nf_log_unknown_packet() calls dump_mac_header() unconditionally, and an skb sent through AF_PACKET with PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS reaches the egress hook with mac_header still unset (__dev_queue_xmit(), which would reset it, is bypassed).

Add the skb_mac_header_was_set() check the ARPHRD_ETHER path already uses, and replace the open-coded MAC header length test with skb_mac_header_len(). Only skbs with an unset MAC header are affected; valid ones are dumped as before.

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dump_mac_header (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:831)
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800ea49d3f by task exploit/148
 Call Trace:
  kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
  dump_mac_header (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:831)
  nf_log_netdev_packet (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:938 net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:963)
  nf_log_packet (net/netfilter/nf_log.c:260)
  nft_log_eval (net/netfilter/nft_log.c:60)
  nft_do_chain (net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:285)
  nft_do_chain_netdev (net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c:307)
  nf_hook_slow (net/netfilter/core.c:619)
  nf_hook_direct_egress (net/packet/af_packet.c:257)
  packet_xmit (net/packet/af_packet.c:280)
  packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3114)
  __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2265)
Fixes 7eb9282cd0ef ("netfilter: ipt_LOG/ip6t_LOG: add option to print decoded MAC header")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-8

---
Backport fix for CVE-2026-52942

 net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_log_ipv4.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_log_ipv4.c +2 -2
index d07583fac8f8..d6164e8e2c73 100644
@@ -296,8 +296,8 @@ static void dump_ipv4_mac_header(struct nf_log_buf *m,
 
 fallback:
 	nf_log_buf_add(m, "MAC=");
-	if (dev->hard_header_len &&
-	    skb->mac_header != skb->network_header) {
+	if (dev->hard_header_len && skb_mac_header_was_set(skb) &&
+	    skb_mac_header_len(skb) != 0) {
 		const unsigned char *p = skb_mac_header(skb);
 		unsigned int i;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#2 lore raw

BTW, fixing Cc: to [email protected]

Quoted 71 lines · Pablo Neira Ayuso

Hi,

Thanks but why only 5.10?

Quoted 66 lines · Alexander Martyniuk

From: Xiang Mei <[email protected]>

commit a84b6fedbc97078788be78dbdd7517d143ad1a77 upstream

The fallback path of dump_mac_header() guards the MAC header access only with "skb->mac_header != skb->network_header", without checking skb_mac_header_was_set(). When the MAC header is unset, mac_header is 0xffff, so the test passes and skb_mac_header(skb) returns skb->head + 0xffff, ~64 KiB past the buffer; the loop then reads dev->hard_header_len bytes out of bounds into the kernel log.

This is reachable via the netdev logger: nf_log_unknown_packet() calls dump_mac_header() unconditionally, and an skb sent through AF_PACKET with PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS reaches the egress hook with mac_header still unset (__dev_queue_xmit(), which would reset it, is bypassed).

Add the skb_mac_header_was_set() check the ARPHRD_ETHER path already uses, and replace the open-coded MAC header length test with skb_mac_header_len(). Only skbs with an unset MAC header are affected; valid ones are dumped as before.

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dump_mac_header (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:831)
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800ea49d3f by task exploit/148
 Call Trace:
  kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
  dump_mac_header (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:831)
  nf_log_netdev_packet (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:938 net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:963)
  nf_log_packet (net/netfilter/nf_log.c:260)
  nft_log_eval (net/netfilter/nft_log.c:60)
  nft_do_chain (net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:285)
  nft_do_chain_netdev (net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c:307)
  nf_hook_slow (net/netfilter/core.c:619)
  nf_hook_direct_egress (net/packet/af_packet.c:257)
  packet_xmit (net/packet/af_packet.c:280)
  packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3114)
  __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2265)
Fixes 7eb9282cd0ef ("netfilter: ipt_LOG/ip6t_LOG: add option to print decoded MAC header")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-8

---
Backport fix for CVE-2026-52942

 net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_log_ipv4.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_log_ipv4.c +2 -2
index d07583fac8f8..d6164e8e2c73 100644
@@ -296,8 +296,8 @@ static void dump_ipv4_mac_header(struct nf_log_buf *m,
 
 fallback:
 	nf_log_buf_add(m, "MAC=");
-	if (dev->hard_header_len &&
-	    skb->mac_header != skb->network_header) {
+	if (dev->hard_header_len && skb_mac_header_was_set(skb) &&
+	    skb_mac_header_len(skb) != 0) {
 		const unsigned char *p = skb_mac_header(skb);
 		unsigned int i;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#3 lore raw
In reply to Pablo Neira Ayuso
Quoted 3 lines · Pablo Neira Ayuso

Hi,

Thanks but why only 5.10?

It's already in the following releases:

	5.15.210 6.1.176 6.6.143 6.12.94 6.18.36 7.0.13 7.1

so 5.10.y seems like the only one missing it at the moment.

thanks,

greg k-h

maintainer
#4 lore raw
In reply to Alexander Martyniuk

net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_log_ipv4.c

Quoted 5 lines

[PATCH 5.10] netfilter: nf_log: validate MAC header was set before dumping it

net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_log_ipv4.c +0 -0

Thanks for the backport - the retarget to nf_log_ipv4.c is right for 5.10.

One gap though: upstream fixed both loggers via the consolidated nf_log_syslog.c, but in 5.10 the IPv6 logger (net/ipv6/netfilter/ nf_log_ipv6.c) still has the identical unguarded fallback and is left vulnerable here - which is also Pablo's "why only 5.10?" point.

--
Thanks,
Sasha

#5 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 netfilter: nf_log: validate MAC header was set before dumping it

From: Xiang Mei <[email protected]>

commit a84b6fedbc97078788be78dbdd7517d143ad1a77 upstream.

The fallback path of dump_mac_header() guards the MAC header access only with "skb->mac_header != skb->network_header", without checking skb_mac_header_was_set(). When the MAC header is unset, mac_header is 0xffff, so the test passes and skb_mac_header(skb) returns skb->head + 0xffff, ~64 KiB past the buffer; the loop then reads dev->hard_header_len bytes out of bounds into the kernel log.

This is reachable via the netdev logger: nf_log_unknown_packet() calls dump_mac_header() unconditionally, and an skb sent through AF_PACKET with PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS reaches the egress hook with mac_header still unset (__dev_queue_xmit(), which would reset it, is bypassed).

Add the skb_mac_header_was_set() check the ARPHRD_ETHER path already uses, and replace the open-coded MAC header length test with skb_mac_header_len(). Only skbs with an unset MAC header are affected; valid ones are dumped as before.

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dump_mac_header (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:831)
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800ea49d3f by task exploit/148
 Call Trace:
  kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
  dump_mac_header (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:831)
  nf_log_netdev_packet (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:938 net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:963)
  nf_log_packet (net/netfilter/nf_log.c:260)
  nft_log_eval (net/netfilter/nft_log.c:60)
  nft_do_chain (net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:285)
  nft_do_chain_netdev (net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c:307)
  nf_hook_slow (net/netfilter/core.c:619)
  nf_hook_direct_egress (net/packet/af_packet.c:257)
  packet_xmit (net/packet/af_packet.c:280)
  packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3114)
  __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2265)
Fixes 7eb9282cd0ef ("netfilter: ipt_LOG/ip6t_LOG: add option to print decoded MAC header")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-8
---
 net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_log_ipv4.c | 4 ++--
 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_log_ipv6.c | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_log_ipv4.c +2 -2
index d07583fac8f8..d6164e8e2c73 100644
@@ -296,8 +296,8 @@ static void dump_ipv4_mac_header(struct nf_log_buf *m,
 
 fallback:
 	nf_log_buf_add(m, "MAC=");
-	if (dev->hard_header_len &&
-	    skb->mac_header != skb->network_header) {
+	if (dev->hard_header_len && skb_mac_header_was_set(skb) &&
+	    skb_mac_header_len(skb) != 0) {
 		const unsigned char *p = skb_mac_header(skb);
 		unsigned int i;
 
net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_log_ipv6.c +2 -2
index 8210ff34ed9b..cc724870a467 100644
@@ -309,8 +309,8 @@ static void dump_ipv6_mac_header(struct nf_log_buf *m,
 
 fallback:
 	nf_log_buf_add(m, "MAC=");
-	if (dev->hard_header_len &&
-	    skb->mac_header != skb->network_header) {
+	if (dev->hard_header_len && skb_mac_header_was_set(skb) &&
+	    skb_mac_header_len(skb) != 0) {
 		const unsigned char *p = skb_mac_header(skb);
 		unsigned int len = dev->hard_header_len;
 		unsigned int i;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
maintainer
#6 lore raw
Quoted 82 lines · Alexander Martyniuk

From: Xiang Mei <[email protected]>

commit a84b6fedbc97078788be78dbdd7517d143ad1a77 upstream.

The fallback path of dump_mac_header() guards the MAC header access only with "skb->mac_header != skb->network_header", without checking skb_mac_header_was_set(). When the MAC header is unset, mac_header is 0xffff, so the test passes and skb_mac_header(skb) returns skb->head + 0xffff, ~64 KiB past the buffer; the loop then reads dev->hard_header_len bytes out of bounds into the kernel log.

This is reachable via the netdev logger: nf_log_unknown_packet() calls dump_mac_header() unconditionally, and an skb sent through AF_PACKET with PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS reaches the egress hook with mac_header still unset (__dev_queue_xmit(), which would reset it, is bypassed).

Add the skb_mac_header_was_set() check the ARPHRD_ETHER path already uses, and replace the open-coded MAC header length test with skb_mac_header_len(). Only skbs with an unset MAC header are affected; valid ones are dumped as before.

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dump_mac_header (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:831)
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800ea49d3f by task exploit/148
 Call Trace:
  kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
  dump_mac_header (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:831)
  nf_log_netdev_packet (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:938 net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:963)
  nf_log_packet (net/netfilter/nf_log.c:260)
  nft_log_eval (net/netfilter/nft_log.c:60)
  nft_do_chain (net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:285)
  nft_do_chain_netdev (net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c:307)
  nf_hook_slow (net/netfilter/core.c:619)
  nf_hook_direct_egress (net/packet/af_packet.c:257)
  packet_xmit (net/packet/af_packet.c:280)
  packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3114)
  __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2265)
Fixes 7eb9282cd0ef ("netfilter: ipt_LOG/ip6t_LOG: add option to print decoded MAC header")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-8
---
 net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_log_ipv4.c | 4 ++--
 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_log_ipv6.c | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_log_ipv4.c +2 -2
index d07583fac8f8..d6164e8e2c73 100644
@@ -296,8 +296,8 @@ static void dump_ipv4_mac_header(struct nf_log_buf *m,
 
 fallback:
 	nf_log_buf_add(m, "MAC=");
-	if (dev->hard_header_len &&
-	    skb->mac_header != skb->network_header) {
+	if (dev->hard_header_len && skb_mac_header_was_set(skb) &&
+	    skb_mac_header_len(skb) != 0) {
 		const unsigned char *p = skb_mac_header(skb);
 		unsigned int i;
 
net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_log_ipv6.c +2 -2
index 8210ff34ed9b..cc724870a467 100644
@@ -309,8 +309,8 @@ static void dump_ipv6_mac_header(struct nf_log_buf *m,
 
 fallback:
 	nf_log_buf_add(m, "MAC=");
-	if (dev->hard_header_len &&
-	    skb->mac_header != skb->network_header) {
+	if (dev->hard_header_len && skb_mac_header_was_set(skb) &&
+	    skb_mac_header_len(skb) != 0) {
 		const unsigned char *p = skb_mac_header(skb);
 		unsigned int len = dev->hard_header_len;
 		unsigned int i;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0

What kernel(s) is this for?