xfsdump: avoid false-positive __strcpy_chk abort on long dirent names
PATCH 1/1 xfsdump: avoid false-positive __strcpy_chk abort on long dirent names
direnthdr_t and direnthdr_v1_t end in dh_name[6], which is used as a trailing variable-length buffer rather than a fixed six-byte field. dump_dirent() allocates each record with malloc(sz), where
sz = offsetofmember(direnthdr*_t, dh_name) + namelen + 1
(rounded up to DIRENTHDR_ALIGN), and the "sz > direntbufsz" check ahead of the copy guarantees the allocation is large enough to hold the name. The declared [6] is part of the on-media record layout: DIRENTHDR_SZ and the arch translation paths depend on it, so it cannot simply be turned into a [] flexible array member.
When xfsdump is built with _FORTIFY_SOURCE together with -fstrict-flex-arrays (increasingly the default in distributions), the trailing dh_name[6] is no longer treated as a flexible array. __builtin_object_size() sizes it to 6, strcpy() is rewritten to __strcpy_chk(dst, src, 6), and dumping any directory entry whose name is longer than five bytes aborts at runtime:
*** buffer overflow detected ***: terminated #4 __fortify_fail #5 __chk_fail #6 __strcpy_chk #7 dump_dirent
The copy is in fact safe; only fortify's notion of the destination size is wrong. Write the name through the byte offset dump_dirent() already computes, (char *)dhdrp + name_offset, instead of through the sized dh_name lvalue. The destination is then a plain char * into the malloc'd record, which fortify cannot sub-object-size, so the spurious check is dropped while the rest of the binary keeps its hardening.
---
Andrey Albershteyn (Cc'd) tested this with fstests on the downstream report and asked that it be sent upstream; the discussion and original backtrace are at https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/pull/533325 .
dump/content.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
dump/content.c +4 -4
@@ -5151,14 +5151,14 @@ dump_dirent(drive_t *drivep, dhdrp->dh_sz = (uint16_t )sz; dhdrp->dh_gen = (uint16_t )(gen &DENTGENMASK );if (name) { -strcpy (dhdrp->dh_name, name); +strcpy ((char *)dhdrp + name_offset, name); } dhdrp->dh_checksum =calc_checksum (dhdrp,DIRENTHDR_SZ );xlate_direnthdr_v1 (dhdrp, tmpdhdrp,1 );if (name) { -strcpy (tmpdhdrp->dh_name, name); +strcpy ((char *)tmpdhdrp + name_offset, name); } }else {direnthdr_t *dhdrp = (direnthdr_t *)contextp->cc_mdirentbufp;
@@ -5169,14 +5169,14 @@ dump_dirent(drive_t *drivep, dhdrp->dh_gen = gen; dhdrp->dh_sz = (uint16_t )sz;if (name) { -strcpy (dhdrp->dh_name, name); +strcpy ((char *)dhdrp + name_offset, name); } dhdrp->dh_checksum =calc_checksum (dhdrp,DIRENTHDR_SZ );xlate_direnthdr (dhdrp, tmpdhdrp,1 );if (name) { -strcpy (tmpdhdrp->dh_name, name); +strcpy ((char *)tmpdhdrp + name_offset, name); } }
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
Quoted 49 lines · vmfunc
direnthdr_tanddirenthdr_v1_tend in dh_name[6], which is used as a trailing variable-length buffer rather than a fixed six-byte field.dump_dirent()allocates each record with malloc(sz), wheresz =
offsetofmember(direnthdr*_t, dh_name)+ namelen + 1(rounded up to
DIRENTHDR_ALIGN), and the "sz > direntbufsz" check ahead of the copy guarantees the allocation is large enough to hold the name. The declared [6] is part of the on-media record layout:DIRENTHDR_SZand the arch translation paths depend on it, so it cannot simply be turned into a [] flexible array member.When xfsdump is built with
_FORTIFY_SOURCEtogether with -fstrict-flex-arrays (increasingly the default in distributions), the trailing dh_name[6] is no longer treated as a flexible array.__builtin_object_size()sizes it to 6,strcpy()is rewritten to__strcpy_chk(dst, src, 6), and dumping any directory entry whose name is longer than five bytes aborts at runtime:*** buffer overflow detected ***: terminated #4 __fortify_fail #5 __chk_fail #6 __strcpy_chk #7 dump_direntThe copy is in fact safe; only fortify's notion of the destination size is wrong. Write the name through the byte offset
dump_dirent()already computes, (char *)dhdrp +name_offset, instead of through the sizeddh_namelvalue. The destination is then a plain char * into the malloc'd record, which fortify cannot sub-object-size, so the spurious check is dropped while the rest of the binary keeps its hardening.Signed-off-by vmfunc <[email protected]>---
Andrey Albershteyn (Cc'd) tested this with fstests on the downstream report and asked that it be sent upstream; the discussion and original backtrace are at https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/pull/533325 .dump/content.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)dump/content.c +0
-0@@ -5151,14 +5151,14 @@ dump_dirent(drive_t *drivep, dhdrp->dh_sz = (uint16_t )sz; dhdrp->dh_gen = (uint16_t )(gen &DENTGENMASK );if (name) {
dump/content.c dump_dirent(drive_t *drivep, · line 5161
Quoted 10 lines
dump/content.c +2
-2-strcpy (dhdrp->dh_name, name); +strcpy ((char *)dhdrp + name_offset, name); } dhdrp->dh_checksum =calc_checksum (dhdrp,DIRENTHDR_SZ );xlate_direnthdr_v1 (dhdrp, tmpdhdrp,1 );if (name) { -strcpy (tmpdhdrp->dh_name, name); +strcpy ((char *)tmpdhdrp + name_offset, name);
Why wouldn't you fix the structure definitions to use the proper VLA syntax (dh_name[]) instead of making the code less readable?
--D
Quoted 24 lines
dump/content.c +2
-2} }else {direnthdr_t *dhdrp = (direnthdr_t *)contextp->cc_mdirentbufp;@@ -5169,14 +5169,14 @@ dump_dirent(drive_t *drivep, dhdrp->dh_gen = gen; dhdrp->dh_sz = (uint16_t )sz;if (name) { -strcpy (dhdrp->dh_name, name); +strcpy ((char *)dhdrp + name_offset, name); } dhdrp->dh_checksum =calc_checksum (dhdrp,DIRENTHDR_SZ );xlate_direnthdr (dhdrp, tmpdhdrp,1 );if (name) { -strcpy (tmpdhdrp->dh_name, name); +strcpy ((char *)tmpdhdrp + name_offset, name); } }Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
Quoted 2 lines · Darrick J. Wong
Why wouldn't you fix the structure definitions to use the proper VLA syntax (dh_name[]) instead of making the code less readable?
looked at that first but dh_name[] doesnt drop in cleanly here. the declared size isnt slack padding, its the count of name bytes carried inline in the fixed-size on-media header, n read_dirent() in restore/content.c reads the record back out using sizeof() of that member:
namep = dhdrp->dh_name + sizeof(dhdrp->dh_name); memcpy(dhdrp->dh_name, dhdr_v1.dh_name, sizeof(dhdr_v1.dh_name));
sizeof() on a flex array member is a constraint violation, so dh_name[] wont compile without rewriting that reader. it also breaks assert(sizeof(direnthdr_v1_t) == DIRENTHDR_SZ): the v1 header is 16 bytes of fields n dh_name[8] is exactly the pad that brings it up to DIRENTHDR_SZ (24). as a [] member it goes to 16 n the record size moves with it.
so a proper [] conversion means reworking the v1 on-media reader + the record-size invariants, felt out of proportion for fixing the fortify abort, so i kept this to the minimal change that preserves the layout n the rest of the hardening. happy to do the struct cleanup as a separate patch if u'd rather, just flagging its a format change not a pure readability one.
thanks,
celeste
Quoted 11 lines · vmfunc
Quoted 2 lines · Darrick J. Wong
Why wouldn't you fix the structure definitions to use the proper VLA syntax (dh_name[]) instead of making the code less readable?
looked at that first but dh_name[] doesnt drop in cleanly here. the declared size isnt slack padding, its the count of name bytes carried inline in the fixed-size on-media header, n
read_dirent()inrestore/content.creads the record back out usingsizeof()of that member:namep = dhdrp->dh_name + sizeof(dhdrp->dh_name); memcpy(dhdrp->dh_name, dhdr_v1.dh_name, sizeof(dhdr_v1.dh_name));
To me it looks like the problem is that mix up the on-disk and in-memory structure with different semantics here. The somewhat more invasive fix would be to split the
direnthdr structure into an in-memory direnthdr one, and an on-disk direnthdr_v3. The former would use a VLA, and the latter the existing hard coded value. This would also allow to make the endian conversion in xlate_direnthdr/xlate_direnthdr_v1 type safe.
Quoted 26 lines · vmfunc
Quoted 2 lines · Darrick J. Wong
Why wouldn't you fix the structure definitions to use the proper VLA syntax (dh_name[]) instead of making the code less readable?
looked at that first but dh_name[] doesnt drop in cleanly here. the declared size isnt slack padding, its the count of name bytes carried inline in the fixed-size on-media header, n
read_dirent()inrestore/content.creads the record back out usingsizeof()of that member:namep = dhdrp->dh_name + sizeof(dhdrp->dh_name); memcpy(dhdrp->dh_name, dhdr_v1.dh_name, sizeof(dhdr_v1.dh_name));
sizeof()on a flex array member is a constraint violation, so dh_name[] wont compile without rewriting that reader. it also breaksassert(sizeof(direnthdr_v1_t) == DIRENTHDR_SZ): the v1 header is 16 bytes of fields n dh_name[8] is exactly the pad that brings it up toDIRENTHDR_SZ(24). as a [] member it goes to 16 n the record size moves with it.so a proper [] conversion means reworking the v1 on-media reader + the record-size invariants, felt out of proportion for fixing the fortify abort, so i kept this to the minimal change that preserves the layout n the rest of the hardening. happy to do the struct cleanup as a separate patch if u'd rather, just flagging its a format change not a pure readability one.
Quoted 3 lines
thanks,
celeste
My thoughts too, seems like easy enough fix to make fortified version not crash.
Signature · 1 line
- Andrey
should we then assume that this is fine to merge?
- vmfunc
Quoted 1 line · Celeste
should we then assume that this is fine to merge?
I still don't think that just papering over the misuse of the same type for on-disk and in-memory uses with different characteristics is a good idea.
Quoted 6 lines · Christoph Hellwig
Quoted 1 line · Celeste
should we then assume that this is fine to merge?
I still don't think that just papering over the misuse of the same type for on-disk and in-memory uses with different characteristics is a good idea.
I agree.
--D