package/util-linux: bump to v2.40.4
PATCH 1/5 package/util-linux: bump to v2.40.4
See the release notes:
- https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/util-linux/v2.40/v2.40.3-ChangeLog
- https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/util-linux/v2.40/v2.40.4-ChangeLog
Also add 0007-lib-path-avoid-double-free-for-cpusets.patch introduced after the 2.40.4 release.
--- ...b-path-avoid-double-free-for-cpusets.patch | 30 +++++++++++++++++++ package/util-linux/util-linux.hash | 2 +- package/util-linux/util-linux.mk | 2 +- 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 package/util-linux/0007-lib-path-avoid-double-free-for-cpusets.patch
package/util-linux/0007-lib-path-avoid-double-free-for-cpusets.patch new file +30 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +From 27279d4ab2431e1afb3a125ae7306eb2323b86b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Karel Zak <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2025 12:25:45 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] lib/path: avoid double free() for cpusets + +Addresses: https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/issues/3641 +Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <[email protected]> + +Upstream: https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/commit/27279d4ab2431e1afb3a125ae7306eb2323b86b7 +Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <[email protected]> +--- + lib/path.c | 4 +++- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/lib/path.c b/lib/path.c +index f897599fd06..29b074a959b 100644 +--- a/lib/path.c ++++ b/lib/path.c +@@ -1053,8 +1053,10 @@ static int ul_path_cpuparse(struct path_cxt *pc, cpu_set_t **set, int maxcpus, i + rc = 0; + + out: +- if (rc) ++ if (rc) { + cpuset_free(*set); ++ *set = NULL; ++ } + free(buf); + return rc; + }
package/util-linux/util-linux.hash +1 -1
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ # From https://mirrors.edge.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/util-linux/v2.40/sha256sums.asc -sha256 d78b37a66f5922d70edf3bdfb01a6b33d34ed3c3cafd6628203b2a2b67c8e8b3 util-linux-2.40.2.tar.xz +sha256 5c1daf733b04e9859afdc3bd87cc481180ee0f88b5c0946b16fdec931975fb79 util-linux-2.40.4.tar.xz # License files, locally calculated sha256 27f25514040a401b2ceb7057eae1f46cedb1666664b519b5be7e0960d1b35164 README.licensing sha256 9b718a9460fed5952466421235bc79eb49d4e9eacc920d7a9dd6285ab8fd6c6d Documentation/licenses/COPYING.BSD-3-Clause
package/util-linux/util-linux.mk +1 -1
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ # util-linux-libs/util-linux-libs.mk needs to be updated accordingly as well. UTIL_LINUX_VERSION_MAJOR = 2.40 -UTIL_LINUX_VERSION = $(UTIL_LINUX_VERSION_MAJOR).2 +UTIL_LINUX_VERSION = $(UTIL_LINUX_VERSION_MAJOR).4 UTIL_LINUX_SOURCE = util-linux-$(UTIL_LINUX_VERSION).tar.xz UTIL_LINUX_SITE = $(BR2_KERNEL_MIRROR)/linux/utils/util-linux/v$(UTIL_LINUX_VERSION_MAJOR)
Signature · 6 lines
2.54.0 _______________________________________________ buildroot mailing list [email protected] https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot
PATCH 2/5 package/util-linux: backport patch CVE-2025-14104
- CVE-2025-14104:
A flaw was found in util-linux. This vulnerability allows a heap buffer overread when processing 256-byte usernames, specifically within the setpwnam() function, affecting SUID (Set User ID) login- utils utilities writing to the password database.
For more information, see:
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-14104
- https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/commit/aaa9e718c88d6916b003da7ebcfe38a3c88df8e6
- https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/commit/9a36d77012c4c771f8d51eba46b6e62c29bf572a
--- .../util-linux/0008-CVE-2025-14104-1.patch | 33 +++++++++++++++++++ .../util-linux/0009-CVE-2025-14104-2.patch | 28 ++++++++++++++++ package/util-linux/util-linux.mk | 4 +++ 3 files changed, 65 insertions(+) create mode 100644 package/util-linux/0008-CVE-2025-14104-1.patch create mode 100644 package/util-linux/0009-CVE-2025-14104-2.patch
package/util-linux/0008-CVE-2025-14104-1.patch new file +33 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +From aaa9e718c88d6916b003da7ebcfe38a3c88df8e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mohamed Maatallah <[email protected]> +Date: Sat, 24 May 2025 03:16:09 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Update setpwnam.c + +Upstream: https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/commit/aaa9e718c88d6916b003da7ebcfe38a3c88df8e6 +CVE: CVE-2025-14104 +Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <[email protected]> +--- + login-utils/setpwnam.c | 10 ++++++---- + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/login-utils/setpwnam.c b/login-utils/setpwnam.c +index 3e3c1abde50..95e470b5a34 100644 +--- a/login-utils/setpwnam.c ++++ b/login-utils/setpwnam.c +@@ -126,10 +126,12 @@ int setpwnam(struct passwd *pwd, const char *prefix) + } + + /* Is this the username we were sent to change? */ +- if (!found && linebuf[namelen] == ':' && +- !strncmp(linebuf, pwd->pw_name, namelen)) { +- /* Yes! So go forth in the name of the Lord and +- * change it! */ ++ if (!found && ++ strncmp(linebuf, pwd->pw_name, namelen) == 0 && ++ strlen(linebuf) > namelen && ++ linebuf[namelen] == ':') { ++ /* Yes! But this time let’s not walk past the end of the buffer ++ * in the name of the Lord, SUID, or anything else. */ + if (putpwent(pwd, fp) < 0) + goto fail; + found = 1;
package/util-linux/0009-CVE-2025-14104-2.patch new file +28 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +From 9a36d77012c4c771f8d51eba46b6e62c29bf572a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mohamed Maatallah <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 26 May 2025 10:06:02 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Update bufflen + +Update buflen + +Upstream: https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/commit/9a36d77012c4c771f8d51eba46b6e62c29bf572a +CVE: CVE-2025-14104 +Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <[email protected]> +--- + login-utils/setpwnam.c | 3 ++- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/login-utils/setpwnam.c b/login-utils/setpwnam.c +index 95e470b5a34..7778e98f7cc 100644 +--- a/login-utils/setpwnam.c ++++ b/login-utils/setpwnam.c +@@ -99,7 +99,8 @@ int setpwnam(struct passwd *pwd, const char *prefix) + goto fail; + + namelen = strlen(pwd->pw_name); +- ++ if (namelen > buflen) ++ buflen += namelen; + linebuf = malloc(buflen); + if (!linebuf) + goto fail;
package/util-linux/util-linux.mk +4 -0
@@ -39,6 +39,10 @@ UTIL_LINUX_AUTORECONF = YES # 0006-add-loopdev-fl-nofollow.patch UTIL_LINUX_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2026-27456 +# 0008-CVE-2025-14104-1.patch +# 0009-CVE-2025-14104-2.patch +UTIL_LINUX_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2025-14104 + UTIL_LINUX_INSTALL_STAGING = YES UTIL_LINUX_DEPENDENCIES = \ host-pkgconf \
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2.54.0 _______________________________________________ buildroot mailing list [email protected] https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot
PATCH 3/5 package/util-linux: backport patch CVE-2026-53612
In reply to Thomas Perale via buildroot- CVE-2026-53612
A TOCTOU (Time-of-Check-Time-of-Use) vulnerability exists in the SUID binary /usr/bin/mount from util-linux. The hook_owner.c post-mount hook performs path-based chmod() and lchown() operations on the mount target after mount() has completed, without verifying that the target path still resolves to the same filesystem object. An unprivileged local user can exploit this race window using renameat2(RENAME_EXCHANGE) to redirect the chmod()/lchown() to an arbitrary path, achieving arbitrary permission/ownership modification on any file or directory.
For more information, see:
- https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/security/advisories/GHSA-g8wm-75wr-g2vh
- https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/commit/d0c5adaeb3a3d823aba1377794de8f009b8152cc
--- package/util-linux/0010-CVE-2026-53612.patch | 89 ++++++++++++++++++++ package/util-linux/util-linux.mk | 3 + 2 files changed, 92 insertions(+) create mode 100644 package/util-linux/0010-CVE-2026-53612.patch
package/util-linux/0010-CVE-2026-53612.patch new file +89 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +From d0c5adaeb3a3d823aba1377794de8f009b8152cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Karel Zak <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 11:15:19 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] libmount: use fd-based fchownat/chmod in hook_owner + +Replace path-based lchown()/chmod() with fd-based operations in the +X-mount.{owner,group,mode} post-mount hook. + +For restricted users the fd_target is pinned in prepare_target() and +re-opened after mount in hook_attach_target() to point to the mounted +filesystem root. For root a local O_PATH fd is opened. Ownership is +changed via fchownat(fd, "", ..., AT_EMPTY_PATH), mode via +/proc/self/fd/N. + +This prevents TOCTOU attacks where an ancestor directory is swapped +between mount and the chmod/chown operations. + +Reported-by: Xinyao Hu <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <[email protected]> +(cherry picked from commit 24da33905c7115c4cbccd0afb2a469804e96467a) + +Upstream: https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/commit/d0c5adaeb3a3d823aba1377794de8f009b8152cc +CVE: CVE-2026-53612 +Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <[email protected]> +--- + libmount/src/hook_owner.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- + 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/libmount/src/hook_owner.c b/libmount/src/hook_owner.c +index 11b238c8917..99f0e705d73 100644 +--- a/libmount/src/hook_owner.c ++++ b/libmount/src/hook_owner.c +@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ + #include <sched.h> + + #include "mountP.h" ++#include "pathnames.h" + #include "fileutils.h" + + struct hook_data { +@@ -48,7 +49,7 @@ static int hook_post( + { + struct hook_data *hd = (struct hook_data *) data; + const char *target; +- int rc = 0; ++ int rc = 0, fd; + + assert(cxt); + +@@ -59,18 +60,33 @@ static int hook_post( + if (!target) + return 0; + ++ /* fd_target is pinned in restricted mode (see prepare_target()), ++ * for root open it here to keep chmod/chown fd-based too */ ++ if (mnt_context_target_fd_required(cxt)) ++ fd = mnt_context_get_target_fd(cxt); ++ else ++ fd = open(target, O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC); ++ ++ if (fd < 0) ++ return -MNT_ERR_CHMOD; ++ + if (hd->owner != (uid_t) -1 || hd->group != (uid_t) -1) { +- DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, " lchown(%s, %u, %u)", target, hd->owner, hd->group)); +- if (lchown(target, hd->owner, hd->group) == -1) +- return -MNT_ERR_CHOWN; ++ DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, " fchownat(%s, %u, %u)", target, hd->owner, hd->group)); ++ if (fchownat(fd, "", hd->owner, hd->group, AT_EMPTY_PATH) == -1) ++ rc = -MNT_ERR_CHOWN; + } + +- if (hd->mode != (mode_t) -1) { +- DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, " chmod(%s, %04o)", target, hd->mode)); +- if (chmod(target, hd->mode) == -1) +- return -MNT_ERR_CHMOD; ++ if (!rc && hd->mode != (mode_t) -1) { ++ char buf[sizeof(_PATH_PROC_FDDIR) + 1 + sizeof(stringify_value(INT_MAX))]; ++ ++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), _PATH_PROC_FDDIR "/%d", fd); ++ DBG(CXT, ul_debugobj(cxt, " chmod(%s, %04o)", buf, hd->mode)); ++ if (chmod(buf, hd->mode) == -1) ++ rc = -MNT_ERR_CHMOD; + } + ++ if (!mnt_context_target_fd_required(cxt)) ++ close(fd); + return rc; + }
package/util-linux/util-linux.mk +3 -0
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ UTIL_LINUX_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2026-27456 # 0009-CVE-2025-14104-2.patch UTIL_LINUX_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2025-14104 +# 0010-CVE-2026-53612.patch +UTIL_LINUX_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2026-53612 + UTIL_LINUX_INSTALL_STAGING = YES UTIL_LINUX_DEPENDENCIES = \ host-pkgconf \
Signature · 6 lines
2.54.0 _______________________________________________ buildroot mailing list [email protected] https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot
PATCH 4/5 package/util-linux: backport patch CVE-2026-53613
In reply to Thomas Perale via buildroot- CVE-2026-53613
A TOCTOU vulnerability exists in the SUID binary /usr/bin/mount from util-linux. When processing restricted (non-root) mount requests, libmount validates the mount target against /etc/fstab entries and checks user permissions, but the actual mount()/move_mount() syscall re-resolves the target pathname. An attacker can use renameat2(RENAME_EXCHANGE) to atomically swap an ancestor directory of the mount target between the permission check and the mount syscall, redirecting an authorized user-directory mount to any root-owned path (e.g., /etc/sudoers.d).
For more information, see:
- https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/security/advisories/GHSA-8gj5-72r3-428g
- https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/commit/b639bf5c4277b7f828b3fcbdbf94bad5a4d20060
- https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/commit/0b010025a0e429bc80355c94db86a843395d49e2
--- .../util-linux/0011-CVE-2026-53613-1.patch | 99 +++++++++ .../util-linux/0012-CVE-2026-53613-2.patch | 189 ++++++++++++++++++ package/util-linux/util-linux.mk | 4 + 3 files changed, 292 insertions(+) create mode 100644 package/util-linux/0011-CVE-2026-53613-1.patch create mode 100644 package/util-linux/0012-CVE-2026-53613-2.patch
package/util-linux/0011-CVE-2026-53613-1.patch new file +99 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +From b639bf5c4277b7f828b3fcbdbf94bad5a4d20060 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Karel Zak <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 27 May 2026 10:35:39 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] lib/fileutils: add ul_open_no_symlinks() + +Add a helper that opens a path rejecting symlinks at any component, +not just the last one. Uses openat2(RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS) when +available (Linux >= 5.6), falls back to open(O_NOFOLLOW). + +Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <[email protected]> +(cherry picked from commit e01e38b24346a21f1d01498c265486a12c009e61) + +Upstream: https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/commit/b639bf5c4277b7f828b3fcbdbf94bad5a4d20060 +CVE: CVE-2026-53613 +Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <[email protected]> +--- + configure.ac | 1 + + include/fileutils.h | 2 ++ + lib/fileutils.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ + meson.build | 1 + + 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac +index 3bbc94488b9..2d9388a3cfd 100644 +--- a/configure.ac ++++ b/configure.ac +@@ -345,6 +345,7 @@ AC_CHECK_HEADERS([ \ + linux/kcmp.h \ + linux/net_namespace.h \ + linux/nsfs.h \ ++ linux/openat2.h \ + linux/pr.h \ + linux/raw.h \ + linux/securebits.h \ +diff --git a/include/fileutils.h b/include/fileutils.h +index 6fc93d0db82..996e183221d 100644 +--- a/include/fileutils.h ++++ b/include/fileutils.h +@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ static inline int is_same_inode(const int fd, const struct stat *st) + return 1; + } + ++extern int ul_open_no_symlinks(const char *path, int flags, mode_t mode); ++ + extern int dup_fd_cloexec(int oldfd, int lowfd); + extern unsigned int get_fd_tabsize(void); + +diff --git a/lib/fileutils.c b/lib/fileutils.c +index b7acae43082..a9c2022be5f 100644 +--- a/lib/fileutils.c ++++ b/lib/fileutils.c +@@ -11,7 +11,14 @@ + #include <unistd.h> + #include <sys/time.h> + #include <sys/resource.h> ++#include <sys/syscall.h> + #include <string.h> ++#include <fcntl.h> ++#include <errno.h> ++ ++#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_OPENAT2_H ++# include <linux/openat2.h> ++#endif + + #include "c.h" + #include "all-io.h" +@@ -343,3 +350,20 @@ char *ul_basename(char *path) + + return p; + } ++ ++int ul_open_no_symlinks(const char *path, int flags, mode_t mode) ++{ ++#if defined(SYS_openat2) && defined(RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS) ++ struct open_how how = { ++ .flags = (__u64) flags, ++ .mode = (__u64) mode, ++ .resolve = RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS, ++ }; ++ int fd = syscall(SYS_openat2, AT_FDCWD, path, &how, sizeof(how)); ++ ++ /* only fall back to O_NOFOLLOW if the syscall is unavailable */ ++ if (fd >= 0 || errno != ENOSYS) ++ return fd; ++#endif ++ return open(path, flags | O_NOFOLLOW, mode); ++} +diff --git a/meson.build b/meson.build +index c79939c0525..7b2b9ee71eb 100644 +--- a/meson.build ++++ b/meson.build +@@ -198,6 +198,7 @@ headers = ''' + linux/kcmp.h + linux/net_namespace.h + linux/nsfs.h ++ linux/openat2.h + linux/mount.h + linux/pr.h + linux/securebits.h
package/util-linux/0012-CVE-2026-53613-2.patch new file +189 -0
189 lines not on this page · raw message
package/util-linux/util-linux.mk +4 -0
@@ -46,6 +46,10 @@ UTIL_LINUX_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2025-14104 # 0010-CVE-2026-53612.patch UTIL_LINUX_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2026-53612 +# 0011-CVE-2026-53613-1.patch +# 0012-CVE-2026-53613-2.patch +UTIL_LINUX_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2026-53613 + UTIL_LINUX_INSTALL_STAGING = YES UTIL_LINUX_DEPENDENCIES = \ host-pkgconf \
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2.54.0 _______________________________________________ buildroot mailing list [email protected] https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot
PATCH 5/5 package/util-linux: backport patch CVE-2026-53614
In reply to Thomas Perale via buildroot- CVE-2026-53614
The SUID binary /usr/bin/mount from util-linux trusts the environment variable LIBMOUNT_FORCE_MOUNT2 via a raw getenv() call in libmount/src/hook_mount.c. An unprivileged user can set LIBMOUNT_FORCE_MOUNT2=always to force the mount process to use the legacy (non-atomic) bind mount path instead of the secure new mount API path.
In the legacy path, a bind mount is performed in two separate
syscalls: first mount(src, tgt, MS_BIND) which exposes the source directory without security flags, then mount(tgt, MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND|MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV) which applies the flags. Between these two syscalls, a brief window exists where the bind-mounted directory is visible without nosuid/noexec protection. A concurrent process can execute a SUID binary from the bind target during this window.
For more information, see:
- https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/security/advisories/GHSA-67r7-8m5w-22wx
- https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/commit/cc81bbcec598cb91f0eb8456282f33eed820ed5f
--- package/util-linux/0013-CVE-2026-53614.patch | 81 ++++++++++++++++++++ package/util-linux/util-linux.mk | 3 + 2 files changed, 84 insertions(+) create mode 100644 package/util-linux/0013-CVE-2026-53614.patch
package/util-linux/0013-CVE-2026-53614.patch new file +81 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +From 31e37c1c7dcf25b76ccf41391fe934a75644c661 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Karel Zak <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 10:58:32 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] libmount: fix SUID bypass via LIBMOUNT_FORCE_MOUNT2 and + legacy mount path + +Use safe_getenv() for LIBMOUNT_FORCE_MOUNT2 to ignore the variable +in SUID context, consistent with LIBMOUNT_FSTAB and other sensitive +environment variables. + +Additionally, refuse multi-step mount(2) sequences (bind+remount and +propagation) for restricted (non-root) users in the legacy mount path. +The two-step approach has a window between syscalls where security +flags (nosuid, noexec, ...) are not yet applied. The new mount API +handles this atomically. + +Reported-by: Xinyao Hu <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <[email protected]> +(cherry picked from commit 9cbfb823500f510b34767edabd3ffd5b436987b4) + +Upstream: https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/commit/cc81bbcec598cb91f0eb8456282f33eed820ed5f +CVE: CVE-2026-53614 +Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <[email protected]> +--- + libmount/src/hook_mount.c | 3 ++- + libmount/src/hook_mount_legacy.c | 8 ++++++++ + 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/libmount/src/hook_mount.c b/libmount/src/hook_mount.c +index 374078c97f8..570ee8e01f9 100644 +--- a/libmount/src/hook_mount.c ++++ b/libmount/src/hook_mount.c +@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ + */ + + #include "mountP.h" ++#include "env.h" + #include "fileutils.h" /* statx() fallback */ + #include "strutils.h" + #include "mount-api-utils.h" +@@ -658,7 +659,7 @@ static int init_sysapi(struct libmnt_context *cxt, + + static int force_classic_mount(struct libmnt_context *cxt) + { +- const char *env = getenv("LIBMOUNT_FORCE_MOUNT2"); ++ const char *env = safe_getenv("LIBMOUNT_FORCE_MOUNT2"); + + if (env) { + if (strcmp(env, "always") == 0) +diff --git a/libmount/src/hook_mount_legacy.c b/libmount/src/hook_mount_legacy.c +index cfdd7af2b2c..942e26e7770 100644 +--- a/libmount/src/hook_mount_legacy.c ++++ b/libmount/src/hook_mount_legacy.c +@@ -285,6 +285,8 @@ static int hook_prepare(struct libmnt_context *cxt, + + /* add extra mount(2) calls for each propagation flag */ + if (flags & MS_PROPAGATION) { ++ if (mnt_context_is_restricted(cxt)) ++ goto eperm; + rc = prepare_propagation(cxt, hs); + if (rc) + return rc; +@@ -294,12 +296,18 @@ static int hook_prepare(struct libmnt_context *cxt, + if ((flags & MS_BIND) + && (flags & MNT_BIND_SETTABLE) + && !(flags & MS_REMOUNT)) { ++ if (mnt_context_is_restricted(cxt)) ++ goto eperm; + rc = prepare_bindremount(cxt, hs); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + + return rc; ++eperm: ++ DBG(HOOK, ul_debugobj(hs, ++ "multi-step mount(2) refused for non-root user")); ++ return -EPERM; + } + + const struct libmnt_hookset hookset_mount_legacy =
package/util-linux/util-linux.mk +3 -0
@@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ UTIL_LINUX_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2026-53612 # 0012-CVE-2026-53613-2.patch UTIL_LINUX_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2026-53613 +# 0013-CVE-2026-53614.patch +UTIL_LINUX_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2026-53614 + UTIL_LINUX_INSTALL_STAGING = YES UTIL_LINUX_DEPENDENCIES = \ host-pkgconf \
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2.54.0 _______________________________________________ buildroot mailing list [email protected] https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot