cxl/features: Bounds-check the fwctl feature commands
v3 cover cxl/features: Bounds-check the fwctl feature commands
The CXL fwctl feature handlers take buffer sizes from userspace, which is out_len, and from the device without fully checking them. This series adds the missing bounds checks.
Patch 1: reject a Get Feature whose count is larger than the output
buffer.
Patch 2: reject a Set Feature whose output buffer is too small for the
reply header. A zero out_len makes kvzalloc() return ZERO_SIZE_PTR, and the header write then corrupts memory.
Patch 3: clamp the Get Feature read loop to the room left in the output
buffer, so a device that returns more than requested cannot write past it.
A related gap is fixed separately by Zhenhao Wan's patch [1].
Changes since v2:
- Expand the single Get Feature fix into a series that also covers the Set Feature output buffer and the Get Feature read loop.
[1]:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Richard Cheng (3):
cxl/features: Reject Get Feature count larger than the output buffer cxl/features: Reject Set Features output buffer smaller than the
header
cxl/features: Clamp Get Feature output size to the remaining buffer
drivers/cxl/core/features.c | 12 +++++++++--- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
base-commit: ef0c9f75a19532d7675384708fc8621e10850104
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v3 1/3 cxl/features: Reject Get Feature count larger than the output buffer
cxlctl_get_feature() sizes its output buffer from the user's fwctl_rpc.out_len, but the device is told to write cxl_mbox_get_feat_in.count bytes into rpc_out->payload, which is a separate user-controlled value. Nothing bounds count against out_len, so a small out_len with a large count overflows the kvzalloc()'d buffer. A heap OOB write reachable from FWCTL_RPC.
Reject requests where count exceeds the available payload room, before allocating.
---
Changelog:
v2 -> v3:
- No change.
v1 -> v2:
- Drop the reproducer and trim the KASAN splat in the commit message
- Sent the reproducer as a regression test in ndctl separately.
Best regards,
Richard Cheng
--- drivers/cxl/core/features.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/cxl/core/features.c +4 -0
@@ -471,6 +471,10 @@ static void *cxlctl_get_feature(struct cxl_features_state *cxlfs,if (!count)return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); +if (out_size < offsetof(struct fwctl_rpc_cxl_out , payload) || + count > out_size - offsetof(struct fwctl_rpc_cxl_out , payload)) +return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); + struct fwctl_rpc_cxl_out *rpc_out __free(kvfree) =kvzalloc (out_size,GFP_KERNEL );if (!rpc_out)
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH v3 1/3] cxl/features: Reject Get Feature count larger than the output buffer
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [Critical] Missing bounds checks on user-provided input length in cxlctl_fw_rpc() and cxlctl_set_feature(), leading to out-of-bounds reads and potential ZERO_SIZE_PTR crashes. --
commit 1f7098b182e4cdaf480b19545ca818cbf043bd29
Author: Richard Cheng <[email protected]>
cxl/features: Reject Get Feature count larger than the output buffer
cxlctl_get_feature() sizes its output buffer from the user's fwctl_rpc.out_len, but the device is told to write count bytes into rpc_out->payload. This adds bounds checking against out_size to prevent overflowing the allocated buffer.
drivers/cxl/core/features.c static void *cxlctl_get_feature(struct cxl_features_state *cxlfs, · line 477
Quoted 12 lines
drivers/cxl/core/features.c +4
-0@@ -471,6 +471,10 @@ static void *cxlctl_get_feature(struct cxl_features_state *cxlfs,if (!count)return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); +if (out_size < offsetof(struct fwctl_rpc_cxl_out , payload) || + count > out_size - offsetof(struct fwctl_rpc_cxl_out , payload)) +return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); +
[Severity: Critical]
This is a pre-existing issue, but while we are adding bounds checks for the output buffer here, does cxlctl_fw_rpc() also need to validate the user-provided in_len?
If the ioctl is called with an in_len of 0, could dereferencing rpc_in->opcode in cxlctl_fw_rpc() lead to a zero-size pointer crash?
Similarly, in cxlctl_set_feature(), the operation size is calculated without verifying in_len:
data_size = rpc_in->op_size - sizeof(feat_in->hdr);
Could a small in_len combined with a large rpc_in->op_size result in an out-of-bounds read, copying adjacent kernel heap memory into the hardware mailbox? Would validating in_len against op_size in cxlctl_fw_rpc() prevent this?
Quoted 3 lines
drivers/cxl/core/features.c +0
-0struct fwctl_rpc_cxl_out *rpc_out __free(kvfree) =kvzalloc (out_size,GFP_KERNEL );if (!rpc_out)
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] cxl/features: Reject Get Feature count larger than the output buffer
Quoted 42 lines · On Fri, Jun 26, 2026 at 10:54:07AM +0800, [email protected] wrote:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [Critical] Missing bounds checks on user-provided input length incxlctl_fw_rpc()andcxlctl_set_feature(), leading to out-of-bounds reads and potentialZERO_SIZE_PTRcrashes. --commit
1f7098b182e4cdaf480b19545ca818cbf043bd29
Author: Richard Cheng <[email protected]>cxl/features: Reject Get Feature count larger than the output buffer
cxlctl_get_feature()sizes its output buffer from the user's fwctl_rpc.out_len, but the device is told to write count bytes intorpc_out->payload. This adds bounds checking againstout_sizeto prevent overflowing the allocated buffer.drivers/cxl/core/features.c static void *cxlctl_get_feature(struct cxl_features_state *cxlfs, · line 477
Quoted 12 lines
drivers/cxl/core/features.c +4
-0@@ -471,6 +471,10 @@ static void *cxlctl_get_feature(struct cxl_features_state *cxlfs,if (!count)return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); +if (out_size < offsetof(struct fwctl_rpc_cxl_out , payload) || + count > out_size - offsetof(struct fwctl_rpc_cxl_out , payload)) +return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); +[Severity: Critical]
This is a pre-existing issue, but while we are adding bounds checks for the output buffer here, doescxlctl_fw_rpc()also need to validate the user-providedin_len?If the ioctl is called with an
in_lenof 0, could dereferencingrpc_in->opcodeincxlctl_fw_rpc()lead to a zero-size pointer crash?Similarly, in
cxlctl_set_feature(), the operation size is calculated without verifyingin_len:data_size = rpc_in->op_size - sizeof(feat_in->hdr);
Quoted 11 lines
Could a small
in_lencombined with a largerpc_in->op_sizeresult in an out-of-bounds read, copying adjacent kernel heap memory into the hardware mailbox? Would validatingin_lenagainstop_sizeincxlctl_fw_rpc()prevent this?Quoted 3 lines
drivers/cxl/core/features.c +0
-0struct fwctl_rpc_cxl_out *rpc_out __free(kvfree) =kvzalloc (out_size,GFP_KERNEL );if (!rpc_out)Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
I think this is addressed here.
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cxl/[email protected]/
--Richard
Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] cxl/features: Reject Get Feature count larger than the output buffer
In reply to Richard ChengQuoted 9 lines · Richard Cheng
cxlctl_get_feature()sizes its output buffer from the user's fwctl_rpc.out_len, but the device is told to write cxl_mbox_get_feat_in.count bytes intorpc_out->payload, which is a separate user-controlled value. Nothing bounds count againstout_len, so a smallout_lenwith a large count overflows the kvzalloc()'d buffer. A heap OOB write reachable fromFWCTL_RPC.Reject requests where count exceeds the available payload room, before allocating.
PATCH v3 2/3 cxl/features: Reject Set Features output buffer smaller than the header
In reply to Richard Chengcxlctl_set_feature() sizes its output buffer from the user's fwctl_rpc.out_len but never checks it is large enough to hold even the fwctl_rpc_cxl_out header. With out_len == 0 , kvzalloc() returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR, which passes the !rpc_out check, the subsequent rpc_out->size = 0 then writes through the poison pointer.
Reject requests whose output buffer can't hold the response header, before allocating. The Set Feature reply carries no payload, so the header is all that is required.
---
Changelog:
v2 -> v3:
- New patch.
drivers/cxl/core/features.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/cxl/core/features.c +3 -0
@@ -520,6 +520,9 @@ static void *cxlctl_set_feature(struct cxl_features_state *cxlfs, flags =le32_to_cpu (feat_in->flags); out_size = *out_len; +if (out_size < offsetof(struct fwctl_rpc_cxl_out , payload)) +return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); + struct fwctl_rpc_cxl_out *rpc_out __free(kvfree) =kvzalloc (out_size,GFP_KERNEL );if (!rpc_out)
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH v3 2/3] cxl/features: Reject Set Features output buffer smaller than the header
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [Critical] Missing validation of the user-provided in_len parameter allows a ZERO_SIZE_PTR dereference and severe out-of-bounds reads in the CXL FWCTL driver. --
commit 149380dfe9472c578ca9fd76d4e5bb0c5ac85c19
Author: Richard Cheng <[email protected]>
cxl/features: Reject Set Features output buffer smaller than the header
cxlctl_set_feature() sizes its output buffer from the user's fwctl_rpc.out_len but never checks it is large enough to hold even the fwctl_rpc_cxl_out header. With out_len == 0 , kvzalloc() returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR, which passes the !rpc_out check, the subsequent rpc_out->size = 0 then writes through the poison pointer.
drivers/cxl/core/features.c static void *cxlctl_set_feature(struct cxl_features_state *cxlfs, · line 525
Quoted 11 lines
drivers/cxl/core/features.c +3
-0@@ -520,6 +520,9 @@ static void *cxlctl_set_feature(struct cxl_features_state *cxlfs, flags =le32_to_cpu (feat_in->flags); out_size = *out_len; +if (out_size < offsetof(struct fwctl_rpc_cxl_out , payload)) +return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); +
[Severity: Critical]
This is a pre-existing issue, but missing validation of the user-provided in_len parameter allows a ZERO_SIZE_PTR dereference and out-of-bounds reads.
If a malicious user passes in_len=0 to the FWCTL_RPC ioctl, kvzalloc(0) returns the ZERO_SIZE_PTR constant (0x10) in drivers/fwctl/main.c:fwctl_cmd_rpc():
void *inbuf __free(kvfree) = kvzalloc(cmd->in_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
The driver unconditionally dereferences this pointer in drivers/cxl/core/features.c:cxlctl_fw_rpc():
const struct fwctl_rpc_cxl *rpc_in = in; u16 opcode = rpc_in->opcode;
Also, if a user provides a small in_len but specifies a massive op_size in the command header, handlers like cxlctl_set_feature() will read out of bounds of the kvzalloc'd heap buffer and transmit that data to the hardware mailbox:
data_size = rpc_in->op_size - sizeof(feat_in->hdr); rc = cxl_set_feature(cxl_mbox, &feat_in->uuid, feat_in->version, feat_in->feat_data, data_size, flags, offset, &return_code);
Should there be validation of in_len before casting and accessing the input buffer, as well as a check to ensure rpc_in->op_size does not exceed in_len?
Quoted 3 lines
drivers/cxl/core/features.c +0
-0struct fwctl_rpc_cxl_out *rpc_out __free(kvfree) =kvzalloc (out_size,GFP_KERNEL );if (!rpc_out)
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=2
Re: [PATCH v3 2/3] cxl/features: Reject Set Features output buffer smaller than the header
Quoted 55 lines · On Fri, Jun 26, 2026 at 10:56:11AM +0800, [email protected] wrote:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [Critical] Missing validation of the user-providedin_lenparameter allows aZERO_SIZE_PTRdereference and severe out-of-bounds reads in the CXL FWCTL driver. --commit
149380dfe9472c578ca9fd76d4e5bb0c5ac85c19
Author: Richard Cheng <[email protected]>cxl/features: Reject Set Features output buffer smaller than the header
cxlctl_set_feature()sizes its output buffer from the user's fwctl_rpc.out_len but never checks it is large enough to hold even thefwctl_rpc_cxl_outheader. Without_len== 0 ,kvzalloc()returnsZERO_SIZE_PTR, which passes the !rpc_out check, the subsequentrpc_out->size= 0 then writes through the poison pointer.drivers/cxl/core/features.c static void *cxlctl_set_feature(struct cxl_features_state *cxlfs, · line 525
Quoted 11 lines
drivers/cxl/core/features.c +3
-0@@ -520,6 +520,9 @@ static void *cxlctl_set_feature(struct cxl_features_state *cxlfs, flags =le32_to_cpu (feat_in->flags); out_size = *out_len; +if (out_size < offsetof(struct fwctl_rpc_cxl_out , payload)) +return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); +[Severity: Critical]
This is a pre-existing issue, but missing validation of the user-providedin_lenparameter allows aZERO_SIZE_PTRdereference and out-of-bounds reads.If a malicious user passes in_len=0 to the
FWCTL_RPCioctl, kvzalloc(0) returns theZERO_SIZE_PTRconstant (0x10) in drivers/fwctl/main.c:fwctl_cmd_rpc():void *inbuf __free(kvfree) = kvzalloc(cmd->in_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);The driver unconditionally dereferences this pointer in drivers/cxl/core/features.c:cxlctl_fw_rpc():
const struct fwctl_rpc_cxl *rpc_in = in; u16 opcode = rpc_in->opcode;Also, if a user provides a small
in_lenbut specifies a massiveop_sizein the command header, handlers likecxlctl_set_feature()will read out of bounds of the kvzalloc'd heap buffer and transmit that data to the hardware mailbox:data_size = rpc_in->op_size - sizeof(feat_in->hdr); rc = cxl_set_feature(cxl_mbox, &feat_in->uuid, feat_in->version, feat_in->feat_data, data_size, flags, offset, &return_code);
Quoted 9 lines
Should there be validation of
in_lenbefore casting and accessing the input buffer, as well as a check to ensurerpc_in->op_sizedoes not exceedin_len?Quoted 3 lines
drivers/cxl/core/features.c +0
-0struct fwctl_rpc_cxl_out *rpc_out __free(kvfree) =kvzalloc (out_size,GFP_KERNEL );if (!rpc_out)Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=2
Same as the previous one,
addressed here
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cxl/[email protected]/
--Richard
Re: [PATCH v3 2/3] cxl/features: Reject Set Features output buffer smaller than the header
In reply to Richard ChengQuoted 6 lines · Richard Cheng
cxlctl_set_feature()sizes its output buffer from the user's fwctl_rpc.out_len but never checks it is large enough to hold even thefwctl_rpc_cxl_outheader. Without_len== 0 ,kvzalloc()returnsZERO_SIZE_PTR, which passes the !rpc_out check, the subsequentrpc_out->size= 0 then writes through the poison pointer.
Quoted 6 lines
Reject requests whose output buffer can't hold the response header, before allocating. The Set Feature reply carries no payload, so the header is all that is required.
Fixes eb5dfcb9e36d ("cxl: Add support to handle user feature commands for set feature")Signed-off-by Richard Cheng <[email protected]>
Quoted 23 lines
---
Changelog:v2 -> v3:
- New patch.drivers/cxl/core/features.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)drivers/cxl/core/features.c +3
-0@@ -520,6 +520,9 @@ static void *cxlctl_set_feature(struct cxl_features_state *cxlfs, flags =le32_to_cpu (feat_in->flags); out_size = *out_len; +if (out_size < offsetof(struct fwctl_rpc_cxl_out , payload)) +return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); + struct fwctl_rpc_cxl_out *rpc_out __free(kvfree) =kvzalloc (out_size,GFP_KERNEL );if (!rpc_out)
Re: [PATCH v3 2/3] cxl/features: Reject Set Features output buffer smaller than the header
In reply to Richard ChengQuoted 9 lines · Richard Cheng
cxlctl_set_feature()sizes its output buffer from the user's fwctl_rpc.out_len but never checks it is large enough to hold even thefwctl_rpc_cxl_outheader. Without_len== 0 ,kvzalloc()returnsZERO_SIZE_PTR, which passes the !rpc_out check, the subsequentrpc_out->size= 0 then writes through the poison pointer.Reject requests whose output buffer can't hold the response header, before allocating. The Set Feature reply carries no payload, so the header is all that is required.
See my message on the ndctl PATCH wrt adding a test case for this one.
PATCH v3 3/3 cxl/features: Clamp Get Feature output size to the remaining buffer
In reply to Richard Chengcxl_get_feature() reads a feature in a loop but passes a fixed size_out as the output capacity every iteration. On the last partial iteration the buffer has less room left, so a device that returns more than asked can overflow feat_out.
Use the per-iter size data_to_rd_size, which already tracks the remaining room, as the output capacity.
---
Changelog:
v2 -> v3:
- New patch.
drivers/cxl/core/features.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/cxl/core/features.c +2 -3
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ size_t cxl_get_feature(struct cxl_mailbox *cxl_mbox, const uuid_t *feat_uuid, void *feat_out, size_t feat_out_size, u16 offset, u16 *return_code) { - size_t data_to_rd_size, size_out; + size_t data_to_rd_size;struct cxl_mbox_get_feat_in pi;struct cxl_mbox_cmd mbox_cmd;size_t data_rcvd_size =0 ;
@@ -237,7 +237,6 @@ size_t cxl_get_feature(struct cxl_mailbox *cxl_mbox, const uuid_t *feat_uuid,if (!feat_out || !feat_out_size)return 0 ; - size_out =min (feat_out_size, cxl_mbox->payload_size);uuid_copy (&pi.uuid, feat_uuid); pi.selection = selection; do {
@@ -250,7 +249,7 @@ size_t cxl_get_feature(struct cxl_mailbox *cxl_mbox, const uuid_t *feat_uuid, .opcode = CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_FEATURE, .size_in = sizeof(pi), .payload_in = &pi, - .size_out = size_out, + .size_out = data_to_rd_size, .payload_out = feat_out + data_rcvd_size, .min_out = data_to_rd_size, };
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH v3 3/3] cxl/features: Clamp Get Feature output size to the remaining buffer
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Silent 16-bit offset wrap-around in CXL feature commands allows device state corruption. --
commit 55606972e1fe115ff716307a2dad0a662361b0c3
Author: Richard Cheng <[email protected]>
cxl/features: Clamp Get Feature output size to the remaining buffer
cxl_get_feature() reads a feature in a loop but passes a fixed size_out as the output capacity every iteration. This commit changes size_out to use the remaining per-iter size, preventing a device from overflowing feat_out on the last partial iteration.
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/cxl/core/features.c +0
-0
[ ... ]
drivers/cxl/core/features.c size_t cxl_get_feature(struct cxl_mailbox *cxl_mbox, const uuid_t *feat_uuid,
Quoted 9 lines
drivers/cxl/core/features.c +0
-1@@ -237,7 +237,6 @@ size_t cxl_get_feature(struct cxl_mailbox *cxl_mbox, const uuid_t *feat_uuid,if (!feat_out || !feat_out_size)return 0 ; - size_out =min (feat_out_size, cxl_mbox->payload_size);uuid_copy (&pi.uuid, feat_uuid); pi.selection = selection; do {@@ -250,7 +249,7 @@ size_t cxl_get_feature(struct cxl_mailbox *cxl_mbox, const uuid_t *feat_uuid,
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does pi.offset silently overflow during the loop if offset + data_rcvd_size exceeds 65535?
Looking at cxl_get_feature(), pi.offset is updated right before this struct initialization:
pi.offset = cpu_to_le16(offset + data_rcvd_size);
Here offset is a u16 and data_rcvd_size is a size_t, but pi.offset is __le16. If a user requests a large operation through the fwctl interface that sums to greater than 65535, the offset will wrap around and truncate the value.
Could this cause the device to read from (or in the case of cxl_set_feature(), write to) the wrong offset, silently corrupting hardware feature data?
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/cxl/core/features.c +1
-1.opcode = CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_FEATURE, .size_in = sizeof(pi), .payload_in = &pi, - .size_out = size_out, + .size_out = data_to_rd_size, .payload_out = feat_out + data_rcvd_size, .min_out = data_to_rd_size, };
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=3
Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] cxl/features: Clamp Get Feature output size to the remaining buffer
Quoted 49 lines · On Fri, Jun 26, 2026 at 10:52:55AM +0800, [email protected] wrote:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Silent 16-bit offset wrap-around in CXL feature commands allows device state corruption. --commit
55606972e1fe115ff716307a2dad0a662361b0c3
Author: Richard Cheng <[email protected]>cxl/features: Clamp Get Feature output size to the remaining buffer
cxl_get_feature()reads a feature in a loop but passes a fixedsize_outas the output capacity every iteration. This commit changessize_outto use the remaining per-iter size, preventing a device from overflowingfeat_outon the last partial iteration.Quoted 4 lines
drivers/cxl/core/features.c +0
-0[ ... ]
drivers/cxl/core/features.c size_t cxl_get_feature(struct cxl_mailbox *cxl_mbox, const uuid_t *feat_uuid,
Quoted 9 lines
drivers/cxl/core/features.c +0
-1@@ -237,7 +237,6 @@ size_t cxl_get_feature(struct cxl_mailbox *cxl_mbox, const uuid_t *feat_uuid,if (!feat_out || !feat_out_size)return 0 ; - size_out =min (feat_out_size, cxl_mbox->payload_size);uuid_copy (&pi.uuid, feat_uuid); pi.selection = selection; do {@@ -250,7 +249,7 @@ size_t cxl_get_feature(struct cxl_mailbox *cxl_mbox, const uuid_t *feat_uuid,[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does pi.offset silently overflow during the loop if offset +data_rcvd_sizeexceeds 65535?Looking at
cxl_get_feature(), pi.offset is updated right before this struct initialization:pi.offset = cpu_to_le16(offset + data_rcvd_size);Here offset is a u16 and
data_rcvd_sizeis asize_t, but pi.offset is__le16. If a user requests a large operation through the fwctl interface that sums to greater than 65535, the offset will wrap around and truncate the value.Could this cause the device to read from (or in the case of
cxl_set_feature(), write to) the wrong offset, silently corrupting hardware feature data?
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/cxl/core/features.c +1
-1.opcode = CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_FEATURE, .size_in = sizeof(pi), .payload_in = &pi, - .size_out = size_out, + .size_out = data_to_rd_size, .payload_out = feat_out + data_rcvd_size, .min_out = data_to_rd_size, };Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=3
This is a different one , I'll include it in another series.
--Richard
Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] cxl/features: Clamp Get Feature output size to the remaining buffer
In reply to Richard ChengQuoted 10 lines · Richard Cheng
cxl_get_feature()reads a feature in a loop but passes a fixedsize_outas the output capacity every iteration. On the last partial iteration the buffer has less room left, so a device that returns more than asked can overflowfeat_out.Use the per-iter size
data_to_rd_size, which already tracks the remaining room, as the output capacity.Fixes 5e5ac21f629d ("cxl/mbox: Add GET_FEATURE mailbox command")Signed-off-by Richard Cheng <[email protected]>
Quoted 39 lines
---
Changelog:v2 -> v3:
- New patch.drivers/cxl/core/features.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)drivers/cxl/core/features.c +2
-3@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ size_t cxl_get_feature(struct cxl_mailbox *cxl_mbox, const uuid_t *feat_uuid, void *feat_out, size_t feat_out_size, u16 offset, u16 *return_code) { - size_t data_to_rd_size, size_out; + size_t data_to_rd_size;struct cxl_mbox_get_feat_in pi;struct cxl_mbox_cmd mbox_cmd;size_t data_rcvd_size =0 ;@@ -237,7 +237,6 @@ size_t cxl_get_feature(struct cxl_mailbox *cxl_mbox, const uuid_t *feat_uuid,if (!feat_out || !feat_out_size)return 0 ; - size_out =min (feat_out_size, cxl_mbox->payload_size);uuid_copy (&pi.uuid, feat_uuid); pi.selection = selection; do {@@ -250,7 +249,7 @@ size_t cxl_get_feature(struct cxl_mailbox *cxl_mbox, const uuid_t *feat_uuid, .opcode = CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_FEATURE, .size_in = sizeof(pi), .payload_in = &pi, - .size_out = size_out, + .size_out = data_to_rd_size, .payload_out = feat_out + data_rcvd_size, .min_out = data_to_rd_size, };
Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] cxl/features: Clamp Get Feature output size to the remaining buffer
In reply to Richard ChengQuoted 7 lines · Richard Cheng
cxl_get_feature()reads a feature in a loop but passes a fixedsize_outas the output capacity every iteration. On the last partial iteration the buffer has less room left, so a device that returns more than asked can overflowfeat_out.Use the per-iter size
data_to_rd_size, which already tracks the remaining room, as the output capacity.
Quoted 13 lines · Richard Cheng
The CXL fwctl feature handlers take buffer sizes from userspace, which is
out_len, and from the device without fully checking them. This series adds the missing bounds checks.Patch 1: reject a Get Feature whose count is larger than the output
buffer.
Patch 2: reject a Set Feature whose output buffer is too small for the
reply header. A zeroout_lenmakeskvzalloc()returnZERO_SIZE_PTR, and the header write then corrupts memory.
Patch 3: clamp the Get Feature read loop to the room left in the output
buffer, so a device that returns more than requested cannot write past it.
Quoted 9 lines
A related gap is fixed separately by Zhenhao Wan's patch [1].
Changes since v2:
- Expand the single Get Feature fix into a series that also covers the Set Feature output buffer and the Get Feature read loop.
Hello,
Just a gentle ping on this serie.
As https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cxl/[email protected]/
landed , I think these are worth to be taken a look as well?
Best regards,
Richard Cheng.
Quoted 14 lines
Richard Cheng (3):
cxl/features: Reject Get Feature count larger than the output buffer cxl/features: Reject Set Features output buffer smaller than the
header
cxl/features: Clamp Get Feature output size to the remaining bufferdrivers/cxl/core/features.c | 12 +++++++++--- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)base-commit:
ef0c9f75a19532d7675384708fc8621e10850104Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Dave Jiang
maintainerQuoted 28 lines · Richard Cheng
The CXL fwctl feature handlers take buffer sizes from userspace, which is
out_len, and from the device without fully checking them. This series adds the missing bounds checks.Patch 1: reject a Get Feature whose count is larger than the output
buffer.
Patch 2: reject a Set Feature whose output buffer is too small for the
reply header. A zeroout_lenmakeskvzalloc()returnZERO_SIZE_PTR, and the header write then corrupts memory.
Patch 3: clamp the Get Feature read loop to the room left in the output
buffer, so a device that returns more than requested cannot write past it.A related gap is fixed separately by Zhenhao Wan's patch [1].
Changes since v2:
- Expand the single Get Feature fix into a series that also covers the Set Feature output buffer and the Get Feature read loop.[1]:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/Richard Cheng (3):
cxl/features: Reject Get Feature count larger than the output buffer cxl/features: Reject Set Features output buffer smaller than the
header
cxl/features: Clamp Get Feature output size to the remaining buffer
Quoted 5 lines
drivers/cxl/core/features.c | 12 +++++++++--- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)base-commit:
ef0c9f75a19532d7675384708fc8621e10850104
Applied to cxl/next2aeb21fe557e cxl/features: Clamp Get Feature output size to the remaining buffer cde18d6c1d91 cxl/features: Reject Set Features output buffer smaller than the header 4bf6bac37507 cxl/features: Reject Get Feature count larger than the output buffer
There was a conflict for 2aeb21fe557e. May want to check that it applied correctly.