cargo: Fix CVE-2026-5222
PATCH 1/2 cargo: Fix CVE-2026-5222
From: Anil Dongare <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [2], using the commit shown in [1].
[1] https://github.com/rust-lang/cargo/commit/c4d63a44234de22dc745231c416b80ed848d997f
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-5222
Signed-off-by Anil Dongare <[email protected]>
--- .../rust/files/CVE-2026-5222.patch | 92 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-devtools/rust/rust-source.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 93 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rust/files/CVE-2026-5222.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/rust/files/CVE-2026-5222.patch new file +92 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +From c4d63a44234de22dc745231c416b80ed848d997f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Arlo Siemsen <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 25 May 2026 09:49:43 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2026-5222: avoid stripping .git suffix when for non git + registries + +CVE: CVE-2026-5222 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/rust-lang/cargo/commit/c4d63a44234de22dc745231c416b80ed848d997f] + +(cherry picked from commit c4d63a44234de22dc745231c416b80ed848d997f) +Signed-off-by: Anil Dongare <[email protected]> +--- + src/tools/cargo/src/cargo/sources/git/source.rs | 7 ++++ + src/tools/cargo/src/cargo/util/canonical_url.rs | 44 ++++++++++++++----------- + 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/tools/cargo/src/cargo/sources/git/source.rs b/src/tools/cargo/src/cargo/sources/git/source.rs +index d6dbe03..a7b3205 100644 +--- a/src/tools/cargo/src/cargo/sources/git/source.rs ++++ b/src/tools/cargo/src/cargo/sources/git/source.rs +@@ -470,6 +470,13 @@ mod test { + assert_eq!(ident1, ident2); + } + ++ #[test] ++ fn test_canonicalize_idents_does_not_strip_dot_git_for_sparse() { ++ let ident1 = ident(&src("sparse+https://crates.io/fake-registry")); ++ let ident2 = ident(&src("sparse+https://crates.io/fake-registry.git")); ++ assert_ne!(ident1, ident2); ++ } ++ + fn src(s: &str) -> SourceId { + SourceId::for_git(&s.into_url().unwrap(), GitReference::DefaultBranch).unwrap() + } +diff --git a/src/tools/cargo/src/cargo/util/canonical_url.rs b/src/tools/cargo/src/cargo/util/canonical_url.rs +index 7516e03..2716d2d 100644 +--- a/src/tools/cargo/src/cargo/util/canonical_url.rs ++++ b/src/tools/cargo/src/cargo/util/canonical_url.rs +@@ -33,27 +33,31 @@ impl CanonicalUrl { + url.path_segments_mut().unwrap().pop_if_empty(); + } + +- // For GitHub URLs specifically, just lower-case everything. GitHub +- // treats both the same, but they hash differently, and we're gonna be +- // hashing them. This wants a more general solution, and also we're +- // almost certainly not using the same case conversion rules that GitHub +- // does. (See issue #84) +- if url.host_str() == Some("github.com") { +- url = format!("https{}", &url[url::Position::AfterScheme..]) +- .parse() +- .unwrap(); +- let path = url.path().to_lowercase(); +- url.set_path(&path); +- } ++ // Perform further canonicalization specific to git registries, which ++ // do not contain a `+` specifier. ++ if !url.scheme().contains('+') { ++ // For GitHub URLs specifically, just lower-case everything. GitHub ++ // treats both the same, but they hash differently, and we're gonna be ++ // hashing them. This wants a more general solution, and also we're ++ // almost certainly not using the same case conversion rules that GitHub ++ // does. (See issue #84) ++ if url.host_str() == Some("github.com") { ++ url = format!("https{}", &url[url::Position::AfterScheme..]) ++ .parse() ++ .unwrap(); ++ let path = url.path().to_lowercase(); ++ url.set_path(&path); ++ } + +- // Repos can generally be accessed with or without `.git` extension. +- let needs_chopping = url.path().ends_with(".git"); +- if needs_chopping { +- let last = { +- let last = url.path_segments().unwrap().next_back().unwrap(); +- last[..last.len() - 4].to_owned() +- }; +- url.path_segments_mut().unwrap().pop().push(&last); ++ // Repos can generally be accessed with or without `.git` extension. ++ let needs_chopping = url.path().ends_with(".git"); ++ if needs_chopping { ++ let last = { ++ let last = url.path_segments().unwrap().next_back().unwrap(); ++ last[..last.len() - 4].to_owned() ++ }; ++ url.path_segments_mut().unwrap().pop().push(&last); ++ } + } + + Ok(CanonicalUrl(url)) +-- +2.44.4
meta/recipes-devtools/rust/rust-source.inc +1 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ SRC_URI += "https://static.rust-lang.org/dist/rustc-${RUST_VERSION}-src.tar.xz;n file://0001-Update-amdgpu-data-layout.patch;patchdir=${RUSTSRC} \ file://0001-Adjust-loongarch-assembly-test.patch;patchdir=${RUSTSRC} \ file://0001-Fix-multiple-option-or-permutations-test-for-big-end.patch;patchdir=${RUSTSRC} \ + file://CVE-2026-5222.patch;patchdir=${RUSTSRC} \ " SRC_URI[rust.sha256sum] = "174fce10ce012317ca995810296d8af199318838180b03d68a853e0f02d4b571"
Signature · 1 line
2.44.4
PATCH 2/2 cargo: Fix CVE-2026-5223
From: Anil Dongare <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [2], using the commit shown in [1].
[1] https://github.com/rust-lang/cargo/commit/285cebf58911eca5b7f177f5d0b1c53e1f646577
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-5223
Signed-off-by Anil Dongare <[email protected]>
--- .../rust/files/CVE-2026-5223.patch | 125 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-devtools/rust/rust-source.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 126 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rust/files/CVE-2026-5223.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/rust/files/CVE-2026-5223.patch new file +125 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +From 285cebf58911eca5b7f177f5d0b1c53e1f646577 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Josh Triplett <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2026 10:35:55 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2026-5223: prohibit unpacking symlinks and other + unexpected entries + +Cargo has historically not allowed creating .crate packages containing +symlinks. (It packages the symlink target in place of the symlink, +instead.) So, any package containing a symlink would have to be +hand-constructed. Such packages are also not allowed on crates.io, so it +could only come from an alternate registry. + +Rather than dealing with symlink traversal attacks when unpacking a +crate, just prohibit symlinks entirely. + +In the process, also prohibit other kinds of unusual entries. As an +exception, allow character devices but warn about them, because some +exist in crates on crates.io. + +CVE: CVE-2026-5223 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/rust-lang/cargo/commit/285cebf58911eca5b7f177f5d0b1c53e1f646577] + +(cherry picked from commit 285cebf58911eca5b7f177f5d0b1c53e1f646577) +Signed-off-by: Anil Dongare <[email protected]> +--- + src/tools/cargo/src/cargo/sources/registry/mod.rs | 10 +++++- + src/tools/cargo/tests/testsuite/registry.rs | 39 ++++++++++------------- + 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/tools/cargo/src/cargo/sources/registry/mod.rs b/src/tools/cargo/src/cargo/sources/registry/mod.rs +index 04d4ec3..d152a1e 100644 +--- a/src/tools/cargo/src/cargo/sources/registry/mod.rs ++++ b/src/tools/cargo/src/cargo/sources/registry/mod.rs +@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ use cargo_util::paths::{self, exclude_from_backups_and_indexing}; + use flate2::read::GzDecoder; + use serde::Deserialize; + use serde::Serialize; +-use tar::Archive; ++use tar::{Archive, EntryType}; + use tracing::debug; + + use crate::core::dependency::Dependency; +@@ -1088,6 +1088,14 @@ fn unpack( + ) + } + ++ // Prevent unpacking symlinks and other unexpected entry types ++ match entry.header().entry_type() { ++ EntryType::Regular | EntryType::Directory => {} ++ t => anyhow::bail!( ++ "invalid tarball downloaded, contains an entry at {entry_path:?} with invalid type {t:?}", ++ ), ++ } ++ + // Prevent unpacking the lockfile from the crate itself. + if entry_path + .file_name() +diff --git a/src/tools/cargo/tests/testsuite/registry.rs b/src/tools/cargo/tests/testsuite/registry.rs +index 5a30dad..4a4e836 100644 +--- a/src/tools/cargo/tests/testsuite/registry.rs ++++ b/src/tools/cargo/tests/testsuite/registry.rs +@@ -3274,8 +3274,7 @@ fn package_lock_inside_package_is_overwritten() { + } + + #[cargo_test] +-fn package_lock_as_a_symlink_inside_package_is_overwritten() { +- let registry = registry::init(); ++fn package_lock_as_a_symlink_inside_package_is_invalid() { + let p = project() + .file( + "Cargo.toml", +@@ -3298,21 +3297,23 @@ fn package_lock_as_a_symlink_inside_package_is_overwritten() { + .symlink(".cargo-ok", "src/lib.rs") + .publish(); + +- p.cargo("check").run(); ++ p.cargo("check") ++ .with_status(101) ++ .with_stderr_data(str![[r#" ++[UPDATING] `dummy-registry` index ++[LOCKING] 1 package to latest compatible version ++[DOWNLOADING] crates ... ++[DOWNLOADED] bar v0.0.1 (registry `dummy-registry`) ++[ERROR] failed to download replaced source registry `crates-io` + +- let id = SourceId::for_registry(registry.index_url()).unwrap(); +- let hash = cargo::util::hex::short_hash(&id); +- let pkg_root = paths::cargo_home() +- .join("registry") +- .join("src") +- .join(format!("-{}", hash)) +- .join("bar-0.0.1"); +- let ok = pkg_root.join(".cargo-ok"); +- let librs = pkg_root.join("src/lib.rs"); ++Caused by: ++ failed to unpack package `bar v0.0.1 (registry `dummy-registry`)` + +- // Is correctly overwritten and doesn't affect the file linked to +- assert_eq!(ok.metadata().unwrap().len(), 7); +- assert_eq!(fs::read_to_string(librs).unwrap(), "pub fn f() {}"); ++Caused by: ++ invalid tarball downloaded, contains an entry at "bar-0.0.1/.cargo-ok" with invalid type Symlink ++ ++"#]]) ++ .run(); + } + + #[cargo_test] +@@ -4751,13 +4752,7 @@ Caused by: + failed to unpack package `bar v1.0.0 (registry `dummy-registry`)` + + Caused by: +- failed to unpack entry at `bar-1.0.0/smuggled` +- +-Caused by: +- failed to unpack `[ROOT]/home/.cargo/registry/src/-[HASH]/bar-1.0.0/smuggled` +- +-Caused by: +- [..] when creating dir [ROOT]/home/.cargo/registry/src/-[HASH]/bar-1.0.0/smuggled ++ invalid tarball downloaded, contains an entry at "bar-1.0.0/smuggled" with invalid type Symlink + + "#]]) + .run(); +-- +2.44.4
meta/recipes-devtools/rust/rust-source.inc +1 -0
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ SRC_URI += "https://static.rust-lang.org/dist/rustc-${RUST_VERSION}-src.tar.xz;n file://0001-Adjust-loongarch-assembly-test.patch;patchdir=${RUSTSRC} \ file://0001-Fix-multiple-option-or-permutations-test-for-big-end.patch;patchdir=${RUSTSRC} \ file://CVE-2026-5222.patch;patchdir=${RUSTSRC} \ + file://CVE-2026-5223.patch;patchdir=${RUSTSRC} \ " SRC_URI[rust.sha256sum] = "174fce10ce012317ca995810296d8af199318838180b03d68a853e0f02d4b571"
Signature · 1 line
2.44.4