net: usb: cx82310_eth: stop parsing reboot marker as packet
Subsystems (4)
PATCH 1/1 net: usb: cx82310_eth: stop parsing reboot marker as packet
From: Tianchu Chen <[email protected]>
Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.
cx82310_rx_fixup() treats an RX length of 0xffff as a device reboot marker and schedules work to re-enable ethernet mode, but then continues processing the marker as a normal packet length. This is an out-of-bounds heap write controlled by the usb device.
Return immediately after scheduling the recovery work so the marker skb is dropped instead of being assembled as packet data.
--- drivers/net/usb/cx82310_eth.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/usb/cx82310_eth.c +1 -0
@@ -282,6 +282,7 @@ static int cx82310_rx_fixup(struct usbnet *dev, struct sk_buff *skb)if (len ==0xffff ) {netdev_info (dev->net,"router was rebooted, re-enabling ethernet mode" );schedule_work (&priv->reenable_work); +return 0 ; }else if (len >CX82310_MTU ) {netdev_err (dev->net,"RX packet too long: %d B\n" , len);return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Jakub Kicinski
maintainerQuoted 8 lines · On Thu, 25 Jun 2026 15:32:04 +0000 Tianchu Chen wrote:
From: Tianchu Chen <[email protected]>
Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.
cx82310_rx_fixup()treats an RX length of0xffffas a device reboot marker and schedules work to re-enable ethernet mode, but then continues processing the marker as a normal packet length. This is an out-of-bounds heap write controlled by the usb device.
Where? Can you be more specific in the commit message? At a glance the accesses seem to be bound-checked with skb->len.
Signature · 1 line
pw-bot: cr
Quoted 8 lines · Jakub Kicinski
Quoted 5 lines · On Thu, 25 Jun 2026 15:32:04 +0000 Tianchu Chen wrote:
From: Tianchu Chen <[email protected]>
Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 5 lines
cx82310_rx_fixup()treats an RX length of0xffffas a device reboot marker and schedules work to re-enable ethernet mode, but then continues processing the marker as a normal packet length. This is an out-of-bounds heap write controlled by the usb device.Where? Can you be more specific in the commit message? At a glance the accesses seem to be bound-checked with
skb->len.Signature · 1 line
pw-bot: cr
The "len > skb->len" check bounds the source read, but the overflow is on the destination buffer.
The buggy path is:
if (len == 0xffff) {
netdev_info(dev->net, "router was rebooted, re-enabling ethernet mode");
schedule_work(&priv->reenable_work);
/* <- BUG: missing return; 0xffff bypasses the oversized-length reject */
} else if (len > CX82310_MTU) {
netdev_err(dev->net, "RX packet too long: %d B\n", len);
return 0;
}
if (len > skb->len) {
dev->partial_len = skb->len; // skb->len is bounded by the USB transfer size (4K)
dev->partial_rem = len - skb->len;
memcpy((void *)dev->partial_data, skb->data,
dev->partial_len); /* <- TRIGGER: can copy 4K bytes into 1516-byte partial_data */
...
...
}For normal oversized lengths, the len > CX82310_MTU branch rejects before this copy. But 0xffff is special-cased and falls through. With a 4096-byte RX URB, after the 2-byte length header is pulled, skb->len can be 4094, while partial_data is allocated as dev->hard_mtu (CX82310_MTU + 2, 1516 bytes).
So the source read is bounded by skb->len; the destination write is not.
I am happy to send a v2 with this spelled out more clearly in the commit message if needed.
Best regards,
Tianchu Chen
Jakub Kicinski
maintainerQuoted 23 lines · On Tue, 30 Jun 2026 10:30:53 +0000 Tianchu Chen wrote:
Quoted 5 lines · Jakub Kicinski
Quoted 4 lines · On Thu, 25 Jun 2026 15:32:04 +0000 Tianchu Chen wrote:
From: Tianchu Chen <[email protected]>
Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 5 lines
cx82310_rx_fixup()treats an RX length of0xffffas a device reboot marker and schedules work to re-enable ethernet mode, but then continues processing the marker as a normal packet length. This is an out-of-bounds heap write controlled by the usb device.Where? Can you be more specific in the commit message? At a glance the accesses seem to be bound-checked with
skb->len.Signature · 1 line
pw-bot: crThe "len >
skb->len" check bounds the source read, but the overflow is on the destination buffer.The buggy path is:
Quoted 13 lines
if (len == 0xffff) {
netdev_info(dev->net, "router was rebooted, re-enabling ethernet mode");
schedule_work(&priv->reenable_work);
/* <- BUG: missing return; 0xffff bypasses the oversized-length reject */
} else if (len > CX82310_MTU) {
netdev_err(dev->net, "RX packet too long: %d B\n", len);
return 0;
}
if (len > skb->len) {
dev->partial_len = skb->len; // skb->len is bounded by the USB transfer size (4K)
dev->partial_rem = len - skb->len;
memcpy((void *)dev->partial_data, skb->data,
dev->partial_len); /* <- TRIGGER: can copy 4K bytes into 1516-byte partial_data */If skb->len (== dev->partial_len) is not bound-checked to the size of dev->partial_data - aren't there more paths that could hit this overflow? Are you fixing the right thing?
Quoted 18 lines
...
...}For normal oversized lengths, the len >
CX82310_MTUbranch rejects before this copy. But0xffffis special-cased and falls through. With a 4096-byte RX URB, after the 2-byte length header is pulled,skb->lencan be 4094, whilepartial_datais allocated asdev->hard_mtu(CX82310_MTU+ 2, 1516 bytes).So the source read is bounded by
skb->len; the destination write is not.I am happy to send a v2 with this spelled out more clearly in the commit message if needed.
Best regards,
Tianchu Chen
Quoted 41 lines · Jakub Kicinski
Quoted 24 lines · On Tue, 30 Jun 2026 10:30:53 +0000 Tianchu Chen wrote:
June 30, 2026 at 8:44 AM, "Jakub Kicinski" <[email protected] mailto:[email protected]?to=%22Jakub%20Kicinski%22%20%3Ckuba%40kernel.org%3E > wrote:
Quoted 9 lines · On Thu, 25 Jun 2026 15:32:04 +0000 Tianchu Chen wrote:
From: Tianchu Chen <[email protected]>
Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.
cx82310_rx_fixup()treats an RX length of0xffffas a device reboot marker and schedules work to re-enable ethernet mode, but then continues processing the marker as a normal packet length. This is an out-of-bounds heap write controlled by the usb device.Where? Can you be more specific in the commit message? At a glance the accesses seem to be bound-checked with
skb->len.
--
pw-bot: crThe "len >
skb->len" check bounds the source read, but the overflow is on the destination buffer.The buggy path is:
Quoted 14 lines
if (len ==
0xffff) {
netdev_info(dev->net, "router was rebooted, re-enabling ethernet mode");schedule_work(&priv->reenable_work);
/* <- BUG: missing return;0xffffbypasses the oversized-length reject */ } else if (len >CX82310_MTU) {
netdev_err(dev->net, "RX packet too long: %d B\n", len);
return 0;
}
if (len >skb->len) {
dev->partial_len=skb->len; //skb->lenis bounded by the USB transfer size (4K)dev->partial_rem= len -skb->len;
memcpy((void *)dev->partial_data,skb->data,
dev->partial_len); /* <- TRIGGER: can copy 4K bytes into 1516-bytepartial_data*/
Quoted 3 lines
If
skb->len(==dev->partial_len) is not bound-checked to the size ofdev->partial_data- aren't there more paths that could hit this overflow? Are you fixing the right thing?
Yes, skb->len and CX82310_MTU are different limits here.
skb->len is the amount of data received in the current USB RX URB. This driver sets dev->rx_urb_size to 4096, so skb->len can be much larger than the network frame MTU.
The safety invariant for the partial_data copy is not that skb->len is MTU-bounded by itself. It is that, for normal frames, the code first rejects len > CX82310_MTU, and then reaches the partial-packet path only when len > skb->len. Therefore, on the normal path:
skb->len < len <= CX82310_MTU
so copying skb->len bytes into partial_data is safe, since partial_data is allocated as dev->hard_mtu = CX82310_MTU + 2.
The 0xffff reboot marker is the only case that breaks that invariant:
len == 0xffff is handled in a separate branch, and it just bypasses the "len > CX82310_MTU" check entirely.
So the only case that may trigger this OOB-write is len == 0xffff, which is a reboot signal and should be skipped from being parsed as normal packet.
Also, skb->len is governed by the USB RX URB size, not by the network MTU; it is a different length limit from CX82310_MTU.
I believe this addresses the concern, but please let me know if you see any remaining issue and/or would prefer a v2.
Best regards,
Tianchu