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net: gro: fix double aggregation of flush-marked skbs

PATCH Superseded Shiming Cheng 2 participants 4 messages Jul 7 – Jul 9

Subsystems (4)

v6 of 7 Superseded Latest is v7 →

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#0 lore raw

PATCH v6 1/1 net: gro: fix double aggregation of flush-marked skbs

The skb_gro_receive_list() function is missing a critical safety check that exists in the skb_gro_receive() implementation. Specifically, it does not validate NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush before allowing packet aggregation, as of commit 0ab03f353d36 ("net-gro: Fix GRO flush when receiving a GSO packet.").

This allows already-GRO'd packets with existing frag_list to be re-aggregated into a new GRO session, corrupting the frag_list chain structure. When skb_segment() attempts to unpack these malformed packets, it encounters invalid state and triggers a kernel panic.

Scenario (Tethering/Device forwarding):
1. Driver: Generated aggregated packet P1 via LRO with frag_list
2. Dev A: Receives aggregated fraglist packet and flush flag set
3. Dev A: Re-enters GRO, skb_gro_receive_list() is called
4. Missing flush check allows re-aggregation despite flush flag
5. Frag_list chain becomes corrupted (loops or dangling refs)
6. Dev B: TX path calls skb_segment(), crashes on corrupted frag_list

Root cause in skb_segment():
The check at line ~4891:

    if (hsize <= 0 && i >= nfrags && skb_headlen(list_skb) &&
        (skb_headlen(list_skb) == len || sg)) {

When frag_list is corrupted by double aggregation, when list_skb is a NULL pointer from skb->next, skb_headlen(list_skb) dereference NULL/corrupted pointers occurs.

Call Trace:
 skb_headlen(NULL skb)
 skb_segment
 tcp_gso_segment
 tcp4_gso_segment
 inet_gso_segment
 skb_mac_gso_segment
 __skb_gso_segment
 skb_gso_segment
 validate_xmit_skb
 validate_xmit_skb_list
 sch_direct_xmit
 qdisc_restart
 __qdisc_run
 qdisc_run
 net_tx_action

Fix: Add NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush validation to the early-return check in skb_gro_receive_list(), matching the defensive programming pattern of skb_gro_receive().

Fixes 3a1296a38d0c ("net: Support GRO/GSO fraglist chaining.")
---
 net/core/gro.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/core/gro.c +3 -1
index 35f2f708f010..b413f4a6462b 100644
@@ -229,7 +229,9 @@ int skb_gro_receive(struct sk_buff *p, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 int skb_gro_receive_list(struct sk_buff *p, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	if (unlikely(p->len + skb->len >= 65536))
+	/* make sure to check flush flag and to not merge */
+	if (unlikely(p->len + skb->len >= 65536 ||
+		     NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush))
 		return -E2BIG;
 
 	if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, skb_gro_offset(skb))) {
Signature · 1 line
2.45.2
#1 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Shiming Cheng

The skb_gro_receive_list() function is missing a critical safety check that exists in the skb_gro_receive() implementation. Specifically, it does not validate NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush before allowing packet aggregation, as of commit 0ab03f353d36 ("net-gro: Fix GRO flush when receiving a GSO packet.").

It does not check .. as of commit .. ?

No, skb_gro_receive checkos NAP_GRO_CB(skb)->flush as of that commit.

Quoted 68 lines

This allows already-GRO'd packets with existing frag_list to be re-aggregated into a new GRO session, corrupting the frag_list chain structure. When skb_segment() attempts to unpack these malformed packets, it encounters invalid state and triggers a kernel panic.

Scenario (Tethering/Device forwarding):
1. Driver: Generated aggregated packet P1 via LRO with frag_list
2. Dev A: Receives aggregated fraglist packet and flush flag set
3. Dev A: Re-enters GRO, skb_gro_receive_list() is called
4. Missing flush check allows re-aggregation despite flush flag
5. Frag_list chain becomes corrupted (loops or dangling refs)
6. Dev B: TX path calls skb_segment(), crashes on corrupted frag_list

Root cause in skb_segment():
The check at line ~4891:

    if (hsize <= 0 && i >= nfrags && skb_headlen(list_skb) &&
        (skb_headlen(list_skb) == len || sg)) {

When frag_list is corrupted by double aggregation, when list_skb is a NULL pointer from skb->next, skb_headlen(list_skb) dereference NULL/corrupted pointers occurs.

Call Trace:
 skb_headlen(NULL skb)
 skb_segment
 tcp_gso_segment
 tcp4_gso_segment
 inet_gso_segment
 skb_mac_gso_segment
 __skb_gso_segment
 skb_gso_segment
 validate_xmit_skb
 validate_xmit_skb_list
 sch_direct_xmit
 qdisc_restart
 __qdisc_run
 qdisc_run
 net_tx_action

Fix: Add NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush validation to the early-return check in skb_gro_receive_list(), matching the defensive programming pattern of skb_gro_receive().

Fixes 3a1296a38d0c ("net: Support GRO/GSO fraglist chaining.")
---
 net/core/gro.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/core/gro.c +3 -1
index 35f2f708f010..b413f4a6462b 100644
@@ -229,7 +229,9 @@ int skb_gro_receive(struct sk_buff *p, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 int skb_gro_receive_list(struct sk_buff *p, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	if (unlikely(p->len + skb->len >= 65536))
+	/* make sure to check flush flag and to not merge */
+	if (unlikely(p->len + skb->len >= 65536 ||
+		     NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush))
 		return -E2BIG;
 
 	if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, skb_gro_offset(skb))) {
Signature · 1 line
2.45.2
#2 lore raw
Quoted 13 lines · Willem de Bruijn

External email : Please do not click links or open attachments until you have verified the sender or the content.

Quoted 7 lines · Shiming Cheng

The skb_gro_receive_list() function is missing a critical safety check
that exists in the skb_gro_receive() implementation. Specifically, it
does not validate NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush before allowing packet aggregation, as of commit 0ab03f353d36 ("net-gro: Fix GRO flush when receiving a GSO packet.").

Quoted 4 lines

It does not check .. as of commit .. ?

No, skb_gro_receive checkos NAP_GRO_CB(skb)->flush as of that commit.

Is this wording okay?

Commit 0ab03f353d36 ("net-gro: Fix GRO flush when receiving a GSO packet.") added a flush check to skb_gro_receive(), but skb_gro_receive_list() lacks the same validation.

As a result, packets marked with NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush may still be re-aggregated.

Quoted 77 lines
Quoted 75 lines

This allows already-GRO'd packets with existing frag_list to be re-aggregated into a new GRO session, corrupting the frag_list chain
structure. When skb_segment() attempts to unpack these malformed packets,
it encounters invalid state and triggers a kernel panic.

Scenario (Tethering/Device forwarding):
1. Driver: Generated aggregated packet P1 via LRO with frag_list
2. Dev A: Receives aggregated fraglist packet and flush flag set
3. Dev A: Re-enters GRO, skb_gro_receive_list() is called
4. Missing flush check allows re-aggregation despite flush flag
5. Frag_list chain becomes corrupted (loops or dangling refs)
6. Dev B: TX path calls skb_segment(), crashes on corrupted
frag_list

Root cause in skb_segment():
The check at line ~4891:

    if (hsize <= 0 && i >= nfrags && skb_headlen(list_skb) &&
        (skb_headlen(list_skb) == len || sg)) {

When frag_list is corrupted by double aggregation, when list_skb
is
a NULL pointer from skb->next, skb_headlen(list_skb) dereference NULL/corrupted pointers occurs.

Call Trace:
 skb_headlen(NULL skb)
 skb_segment
 tcp_gso_segment
 tcp4_gso_segment
 inet_gso_segment
 skb_mac_gso_segment
 __skb_gso_segment
 skb_gso_segment
 validate_xmit_skb
 validate_xmit_skb_list
 sch_direct_xmit
 qdisc_restart
 __qdisc_run
 qdisc_run
 net_tx_action

Fix: Add NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush validation to the early-return check in
skb_gro_receive_list(), matching the defensive programming pattern of
skb_gro_receive().

Fixes 3a1296a38d0c ("net: Support GRO/GSO fraglist chaining.")
---
 net/core/gro.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/core/gro.c +3 -1
index 35f2f708f010..b413f4a6462b 100644
@@ -229,7 +229,9 @@ int skb_gro_receive(struct sk_buff *p, struct
 sk_buff *skb)
 
 int skb_gro_receive_list(struct sk_buff *p, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-     if (unlikely(p->len + skb->len >= 65536))
+     /* make sure to check flush flag and to not merge */
+     if (unlikely(p->len + skb->len >= 65536 ||
+                  NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush))
              return -E2BIG;
 
      if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, skb_gro_offset(skb))) {

--
2.45.2

#3 lore raw
Quoted 19 lines · Shiming Cheng (成诗明)
Quoted 13 lines · Willem de Bruijn

External email : Please do not click links or open attachments until you have verified the sender or the content.

Quoted 7 lines · Shiming Cheng

The skb_gro_receive_list() function is missing a critical safety check
that exists in the skb_gro_receive() implementation. Specifically, it
does not validate NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush before allowing packet aggregation, as of commit 0ab03f353d36 ("net-gro: Fix GRO flush when receiving a GSO packet.").

Quoted 4 lines

It does not check .. as of commit .. ?

No, skb_gro_receive checkos NAP_GRO_CB(skb)->flush as of that commit.

Quoted 8 lines

Is this wording okay?

Commit 0ab03f353d36 ("net-gro: Fix GRO flush when receiving a GSO packet.") added a flush check to skb_gro_receive(), but skb_gro_receive_list() lacks the same validation.

As a result, packets marked with NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush may still be re-aggregated.

That sounds good to me, thanks.