lib: sbi_ipi: Validate hartids against domain, not HSM state
PATCH 1/1 lib: sbi_ipi: Validate hartids against domain, not HSM state
Commit 37eaca4ab33d ("lib: sbi_ipi: Return error for invalid hartids") added a weight check against the HSM-interruptible mask, which excludes harts in STOPPED state. This causes sbi_ipi_send_many() to return SBI_EINVAL when the kernel sends a remote fence (e.g. TLB shootdown) whose hmask includes a hart that was stopped by CPU hotplug:
__sbi_rfence_v02_call: hbase = [0] hmask = [0x3] failed (error [-22])
Validate requested hartids against the domain's assigned hartmask instead. This still rejects truly invalid or cross-domain hartids, but allows HSM-STOPPED harts to be silently skipped — which is safe because a stopped hart will do a full local TLB flush on its next HSM start before re-entering S-mode.
--- lib/sbi/sbi_ipi.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
lib/sbi/sbi_ipi.c +9 -2
@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ int sbi_ipi_send_many(ulong hmask, ulong hbase, u32 event, void *data)if (hbase !=-1UL ) {struct sbi_hartmask tmp_mask = {0 }; +struct sbi_hartmask domain_mask;int count =sbi_popcount (hmask);for (i = hbase; hmask; i++, hmask >>=1 ) {
@@ -143,10 +144,16 @@ int sbi_ipi_send_many(ulong hmask, ulong hbase, u32 event, void *data)sbi_hartmask_set_hartid (i, &tmp_mask); } -sbi_hartmask_and (&target_mask, &target_mask, &tmp_mask); +/* Validate hartids against domain assignment, not HSM state */ + rc =sbi_domain_get_assigned_hartmask (dom, &domain_mask); +if (rc) +return rc; -if (sbi_hartmask_weight (&target_mask) != count) +sbi_hartmask_and (&domain_mask, &domain_mask, &tmp_mask); +if (sbi_hartmask_weight (&domain_mask) != count)return SBI_EINVAL ; + +sbi_hartmask_and (&target_mask, &target_mask, &tmp_mask); }/* Send IPIs */
Signature · 7 lines
2.50.1 -- opensbi mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/opensbi
Hello everyone,
Friendly ping on this patch. Is there any comment on this fix? Thanks.
To summarize, commit 37eaca4ab33d ("lib: sbi_ipi: Return error for invalid hartids") added a weight check against the HSM-interruptible mask. This causes sbi_ipi_send_many() to return SBI_EINVAL when the kernel sends a remote fence whose hmask includes a hart that was stopped by CPU hotplug, because STOPPED harts are excluded from the HSM-interruptible mask:
__sbi_rfence_v02_call: hbase = [0] hmask = [0x3] failed (error [-22])
This patch changes the validation to use the domain's assigned hartmask instead, which still rejects truly invalid or cross-domain hartids while allowing HSM-STOPPED harts to be silently skipped.
Thanks,
Pei
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opensbi mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/opensbi
Quoted 9 lines · Chen Pei
Commit
37eaca4ab33d("lib:sbi_ipi: Return error for invalid hartids") added a weight check against the HSM-interruptible mask, which excludes harts in STOPPED state. This causessbi_ipi_send_many()to returnSBI_EINVALwhen the kernel sends a remote fence (e.g. TLB shootdown) whose hmask includes a hart that was stopped by CPU hotplug:
__sbi_rfence_v02_call: hbase = [0] hmask = [0x3] failed (error [-22])
Quoted 8 lines
Validate requested hartids against the domain's assigned hartmask instead. This still rejects truly invalid or cross-domain hartids, but allows HSM-STOPPED harts to be silently skipped — which is safe because a stopped hart will do a full local TLB flush on its next HSM start before re-entering S-mode.
Fixes 37eaca4ab33d ("lib: sbi_ipi: Return error for invalid hartids")Signed-off-by Chen Pei <[email protected]>
LGTM.
Applied this patch to the riscv/opensbi repo.
Thanks,
Anup
Quoted 43 lines
--- lib/sbi/sbi_ipi.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)lib/sbi/sbi_ipi.c +9
-3@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ int sbi_ipi_send_many(ulong hmask, ulong hbase, u32 event, void *data)if (hbase !=-1UL ) {struct sbi_hartmask tmp_mask = {0 }; +struct sbi_hartmask domain_mask;int count =sbi_popcount (hmask);for (i = hbase; hmask; i++, hmask >>=1 ) {@@ -143,10 +144,16 @@ int sbi_ipi_send_many(ulong hmask, ulong hbase, u32 event, void *data)sbi_hartmask_set_hartid (i, &tmp_mask); } -sbi_hartmask_and (&target_mask, &target_mask, &tmp_mask); +/* Validate hartids against domain assignment, not HSM state */ + rc =sbi_domain_get_assigned_hartmask (dom, &domain_mask); +if (rc) +return rc; -if (sbi_hartmask_weight (&target_mask) != count) +sbi_hartmask_and (&domain_mask, &domain_mask, &tmp_mask); +if (sbi_hartmask_weight (&domain_mask) != count)return SBI_EINVAL ; + +sbi_hartmask_and (&target_mask, &target_mask, &tmp_mask); }/* Send IPIs */ --2.50.1
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