cxl/mbox: Break poison list loop on an empty payload
Dave Jiang
maintainerPATCH 1/1 cxl/mbox: Break poison list loop on an empty payload
A device that returns count == 0 with CXL_POISON_FLAG_MORE set on every iteration never advances nr_records, so the max_errors guard never trips and the do/while loops forever while holding poison.mutex. That hangs the sysfs-triggered scan thread and blocks all subsequent poison operations on the device. The existing "Protect against an uncleared _FLAG_MORE" guard was intended to bound a misbehaving device but does not cover the count == 0 case.
Stop the loop on an empty payload so a malfunctioning or malicious device cannot wedge the poison scan.
--- drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c +5 -0
@@ -1455,6 +1455,11 @@ int cxl_mem_get_poison(struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd, u64 offset, u64 len,if (rc)break ; +if (!le16_to_cpu (po->count)) { +dev_dbg (&cxlmd->dev,"Poison empty payload!\n" ); +break ; + } +for (int i =0 ; i <le16_to_cpu (po->count); i++) trace_cxl_poison(cxlmd, cxlr, &po->record[i], po->flags, po->overflow_ts,
base-commit: 8cdeaa50eae8dad34885515f62559ee83e7e8dda
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
[email protected]
AI reviewThank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Out-of-bounds read of kernel memory due to unvalidated po->count from device payload. --
--- Patch [1]: [PATCH] cxl/mbox: Break poison list loop on an empty payload --- commit bae9e2badcecd54aec9a327464ba99a57b005a54
Author: Dave Jiang <[email protected]>
cxl/mbox: Break poison list loop on an empty payload
This commit prevents an infinite loop when a device returns count == 0 with CXL_POISON_FLAG_MORE set by breaking the poison list loop on an empty payload.
Quoted 3 lines
drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c +0
-0
[ ... ]
drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c int cxl_mem_get_poison(struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd, u64 offset, u64 len, · line 1464
Quoted 11 lines
drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c +5
-0@@ -1455,6 +1455,11 @@ int cxl_mem_get_poison(struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd, u64 offset, u64 len,if (rc)break ; +if (!le16_to_cpu (po->count)) { +dev_dbg (&cxlmd->dev,"Poison empty payload!\n" ); +break ; + } +for (int i =0 ; i <le16_to_cpu (po->count); i++) trace_cxl_poison(cxlmd, cxlr, &po->record[i],
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does this loop blindly trust the device provided count without validating it against the actual payload size?
If a malicious or malfunctioning device returns a small payload but specifies a large po->count, iterating up to le16_to_cpu(po->count) could read out of bounds of the allocated cxl_mbox->payload_size. The unvalidated memory is then passed to trace_cxl_poison().
Could we add a bounds check in cxl_mem_get_poison() to ensure the payload actually contains the expected number of records?
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
Quoted 10 lines · Dave Jiang
A device that returns count == 0 with
CXL_POISON_FLAG_MOREset on every iteration never advancesnr_records, so themax_errorsguard never trips and the do/while loops forever while holding poison.mutex. That hangs the sysfs-triggered scan thread and blocks all subsequent poison operations on the device. The existing "Protect against an uncleared_FLAG_MORE" guard was intended to bound a misbehaving device but does not cover the count == 0 case.Stop the loop on an empty payload so a malfunctioning or malicious device cannot wedge the poison scan.
I'm guessing Sashiko's new pre-existing complaint will appear as a new patch in the future, so for this one, let's get it merged:
Quoted 30 lines
Fixes ed83f7ca398b ("cxl/mbox: Add GET_POISON_LIST mailbox command")Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-8Signed-off-by Dave Jiang <[email protected]>--- drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c +5
-0@@ -1455,6 +1455,11 @@ int cxl_mem_get_poison(struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd, u64 offset, u64 len,if (rc)break ; +if (!le16_to_cpu (po->count)) { +dev_dbg (&cxlmd->dev,"Poison empty payload!\n" ); +break ; + } +for (int i =0 ; i <le16_to_cpu (po->count); i++) trace_cxl_poison(cxlmd, cxlr, &po->record[i], po->flags, po->overflow_ts,base-commit:
8cdeaa50eae8dad34885515f62559ee83e7e8ddaSignature · 1 line
2.54.0
Quoted 8 lines · Dave Jiang
A device that returns count == 0 with
CXL_POISON_FLAG_MOREset on every iteration never advancesnr_records, so themax_errorsguard never trips and the do/while loops forever while holding poison.mutex. That hangs the sysfs-triggered scan thread and blocks all subsequent poison operations on the device. The existing "Protect against an uncleared_FLAG_MORE" guard was intended to bound a misbehaving device but does not cover the count == 0 case.
Quoted 7 lines
Stop the loop on an empty payload so a malfunctioning or malicious device cannot wedge the poison scan.
Fixes ed83f7ca398b ("cxl/mbox: Add GET_POISON_LIST mailbox command")Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-8Signed-off-by Dave Jiang <[email protected]>
Applied to cxl/next8b301c4afbce
Quoted 22 lines
--- drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c +5
-0@@ -1455,6 +1455,11 @@ int cxl_mem_get_poison(struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd, u64 offset, u64 len,if (rc)break ; +if (!le16_to_cpu (po->count)) { +dev_dbg (&cxlmd->dev,"Poison empty payload!\n" ); +break ; + } +for (int i =0 ; i <le16_to_cpu (po->count); i++) trace_cxl_poison(cxlmd, cxlr, &po->record[i], po->flags, po->overflow_ts,base-commit:
8cdeaa50eae8dad34885515f62559ee83e7e8dda