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xfrm: defensively unhash xfrm_state lists in __xfrm_state_delete

PATCH Applied Mark Bundschuh 2 participants 2 messages Jul 10 – Jul 11 Stable branch

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PATCH 1/1 xfrm: defensively unhash xfrm_state lists in __xfrm_state_delete

From: Michal Kosiorek <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 14acf9652e5690de3c7486c6db5fb8dafd0a32a3 ]

KASAN reproduces a slab-use-after-free in __xfrm_state_delete()'s hlist_del_rcu calls under syzkaller load on linux-6.12.y stable (reproduced on 6.12.47, also reachable via the same code path on torvalds/master and on the ipsec tree). Nine unique signatures cluster in the xfrm_state lifecycle, the load-bearing one being:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __hlist_del include/linux/list.h:990 [inline]
  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hlist_del_rcu include/linux/rculist.h:516 [inline]
  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __xfrm_state_delete net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
  Write of size 8 at addr ffff8881198bcb70 by task kworker/u8:9/435

  Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
  Call Trace:
   __hlist_del / hlist_del_rcu
   __xfrm_state_delete
   xfrm_state_delete
   xfrm_state_flush
   xfrm_state_fini
   ops_exit_list
   cleanup_net

The other observed signatures hit the same slab object from __xfrm_state_lookup, xfrm_alloc_spi, __xfrm_state_insert and an OOB write variant of __xfrm_state_delete, all on the byseq/byspi hash chains.

__xfrm_state_delete() guards its byseq and byspi unhashes with value-based predicates:

	if (x->km.seq)
		hlist_del_rcu(&x->byseq);
	if (x->id.spi)
		hlist_del_rcu(&x->byspi);

while everywhere else in the file (e.g. state_cache, state_cache_input) the safer hlist_unhashed() check is used. xfrm_alloc_spi() sets x->id.spi = newspi inside xfrm_state_lock and then immediately inserts into byspi, but a path that observes x->id.spi != 0 outside of xfrm_state_lock can still skip-or-hit the byspi unhash inconsistently with whether x is actually on the list. The same holds for x->km.seq versus byseq, and the bydst/bysrc unhashes have no predicate at all, so a second __xfrm_state_delete() on the same object writes through LIST_POISON pprev.

The defensive change here:

- Use hlist_del_init_rcu() instead of hlist_del_rcu() on bydst, bysrc, byseq and byspi so a second deletion is a no-op rather than a write through LIST_POISON pprev. The byseq/byspi nodes are already initialised in xfrm_state_alloc().
- Test hlist_unhashed() rather than the value predicate for byseq/byspi, so the unhash decision tracks list state rather than mutable scalar fields.

Empirical verification: applied this patch on top of v6.12.47, rebuilt, and re-ran the same syzkaller harness for 1h16m on a previously-crashy configuration that produced ~100 hits each of slab-use-after-free Read in xfrm_alloc_spi / Read in __xfrm_state_lookup / Write in __xfrm_state_delete. After the patch, 7.1M execs across 32 VMs at ~1550 exec/sec produced zero xfrm_state UAF/OOB hits. /proc/slabinfo confirms the xfrm_state slab is actively allocated and freed during the run (~143 KiB resident), so the fuzzer is still exercising those code paths -- they just no longer crash.

Reproduction:

- Linux 6.12.47 x86_64 + KASAN_GENERIC + KASAN_INLINE + KCOV
- syzkaller @ 746545b8b1e4c3a128db8652b340d3df90ce61db
- 32 QEMU/KVM VMs x 2 vCPU on AWS c5.metal bare metal
- 9 unique signatures collected in ~9h, all within xfrm_state lifecycle

Fixes fe9f1d8779cb ("xfrm: add state hashtable keyed by seq")
Fixes 7b4dc3600e48 ("[XFRM]: Do not add a state whose SPI is zero to the SPI hash.")

[ 5.10: drop state_cache{,_input} lines from context because 81a331a ("xfrm: Add an inbound percpu state cache.") does not exist yet, drop xfrm_nat_keepalive_state_updated line from context because f531d13 ("xfrm: support sending NAT keepalives in ESP in UDP states") does not exist yet, and remove byseq since that optimization in fe9f1d8 ("xfrm:
add state hashtable keyed by seq") does not exist yet ]

net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c +5 -4
@@ -659,10 +659,11 @@ int __xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
 		x->km.state = XFRM_STATE_DEAD;
 		spin_lock(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock);
 		list_del(&x->km.all);
-		hlist_del_rcu(&x->bydst);
-		hlist_del_rcu(&x->bysrc);
-		if (x->id.spi)
-			hlist_del_rcu(&x->byspi);
+		hlist_del_init_rcu(&x->bydst);
+		hlist_del_init_rcu(&x->bysrc);
+
+		if (!hlist_unhashed(&x->byspi))
+			hlist_del_init_rcu(&x->byspi);
 		net->xfrm.state_num--;
 		spin_unlock(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock);
 
maintainer Applied
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Quoted 6 lines

From: Michal Kosiorek <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 14acf9652e5690de3c7486c6db5fb8dafd0a32a3 ]

KASAN reproduces a slab-use-after-free in __xfrm_state_delete()'s hlist_del_rcu calls under syzkaller load on linux-6.12.y stable

Queued for 5.10, thanks.

Signature · 2 lines
Thanks,
Sasha