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6.12.95-rc1 review

PATCH In review Greg Kroah-Hartman 9 participants 216 messages Jul 2 – Jul 10 Page 2 of 2

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author maintainer
#110 lore raw

PATCH 110/204 batman-adv: ensure bcast is writable before modifying TTL

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit 4cd6d3a4b96a8576f1fed8f9f9f17c2dc2978e0c upstream.

Before batman-adv is allowed to write to an skb, it either has to have its own copy of the skb or used skb_cow() to ensure that the data part is not shared.

The old implementation used a shared queue and created copies before attempting to write to it. But with the new implementation, the broadcast packet is already modified when it gets received. Potentially writing to shared buffers in this process.

Adding a skb_cow() right before this operation avoids this and can at the same time prepare it for the modifications required to rebroadcast the packet.

Fixes 3f69339068f9 ("batman-adv: bcast: queue per interface, if needed")
---
 net/batman-adv/routing.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
net/batman-adv/routing.c +6 -0
index f1061985149fc5..32a40c1c115c6a 100644
@@ -1198,6 +1198,12 @@ int batadv_recv_bcast_packet(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	if (batadv_is_my_mac(bat_priv, bcast_packet->orig))
 		goto free_skb;
 
+	/* create a copy of the skb, if needed, to modify it. */
+	if (skb_cow(skb, ETH_HLEN) < 0)
+		goto free_skb;
+
+	bcast_packet = (struct batadv_bcast_packet *)skb->data;
+
 	if (bcast_packet->ttl-- < 2)
 		goto free_skb;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#111 lore raw

PATCH 111/204 batman-adv: fix (m|b)cast csum after decrementing TTL

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit e728bbdf32660c8f32b8f5e8d09427a2c131ad60 upstream.

The broadcast and multicast packets can be received at the same time by the local system and forwarded to other nodes. Both are simply decrementing the TTL at the beginning of the receive path - independent of chosen paths (receive/forward). But such a modification of the data conflicts with the hw csum. This is not a problem when the packet is directly forwarded but can cause errors in the local receive path.

Such a problem can then trigger a "hw csum failure". The receiver path must therefore ensure that the csum is fixed for each modification of the payload before batadv_interface_rx() is reached.

Since all batman-adv packet types with a ttl have it as u8 at offset 2, a helper can be used for all of them. But it is only used at the moment for batadv_bcast_packet and batadv_mcast_packet because they are the only ones which deliver the packet locally but unconditionally modify the TTL.

Fixes 3f69339068f9 ("batman-adv: bcast: queue per interface, if needed")
Fixes 07afe1ba288c ("batman-adv: mcast: implement multicast packet reception and forwarding")
[ Context ]
---
 net/batman-adv/routing.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 56 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/batman-adv/routing.c +56 -2
index 32a40c1c115c6a..85bc2d284a7798 100644
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 #include "main.h"
 
 #include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/build_bug.h>
 #include <linux/byteorder/generic.h>
 #include <linux/compiler.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
@@ -205,6 +206,59 @@ bool batadv_check_management_packet(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	return true;
 }
 
+/**
+ * batadv_skb_decrement_ttl() - decrement ttl in a batman-adv header, csum-safe
+ * @skb: the received packet with @skb->data pointing to the batman-adv header
+ *
+ * Supports the following packet types, all of which carry the TTL at offset 2:
+ *
+ * - batadv_ogm_packet
+ * - batadv_ogm2_packet
+ * - batadv_icmp_header
+ * - batadv_icmp_packet
+ * - batadv_icmp_tp_packet
+ * - batadv_icmp_packet_rr
+ * - batadv_unicast_packet
+ * - batadv_frag_packet
+ * - batadv_bcast_packet
+ * - batadv_mcast_packet
+ * - batadv_coded_packet
+ * - batadv_unicast_tvlv_packet
+ *
+ * Return: true if the packet may be forwarded (ttl decremented),
+ *  false if it must be dropped (ttl would expire)
+ */
+static bool batadv_skb_decrement_ttl(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	static const size_t ttl_offset = 2;
+	u8 *ttl_pos;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_ogm_packet, ttl) != ttl_offset);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_ogm2_packet, ttl) != ttl_offset);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_icmp_header, ttl) != ttl_offset);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_icmp_packet, ttl) != ttl_offset);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_icmp_tp_packet, ttl) != ttl_offset);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_icmp_packet_rr, ttl) != ttl_offset);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_unicast_packet, ttl) != ttl_offset);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_frag_packet, ttl) != ttl_offset);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_bcast_packet, ttl) != ttl_offset);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_mcast_packet, ttl) != ttl_offset);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_coded_packet, ttl) != ttl_offset);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_unicast_tvlv_packet, ttl) != ttl_offset);
+
+	ttl_pos = skb->data + ttl_offset;
+
+	/* would expire on this hop -> drop, leave header + csum untouched */
+	if (*ttl_pos < 2)
+		return false;
+
+	skb_postpull_rcsum(skb, ttl_pos, 1);
+	(*ttl_pos)--;
+	skb_postpush_rcsum(skb, ttl_pos, 1);
+
+	return true;
+}
+
 /**
  * batadv_recv_my_icmp_packet() - receive an icmp packet locally
  * @bat_priv: the bat priv with all the soft interface information
@@ -1204,7 +1258,7 @@ int batadv_recv_bcast_packet(struct sk_buff *skb,
 
 	bcast_packet = (struct batadv_bcast_packet *)skb->data;
 
-	if (bcast_packet->ttl-- < 2)
+	if (!batadv_skb_decrement_ttl(skb))
 		goto free_skb;
 
 	orig_node = batadv_orig_hash_find(bat_priv, bcast_packet->orig);
@@ -1311,7 +1365,7 @@ int batadv_recv_mcast_packet(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		goto free_skb;
 
 	mcast_packet = (struct batadv_mcast_packet *)skb->data;
-	if (mcast_packet->ttl-- < 2)
+	if (!batadv_skb_decrement_ttl(skb))
 		goto free_skb;
 
 	tvlv_buff = (unsigned char *)(skb->data + hdr_size);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#112 lore raw

PATCH 112/204 batman-adv: frag: ensure fragment is writable before modifying TTL

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit b7293c6e8c15b2db77809b25cf8389e35331b27a upstream.

Before batman-adv is allowed to write to an skb, it either has to have its own copy of the skb or use skb_cow() to ensure that the data part is not shared. But batadv_frag_skb_fwd() modifies the TTL even when it is shared.

Adding a skb_cow() right before this operation avoids this and can at the same time prepare it for the modifications required to forward the fragment.

Fixes 610bfc6bc99b ("batman-adv: Receive fragmented packets and merge")
[ Context ]
---
 net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
 net/batman-adv/fragmentation.h |  3 ++-
 net/batman-adv/routing.c       |  3 +--
 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c +14 -1
index fd7cb789ae9a6a..f6714405b0f948 100644
@@ -384,6 +384,8 @@ bool batadv_frag_skb_buffer(struct sk_buff **skb,
  * @skb: skb to forward
  * @recv_if: interface that the skb is received on
  * @orig_node_src: originator that the skb is received from
+ * @rx_result: set to NET_RX_SUCCESS when the fragment was forwarded and
+ *  NET_RX_DROP when it was dropped; only valid when true is returned
  *
  * Look up the next-hop of the fragments payload and check if the merged packet
  * will exceed the MTU towards the next-hop. If so, the fragment is forwarded
@@ -393,7 +395,8 @@ bool batadv_frag_skb_buffer(struct sk_buff **skb,
  */
 bool batadv_frag_skb_fwd(struct sk_buff *skb,
 			 struct batadv_hard_iface *recv_if,
-			 struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node_src)
+			 struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node_src,
+			 int *rx_result)
 {
 	struct batadv_priv *bat_priv = netdev_priv(recv_if->soft_iface);
 	struct batadv_neigh_node *neigh_node = NULL;
@@ -412,12 +415,22 @@ bool batadv_frag_skb_fwd(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	 */
 	total_size = ntohs(packet->total_size);
 	if (total_size > neigh_node->if_incoming->net_dev->mtu) {
+		if (skb_cow(skb, ETH_HLEN) < 0) {
+			kfree_skb(skb);
+			*rx_result = NET_RX_DROP;
+			ret = true;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		packet = (struct batadv_frag_packet *)skb->data;
+
 		batadv_inc_counter(bat_priv, BATADV_CNT_FRAG_FWD);
 		batadv_add_counter(bat_priv, BATADV_CNT_FRAG_FWD_BYTES,
 				   skb->len + ETH_HLEN);
 
 		packet->ttl--;
 		batadv_send_unicast_skb(skb, neigh_node);
+		*rx_result = NET_RX_SUCCESS;
 		ret = true;
 	}
 
net/batman-adv/fragmentation.h +2 -1
index dbf0871f870303..51e281027ab630 100644
@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@ void batadv_frag_purge_orig(struct batadv_orig_node *orig,
 			    bool (*check_cb)(struct batadv_frag_table_entry *));
 bool batadv_frag_skb_fwd(struct sk_buff *skb,
 			 struct batadv_hard_iface *recv_if,
-			 struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node_src);
+			 struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node_src,
+			 int *rx_result);
 bool batadv_frag_skb_buffer(struct sk_buff **skb,
 			    struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node);
 int batadv_frag_send_packet(struct sk_buff *skb,
net/batman-adv/routing.c +1 -2
index 85bc2d284a7798..6fd18b69e5f6be 100644
@@ -1175,10 +1175,9 @@ int batadv_recv_frag_packet(struct sk_buff *skb,
 
 	/* Route the fragment if it is not for us and too big to be merged. */
 	if (!batadv_is_my_mac(bat_priv, frag_packet->dest) &&
-	    batadv_frag_skb_fwd(skb, recv_if, orig_node_src)) {
+	    batadv_frag_skb_fwd(skb, recv_if, orig_node_src, &ret)) {
 		/* skb was consumed */
 		skb = NULL;
-		ret = NET_RX_SUCCESS;
 		goto put_orig_node;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#113 lore raw

PATCH 113/204 batman-adv: frag: avoid underflow of TTL

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit 493d9d2528e1a09b090e4b37f0f553def7bd5ce9 upstream.

Packets with a TTL are using it to limit the amount of time this packet can be forwarded. But for batadv_frag_packet, the TTL was always only reduced but it was never evaluated. It could even underflow without any effect.

Check the TTL in batadv_frag_skb_fwd() before attempting to prepare it for forwarding. This keeps it in sync with the not fragmented unicast packet.

Fixes 610bfc6bc99b ("batman-adv: Receive fragmented packets and merge")
---
 net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c +7 -0
index f6714405b0f948..375c9499121346 100644
@@ -415,6 +415,13 @@ bool batadv_frag_skb_fwd(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	 */
 	total_size = ntohs(packet->total_size);
 	if (total_size > neigh_node->if_incoming->net_dev->mtu) {
+		if (packet->ttl < 2) {
+			kfree_skb(skb);
+			*rx_result = NET_RX_DROP;
+			ret = true;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
 		if (skb_cow(skb, ETH_HLEN) < 0) {
 			kfree_skb(skb);
 			*rx_result = NET_RX_DROP;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#114 lore raw

PATCH 114/204 batman-adv: v: prevent OGM aggregation on disabled hardif

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit d11c00b95b2a3b3934007fc003dccc6fdcc061ad upstream.

When an interface gets disabled, the worker is correctly disabled by batadv_hardif_disable_interface() -> ... -> batadv_v_ogm_iface_disable(). In this process, the skb aggr_list is also freed.

But batadv_v_ogm_send_meshif() can still queue new skbs (via batadv_v_ogm_queue_on_if()) to the aggr_list. This will only stop after all cores can no longer find the RCU protected list of hard interfaces. These queued skbs will never be freed or consumed by batadv_v_ogm_aggr_work.

The batadv_v_ogm_iface_disable() function must block batadv_v_ogm_queue_on_if() to avoid leak of skbs.

Fixes f89255a02f1d ("batman-adv: BATMAN_V: introduce per hard-iface OGMv2 queues")
[ Context ]
---
 net/batman-adv/bat_v.c     |  1 +
 net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c | 12 ++++++++++++
 net/batman-adv/types.h     |  6 ++++++
 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+)
net/batman-adv/bat_v.c +1 -0
index d35479c465e2c4..e13b39121f2db8 100644
@@ -819,6 +819,7 @@ void batadv_v_hardif_init(struct batadv_hard_iface *hard_iface)
 
 	hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_len = 0;
 	skb_queue_head_init(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list);
+	hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list_enabled = false;
 	INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_wq,
 			  batadv_v_ogm_aggr_work);
 }
net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c +12 -0
index 8cfc3944dcfd52..48a67705eba85c 100644
@@ -254,11 +254,18 @@ static void batadv_v_ogm_queue_on_if(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 	}
 
 	spin_lock_bh(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list.lock);
+	if (!hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list_enabled) {
+		kfree_skb(skb);
+		goto unlock;
+	}
+
 	if (!batadv_v_ogm_queue_left(skb, hard_iface))
 		batadv_v_ogm_aggr_send(bat_priv, hard_iface);
 
 	hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_len += batadv_v_ogm_len(skb);
 	__skb_queue_tail(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list, skb);
+
+unlock:
 	spin_unlock_bh(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list.lock);
 }
 
@@ -421,6 +428,10 @@ int batadv_v_ogm_iface_enable(struct batadv_hard_iface *hard_iface)
 {
 	struct batadv_priv *bat_priv = netdev_priv(hard_iface->soft_iface);
 
+	spin_lock_bh(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list.lock);
+	hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list_enabled = true;
+	spin_unlock_bh(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list.lock);
+
 	batadv_v_ogm_start_queue_timer(hard_iface);
 	batadv_v_ogm_start_timer(bat_priv);
 
@@ -436,6 +447,7 @@ void batadv_v_ogm_iface_disable(struct batadv_hard_iface *hard_iface)
 	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_wq);
 
 	spin_lock_bh(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list.lock);
+	hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list_enabled = false;
 	batadv_v_ogm_aggr_list_free(hard_iface);
 	spin_unlock_bh(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list.lock);
 }
net/batman-adv/types.h +6 -0
index f703d266780d74..3b2a170b1cf18b 100644
@@ -130,6 +130,12 @@ struct batadv_hard_iface_bat_v {
 	/** @aggr_list: queue for to be aggregated OGM packets */
 	struct sk_buff_head aggr_list;
 
+	/**
+	 * @aggr_list_enabled: aggr_list is active and new skbs can be
+	 * enqueued. Protected by aggr_list.lock after initialization
+	 */
+	bool aggr_list_enabled:1;
+
 	/** @aggr_len: size of the OGM aggregate (excluding ethernet header) */
 	unsigned int aggr_len;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#115 lore raw

PATCH 115/204 batman-adv: tp_meter: restrict number of unacked list entries

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit e7c775110e1858e5a7471a23a9c9658c0af9df89 upstream.

When the unacked_list is unbound, an attacker could send messages with small lengths and appropriated seqno + gaps to force the receiver to allocate more and more unacked_list entries. And the end either causing an out-of-memory situation or increase the management overhead for the (large) list that significant portions of CPU cycles are wasted in searching through the list.

When limiting the list to a specific number, it is important to still correctly add a new entry to the list. But if the list became larger than the limit, the last entry of the list (with the highest seqno) must be dropped to still allow the earlier seqnos to finish and therefore to continue the process. Otherwise, the process might get stuck with too high seqnos which are not handled by batadv_tp_ack_unordered().

Fixes 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation")
[ Switch to pre-splitted tp_vars structure names ]
---
 net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
 net/batman-adv/types.h    |  3 +++
 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c +22 -1
index 133eed2fa9507f..638dd438a6c052 100644
@@ -87,6 +87,11 @@
 #define BATADV_TP_PLEN (BATADV_TP_PACKET_LEN - ETH_HLEN - \
 			sizeof(struct batadv_unicast_packet))
 
+/**
+ * BATADV_TP_MAX_UNACKED - maximum number of packets a receiver didn't yet ack
+ */
+#define BATADV_TP_MAX_UNACKED 100
+
 static u8 batadv_tp_prerandom[4096] __read_mostly;
 
 /**
@@ -1195,6 +1200,7 @@ static void batadv_tp_receiver_shutdown(struct timer_list *t)
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(un, safe, &tp_vars->unacked_list, list) {
 		list_del(&un->list);
 		kfree(un);
+		tp_vars->unacked_count--;
 	}
 	spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
 
@@ -1308,6 +1314,7 @@ static bool batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars,
 	/* if the list is empty immediately attach this new object */
 	if (list_empty(&tp_vars->unacked_list)) {
 		list_add(&new->list, &tp_vars->unacked_list);
+		tp_vars->unacked_count++;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -1338,12 +1345,24 @@ static bool batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars,
 		 */
 		list_add(&new->list, &un->list);
 		added = true;
+		tp_vars->unacked_count++;
 		break;
 	}
 
 	/* received packet with smallest seqno out of order; add it to front */
-	if (!added)
+	if (!added) {
 		list_add(&new->list, &tp_vars->unacked_list);
+		tp_vars->unacked_count++;
+	}
+
+	/* remove the last (biggest) unacked seqno when list is too large */
+	if (tp_vars->unacked_count > BATADV_TP_MAX_UNACKED) {
+		un = list_last_entry(&tp_vars->unacked_list,
+				     struct batadv_tp_unacked, list);
+		list_del(&un->list);
+		kfree(un);
+		tp_vars->unacked_count--;
+	}
 
 out:
 	spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
@@ -1380,6 +1399,7 @@ static void batadv_tp_ack_unordered(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars)
 
 		list_del(&un->list);
 		kfree(un);
+		tp_vars->unacked_count--;
 	}
 	spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
 }
@@ -1430,6 +1450,7 @@ batadv_tp_init_recv(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 
 	spin_lock_init(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tp_vars->unacked_list);
+	tp_vars->unacked_count = 0;
 
 	kref_get(&tp_vars->refcount);
 	timer_setup(&tp_vars->timer, batadv_tp_receiver_shutdown, 0);
net/batman-adv/types.h +3 -0
index 3b2a170b1cf18b..e8679a4cd0413b 100644
@@ -1564,6 +1564,9 @@ struct batadv_tp_vars {
 	/** @unacked_lock: protect unacked_list */
 	spinlock_t unacked_lock;
 
+	/** @unacked_count: number of unacked entries */
+	size_t unacked_count;
+
 	/** @last_recv_time: time (jiffies) a msg was received */
 	unsigned long last_recv_time;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#116 lore raw

PATCH 116/204 batman-adv: tp_meter: annotate last_recv_time access with READ/WRITE_ONCE

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit d67c728f07fca2ee6ffdc6dd4421cf2e8691f4d1 upstream.

The last_recv_time field for batadv_tp_receiver tracks the jiffies value of the most recent activity and is used to detect timeouts. These accesses are not consistently protected by a lock, so READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE must be used to prevent data races caused by compiler optimizations.

Fixes 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation")
---
 net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c +4 -4
index 638dd438a6c052..b882919a868ca0 100644
@@ -1183,7 +1183,7 @@ static void batadv_tp_receiver_shutdown(struct timer_list *t)
 	bat_priv = tp_vars->bat_priv;
 
 	/* if there is recent activity rearm the timer */
-	if (!batadv_has_timed_out(tp_vars->last_recv_time,
+	if (!batadv_has_timed_out(READ_ONCE(tp_vars->last_recv_time),
 				  BATADV_TP_RECV_TIMEOUT)) {
 		/* reset the receiver shutdown timer */
 		batadv_tp_reset_receiver_timer(tp_vars);
@@ -1424,7 +1424,7 @@ batadv_tp_init_recv(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 	tp_vars = batadv_tp_list_find_session(bat_priv, icmp->orig,
 					      icmp->session, BATADV_TP_RECEIVER);
 	if (tp_vars) {
-		tp_vars->last_recv_time = jiffies;
+		WRITE_ONCE(tp_vars->last_recv_time, jiffies);
 		goto out_unlock;
 	}
 
@@ -1455,7 +1455,7 @@ batadv_tp_init_recv(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 	kref_get(&tp_vars->refcount);
 	timer_setup(&tp_vars->timer, batadv_tp_receiver_shutdown, 0);
 
-	tp_vars->last_recv_time = jiffies;
+	WRITE_ONCE(tp_vars->last_recv_time, jiffies);
 
 	kref_get(&tp_vars->refcount);
 	hlist_add_head_rcu(&tp_vars->list, &bat_priv->tp_list);
@@ -1506,7 +1506,7 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 			goto out;
 		}
 
-		tp_vars->last_recv_time = jiffies;
+		WRITE_ONCE(tp_vars->last_recv_time, jiffies);
 	}
 
 	/* if the packet is a duplicate, it may be the case that an ACK has been
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#117 lore raw

PATCH 117/204 batman-adv: tp_meter: prevent parallel modifications of last_recv

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit 6dde0cfcb36e4d5b3de35b75696937478441eed4 upstream.

When last_recv is updated to store the last receive sequence number, it is assuming that nothing is modifying in parallel while:

* check for outdated packets is done
* out of order check is performed (and packets are stored in out-of-order queue)
* the out-of-order queue was searched for closed gaps
* sequence number for next ack is calculated

Nothing of that was actually protected. It could therefore happen that the last_recv was updated multiple times in parallel and the final sequence number was calculated with deltas which had no connection to the sequence number they were added to.

Lock this whole region with the same lock which was already used to protect the unacked (out-of-order) list.

Fixes 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation")
[ Switch to pre-splitted tp_vars structure names ]
---
 net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 22 +++++++++++++---------
 net/batman-adv/types.h    |  2 +-
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c +13 -9
index b882919a868ca0..f745bc09a04963 100644
@@ -1294,6 +1294,7 @@ static int batadv_tp_send_ack(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, const u8 *dst,
  */
 static bool batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars,
 					  const struct sk_buff *skb)
+	__must_hold(&tp_vars->unacked_lock)
 {
 	const struct batadv_icmp_tp_packet *icmp;
 	struct batadv_tp_unacked *un, *new;
@@ -1310,12 +1311,11 @@ static bool batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars,
 	payload_len = skb->len - sizeof(struct batadv_unicast_packet);
 	new->len = payload_len;
 
-	spin_lock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
 	/* if the list is empty immediately attach this new object */
 	if (list_empty(&tp_vars->unacked_list)) {
 		list_add(&new->list, &tp_vars->unacked_list);
 		tp_vars->unacked_count++;
-		goto out;
+		return true;
 	}
 
 	/* otherwise loop over the list and either drop the packet because this
@@ -1364,9 +1364,6 @@ static bool batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars,
 		tp_vars->unacked_count--;
 	}
 
-out:
-	spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
-
 	return true;
 }
 
@@ -1376,6 +1373,7 @@ static bool batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars,
  * @tp_vars: the private data of the current TP meter session
  */
 static void batadv_tp_ack_unordered(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars)
+	__must_hold(&tp_vars->unacked_lock)
 {
 	struct batadv_tp_unacked *un, *safe;
 	u32 to_ack;
@@ -1383,7 +1381,6 @@ static void batadv_tp_ack_unordered(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars)
 	/* go through the unacked packet list and possibly ACK them as
 	 * well
 	 */
-	spin_lock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(un, safe, &tp_vars->unacked_list, list) {
 		/* the list is ordered, therefore it is possible to stop as soon
 		 * there is a gap between the last acked seqno and the seqno of
@@ -1401,7 +1398,6 @@ static void batadv_tp_ack_unordered(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars)
 		kfree(un);
 		tp_vars->unacked_count--;
 	}
-	spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1481,6 +1477,7 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 	const struct batadv_icmp_tp_packet *icmp;
 	struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars;
 	size_t packet_size;
+	u32 to_ack;
 	u32 seqno;
 
 	icmp = (struct batadv_icmp_tp_packet *)skb->data;
@@ -1509,6 +1506,8 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 		WRITE_ONCE(tp_vars->last_recv_time, jiffies);
 	}
 
+	spin_lock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
+
 	/* if the packet is a duplicate, it may be the case that an ACK has been
 	 * lost. Resend the ACK
 	 */
@@ -1520,8 +1519,10 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 		/* exit immediately (and do not send any ACK) if the packet has
 		 * not been enqueued correctly
 		 */
-		if (!batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(tp_vars, skb))
+		if (!batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(tp_vars, skb)) {
+			spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
 			goto out;
+		}
 
 		/* send a duplicate ACK */
 		goto send_ack;
@@ -1535,11 +1536,14 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 	batadv_tp_ack_unordered(tp_vars);
 
 send_ack:
+	to_ack = tp_vars->last_recv;
+	spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
+
 	/* send the ACK. If the received packet was out of order, the ACK that
 	 * is going to be sent is a duplicate (the sender will count them and
 	 * possibly enter Fast Retransmit as soon as it has reached 3)
 	 */
-	batadv_tp_send_ack(bat_priv, icmp->orig, tp_vars->last_recv,
+	batadv_tp_send_ack(bat_priv, icmp->orig, to_ack,
 			   icmp->timestamp, icmp->session, icmp->uid);
 out:
 	batadv_tp_vars_put(tp_vars);
net/batman-adv/types.h +1 -1
index e8679a4cd0413b..01c8fef027b419 100644
@@ -1561,7 +1561,7 @@ struct batadv_tp_vars {
 	/** @unacked_list: list of unacked packets (meta-info only) */
 	struct list_head unacked_list;
 
-	/** @unacked_lock: protect unacked_list */
+	/** @unacked_lock: protect unacked_list + &batadv_tp_receiver.last_recv */
 	spinlock_t unacked_lock;
 
 	/** @unacked_count: number of unacked entries */
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#118 lore raw

PATCH 118/204 batman-adv: tp_meter: handle overlapping packets

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit cbde75c38b21f022891525078622587ad557b7c1 upstream.

If the size of the packets would change during the transmission, it could happen that some retries of packets are overlapping. In this case, precise comparisons of sequence numbers by the receiver would be wrong. It is then necessary to check if the start sequence number to the end sequence number ("seqno + length") would contain a new range.

If this is the case then this is enough to accept this packet. In all other cases, the packet still has to be dropped (and not acked).

Fixes 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation")
[ Switch to pre-splitted tp_vars structure names ]
---
 net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 25 +++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c +11 -14
index f745bc09a04963..50b83e0438a07b 100644
@@ -1284,7 +1284,8 @@ static int batadv_tp_send_ack(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, const u8 *dst,
 /**
  * batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order() - store an out of order packet
  * @tp_vars: the private data of the current TP meter session
- * @skb: the buffer containing the received packet
+ * @seqno: sequence number of new received packet
+ * @payload_len: length of the received packet
  *
  * Store the out of order packet in the unacked list for late processing. This
  * packets are kept in this list so that they can be ACKed at once as soon as
@@ -1293,22 +1294,17 @@ static int batadv_tp_send_ack(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, const u8 *dst,
  * Return: true if the packed has been successfully processed, false otherwise
  */
 static bool batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars,
-					  const struct sk_buff *skb)
+					  u32 seqno, u32 payload_len)
 	__must_hold(&tp_vars->unacked_lock)
 {
-	const struct batadv_icmp_tp_packet *icmp;
 	struct batadv_tp_unacked *un, *new;
-	u32 payload_len;
 	bool added = false;
 
 	new = kmalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (unlikely(!new))
 		return false;
 
-	icmp = (struct batadv_icmp_tp_packet *)skb->data;
-
-	new->seqno = ntohl(icmp->seqno);
-	payload_len = skb->len - sizeof(struct batadv_unicast_packet);
+	new->seqno = seqno;
 	new->len = payload_len;
 
 	/* if the list is empty immediately attach this new object */
@@ -1476,7 +1472,7 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 {
 	const struct batadv_icmp_tp_packet *icmp;
 	struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars;
-	size_t packet_size;
+	u32 payload_len;
 	u32 to_ack;
 	u32 seqno;
 
@@ -1511,15 +1507,17 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 	/* if the packet is a duplicate, it may be the case that an ACK has been
 	 * lost. Resend the ACK
 	 */
-	if (batadv_seq_before(seqno, tp_vars->last_recv))
+	payload_len = skb->len - sizeof(struct batadv_unicast_packet);
+	to_ack = seqno + payload_len;
+	if (batadv_seq_before(to_ack, tp_vars->last_recv))
 		goto send_ack;
 
 	/* if the packet is out of order enqueue it */
-	if (ntohl(icmp->seqno) != tp_vars->last_recv) {
+	if (batadv_seq_before(tp_vars->last_recv, seqno)) {
 		/* exit immediately (and do not send any ACK) if the packet has
 		 * not been enqueued correctly
 		 */
-		if (!batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(tp_vars, skb)) {
+		if (!batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(tp_vars, seqno, payload_len)) {
 			spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
 			goto out;
 		}
@@ -1529,8 +1527,7 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 	}
 
 	/* if everything was fine count the ACKed bytes */
-	packet_size = skb->len - sizeof(struct batadv_unicast_packet);
-	tp_vars->last_recv += packet_size;
+	tp_vars->last_recv = to_ack;
 
 	/* check if this ordered message filled a gap.... */
 	batadv_tp_ack_unordered(tp_vars);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#119 lore raw

PATCH 119/204 batman-adv: tt: dont merge change entries with different VIDs

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit f08e06c2d5c3e2434e7c773f2213f4a7dce6bc1e upstream.

batadv_tt_local_event() merges/cancels events for the same client which would conflict or be duplicates. The matching of the queued events only compares the MAC address - the VLAN ID stored in each event is ignored.

If a MAC would now appear on multiple VID, the two ADD change events (for VID 1 and VID 2) would be merged to a single vid event. The remote can therefore not calculate the correct TT table and desync. A full translation table exchange is required to recover from this state.

A check of VID is therefore necessary to avoid such wrong merges/cancels.

Fixes c018ad3de61a ("batman-adv: add the VLAN ID attribute to the TT entry")
[ Context ]
---
 net/batman-adv/translation-table.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
net/batman-adv/translation-table.c +3 -0
index 7041cd69e20070..69a42bc3fa02e6 100644
@@ -485,6 +485,9 @@ static void batadv_tt_local_event(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 		if (!batadv_compare_eth(entry->change.addr, common->addr))
 			continue;
 
+		if (entry->change.vid != tt_change_node->change.vid)
+			continue;
+
 		/* DEL+ADD in the same orig interval have no effect and can be
 		 * removed to avoid silly behaviour on the receiver side. The
 		 * other way around (ADD+DEL) can happen in case of roaming of
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#120 lore raw

PATCH 120/204 batman-adv: tt: track roam count per VID

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit 12407d5f61c2653a64f2ff4b22f3c267f8420ef1 upstream.

batadv_tt_check_roam_count() is supposed to track roaming of a TT entry. But TT entries are for a MAC + VID. The VID was completely missed and thus leads to incorrect detection of ROAM counts when a client MAC exists in multiple VLANs.

Fixes c018ad3de61a ("batman-adv: add the VLAN ID attribute to the TT entry")
[ Context ]
---
 net/batman-adv/translation-table.c | 9 +++++++--
 net/batman-adv/types.h             | 3 +++
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/batman-adv/translation-table.c +7 -2
index 69a42bc3fa02e6..2a7caab5c197ea 100644
@@ -3517,6 +3517,7 @@ static void batadv_tt_roam_purge(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv)
  * batadv_tt_check_roam_count() - check if a client has roamed too frequently
  * @bat_priv: the bat priv with all the soft interface information
  * @client: mac address of the roaming client
+ * @vid: VLAN identifier
  *
  * This function checks whether the client already reached the
  * maximum number of possible roaming phases. In this case the ROAMING_ADV
@@ -3524,7 +3525,7 @@ static void batadv_tt_roam_purge(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv)
  *
  * Return: true if the ROAMING_ADV can be sent, false otherwise
  */
-static bool batadv_tt_check_roam_count(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, u8 *client)
+static bool batadv_tt_check_roam_count(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, u8 *client, u16 vid)
 {
 	struct batadv_tt_roam_node *tt_roam_node;
 	bool ret = false;
@@ -3537,6 +3538,9 @@ static bool batadv_tt_check_roam_count(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, u8 *client)
 		if (!batadv_compare_eth(tt_roam_node->addr, client))
 			continue;
 
+		if (tt_roam_node->vid != vid)
+			continue;
+
 		if (batadv_has_timed_out(tt_roam_node->first_time,
 					 BATADV_ROAMING_MAX_TIME))
 			continue;
@@ -3558,6 +3562,7 @@ static bool batadv_tt_check_roam_count(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, u8 *client)
 		atomic_set(&tt_roam_node->counter,
 			   BATADV_ROAMING_MAX_COUNT - 1);
 		ether_addr_copy(tt_roam_node->addr, client);
+		tt_roam_node->vid = vid;
 
 		list_add(&tt_roam_node->list, &bat_priv->tt.roam_list);
 		ret = true;
@@ -3594,7 +3599,7 @@ static void batadv_send_roam_adv(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, u8 *client,
 	/* before going on we have to check whether the client has
 	 * already roamed to us too many times
 	 */
-	if (!batadv_tt_check_roam_count(bat_priv, client))
+	if (!batadv_tt_check_roam_count(bat_priv, client, vid))
 		goto out;
 
 	batadv_dbg(BATADV_DBG_TT, bat_priv,
net/batman-adv/types.h +3 -0
index 01c8fef027b419..9bde0469e748ce 100644
@@ -2065,6 +2065,9 @@ struct batadv_tt_roam_node {
 	/** @addr: mac address of the client in the roaming phase */
 	u8 addr[ETH_ALEN];
 
+	/** @vid: VLAN identifier */
+	u16 vid;
+
 	/**
 	 * @counter: number of allowed roaming events per client within a single
 	 * OGM interval (changes are committed with each OGM)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#121 lore raw

PATCH 121/204 batman-adv: dat: prevent false sharing between VLANs

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit 20d7658b74169f86d4ac01b9185b3eadddf71f28 upstream.

The local hash of DAT entries is supposed to be VLAN (VID) aware. But the adding to the hash and the search in the hash were not checking the VID information of the hash entries. The entries would therefore only be correctly separated when batadv_hash_dat() didn't select the same buckets for different VIDs.

Fixes be1db4f6615b ("batman-adv: make the Distributed ARP Table vlan aware")
---
 net/batman-adv/distributed-arp-table.c | 12 +++++++++---
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/batman-adv/distributed-arp-table.c +9 -3
index 4d53e7c3ea5463..bd5477263ecd7c 100644
@@ -215,10 +215,13 @@ static void batadv_dat_purge(struct work_struct *work)
  */
 static bool batadv_compare_dat(const struct hlist_node *node, const void *data2)
 {
-	const void *data1 = container_of(node, struct batadv_dat_entry,
-					 hash_entry);
+	const struct batadv_dat_entry *entry1;
+	const struct batadv_dat_entry *entry2;
 
-	return memcmp(data1, data2, sizeof(__be32)) == 0;
+	entry1 = container_of(node, struct batadv_dat_entry, hash_entry);
+	entry2 = data2;
+
+	return entry1->ip == entry2->ip && entry1->vid == entry2->vid;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -345,6 +348,9 @@ batadv_dat_entry_hash_find(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, __be32 ip,
 		if (dat_entry->ip != ip)
 			continue;
 
+		if (dat_entry->vid != vid)
+			continue;
+
 		if (!kref_get_unless_zero(&dat_entry->refcount))
 			continue;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#122 lore raw

PATCH 122/204 batman-adv: tvlv: enforce 2-byte alignment

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit 32a6799255525d6ea4da0f7e9e0e521ad9560a46 upstream.

The fields of an aggregated OGM(v2) are accessed assuming (at least) 2-byte alignment, so a following OGM must start at an even offset. As the header length is even, an odd tvlv_len would misalign it and trigger unaligned accesses on strict-alignment architectures.

Such a misaligned TVLV/OGM/OGMv2 is not created by a normal participant in the mesh. Therefore, reject such malformed packets.

Fixes ef26157747d4 ("batman-adv: tvlv - basic infrastructure")
---
 net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c | 11 ++++++++++-
 net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c  | 11 ++++++++++-
 net/batman-adv/routing.c    |  6 ++++++
 net/batman-adv/tvlv.c       |  6 ++++++
 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c +10 -1
index b37c9fb178ae50..5dd3e1f281bab2 100644
@@ -310,14 +310,23 @@ batadv_iv_ogm_aggr_packet(int buff_pos, int packet_len,
 			  const struct batadv_ogm_packet *ogm_packet)
 {
 	int next_buff_pos = 0;
+	u16 tvlv_len;
 
 	/* check if there is enough space for the header */
 	next_buff_pos += buff_pos + sizeof(*ogm_packet);
 	if (next_buff_pos > packet_len)
 		return false;
 
+	tvlv_len = ntohs(ogm_packet->tvlv_len);
+
+	/* the fields of an aggregated OGM are accessed assuming (at least)
+	 * 2-byte alignment, so a following OGM must start at an even offset.
+	 */
+	if (tvlv_len & 1)
+		return false;
+
 	/* check if there is enough space for the optional TVLV */
-	next_buff_pos += ntohs(ogm_packet->tvlv_len);
+	next_buff_pos += tvlv_len;
 
 	return next_buff_pos <= packet_len;
 }
net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c +10 -1
index 48a67705eba85c..c5c4d33cb19838 100644
@@ -853,14 +853,23 @@ batadv_v_ogm_aggr_packet(int buff_pos, int packet_len,
 			 const struct batadv_ogm2_packet *ogm2_packet)
 {
 	int next_buff_pos = 0;
+	u16 tvlv_len;
 
 	/* check if there is enough space for the header */
 	next_buff_pos += buff_pos + sizeof(*ogm2_packet);
 	if (next_buff_pos > packet_len)
 		return false;
 
+	tvlv_len = ntohs(ogm2_packet->tvlv_len);
+
+	/* the fields of an aggregated OGMv2 are accessed assuming (at least)
+	 * 2-byte alignment, so a following OGMv2 must start at an even offset.
+	 */
+	if (tvlv_len & 1)
+		return false;
+
 	/* check if there is enough space for the optional TVLV */
-	next_buff_pos += ntohs(ogm2_packet->tvlv_len);
+	next_buff_pos += tvlv_len;
 
 	return next_buff_pos <= packet_len;
 }
net/batman-adv/routing.c +6 -0
index 6fd18b69e5f6be..f828d8143f7526 100644
@@ -1373,6 +1373,12 @@ int batadv_recv_mcast_packet(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	if (tvlv_buff_len > skb->len - hdr_size)
 		goto free_skb;
 
+	/* the fields of an multicast payload are accessed assuming (at least)
+	 * 2-byte alignment, so a following packet must start at an even offset.
+	 */
+	if (tvlv_buff_len & 1)
+		goto free_skb;
+
 	ret = batadv_tvlv_containers_process(bat_priv, BATADV_MCAST, NULL, skb,
 					     tvlv_buff, tvlv_buff_len);
 	if (ret >= 0) {
net/batman-adv/tvlv.c +6 -0
index 8d6b017c433cc9..e1cd27b99bd119 100644
@@ -464,6 +464,12 @@ int batadv_tvlv_containers_process(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 		if (tvlv_value_cont_len > tvlv_value_len)
 			break;
 
+		/* the next tvlv header is accessed assuming (at least) 2-byte
+		 * alignment, so it must start at an even offset.
+		 */
+		if (tvlv_value_cont_len & 1)
+			break;
+
 		tvlv_handler = batadv_tvlv_handler_get(bat_priv,
 						       tvlv_hdr->type,
 						       tvlv_hdr->version);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#123 lore raw

PATCH 123/204 batman-adv: tvlv: avoid race of cifsnotfound handler state

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit edb557b2ba38fea2c5eb710cf366c797e187218c upstream.

TVLV handlers can have the flag BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CIFNOTFND set to signal that the OGM handler should be called (with NULL for data) when the specific TVLV container was not found in the OGM. This is used by:

* DAT
* GW
* Multicast (OGM + Tracker)

The state whether the handler was executed was stored in the struct batadv_tvlv_handler. But the TVLV processing is started without any lock. Multiple parallel contexts processing TVLVs would therefore overwrite each others BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CALLED flag in the shared batadv_tvlv_handler.

Drop the shared BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CALLED flag and instead determine, per TVLV buffer, whether a matching container was present by scanning the packet's buffer.

Fixes ef26157747d4 ("batman-adv: tvlv - basic infrastructure")
---
 net/batman-adv/tvlv.c  | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 net/batman-adv/types.h |  7 -----
 2 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
net/batman-adv/tvlv.c +57 -6
index e1cd27b99bd119..cc66e231ccb8a0 100644
@@ -398,7 +398,6 @@ static int batadv_tvlv_call_handler(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 		tvlv_handler->ogm_handler(bat_priv, orig_node,
 					  BATADV_NO_FLAGS,
 					  tvlv_value, tvlv_value_len);
-		tvlv_handler->flags |= BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CALLED;
 		break;
 	case BATADV_UNICAST_TVLV:
 		if (!skb)
@@ -430,6 +429,48 @@ static int batadv_tvlv_call_handler(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 	return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
 }
 
+/**
+ * batadv_tvlv_containers_contain() - check if a tvlv buffer holds a container
+ * @tvlv_value: tvlv content
+ * @tvlv_value_len: tvlv content length
+ * @type: tvlv container type to look for
+ * @version: tvlv container version to look for
+ *
+ * Return: true if a container of the given type and version is present in the
+ * tvlv buffer, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool batadv_tvlv_containers_contain(void *tvlv_value,
+					   u16 tvlv_value_len, u8 type,
+					   u8 version)
+{
+	struct batadv_tvlv_hdr *tvlv_hdr;
+	u16 tvlv_value_cont_len;
+
+	while (tvlv_value_len >= sizeof(*tvlv_hdr)) {
+		tvlv_hdr = tvlv_value;
+		tvlv_value_cont_len = ntohs(tvlv_hdr->len);
+		tvlv_value = tvlv_hdr + 1;
+		tvlv_value_len -= sizeof(*tvlv_hdr);
+
+		if (tvlv_value_cont_len > tvlv_value_len)
+			break;
+
+		/* the next tvlv header is accessed assuming (at least) 2-byte
+		 * alignment, so it must start at an even offset.
+		 */
+		if (tvlv_value_cont_len & 1)
+			break;
+
+		if (tvlv_hdr->type == type && tvlv_hdr->version == version)
+			return true;
+
+		tvlv_value = (u8 *)tvlv_value + tvlv_value_cont_len;
+		tvlv_value_len -= tvlv_value_cont_len;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
 /**
  * batadv_tvlv_containers_process() - parse the given tvlv buffer to call the
  *  appropriate handlers
@@ -449,7 +490,9 @@ int batadv_tvlv_containers_process(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 				   struct sk_buff *skb, void *tvlv_value,
 				   u16 tvlv_value_len)
 {
+	u16 tvlv_value_start_len = tvlv_value_len;
 	struct batadv_tvlv_handler *tvlv_handler;
+	void *tvlv_value_start = tvlv_value;
 	struct batadv_tvlv_hdr *tvlv_hdr;
 	u16 tvlv_value_cont_len;
 	u8 cifnotfound = BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CIFNOTFND;
@@ -493,12 +536,20 @@ int batadv_tvlv_containers_process(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 		if (!tvlv_handler->ogm_handler)
 			continue;
 
-		if ((tvlv_handler->flags & BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CIFNOTFND) &&
-		    !(tvlv_handler->flags & BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CALLED))
-			tvlv_handler->ogm_handler(bat_priv, orig_node,
-						  cifnotfound, NULL, 0);
+		if (!(tvlv_handler->flags & BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CIFNOTFND))
+			continue;
 
-		tvlv_handler->flags &= ~BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CALLED;
+		/* if the corresponding container was present then the handler
+		 * was already called from the loop above
+		 */
+		if (batadv_tvlv_containers_contain(tvlv_value_start,
+						   tvlv_value_start_len,
+						   tvlv_handler->type,
+						   tvlv_handler->version))
+			continue;
+
+		tvlv_handler->ogm_handler(bat_priv, orig_node,
+					  cifnotfound, NULL, 0);
 	}
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 
net/batman-adv/types.h +0 -7
index 9bde0469e748ce..0022bee14574df 100644
@@ -2483,13 +2483,6 @@ enum batadv_tvlv_handler_flags {
 	 *  will call this handler even if its type was not found (with no data)
 	 */
 	BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CIFNOTFND = BIT(1),
-
-	/**
-	 * @BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CALLED: interval tvlv handling flag - the
-	 *  API marks a handler as being called, so it won't be called if the
-	 *  BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CIFNOTFND flag was set
-	 */
-	BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CALLED = BIT(2),
 };
 
 #endif /* _NET_BATMAN_ADV_TYPES_H_ */
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#124 lore raw

PATCH 124/204 ipv6: account for fraggap on the paged allocation path

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wongi Lee <[email protected]>

commit 736b380e28d0480c7bc3e022f1950f31fe53a7c5 upstream.

In __ip6_append_data(), when the paged-allocation branch is taken (MSG_MORE / NETIF_F_SG / large fraglen), alloclen and pagedlen are computed as

	alloclen = fragheaderlen + transhdrlen;
	pagedlen = datalen - transhdrlen;

datalen already includes fraggap (datalen = length + fraggap). When fraggap is non-zero, this is not the first skb and transhdrlen is zero. The fraggap bytes carried over from the previous skb are copied just past the fragment headers in the new skb's linear area. The linear area is therefore undersized by fraggap bytes while pagedlen is overstated by the same amount, and the copy writes past skb->end into the trailing skb_shared_info.

An unprivileged user can trigger this via a UDPv6 socket using MSG_MORE together with MSG_SPLICE_PAGES.

The bad accounting was introduced by commit 773ba4fe9104 ("ipv6:
avoid partial copy for zc"). Before commit ce650a166335 ("udp6: Fix __ip6_append_data()'s handling of MSG_SPLICE_PAGES"), the negative copy value caused -EINVAL to be returned. That later commit allowed MSG_SPLICE_PAGES to proceed in this case, making the corruption triggerable.

The non-paged branch sets alloclen to fraglen, which already accounts for fraggap because datalen does. Bring the paged branch in line by adding fraggap to alloclen and subtracting it from pagedlen.

After this adjustment, copy no longer collapses to -fraggap on the paged path, so remove the stale comment describing that old arithmetic. Since a negative copy is no longer expected for a valid MSG_SPLICE_PAGES case, remove the MSG_SPLICE_PAGES exception from the negative copy check.

---
 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c |    9 +++------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/ip6_output.c +3 -6
@@ -1633,8 +1633,8 @@ alloc_new_skb:
 				  !(rt->dst.dev->features & NETIF_F_SG)))
 				alloclen = fraglen;
 			else {
-				alloclen = fragheaderlen + transhdrlen;
-				pagedlen = datalen - transhdrlen;
+				alloclen = fragheaderlen + transhdrlen + fraggap;
+				pagedlen = datalen - transhdrlen - fraggap;
 			}
 			alloclen += alloc_extra;
 
@@ -1649,10 +1649,7 @@ alloc_new_skb:
 			fraglen = datalen + fragheaderlen;
 
 			copy = datalen - transhdrlen - fraggap - pagedlen;
-			/* [!] NOTE: copy may be negative if pagedlen>0
-			 * because then the equation may reduces to -fraggap.
-			 */
-			if (copy < 0 && !(flags & MSG_SPLICE_PAGES)) {
+			if (copy < 0) {
 				err = -EINVAL;
 				goto error;
 			}
author maintainer
#125 lore raw

PATCH 125/204 fs: constify file ptr in backing_file accessor helpers

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Amir Goldstein <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4e301d858af17ae2ce56886296e5458c5a08219a ]

Add internal helper backing_file_set_user_path() for the only two cases that need to modify backing_file fields.

---
 fs/backing-file.c  |  4 ++--
 fs/file_table.c    | 13 ++++++++-----
 fs/internal.h      |  1 +
 include/linux/fs.h |  6 +++---
 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
fs/backing-file.c +2 -2
index 09a9be945d45e6..892361c31c3de9 100644
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ struct file *backing_file_open(const struct path *user_path, int flags,
 		return f;
 
 	path_get(user_path);
-	*backing_file_user_path(f) = *user_path;
+	backing_file_set_user_path(f, user_path);
 	error = vfs_open(real_path, f);
 	if (error) {
 		fput(f);
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ struct file *backing_tmpfile_open(const struct path *user_path, int flags,
 		return f;
 
 	path_get(user_path);
-	*backing_file_user_path(f) = *user_path;
+	backing_file_set_user_path(f, user_path);
 	error = vfs_tmpfile(real_idmap, real_parentpath, f, mode);
 	if (error) {
 		fput(f);
fs/file_table.c +8 -5
index 2a08bc93b0b9c1..75a1908d51a9f5 100644
@@ -48,17 +48,20 @@ struct backing_file {
 	struct path user_path;
 };
 
-static inline struct backing_file *backing_file(struct file *f)
-{
-	return container_of(f, struct backing_file, file);
-}
+#define backing_file(f) container_of(f, struct backing_file, file)
 
-struct path *backing_file_user_path(struct file *f)
+struct path *backing_file_user_path(const struct file *f)
 {
 	return &backing_file(f)->user_path;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(backing_file_user_path);
 
+void backing_file_set_user_path(struct file *f, const struct path *path)
+{
+	backing_file(f)->user_path = *path;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(backing_file_set_user_path);
+
 static inline void backing_file_free(struct backing_file *ff)
 {
 	path_put(&ff->user_path);
fs/internal.h +1 -0
index 8c1b7acbbe8faa..a4352d333c617a 100644
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ extern void chroot_fs_refs(const struct path *, const struct path *);
 struct file *alloc_empty_file(int flags, const struct cred *cred);
 struct file *alloc_empty_file_noaccount(int flags, const struct cred *cred);
 struct file *alloc_empty_backing_file(int flags, const struct cred *cred);
+void backing_file_set_user_path(struct file *f, const struct path *path);
 
 static inline void file_put_write_access(struct file *file)
 {
include/linux/fs.h +3 -3
index 87720e1b54192c..70bbc00a2bd250 100644
@@ -2738,7 +2738,7 @@ struct file *dentry_open(const struct path *path, int flags,
 			 const struct cred *creds);
 struct file *dentry_create(const struct path *path, int flags, umode_t mode,
 			   const struct cred *cred);
-struct path *backing_file_user_path(struct file *f);
+struct path *backing_file_user_path(const struct file *f);
 
 /*
  * When mmapping a file on a stackable filesystem (e.g., overlayfs), the file
@@ -2750,14 +2750,14 @@ struct path *backing_file_user_path(struct file *f);
  * by fstat() on that same fd.
  */
 /* Get the path to display in /proc/<pid>/maps */
-static inline const struct path *file_user_path(struct file *f)
+static inline const struct path *file_user_path(const struct file *f)
 {
 	if (unlikely(f->f_mode & FMODE_BACKING))
 		return backing_file_user_path(f);
 	return &f->f_path;
 }
 /* Get the inode whose inode number to display in /proc/<pid>/maps */
-static inline const struct inode *file_user_inode(struct file *f)
+static inline const struct inode *file_user_inode(const struct file *f)
 {
 	if (unlikely(f->f_mode & FMODE_BACKING))
 		return d_inode(backing_file_user_path(f)->dentry);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#126 lore raw

PATCH 126/204 lsm: add backing_file LSM hooks

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paul Moore <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6af36aeb147a06dea47c49859cd6ca5659aeb987 ]

Stacked filesystems such as overlayfs do not currently provide the necessary mechanisms for LSMs to properly enforce access controls on the mmap() and mprotect() operations. In order to resolve this gap, a LSM security blob is being added to the backing_file struct and the following new LSM hooks are being created:

security_backing_file_alloc()
security_backing_file_free()
security_mmap_backing_file()

The first two hooks are to manage the lifecycle of the LSM security blob in the backing_file struct, while the third provides a new mmap() access control point for the underlying backing file. It is also expected that LSMs will likely want to update their security_file_mprotect() callback to address issues with their mprotect() controls, but that does not require a change to the security_file_mprotect() LSM hook.

There are a three other small changes to support these new LSM hooks:
* Pass the user file associated with a backing file down to alloc_empty_backing_file() so it can be included in the security_backing_file_alloc() hook.
* Add getter and setter functions for the backing_file struct LSM blob as the backing_file struct remains private to fs/file_table.c.
* Constify the file struct field in the LSM common_audit_data struct to better support LSMs that need to pass a const file struct pointer into the common LSM audit code.

Thanks to Arnd Bergmann for identifying the missing EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL() and supplying a fixup.

[ Mainline declares lsm_backing_file_cache in security/lsm.h. Linux 6.12.y does not have security/lsm_init.c or security/lsm.h; the cache variable is defined locally as static struct kmem_cache *lsm_backing_file_cache in security/security.c. ]

---
 fs/backing-file.c             |  18 ++++--
 fs/file_table.c               |  27 +++++++--
 fs/fuse/passthrough.c         |   2 +-
 fs/internal.h                 |   3 +-
 fs/overlayfs/dir.c            |   2 +-
 fs/overlayfs/file.c           |   3 +-
 include/linux/backing-file.h  |   4 +-
 include/linux/fs.h            |  13 ++++
 include/linux/lsm_audit.h     |   2 +-
 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h |   5 ++
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h     |   1 +
 include/linux/security.h      |  22 +++++++
 security/security.c           | 109 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 13 files changed, 195 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
fs/backing-file.c +14 -4
index 892361c31c3de9..53690754810f1d 100644
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <linux/backing-file.h>
 #include <linux/splice.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include "internal.h"
 
@@ -29,14 +30,15 @@
  * returned file into a container structure that also stores the stacked
  * file's path, which can be retrieved using backing_file_user_path().
  */
-struct file *backing_file_open(const struct path *user_path, int flags,
+struct file *backing_file_open(const struct file *user_file, int flags,
 			       const struct path *real_path,
 			       const struct cred *cred)
 {
+	const struct path *user_path = &user_file->f_path;
 	struct file *f;
 	int error;
 
-	f = alloc_empty_backing_file(flags, cred);
+	f = alloc_empty_backing_file(flags, cred, user_file);
 	if (IS_ERR(f))
 		return f;
 
@@ -52,15 +54,16 @@ struct file *backing_file_open(const struct path *user_path, int flags,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(backing_file_open);
 
-struct file *backing_tmpfile_open(const struct path *user_path, int flags,
+struct file *backing_tmpfile_open(const struct file *user_file, int flags,
 				  const struct path *real_parentpath,
 				  umode_t mode, const struct cred *cred)
 {
 	struct mnt_idmap *real_idmap = mnt_idmap(real_parentpath->mnt);
+	const struct path *user_path = &user_file->f_path;
 	struct file *f;
 	int error;
 
-	f = alloc_empty_backing_file(flags, cred);
+	f = alloc_empty_backing_file(flags, cred, user_file);
 	if (IS_ERR(f))
 		return f;
 
@@ -326,6 +329,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(backing_file_splice_write);
 int backing_file_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 		      struct backing_file_ctx *ctx)
 {
+	struct file *user_file = vma->vm_file;
 	const struct cred *old_cred;
 	int ret;
 
@@ -339,6 +343,12 @@ int backing_file_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 	vma_set_file(vma, file);
 
 	old_cred = override_creds(ctx->cred);
+	ret = security_mmap_backing_file(vma, file, user_file);
+	if (ret) {
+		revert_creds(old_cred);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
 	ret = call_mmap(vma->vm_file, vma);
 	revert_creds(old_cred);
 
fs/file_table.c +23 -4
index 75a1908d51a9f5..f78bcff79f1a04 100644
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ static struct percpu_counter nr_files __cacheline_aligned_in_smp;
 struct backing_file {
 	struct file file;
 	struct path user_path;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+	void *security;
+#endif
 };
 
 #define backing_file(f) container_of(f, struct backing_file, file)
@@ -62,8 +65,21 @@ void backing_file_set_user_path(struct file *f, const struct path *path)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(backing_file_set_user_path);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+void *backing_file_security(const struct file *f)
+{
+	return backing_file(f)->security;
+}
+
+void backing_file_set_security(struct file *f, void *security)
+{
+	backing_file(f)->security = security;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+
 static inline void backing_file_free(struct backing_file *ff)
 {
+	security_backing_file_free(&ff->file);
 	path_put(&ff->user_path);
 	kfree(ff);
 }
@@ -262,10 +278,12 @@ struct file *alloc_empty_file_noaccount(int flags, const struct cred *cred)
 	return f;
 }
 
-static int init_backing_file(struct backing_file *ff)
+static int init_backing_file(struct backing_file *ff,
+			     const struct file *user_file)
 {
 	memset(&ff->user_path, 0, sizeof(ff->user_path));
-	return 0;
+	backing_file_set_security(&ff->file, NULL);
+	return security_backing_file_alloc(&ff->file, user_file);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -275,7 +293,8 @@ static int init_backing_file(struct backing_file *ff)
  * This is only for kernel internal use, and the allocate file must not be
  * installed into file tables or such.
  */
-struct file *alloc_empty_backing_file(int flags, const struct cred *cred)
+struct file *alloc_empty_backing_file(int flags, const struct cred *cred,
+				      const struct file *user_file)
 {
 	struct backing_file *ff;
 	int error;
@@ -292,7 +311,7 @@ struct file *alloc_empty_backing_file(int flags, const struct cred *cred)
 
 	/* The f_mode flags must be set before fput(). */
 	ff->file.f_mode |= FMODE_BACKING | FMODE_NOACCOUNT;
-	error = init_backing_file(ff);
+	error = init_backing_file(ff, user_file);
 	if (unlikely(error)) {
 		fput(&ff->file);
 		return ERR_PTR(error);
fs/fuse/passthrough.c +1 -1
index 6bfd09dda9e3e6..140e150be0de85 100644
@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ struct fuse_backing *fuse_passthrough_open(struct file *file,
 		goto out;
 
 	/* Allocate backing file per fuse file to store fuse path */
-	backing_file = backing_file_open(&file->f_path, file->f_flags,
+	backing_file = backing_file_open(file, file->f_flags,
 					 &fb->file->f_path, fb->cred);
 	err = PTR_ERR(backing_file);
 	if (IS_ERR(backing_file)) {
fs/internal.h +2 -1
index a4352d333c617a..997acc721f6175 100644
@@ -99,7 +99,8 @@ extern void chroot_fs_refs(const struct path *, const struct path *);
  */
 struct file *alloc_empty_file(int flags, const struct cred *cred);
 struct file *alloc_empty_file_noaccount(int flags, const struct cred *cred);
-struct file *alloc_empty_backing_file(int flags, const struct cred *cred);
+struct file *alloc_empty_backing_file(int flags, const struct cred *cred,
+				      const struct file *user_file);
 void backing_file_set_user_path(struct file *f, const struct path *path);
 
 static inline void file_put_write_access(struct file *file)
fs/overlayfs/dir.c +1 -1
index ab65e98a1defdd..1c8009bf194bc1 100644
@@ -1320,7 +1320,7 @@ static int ovl_create_tmpfile(struct file *file, struct dentry *dentry,
 		goto out_revert_creds;
 
 	ovl_path_upper(dentry->d_parent, &realparentpath);
-	realfile = backing_tmpfile_open(&file->f_path, flags, &realparentpath,
+	realfile = backing_tmpfile_open(file, flags, &realparentpath,
 					mode, current_cred());
 	err = PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(realfile);
 	pr_debug("tmpfile/open(%pd2, 0%o) = %i\n", realparentpath.dentry, mode, err);
fs/overlayfs/file.c +1 -2
index 94095058da34ec..3765e1defa1981 100644
@@ -47,8 +47,7 @@ static struct file *ovl_open_realfile(const struct file *file,
 	} else {
 		if (!inode_owner_or_capable(real_idmap, realinode))
 			flags &= ~O_NOATIME;
-
-		realfile = backing_file_open(file_user_path((struct file *) file),
+		realfile = backing_file_open(file,
 					     flags, realpath, current_cred());
 	}
 	revert_creds(old_cred);
include/linux/backing-file.h +2 -2
index 2eed0ffb5e8f83..cd18acd7ac5b29 100644
@@ -19,10 +19,10 @@ struct backing_file_ctx {
 	void (*end_write)(struct file *, loff_t, ssize_t);
 };
 
-struct file *backing_file_open(const struct path *user_path, int flags,
+struct file *backing_file_open(const struct file *user_file, int flags,
 			       const struct path *real_path,
 			       const struct cred *cred);
-struct file *backing_tmpfile_open(const struct path *user_path, int flags,
+struct file *backing_tmpfile_open(const struct file *user_file, int flags,
 				  const struct path *real_parentpath,
 				  umode_t mode, const struct cred *cred);
 ssize_t backing_file_read_iter(struct file *file, struct iov_iter *iter,
include/linux/fs.h +13 -0
index 70bbc00a2bd250..0eb43147dc877e 100644
@@ -2740,6 +2740,19 @@ struct file *dentry_create(const struct path *path, int flags, umode_t mode,
 			   const struct cred *cred);
 struct path *backing_file_user_path(const struct file *f);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+void *backing_file_security(const struct file *f);
+void backing_file_set_security(struct file *f, void *security);
+#else
+static inline void *backing_file_security(const struct file *f)
+{
+	return NULL;
+}
+static inline void backing_file_set_security(struct file *f, void *security)
+{
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+
 /*
  * When mmapping a file on a stackable filesystem (e.g., overlayfs), the file
  * stored in ->vm_file is a backing file whose f_inode is on the underlying
include/linux/lsm_audit.h +1 -1
index 97a8b21eb03339..c0a2839253fa1f 100644
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ struct common_audit_data {
 #endif
 		char *kmod_name;
 		struct lsm_ioctlop_audit *op;
-		struct file *file;
+		const struct file *file;
 		struct lsm_ibpkey_audit *ibpkey;
 		struct lsm_ibendport_audit *ibendport;
 		int reason;
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +5 -0
index 9eca013aa5e1f6..addb34abffa18a 100644
@@ -188,6 +188,9 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_permission, struct file *file, int mask)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_alloc_security, struct file *file)
 LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, file_release, struct file *file)
 LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, file_free_security, struct file *file)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, backing_file_alloc, struct file *backing_file,
+	 const struct file *user_file)
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, backing_file_free, struct file *backing_file)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_ioctl, struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 	 unsigned long arg)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_ioctl_compat, struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
@@ -195,6 +198,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_ioctl_compat, struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, mmap_addr, unsigned long addr)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, mmap_file, struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 	 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, mmap_backing_file, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+	 struct file *backing_file, struct file *user_file)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_mprotect, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 	 unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_lock, struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +1 -0
index 090d1d3e19fed6..0876cf11e200c6 100644
@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {
 struct lsm_blob_sizes {
 	int lbs_cred;
 	int lbs_file;
+	int lbs_backing_file;
 	int lbs_ib;
 	int lbs_inode;
 	int lbs_sock;
include/linux/security.h +22 -0
index 2c6db949ad1a16..e4300f2ff11b55 100644
@@ -421,11 +421,17 @@ int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask);
 int security_file_alloc(struct file *file);
 void security_file_release(struct file *file);
 void security_file_free(struct file *file);
+int security_backing_file_alloc(struct file *backing_file,
+				const struct file *user_file);
+void security_backing_file_free(struct file *backing_file);
 int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
 int security_file_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 			       unsigned long arg);
 int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
 			unsigned long flags);
+int security_mmap_backing_file(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+			       struct file *backing_file,
+			       struct file *user_file);
 int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr);
 int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
 			   unsigned long prot);
@@ -1065,6 +1071,15 @@ static inline void security_file_release(struct file *file)
 static inline void security_file_free(struct file *file)
 { }
 
+static inline int security_backing_file_alloc(struct file *backing_file,
+					      const struct file *user_file)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_backing_file_free(struct file *backing_file)
+{ }
+
 static inline int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 				      unsigned long arg)
 {
@@ -1084,6 +1099,13 @@ static inline int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline int security_mmap_backing_file(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+					     struct file *backing_file,
+					     struct file *user_file)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static inline int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
 {
 	return cap_mmap_addr(addr);
security/security.c +109 -0

151 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#127 lore raw

PATCH 127/204 selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paul Moore <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 82544d36b1729153c8aeb179e84750f0c085d3b1 ]

The existing SELinux security model for overlayfs is to allow access if the current task is able to access the top level file (the "user" file) and the mounter's credentials are sufficient to access the lower level file (the "backing" file). Unfortunately, the current code does not properly enforce these access controls for both mmap() and mprotect() operations on overlayfs filesystems.

This patch makes use of the newly created security_mmap_backing_file() LSM hook to provide the missing backing file enforcement for mmap() operations, and leverages the backing file API and new LSM blob to provide the necessary information to properly enforce the mprotect() access controls.

---
 security/selinux/hooks.c          | 242 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 security/selinux/include/objsec.h |  11 ++
 2 files changed, 189 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)
security/selinux/hooks.c +178 -64
index 8e31d3b60fc62e..1b89c8d5fa2fc3 100644
@@ -1724,49 +1724,72 @@ static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 static int bpf_fd_pass(const struct file *file, u32 sid);
 #endif
 
-/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
-   access an inode in a given way.  Check access to the
-   descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
-   check a particular permission to the file.
-   Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
-   has the same SID as the process.  If av is zero, then
-   access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
-   where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
-static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
-			 struct file *file,
-			 u32 av)
+static int __file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, const struct file *file,
+			   u32 av, bool bf_user_file)
+
 {
-	struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
-	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
+	struct inode *inode;
+	u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
+	u32 tsid_fd;
 	int rc;
 
-	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
-	ad.u.file = file;
+	if (bf_user_file) {
+		struct backing_file_security_struct *bfsec;
+		const struct path *path;
 
-	if (sid != fsec->sid) {
-		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
-				  SECCLASS_FD,
-				  FD__USE,
-				  &ad);
+		if (WARN_ON(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_BACKING)))
+			return -EIO;
+
+		bfsec = selinux_backing_file(file);
+		path = backing_file_user_path(file);
+		tsid_fd = bfsec->uf_sid;
+		inode = d_inode(path->dentry);
+
+		ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
+		ad.u.path = *path;
+	} else {
+		struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
+
+		tsid_fd = fsec->sid;
+		inode = file_inode(file);
+
+		ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+		ad.u.file = file;
+	}
+
+	if (ssid != tsid_fd) {
+		rc = avc_has_perm(ssid, tsid_fd, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
 		if (rc)
-			goto out;
+			return rc;
 	}
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
-	rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred));
+	/* regardless of backing vs user file, use the underlying file here */
+	rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, ssid);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 #endif
 
 	/* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
-	rc = 0;
 	if (av)
-		rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
+		return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
 
-out:
-	return rc;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
+   access an inode in a given way.  Check access to the
+   descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
+   check a particular permission to the file.
+   Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
+   has the same SID as the process.  If av is zero, then
+   access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
+   where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
+static inline int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+				const struct file *file, u32 av)
+{
+	return __file_has_perm(cred, file, av, false);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -3653,6 +3676,17 @@ static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int selinux_backing_file_alloc(struct file *backing_file,
+				      const struct file *user_file)
+{
+	struct backing_file_security_struct *bfsec;
+
+	bfsec = selinux_backing_file(backing_file);
+	bfsec->uf_sid = selinux_file(user_file)->sid;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
  * operation to an inode.
@@ -3770,42 +3804,55 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 
 static int default_noexec __ro_after_init;
 
-static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
+static int __file_map_prot_check(const struct cred *cred,
+				 const struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
+				 bool shared, bool bf_user_file)
 {
-	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
-	int rc = 0;
+	struct inode *inode = NULL;
+	bool prot_exec = prot & PROT_EXEC;
+	bool prot_write = prot & PROT_WRITE;
+
+	if (file) {
+		if (bf_user_file)
+			inode = d_inode(backing_file_user_path(file)->dentry);
+		else
+			inode = file_inode(file);
+	}
+
+	if (default_noexec && prot_exec &&
+	    (!file || IS_PRIVATE(inode) || (!shared && prot_write))) {
+		int rc;
+		u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
 
-	if (default_noexec &&
-	    (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) ||
-				   (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
 		/*
-		 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
-		 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
-		 * This has an additional check.
+		 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a private
+		 * file mapping that will also be writable.
 		 */
-		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
-				  PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL);
+		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECMEM,
+				  NULL);
 		if (rc)
-			goto error;
+			return rc;
 	}
 
 	if (file) {
-		/* read access is always possible with a mapping */
+		/* "read" always possible, "write" only if shared */
 		u32 av = FILE__READ;
-
-		/* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
-		if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
+		if (shared && prot_write)
 			av |= FILE__WRITE;
-
-		if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
+		if (prot_exec)
 			av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
 
-		return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
+		return __file_has_perm(cred, file, av, bf_user_file);
 	}
 
-error:
-	return rc;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int file_map_prot_check(const struct cred *cred,
+				      const struct file *file,
+				      unsigned long prot, bool shared)
+{
+	return __file_map_prot_check(cred, file, prot, shared, false);
 }
 
 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
@@ -3821,36 +3868,80 @@ static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file,
-			     unsigned long reqprot __always_unused,
-			     unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+static int selinux_mmap_file_common(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
+				    unsigned long prot, bool shared)
 {
-	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	int rc;
-
 	if (file) {
+		int rc;
+		struct common_audit_data ad;
+
 		ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
 		ad.u.file = file;
-		rc = inode_has_perm(current_cred(), file_inode(file),
-				    FILE__MAP, &ad);
+		rc = inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), FILE__MAP, &ad);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 	}
 
-	return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
-				   (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
+	return file_map_prot_check(cred, file, prot, shared);
+}
+
+static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file,
+			     unsigned long reqprot __always_unused,
+			     unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+{
+	return selinux_mmap_file_common(current_cred(), file, prot,
+					(flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_mmap_backing_file - Check mmap permissions on a backing file
+ * @vma: memory region
+ * @backing_file: stacked filesystem backing file
+ * @user_file: user visible file
+ *
+ * This is called after selinux_mmap_file() on stacked filesystems, and it
+ * is this function's responsibility to verify access to @backing_file and
+ * setup the SELinux state for possible later use in the mprotect() code path.
+ *
+ * By the time this function is called, mmap() access to @user_file has already
+ * been authorized and @vma->vm_file has been set to point to @backing_file.
+ *
+ * Return zero on success, negative values otherwise.
+ */
+static int selinux_mmap_backing_file(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+				     struct file *backing_file,
+				     struct file *user_file __always_unused)
+{
+	unsigned long prot = 0;
+
+	/* translate vma->vm_flags perms into PROT perms */
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_READ)
+		prot |= PROT_READ;
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
+		prot |= PROT_WRITE;
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)
+		prot |= PROT_EXEC;
+
+	return selinux_mmap_file_common(backing_file->f_cred, backing_file,
+					prot, vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED);
 }
 
 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 				 unsigned long reqprot __always_unused,
 				 unsigned long prot)
 {
+	int rc;
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
+	const struct file *file = vma->vm_file;
+	bool backing_file;
+	bool shared = vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED;
+
+	/* check if we need to trigger the "backing files are awful" mode */
+	backing_file = file && (file->f_mode & FMODE_BACKING);
 
 	if (default_noexec &&
 	    (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
-		int rc = 0;
 		/*
 		 * We don't use the vma_is_initial_heap() helper as it has
 		 * a history of problems and is currently broken on systems
@@ -3864,11 +3955,15 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 		    vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
 			rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 					  PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL);
-		} else if (!vma->vm_file && (vma_is_initial_stack(vma) ||
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+		} else if (!file && (vma_is_initial_stack(vma) ||
 			    vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) {
 			rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 					  PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL);
-		} else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+		} else if (file && vma->anon_vma) {
 			/*
 			 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
 			 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
@@ -3876,13 +3971,29 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 			 * modified content.  This typically should only
 			 * occur for text relocations.
 			 */
-			rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
+			rc = __file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__EXECMOD,
+					     backing_file);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+			if (backing_file) {
+				rc = file_has_perm(file->f_cred, file,
+						   FILE__EXECMOD);
+				if (rc)
+					return rc;
+			}
 		}
+	}
+
+	rc = __file_map_prot_check(cred, file, prot, shared, backing_file);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	if (backing_file) {
+		rc = file_map_prot_check(file->f_cred, file, prot, shared);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 	}
 
-	return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
@@ -6960,6 +7071,7 @@ static void selinux_bpf_token_free(struct bpf_token *token)
 struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
 	.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
 	.lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
+	.lbs_backing_file = sizeof(struct backing_file_security_struct),
 	.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
 	.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
 	.lbs_key = sizeof(struct key_security_struct),
@@ -7165,9 +7277,11 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(backing_file_alloc, selinux_backing_file_alloc),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl_compat, selinux_file_ioctl_compat),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_backing_file, selinux_mmap_backing_file),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock),
security/selinux/include/objsec.h +11 -0
index c88cae81ee4c52..dc42282a2c0521 100644
@@ -61,6 +61,10 @@ struct file_security_struct {
 	u32 pseqno; /* Policy seqno at the time of file open */
 };
 
+struct backing_file_security_struct {
+	u32 uf_sid; /* associated user file fsec->sid */
+};
+
 struct superblock_security_struct {
 	u32 sid; /* SID of file system superblock */
 	u32 def_sid; /* default SID for labeling */
@@ -159,6 +163,13 @@ static inline struct file_security_struct *selinux_file(const struct file *file)
 	return file->f_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_file;
 }
 
+static inline struct backing_file_security_struct *
+selinux_backing_file(const struct file *backing_file)
+{
+	void *blob = backing_file_security(backing_file);
+	return blob + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_backing_file;
+}
+
 static inline struct inode_security_struct *
 selinux_inode(const struct inode *inode)
 {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#128 lore raw

PATCH 128/204 inet: add indirect call wrapper for getfrag() calls

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5204ccbfa22358f95afd031a3f337e6d9a74baea ]

UDP send path suffers from one indirect call to ip_generic_getfrag()

We can use INDIRECT_CALL_1() to avoid it.

Stable-dep-of: eca856950f7c ("ipv4: account for fraggap on the paged allocation path")

---
 net/ipv4/ip_output.c  | 13 +++++++++----
 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 13 ++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/ip_output.c +9 -4
index ba51fc42531c26..0d0d6ebdd3a849 100644
@@ -1169,7 +1169,10 @@ static int __ip_append_data(struct sock *sk,
 			/* [!] NOTE: copy will be negative if pagedlen>0
 			 * because then the equation reduces to -fraggap.
 			 */
-			if (copy > 0 && getfrag(from, data + transhdrlen, offset, copy, fraggap, skb) < 0) {
+			if (copy > 0 &&
+			    INDIRECT_CALL_1(getfrag, ip_generic_getfrag,
+					    from, data + transhdrlen, offset,
+					    copy, fraggap, skb) < 0) {
 				err = -EFAULT;
 				kfree_skb(skb);
 				goto error;
@@ -1213,8 +1216,9 @@ static int __ip_append_data(struct sock *sk,
 			unsigned int off;
 
 			off = skb->len;
-			if (getfrag(from, skb_put(skb, copy),
-					offset, copy, off, skb) < 0) {
+			if (INDIRECT_CALL_1(getfrag, ip_generic_getfrag,
+					    from, skb_put(skb, copy),
+					    offset, copy, off, skb) < 0) {
 				__skb_trim(skb, off);
 				err = -EFAULT;
 				goto error;
@@ -1254,7 +1258,8 @@ static int __ip_append_data(struct sock *sk,
 				get_page(pfrag->page);
 			}
 			copy = min_t(int, copy, pfrag->size - pfrag->offset);
-			if (getfrag(from,
+			if (INDIRECT_CALL_1(getfrag, ip_generic_getfrag,
+				    from,
 				    page_address(pfrag->page) + pfrag->offset,
 				    offset, copy, skb->len, skb) < 0)
 				goto error_efault;
net/ipv6/ip6_output.c +8 -5
index 3804ead05a35ae..50b41be5d38d0e 100644
@@ -1695,8 +1695,9 @@ static int __ip6_append_data(struct sock *sk,
 				pskb_trim_unique(skb_prev, maxfraglen);
 			}
 			if (copy > 0 &&
-			    getfrag(from, data + transhdrlen, offset,
-				    copy, fraggap, skb) < 0) {
+			    INDIRECT_CALL_1(getfrag, ip_generic_getfrag,
+					   from, data + transhdrlen, offset,
+					   copy, fraggap, skb) < 0) {
 				err = -EFAULT;
 				kfree_skb(skb);
 				goto error;
@@ -1740,8 +1741,9 @@ static int __ip6_append_data(struct sock *sk,
 			unsigned int off;
 
 			off = skb->len;
-			if (getfrag(from, skb_put(skb, copy),
-						offset, copy, off, skb) < 0) {
+			if (INDIRECT_CALL_1(getfrag, ip_generic_getfrag,
+					    from, skb_put(skb, copy),
+					    offset, copy, off, skb) < 0) {
 				__skb_trim(skb, off);
 				err = -EFAULT;
 				goto error;
@@ -1781,7 +1783,8 @@ static int __ip6_append_data(struct sock *sk,
 				get_page(pfrag->page);
 			}
 			copy = min_t(int, copy, pfrag->size - pfrag->offset);
-			if (getfrag(from,
+			if (INDIRECT_CALL_1(getfrag, ip_generic_getfrag,
+				    from,
 				    page_address(pfrag->page) + pfrag->offset,
 				    offset, copy, skb->len, skb) < 0)
 				goto error_efault;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#129 lore raw

PATCH 129/204 ipv4: account for fraggap on the paged allocation path

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wongi Lee <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit eca856950f7cb1a221e02b99d758409f2c5cec42 ]

In __ip_append_data(), when the paged-allocation branch is taken, alloclen and pagedlen are computed as

	alloclen = fragheaderlen + transhdrlen;
	pagedlen = datalen - transhdrlen;

datalen already includes fraggap, but the fraggap bytes carried over from the previous skb are copied into the new skb's linear area at offset transhdrlen by the subsequent skb_copy_and_csum_bits(). The linear area is therefore undersized by fraggap bytes while pagedlen is overstated by the same amount.

The non-paged branch sets alloclen to fraglen, which already accounts for fraggap because datalen does. Bring the paged branch in line by adding fraggap to alloclen and subtracting it from pagedlen.

After this adjustment, copy no longer collapses to -fraggap on the paged path, so remove the stale comment describing that old arithmetic.

---
 net/ipv4/ip_output.c | 7 ++-----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/ip_output.c +2 -5
index 0d0d6ebdd3a849..41031c5c430334 100644
@@ -1118,8 +1118,8 @@ static int __ip_append_data(struct sock *sk,
 				  !(rt->dst.dev->features & NETIF_F_SG)))
 				alloclen = fraglen;
 			else {
-				alloclen = fragheaderlen + transhdrlen;
-				pagedlen = datalen - transhdrlen;
+				alloclen = fragheaderlen + transhdrlen + fraggap;
+				pagedlen = datalen - transhdrlen - fraggap;
 			}
 
 			alloclen += alloc_extra;
@@ -1166,9 +1166,6 @@ static int __ip_append_data(struct sock *sk,
 			}
 
 			copy = datalen - transhdrlen - fraggap - pagedlen;
-			/* [!] NOTE: copy will be negative if pagedlen>0
-			 * because then the equation reduces to -fraggap.
-			 */
 			if (copy > 0 &&
 			    INDIRECT_CALL_1(getfrag, ip_generic_getfrag,
 					    from, data + transhdrlen, offset,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#130 lore raw

PATCH 130/204 ntfs3: reject direct userspace writes to reserved $LX* xattrs

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Konstantin Komarov <[email protected]>

commit 5b08dccecf825cbf905f348bc6ccb497507e28e2 upstream.

NTFS3 uses $LXUID, $LXGID, $LXMOD and $LXDEV as internal WSL permission metadata and reloads them into i_uid, i_gid and i_mode from ntfs_get_wsl_perm().

Because the empty-prefix xattr handler also lets file owners call setxattr() on these names directly, an unprivileged writer on a writable ntfs3 mount can plant root ownership and S_ISUID on their own file and gain euid 0 after inode reload.

Reject direct userspace writes to the reserved $LX* names. Internal ntfs3 metadata updates are unchanged because ntfs_save_wsl_perm() writes them via ntfs_set_ea() directly.

[[email protected]: added an additional check for non privileged users]
---
 fs/ntfs3/xattr.c |   12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
fs/ntfs3/xattr.c +12 -0
@@ -829,6 +829,12 @@ out:
 	return err;
 }
 
+static bool ntfs_is_reserved_lxattr(const char *name)
+{
+	return !strcmp(name, "$LXUID") || !strcmp(name, "$LXGID") ||
+	       !strcmp(name, "$LXMOD") || !strcmp(name, "$LXDEV");
+}
+
 /*
  * ntfs_setxattr - inode_operations::setxattr
  */
@@ -933,6 +939,12 @@ set_new_fa:
 		goto out;
 	}
 
+	/* Do not allow non privileged users to change $LXUID/$LXGID... */
+	if (ntfs_is_reserved_lxattr(name) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+		err = -EPERM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
 	/* Deal with NTFS extended attribute. */
 	err = ntfs_set_ea(inode, name, strlen(name), value, size, flags, 0,
 			  NULL);
author maintainer
#131 lore raw

PATCH 131/204 KVM: SEV: Move sev_free_vcpu() down below sev_es_unmap_ghcb()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 08385c5e1814edee829ffe475d559ed730354335 ]

Relocate sev_free_vcpu() down in sev.c so that it's definition comes after sev_es_unmap_ghcb(). This will allow sharing unmap functionality between the two functions without needing a forward declaration (or weird placement of the common code).

No functional change intended.

Message-ID: <[email protected]>

Message-ID: <[email protected]>

[sean: Preserve use of sev_es_guest() as is_sev_es_guest() doesn't exist
in 6.12, resolve superficial conflict due to pre_sev_run() prototype mismatch.]

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +31 -31
index 73e49317735173..7ddce0685293de 100644
@@ -3168,37 +3168,6 @@ void sev_guest_memory_reclaimed(struct kvm *kvm)
 	wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
 }
 
-void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
-	struct vcpu_svm *svm;
-
-	if (!sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
-		return;
-
-	svm = to_svm(vcpu);
-
-	/*
-	 * If it's an SNP guest, then the VMSA was marked in the RMP table as
-	 * a guest-owned page. Transition the page to hypervisor state before
-	 * releasing it back to the system.
-	 */
-	if (sev_snp_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
-		u64 pfn = __pa(svm->sev_es.vmsa) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
-
-		if (kvm_rmp_make_shared(vcpu->kvm, pfn, PG_LEVEL_4K))
-			goto skip_vmsa_free;
-	}
-
-	if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
-		sev_flush_encrypted_page(vcpu, svm->sev_es.vmsa);
-
-	__free_page(virt_to_page(svm->sev_es.vmsa));
-
-skip_vmsa_free:
-	if (svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free)
-		kvfree(svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa);
-}
-
 static void dump_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 {
 	struct ghcb *ghcb = svm->sev_es.ghcb;
@@ -3475,6 +3444,37 @@ void sev_es_unmap_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 	svm->sev_es.ghcb = NULL;
 }
 
+void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_svm *svm;
+
+	if (!sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+		return;
+
+	svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * If it's an SNP guest, then the VMSA was marked in the RMP table as
+	 * a guest-owned page. Transition the page to hypervisor state before
+	 * releasing it back to the system.
+	 */
+	if (sev_snp_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
+		u64 pfn = __pa(svm->sev_es.vmsa) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+		if (kvm_rmp_make_shared(vcpu->kvm, pfn, PG_LEVEL_4K))
+			goto skip_vmsa_free;
+	}
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
+		sev_flush_encrypted_page(vcpu, svm->sev_es.vmsa);
+
+	__free_page(virt_to_page(svm->sev_es.vmsa));
+
+skip_vmsa_free:
+	if (svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free)
+		kvfree(svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa);
+}
+
 void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu)
 {
 	struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu_ptr(&svm_data, cpu);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#132 lore raw

PATCH 132/204 KVM: SEV: Unmap and unpin the GHCB as needed on vCPU free

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit db38bcb3311053954f62b865cd2d86e164b04351 ]

Unmap and unpin the GHCB as needed when freeing a vCPU. If the VM is destroyed after mapping+pinning the GHCB on #VMGEXIT, without re-running the vCPU, KVM will effectively leak the GHCB and any mappings created for the GHCB.

Fixes 291bd20d5d88 ("KVM: SVM: Add initial support for a VMGEXIT VMEXIT")

Message-ID: <[email protected]>

Message-ID: <[email protected]>

[sean: Preserve @dirty=true param to kvm_vcpu_unmap()]
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +16 -10
index 7ddce0685293de..6032d7e69a20e7 100644
@@ -3412,6 +3412,20 @@ static int sev_es_validate_vmgexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 	return 1;
 }
 
+static void __sev_es_unmap_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	if (svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free) {
+		kvfree(svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa);
+		svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa = NULL;
+		svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free = false;
+	}
+
+	if (svm->sev_es.ghcb) {
+		kvm_vcpu_unmap(&svm->vcpu, &svm->sev_es.ghcb_map, true);
+		svm->sev_es.ghcb = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
 void sev_es_unmap_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 {
 	/* Clear any indication that the vCPU is in a type of AP Reset Hold */
@@ -3430,18 +3444,11 @@ void sev_es_unmap_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 		svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_sync = false;
 	}
 
-	if (svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free) {
-		kvfree(svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa);
-		svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa = NULL;
-		svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free = false;
-	}
-
 	trace_kvm_vmgexit_exit(svm->vcpu.vcpu_id, svm->sev_es.ghcb);
 
 	sev_es_sync_to_ghcb(svm);
 
-	kvm_vcpu_unmap(&svm->vcpu, &svm->sev_es.ghcb_map, true);
-	svm->sev_es.ghcb = NULL;
+	__sev_es_unmap_ghcb(svm);
 }
 
 void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -3471,8 +3478,7 @@ void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	__free_page(virt_to_page(svm->sev_es.vmsa));
 
 skip_vmsa_free:
-	if (svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free)
-		kvfree(svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa);
+	__sev_es_unmap_ghcb(svm);
 }
 
 void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#133 lore raw

PATCH 133/204 af_unix: Set gc_in_progress to true in unix_gc().

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d82ba05263c69fa2437fe93e4e561cc40f4c03af ]

Igor Ushakov reported that unix_gc() could run with gc_in_progress being false if the work is scheduled while running:

  Thread 1         Thread 2                     Thread 3
  --------         --------                     --------
                   unix_schedule_gc()           unix_schedule_gc()
                   `- if (!gc_in_progress)      `- if (!gc_in_progress)
                      |- gc_in_progress = true     |
                      `- queue_work()              |
  unix_gc() <----------------/                     |
  |                                                |- gc_in_progress = true
  ...                                              `- queue_work()
  |                                                       |
  `- gc_in_progress = false                               |
                                                          |

unix_gc() <---------------------------------------------' |
... /* gc_in_progress == false */
|
`- gc_in_progress = false

unix_peek_fpl() relies on gc_in_progress not to confuse GC by MSG_PEEK.

Let's set gc_in_progress to true in unix_gc().

[ Add setting gc_in_progress in __unix_gc(). Keep the existing
set in unix_gc() for wait_for_unix_gc() over-limit throttling. ]

---
 net/unix/garbage.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/unix/garbage.c +2 -0
index 1cdb54c61619f5..fa6983dc3181d9 100644
@@ -583,6 +583,8 @@ static void __unix_gc(struct work_struct *work)
 	struct sk_buff_head hitlist;
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 
+	WRITE_ONCE(gc_in_progress, true);
+
 	spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
 
 	if (!unix_graph_maybe_cyclic) {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#134 lore raw

PATCH 134/204 mtd: spi-nor: macronix: Add post_sfdp fixups for Quad Input Page Program

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Cheng Ming Lin <[email protected]>

commit 798aafeffb369c5eb36e406b18970ef27baa820d upstream.

Although certain Macronix NOR flash support the Quad Input Page Program feature, the corresponding information in the 4-byte Address Instruction Table of these flash is not properly filled. As a result, this feature cannot be enabled as expected.

To address this issue, a post_sfdp fixups implementation is required to correct the missing information.

---
 drivers/mtd/spi-nor/macronix.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+)
drivers/mtd/spi-nor/macronix.c +23 -0
index ea6be95e75a526..678ebaa220ca98 100644
@@ -28,8 +28,26 @@ mx25l25635_post_bfpt_fixups(struct spi_nor *nor,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int
+macronix_qpp4b_post_sfdp_fixups(struct spi_nor *nor)
+{
+	/* PP_1_1_4_4B is supported but missing in 4BAIT. */
+	struct spi_nor_flash_parameter *params = nor->params;
+
+	params->hwcaps.mask |= SNOR_HWCAPS_PP_1_1_4;
+	spi_nor_set_pp_settings(&params->page_programs[SNOR_CMD_PP_1_1_4],
+				SPINOR_OP_PP_1_1_4_4B, SNOR_PROTO_1_1_4);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static const struct spi_nor_fixups mx25l25635_fixups = {
 	.post_bfpt = mx25l25635_post_bfpt_fixups,
+	.post_sfdp = macronix_qpp4b_post_sfdp_fixups,
+};
+
+static const struct spi_nor_fixups macronix_qpp4b_fixups = {
+	.post_sfdp = macronix_qpp4b_post_sfdp_fixups,
 };
 
 static const struct flash_info macronix_nor_parts[] = {
@@ -85,11 +103,13 @@ static const struct flash_info macronix_nor_parts[] = {
 		.size = SZ_64M,
 		.no_sfdp_flags = SPI_NOR_DUAL_READ | SPI_NOR_QUAD_READ,
 		.fixup_flags = SPI_NOR_4B_OPCODES,
+		.fixups = &macronix_qpp4b_fixups,
 	}, {
 		.id = SNOR_ID(0xc2, 0x20, 0x1b),
 		.name = "mx66l1g45g",
 		.size = SZ_128M,
 		.no_sfdp_flags = SECT_4K | SPI_NOR_DUAL_READ | SPI_NOR_QUAD_READ,
+		.fixups = &macronix_qpp4b_fixups,
 	}, {
 		.id = SNOR_ID(0xc2, 0x23, 0x14),
 		.name = "mx25v8035f",
@@ -137,18 +157,21 @@ static const struct flash_info macronix_nor_parts[] = {
 		.size = SZ_64M,
 		.no_sfdp_flags = SECT_4K | SPI_NOR_DUAL_READ | SPI_NOR_QUAD_READ,
 		.fixup_flags = SPI_NOR_4B_OPCODES,
+		.fixups = &macronix_qpp4b_fixups,
 	}, {
 		.id = SNOR_ID(0xc2, 0x25, 0x3a),
 		.name = "mx66u51235f",
 		.size = SZ_64M,
 		.no_sfdp_flags = SECT_4K | SPI_NOR_DUAL_READ | SPI_NOR_QUAD_READ,
 		.fixup_flags = SPI_NOR_4B_OPCODES,
+		.fixups = &macronix_qpp4b_fixups,
 	}, {
 		.id = SNOR_ID(0xc2, 0x25, 0x3c),
 		.name = "mx66u2g45g",
 		.size = SZ_256M,
 		.no_sfdp_flags = SECT_4K | SPI_NOR_DUAL_READ | SPI_NOR_QUAD_READ,
 		.fixup_flags = SPI_NOR_4B_OPCODES,
+		.fixups = &macronix_qpp4b_fixups,
 	}, {
 		.id = SNOR_ID(0xc2, 0x26, 0x18),
 		.name = "mx25l12855e",
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#135 lore raw

PATCH 135/204 mtd: spi-nor: macronix: add support for mx66{l2, u1}g45g

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Cheng Ming Lin <[email protected]>

commit 797bbaa7531f75985b199e484451fa3f954382b3 upstream.

Due to incorrect values in the 4-BAIT table for these two flash IDs, it is necessary to add these two flash IDs with fixups.

---
 drivers/mtd/spi-nor/macronix.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
drivers/mtd/spi-nor/macronix.c +8 -0
index 678ebaa220ca98..6127565372c529 100644
@@ -110,6 +110,10 @@ static const struct flash_info macronix_nor_parts[] = {
 		.size = SZ_128M,
 		.no_sfdp_flags = SECT_4K | SPI_NOR_DUAL_READ | SPI_NOR_QUAD_READ,
 		.fixups = &macronix_qpp4b_fixups,
+	}, {
+		/* MX66L2G45G */
+		.id = SNOR_ID(0xc2, 0x20, 0x1c),
+		.fixups = &macronix_qpp4b_fixups,
 	}, {
 		.id = SNOR_ID(0xc2, 0x23, 0x14),
 		.name = "mx25v8035f",
@@ -165,6 +169,10 @@ static const struct flash_info macronix_nor_parts[] = {
 		.no_sfdp_flags = SECT_4K | SPI_NOR_DUAL_READ | SPI_NOR_QUAD_READ,
 		.fixup_flags = SPI_NOR_4B_OPCODES,
 		.fixups = &macronix_qpp4b_fixups,
+	}, {
+		/* MX66U1G45G */
+		.id = SNOR_ID(0xc2, 0x25, 0x3b),
+		.fixups = &macronix_qpp4b_fixups,
 	}, {
 		.id = SNOR_ID(0xc2, 0x25, 0x3c),
 		.name = "mx66u2g45g",
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#136 lore raw

PATCH 136/204 mac802154: llsec: add skb_cow_data() before in-place crypto

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Doruk Tan Ozturk <[email protected]>

commit 84a04eb5b210643bd67aab81ff805d32f62aa865 upstream.

llsec_do_encrypt_unauth(), llsec_do_encrypt_auth(), llsec_do_decrypt_unauth(), and llsec_do_decrypt_auth() all perform in-place cryptographic transformations on skb data. They build a scatterlist with sg_init_one() pointing into the skb's linear data area and then pass the same scatterlist as both src and dst to the crypto API (e.g. crypto_skcipher_encrypt/decrypt, crypto_aead_encrypt/decrypt).

On the RX path, __ieee802154_rx_handle_packet() clones the received skb before handing it to each subscriber via ieee802154_subif_frame(). The cloned skb shares the same underlying data buffer via reference counting. When llsec_do_decrypt() subsequently modifies this shared buffer in place, it corrupts data that other clones -- potentially belonging to other sockets or subsystems -- still reference.

On the TX path, similar data sharing can occur when an skb's head has been cloned (skb_cloned() returns true).

The fix is to call skb_cow_data() before performing any in-place crypto operation. skb_cow_data() ensures that the skb's data area is not
shared: if the skb head is cloned or the data spans multiple fragments, it copies the data into a private buffer that can be safely modified in place. This is the same pattern used by:

- ESP (net/ipv4/esp4.c, net/ipv6/esp6.c)
- MACsec (drivers/net/macsec.c)
- WireGuard (drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c)
- TIPC (net/tipc/crypto.c)

Without this guard, in-place crypto on shared skb data leads to:
- Silent data corruption of other skb clones
- Use-after-free when the crypto API scatterwalk writes through a page that has already been freed by another clone's kfree_skb()
- Kernel crashes under concurrent 802.15.4 traffic with security enabled (KASAN/KMSAN reports slab-use-after-free)

Found by 0sec (https://0sec.ai) using automated source analysis.

Fixes 4c14a2fb5d14 ("mac802154: add llsec decryption method")
Fixes 03556e4d0dbb ("mac802154: add llsec encryption method")
Closes <link to your mail on lore>
---
 net/mac802154/llsec.c |   14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
net/mac802154/llsec.c +14 -0
@@ -710,6 +710,7 @@ int mac802154_llsec_encrypt(struct mac80
 {
 	struct ieee802154_hdr hdr;
 	int rc, authlen, hlen;
+	struct sk_buff *trailer;
 	struct mac802154_llsec_key *key;
 	u32 frame_ctr;
 
@@ -769,6 +770,12 @@ int mac802154_llsec_encrypt(struct mac80
 	skb->mac_len = ieee802154_hdr_push(skb, &hdr);
 	skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
 
+	rc = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer);
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		llsec_key_put(key);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
 	rc = llsec_do_encrypt(skb, sec, &hdr, key);
 	llsec_key_put(key);
 
@@ -908,6 +915,13 @@ llsec_do_decrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, co
 		 const struct ieee802154_hdr *hdr,
 		 struct mac802154_llsec_key *key, __le64 dev_addr)
 {
+	struct sk_buff *trailer;
+	int err;
+
+	err = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer);
+	if (err < 0)
+		return err;
+
 	if (hdr->sec.level == IEEE802154_SCF_SECLEVEL_ENC)
 		return llsec_do_decrypt_unauth(skb, sec, hdr, key, dev_addr);
 	else
author maintainer
#137 lore raw

PATCH 137/204 net: skmsg: preserve sg.copy across SG transforms

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yiming Qian <[email protected]>

commit 406e8a651a7b854c41fecd5117bb282b3a6c2c6b upstream.

The sk_msg sg.copy bitmap is part of the scatterlist entry ownership state. A set bit tells sk_msg_compute_data_pointers() not to expose the entry through writable BPF ctx->data. This protects entries backed by pages that are not private to the sk_msg, such as splice-backed file page-cache pages.

Several sk_msg transform paths move, copy, split, or compact msg->sg.data[] entries without moving the matching sg.copy bit. This can make an externally backed entry arrive at a new slot with a clear copy bit. A later SK_MSG verdict can then expose sg_virt(sge) as writable ctx->data and BPF stores can modify the original page cache.

Keep sg.copy synchronized with sg.data[] whenever entries are transferred, shifted, split, or copied into a new sk_msg. Clear the bit when an entry is replaced by a newly allocated private page or freed. This covers the BPF pull/push/pop helpers, sk_msg_shift_left/right(), sk_msg_xfer(), and tls_split_open_record(), including the partial tail entry created during TLS open-record splitting.

---
 include/linux/skmsg.h |   15 +++++++++++----
 net/core/filter.c     |   27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 net/core/skmsg.c      |    2 ++
 net/tls/tls_sw.c      |    4 ++++
 4 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
include/linux/skmsg.h +11 -4
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 #ifndef _LINUX_SKMSG_H
 #define _LINUX_SKMSG_H
 
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
 #include <linux/bpf.h>
 #include <linux/filter.h>
 #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
@@ -199,11 +200,14 @@ static inline void sk_msg_xfer(struct sk
 			       int which, u32 size)
 {
 	dst->sg.data[which] = src->sg.data[which];
+	__assign_bit(which, dst->sg.copy, test_bit(which, src->sg.copy));
 	dst->sg.data[which].length  = size;
 	dst->sg.size		   += size;
 	src->sg.size		   -= size;
 	src->sg.data[which].length -= size;
 	src->sg.data[which].offset += size;
+	if (!src->sg.data[which].length)
+		__clear_bit(which, src->sg.copy);
 }
 
 static inline void sk_msg_xfer_full(struct sk_msg *dst, struct sk_msg *src)
@@ -273,16 +277,19 @@ static inline void sk_msg_page_add(struc
 static inline void sk_msg_sg_copy(struct sk_msg *msg, u32 i, bool copy_state)
 {
 	do {
-		if (copy_state)
-			__set_bit(i, msg->sg.copy);
-		else
-			__clear_bit(i, msg->sg.copy);
+		__assign_bit(i, msg->sg.copy, copy_state);
 		sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
 		if (i == msg->sg.end)
 			break;
 	} while (1);
 }
 
+static inline void sk_msg_sg_copy_assign(struct sk_msg *dst, u32 dst_i,
+					 const struct sk_msg *src, u32 src_i)
+{
+	__assign_bit(dst_i, dst->sg.copy, test_bit(src_i, src->sg.copy));
+}
+
 static inline void sk_msg_sg_copy_set(struct sk_msg *msg, u32 start)
 {
 	sk_msg_sg_copy(msg, start, true);
net/core/filter.c +27 -0
@@ -2740,11 +2740,13 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_pull_data, struct sk_
 		poffset += len;
 		sge->length = 0;
 		put_page(sg_page(sge));
+		__clear_bit(i, msg->sg.copy);
 
 		sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
 	} while (i != last_sge);
 
 	sg_set_page(&msg->sg.data[first_sge], page, copy, 0);
+	__clear_bit(first_sge, msg->sg.copy);
 
 	/* To repair sg ring we need to shift entries. If we only
 	 * had a single entry though we can just replace it and
@@ -2770,9 +2772,11 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_pull_data, struct sk_
 			break;
 
 		msg->sg.data[i] = msg->sg.data[move_from];
+		sk_msg_sg_copy_assign(msg, i, msg, move_from);
 		msg->sg.data[move_from].length = 0;
 		msg->sg.data[move_from].page_link = 0;
 		msg->sg.data[move_from].offset = 0;
+		__clear_bit(move_from, msg->sg.copy);
 		sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
 	} while (1);
 
@@ -2801,6 +2805,7 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_push_data, struct sk_
 {
 	struct scatterlist sge, nsge, nnsge, rsge = {0}, *psge;
 	u32 new, i = 0, l = 0, space, copy = 0, offset = 0;
+	bool sge_copy, nsge_copy, nnsge_copy, rsge_copy = false;
 	u8 *raw, *to, *from;
 	struct page *page;
 
@@ -2873,6 +2878,7 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_push_data, struct sk_
 			sk_msg_iter_var_prev(i);
 		psge = sk_msg_elem(msg, i);
 		rsge = sk_msg_elem_cpy(msg, i);
+		rsge_copy = test_bit(i, msg->sg.copy);
 
 		psge->length = start - offset;
 		rsge.length -= psge->length;
@@ -2897,24 +2903,32 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_push_data, struct sk_
 
 	/* Shift one or two slots as needed */
 	sge = sk_msg_elem_cpy(msg, new);
+	sge_copy = test_bit(new, msg->sg.copy);
 	sg_unmark_end(&sge);
 
 	nsge = sk_msg_elem_cpy(msg, i);
+	nsge_copy = test_bit(i, msg->sg.copy);
 	if (rsge.length) {
 		sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
 		nnsge = sk_msg_elem_cpy(msg, i);
+		nnsge_copy = test_bit(i, msg->sg.copy);
 		sk_msg_iter_next(msg, end);
 	}
 
 	while (i != msg->sg.end) {
 		msg->sg.data[i] = sge;
+		__assign_bit(i, msg->sg.copy, sge_copy);
 		sge = nsge;
+		sge_copy = nsge_copy;
 		sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
 		if (rsge.length) {
 			nsge = nnsge;
+			nsge_copy = nnsge_copy;
 			nnsge = sk_msg_elem_cpy(msg, i);
+			nnsge_copy = test_bit(i, msg->sg.copy);
 		} else {
 			nsge = sk_msg_elem_cpy(msg, i);
+			nsge_copy = test_bit(i, msg->sg.copy);
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -2928,6 +2942,7 @@ place_new:
 		get_page(sg_page(&rsge));
 		sk_msg_iter_var_next(new);
 		msg->sg.data[new] = rsge;
+		__assign_bit(new, msg->sg.copy, rsge_copy);
 	}
 
 	sk_msg_reset_curr(msg);
@@ -2955,25 +2970,33 @@ static void sk_msg_shift_left(struct sk_
 		prev = i;
 		sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
 		msg->sg.data[prev] = msg->sg.data[i];
+		sk_msg_sg_copy_assign(msg, prev, msg, i);
 	} while (i != msg->sg.end);
 
 	sk_msg_iter_prev(msg, end);
+	__clear_bit(msg->sg.end, msg->sg.copy);
 }
 
 static void sk_msg_shift_right(struct sk_msg *msg, int i)
 {
 	struct scatterlist tmp, sge;
+	bool tmp_copy, sge_copy;
 
 	sk_msg_iter_next(msg, end);
 	sge = sk_msg_elem_cpy(msg, i);
+	sge_copy = test_bit(i, msg->sg.copy);
 	sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
 	tmp = sk_msg_elem_cpy(msg, i);
+	tmp_copy = test_bit(i, msg->sg.copy);
 
 	while (i != msg->sg.end) {
 		msg->sg.data[i] = sge;
+		__assign_bit(i, msg->sg.copy, sge_copy);
 		sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
 		sge = tmp;
+		sge_copy = tmp_copy;
 		tmp = sk_msg_elem_cpy(msg, i);
+		tmp_copy = test_bit(i, msg->sg.copy);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -3033,6 +3056,8 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_pop_data, struct sk_m
 		struct scatterlist *nsge, *sge = sk_msg_elem(msg, i);
 		int a = start - offset;
 		int b = sge->length - pop - a;
+		u32 sge_i = i;
+		bool sge_copy = test_bit(i, msg->sg.copy);
 
 		sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
 
@@ -3045,6 +3070,7 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_pop_data, struct sk_m
 				sg_set_page(nsge,
 					    sg_page(sge),
 					    b, sge->offset + pop + a);
+				__assign_bit(i, msg->sg.copy, sge_copy);
 			} else {
 				struct page *page, *orig;
 				u8 *to, *from;
@@ -3061,6 +3087,7 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_pop_data, struct sk_m
 				memcpy(to, from, a);
 				memcpy(to + a, from + a + pop, b);
 				sg_set_page(sge, page, a + b, 0);
+				__clear_bit(sge_i, msg->sg.copy);
 				put_page(orig);
 			}
 			pop = 0;
net/core/skmsg.c +2 -0
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ int sk_msg_alloc(struct sock *sk, struct
 			sge = &msg->sg.data[msg->sg.end];
 			sg_unmark_end(sge);
 			sg_set_page(sge, pfrag->page, use, orig_offset);
+			__clear_bit(msg->sg.end, msg->sg.copy);
 			get_page(pfrag->page);
 			sk_msg_iter_next(msg, end);
 		}
@@ -186,6 +187,7 @@ static int sk_msg_free_elem(struct sock
 			sk_mem_uncharge(sk, len);
 		put_page(sg_page(sge));
 	}
+	__clear_bit(i, msg->sg.copy);
 	memset(sge, 0, sizeof(*sge));
 	return len;
 }
net/tls/tls_sw.c +4 -0
@@ -623,6 +623,7 @@ static int tls_split_open_record(struct
 	struct scatterlist *sge, *osge, *nsge;
 	u32 orig_size = msg_opl->sg.size;
 	struct scatterlist tmp = { };
+	u32 tmp_i = 0;
 	struct sk_msg *msg_npl;
 	struct tls_rec *new;
 	int ret;
@@ -644,6 +645,7 @@ static int tls_split_open_record(struct
 		if (sge->length > apply) {
 			u32 len = sge->length - apply;
 
+			tmp_i = i;
 			get_page(sg_page(sge));
 			sg_set_page(&tmp, sg_page(sge), len,
 				    sge->offset + apply);
@@ -675,6 +677,7 @@ static int tls_split_open_record(struct
 	nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j);
 	if (tmp.length) {
 		memcpy(nsge, &tmp, sizeof(*nsge));
+		sk_msg_sg_copy_assign(msg_npl, j, msg_opl, tmp_i);
 		sk_msg_iter_var_next(j);
 		nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j);
 	}
@@ -682,6 +685,7 @@ static int tls_split_open_record(struct
 	osge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
 	while (osge->length) {
 		memcpy(nsge, osge, sizeof(*nsge));
+		sk_msg_sg_copy_assign(msg_npl, j, msg_opl, i);
 		sg_unmark_end(nsge);
 		sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
 		sk_msg_iter_var_next(j);
author maintainer
#138 lore raw

PATCH 138/204 net: ip_gre: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Maoyi Xie <[email protected]>

commit 8165f7ff57d9667d2bb477ef6af83ede7fed4ad7 upstream.

A tunnel changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the tunnel link netns t->net. They differ once the device is created in or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a caller privileged there but not in t->net can rewrite a tunnel that lives in t->net.

Add rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() next to rtnl_get_net_ns_capable() in net/core/rtnetlink.c. It requires CAP_NET_ADMIN in the link netns and is skipped when the link netns is dev_net(dev), where the rtnl path already checked it. The other patches in this series use the same helper.

Gate ipgre_changelink() and erspan_changelink() with it, at the top of the op before any attribute is parsed, because the parsers update live tunnel fields first. ipgre_netlink_parms() sets t->collect_md before ip_tunnel_changelink() runs.

Commit 8b484efd5cb4 ("ip6: vti: Use ip6_tnl.net in vti6_siocdevprivate().") added the same check on the ioctl path. This adds it on RTM_NEWLINK.

---
 include/net/rtnetlink.h |    2 ++
 net/core/rtnetlink.c    |    8 ++++++++
 net/ipv4/ip_gre.c       |    6 ++++++
 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+)
include/net/rtnetlink.h +2 -0
@@ -212,6 +212,8 @@ int rtnl_configure_link(struct net_devic
 int rtnl_nla_parse_ifinfomsg(struct nlattr **tb, const struct nlattr *nla_peer,
 			     struct netlink_ext_ack *exterr);
 struct net *rtnl_get_net_ns_capable(struct sock *sk, int netnsid);
+bool rtnl_dev_link_net_capable(const struct net_device *dev,
+			       const struct net *link_net);
 
 #define MODULE_ALIAS_RTNL_LINK(kind) MODULE_ALIAS("rtnl-link-" kind)
 
net/core/rtnetlink.c +8 -0
@@ -2205,6 +2205,14 @@ struct net *rtnl_get_net_ns_capable(stru
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rtnl_get_net_ns_capable);
 
+bool rtnl_dev_link_net_capable(const struct net_device *dev,
+			       const struct net *link_net)
+{
+	return net_eq(link_net, dev_net(dev)) ||
+	       ns_capable(link_net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rtnl_dev_link_net_capable);
+
 static int rtnl_valid_dump_ifinfo_req(const struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
 				      bool strict_check, struct nlattr **tb,
 				      struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
net/ipv4/ip_gre.c +6 -0
@@ -1446,6 +1446,9 @@ static int ipgre_changelink(struct net_d
 	__u32 fwmark = t->fwmark;
 	int err;
 
+	if (!rtnl_dev_link_net_capable(dev, t->net))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	err = ipgre_newlink_encap_setup(dev, data);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
@@ -1475,6 +1478,9 @@ static int erspan_changelink(struct net_
 	__u32 fwmark = t->fwmark;
 	int err;
 
+	if (!rtnl_dev_link_net_capable(dev, t->net))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	err = ipgre_newlink_encap_setup(dev, data);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
author maintainer
#139 lore raw

PATCH 139/204 apparmor: mediate the implicit connect of TCP fast open sendmsg

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bryam Vargas <[email protected]>

commit 4d587cd8a72155089a627130bbd4716ec0856e21 upstream.

sendmsg()/sendto() with MSG_FASTOPEN is a combination of connect(2) and write(2): it opens the connection in the SYN. apparmor_socket_sendmsg() only checks AA_MAY_SEND, so a profile that grants send but denies connect lets a confined task open an outbound TCP/MPTCP connection that connect(2) would have refused, bypassing connect mediation.

Mediate the implicit connect when MSG_FASTOPEN is set and a destination is supplied. Add it to apparmor_socket_sendmsg() (not the shared aa_sock_msg_perm() helper, which recvmsg also uses) and call aa_sk_perm() directly, mirroring the selinux and tomoyo fixes. sk_is_tcp() does not cover MPTCP fast open, so the SOCK_STREAM/IPPROTO_MPTCP arm is explicit.

Fixes cf60af03ca4e ("net-tcp: Fast Open client - sendmsg(MSG_FASTOPEN)")
---
 security/apparmor/lsm.c |   16 +++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/apparmor/lsm.c +15 -1
@@ -1207,7 +1207,21 @@ static int aa_sock_msg_perm(const char *
 static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
 				   struct msghdr *msg, int size)
 {
-	return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size);
+	int error = aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size);
+
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+	/* TCP fast open carries connect() semantics in sendmsg(); mediate
+	 * the implicit connect so it cannot bypass the connect permission.
+	 */
+	if ((msg->msg_flags & MSG_FASTOPEN) && msg->msg_name &&
+	    (sk_is_tcp(sock->sk) ||
+	     (sk_is_inet(sock->sk) && sock->sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM &&
+	      sock->sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_MPTCP)))
+		error = aa_sk_perm(OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, sock->sk);
+
+	return error;
 }
 
 static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
author maintainer
#140 lore raw

PATCH 140/204 apparmor: fix use-after-free in rawdata dedup loop

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ruslan Valiyev <[email protected]>

commit 6f060496d03e4dc560a40f73770bd08335cb7a27 upstream.

aa_replace_profiles() walks ns->rawdata_list to dedup the incoming policy blob against entries already attached to existing profiles. Per the kernel-doc on struct aa_loaddata, list membership does not hold a reference: profiles hold pcount, and when the last pcount drops, do_ploaddata_rmfs() is queued on a workqueue that takes ns->lock and removes the entry. Between dropping the last pcount and the workqueue running, an entry remains on the list with pcount == 0.

aa_get_profile_loaddata() is an unconditional kref_get() on pcount, so when the dedup loop hits such an entry, refcount hardening reports

refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.

inside aa_replace_profiles(), and the poisoned counter then trips "saturated" and "underflow" warnings on the subsequent uses of the same loaddata.

Before commit a0b7091c4de4 ("apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereference") the dedup path used a get_unless_zero-style helper on a single counter, so the existing "if (tmp)" guard was meaningful. The split-refcount refactor introduced aa_get_profile_loaddata(), which has plain kref_get() semantics, and the guard quietly became a no-op.

Introduce aa_get_profile_loaddata_not0(), matching the existing _not0 convention used by aa_get_profile_not0(), and use it for the rawdata_list dedup lookup so dying entries are skipped.

Reproduced on x86_64 with v7.1-rc5 in QEMU+KVM running Ubuntu 24.04 + stress-ng 0.17.06:

  stress-ng --apparmor 1 --klog-check --timeout 60s

Without this patch the three refcount_t warnings fire within a few seconds. With it the same 60 s run is clean. Coverage is a smoke-test only; a longer soak with CONFIG_KASAN, CONFIG_KCSAN and CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING would be welcome from anyone with the cycles.

---
 security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h |   19 +++++++++++++++++++
 security/apparmor/policy.c                |    8 ++++++--
 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h +19 -0
@@ -163,6 +163,25 @@ aa_get_profile_loaddata(struct aa_loadda
 	return data;
 }
 
+/**
+ * aa_get_profile_loaddata_not0 - get a profile reference count if not zero
+ * @data: reference to get a count on
+ *
+ * Like aa_get_profile_loaddata(), but safe to call on an entry that may
+ * be on a list (e.g. ns->rawdata_list) where the last pcount has already
+ * dropped and the deferred cleanup has not yet run.
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to reference, or %NULL if @data is NULL or its
+ *          profile refcount has already reached zero.
+ */
+static inline struct aa_loaddata *
+aa_get_profile_loaddata_not0(struct aa_loaddata *data)
+{
+	if (data && kref_get_unless_zero(&data->pcount))
+		return data;
+	return NULL;
+}
+
 void __aa_loaddata_update(struct aa_loaddata *data, long revision);
 bool aa_rawdata_eq(struct aa_loaddata *l, struct aa_loaddata *r);
 void aa_loaddata_kref(struct kref *kref);
security/apparmor/policy.c +6 -2
@@ -1175,8 +1175,12 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns
 			if (aa_rawdata_eq(rawdata_ent, udata)) {
 				struct aa_loaddata *tmp;
 
-				tmp = aa_get_profile_loaddata(rawdata_ent);
-				/* check we didn't fail the race */
+				/*
+				 * Entries remain on rawdata_list with
+				 * pcount == 0 until do_ploaddata_rmfs()
+				 * runs; only take a live profile ref.
+				 */
+				tmp = aa_get_profile_loaddata_not0(rawdata_ent);
 				if (tmp) {
 					aa_put_profile_loaddata(udata);
 					udata = tmp;
author maintainer
#141 lore raw

PATCH 141/204 NTB: epf: Avoid pci_iounmap() with offset when PEER_SPAD and CONFIG share BAR

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Koichiro Den <[email protected]>

commit d876153680e3d721d385e554def919bce3d18c74 upstream.

When BAR_PEER_SPAD and BAR_CONFIG share one PCI BAR, the module teardown path ends up calling pci_iounmap() on the same iomem with some offset, which is unnecessary and triggers a kernel warning like the following:

Trying to vunmap() nonexistent vm area (0000000069a5ffe8)

  WARNING: mm/vmalloc.c:3470 at vunmap+0x58/0x68, CPU#5: modprobe/2937
  [...]
  Call trace:
   vunmap+0x58/0x68 (P)
   iounmap+0x34/0x48
   pci_iounmap+0x2c/0x40
   ntb_epf_pci_remove+0x44/0x80 [ntb_hw_epf]
   pci_device_remove+0x48/0xf8
   device_remove+0x50/0x88
   device_release_driver_internal+0x1c8/0x228
   driver_detach+0x50/0xb0
   bus_remove_driver+0x74/0x100
   driver_unregister+0x34/0x68
   pci_unregister_driver+0x34/0xa0
   ntb_epf_pci_driver_exit+0x14/0xfe0 [ntb_hw_epf]
  [...]

Fix it by unmapping only when PEER_SPAD and CONFIG use difference bars.

Fixes e75d5ae8ab88 ("NTB: epf: Allow more flexibility in the memory BAR map method")
---
 drivers/ntb/hw/epf/ntb_hw_epf.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/ntb/hw/epf/ntb_hw_epf.c +2 -1
@@ -646,7 +646,8 @@ static void ntb_epf_deinit_pci(struct nt
 	struct pci_dev *pdev = ndev->ntb.pdev;
 
 	pci_iounmap(pdev, ndev->ctrl_reg);
-	pci_iounmap(pdev, ndev->peer_spad_reg);
+	if (ndev->barno_map[BAR_PEER_SPAD] != ndev->barno_map[BAR_CONFIG])
+		pci_iounmap(pdev, ndev->peer_spad_reg);
 	pci_iounmap(pdev, ndev->db_reg);
 
 	pci_release_regions(pdev);
author maintainer
#142 lore raw

PATCH 142/204 fbdev: fix use-after-free in store_modes()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ian Bridges <[email protected]>

commit 2c1c805c65fb7dc7524e20376d6987721e73a0b1 upstream.

store_modes() replaces a framebuffer's modelist with modes from userspace. On success it frees the old modelist with fb_destroy_modelist(). Two fields still point into that freed list.

One pointer is fb_display[i].mode, the mode a console is using. fbcon_new_modelist() moves these pointers to the new list. It only does so for consoles still mapped to the framebuffer. An unmapped console is skipped and keeps its stale pointer. Unbinding fbcon, for example, sets con2fb_map[i] to -1 but leaves fb_display[i].mode set. An FBIOPUT_VSCREENINFO ioctl with FB_ACTIVATE_INV_MODE later reaches fbcon_mode_deleted(). That function reads the stale fb_display[i].mode through fb_mode_is_equal(). The read is a use-after-free.

The other pointer is fb_info->mode, the current mode. It is set through the mode sysfs attribute. store_modes() does not update fb_info->mode, so it is left pointing into the freed list. show_mode(), the attribute's read handler, dereferences the stale fb_info->mode through mode_string(). The read is a use-after-free.

Clear both pointers before freeing the list. Commit a1f305893074 ("fbcon:
Set fb_display[i]->mode to NULL when the mode is released") added the helper fbcon_delete_modelist(). It clears every fb_display[i].mode that points into a given list. So far it is called only from the unregister path. Call it from store_modes() too, and set fb_info->mode to NULL.

---
 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbsysfs.c |   10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbsysfs.c +9 -1
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <linux/major.h>
 
 #include "fb_internal.h"
+#include "fbcon.h"
 
 #define FB_SYSFS_FLAG_ATTR 1
 
@@ -113,8 +114,15 @@ static ssize_t store_modes(struct device
 	if (fb_new_modelist(fb_info)) {
 		fb_destroy_modelist(&fb_info->modelist);
 		list_splice(&old_list, &fb_info->modelist);
-	} else
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * fb_display[i].mode and fb_info->mode both point into the old
+		 * list. Clear them before it is freed.
+		 */
+		fbcon_delete_modelist(&old_list);
+		fb_info->mode = NULL;
 		fb_destroy_modelist(&old_list);
+	}
 
 	unlock_fb_info(fb_info);
 	console_unlock();
author maintainer
#143 lore raw

PATCH 143/204 block: invalidate cached plug timestamp after task switch

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Usama Arif <[email protected]>

commit fad156c2af227f42ca796cbb20ddc354a6dd9932 upstream.

blk_time_get_ns() caches ktime_get_ns() in current->plug->cur_ktime and marks the task with PF_BLOCK_TS. That cache is only valid while the task keeps running; if the task is switched out, wall-clock time advances and the cached value must not be reused when the task runs again.

The existing invalidation covers explicit plug flushes through __blk_flush_plug(), and the schedule() / rtmutex paths through sched_update_worker(). It does not cover in-kernel preemption paths such as preempt_schedule(), preempt_schedule_notrace(), and preempt_schedule_irq(), which enter __schedule(SM_PREEMPT) directly and return without calling sched_update_worker().

As a result, a task preempted while holding a plug with PF_BLOCK_TS set can reuse a stale plug->cur_ktime after it is scheduled back in. blk-iocost then consumes that stale timestamp through ioc_now(), producing stale vnow values for throttle decisions, and through ioc_rqos_done(), inflating on-queue time and feeding false missed-QoS samples into vrate adjustment.

Move the schedule-side invalidation to finish_task_switch(), which runs for the scheduled-in task after every actual context switch regardless of which schedule entry point was used. Keep __blk_flush_plug() as the explicit flush/finish-plug invalidation path, and remove only the PF_BLOCK_TS handling from sched_update_worker().

Fixes 06b23f92af87 ("block: update cached timestamp post schedule/preemption")
---
 include/linux/blkdev.h |   18 +++++++-----------
 kernel/sched/core.c    |   12 ++++++++----
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
include/linux/blkdev.h +7 -11
@@ -1105,16 +1105,12 @@ static inline void blk_flush_plug(struct
 		__blk_flush_plug(plug, async);
 }
 
-/*
- * tsk == current here
- */
-static inline void blk_plug_invalidate_ts(struct task_struct *tsk)
-{
-	struct blk_plug *plug = tsk->plug;
-
-	if (plug)
-		plug->cur_ktime = 0;
-	current->flags &= ~PF_BLOCK_TS;
+static __always_inline void blk_plug_invalidate_ts(void)
+{
+	if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_BLOCK_TS)) {
+		current->plug->cur_ktime = 0;
+		current->flags &= ~PF_BLOCK_TS;
+	}
 }
 
 int blkdev_issue_flush(struct block_device *bdev);
@@ -1140,7 +1136,7 @@ static inline void blk_flush_plug(struct
 {
 }
 
-static inline void blk_plug_invalidate_ts(struct task_struct *tsk)
+static inline void blk_plug_invalidate_ts(void)
 {
 }
 
kernel/sched/core.c +8 -4
@@ -5226,6 +5226,12 @@ static struct rq *finish_task_switch(str
 	 */
 	kmap_local_sched_in();
 
+	/*
+	 * Any cached block-layer timestamp (plug->cur_ktime) is stale now,
+	 * invalidate it.
+	 */
+	blk_plug_invalidate_ts();
+
 	fire_sched_in_preempt_notifiers(current);
 	/*
 	 * When switching through a kernel thread, the loop in
@@ -6785,12 +6791,10 @@ static inline void sched_submit_work(str
 
 static void sched_update_worker(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
-	if (tsk->flags & (PF_WQ_WORKER | PF_IO_WORKER | PF_BLOCK_TS)) {
-		if (tsk->flags & PF_BLOCK_TS)
-			blk_plug_invalidate_ts(tsk);
+	if (tsk->flags & (PF_WQ_WORKER | PF_IO_WORKER)) {
 		if (tsk->flags & PF_WQ_WORKER)
 			wq_worker_running(tsk);
-		else if (tsk->flags & PF_IO_WORKER)
+		else
 			io_wq_worker_running(tsk);
 	}
 }
author maintainer
#144 lore raw

PATCH 144/204 err.h: use __always_inline on all error pointer helpers

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>

commit 94bfc7f3b0c7c33331ba4ff6cc64ff309dfcbce8 upstream.

While testing randconfig builds on s390, I came across a link failure with CONFIG_DMA_SHARED_BUFFER disabled:

ERROR: modpost: "dma_buf_put" [drivers/iommu/iommufd/iommufd.ko] undefined!

The problem here is that IS_ERR() is not inlined and dead code elimination fails as a consequence.

The err.h helpers all turn into a trivial assignment of a bit mask and should never result in a function call, so force them to always be inline. This should generally result in better object code aside from avoiding the link failure above.

---
 include/linux/err.h |   12 ++++++------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
include/linux/err.h +6 -6
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
  *
  * Return: A pointer with @error encoded within its value.
  */
-static inline void * __must_check ERR_PTR(long error)
+static __always_inline void * __must_check ERR_PTR(long error)
 {
 	return (void *) error;
 }
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ static inline void * __must_check ERR_PT
  * @ptr: An error pointer.
  * Return: The error code within @ptr.
  */
-static inline long __must_check PTR_ERR(__force const void *ptr)
+static __always_inline long __must_check PTR_ERR(__force const void *ptr)
 {
 	return (long) ptr;
 }
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static inline long __must_check PTR_ERR(
  * @ptr: The pointer to check.
  * Return: true if @ptr is an error pointer, false otherwise.
  */
-static inline bool __must_check IS_ERR(__force const void *ptr)
+static __always_inline bool __must_check IS_ERR(__force const void *ptr)
 {
 	return IS_ERR_VALUE((unsigned long)ptr);
 }
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static inline bool __must_check IS_ERR(_
  *
  * Like IS_ERR(), but also returns true for a null pointer.
  */
-static inline bool __must_check IS_ERR_OR_NULL(__force const void *ptr)
+static __always_inline bool __must_check IS_ERR_OR_NULL(__force const void *ptr)
 {
 	return unlikely(!ptr) || IS_ERR_VALUE((unsigned long)ptr);
 }
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ static inline bool __must_check IS_ERR_O
  * Explicitly cast an error-valued pointer to another pointer type in such a
  * way as to make it clear that's what's going on.
  */
-static inline void * __must_check ERR_CAST(__force const void *ptr)
+static __always_inline void * __must_check ERR_CAST(__force const void *ptr)
 {
 	/* cast away the const */
 	return (void *) ptr;
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static inline void * __must_check ERR_CA
  *
  * Return: The error code within @ptr if it is an error pointer; 0 otherwise.
  */
-static inline int __must_check PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(__force const void *ptr)
+static __always_inline int __must_check PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(__force const void *ptr)
 {
 	if (IS_ERR(ptr))
 		return PTR_ERR(ptr);
author maintainer
#145 lore raw

PATCH 145/204 KEYS: fix overflow in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>

commit cb481e59ea6cae3b7796ac1d7a22b6b24c3f3c0b upstream.

The length for the internal output buffer is calculated incorrectly, which can result overflow when a too small buffer is provided.

Fix the bug by allocating internal output with the size of the maximum length of the cryptographic primitive instead of caller provided size.

Cc [email protected] # v4.20+
Fixes 00d60fd3b932 ("KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver #2]")
---
 security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c |    9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c +8 -1
@@ -138,28 +138,35 @@ static int keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(cons
 		if (uparams.in_len  > info.max_dec_size ||
 		    uparams.out_len > info.max_enc_size)
 			return -EINVAL;
+
+		params->out_len = info.max_enc_size;
 		break;
 	case KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT:
 		if (uparams.in_len  > info.max_enc_size ||
 		    uparams.out_len > info.max_dec_size)
 			return -EINVAL;
+
+		params->out_len = info.max_dec_size;
 		break;
 	case KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN:
 		if (uparams.in_len  > info.max_data_size ||
 		    uparams.out_len > info.max_sig_size)
 			return -EINVAL;
+
+		params->out_len = info.max_sig_size;
 		break;
 	case KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY:
 		if (uparams.in_len  > info.max_data_size ||
 		    uparams.in2_len > info.max_sig_size)
 			return -EINVAL;
+
+		params->out_len = info.max_sig_size;
 		break;
 	default:
 		BUG();
 	}
 
 	params->in_len  = uparams.in_len;
-	params->out_len = uparams.out_len; /* Note: same as in2_len */
 	return 0;
 }
 
author maintainer
#146 lore raw

PATCH 146/204 keys: Pin request_key_auth payload in instantiate paths

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shaomin Chen <[email protected]>

commit fd15b457a86939c38aa12116adabd8ff686c5e51 upstream.

A: request_key() B: KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV
================ =========================

create auth key
store rka in auth key
wait for helper
get auth key
load rka from auth key
copy user payload
sleep on #PF

helper completed
detach and free rka
destroy auth key

                       wake up
                       use rka->target_key
                       **USE-AFTER-FREE**

Give request_key_auth payloads a refcount. Take a payload reference while authkey->sem stabilizes the payload and revocation state. Hold that reference across the instantiate and reject paths. Drop the auth key owning reference from revoke and destroy.

[jarkko: Replaced the first two paragraphs of text with an actual
concurrency scenario.]

Cc [email protected] # v5.10+
Fixes b5f545c880a2 ("[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys")
---
 include/keys/request_key_auth-type.h |    2 ++
 security/keys/internal.h             |    2 ++
 security/keys/keyctl.c               |   24 ++++++++++++++++++------
 security/keys/request_key_auth.c     |   33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 4 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
include/keys/request_key_auth-type.h +2 -0
@@ -9,12 +9,14 @@
 #define _KEYS_REQUEST_KEY_AUTH_TYPE_H
 
 #include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/refcount.h>
 
 /*
  * Authorisation record for request_key().
  */
 struct request_key_auth {
 	struct rcu_head		rcu;
+	refcount_t		usage;
 	struct key		*target_key;
 	struct key		*dest_keyring;
 	const struct cred	*cred;
security/keys/internal.h +2 -0
@@ -208,6 +208,8 @@ extern struct key *request_key_auth_new(
 					const void *callout_info,
 					size_t callout_len,
 					struct key *dest_keyring);
+struct request_key_auth *request_key_auth_get(struct key *authkey);
+void request_key_auth_put(struct request_key_auth *rka);
 
 extern struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id);
 
security/keys/keyctl.c +18 -6
@@ -1197,9 +1197,13 @@ static long keyctl_instantiate_key_commo
 	if (!instkey)
 		goto error;
 
-	rka = instkey->payload.data[0];
-	if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
+	rka = request_key_auth_get(instkey);
+	if (!rka) {
+		ret = -EKEYREVOKED;
 		goto error;
+	}
+	if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
+		goto error_put_rka;
 
 	/* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
 	payload = NULL;
@@ -1208,7 +1212,7 @@ static long keyctl_instantiate_key_commo
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
 		payload = kvmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!payload)
-			goto error;
+			goto error_put_rka;
 
 		ret = -EFAULT;
 		if (!copy_from_iter_full(payload, plen, from))
@@ -1234,6 +1238,8 @@ static long keyctl_instantiate_key_commo
 
 error2:
 	kvfree_sensitive(payload, plen);
+error_put_rka:
+	request_key_auth_put(rka);
 error:
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -1358,15 +1364,19 @@ long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t id,
 	if (!instkey)
 		goto error;
 
-	rka = instkey->payload.data[0];
-	if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
+	rka = request_key_auth_get(instkey);
+	if (!rka) {
+		ret = -EKEYREVOKED;
 		goto error;
+	}
+	if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
+		goto error_put_rka;
 
 	/* find the destination keyring if present (which must also be
 	 * writable) */
 	ret = get_instantiation_keyring(ringid, rka, &dest_keyring);
 	if (ret < 0)
-		goto error;
+		goto error_put_rka;
 
 	/* instantiate the key and link it into a keyring */
 	ret = key_reject_and_link(rka->target_key, timeout, error,
@@ -1379,6 +1389,8 @@ long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t id,
 	if (ret == 0)
 		keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
 
+error_put_rka:
+	request_key_auth_put(rka);
 error:
 	return ret;
 }
security/keys/request_key_auth.c +31 -2
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_describe(co
 static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *);
 static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *);
 static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *, char *, size_t);
+static void request_key_auth_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *);
 
 /*
  * The request-key authorisation key type definition.
@@ -116,6 +117,31 @@ static void free_request_key_auth(struct
 }
 
 /*
+ * Take a reference to the request-key authorisation payload so callers can
+ * drop authkey->sem before doing operations that may sleep.
+ */
+struct request_key_auth *request_key_auth_get(struct key *authkey)
+{
+	struct request_key_auth *rka;
+
+	down_read(&authkey->sem);
+	rka = dereference_key_locked(authkey);
+	if (rka && !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &authkey->flags))
+		refcount_inc(&rka->usage);
+	else
+		rka = NULL;
+	up_read(&authkey->sem);
+
+	return rka;
+}
+
+void request_key_auth_put(struct request_key_auth *rka)
+{
+	if (rka && refcount_dec_and_test(&rka->usage))
+		call_rcu(&rka->rcu, request_key_auth_rcu_disposal);
+}
+
+/*
  * Dispose of the request_key_auth record under RCU conditions
  */
 static void request_key_auth_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *rcu)
@@ -136,8 +162,10 @@ static void request_key_auth_revoke(stru
 	struct request_key_auth *rka = dereference_key_locked(key);
 
 	kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
+	if (!rka)
+		return;
 	rcu_assign_keypointer(key, NULL);
-	call_rcu(&rka->rcu, request_key_auth_rcu_disposal);
+	request_key_auth_put(rka);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -150,7 +178,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_destroy(str
 	kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
 	if (rka) {
 		rcu_assign_keypointer(key, NULL);
-		call_rcu(&rka->rcu, request_key_auth_rcu_disposal);
+		request_key_auth_put(rka);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -174,6 +202,7 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct
 	rka = kzalloc(sizeof(*rka), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!rka)
 		goto error;
+	refcount_set(&rka->usage, 1);
 	rka->callout_info = kmemdup(callout_info, callout_len, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!rka->callout_info)
 		goto error_free_rka;
author maintainer
#147 lore raw

PATCH 147/204 wifi: mt76: mt76x2u: Add support for ELECOM WDC-867SU3S

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zenm Chen <[email protected]>

commit f4ce0664e9f0387873b181777891741c33e19465 upstream.

Add the ID 056e:400a to the table to support an additional MT7612U
adapter: ELECOM WDC-867SU3S.

Compile tested only.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt76x2/usb.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt76x2/usb.c +1 -0
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id mt76x2
 	{ USB_DEVICE(0x0e8d, 0x7612) },	/* Aukey USBAC1200 - Alfa AWUS036ACM */
 	{ USB_DEVICE(0x057c, 0x8503) },	/* Avm FRITZ!WLAN AC860 */
 	{ USB_DEVICE(0x7392, 0xb711) },	/* Edimax EW 7722 UAC */
+	{ USB_DEVICE(0x056e, 0x400a) },	/* ELECOM WDC-867SU3S */
 	{ USB_DEVICE(0x0e8d, 0x7632) },	/* HC-M7662BU1 */
 	{ USB_DEVICE(0x0471, 0x2126) }, /* LiteOn WN4516R module, nonstandard USB connector */
 	{ USB_DEVICE(0x0471, 0x7600) }, /* LiteOn WN4519R module, nonstandard USB connector */
author maintainer
#148 lore raw

PATCH 148/204 wifi: mt76: mt7925: dont disable AP BSS when removing TDLS peer

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: ElXreno <[email protected]>

commit 37d65384aa6f9cbe45f4052b13b378af1aab3e95 upstream.

On a STATION vif, removing a TDLS peer takes the mt7925_mac_sta_remove -> mt7925_mac_sta_remove_links path. The first loop in that function calls mt7925_mcu_add_bss_info(..., enable=false) for every link of the station being removed. For a non-MLO STATION vif there is exactly one link, link 0, whose bss_conf is the AP's. TDLS peers do not have their own bss_conf - they share the AP's BSS.

The result is that every TDLS peer teardown sends a BSS_INFO_UPDATE with enable=0 for the AP's BSS to the firmware, which wipes the AP-side rate-control context. The connection stays associated and TX from the host still works at the negotiated rate, but the AP's downlink to us collapses to the lowest mandatory OFDM rate (HE-MCS 0 / 6 Mbit/s OFDM) and only slowly recovers as rate adaptation re-learns under sustained traffic. With brief or bursty traffic the link can stay at 6-72 Mbit/s indefinitely, requiring a manual reconnect.

mt7925_mac_link_sta_remove() already guards its own mt7925_mcu_add_bss_info(..., false) call with "vif->type == NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION && !link_sta->sta->tdls". Add the equivalent guard at the top of the cleanup loop in mt7925_mac_sta_remove_links(), above the link_sta / link_conf / mlink / mconf lookups, so TDLS peer teardown skips the loop body entirely without doing the per-link work that would just be thrown away.

Verified on mt7925e by triggering Samsung-S938B auto-TDLS via iperf3 and watching iw rx bitrate after teardown:

Before: rx bitrate collapses to 6.0-72.0 Mbit/s, oscillates 17/72/
137/288/432 Mbit/s for 30+ seconds, no full recovery without a manual reassoc.
After: rx bitrate stays at 1200.9 Mbit/s HE-MCS 11 NSS 2 80 MHz
across the entire TDLS lifecycle.

bpftrace confirms a single mt7925_mcu_add_bss_info(enable=0) call per teardown before the fix; zero such calls after.

Fixes 3878b4333602 ("wifi: mt76: mt7925: update mt7925_mac_link_sta_[add, assoc, remove] for MLO")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-7 bpftrace
---
 drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7925/main.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7925/main.c +3 -0
@@ -1190,6 +1190,9 @@ mt7925_mac_sta_remove_links(struct mt792
 		if (vif->type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP)
 			break;
 
+		if (vif->type == NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION && sta->tdls)
+			continue;
+
 		link_sta = mt792x_sta_to_link_sta(vif, sta, link_id);
 		if (!link_sta)
 			continue;
author maintainer
#149 lore raw

PATCH 149/204 wifi: ath11k: fix warning when unbinding

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jose Ignacio Tornos Martinez <[email protected]>

commit 8b7a26b6681922a38cd5a7829ace61f8e54df9b7 upstream.

If there is an error during some initialization related to firmware, the buffers dp->tx_ring[i].tx_status are released.
However this is released again when the device is unbinded (ath11k_pci), and we get:

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6231 at mm/slub.c:4368 free_large_kmalloc+0x57/0x90
Call Trace:

free_large_kmalloc
ath11k_dp_free
ath11k_core_deinit
ath11k_pci_remove
...

The issue is always reproducible from a VM because the MSI addressing initialization is failing.

In order to fix the issue, just set the buffers to NULL after releasing in order to avoid the double free.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/dp.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/dp.c +1 -0
@@ -1040,6 +1040,7 @@ void ath11k_dp_free(struct ath11k_base *
 		idr_destroy(&dp->tx_ring[i].txbuf_idr);
 		spin_unlock_bh(&dp->tx_ring[i].tx_idr_lock);
 		kfree(dp->tx_ring[i].tx_status);
+		dp->tx_ring[i].tx_status = NULL;
 	}
 
 	/* Deinit any SOC level resource */
author maintainer
#150 lore raw

PATCH 150/204 wifi: rtlwifi: rtl8821ae: Fix C2H bit location in RX descriptor

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bitterblue Smith <[email protected]>

commit 83d38df6929118c3f996b9e3351c2d5014073d87 upstream.

Bit 28 of double word 2 in the RX descriptor indicates if the packet is a normal 802.11 frame, or a message from the wifi firmware to the driver (Card 2 Host).

Commit f5678bfe1cdc ("rtlwifi: rtl8821ae: Replace local bit manipulation macros") mistakenly made the driver look for this bit in double word 1, causing packet loss and Bluetooth coexistence problems.

Fixes f5678bfe1cdc ("rtlwifi: rtl8821ae: Replace local bit manipulation macros")
---
 drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8821ae/trx.h |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8821ae/trx.h +1 -1
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ static inline int get_rx_desc_paggr(__le
 
 static inline int get_rx_status_desc_rpt_sel(__le32 *__pdesc)
 {
-	return le32_get_bits(*(__pdesc + 1), BIT(28));
+	return le32_get_bits(*(__pdesc + 2), BIT(28));
 }
 
 static inline int get_rx_desc_rxmcs(__le32 *__pdesc)
author maintainer
#151 lore raw

PATCH 151/204 wifi: rtw88: increase TX report timeout to fix race condition

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Luka Gejak <[email protected]>

commit c80788f7c5aed8d420366b821f867a8a353d83a5 upstream.

The driver expects the firmware to report TX status within 500ms. However, a timeout can be triggered when the hardware performs background scans while under TX load. During these scans, the firmware stays off-channel for periods exceeding 500ms, delaying the delivery of TX reports back to the driver.

When this occurs, the purge timer fires prematurely and drops the tracking skbs from the queue. This results in the host stack interpreting the missing status as packet loss, leading to TCP window collapse. In testing with iperf3, this causes throughput to drop from ~90 Mbps to near-zero for approximately 2 seconds until the connection recovers.

Increase RTW_TX_PROBE_TIMEOUT to 2500ms for RTL8723DU. This duration is sufficient to accommodate off-channel dwell time during full background scans, ensuring the purge timer only trips during genuine firmware lockups and preventing unnecessary TCP retransmission cycles.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/tx.c |    7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/tx.c +6 -1
@@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ void rtw_tx_report_purge_timer(struct ti
 void rtw_tx_report_enqueue(struct rtw_dev *rtwdev, struct sk_buff *skb, u8 sn)
 {
 	struct rtw_tx_report *tx_report = &rtwdev->tx_report;
+	unsigned long timeout = RTW_TX_PROBE_TIMEOUT;
 	unsigned long flags;
 	u8 *drv_data;
 
@@ -202,7 +203,11 @@ void rtw_tx_report_enqueue(struct rtw_de
 	__skb_queue_tail(&tx_report->queue, skb);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tx_report->q_lock, flags);
 
-	mod_timer(&tx_report->purge_timer, jiffies + RTW_TX_PROBE_TIMEOUT);
+	if (rtwdev->chip->id == RTW_CHIP_TYPE_8723D &&
+	    rtwdev->hci.type == RTW_HCI_TYPE_USB)
+		timeout = msecs_to_jiffies(2500);
+
+	mod_timer(&tx_report->purge_timer, jiffies + timeout);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(rtw_tx_report_enqueue);
 
author maintainer
#152 lore raw

PATCH 152/204 wifi: rtw88: usb: fix memory leaks on USB write failures

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Luka Gejak <[email protected]>

commit 6b964941bbfe6e0f18b1a5e008486dbb62df440a upstream.

When rtw_usb_write_port() fails to submit a USB Request Block (URB) (e.g., due to device disconnect or ENOMEM), the completion callback is never executed.

Currently, the driver ignores the return value of rtw_usb_write_port() in rtw_usb_write_data() and rtw_usb_tx_agg_skb(). Because these functions rely on the completion callback to free the socket buffers (skbs) and the transaction control block (txcb), a submission failure results in:
1. A memory leak of the allocated skb in rtw_usb_write_data().
2. A memory leak of the txcb structure and all aggregated skbs in rtw_usb_tx_agg_skb().

Fix this by checking the return value of rtw_usb_write_port(). If it fails, explicitly free the skb in rtw_usb_write_data(), and properly purge the tx_ack_queue and free the txcb in rtw_usb_tx_agg_skb().

The issue was discovered in practice during device disconnect/reconnect scenarios and memory pressure conditions. Tested by verifying normal TX operation continues after the fix without regressions.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/usb.c |   13 +++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/usb.c +11 -2
@@ -398,6 +398,7 @@ static bool rtw_usb_tx_agg_skb(struct rt
 	int agg_num = 0;
 	unsigned int align_next = 0;
 	u8 qsel;
+	int ret;
 
 	if (skb_queue_empty(list))
 		return false;
@@ -455,7 +456,13 @@ queue:
 	tx_desc = (struct rtw_tx_desc *)skb_head->data;
 	qsel = le32_get_bits(tx_desc->w1, RTW_TX_DESC_W1_QSEL);
 
-	rtw_usb_write_port(rtwdev, qsel, skb_head, rtw_usb_write_port_tx_complete, txcb);
+	ret = rtw_usb_write_port(rtwdev, qsel, skb_head,
+				 rtw_usb_write_port_tx_complete, txcb);
+	if (ret) {
+		ieee80211_purge_tx_queue(rtwdev->hw, &txcb->tx_ack_queue);
+		kfree(txcb);
+		return false;
+	}
 
 	return true;
 }
@@ -517,8 +524,10 @@ static int rtw_usb_write_data(struct rtw
 
 	ret = rtw_usb_write_port(rtwdev, qsel, skb,
 				 rtw_usb_write_port_complete, skb);
-	if (unlikely(ret))
+	if (unlikely(ret)) {
 		rtw_err(rtwdev, "failed to do USB write, ret=%d\n", ret);
+		dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
+	}
 
 	return ret;
 }
author maintainer
#153 lore raw

PATCH 153/204 wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: fix race condition in PTP removal

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Junjie Cao <[email protected]>

commit 65150c9cc3e06ab54bc4e8134a47f6f5d095a4e3 upstream.

iwl_mvm_ptp_remove() calls cancel_delayed_work_sync() only after ptp_clock_unregister() and clearing ptp_data state (ptp_clock, ptp_clock_info, last_gp2).

This creates a race where the delayed work iwl_mvm_ptp_work() can execute between ptp_clock_unregister() and cancel_delayed_work_sync(), observing partially cleared PTP state.

Move cancel_delayed_work_sync() before ptp_clock_unregister() to ensure the delayed work is fully stopped before any PTP cleanup begins.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/ptp.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/ptp.c +1 -1
@@ -316,11 +316,11 @@ void iwl_mvm_ptp_remove(struct iwl_mvm *
 			 mvm->ptp_data.ptp_clock_info.name,
 			 ptp_clock_index(mvm->ptp_data.ptp_clock));
 
+		cancel_delayed_work_sync(&mvm->ptp_data.dwork);
 		ptp_clock_unregister(mvm->ptp_data.ptp_clock);
 		mvm->ptp_data.ptp_clock = NULL;
 		memset(&mvm->ptp_data.ptp_clock_info, 0,
 		       sizeof(mvm->ptp_data.ptp_clock_info));
 		mvm->ptp_data.last_gp2 = 0;
-		cancel_delayed_work_sync(&mvm->ptp_data.dwork);
 	}
 }
author maintainer
#154 lore raw

PATCH 154/204 f2fs: validate compress cache inode only when enabled

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wenjie Qi <[email protected]>

commit 5073c66a96a9c23c0c2533ed4ed06e42f9021208 upstream.

F2FS_COMPRESS_INO() uses NM_I(sbi)->max_nid as the synthetic inode number for the compressed page cache inode. That inode only exists when the compress_cache mount option is enabled.

When compress_cache is disabled, max_nid is outside the valid inode range. A corrupted directory entry that points to ino == max_nid should therefore be rejected by f2fs_check_nid_range(). However, is_meta_ino() currently treats F2FS_COMPRESS_INO() as a meta inode unconditionally, so f2fs_iget() bypasses do_read_inode() and its nid range check, and instantiates a fake internal inode instead.

Gate the compressed cache inode case on COMPRESS_CACHE, matching f2fs_init_compress_inode(). With compress_cache disabled, ino == max_nid now follows the normal inode path and is rejected as an out-of-range nid.

Fixes 6ce19aff0b8c ("f2fs: compress: add compress_inode to cache compressed blocks")
---
 fs/f2fs/inode.c |    9 +++++++--
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/inode.c +7 -2
@@ -541,8 +541,13 @@ static int do_read_inode(struct inode *i
 
 static bool is_meta_ino(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, unsigned int ino)
 {
-	return ino == F2FS_NODE_INO(sbi) || ino == F2FS_META_INO(sbi) ||
-		ino == F2FS_COMPRESS_INO(sbi);
+	if (ino == F2FS_NODE_INO(sbi) || ino == F2FS_META_INO(sbi))
+		return true;
+#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FS_COMPRESSION
+	if (test_opt(sbi, COMPRESS_CACHE) && ino == F2FS_COMPRESS_INO(sbi))
+		return true;
+#endif
+	return false;
 }
 
 struct inode *f2fs_iget(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long ino)
author maintainer
#155 lore raw

PATCH 155/204 f2fs: fix to round down start offset of fallocate for pin file

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sunmin Jeong <[email protected]>

commit 4275b59673eb60b02eec3997816c83f1f4b909c4 upstream.

Currently, the length of fallocate for pin file is section-aligned to keep allocated sections from being selected as victims of GC. However, for the case that the start offset of fallocate is not aligned in section, the allocated sections can't be fully utilized. It's because a new section is allocated by f2fs_allocate_pinning_section() after using blks_per_sec blocks regardless of the start offset. As a result, several unexpected dirty segments may be created, including blocks assigned to the pinned file.

To address this issue, let's round down the start offset of fallocate to the length of section.

The reproducing scenario is as below

chunk=$(((2<<20)+4096)) # 2MB + 4KB
touch test
f2fs_io pinfile set test
f2fs_io fallocate 0 0 $chunk test
f2fs_io fallocate 0 $chunk $chunk test
f2fs_io fallocate 0 $((chunk*2)) $chunk test
f2fs_io fiemap 0 $((chunk*3)) test

Fiemap: offset = 0 len = 12288
logical addr. physical addr. length flags

0   0000000000000000 000000068c600000 0000000000400000 00001088
1   0000000000400000 000000003d400000 0000000000001000 00001088
2   0000000000401000 00000003eb200000 0000000000200000 00001088
3   0000000000601000 00000005e4200000 0000000000001000 00001088
4   0000000000602000 0000000605400000 0000000000200000 00001089
---
 fs/f2fs/file.c |    9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/f2fs/file.c +8 -1
@@ -1838,8 +1838,15 @@ static int f2fs_expand_inode_data(struct
 
 	if (f2fs_is_pinned_file(inode)) {
 		block_t sec_blks = CAP_BLKS_PER_SEC(sbi);
-		block_t sec_len = roundup(map.m_len, sec_blks);
+		block_t sec_len;
 
+		if (map.m_lblk % sec_blks) {
+			map.m_lblk = rounddown(map.m_lblk, sec_blks);
+			map.m_len = pg_end - map.m_lblk;
+			if (off_end)
+				map.m_len++;
+		}
+		sec_len = roundup(map.m_len, sec_blks);
 		map.m_len = sec_blks;
 next_alloc:
 		f2fs_down_write(&sbi->pin_sem);
author maintainer
#156 lore raw

PATCH 156/204 f2fs: validate ACL entry sizes in f2fs_acl_from_disk()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhang Cen <[email protected]>

commit c4810ada31e80cbe4011467c4f3b1e93f94134f3 upstream.

f2fs_acl_count() only validates the aggregate ACL xattr length. A malformed ACL can still place ACL_USER or ACL_GROUP in a slot that only contains struct f2fs_acl_entry_short bytes, and f2fs_acl_from_disk() then reads entry->e_id before verifying that a full entry fits.

Require a short entry before reading e_tag and e_perm, and require a full entry before reading e_id for ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP. Return -EFSCORRUPTED from these new truncated-entry checks, while keeping the pre-existing -EINVAL paths unchanged.

Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in __f2fs_get_acl+0x6fb/0x7e0

RIP: 0033:0x7f4b835ea7aa
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888114589960 which belongs
to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 8-byte
region [ffff888114589960, ffff888114589968)
Read of size 4
Call trace:
  dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?)
  print_report+0xce/0x630 (?:?)
  __f2fs_get_acl+0x6fb/0x7e0 (fs/f2fs/acl.c:169)
  srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?)
  __virt_addr_valid+0x224/0x430 (?:?)
  kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 (?:?)
  __f2fs_get_acl+0x5/0x7e0 (fs/f2fs/acl.c:169)
  __get_acl+0x281/0x380 (?:?)
  vfs_get_acl+0x10b/0x190 (?:?)
  do_get_acl+0x2a/0x410 (?:?)
  do_get_acl+0x9/0x410 (?:?)
  do_getxattr+0xe8/0x260 (?:?)
  filename_getxattr+0xd1/0x140 (?:?)
  do_getname+0x2d/0x2d0 (?:?)
  path_getxattrat+0x16c/0x200 (?:?)
  lock_release+0xc8/0x290 (?:?)
  cgroup_update_frozen+0x9d/0x320 (?:?)
  lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xea/0x1a0 (?:?)
  trace_hardirqs_on+0x1a/0x170 (?:?)
  _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x50 (?:?)
  do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87)
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?)
Fixes af48b85b8cd3 ("f2fs: add xattr and acl functionalities")
Assisted-by Codex:gpt-5.5
---
 fs/f2fs/acl.c |   18 ++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/acl.c +16 -2
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ static inline int f2fs_acl_count(size_t
 static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size)
 {
 	int i, count;
+	int err = -EINVAL;
 	struct posix_acl *acl;
 	struct f2fs_acl_header *hdr = (struct f2fs_acl_header *)value;
 	struct f2fs_acl_entry *entry = (struct f2fs_acl_entry *)(hdr + 1);
@@ -69,8 +70,11 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_d
 
 	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
 
-		if ((char *)entry > end)
+		if (unlikely((char *)entry +
+				sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry_short) > end)) {
+			err = -EFSCORRUPTED;
 			goto fail;
+		}
 
 		acl->a_entries[i].e_tag  = le16_to_cpu(entry->e_tag);
 		acl->a_entries[i].e_perm = le16_to_cpu(entry->e_perm);
@@ -85,6 +89,11 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_d
 			break;
 
 		case ACL_USER:
+			if (unlikely((char *)entry +
+					sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry) > end)) {
+				err = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+				goto fail;
+			}
 			acl->a_entries[i].e_uid =
 				make_kuid(&init_user_ns,
 						le32_to_cpu(entry->e_id));
@@ -92,6 +101,11 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_d
 					sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry));
 			break;
 		case ACL_GROUP:
+			if (unlikely((char *)entry +
+					sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry) > end)) {
+				err = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+				goto fail;
+			}
 			acl->a_entries[i].e_gid =
 				make_kgid(&init_user_ns,
 						le32_to_cpu(entry->e_id));
@@ -107,7 +121,7 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_d
 	return acl;
 fail:
 	posix_acl_release(acl);
-	return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	return ERR_PTR(err);
 }
 
 static void *f2fs_acl_to_disk(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
author maintainer
#157 lore raw

PATCH 157/204 f2fs: fix incorrect FI_NO_EXTENT handling in __destroy_extent_node()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yongpeng Yang <[email protected]>

commit 1f70ddb28a3c71df124da5fa4040c808116d6bb9 upstream.

When __destroy_extent_node() sets the inode flag FI_NO_EXTENT, it does not reset the length of the largest extent to 0 and update the inode folio. Since modifications to the extent tree are disallowed afterward, the cached largest extent may become stale. This can trigger the following error in xfstests generic/388:

F2FS-fs (dm-0): sanity_check_extent_cache: inode (ino=1761) extent info [220057, 57, 6] is incorrect, run fsck to fix

In the f2fs_drop_inode path, __destroy_extent_node() does not need to guarantee that et->node_cnt is 0, because concurrency with writeback is expected in this path, and writeback may update the extent cache.

This patch reverts commit ed78aeebef05 ("f2fs: fix node_cnt race between extent node destroy and writeback"), and remove the unnecessary zero check of et->node_cnt.

Fixes ed78aeebef05 ("f2fs: fix node_cnt race between extent node destroy and writeback")
---
 fs/f2fs/extent_cache.c |   19 +++++++------------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/extent_cache.c +7 -12
@@ -86,10 +86,9 @@ static bool __may_extent_tree(struct ino
 	if (!__init_may_extent_tree(inode, type))
 		return false;
 
-	if (is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_NO_EXTENT))
-		return false;
-
 	if (type == EX_READ) {
+		if (is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_NO_EXTENT))
+			return false;
 		if (is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_COMPRESSED_FILE) &&
 				 !f2fs_sb_has_readonly(F2FS_I_SB(inode)))
 			return false;
@@ -602,14 +601,10 @@ static unsigned int __destroy_extent_nod
 
 	while (atomic_read(&et->node_cnt)) {
 		write_lock(&et->lock);
-		if (!is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_NO_EXTENT))
-			set_inode_flag(inode, FI_NO_EXTENT);
 		node_cnt += __free_extent_tree(sbi, et, nr_shrink);
 		write_unlock(&et->lock);
 	}
 
-	f2fs_bug_on(sbi, atomic_read(&et->node_cnt));
-
 	return node_cnt;
 }
 
@@ -639,12 +634,12 @@ static void __update_extent_tree_range(s
 
 	write_lock(&et->lock);
 
-	if (is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_NO_EXTENT)) {
-		write_unlock(&et->lock);
-		return;
-	}
-
 	if (type == EX_READ) {
+		if (is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_NO_EXTENT)) {
+			write_unlock(&et->lock);
+			return;
+		}
+
 		prev = et->largest;
 		dei.len = 0;
 
author maintainer
#158 lore raw

PATCH 158/204 f2fs: keep atomic write retry from zeroing original data

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wenjie Qi <[email protected]>

commit 6d874b65aadce56ac78f76129dbcfc2599b638f8 upstream.

A partial atomic write reserves a block in the COW inode before reading the original data page for the untouched bytes in that page.

If that read fails, write_begin returns an error but leaves the COW inode entry as NEW_ADDR. A retry of the same partial write then finds the COW entry, treats it as existing COW data, and f2fs_write_begin() zeroes the whole folio because blkaddr is NEW_ADDR.

If the retry is committed, the bytes outside the retried write range are committed as zeroes instead of preserving the original file contents.

Only use the COW inode as the read source when it already has a real data block. If the COW entry is still NEW_ADDR, treat it as a reservation to
reuse: keep reading the old data from the original inode and avoid reserving or accounting the same atomic block again.

Fixes 3db1de0e582c ("f2fs: change the current atomic write way")
---
 fs/f2fs/data.c |   16 +++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/data.c +11 -5
@@ -3566,6 +3566,7 @@ static int prepare_atomic_write_begin(st
 	pgoff_t index = folio->index;
 	int err = 0;
 	block_t ori_blk_addr = NULL_ADDR;
+	bool cow_has_reserved_block = false;
 
 	/* If pos is beyond the end of file, reserve a new block in COW inode */
 	if ((pos & PAGE_MASK) >= i_size_read(inode))
@@ -3575,9 +3576,11 @@ static int prepare_atomic_write_begin(st
 	err = __find_data_block(cow_inode, index, blk_addr);
 	if (err) {
 		return err;
-	} else if (*blk_addr != NULL_ADDR) {
+	} else if (__is_valid_data_blkaddr(*blk_addr)) {
 		*use_cow = true;
 		return 0;
+	} else if (*blk_addr == NEW_ADDR) {
+		cow_has_reserved_block = true;
 	}
 
 	if (is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_ATOMIC_REPLACE))
@@ -3590,10 +3593,13 @@ static int prepare_atomic_write_begin(st
 
 reserve_block:
 	/* Finally, we should reserve a new block in COW inode for the update */
-	err = __reserve_data_block(cow_inode, index, blk_addr, node_changed);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-	inc_atomic_write_cnt(inode);
+	if (!cow_has_reserved_block) {
+		err = __reserve_data_block(cow_inode, index, blk_addr,
+					   node_changed);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+		inc_atomic_write_cnt(inode);
+	}
 
 	if (ori_blk_addr != NULL_ADDR)
 		*blk_addr = ori_blk_addr;
author maintainer
#159 lore raw

PATCH 159/204 block: Avoid mounting the bdev pseudo-filesystem in userspace

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Denis Arefev <[email protected]>

commit f73aa66dffcb8e61e78f01b56163ec16a15d06d2 upstream.

The bdev pseudo-filesystem is an internal kernel filesystem with which userspace should not interfere. Unregister it so that userspace cannot even attempt to mount it.

This fixes a bug [1] that occurs when attempting to access files, because the system call move_mount() uses pointers declared in the inode_operations structure, which for the bdev pseudo-filesystem are always equal to 0. inode->i_op = &empty_iops;

[1]

 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
 #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
 #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page
 PGD 23380067 P4D 23380067 PUD 23381067 PMD 0
 Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
 CPU: 2 PID: 17125 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.1.155-syzkaller-00350-g84221fde2681 #0
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
 RIP: 0010:0x0

 Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 lookup_open.isra.0+0x700/0x1180 fs/namei.c:3460
 open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3550 [inline]
 path_openat+0x953/0x2700 fs/namei.c:3780
 do_filp_open+0x1c5/0x410 fs/namei.c:3810
 do_sys_openat2+0x171/0x4d0 fs/open.c:1318
 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1334 [inline]
 __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1350 [inline]
 __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1345 [inline]
 __x64_sys_openat+0x13c/0x1f0 fs/open.c:1345
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.

---
 block/bdev.c |    5 -----
 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)
block/bdev.c +0 -5
@@ -414,15 +414,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blockdev_superblock);
 
 void __init bdev_cache_init(void)
 {
-	int err;
-
 	bdev_cachep = kmem_cache_create("bdev_cache", sizeof(struct bdev_inode),
 			0, (SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT|
 				SLAB_ACCOUNT|SLAB_PANIC),
 			init_once);
-	err = register_filesystem(&bd_type);
-	if (err)
-		panic("Cannot register bdev pseudo-fs");
 	blockdev_mnt = kern_mount(&bd_type);
 	if (IS_ERR(blockdev_mnt))
 		panic("Cannot create bdev pseudo-fs");
author maintainer
#160 lore raw

PATCH 160/204 bpf: use kvfree() for replaced sysctl write buffer

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dawei Feng <[email protected]>

commit 4c21b5927d4364bfe7365f2700da5fea0ed0d004 upstream.

proc_sys_call_handler() allocates its temporary sysctl buffer with kvzalloc() and passes it to __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl(). Since kvzalloc() may fall back to vmalloc() for large allocations, freeing that buffer with kfree() is wrong and can corrupt memory.

Use kvfree() to safely handle both kmalloc and kvzalloc()/vmalloc allocations.

The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still present in v7.1-rc5.

Reproduced the bug based on v7.1-rc4 in a QEMU x86_64 guest booted with KASAN and CONFIG_FAILSLAB enabled. To exercise the replacement path, the test tree also included the accompanying fix for the stale ret == 1 check in __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl(). The reproducer confines failslab injections to the proc_sys_call_handler() range, uses stacktrace-depth=32, and injects fail-nth=1 while writing 8191 bytes to /proc/sys/kernel/domainname from a task in the target cgroup. Under that setup, fail-nth=1 triggered the fault:

  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffeb0200024d48
  #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
  PGD 0 P4D 0
  Oops: Oops: 0000  SMP KASAN NOPTI
  CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 209 Comm: repro_proc_sys_ Not tainted 7.1.0-rc4-00686-g97625979a5d4  PREEMPT(lazy)
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:kfree+0x6e/0x510
  ...
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   ? __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl+0x626/0xc30
   __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl+0x74d/0xc30
   ? __pfx___cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl+0x10/0x10
   ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
   ? __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x345/0x870
   ? proc_sys_call_handler+0x250/0x480
   ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
   proc_sys_call_handler+0x3a2/0x480
   ? __pfx_proc_sys_call_handler+0x10/0x10
   ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
   ? selinux_file_permission+0x39f/0x500
   ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
   ? lock_is_held_type+0x9e/0x120
   vfs_write+0x98e/0x1000
   ...
   </TASK>

With this fix applied on top of the same test setup, rerunning the reproducer with fail-nth=1 yields no corresponding Oops reports.

Fixes 4508943794ef ("proc: use kvzalloc for our kernel buffer")
---
 kernel/bpf/cgroup.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/bpf/cgroup.c +1 -1
@@ -1774,7 +1774,7 @@ int __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl(struc
 	kfree(ctx.cur_val);
 
 	if (ret == 1 && ctx.new_updated) {
-		kfree(*buf);
+		kvfree(*buf);
 		*buf = ctx.new_val;
 		*pcount = ctx.new_len;
 	} else {
author maintainer
#161 lore raw

PATCH 161/204 MIPS: DEC: Prevent initial console buffer from landing in XKPHYS

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Maciej W. Rozycki <[email protected]>

commit 7fb13fd35110ebe95eb053faf79d018f51144d85 upstream.

In 64-bit configurations calling the initial console output handler from a kernel thread other than the initial one will result in a situation where the stack has been placed in the XKPHYS 64-bit memory segment and consequently so has been the buffer allocated there that is used as the argument corresponding to the `%s' output conversion specifier for the firmware's printf() entry point.

This 64-bit address will then be truncated by 32-bit firmware, resulting in an attempt to access the wrong memory location, which in turn will cause all kinds of unpredictable behaviour, such as a kernel crash:

Console: colour dummy device 160x64
Calibrating delay loop... 49.36 BogoMIPS (lpj=192512)
pid_max: default: 32768 minimum: 301
CPU 0 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 000000000203bd00, epc == ffffffffbfc08364, ra == ffffffffbfc08800 Oops[#1]:

  CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.18.0-rc2-00254-gfb649bda6f56-dirty #121
  $ 0   : 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000000000000023 ffffffff80684ba0
  $ 4   : 000000000203bd00 ffffffffbfc0f3b4 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000073
  $ 8   : 0a303d7469000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000073 ffffffffbfc0f473
  $12   : 0000000000000002 0000000000000000 ffffffff80684c1c 0000000000000000
  $16   : 0000000000000000 ffffffff80596dc9 0000000000000000 ffffffffbfc09240
  $20   : ffffffff80684c40 ffffffffbfc0f400 000000000000002d 000000000000002b
  $24   : ffffffffffffffbf 000000000203bd00
  $28   : ffffffff805f0000 ffffffff80684b58 0000000000000030 ffffffffbfc08800
  Hi    : 0000000000000000
  Lo    : 0000000000000aa8
  epc   : ffffffffbfc08364 0xffffffffbfc08364
  ra    : ffffffffbfc08800 0xffffffffbfc08800
  Status: 140120e2        KX SX UX KERNEL EXL
  Cause : 00000008 (ExcCode 02)
  BadVA : 000000000203bd00
  PrId  : 00000430 (R4000SC)
  Modules linked in:
  Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo=(____ptrval____), task=(____ptrval____), tls=0000000000000000)
  Stack : 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000004d0000004d
          80684cc0806a2a40 80596dc80000004d 8061000000000000 bfc0850c80684c38
          0000000000000000 000000000203bd00 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
          0000000000000000 00000000bfc0f3b4 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
          0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
          0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
          0000002500000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 802c1a7400000000
          0203bd0080596dc8 0203bd4d69000000 6c61632000000018 5f746567646e6172
          6c616320625f6d6f 5f736e5f6d6f7266 206361323778302b 303d74696e726320
          806a0a38806b0000 806a0a38806b0000 00000000806b0000 80683c58806b0000
          ...
  Call Trace:

  Code: a082ffff  03e00008  00601021 <80820000> 00001821  10400005  24840001  80820000  24630001

  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt

KN04 V2.1k (PC: 0xa0026768, SP: 0x806848e8)

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

In this case the pointer in $4 was truncated from 0x980000000203bd00 to 0x000000000203bd00.

This may happen when no final console driver has been enabled in the configuration and consequently the initial console continues being used late into bootstrap or with an upcoming change that will switch the zs driver to use a platform device, which in turn will make the console handover happen only after other kernel threads have already been started.

Fix the issue by making the buffer static and initdata, and therefore placed in the CKSEG0 32-bit compatibility segment, observing that the console output handler is called with the console lock held, implying no need for this code to be reentrant. Add an assertion to verify the buffer actually has been placed in a compatibility segment.

Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc [email protected] # v2.6.12+
---
 arch/mips/dec/prom/console.c |    7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/mips/dec/prom/console.c +5 -2
@@ -2,8 +2,9 @@
 /*
  *	DECstation PROM-based early console support.
  *
- *	Copyright (C) 2004, 2007  Maciej W. Rozycki
+ *	Copyright (C) 2004, 2007, 2026  Maciej W. Rozycki
  */
+#include <linux/bug.h>
 #include <linux/console.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
@@ -14,9 +15,11 @@
 static void __init prom_console_write(struct console *con, const char *s,
 				      unsigned int c)
 {
-	char buf[81];
+	static char buf[81] __initdata = { 0 };
 	unsigned int chunk = sizeof(buf) - 1;
 
+	BUG_ON((long)buf != (int)(long)buf);
+
 	while (c > 0) {
 		if (chunk > c)
 			chunk = c;
author maintainer
#162 lore raw

PATCH 162/204 exfat: fix potential use-after-free in exfat_find_dir_entry()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>

commit 3f5f8ee9917cc2b9076ac533492d8a200edcabb8 upstream.

In exfat_find_dir_entry(), the buffer_head obtained from exfat_get_dentry() is released with brelse(bh) before the fall-through TYPE_EXTEND branch reads the directory entry through ep (which points into bh->b_data):

	brelse(bh);
	if (entry_type == TYPE_EXTEND) {
		...
		len = exfat_extract_uni_name(ep, entry_uniname);
		...
	}

After brelse() drops our reference, nothing guarantees that the underlying page backing bh->b_data remains valid for the subsequent exfat_extract_uni_name() read. This is the same pattern fixed in commit fc961522ddbd ("exfat: Fix potential use after free in exfat_load_upcase_table()").

Move brelse(bh) so it runs after ep is no longer dereferenced on each branch.

Confirmed on QEMU x86_64 with CONFIG_KASAN=y + CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=y
+ CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING=y on linux-next, using a crafted exFAT image (long filename with same-hash collisions forcing the TYPE_EXTEND path). With a debug-only invalidate_bdev() inserted between brelse(bh) and the ep read to make the stale-deref window deterministic, the unpatched kernel faults:

  BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in exfat_find_dir_entry+0x133b/0x15a0
  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff88801a5fa0c2
  Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI
  RIP: 0010:exfat_find_dir_entry+0x1188/0x15a0

With this patch applied, the same instrumented harness completes cleanly under the same sanitizer stack. I have not reproduced a crash on an uninstrumented kernel under ordinary reclaim; the instrumented A/B establishes the lifetime violation and that the patch closes it, not an unaided triggerability claim.

Fixes ca06197382bd ("exfat: add directory operations")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-7
---
 fs/exfat/dir.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/exfat/dir.c +3 -1
@@ -1100,12 +1100,12 @@ rewind:
 				continue;
 			}
 
-			brelse(bh);
 			if (entry_type == TYPE_EXTEND) {
 				unsigned short entry_uniname[16], unichar;
 
 				if (step != DIRENT_STEP_NAME ||
 				    name_len >= MAX_NAME_LENGTH) {
+					brelse(bh);
 					step = DIRENT_STEP_FILE;
 					continue;
 				}
@@ -1116,6 +1116,7 @@ rewind:
 					uniname += EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN;
 
 				len = exfat_extract_uni_name(ep, entry_uniname);
+				brelse(bh);
 				name_len += len;
 
 				unichar = *(uniname+len);
@@ -1134,6 +1135,7 @@ rewind:
 				continue;
 			}
 
+			brelse(bh);
 			if (entry_type &
 					(TYPE_CRITICAL_SEC | TYPE_BENIGN_SEC)) {
 				if (step == DIRENT_STEP_SECD) {
author maintainer
#163 lore raw

PATCH 163/204 KVM: Replace guest-triggerable BUG_ON() in ioeventfd datamatch with get_unaligned()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

commit f1edbed787ba67988ed34e0132ca128b052b6ce8 upstream.

Drop a BUG_ON() that has been reachable since it was first added, way back in 2009, and instead use get_unaligned() to perform potentially-unaligned accesses.

For a given store, KVM x86's emulator tracks the entire value in the destination operand, x86_emulate_ctxt.dst. If the destination is memory, and the target splits multiple pages and/or is emulated MMIO, then KVM handles each fragment independently. E.g. on a page split starting at page offset 0xffc, KVM writes 4 bytes to the first page, then the remaining bytes to the second page, using ctxt->dst as the source for both (with appropriate offsets).

If the destination splits a page *and* hits emulated MMIO on the second page, then KVM will complete the write to the first page, then emulate the MMIO access to the second page. If there is a datamatch-enabled ioeventfd at offset 0 of the second page, then KVM will process the remainder of the store as a potential ioeventfd signal.

Putting it all together, if the guest emits a store that splits a page starting at page offset N, and the second page has a datamatch-enabled ioeventfd at offset 0, then KVM will check for datamatch using &dst.valptr[N] as the source. Due to dst (and thus dst.valptr) being 32-byte aligned, if N is not aligned to @len, the BUG_ON() fires.

E.g. with a 16-byte store at page offset 0xffc, to an ioeventfd of len 8, all initial checks in ioeventfd_in_range() will succeed, and the BUG_ON() fires due to @val being 4-byte aligned, but not 8-byte aligned.

  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/eventfd.c:783!
  Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
  CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 615 Comm: repro Not tainted 7.1.0-rc2-ff238429d1ea #365 PREEMPT
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  RIP: 0010:ioeventfd_write+0x6c/0x70 [kvm]
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   __kvm_io_bus_write+0x85/0xb0 [kvm]
   kvm_io_bus_write+0x53/0x80 [kvm]
   vcpu_mmio_write+0x66/0xf0 [kvm]
   emulator_read_write_onepage+0x12a/0x540 [kvm]
   emulator_read_write+0x109/0x2b0 [kvm]
   x86_emulate_insn+0x4f8/0xfb0 [kvm]
   x86_emulate_instruction+0x181/0x790 [kvm]
   kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x313/0x630 [kvm]
   vmx_handle_exit+0x18a/0x590 [kvm_intel]
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xc81/0x1c90 [kvm]
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2d5/0x970 [kvm]
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8a/0xd0
   do_syscall_64+0xb7/0x890
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
  RIP: 0033:0x7f19c931a9bf
   </TASK>
  Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

In a perfect world, the fix would be to simply delete the BUG_ON(), as KVM x86 doesn't perform alignment checks on "normal" memory accesses at CPL0. Sadly, C99 ruins all the fun; while the x86 architecture plays nice, dereferencing an unaligned pointer directly is undefined behavior in C, e.g. triggers splats when running with CONFIG_UBSAN_ALIGNMENT=y.

Fixes d34e6b175e61 ("KVM: add ioeventfd support")

Message-ID: <[email protected]>

---
 virt/kvm/eventfd.c |   12 +++++-------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
virt/kvm/eventfd.c +5 -7
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/seqlock.h>
 #include <linux/irqbypass.h>
+#include <linux/unaligned.h>
 #include <trace/events/kvm.h>
 
 #include <kvm/iodev.h>
@@ -744,21 +745,18 @@ ioeventfd_in_range(struct _ioeventfd *p,
 		return true;
 
 	/* otherwise, we have to actually compare the data */
-
-	BUG_ON(!IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)val, len));
-
 	switch (len) {
 	case 1:
-		_val = *(u8 *)val;
+		_val = get_unaligned((u8 *)val);
 		break;
 	case 2:
-		_val = *(u16 *)val;
+		_val = get_unaligned((u16 *)val);
 		break;
 	case 4:
-		_val = *(u32 *)val;
+		_val = get_unaligned((u32 *)val);
 		break;
 	case 8:
-		_val = *(u64 *)val;
+		_val = get_unaligned((u64 *)val);
 		break;
 	default:
 		return false;
author maintainer
#164 lore raw

PATCH 164/204 gfs2: fix use-after-free in gfs2_qd_dealloc

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tristan Madani <[email protected]>

commit f9c9ec2c319f843b70ecdf939d48b52d189bc081 upstream.

gfs2_qd_dealloc(), called as an RCU callback from gfs2_qd_dispose(), accesses the superblock object sdp through qd->qd_sbd after freeing qd. It does so to decrement sd_quota_count and wake up sd_kill_wait.

However, by the time the RCU callback runs, gfs2_put_super() may have already freed sdp via free_sbd(). This can happen when gfs2_quota_cleanup() is called during unmount: it disposes of quota objects via call_rcu() and then waits on sd_kill_wait with a 60-second timeout. If the timeout expires, or if gfs2_gl_hash_clear() triggers additional qd_put() calls that schedule more RCU callbacks after the wait completes, gfs2_put_super() will proceed to free the superblock while RCU callbacks referencing it are still pending.

Add an rcu_barrier() before free_sbd() in gfs2_put_super() to ensure all pending RCU callbacks (including gfs2_qd_dealloc) have completed before the superblock is freed.

---
 fs/gfs2/super.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/gfs2/super.c +1 -0
@@ -652,6 +652,7 @@ restart:
 	gfs2_delete_debugfs_file(sdp);
 
 	gfs2_sys_fs_del(sdp);
+	rcu_barrier();
 	free_sbd(sdp);
 }
 
author maintainer
#165 lore raw

PATCH 165/204 pwrseq: core: fix use-after-free in pwrseq_debugfs_seq_next()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wentao Liang <[email protected]>

commit 257595adf9dac15ae1edd9d07753fbc576a7583d upstream.

pwrseq_debugfs_seq_next() declares 'next' with __free(put_device), which causes put_device() to be called on the returned pointer when the variable goes out of scope. This results in a use-after-free since the seq_file framework receives a pointer whose reference has already been dropped.

Simply removing __free(put_device) would fix the UAF but would leak the reference acquired by bus_find_next_device(), as stop() only calls up_read(&pwrseq_sem) and never releases the device reference.

Fix this by making the reference counting consistent across all seq_file callbacks, matching the standard pattern used by PCI and SCSI:

- start(): use get_device() so it returns a referenced pointer.
- next(): explicitly put_device(curr) to release the previous device's reference (no NULL check needed - the seq_file framework only calls next() while the previous return was non-NULL).
- stop(): put_device(data) to release the last iterated device's reference, with a NULL guard since stop() may be called with NULL when start() returned NULL or next() reached end-of-sequence.

---
 drivers/power/sequencing/core.c |   14 +++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/power/sequencing/core.c +9 -5
@@ -990,8 +990,9 @@ static void *pwrseq_debugfs_seq_start(st
 	ctx.index = *pos;
 
 	/*
-	 * We're holding the lock for the entire printout so no need to fiddle
-	 * with device reference count.
+	 * Hold the lock for the entire printout to prevent device removal.
+	 * Reference counts are managed by start()/next()/stop() as required
+	 * by the seq_file contract.
 	 */
 	down_read(&pwrseq_sem);
 
@@ -999,7 +1000,7 @@ static void *pwrseq_debugfs_seq_start(st
 	if (!ctx.index)
 		return NULL;
 
-	return ctx.dev;
+	return get_device(ctx.dev);
 }
 
 static void *pwrseq_debugfs_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *data,
@@ -1009,8 +1010,9 @@ static void *pwrseq_debugfs_seq_next(str
 
 	++*pos;
 
-	struct device *next __free(put_device) =
-			bus_find_next_device(&pwrseq_bus, curr);
+	struct device *next = bus_find_next_device(&pwrseq_bus, curr);
+
+	put_device(curr);
 	return next;
 }
 
@@ -1059,6 +1061,8 @@ static int pwrseq_debugfs_seq_show(struc
 
 static void pwrseq_debugfs_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *data)
 {
+	if (data)
+		put_device(data);
 	up_read(&pwrseq_sem);
 }
 
author maintainer
#166 lore raw

PATCH 166/204 hdlc_ppp: sync per-proto timers before freeing hdlc state

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Fan Wu <[email protected]>

commit c78a4e41ab5ead6193ad8a2dd92e8906bae659fa upstream.

Each PPP control protocol (LCP/IPCP/IPV6CP) embedded in struct ppp registers a timer via timer_setup(). That struct ppp is the hdlc->state allocation, which detach_hdlc_protocol() frees with kfree() in both teardown paths: unregister_hdlc_device() and the re-attach inside attach_hdlc_protocol().

The ppp proto never registered a .detach callback, so detach_hdlc_protocol() performs no timer synchronization before the kfree(). The only cancel, timer_delete(&proto->timer) in ppp_cp_event(), is partial (it does not wait for a running callback) and only runs on the ->CLOSED transition; ppp_stop()/ppp_close() do not sync either. A ppp_timer callback already executing (blocked on ppp->lock) survives the kfree and then dereferences proto->state / ppp->lock in freed memory, leading to a use-after-free.

Fix this by adding a .detach helper that calls timer_shutdown_sync() on every per-proto timer. detach_hdlc_protocol() invokes proto->detach(dev) before kfree(hdlc->state), so timer_shutdown_sync()
now runs on both free paths.
timer_shutdown_sync() is used instead of timer_delete_sync() because the keepalive path re-arms the timer through add_timer()/mod_timer() and shutdown blocks any re-activation during teardown.

Initialize the per-protocol timers in ppp_ioctl() when the protocol is attached, and remove the now-redundant timer_setup() from ppp_start(), so that the timers are initialized exactly once at attach time and ppp_timer_release() never operates on uninitialized timer_list structures. attach_hdlc_protocol() uses kmalloc() (not kzalloc), so struct ppp's protos[i].timer is uninitialized garbage until the first timer_setup(); without this init-at-attach, attaching the PPP protocol without ever bringing the device up would leave timer_shutdown_sync() operating on uninitialized memory in .detach. Moving the init out of ppp_start() (which only runs on NETDEV_UP) into the attach path makes the initialization unconditional and avoids initializing the same timer_list twice.

This bug was found by static analysis.

---
 drivers/net/wan/hdlc_ppp.c |   15 +++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wan/hdlc_ppp.c +13 -2
@@ -621,7 +621,6 @@ static void ppp_start(struct net_device
 		struct proto *proto = &ppp->protos[i];
 
 		proto->dev = dev;
-		timer_setup(&proto->timer, ppp_timer, 0);
 		proto->state = CLOSED;
 	}
 	ppp->protos[IDX_LCP].pid = PID_LCP;
@@ -641,6 +640,15 @@ static void ppp_close(struct net_device
 	ppp_tx_flush();
 }
 
+static void ppp_timer_release(struct net_device *dev)
+{
+	struct ppp *ppp = get_ppp(dev);
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < IDX_COUNT; i++)
+		timer_shutdown_sync(&ppp->protos[i].timer);
+}
+
 static struct hdlc_proto proto = {
 	.start		= ppp_start,
 	.stop		= ppp_stop,
@@ -649,6 +657,7 @@ static struct hdlc_proto proto = {
 	.ioctl		= ppp_ioctl,
 	.netif_rx	= ppp_rx,
 	.module		= THIS_MODULE,
+	.detach		= ppp_timer_release,
 };
 
 static const struct header_ops ppp_header_ops = {
@@ -659,7 +668,7 @@ static int ppp_ioctl(struct net_device *
 {
 	hdlc_device *hdlc = dev_to_hdlc(dev);
 	struct ppp *ppp;
-	int result;
+	int i, result;
 
 	switch (ifs->type) {
 	case IF_GET_PROTO:
@@ -687,6 +696,8 @@ static int ppp_ioctl(struct net_device *
 			return result;
 
 		ppp = get_ppp(dev);
+		for (i = 0; i < IDX_COUNT; i++)
+			timer_setup(&ppp->protos[i].timer, ppp_timer, 0);
 		spin_lock_init(&ppp->lock);
 		ppp->req_timeout = 2;
 		ppp->cr_retries = 10;
author maintainer
#167 lore raw

PATCH 167/204 blk-cgroup: fix UAF in __blkcg_rstat_flush()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michal Koutný <[email protected]>

commit 0ab5ee5a1badb58cbb2242617cb01a4972b1f2a2 upstream.

When multiple blkgs in the same blkcg are released concurrently, a use-after-free can occur. The race happens when one blkg's __blkcg_rstat_flush() removes another blkg's iostat entries via llist_del_all(). The second blkg sees an empty list and proceeds to free itself while the first is still iterating over its entries.

Move the flush from __blkg_release() (RCU callback) to blkg_release() (before call_rcu). This ensures the RCU grace period waits for any concurrent flush's rcu_read_lock() section to complete before freeing.

---
 block/blk-cgroup.c |   21 +++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
block/blk-cgroup.c +11 -10
@@ -164,20 +164,10 @@ static void blkg_free(struct blkcg_gq *b
 static void __blkg_release(struct rcu_head *rcu)
 {
 	struct blkcg_gq *blkg = container_of(rcu, struct blkcg_gq, rcu_head);
-	struct blkcg *blkcg = blkg->blkcg;
-	int cpu;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_CGROUP_PUNT_BIO
 	WARN_ON(!bio_list_empty(&blkg->async_bios));
 #endif
-	/*
-	 * Flush all the non-empty percpu lockless lists before releasing
-	 * us, given these stat belongs to us.
-	 *
-	 * blkg_stat_lock is for serializing blkg stat update
-	 */
-	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
-		__blkcg_rstat_flush(blkcg, cpu);
 
 	/* release the blkcg and parent blkg refs this blkg has been holding */
 	css_put(&blkg->blkcg->css);
@@ -195,6 +185,17 @@ static void __blkg_release(struct rcu_he
 static void blkg_release(struct percpu_ref *ref)
 {
 	struct blkcg_gq *blkg = container_of(ref, struct blkcg_gq, refcnt);
+	struct blkcg *blkcg = blkg->blkcg;
+	int cpu;
+
+	/*
+	 * Flush all the non-empty percpu lockless lists before releasing
+	 * us, given these stat belongs to us.
+	 *
+	 * blkg_stat_lock is for serializing blkg stat update
+	 */
+	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
+		__blkcg_rstat_flush(blkcg, cpu);
 
 	call_rcu(&blkg->rcu_head, __blkg_release);
 }
author maintainer
#168 lore raw

PATCH 168/204 tipc: fix slab-use-after-free Read in tipc_aead_decrypt_done

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Doruk Tan Ozturk <[email protected]>

commit bda3348872a2ef0d19f2df6aa8cb5025adce2f20 upstream.

tipc_aead_decrypt() goes straight from tipc_bearer_hold(b) to crypto_aead_decrypt(req) without taking a reference on the netns, unlike the encrypt path. When crypto_aead_decrypt() is offloaded asynchronously (e.g. the SIMD aead wrapper queuing to cryptd), the cryptd worker runs tipc_aead_decrypt_done() later. If the bearer's netns is torn down in the meantime, cleanup_net() -> tipc_exit_net() -> tipc_crypto_stop() frees the per-netns tipc_crypto, and the completion then reads it:
tipc_aead_decrypt_done() dereferences aead->crypto->stats and aead->crypto->net, and tipc_crypto_rcv_complete() dereferences aead->crypto->aead[] and the node table -- reading freed memory.

Decoded KASAN splat (v7.1-rc7, CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE + TIPC + TIPC_CRYPTO):

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tipc_aead_decrypt_done (net/tipc/crypto.c:999)
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881056258a8 by task kworker/u16:2/51
  Workqueue: events_unbound
  Call Trace:
   tipc_aead_decrypt_done (net/tipc/crypto.c:999)
   process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314)
   worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3397 kernel/workqueue.c:3478)
   kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
   ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)
   ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)

  Allocated by task 169:
   __kasan_kmalloc (mm/kasan/common.c:398 mm/kasan/common.c:415)
   tipc_crypto_start (net/tipc/crypto.c:1502)
   tipc_init_net (net/tipc/core.c:72)
   ops_init (net/core/net_namespace.c:137)
   setup_net (net/core/net_namespace.c:446)
   copy_net_ns (net/core/net_namespace.c:579)
   create_new_namespaces (kernel/nsproxy.c:132)
   __x64_sys_unshare (kernel/fork.c:3316)
   do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63)
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)

  Freed by task 8:
   kfree (mm/slub.c:6566)
   tipc_exit_net (net/tipc/core.c:119)
   cleanup_net (net/core/net_namespace.c:704)
   process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314)
   kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)

This is the same class of bug that commit e279024617134 ("net/tipc: fix slab-use-after-free Read in tipc_aead_encrypt_done") fixed for the encrypt side. The encrypt path takes maybe_get_net(aead->crypto->net) before crypto_aead_encrypt() and drops it with put_net() on the synchronous return paths and in tipc_aead_encrypt_done(); the -EINPROGRESS/-EBUSY return keeps the reference for the async callback to release. The decrypt path was left without the equivalent guard.

Mirror the encrypt-side fix on the decrypt path: take a net reference before crypto_aead_decrypt() (failing with -ENODEV and the matching bearer put if it cannot be acquired), keep it across the -EINPROGRESS/-EBUSY async return, and drop it with put_net() on the synchronous success/error return and at the end of tipc_aead_decrypt_done().

Reproduced under KASAN on v7.1-rc7: a UDP bearer with a cluster key is flooded with crafted encrypted frames from an unknown peer (driving the cluster-key decrypt path) while the bearer's netns is repeatedly torn down. The completion must run asynchronously to outlive tipc_crypto_stop(); on x86 the stock aesni gcm(aes) now decrypts synchronously, so the async path was exercised via cryptd offload. The unguarded aead->crypto dereference in tipc_aead_decrypt_done() is the unpatched upstream path; tipc_aead_decrypt() still lacks maybe_get_net(aead->crypto->net), so the completion can outlive the free on any config where crypto_aead_decrypt() goes async.

Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).

---
 net/tipc/crypto.c |    9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
net/tipc/crypto.c +9 -0
@@ -950,12 +950,20 @@ static int tipc_aead_decrypt(struct net
 		goto exit;
 	}
 
+	/* Get net to avoid freed tipc_crypto when delete namespace */
+	if (!maybe_get_net(net)) {
+		tipc_bearer_put(b);
+		rc = -ENODEV;
+		goto exit;
+	}
+
 	/* Now, do decrypt */
 	rc = crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
 	if (rc == -EINPROGRESS || rc == -EBUSY)
 		return rc;
 
 	tipc_bearer_put(b);
+	put_net(net);
 
 exit:
 	kfree(ctx);
@@ -993,6 +1001,7 @@ static void tipc_aead_decrypt_done(void
 	}
 
 	tipc_bearer_put(b);
+	put_net(net);
 }
 
 static inline int tipc_ehdr_size(struct tipc_ehdr *ehdr)
author maintainer
#169 lore raw

PATCH 169/204 LoongArch: Report dying CPU to RCU in stop_this_cpu()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Huacai Chen <[email protected]>

commit f2539c56c74691e7a88af6372ba2b48c06ed2fe4 upstream.

This is a port of MIPS commit 9f3f3bdc6d9dac1 ("MIPS: smp: report dying CPU to RCU in stop_this_cpu()"). smp_send_stop() parks all secondary CPUs in stop_this_cpu(). And the function marks the CPU offline for the scheduler via set_cpu_online(false) but never informs RCU, so RCU keeps expecting a quiescent state from CPUs that are now spinning forever with interrupts disabled.

As long as nothing waits for an RCU grace period after smp_send_stop() this is harmless, which is why it went unnoticed. However, since commit 91840be8f710370 ("irq_work: Fix use-after-free in irq_work_single() on PREEMPT_RT"), irq_work_sync() calls synchronize_rcu() on architectures without an irq_work self-IPI, i.e. where arch_irq_work_has_interrupt() returns false. Any irq_work_sync() issued in the reboot/shutdown/halt path after smp_send_stop() then blocks on a grace period that can never complete, hanging the reboot:

  WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 15 at kernel/irq_work.c:144 irq_work_queue_on
  ...
  rcu: INFO: rcu_sched detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:
  rcu: Offline CPU 1 blocking current GP.
  rcu: Offline CPU 2 blocking current GP.
  rcu: Offline CPU 3 blocking current GP.

This issue needs some hacks to reproduce, and it was not noticed on LoongArch because arch_irq_work_has_interrupt() usually returns true.

Call rcutree_report_cpu_dead() once interrupts are disabled, mirroring the generic CPU-hotplug offline path, so RCU stops waiting on the parked CPUs and grace periods can still complete. LoongArch shuts down all CPUs here without going through the CPU-hotplug mechanism, so this report is not otherwise issued.

Fixes 91840be8f710 ("irq_work: Fix use-after-free in irq_work_single() on PREEMPT_RT")
---
 arch/loongarch/kernel/smp.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/loongarch/kernel/smp.c +1 -0
@@ -650,6 +650,7 @@ static void stop_this_cpu(void *dummy)
 	set_cpu_online(smp_processor_id(), false);
 	calculate_cpu_foreign_map();
 	local_irq_disable();
+	rcutree_report_cpu_dead();
 	while (true);
 }
 
author maintainer
#170 lore raw

PATCH 170/204 pNFS: Fix use-after-free in pnfs_update_layout()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wentao Liang <[email protected]>

commit 13e198a90ca4050f4bee8a3f23680389a6563ccc upstream.

When hitting the NFS_LAYOUT_RETURN branch in pnfs_update_layout(), the code calls pnfs_prepare_to_retry_layoutget(lo). If it succeeds, pnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo) is called before trace_pnfs_update_layout(), which still references 'lo'. This results in a use-after-free when the tracepoint accesses lo's fields.

Fix this by moving the tracepoint call before pnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo).

Fixes 2c8d5fc37fe2 ("pNFS: Stricter ordering of layoutget and layoutreturn")
---
 fs/nfs/pnfs.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/nfs/pnfs.c +1 -1
@@ -2217,11 +2217,11 @@ lookup_again:
 		dprintk("%s wait for layoutreturn\n", __func__);
 		lseg = ERR_PTR(pnfs_prepare_to_retry_layoutget(lo));
 		if (!IS_ERR(lseg)) {
-			pnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo);
 			dprintk("%s retrying\n", __func__);
 			trace_pnfs_update_layout(ino, pos, count, iomode, lo,
 						 lseg,
 						 PNFS_UPDATE_LAYOUT_RETRY);
+			pnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo);
 			goto lookup_again;
 		}
 		trace_pnfs_update_layout(ino, pos, count, iomode, lo, lseg,
author maintainer
#171 lore raw

PATCH 171/204 irqchip/imgpdc: Fix resource leak, add missing chained handler cleanup on remove

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Qingshuang Fu <[email protected]>

commit 37738fdf2ab1e504d1c63ce5bc0aeb6452d8f057 upstream.

The driver allocates domain generic chips using irq_alloc_domain_generic_chips() during probe and sets up chained handlers using irq_set_chained_handler_and_data(). However, on driver removal, the generic chips are not freed and the chained handlers are not removed.

The generic chips remain on the global gc_list and may later be accessed by generic interrupt chip suspend, resume, or shutdown callbacks after the driver has been removed, potentially resulting in a use-after-free and kernel crash.

The chained handlers that were installed in probe for peripheral and syswake interrupts are also left dangling, which can lead to spurious interrupts accessing freed memory.

Fix these issues by:

- Setting IRQ_DOMAIN_FLAG_DESTROY_GC flag in domain->flags, so the core code automatically removes generic chips when irq_domain_remove() is called

- Clearing all chained handlers with NULL in pdc_intc_remove()

---
 drivers/irqchip/irq-imgpdc.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/irqchip/irq-imgpdc.c +6 -0
@@ -378,6 +378,7 @@ static int pdc_intc_probe(struct platfor
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "cannot add IRQ domain\n");
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
+	priv->domain->flags |= IRQ_DOMAIN_FLAG_DESTROY_GC;
 
 	/*
 	 * Set up 2 generic irq chips with 2 chip types.
@@ -465,6 +466,11 @@ static void pdc_intc_remove(struct platf
 {
 	struct pdc_intc_priv *priv = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
 
+	for (unsigned int i = 0; i < priv->nr_perips; ++i)
+		irq_set_chained_handler_and_data(priv->perip_irqs[i], NULL, NULL);
+
+	irq_set_chained_handler_and_data(priv->syswake_irq, NULL, NULL);
+
 	irq_domain_remove(priv->domain);
 }
 
author maintainer
#172 lore raw

PATCH 172/204 fpga: region: fix use-after-free in child_regions_with_firmware()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wentao Liang <[email protected]>

commit 54f3c5643ec523a04b6ec0e7c19eb10f5ebebdd3 upstream.

Move of_node_put(child_region) after the error print to avoid accessing freed memory when pr_err() references child_region.

Fixes 0fa20cdfcc1f ("fpga: fpga-region: device tree control for FPGA")
[ Yilun: Fix the Fixes tag ]
---
 drivers/fpga/of-fpga-region.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/fpga/of-fpga-region.c +1 -2
@@ -168,11 +168,10 @@ static int child_regions_with_firmware(s
 						     fpga_region_of_match);
 	}
 
-	of_node_put(child_region);
-
 	if (ret)
 		pr_err("firmware-name not allowed in child FPGA region: %pOF",
 		       child_region);
+	of_node_put(child_region);
 
 	return ret;
 }
author maintainer
#173 lore raw

PATCH 173/204 rpmsg: char: Fix use-after-free on probe error path

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yuho Choi <[email protected]>

commit 1ff3f528e67d20e2b1483dcaba899dc7832b2e6b upstream.

rpmsg_chrdev_probe() stores the newly allocated eptdev in the default endpoint's priv pointer before calling rpmsg_chrdev_eptdev_add(). If rpmsg_chrdev_eptdev_add() then fails, its error path frees eptdev while the default endpoint may still dispatch callbacks with the stale priv pointer.

Avoid publishing eptdev through the default endpoint until rpmsg_chrdev_eptdev_add() succeeds. Messages received before the priv pointer is published should be ignored by rpmsg_ept_cb(). Flow-control updates can hit rpmsg_ept_flow_cb() in the same window, so make both callbacks return success when priv is NULL.

Fixes bc69d1066569 ("rpmsg: char: Introduce the "rpmsg-raw" channel")
---
 drivers/rpmsg/rpmsg_char.c |   15 +++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/rpmsg/rpmsg_char.c +13 -2
@@ -104,6 +104,9 @@ static int rpmsg_ept_cb(struct rpmsg_dev
 	struct rpmsg_eptdev *eptdev = priv;
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 
+	if (!eptdev)
+		return 0;
+
 	skb = alloc_skb(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (!skb)
 		return -ENOMEM;
@@ -124,6 +127,9 @@ static int rpmsg_ept_flow_cb(struct rpms
 {
 	struct rpmsg_eptdev *eptdev = priv;
 
+	if (!eptdev)
+		return 0;
+
 	eptdev->remote_flow_restricted = enable;
 	eptdev->remote_flow_updated = true;
 
@@ -490,6 +496,7 @@ static int rpmsg_chrdev_probe(struct rpm
 	struct rpmsg_channel_info chinfo;
 	struct rpmsg_eptdev *eptdev;
 	struct device *dev = &rpdev->dev;
+	int ret;
 
 	memcpy(chinfo.name, rpdev->id.name, RPMSG_NAME_SIZE);
 	chinfo.src = rpdev->src;
@@ -502,13 +509,17 @@ static int rpmsg_chrdev_probe(struct rpm
 	/* Set the default_ept to the rpmsg device endpoint */
 	eptdev->default_ept = rpdev->ept;
 
+	ret = rpmsg_chrdev_eptdev_add(eptdev, chinfo);
+
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 	/*
 	 * The rpmsg_ept_cb uses *priv parameter to get its rpmsg_eptdev context.
-	 * Storedit in default_ept *priv field.
+	 * Stored it in default_ept *priv field.
 	 */
 	eptdev->default_ept->priv = eptdev;
 
-	return rpmsg_chrdev_eptdev_add(eptdev, chinfo);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static void rpmsg_chrdev_remove(struct rpmsg_device *rpdev)
author maintainer
#174 lore raw

PATCH 174/204 ocfs2: reject oversized group bitmap descriptors

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhang Cen <[email protected]>

commit 9bd541e09dffff27e5bec0f9f45b0228173a5375 upstream.

ocfs2_validate_gd_parent() only bounds bg_bits against the parent allocator's chain geometry. A malicious descriptor can still claim a bg_size/bg_bits pair that exceeds the bitmap bytes that physically fit in the group descriptor block, so later bitmap scans and bit updates can run past bg_bitmap.

Add a physical-cap check based on ocfs2_group_bitmap_size() for the parent allocator type and reject descriptors whose bg_size or bg_bits exceed that capacity. Keep the existing chain geometry check so both the on-disk bitmap layout and the allocator metadata must agree before the descriptor is used.

Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN use-after-free in _find_next_bit+0x7f/0xc0

Read of size 8
Call trace:
  dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?)
  print_report+0xd0/0x630 (?:?)
  _find_next_bit+0x7f/0xc0 (?:?)
  srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?)
  __virt_addr_valid+0x188/0x2f0 (?:?)
  kasan_report+0xe4/0x120 (?:?)
  ocfs2_find_max_contig_free_bits+0x35/0x70 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1375)
  ocfs2_block_group_set_bits+0x472/0x4b0 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1457)
  ocfs2_cluster_group_search+0x16b/0x440 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:86)
  ocfs2_bg_discontig_fix_result+0x1ef/0x230 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1786)
  ocfs2_search_chain+0x8f8/0x10a0 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1886)
  get_page_from_freelist+0x70e/0x2370 (?:?)
  lock_release+0xc6/0x290 (?:?)
  do_raw_spin_unlock+0x9a/0x100 (?:?)
  kasan_unpoison+0x27/0x60 (?:?)
  __bfs+0x147/0x240 (?:?)
  get_page_from_freelist+0x83d/0x2370 (?:?)
  ocfs2_claim_suballoc_bits+0x38c/0xe70 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:96)
  sched_domains_numa_masks_clear+0x70/0xd0 (?:?)
  check_irq_usage+0xe8/0xb70 (?:?)
  __ocfs2_claim_clusters+0x18d/0x4c0 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:2497)
  check_path+0x24/0x50 (?:?)
  rcu_is_watching+0x20/0x50 (?:?)
  check_prev_add+0xfd/0xd00 (?:?)
  ocfs2_add_clusters_in_btree+0x17d/0x810 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
  __folio_batch_add_and_move+0x1f5/0x3d0 (?:?)
  ocfs2_add_inode_data+0xd9/0x120 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
  filemap_add_folio+0x105/0x1f0 (?:?)
  ocfs2_write_begin_nolock+0x29f7/0x2f80 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:3043)
  ocfs2_read_inode_block+0xb5/0x110 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
  down_write+0xf5/0x180 (?:?)
  ocfs2_write_begin+0x180/0x240 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
  __mark_inode_dirty+0x758/0x9a0 (?:?)
  inode_to_bdi+0x41/0x90 (?:?)
  balance_dirty_pages_ratelimited_flags+0xf8/0x1d0 (?:?)
  generic_perform_write+0x252/0x440 (?:?)
  mnt_put_write_access_file+0x16/0x70 (?:?)
  file_update_time_flags+0xe4/0x200 (?:?)
  ocfs2_file_write_iter+0x80a/0x1320 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
  lock_acquire+0x184/0x2f0 (?:?)
  ksys_write+0xd2/0x170 (?:?)
  apparmor_file_permission+0xf5/0x310 (?:?)
  read_zero+0x8d/0x140 (?:?)
  lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x100 (?:?)
Fixes ccd979bdbce9 ("[PATCH] OCFS2: The Second Oracle Cluster Filesystem")
Assisted-by Codex:gpt-5.5
Cc Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Cc Joel Becker <[email protected]>
Cc Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Cc Changwei Ge <[email protected]>
Cc Jun Piao <[email protected]>
Cc Heming Zhao <[email protected]>
---
 fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c |   22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c +22 -0
@@ -205,8 +205,16 @@ static int ocfs2_validate_gd_parent(stru
 				    int resize)
 {
 	unsigned int max_bits;
+	unsigned int max_bitmap_bits;
+	unsigned int max_bitmap_size;
+	int suballocator;
 	struct ocfs2_group_desc *gd = (struct ocfs2_group_desc *)bh->b_data;
 
+	suballocator = le64_to_cpu(di->i_blkno) != OCFS2_SB(sb)->bitmap_blkno;
+	max_bitmap_size = ocfs2_group_bitmap_size(sb, suballocator,
+						  OCFS2_SB(sb)->s_feature_incompat);
+	max_bitmap_bits = max_bitmap_size * 8;
+
 	if (di->i_blkno != gd->bg_parent_dinode) {
 		do_error("Group descriptor #%llu has bad parent pointer (%llu, expected %llu)\n",
 			 (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr,
@@ -214,6 +222,20 @@ static int ocfs2_validate_gd_parent(stru
 			 (unsigned long long)le64_to_cpu(di->i_blkno));
 	}
 
+	if (le16_to_cpu(gd->bg_size) > max_bitmap_size) {
+		do_error("Group descriptor #%llu has bitmap size %u but physical max of %u\n",
+			 (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr,
+			 le16_to_cpu(gd->bg_size),
+			 max_bitmap_size);
+	}
+
+	if (le16_to_cpu(gd->bg_bits) > max_bitmap_bits) {
+		do_error("Group descriptor #%llu has bit count %u but physical max of %u\n",
+			 (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr,
+			 le16_to_cpu(gd->bg_bits),
+			 max_bitmap_bits);
+	}
+
 	max_bits = le16_to_cpu(di->id2.i_chain.cl_cpg) * le16_to_cpu(di->id2.i_chain.cl_bpc);
 	if (le16_to_cpu(gd->bg_bits) > max_bits) {
 		do_error("Group descriptor #%llu has bit count of %u\n",
author maintainer
#175 lore raw

PATCH 175/204 9p: avoid putting oldfid in p9_client_walk() error path

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yizhou Zhao <[email protected]>

commit 1a3860d46e3eb47dbd60339783cdad7904486b9f upstream.

When p9_client_walk() is called with clone set to false, fid aliases oldfid. If the walk subsequently fails after the request has been sent, the error path jumps to clunk_fid, which currently calls p9_fid_put(fid) unconditionally.

This drops a reference to oldfid even though ownership of oldfid remains with the caller. If this is the last reference, oldfid can be clunked and destroyed while the caller still expects it to be valid. A later use or put of oldfid can then trigger a use-after-free or refcount underflow.

Fix this by only putting fid in the clunk_fid error path when it does not alias oldfid, matching the existing guard in the error path below.

This can be triggered when a multi-component walk is split into multiple p9_client_walk() calls and a later non-cloning walk fails. A reproducer and refcount warning logs are available on request.

Fixes b48dbb998d70 ("9p fid refcount: add p9_fid_get/put wrappers")
Assisted-by GLM 5.1

Message-ID: <[email protected]>

---
 net/9p/client.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/9p/client.c +2 -1
@@ -1215,7 +1215,8 @@ struct p9_fid *p9_client_walk(struct p9_
 
 clunk_fid:
 	kfree(wqids);
-	p9_fid_put(fid);
+	if (fid != oldfid)
+		p9_fid_put(fid);
 	fid = NULL;
 
 error:
author maintainer
#176 lore raw

PATCH 176/204 MIPS: smp: report dying CPU to RCU in stop_this_cpu()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jonas Jelonek <[email protected]>

commit 9f3f3bdc6d9dac1a5a8262ee7ad0f2ff1527a7e7 upstream.

smp_send_stop() parks all secondary CPUs in stop_this_cpu(). The function marks the CPU offline for the scheduler via set_cpu_online(false) but never informs RCU, so RCU keeps expecting a quiescent state from CPUs that are now spinning forever with interrupts disabled.

As long as nothing waits for an RCU grace period after smp_send_stop() this is harmless, which is why it went unnoticed. Since commit 91840be8f710 ("irq_work: Fix use-after-free in irq_work_single() on PREEMPT_RT") however, irq_work_sync() calls synchronize_rcu() on architectures without an irq_work self-IPI, i.e. where arch_irq_work_has_interrupt() returns false. That is the asm-generic default used by MIPS. Any irq_work_sync() issued in the reboot/shutdown path after smp_send_stop() then blocks on a grace period that can never complete, hanging the reboot:

  WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 15 at kernel/irq_work.c:144 irq_work_queue_on
  ...
  rcu: INFO: rcu_sched detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:
  rcu: Offline CPU 1 blocking current GP.
  rcu: Offline CPU 2 blocking current GP.
  rcu: Offline CPU 3 blocking current GP.

This issue was noticed on several Realtek MIPS switch SoCs (MIPS interAptiv) and came up during kernel bump downstream in OpenWrt from 6.18.33 to 6.18.34, after the backport of the patch to the 6.18 stable branch. The patch also has been backported all the way back to 6.1.

Call rcutree_report_cpu_dead() once interrupts are disabled, mirroring the generic CPU-hotplug offline path, so RCU stops waiting on the parked CPUs and grace periods can still complete. MIPS shuts down all CPUs here without going through the CPU-hotplug mechanism, so this report is not otherwise issued. Reporting a dying CPU to RCU outside the regular hotplug offline path is not unprecedented: arm64 does the same in cpu_die_early(). There it is an exception for a CPU that was coming online and is aborting bringup, rather than the default shutdown action as on MIPS.

Fixes 91840be8f710 ("irq_work: Fix use-after-free in irq_work_single() on PREEMPT_RT")
---
 arch/mips/kernel/smp.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/mips/kernel/smp.c +2 -0
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched/mm.h>
 #include <linux/cpumask.h>
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/ftrace.h>
 #include <linux/irqdomain.h>
@@ -411,6 +412,7 @@ static void stop_this_cpu(void *dummy)
 	set_cpu_online(smp_processor_id(), false);
 	calculate_cpu_foreign_map();
 	local_irq_disable();
+	rcutree_report_cpu_dead();
 	while (1);
 }
 
author maintainer
#177 lore raw

PATCH 177/204 KVM: x86: hyper-v: Bound the bank index when querying sparse banks

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hyunwoo Kim <[email protected]>

commit 4721f8160f17554b003e8928bb61e6c9b2fe92a3 upstream.

When checking if a VP ID is included in a sparse bank set, explicitly check that the ID can actually be contained in a sparse bank (the TLFS allows for a maximum of 64 banks of 64 vCPUs each). When handling a paravirtual TLB flush for L2, the VP ID is copied verbatim from the enlightened VMCS, without any bounds check, i.e. isn't guaranteed to be under the limit of 4096.

Failure to check the bounds of the VP ID leads to an out-of-bounds read when testing the sparse bank, and super strictly speaking could lead to KVM performing an unnecessary TLB flush for an L2 vCPU.

==================================================================

  BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hv_is_vp_in_sparse_set+0x85/0x100 [kvm]
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff88811ba5f598 by task hyperv_evmcs/2802

  CPU: 12 UID: 1000 PID: 2802 Comm: hyperv_evmcs Not tainted 7.1.0-rc2 #7 PREEMPT
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x60
   print_report+0xcb/0x5d0
   kasan_report+0xb4/0xe0
   kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
   hv_is_vp_in_sparse_set+0x85/0x100 [kvm]
   kvm_hv_flush_tlb+0xe9e/0x16c0 [kvm]
   kvm_hv_hypercall+0xe6b/0x1e60 [kvm]
   vmx_handle_exit+0x485/0x1b60 [kvm_intel]
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x22e3/0x5070 [kvm]
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x5d0/0x10c0 [kvm]
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x129/0x1a0
   do_syscall_64+0xb9/0xcf0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
  RIP: 0033:0x7f0e62d1a9bf
   </TASK>

  The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
  page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffffffffffffffff pfn:0x11ba5f
  flags: 0x4000000000000000(zone=1)
  raw: 4000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
  raw: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
  page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

  Memory state around the buggy address:
   ffff88811ba5f480: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
   ffff88811ba5f500: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
  >ffff88811ba5f580: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
                              ^
   ffff88811ba5f600: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
   ffff88811ba5f680: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
  ==================================================================
  Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint

Opportunistically add a compile time assertion to ensure the maximum number of sparse banks exactly matches the number of possible bits in the passed in mask.

Fixes c58a318f6090 ("KVM: x86: hyper-v: L2 TLB flush")
[sean: add KASAN splat, drop comment, add assert, massage changelog]
---
 arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c +5 -0
@@ -1838,6 +1838,11 @@ static bool hv_is_vp_in_sparse_set(u32 v
 	int valid_bit_nr = vp_id / HV_VCPUS_PER_SPARSE_BANK;
 	unsigned long sbank;
 
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(BITS_PER_TYPE(valid_bank_mask) != HV_MAX_SPARSE_VCPU_BANKS);
+
+	if (valid_bit_nr >= HV_MAX_SPARSE_VCPU_BANKS)
+		return false;
+
 	if (!test_bit(valid_bit_nr, (unsigned long *)&valid_bank_mask))
 		return false;
 
author maintainer
#178 lore raw

PATCH 178/204 KVM: SVM: Fix page overflow in sev_dbg_crypt() for ENCRYPT path

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ashutosh Desai <[email protected]>

commit 78ee2d50185a037b3d2452a97f3dad69c3f7f389 upstream.

In sev_dbg_crypt(), the per-iteration transfer length is bounded by the source page offset (PAGE_SIZE - s_off) but not by the destination page offset (PAGE_SIZE - d_off). When d_off > s_off, the encrypt path (__sev_dbg_encrypt_user) performs a read-modify-write using a single-page intermediate buffer (dst_tpage):

1. __sev_dbg_decrypt() expands the size to round_up(len + (d_off & 15), 16) before issuing the PSP command. If len + (d_off & 15) > PAGE_SIZE, the PSP writes beyond the end of the 4096-byte dst_tpage allocation.

2. The subsequent memcpy()/copy_from_user() into page_address(dst_tpage) + (d_off & 15) of 'len' bytes overflows by up to 15 bytes under the same condition.

Trigger example: s_off = 0, d_off = 1, debug.len = PAGE_SIZE - the PSP is instructed to write round_up(4097, 16) = 4112 bytes to a 4096-byte buffer.

Fix by also bounding len by (PAGE_SIZE - d_off), the same check that sev_send_update_data() already performs for its single-page guest region.

==================================================================

 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sev_dbg_crypt+0x993/0xd10 [kvm_amd]
 Write of size 4095 at addr ff110062293bb009 by task sev_dbg_test/228214

 CPU: 96 UID: 0 PID: 228214 Comm: sev_dbg_test Tainted: G     U  W           7.0.0-smp--5ce9b0c48211-dbg #156 PREEMPTLAZY
 Tainted: [U]=USER, [W]=WARN
 Hardware name: Google Astoria/astoria, BIOS 0.20250817.1-0 08/25/2025
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x54/0x70
  print_report+0xbc/0x260
  kasan_report+0xa2/0xd0
  kasan_check_range+0x25f/0x2c0
  __asan_memcpy+0x40/0x70
  sev_dbg_crypt+0x993/0xd10 [kvm_amd]
  sev_mem_enc_ioctl+0x33c/0x450 [kvm_amd]
  kvm_vm_ioctl+0x65d/0x6d0 [kvm]
  __se_sys_ioctl+0xb2/0x100
  do_syscall_64+0xe8/0x870
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
  </TASK>

 The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
 page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x7fe72b6a0 pfn:0x62293bb
 memcg:ff11000112827d82
 flags: 0x1400000000000000(node=1|zone=1)
 raw: 1400000000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 00000007fe72b6a0 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff ff11000112827d82
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ff110062293bbf00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ff110062293bbf80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ff110062293bc000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
                    ^
  ff110062293bc080: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
  ff110062293bc100: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ==================================================================
 Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
Fixes 24f41fb23a39 ("KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV DEBUG_DECRYPT command")
Fixes 7d1594f5d94b ("KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV DEBUG_ENCRYPT command")
[sean: add sample KASAN splat, Fixes, and stable@]
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +1 -0
@@ -1280,6 +1280,7 @@ static int sev_dbg_crypt(struct kvm *kvm
 		s_off = vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
 		d_off = dst_vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
 		len = min_t(size_t, (PAGE_SIZE - s_off), size);
+		len = min_t(size_t, len, PAGE_SIZE - d_off);
 
 		if (dec)
 			ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(kvm,
author maintainer
#179 lore raw

PATCH 179/204 power: reset: linkstation-poweroff: fix use-after-free in the linkstation_poweroff_init()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wentao Liang <[email protected]>

commit 8eec545cde69e46e9a1d2b7d915ce4f5df85b3bd upstream.

Move of_node_put(dn) after the of_match_node() call, which still needs the node pointer. The node reference is correctly released after use.

Fixes e2f471efe1d6 ("power: reset: linkstation-poweroff: prepare for new devices")
---
 drivers/power/reset/linkstation-poweroff.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/power/reset/linkstation-poweroff.c +1 -1
@@ -163,10 +163,10 @@ static int __init linkstation_poweroff_i
 	dn = of_find_matching_node(NULL, ls_poweroff_of_match);
 	if (!dn)
 		return -ENODEV;
-	of_node_put(dn);
 
 	match = of_match_node(ls_poweroff_of_match, dn);
 	cfg = match->data;
+	of_node_put(dn);
 
 	dn = of_find_node_by_name(NULL, cfg->mdio_node_name);
 	if (!dn)
author maintainer
#180 lore raw

PATCH 180/204 riscv: kfence: Call mark_new_valid_map() for kfence_unprotect()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vivian Wang <[email protected]>

commit 8d6c8c40e733b3fcaf92fed0a078bba2f6941a3b upstream.

In kfence_protect_page(), which kfence_unprotect() calls, we cannot send IPIs to other CPUs to ask them to flush TLB. This may lead to those CPUs spuriously faulting on a recently allocated kfence object despite it being valid, leading to false positive use-after-free reports.

Fix this by calling mark_new_valid_map() so that the page fault handling code path notices the spurious fault and flushes TLB then retries the access.

Update the comment in handle_exception to indicate that new_valid_map_cpus_check also handles kfence_unprotect() spurious faults.

Note that kfence_protect() has the same stale TLB entries problem, but that leads to false negatives, which is fine with kfence.

---
 arch/riscv/include/asm/kfence.h |    7 +++++--
 arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S       |    6 ++++--
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/riscv/include/asm/kfence.h +5 -2
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 #include <linux/kfence.h>
 #include <linux/pfn.h>
 #include <asm-generic/pgalloc.h>
+#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 
 static inline bool arch_kfence_init_pool(void)
@@ -17,10 +18,12 @@ static inline bool kfence_protect_page(u
 {
 	pte_t *pte = virt_to_kpte(addr);
 
-	if (protect)
+	if (protect) {
 		set_pte(pte, __pte(pte_val(ptep_get(pte)) & ~_PAGE_PRESENT));
-	else
+	} else {
 		set_pte(pte, __pte(pte_val(ptep_get(pte)) | _PAGE_PRESENT));
+		mark_new_valid_map();
+	}
 
 	preempt_disable();
 	local_flush_tlb_kernel_range(addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE);
arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S +4 -2
@@ -106,8 +106,10 @@ SYM_CODE_START(handle_exception)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
 	/*
-	 * The RISC-V kernel does not eagerly emit a sfence.vma after each
-	 * new vmalloc mapping, which may result in exceptions:
+	 * The RISC-V kernel does not flush TLBs on all CPUS after each new
+	 * vmalloc mapping or kfence_unprotect(), which may result in
+	 * exceptions:
+	 *
 	 * - if the uarch caches invalid entries, the new mapping would not be
 	 *   observed by the page table walker and an invalidation is needed.
 	 * - if the uarch does not cache invalid entries, a reordered access
author maintainer
#181 lore raw

PATCH 181/204 fbdev: Fix fb_new_modelist to prevent null-ptr-deref in fb_videomode_to_var

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ian Bridges <[email protected]>

commit 7f08fc10fa3d3366dc3af723970bd03d7d6d10e3 upstream.

info->var, a framebuffer's current mode, is expected to have a matching entry in info->modelist. var_to_display() relies on this and treats a failed fb_match_mode() as "This should not happen". fb_set_var() keeps it true by adding the mode to the list on every change, and do_register_framebuffer() does the same at registration.

store_modes() replaces the modelist from userspace. fb_new_modelist() validates the new modes but does not check that info->var still has a match. It relies on fbcon_new_modelist() to re-point consoles, but that only handles consoles mapped to the framebuffer. With fbcon unbound there are none, so info->var is left describing a mode that is no longer in the list.

A later console takeover runs var_to_display(), where fb_match_mode() returns NULL and leaves fb_display[i].mode NULL. fbcon_switch() passes it to display_to_var(), and fb_videomode_to_var() dereferences the NULL mode.

Keep the current mode in the list in fb_new_modelist(), the same way fb_set_var() does.

---
 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c |   12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c +12 -0
@@ -680,6 +680,18 @@ int fb_new_modelist(struct fb_info *info
 	if (list_empty(&info->modelist))
 		return 1;
 
+	/*
+	 * The new modelist may not contain the current mode (info->var), and
+	 * fbcon_new_modelist() below only re-points consoles mapped to this
+	 * framebuffer. Add the current mode here so info->var keeps a match
+	 * even when fbcon is unbound.
+	 */
+	if (!fb_match_mode(&info->var, &info->modelist)) {
+		fb_var_to_videomode(&mode, &info->var);
+		if (fb_add_videomode(&mode, &info->modelist))
+			return 1;
+	}
+
 	fbcon_new_modelist(info);
 
 	return 0;
author maintainer
#182 lore raw

PATCH 182/204 fbdev: modedb: fix a possible UAF in fb_find_mode()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tuo Li <[email protected]>

commit 85b6256469cebdac395e7447147e06b2e151014f upstream.

If mode_option is NULL, it is assigned from mode_option_buf:

  if (!mode_option) {
    fb_get_options(NULL, &mode_option_buf);
    mode_option = mode_option_buf;
  }

Later, name is assigned from mode_option:

  const char *name = mode_option;

However, mode_option_buf is freed before name is no longer used:

  kfree(mode_option_buf);

while name is still accessed by:

if ((name_matches(db[i], name, namelen) ||

Since name aliases mode_option_buf, this may result in a use-after-free.

Fix this by extending the lifetime of mode_option_buf until the end of the function by using scope-based resource management for cleanup.

---
 drivers/video/fbdev/core/modedb.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/video/fbdev/core/modedb.c +1 -2
@@ -625,7 +625,7 @@ int fb_find_mode(struct fb_var_screeninf
 		 const struct fb_videomode *default_mode,
 		 unsigned int default_bpp)
 {
-	char *mode_option_buf = NULL;
+	char *mode_option_buf __free(kfree) = NULL;
 	int i;
 
 	/* Set up defaults */
@@ -723,7 +723,6 @@ int fb_find_mode(struct fb_var_screeninf
 			res_specified = 1;
 		}
 done:
-		kfree(mode_option_buf);
 		if (cvt) {
 			struct fb_videomode cvt_mode;
 			int ret;
author maintainer
#183 lore raw

PATCH 183/204 fbdev: modedb: Fix misaligned fields in the 1920x1080-60 mode

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Steffen Persvold <[email protected]>

commit d894c48a57d78206e4df9c90d4acfaf39394806a upstream.

The 1920x1080@60 modedb entry has one too many initializers before its sync field: a stray "0" occupies the sync slot, which shifts the remaining values by one field. The entry therefore decodes as sync = 0, vmode = FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT | FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT (0x3, i.e. FB_VMODE_INTERLACED | FB_VMODE_DOUBLE), and flag = FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, instead of the intended sync = positive H/V, vmode = non-interlaced.

fb_find_mode() then returns a 1920x1080 mode flagged as interlaced + doublescan with active-low syncs. Drivers that honour var->vmode and var->sync when programming display timing enable doublescan and the wrong sync polarity, corrupting the output.

Drop the stray initializer so sync and vmode hold their intended values (positive H/V sync, non-interlaced), matching the adjacent 1920x1200 entry.

Fixes c8902258b2b8 ("fbdev: modedb: Add 1920x1080 at 60 Hz video mode")
---
 drivers/video/fbdev/core/modedb.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/video/fbdev/core/modedb.c +1 -1
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ static const struct fb_videomode modedb[
 		FB_VMODE_DOUBLE },
 
 	/* 1920x1080 @ 60 Hz, 67.3 kHz hsync */
-	{ NULL, 60, 1920, 1080, 6734, 148, 88, 36, 4, 44, 5, 0,
+	{ NULL, 60, 1920, 1080, 6734, 148, 88, 36, 4, 44, 5,
 		FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT | FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT,
 		FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED },
 
author maintainer
#184 lore raw

PATCH 184/204 i2c: core: fix adapter registration race

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

commit ba14d7cf2fe7284610a29854bdff22b2537d3ce6 upstream.

Adapters can be looked up based on their id using i2c_get_adapter() which takes a reference to the embedded struct device.

Make sure that the adapter (including its struct device) has been initialised before adding it to the IDR to avoid accessing uninitialised data which could, for example, lead to NULL-pointer dereferences or use-after-free.

Note that the i2c-dev chardev, which is registered from a bus notifier, currently uses i2c_get_adapter() so the adapter needs to be added to the IDR before registration.

Fixes 6e13e6418418 ("i2c: Add i2c_add_numbered_adapter()")
Cc [email protected] # 2.6.22
---
 drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c |    8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c +6 -2
@@ -1559,6 +1559,10 @@ static int i2c_register_adapter(struct i
 	pm_suspend_ignore_children(&adap->dev, true);
 	pm_runtime_enable(&adap->dev);
 
+	mutex_lock(&core_lock);
+	idr_replace(&i2c_adapter_idr, adap, adap->nr);
+	mutex_unlock(&core_lock);
+
 	res = device_add(&adap->dev);
 	if (res) {
 		pr_err("adapter '%s': can't register device (%d)\n", adap->name, res);
@@ -1617,7 +1621,7 @@ static int __i2c_add_numbered_adapter(st
 	int id;
 
 	mutex_lock(&core_lock);
-	id = idr_alloc(&i2c_adapter_idr, adap, adap->nr, adap->nr + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	id = idr_alloc(&i2c_adapter_idr, NULL, adap->nr, adap->nr + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
 	mutex_unlock(&core_lock);
 	if (WARN(id < 0, "couldn't get idr"))
 		return id == -ENOSPC ? -EBUSY : id;
@@ -1653,7 +1657,7 @@ int i2c_add_adapter(struct i2c_adapter *
 	}
 
 	mutex_lock(&core_lock);
-	id = idr_alloc(&i2c_adapter_idr, adapter,
+	id = idr_alloc(&i2c_adapter_idr, NULL,
 		       __i2c_first_dynamic_bus_num, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
 	mutex_unlock(&core_lock);
 	if (WARN(id < 0, "couldn't get idr"))
author maintainer
#185 lore raw

PATCH 185/204 NFSD: Fix SECINFO_NO_NAME decode error cleanup

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Guannan Wang <[email protected]>

commit 9e18e83b8846a5c3fe13fc8a464b4865d33996c6 upstream.

nfsd4_decode_secinfo_no_name() currently initializes sin_exp after decoding sin_style. If the XDR stream is truncated, the decoder returns nfserr_bad_xdr before sin_exp is initialized.

Since commit 3fdc54646234 ("NFSD: Reduce amount of struct nfsd4_compoundargs that needs clearing"), the inline iops array is not cleared between RPC calls. A failed SECINFO_NO_NAME decode can therefore leave sin_exp holding stale union contents from a previous operation.

The error response path still invokes nfsd4_secinfo_no_name_release(), which calls exp_put() on a non-NULL sin_exp.

Initialize sin_exp before the first failable decode step, matching nfsd4_decode_secinfo().

Fixes 3fdc54646234 ("NFSD: Reduce amount of struct nfsd4_compoundargs that needs clearing")
---
 fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c +2 -1
@@ -1849,10 +1849,11 @@ static __be32 nfsd4_decode_secinfo_no_na
 					   union nfsd4_op_u *u)
 {
 	struct nfsd4_secinfo_no_name *sin = &u->secinfo_no_name;
+
+	sin->sin_exp = NULL;
 	if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(argp->xdr, &sin->sin_style) < 0)
 		return nfserr_bad_xdr;
 
-	sin->sin_exp = NULL;
 	return nfs_ok;
 }
 
author maintainer
#186 lore raw

PATCH 186/204 nfsd: fix posix_acl leak on SETACL decode failure

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>

commit 0853ac544c590880d797b04daa33fcb72b6be0e1 upstream.

nfsaclsvc_decode_setaclargs() and nfs3svc_decode_setaclargs() each call nfs_stream_decode_acl() twice, first for NFS_ACL and then for NFS_DFACL. Each successful call transfers ownership of a freshly allocated posix_acl into argp->acl_access or argp->acl_default. If the first call succeeds but the second fails, the decoder returns false and argp->acl_access is left dangling.

ACLPROC2_SETACL.pc_release was wired to nfssvc_release_attrstat and ACLPROC3_SETACL.pc_release was wired to nfs3svc_release_fhandle. Both only call fh_put() and have no knowledge of the ACL fields on argp. The posix_acl_release() pairs sat at the out: labels inside nfsacld_proc_setacl() and nfsd3_proc_setacl(), but svc_process() skips pc_func when pc_decode returns false, so that cleanup is unreachable on decode failure:

svc_process_common()
pc_decode() /* decode_setaclargs: false */
/* pc_func skipped */
pc_release() /* fh_put only -- ACLs leaked */

The orphaned posix_acl is leaked for the lifetime of the server.

Fix by adding nfsaclsvc_release_setacl() and nfs3svc_release_setacl(), which release both argp->acl_access and argp->acl_default in addition to fh_put(), and wiring them as pc_release for their respective SETACL procedures. pc_release runs on every path svc_process() takes after decode, including decode failure, so the posix_acl_release() pairs are removed from the proc functions' out: labels to keep ownership in one place. This matches the existing release_getacl() pattern used by the sibling GETACL procedures.

Fixes a257cdd0e217 ("[PATCH] NFSD: Add server support for NFSv3 ACLs.")
Assisted-by kres:claude-opus-4-7
---
 fs/nfsd/nfs2acl.c |   17 ++++++++++++-----
 fs/nfsd/nfs3acl.c |   17 ++++++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
fs/nfsd/nfs2acl.c +12 -5
@@ -131,10 +131,7 @@ static __be32 nfsacld_proc_setacl(struct
 	resp->status = fh_getattr(fh, &resp->stat);
 
 out:
-	/* argp->acl_{access,default} may have been allocated in
-	   nfssvc_decode_setaclargs. */
-	posix_acl_release(argp->acl_access);
-	posix_acl_release(argp->acl_default);
+	/* argp->acl_{access,default} are released in nfsaclsvc_release_setacl. */
 	return rpc_success;
 
 out_drop_lock:
@@ -310,6 +307,16 @@ static void nfsaclsvc_release_access(str
 	fh_put(&resp->fh);
 }
 
+static void nfsaclsvc_release_setacl(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
+{
+	struct nfsd3_setaclargs *argp = rqstp->rq_argp;
+	struct nfsd_attrstat *resp = rqstp->rq_resp;
+
+	fh_put(&resp->fh);
+	posix_acl_release(argp->acl_access);
+	posix_acl_release(argp->acl_default);
+}
+
 #define ST 1		/* status*/
 #define AT 21		/* attributes */
 #define pAT (1+AT)	/* post attributes - conditional */
@@ -343,7 +350,7 @@ static const struct svc_procedure nfsd_a
 		.pc_func = nfsacld_proc_setacl,
 		.pc_decode = nfsaclsvc_decode_setaclargs,
 		.pc_encode = nfssvc_encode_attrstatres,
-		.pc_release = nfssvc_release_attrstat,
+		.pc_release = nfsaclsvc_release_setacl,
 		.pc_argsize = sizeof(struct nfsd3_setaclargs),
 		.pc_argzero = sizeof(struct nfsd3_setaclargs),
 		.pc_ressize = sizeof(struct nfsd_attrstat),
fs/nfsd/nfs3acl.c +12 -5
@@ -118,10 +118,7 @@ out_drop_lock:
 out_errno:
 	resp->status = nfserrno(error);
 out:
-	/* argp->acl_{access,default} may have been allocated in
-	   nfs3svc_decode_setaclargs. */
-	posix_acl_release(argp->acl_access);
-	posix_acl_release(argp->acl_default);
+	/* argp->acl_{access,default} are released in nfs3svc_release_setacl. */
 	return rpc_success;
 }
 
@@ -223,6 +220,16 @@ static void nfs3svc_release_getacl(struc
 	posix_acl_release(resp->acl_default);
 }
 
+static void nfs3svc_release_setacl(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
+{
+	struct nfsd3_setaclargs *argp = rqstp->rq_argp;
+	struct nfsd3_attrstat *resp = rqstp->rq_resp;
+
+	fh_put(&resp->fh);
+	posix_acl_release(argp->acl_access);
+	posix_acl_release(argp->acl_default);
+}
+
 #define ST 1		/* status*/
 #define AT 21		/* attributes */
 #define pAT (1+AT)	/* post attributes - conditional */
@@ -256,7 +263,7 @@ static const struct svc_procedure nfsd_a
 		.pc_func = nfsd3_proc_setacl,
 		.pc_decode = nfs3svc_decode_setaclargs,
 		.pc_encode = nfs3svc_encode_setaclres,
-		.pc_release = nfs3svc_release_fhandle,
+		.pc_release = nfs3svc_release_setacl,
 		.pc_argsize = sizeof(struct nfsd3_setaclargs),
 		.pc_argzero = sizeof(struct nfsd3_setaclargs),
 		.pc_ressize = sizeof(struct nfsd3_attrstat),
author maintainer
#187 lore raw

PATCH 187/204 nfsd: check get_user() return when reading princhashlen

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dominik Woźniak <[email protected]>

commit e186fa1c057f5eccb22afb1e83e34c0627085868 upstream.

In __cld_pipe_inprogress_downcall(), the get_user() that reads princhashlen from the userspace cld_msg_v2 buffer does not check its return value. A failing copy leaves princhashlen with uninitialised stack contents, which are then used to drive memdup_user() and stored as princhash.len on the resulting reclaim record. The other get_user() calls in this function all check the return; only this one is missed, which is most likely a copy-paste oversight from when v2 upcalls were introduced.

Mirror the existing pattern used a few lines above for namelen. namecopy is declared with __free(kfree) so the early return cleans up the already-allocated buffer automatically.

Fixes 6ee95d1c8991 ("nfsd: add support for upcall version 2")
---
 fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c +2 -1
@@ -818,7 +818,8 @@ __cld_pipe_inprogress_downcall(const str
 			if (IS_ERR(name.data))
 				return PTR_ERR(name.data);
 			name.len = namelen;
-			get_user(princhashlen, &ci->cc_princhash.cp_len);
+			if (get_user(princhashlen, &ci->cc_princhash.cp_len))
+				return -EFAULT;
 			if (princhashlen > 0) {
 				princhash.data = memdup_user(
 						&ci->cc_princhash.cp_data,
#188 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 6.12 187/204] nfsd: check get_user() return when reading princhashlen

Hi Greg,

Sorry, I couldn't send this in 48 hrs of testing timeline.

Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dominik Woźniak <[email protected]>

commit e186fa1c057f5eccb22afb1e83e34c0627085868 upstream.

Quoted 9 lines

In __cld_pipe_inprogress_downcall(), the get_user() that reads princhashlen from the userspace cld_msg_v2 buffer does not check its return value. A failing copy leaves princhashlen with uninitialised stack contents, which are then used to drive memdup_user() and stored as princhash.len on the resulting reclaim record. The other get_user() calls in this function all check the return; only this one is missed, which is most likely a copy-paste oversight from when v2 upcalls were introduced.

I ran an AI-assisted backport review and verified a leak in the released
6.12.95 equivalent of this patch, 0ec4aaa488ff (“nfsd: check get_user() return when reading princhashlen”), this is only in 6.19-rc1+

Upstream e186fa1c057f uses an automatically cleaned-up temporary:

  	char *namecopy __free(kfree) = NULL;
  	...
  	namecopy = memdup_user(...);
  	...
  	if (get_user(princhashlen, ...))
  		return -EFAULT;

But 6.12 retains the older manual ownership model:

  	name.data = memdup_user(...);
  	...
  	if (get_user(princhashlen, ...))
  		return -EFAULT;

Thus a fault while reading cp_len after the name copy succeeds leaks name.data. The upstream early return relies on 4552f4e3f2c9 ("nfsd:
change nfs4_client_to_reclaim() to allocate data"), which introduced the scoped cleanup, but that commit is not present in 6.12.y.

Maybe we should fix this up with a downstream backport ? That looks like a simple approach to me.

thanks,
Harshit

Quoted 31 lines

Mirror the existing pattern used a few lines above for namelen. namecopy is declared with __free(kfree) so the early return cleans up the already-allocated buffer automatically.

Fixes 6ee95d1c8991 ("nfsd: add support for upcall version 2")
---
  fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c |    3 ++-
  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c +2 -1
@@ -818,7 +818,8 @@ __cld_pipe_inprogress_downcall(const str
  			if (IS_ERR(name.data))
  				return PTR_ERR(name.data);
  			name.len = namelen;
-			get_user(princhashlen, &ci->cc_princhash.cp_len);
+			if (get_user(princhashlen, &ci->cc_princhash.cp_len))
+				return -EFAULT;
  			if (princhashlen > 0) {
  				princhash.data = memdup_user(
  						&ci->cc_princhash.cp_data,
author maintainer
#189 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 6.12 187/204] nfsd: check get_user() return when reading princhashlen

Quoted 44 lines · Harshit Mogalapalli

Hi Greg,

Sorry, I couldn't send this in 48 hrs of testing timeline.

Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dominik Woźniak <[email protected]>

commit e186fa1c057f5eccb22afb1e83e34c0627085868 upstream.

Quoted 9 lines

In __cld_pipe_inprogress_downcall(), the get_user() that reads princhashlen from the userspace cld_msg_v2 buffer does not check its return value. A failing copy leaves princhashlen with uninitialised stack contents, which are then used to drive memdup_user() and stored as princhash.len on the resulting reclaim record. The other get_user() calls in this function all check the return; only this one is missed, which is most likely a copy-paste oversight from when v2 upcalls were introduced.

I ran an AI-assisted backport review and verified a leak in the released 6.12.95 equivalent of this patch, 0ec4aaa488ff (“nfsd: check get_user() return when reading princhashlen”), this is only in 6.19-rc1+

Upstream e186fa1c057f uses an automatically cleaned-up temporary:

  	char *namecopy __free(kfree) = NULL;
  	...
  	namecopy = memdup_user(...);
  	...
  	if (get_user(princhashlen, ...))
  		return -EFAULT;

But 6.12 retains the older manual ownership model:

  	name.data = memdup_user(...);
  	...
  	if (get_user(princhashlen, ...))
  		return -EFAULT;
Quoted 7 lines

Thus a fault while reading cp_len after the name copy succeeds leaks name.data. The upstream early return relies on 4552f4e3f2c9 ("nfsd:
change nfs4_client_to_reclaim() to allocate data"), which introduced the scoped cleanup, but that commit is not present in 6.12.y.

Maybe we should fix this up with a downstream backport ? That looks like a simple approach to me.

Yes, that would be good, can you send a fix for it?

thanks,

greg k-h

#190 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 6.12 187/204] nfsd: check get_user() return when reading princhashlen

Hi Greg,

Quoted 4 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 2 lines

Maybe we should fix this up with a downstream backport ? That looks like a simple approach to me.

Yes, that would be good, can you send a fix for it?

thanks for checking. Will do.

Regards,
Harshit

Quoted 3 lines

thanks,

greg k-h

#191 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 6.12 187/204] nfsd: check get_user() return when reading princhashlen

Hi Greg,

Quoted 10 lines · Harshit Mogalapalli

Hi Greg,

Quoted 4 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 2 lines

Maybe we should fix this up with a downstream backport ? That looks like a simple approach to me.

Yes, that would be good, can you send a fix for it?

thanks for checking. Will do.

I just started the backport and looked into the stable-queue, turns out we my report is a duplicate of what Ben reported and Sasha already picked few patches to branches which have this issue:

Thanks Sasha!

"""

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 7 lines

You're right - the new early return leaks name.data on every branch lacking 4552f4e3f2c9, and the patch shipped in this round of releases on all six branches.

Could someone please send a tested backport of 4552f4e3f2c9 to all relevant
trees?

Not wanting to duplicate effort, is that "someone" me ?

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines

Looks like most of the conflict is due to a missing 89bd77cf436b ("nfsd:
move
name lookup out of nfsd4_list_rec_dir()"). Ok to queue up both 89bd77cf436b and
4552f4e3f2c9?

Those don't look like Rocket Science (tm), so go ahead.

Now queued up, thanks!

"""
https://lore.kernel.org/all/ak49GYepsuRSyu1b@laps/

so we could call it DONE!

Sorry for the duplicate report.

thanks,
Harshit

Quoted 8 lines

Regards,
Harshit

Quoted 3 lines

thanks,

greg k-h

author maintainer
#192 lore raw

PATCH 188/204 nfsd: avoid leaking pre-allocated openowner on unconfirmed retry race

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>

commit 57aee7a35bb12753057c5b65d72d1f46c0e95b07 upstream.

When find_or_alloc_open_stateowner() encounters an unconfirmed owner, it calls release_openowner() and sets oo = NULL. Control then falls through past the if (oo) guard -- which would have freed any pre-allocated new -- and unconditionally executes new = alloc_stateowner(...). If new was already allocated on a prior iteration, the pointer is silently overwritten and the previous allocation (slab object + owner name buffer) is leaked.

This requires a race: two NFSv4.0 OPEN threads with the same owner string, where a concurrent thread inserts a new unconfirmed owner into the hash between retry iterations. The window is narrow but repeatable under adversarial conditions.

Fix by adding goto retry after oo = NULL so the already-allocated new is reused on the next iteration rather than overwritten.

Fixes 23df17788c62 ("nfsd: perform all find_openstateowner_str calls in the one place.")
Assisted-by kres:claude-opus-4-6
---
 fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c +1 -0
@@ -4971,6 +4971,7 @@ retry:
 		/* Replace unconfirmed owners without checking for replay. */
 		release_openowner(oo);
 		oo = NULL;
+		goto retry;
 	}
 	if (oo) {
 		if (new)
author maintainer
#193 lore raw

PATCH 189/204 nfsd: reset write verifier on deferred writeback errors

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>

commit 2090b05803faab8a9fa62fbff871007862cac1b7 upstream.

nfsd_vfs_write() and nfsd_commit() both call filemap_check_wb_err() to detect deferred writeback errors, but neither rotates the server's write verifier (nn->writeverf) when this check fails. Every other durable-storage-failure path in these functions calls commit_reset_write_verifier() before returning an error.

The missing rotation means clients holding UNSTABLE write data under the current verifier will COMMIT, receive the unchanged verifier back, and conclude their data is durable — silently dropping data that failed writeback. This violates the UNSTABLE+COMMIT durability contract (RFC 1813 §3.3.7, RFC 8881 §18.32).

Add commit_reset_write_verifier() calls at both filemap_check_wb_err() error sites, matching the pattern used by adjacent error paths in the same functions. The helper already filters -EAGAIN and -ESTALE internally, so the calls are unconditionally safe.

Fixes 555dbf1a9aac ("nfsd: Replace use of rwsem with errseq_t")
Assisted-by kres:claude-opus-4-6
---
 fs/nfsd/vfs.c |    6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/nfsd/vfs.c +5 -1
@@ -1203,8 +1203,10 @@ nfsd_vfs_write(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, s
 	nfsd_stats_io_write_add(nn, exp, *cnt);
 	fsnotify_modify(file);
 	host_err = filemap_check_wb_err(file->f_mapping, since);
-	if (host_err < 0)
+	if (host_err < 0) {
+		commit_reset_write_verifier(nn, rqstp, host_err);
 		goto out_nfserr;
+	}
 
 	if (stable && fhp->fh_use_wgather) {
 		host_err = wait_for_concurrent_writes(file);
@@ -1370,6 +1372,8 @@ nfsd_commit(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, stru
 			nfsd_copy_write_verifier(verf, nn);
 			err2 = filemap_check_wb_err(nf->nf_file->f_mapping,
 						    since);
+			if (err2 < 0)
+				commit_reset_write_verifier(nn, rqstp, err2);
 			err = nfserrno(err2);
 			break;
 		case -EINVAL:
author maintainer
#194 lore raw

PATCH 190/204 NFSv4/pNFS: reject zero-length r_addr in nfs4_decode_mp_ds_addr

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>

commit 41fe0f7b84f0cb822ae10ab08592996a592b2a25 upstream.

nfs4_decode_mp_ds_addr() decodes the r_netid and r_addr opaques of a netaddr4 from a GETDEVICEINFO multipath-DS body, then immediately calls strrchr(buf, '.') to locate the port separator. Both decodes use xdr_stream_decode_string_dup(), and the current code checks only "nlen < 0" / "rlen < 0" before dereferencing the returned string.

When the on-wire opaque has length zero, xdr_stream_decode_opaque_inline() returns 0 and xdr_stream_decode_string_dup() falls through to its "*str = NULL; return ret" tail, leaving buf NULL with a return value of 0. The "< 0" check does not catch this, and the next line is strrchr(NULL, '.'), a kernel NULL pointer dereference reachable from any pNFS-flexfile client mounted against a malicious or compromised metadata server.

Reject the zero-length cases explicitly so the decoder fails with -EBADMSG (treated as a malformed GETDEVICEINFO body) instead of panicking the client.

Fixes 6b7f3cf96364 ("nfs41: pull decode_ds_addr from file layout to generic pnfs")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-7
---
 fs/nfs/pnfs_nfs.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/pnfs_nfs.c +2 -2
@@ -1055,14 +1055,14 @@ nfs4_decode_mp_ds_addr(struct net *net,
 	/* r_netid */
 	nlen = xdr_stream_decode_string_dup(xdr, &netid, XDR_MAX_NETOBJ,
 					    gfp_flags);
-	if (unlikely(nlen < 0))
+	if (unlikely(nlen <= 0))
 		goto out_err;
 
 	/* r_addr: ip/ip6addr with port in dec octets - see RFC 5665 */
 	/* port is ".ABC.DEF", 8 chars max */
 	rlen = xdr_stream_decode_string_dup(xdr, &buf, INET6_ADDRSTRLEN +
 					    IPV6_SCOPE_ID_LEN + 8, gfp_flags);
-	if (unlikely(rlen < 0))
+	if (unlikely(rlen <= 0))
 		goto out_free_netid;
 
 	/* replace port '.' with '-' */
author maintainer
#195 lore raw

PATCH 191/204 NFS: Prevent resource leak in nfs_alloc_server()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Markus Elfring <[email protected]>

commit d189f224308c8ac3feeea8e442c99922bd18f1b2 upstream.

It was overlooked to call ida_free() after a failed nfs_alloc_iostats() call. Thus add the missed function call in an if branch.

---
 fs/nfs/client.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/nfs/client.c +1 -0
@@ -1054,6 +1054,7 @@ struct nfs_server *nfs_alloc_server(void
 
 	server->io_stats = nfs_alloc_iostats();
 	if (!server->io_stats) {
+		ida_free(&s_sysfs_ids, server->s_sysfs_id);
 		kfree(server);
 		return NULL;
 	}
author maintainer
#196 lore raw

PATCH 192/204 ksmbd: fix out-of-bounds read in smb_check_perm_dacl()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hem Parekh <[email protected]>

commit 1ef06004ed4bd6d3ed8c840d9d1a376b66d4935b upstream.

The permission-check ACE walk in smb_check_perm_dacl() validates the ACE header size and caps sid.num_subauth at SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES, but it never checks that ace->size is actually large enough to contain num_subauth sub-authorities before compare_sids() dereferences them.

CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE covers the SID header up to but excluding the sub_auth[] array, and offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) is the ACE header, so the existing guards only guarantee the 8-byte SID base, i.e. zero sub-authorities. compare_sids() then reads ace->sid.sub_auth[i] for i < min(local_sid->num_subauth, ace->sid.num_subauth). The local comparison SIDs (sid_everyone, sid_unix_NFS_mode, and the id_to_sid() result) always have at least one sub-authority, and an attacker controls the ACE revision and authority bytes (which lie within the in-bounds SID base), so they can match one of those SIDs and force the sub_auth read.

A crafted ACE with size == 16 and num_subauth >= 1 placed at the tail of the security descriptor therefore causes a heap out-of-bounds read of up to SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES * sizeof(__le32) bytes past the pntsd allocation. The security descriptor is loaded by ksmbd_vfs_get_sd_xattr() into a buffer sized exactly to the on-disk data (kzalloc(sd_size) in ndr_decode_v4_ntacl()), so the read lands past the allocation. The malformed descriptor can be stored verbatim via SMB2_SET_INFO (the DACL is not normalised before being written to the security.NTACL xattr) and the read fires on a subsequent SMB2_CREATE access check, making this reachable by an authenticated client on a share that uses ACL xattrs.

Add the missing num_subauth-versus-ace_size check, mirroring the identical guards already present in the sibling parsers parse_dacl() and smb_inherit_dacl().

Fixes d07b26f39246 ("ksmbd: require minimum ACE size in smb_check_perm_dacl()")
---
 fs/smb/server/smbacl.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/smb/server/smbacl.c +3 -1
@@ -1480,7 +1480,9 @@ int smb_check_perm_dacl(struct ksmbd_con
 			break;
 		aces_size -= ace_size;
 
-		if (ace->sid.num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES)
+		if (ace->sid.num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES ||
+		    ace_size < offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) + CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE +
+			      sizeof(__le32) * ace->sid.num_subauth)
 			break;
 
 		if (!compare_sids(&sid, &ace->sid) ||
author maintainer
#197 lore raw

PATCH 193/204 serial: 8250_dw: unregister 8250 port if clk_notifier_register() fails

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Stepan Ionichev <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 10fc708b4de7f86002d2d735a2dbf3b5b7f65692 ]

dw8250_probe() registers the 8250 port via serial8250_register_8250_port() and then, if the device has a clock, registers a clock notifier. If clk_notifier_register() fails, probe returns the error but leaves the 8250 port registered. The matching serial8250_unregister_port() lives in dw8250_remove(), which is not called when probe fails, so the port slot stays occupied until the device is rebound or the system is rebooted. The devm-allocated driver data is freed while the port still references it (via the saved private_data and serial_in/serial_out callbacks), so any access to that port slot before a rebind is a use-after-free hazard.

Unregister the port on the clk_notifier_register() error path.

---
 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_dw.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_dw.c +3 -1
@@ -655,8 +655,10 @@ static int dw8250_probe(struct platform_
 	 */
 	if (data->clk) {
 		err = clk_notifier_register(data->clk, &data->clk_notifier);
-		if (err)
+		if (err) {
+			serial8250_unregister_port(data->data.line);
 			return dev_err_probe(dev, err, "Failed to set the clock notifier\n");
+		}
 		queue_work(system_unbound_wq, &data->clk_work);
 	}
 
author maintainer
#198 lore raw

PATCH 194/204 drivers/base/memory: set mem->altmap after successful device registration

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Georgi Djakov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a2b8d7827f48ee54a686cb80e4a1d0ff954ec42a ]

If __add_memory_block() fails at xa_store() (under memory pressure for example), device_unregister() is called, which eventually triggers memory_block_release() with mem->altmap still set, causing a WARN_ON(mem->altmap). This was triggered by modifying virtio-mem driver.

Fix this by delaying the assignment of mem->altmap until after __add_memory_block() has succeeded.

Fixes 1a8c64e11043 ("mm/memory_hotplug: embed vmem_altmap details in memory block")
Cc Vishal Verma <[email protected]>
Cc Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Cc Richard Cheng <[email protected]>
Cc David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Cc Georgi Djakov <[email protected]>
Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc "Rafael J. Wysocki" <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/base/memory.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/base/memory.c +2 -1
@@ -794,7 +794,6 @@ static int add_memory_block(unsigned lon
 	mem->start_section_nr = block_id * sections_per_block;
 	mem->state = state;
 	mem->nid = NUMA_NO_NODE;
-	mem->altmap = altmap;
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mem->group_next);
 
 #ifndef CONFIG_NUMA
@@ -812,6 +811,8 @@ static int add_memory_block(unsigned lon
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
+	mem->altmap = altmap;
+
 	if (group) {
 		mem->group = group;
 		list_add(&mem->group_next, &group->memory_blocks);
author maintainer
#199 lore raw

PATCH 195/204 Documentation: ioctl-number: Fix linuxppc-dev mailto link

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bagas Sanjaya <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3dfa97bd93614c15418ba7b5c727f6c5bb617174 ]

Spell out full Linux PPC mailing list address like other subsystem mailing lists listed in the table.

Stable-dep-of: d237230728c5 ("crypto: qat - remove unused character device and IOCTLs")

---
 Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst +2 -2
@@ -358,9 +358,9 @@ Code  Seq#    Include File
 0xB1  00-1F                                                          PPPoX
                                                                      <mailto:[email protected]>
 0xB2  00     arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/papr-vpd.h                powerpc/pseries VPD API
-                                                                     <mailto:linuxppc-dev>
+                                                                     <mailto:[email protected]>
 0xB2  01-02  arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/papr-sysparm.h            powerpc/pseries system parameter API
-                                                                     <mailto:linuxppc-dev>
+                                                                     <mailto:[email protected]>
 0xB3  00     linux/mmc/ioctl.h
 0xB4  00-0F  linux/gpio.h                                            <mailto:[email protected]>
 0xB5  00-0F  uapi/linux/rpmsg.h                                      <mailto:[email protected]>
author maintainer
#200 lore raw

PATCH 196/204 Documentation: ioctl-number: Extend "Include File" column width

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bagas Sanjaya <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 15afd5def819e4df2a29cef6fcfa6ae7ba167c0f ]

Extend width of "Include File" column to fit full path to papr-physical-attestation.h in later commit.

Stable-dep-of: d237230728c5 ("crypto: qat - remove unused character device and IOCTLs")

---
 Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst |  486 ++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 243 insertions(+), 243 deletions(-)
Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst +243 -243
@@ -66,330 +66,330 @@ This table lists ioctls visible from use
 most drivers up to 2.6.31, but I know I am missing some.  There has been
 no attempt to list non-X86 architectures or ioctls from drivers/staging/.
 
-====  =====  ======================================================= ================================================================
-Code  Seq#    Include File                                           Comments
+====  =====  ========================================================= ================================================================
+Code  Seq#    Include File                                             Comments
       (hex)
-====  =====  ======================================================= ================================================================
-0x00  00-1F  linux/fs.h                                              conflict!
-0x00  00-1F  scsi/scsi_ioctl.h                                       conflict!
-0x00  00-1F  linux/fb.h                                              conflict!
-0x00  00-1F  linux/wavefront.h                                       conflict!
+====  =====  ========================================================= ================================================================
+0x00  00-1F  linux/fs.h                                                conflict!
+0x00  00-1F  scsi/scsi_ioctl.h                                         conflict!
+0x00  00-1F  linux/fb.h                                                conflict!
+0x00  00-1F  linux/wavefront.h                                         conflict!
 0x02  all    linux/fd.h
 0x03  all    linux/hdreg.h
-0x04  D2-DC  linux/umsdos_fs.h                                       Dead since 2.6.11, but don't reuse these.
+0x04  D2-DC  linux/umsdos_fs.h                                         Dead since 2.6.11, but don't reuse these.
 0x06  all    linux/lp.h
 0x07  9F-D0  linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h, uapi/linux/vm_sockets.h
 0x09  all    linux/raid/md_u.h
 0x10  00-0F  drivers/char/s390/vmcp.h
 0x10  10-1F  arch/s390/include/uapi/sclp_ctl.h
 0x10  20-2F  arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/hypfs.h
-0x12  all    linux/fs.h                                              BLK* ioctls
+0x12  all    linux/fs.h                                                BLK* ioctls
              linux/blkpg.h
-0x15  all    linux/fs.h                                              FS_IOC_* ioctls
-0x1b  all                                                            InfiniBand Subsystem
-                                                                     <http://infiniband.sourceforge.net/>
+0x15  all    linux/fs.h                                                FS_IOC_* ioctls
+0x1b  all                                                              InfiniBand Subsystem
+                                                                       <http://infiniband.sourceforge.net/>
 0x20  all    drivers/cdrom/cm206.h
 0x22  all    scsi/sg.h
-0x3E  00-0F  linux/counter.h                                         <mailto:[email protected]>
+0x3E  00-0F  linux/counter.h                                           <mailto:[email protected]>
 '!'   00-1F  uapi/linux/seccomp.h
-'#'   00-3F                                                          IEEE 1394 Subsystem
-                                                                     Block for the entire subsystem
+'#'   00-3F                                                            IEEE 1394 Subsystem
+                                                                       Block for the entire subsystem
 '$'   00-0F  linux/perf_counter.h, linux/perf_event.h
-'%'   00-0F  include/uapi/linux/stm.h                                System Trace Module subsystem
-                                                                     <mailto:[email protected]>
+'%'   00-0F  include/uapi/linux/stm.h                                  System Trace Module subsystem
+                                                                       <mailto:[email protected]>
 '&'   00-07  drivers/firewire/nosy-user.h
-'*'   00-1F  uapi/linux/user_events.h                                User Events Subsystem
-                                                                     <mailto:[email protected]>
-'1'   00-1F  linux/timepps.h                                         PPS kit from Ulrich Windl
-                                                                     <ftp://ftp.de.kernel.org/pub/linux/daemons/ntp/PPS/>
+'*'   00-1F  uapi/linux/user_events.h                                  User Events Subsystem
+                                                                       <mailto:[email protected]>
+'1'   00-1F  linux/timepps.h                                           PPS kit from Ulrich Windl
+                                                                       <ftp://ftp.de.kernel.org/pub/linux/daemons/ntp/PPS/>
 '2'   01-04  linux/i2o.h
-'3'   00-0F  drivers/s390/char/raw3270.h                             conflict!
-'3'   00-1F  linux/suspend_ioctls.h,                                 conflict!
+'3'   00-0F  drivers/s390/char/raw3270.h                               conflict!
+'3'   00-1F  linux/suspend_ioctls.h,                                   conflict!
              kernel/power/user.c
-'8'   all                                                            SNP8023 advanced NIC card
-                                                                     <mailto:[email protected]>
+'8'   all                                                              SNP8023 advanced NIC card
+                                                                       <mailto:[email protected]>
 ';'   64-7F  linux/vfio.h
 ';'   80-FF  linux/iommufd.h
-'='   00-3f  uapi/linux/ptp_clock.h                                  <mailto:[email protected]>
-'@'   00-0F  linux/radeonfb.h                                        conflict!
-'@'   00-0F  drivers/video/aty/aty128fb.c                            conflict!
-'A'   00-1F  linux/apm_bios.h                                        conflict!
-'A'   00-0F  linux/agpgart.h,                                        conflict!
+'='   00-3f  uapi/linux/ptp_clock.h                                    <mailto:[email protected]>
+'@'   00-0F  linux/radeonfb.h                                          conflict!
+'@'   00-0F  drivers/video/aty/aty128fb.c                              conflict!
+'A'   00-1F  linux/apm_bios.h                                          conflict!
+'A'   00-0F  linux/agpgart.h,                                          conflict!
              drivers/char/agp/compat_ioctl.h
-'A'   00-7F  sound/asound.h                                          conflict!
-'B'   00-1F  linux/cciss_ioctl.h                                     conflict!
-'B'   00-0F  include/linux/pmu.h                                     conflict!
-'B'   C0-FF  advanced bbus                                           <mailto:[email protected]>
-'B'   00-0F  xen/xenbus_dev.h                                        conflict!
-'C'   all    linux/soundcard.h                                       conflict!
-'C'   01-2F  linux/capi.h                                            conflict!
-'C'   F0-FF  drivers/net/wan/cosa.h                                  conflict!
+'A'   00-7F  sound/asound.h                                            conflict!
+'B'   00-1F  linux/cciss_ioctl.h                                       conflict!
+'B'   00-0F  include/linux/pmu.h                                       conflict!
+'B'   C0-FF  advanced bbus                                             <mailto:[email protected]>
+'B'   00-0F  xen/xenbus_dev.h                                          conflict!
+'C'   all    linux/soundcard.h                                         conflict!
+'C'   01-2F  linux/capi.h                                              conflict!
+'C'   F0-FF  drivers/net/wan/cosa.h                                    conflict!
 'D'   all    arch/s390/include/asm/dasd.h
-'D'   40-5F  drivers/scsi/dpt/dtpi_ioctl.h                           Dead since 2022
+'D'   40-5F  drivers/scsi/dpt/dtpi_ioctl.h                             Dead since 2022
 'D'   05     drivers/scsi/pmcraid.h
-'E'   all    linux/input.h                                           conflict!
-'E'   00-0F  xen/evtchn.h                                            conflict!
-'F'   all    linux/fb.h                                              conflict!
-'F'   01-02  drivers/scsi/pmcraid.h                                  conflict!
-'F'   20     drivers/video/fsl-diu-fb.h                              conflict!
-'F'   20     linux/ivtvfb.h                                          conflict!
-'F'   20     linux/matroxfb.h                                        conflict!
-'F'   20     drivers/video/aty/atyfb_base.c                          conflict!
-'F'   00-0F  video/da8xx-fb.h                                        conflict!
-'F'   80-8F  linux/arcfb.h                                           conflict!
-'F'   DD     video/sstfb.h                                           conflict!
-'G'   00-3F  drivers/misc/sgi-gru/grulib.h                           conflict!
-'G'   00-0F  xen/gntalloc.h, xen/gntdev.h                            conflict!
-'H'   00-7F  linux/hiddev.h                                          conflict!
-'H'   00-0F  linux/hidraw.h                                          conflict!
-'H'   01     linux/mei.h                                             conflict!
-'H'   02     linux/mei.h                                             conflict!
-'H'   03     linux/mei.h                                             conflict!
-'H'   00-0F  sound/asound.h                                          conflict!
-'H'   20-40  sound/asound_fm.h                                       conflict!
-'H'   80-8F  sound/sfnt_info.h                                       conflict!
-'H'   10-8F  sound/emu10k1.h                                         conflict!
-'H'   10-1F  sound/sb16_csp.h                                        conflict!
-'H'   10-1F  sound/hda_hwdep.h                                       conflict!
-'H'   40-4F  sound/hdspm.h                                           conflict!
-'H'   40-4F  sound/hdsp.h                                            conflict!
+'E'   all    linux/input.h                                             conflict!
+'E'   00-0F  xen/evtchn.h                                              conflict!
+'F'   all    linux/fb.h                                                conflict!
+'F'   01-02  drivers/scsi/pmcraid.h                                    conflict!
+'F'   20     drivers/video/fsl-diu-fb.h                                conflict!
+'F'   20     linux/ivtvfb.h                                            conflict!
+'F'   20     linux/matroxfb.h                                          conflict!
+'F'   20     drivers/video/aty/atyfb_base.c                            conflict!
+'F'   00-0F  video/da8xx-fb.h                                          conflict!
+'F'   80-8F  linux/arcfb.h                                             conflict!
+'F'   DD     video/sstfb.h                                             conflict!
+'G'   00-3F  drivers/misc/sgi-gru/grulib.h                             conflict!
+'G'   00-0F  xen/gntalloc.h, xen/gntdev.h                              conflict!
+'H'   00-7F  linux/hiddev.h                                            conflict!
+'H'   00-0F  linux/hidraw.h                                            conflict!
+'H'   01     linux/mei.h                                               conflict!
+'H'   02     linux/mei.h                                               conflict!
+'H'   03     linux/mei.h                                               conflict!
+'H'   00-0F  sound/asound.h                                            conflict!
+'H'   20-40  sound/asound_fm.h                                         conflict!
+'H'   80-8F  sound/sfnt_info.h                                         conflict!
+'H'   10-8F  sound/emu10k1.h                                           conflict!
+'H'   10-1F  sound/sb16_csp.h                                          conflict!
+'H'   10-1F  sound/hda_hwdep.h                                         conflict!
+'H'   40-4F  sound/hdspm.h                                             conflict!
+'H'   40-4F  sound/hdsp.h                                              conflict!
 'H'   90     sound/usb/usx2y/usb_stream.h
-'H'   00-0F  uapi/misc/habanalabs.h                                  conflict!
+'H'   00-0F  uapi/misc/habanalabs.h                                    conflict!
 'H'   A0     uapi/linux/usb/cdc-wdm.h
-'H'   C0-F0  net/bluetooth/hci.h                                     conflict!
-'H'   C0-DF  net/bluetooth/hidp/hidp.h                               conflict!
-'H'   C0-DF  net/bluetooth/cmtp/cmtp.h                               conflict!
-'H'   C0-DF  net/bluetooth/bnep/bnep.h                               conflict!
-'H'   F1     linux/hid-roccat.h                                      <mailto:[email protected]>
+'H'   C0-F0  net/bluetooth/hci.h                                       conflict!
+'H'   C0-DF  net/bluetooth/hidp/hidp.h                                 conflict!
+'H'   C0-DF  net/bluetooth/cmtp/cmtp.h                                 conflict!
+'H'   C0-DF  net/bluetooth/bnep/bnep.h                                 conflict!
+'H'   F1     linux/hid-roccat.h                                        <mailto:[email protected]>
 'H'   F8-FA  sound/firewire.h
-'I'   all    linux/isdn.h                                            conflict!
-'I'   00-0F  drivers/isdn/divert/isdn_divert.h                       conflict!
-'I'   40-4F  linux/mISDNif.h                                         conflict!
+'I'   all    linux/isdn.h                                              conflict!
+'I'   00-0F  drivers/isdn/divert/isdn_divert.h                         conflict!
+'I'   40-4F  linux/mISDNif.h                                           conflict!
 'K'   all    linux/kd.h
-'L'   00-1F  linux/loop.h                                            conflict!
-'L'   10-1F  drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_ctl.h                      conflict!
-'L'   E0-FF  linux/ppdd.h                                            encrypted disk device driver
-                                                                     <http://linux01.gwdg.de/~alatham/ppdd.html>
-'M'   all    linux/soundcard.h                                       conflict!
-'M'   01-16  mtd/mtd-abi.h                                           conflict!
+'L'   00-1F  linux/loop.h                                              conflict!
+'L'   10-1F  drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_ctl.h                        conflict!
+'L'   E0-FF  linux/ppdd.h                                              encrypted disk device driver
+                                                                       <http://linux01.gwdg.de/~alatham/ppdd.html>
+'M'   all    linux/soundcard.h                                         conflict!
+'M'   01-16  mtd/mtd-abi.h                                             conflict!
       and    drivers/mtd/mtdchar.c
 'M'   01-03  drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas.h
-'M'   00-0F  drivers/video/fsl-diu-fb.h                              conflict!
+'M'   00-0F  drivers/video/fsl-diu-fb.h                                conflict!
 'N'   00-1F  drivers/usb/scanner.h
 'N'   40-7F  drivers/block/nvme.c
-'N'   80-8F  uapi/linux/ntsync.h                                     NT synchronization primitives
-                                                                     <mailto:[email protected]>
-'O'   00-06  mtd/ubi-user.h                                          UBI
-'P'   all    linux/soundcard.h                                       conflict!
-'P'   60-6F  sound/sscape_ioctl.h                                    conflict!
-'P'   00-0F  drivers/usb/class/usblp.c                               conflict!
-'P'   01-09  drivers/misc/pci_endpoint_test.c                        conflict!
-'P'   00-0F  xen/privcmd.h                                           conflict!
-'P'   00-05  linux/tps6594_pfsm.h                                    conflict!
+'N'   80-8F  uapi/linux/ntsync.h                                       NT synchronization primitives
+                                                                       <mailto:[email protected]>
+'O'   00-06  mtd/ubi-user.h                                            UBI
+'P'   all    linux/soundcard.h                                         conflict!
+'P'   60-6F  sound/sscape_ioctl.h                                      conflict!
+'P'   00-0F  drivers/usb/class/usblp.c                                 conflict!
+'P'   01-09  drivers/misc/pci_endpoint_test.c                          conflict!
+'P'   00-0F  xen/privcmd.h                                             conflict!
+'P'   00-05  linux/tps6594_pfsm.h                                      conflict!
 'Q'   all    linux/soundcard.h
-'R'   00-1F  linux/random.h                                          conflict!
-'R'   01     linux/rfkill.h                                          conflict!
+'R'   00-1F  linux/random.h                                            conflict!
+'R'   01     linux/rfkill.h                                            conflict!
 'R'   20-2F  linux/trace_mmap.h
 'R'   C0-DF  net/bluetooth/rfcomm.h
 'R'   E0     uapi/linux/fsl_mc.h
-'S'   all    linux/cdrom.h                                           conflict!
-'S'   80-81  scsi/scsi_ioctl.h                                       conflict!
-'S'   82-FF  scsi/scsi.h                                             conflict!
-'S'   00-7F  sound/asequencer.h                                      conflict!
-'T'   all    linux/soundcard.h                                       conflict!
-'T'   00-AF  sound/asound.h                                          conflict!
-'T'   all    arch/x86/include/asm/ioctls.h                           conflict!
-'T'   C0-DF  linux/if_tun.h                                          conflict!
-'U'   all    sound/asound.h                                          conflict!
-'U'   00-CF  linux/uinput.h                                          conflict!
+'S'   all    linux/cdrom.h                                             conflict!
+'S'   80-81  scsi/scsi_ioctl.h                                         conflict!
+'S'   82-FF  scsi/scsi.h                                               conflict!
+'S'   00-7F  sound/asequencer.h                                        conflict!
+'T'   all    linux/soundcard.h                                         conflict!
+'T'   00-AF  sound/asound.h                                            conflict!
+'T'   all    arch/x86/include/asm/ioctls.h                             conflict!
+'T'   C0-DF  linux/if_tun.h                                            conflict!
+'U'   all    sound/asound.h                                            conflict!
+'U'   00-CF  linux/uinput.h                                            conflict!
 'U'   00-EF  linux/usbdevice_fs.h
 'U'   C0-CF  drivers/bluetooth/hci_uart.h
-'V'   all    linux/vt.h                                              conflict!
-'V'   all    linux/videodev2.h                                       conflict!
-'V'   C0     linux/ivtvfb.h                                          conflict!
-'V'   C0     linux/ivtv.h                                            conflict!
-'V'   C0     media/si4713.h                                          conflict!
-'W'   00-1F  linux/watchdog.h                                        conflict!
-'W'   00-1F  linux/wanrouter.h                                       conflict! (pre 3.9)
-'W'   00-3F  sound/asound.h                                          conflict!
+'V'   all    linux/vt.h                                                conflict!
+'V'   all    linux/videodev2.h                                         conflict!
+'V'   C0     linux/ivtvfb.h                                            conflict!
+'V'   C0     linux/ivtv.h                                              conflict!
+'V'   C0     media/si4713.h                                            conflict!
+'W'   00-1F  linux/watchdog.h                                          conflict!
+'W'   00-1F  linux/wanrouter.h                                         conflict! (pre 3.9)
+'W'   00-3F  sound/asound.h                                            conflict!
 'W'   40-5F  drivers/pci/switch/switchtec.c
 'W'   60-61  linux/watch_queue.h
-'X'   all    fs/xfs/xfs_fs.h,                                        conflict!
+'X'   all    fs/xfs/xfs_fs.h,                                          conflict!
              fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_ioctl32.h,
              include/linux/falloc.h,
              linux/fs.h,
-'X'   all    fs/ocfs2/ocfs_fs.h                                      conflict!
-'X'   01     linux/pktcdvd.h                                         conflict!
+'X'   all    fs/ocfs2/ocfs_fs.h                                        conflict!
+'X'   01     linux/pktcdvd.h                                           conflict!
 'Z'   14-15  drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.h
-'['   00-3F  linux/usb/tmc.h                                         USB Test and Measurement Devices
-                                                                     <mailto:[email protected]>
-'a'   all    linux/atm*.h, linux/sonet.h                             ATM on linux
-                                                                     <http://lrcwww.epfl.ch/>
-'a'   00-0F  drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_common.h          conflict! qat driver
-'b'   00-FF                                                          conflict! bit3 vme host bridge
-                                                                     <mailto:[email protected]>
-'b'   00-0F  linux/dma-buf.h                                         conflict!
-'c'   00-7F  linux/comstats.h                                        conflict!
-'c'   00-7F  linux/coda.h                                            conflict!
-'c'   00-1F  linux/chio.h                                            conflict!
-'c'   80-9F  arch/s390/include/asm/chsc.h                            conflict!
+'['   00-3F  linux/usb/tmc.h                                           USB Test and Measurement Devices
+                                                                       <mailto:[email protected]>
+'a'   all    linux/atm*.h, linux/sonet.h                               ATM on linux
+                                                                       <http://lrcwww.epfl.ch/>
+'a'   00-0F  drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_common.h            conflict! qat driver
+'b'   00-FF                                                            conflict! bit3 vme host bridge
+                                                                       <mailto:[email protected]>
+'b'   00-0F  linux/dma-buf.h                                           conflict!
+'c'   00-7F  linux/comstats.h                                          conflict!
+'c'   00-7F  linux/coda.h                                              conflict!
+'c'   00-1F  linux/chio.h                                              conflict!
+'c'   80-9F  arch/s390/include/asm/chsc.h                              conflict!
 'c'   A0-AF  arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h conflict!
-'d'   00-FF  linux/char/drm/drm.h                                    conflict!
-'d'   02-40  pcmcia/ds.h                                             conflict!
+'d'   00-FF  linux/char/drm/drm.h                                      conflict!
+'d'   02-40  pcmcia/ds.h                                               conflict!
 'd'   F0-FF  linux/digi1.h
-'e'   all    linux/digi1.h                                           conflict!
-'f'   00-1F  linux/ext2_fs.h                                         conflict!
-'f'   00-1F  linux/ext3_fs.h                                         conflict!
-'f'   00-0F  fs/jfs/jfs_dinode.h                                     conflict!
-'f'   00-0F  fs/ext4/ext4.h                                          conflict!
-'f'   00-0F  linux/fs.h                                              conflict!
-'f'   00-0F  fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_fs.h                                     conflict!
+'e'   all    linux/digi1.h                                             conflict!
+'f'   00-1F  linux/ext2_fs.h                                           conflict!
+'f'   00-1F  linux/ext3_fs.h                                           conflict!
+'f'   00-0F  fs/jfs/jfs_dinode.h                                       conflict!
+'f'   00-0F  fs/ext4/ext4.h                                            conflict!
+'f'   00-0F  linux/fs.h                                                conflict!
+'f'   00-0F  fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_fs.h                                       conflict!
 'f'   13-27  linux/fscrypt.h
 'f'   81-8F  linux/fsverity.h
 'g'   00-0F  linux/usb/gadgetfs.h
 'g'   20-2F  linux/usb/g_printer.h
-'h'   00-7F                                                          conflict! Charon filesystem
-                                                                     <mailto:[email protected]>
-'h'   00-1F  linux/hpet.h                                            conflict!
+'h'   00-7F                                                            conflict! Charon filesystem
+                                                                       <mailto:[email protected]>
+'h'   00-1F  linux/hpet.h                                              conflict!
 'h'   80-8F  fs/hfsplus/ioctl.c
-'i'   00-3F  linux/i2o-dev.h                                         conflict!
-'i'   0B-1F  linux/ipmi.h                                            conflict!
+'i'   00-3F  linux/i2o-dev.h                                           conflict!
+'i'   0B-1F  linux/ipmi.h                                              conflict!
 'i'   80-8F  linux/i8k.h
-'i'   90-9F  `linux/iio/*.h`                                         IIO
+'i'   90-9F  `linux/iio/*.h`                                           IIO
 'j'   00-3F  linux/joystick.h
-'k'   00-0F  linux/spi/spidev.h                                      conflict!
-'k'   00-05  video/kyro.h                                            conflict!
-'k'   10-17  linux/hsi/hsi_char.h                                    HSI character device
-'l'   00-3F  linux/tcfs_fs.h                                         transparent cryptographic file system
-                                                                     <http://web.archive.org/web/%2A/http://mikonos.dia.unisa.it/tcfs>
-'l'   40-7F  linux/udf_fs_i.h                                        in development:
-                                                                     <https://github.com/pali/udftools>
-'m'   00-09  linux/mmtimer.h                                         conflict!
-'m'   all    linux/mtio.h                                            conflict!
-'m'   all    linux/soundcard.h                                       conflict!
-'m'   all    linux/synclink.h                                        conflict!
-'m'   00-19  drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.h                         conflict!
-'m'   00     drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_ioctl.h                  conflict!
+'k'   00-0F  linux/spi/spidev.h                                        conflict!
+'k'   00-05  video/kyro.h                                              conflict!
+'k'   10-17  linux/hsi/hsi_char.h                                      HSI character device
+'l'   00-3F  linux/tcfs_fs.h                                           transparent cryptographic file system
+                                                                       <http://web.archive.org/web/%2A/http://mikonos.dia.unisa.it/tcfs>
+'l'   40-7F  linux/udf_fs_i.h                                          in development:
+                                                                       <https://github.com/pali/udftools>
+'m'   00-09  linux/mmtimer.h                                           conflict!
+'m'   all    linux/mtio.h                                              conflict!
+'m'   all    linux/soundcard.h                                         conflict!
+'m'   all    linux/synclink.h                                          conflict!
+'m'   00-19  drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.h                           conflict!
+'m'   00     drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_ioctl.h                    conflict!
 'n'   00-7F  linux/ncp_fs.h and fs/ncpfs/ioctl.c
-'n'   80-8F  uapi/linux/nilfs2_api.h                                 NILFS2
-'n'   E0-FF  linux/matroxfb.h                                        matroxfb
-'o'   00-1F  fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_fs.h                                     OCFS2
-'o'   00-03  mtd/ubi-user.h                                          conflict! (OCFS2 and UBI overlaps)
-'o'   40-41  mtd/ubi-user.h                                          UBI
-'o'   01-A1  `linux/dvb/*.h`                                         DVB
-'p'   00-0F  linux/phantom.h                                         conflict! (OpenHaptics needs this)
-'p'   00-1F  linux/rtc.h                                             conflict!
+'n'   80-8F  uapi/linux/nilfs2_api.h                                   NILFS2
+'n'   E0-FF  linux/matroxfb.h                                          matroxfb
+'o'   00-1F  fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_fs.h                                       OCFS2
+'o'   00-03  mtd/ubi-user.h                                            conflict! (OCFS2 and UBI overlaps)
+'o'   40-41  mtd/ubi-user.h                                            UBI
+'o'   01-A1  `linux/dvb/*.h`                                           DVB
+'p'   00-0F  linux/phantom.h                                           conflict! (OpenHaptics needs this)
+'p'   00-1F  linux/rtc.h                                               conflict!
 'p'   40-7F  linux/nvram.h
-'p'   80-9F  linux/ppdev.h                                           user-space parport
-                                                                     <mailto:[email protected]>
-'p'   A1-A5  linux/pps.h                                             LinuxPPS
-                                                                     <mailto:[email protected]>
+'p'   80-9F  linux/ppdev.h                                             user-space parport
+                                                                       <mailto:[email protected]>
+'p'   A1-A5  linux/pps.h                                               LinuxPPS
+                                                                       <mailto:[email protected]>
 'q'   00-1F  linux/serio.h
-'q'   80-FF  linux/telephony.h                                       Internet PhoneJACK, Internet LineJACK
-             linux/ixjuser.h                                         <http://web.archive.org/web/%2A/http://www.quicknet.net>
+'q'   80-FF  linux/telephony.h                                         Internet PhoneJACK, Internet LineJACK
+             linux/ixjuser.h                                           <http://web.archive.org/web/%2A/http://www.quicknet.net>
 'r'   00-1F  linux/msdos_fs.h and fs/fat/dir.c
 's'   all    linux/cdk.h
 't'   00-7F  linux/ppp-ioctl.h
 't'   80-8F  linux/isdn_ppp.h
-'t'   90-91  linux/toshiba.h                                         toshiba and toshiba_acpi SMM
-'u'   00-1F  linux/smb_fs.h                                          gone
-'u'   00-2F  linux/ublk_cmd.h                                        conflict!
-'u'   20-3F  linux/uvcvideo.h                                        USB video class host driver
-'u'   40-4f  linux/udmabuf.h                                         userspace dma-buf misc device
-'v'   00-1F  linux/ext2_fs.h                                         conflict!
-'v'   00-1F  linux/fs.h                                              conflict!
-'v'   00-0F  linux/sonypi.h                                          conflict!
-'v'   00-0F  media/v4l2-subdev.h                                     conflict!
-'v'   20-27  arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/vas-api.h		     VAS API
-'v'   C0-FF  linux/meye.h                                            conflict!
-'w'   all                                                            CERN SCI driver
-'y'   00-1F                                                          packet based user level communications
-                                                                     <mailto:[email protected]>
-'z'   00-3F                                                          CAN bus card conflict!
-                                                                     <mailto:[email protected]>
-'z'   40-7F                                                          CAN bus card conflict!
-                                                                     <mailto:[email protected]>
-'z'   10-4F  drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.h                        conflict!
+'t'   90-91  linux/toshiba.h                                           toshiba and toshiba_acpi SMM
+'u'   00-1F  linux/smb_fs.h                                            gone
+'u'   00-2F  linux/ublk_cmd.h                                          conflict!
+'u'   20-3F  linux/uvcvideo.h                                          USB video class host driver
+'u'   40-4f  linux/udmabuf.h                                           userspace dma-buf misc device
+'v'   00-1F  linux/ext2_fs.h                                           conflict!
+'v'   00-1F  linux/fs.h                                                conflict!
+'v'   00-0F  linux/sonypi.h                                            conflict!
+'v'   00-0F  media/v4l2-subdev.h                                       conflict!
+'v'   20-27  arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/vas-api.h                   VAS API
+'v'   C0-FF  linux/meye.h                                              conflict!
+'w'   all                                                              CERN SCI driver
+'y'   00-1F                                                            packet based user level communications
+                                                                       <mailto:[email protected]>
+'z'   00-3F                                                            CAN bus card conflict!
+                                                                       <mailto:[email protected]>
+'z'   40-7F                                                            CAN bus card conflict!
+                                                                       <mailto:[email protected]>
+'z'   10-4F  drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.h                          conflict!
 '|'   00-7F  linux/media.h
 0x80  00-1F  linux/fb.h
 0x81  00-1F  linux/vduse.h
 0x89  00-06  arch/x86/include/asm/sockios.h
 0x89  0B-DF  linux/sockios.h
-0x89  E0-EF  linux/sockios.h                                         SIOCPROTOPRIVATE range
-0x89  F0-FF  linux/sockios.h                                         SIOCDEVPRIVATE range
+0x89  E0-EF  linux/sockios.h                                           SIOCPROTOPRIVATE range
+0x89  F0-FF  linux/sockios.h                                           SIOCDEVPRIVATE range
 0x8A  00-1F  linux/eventpoll.h
 0x8B  all    linux/wireless.h
-0x8C  00-3F                                                          WiNRADiO driver
-                                                                     <http://www.winradio.com.au/>
+0x8C  00-3F                                                            WiNRADiO driver
+                                                                       <http://www.winradio.com.au/>
 0x90  00     drivers/cdrom/sbpcd.h
 0x92  00-0F  drivers/usb/mon/mon_bin.c
 0x93  60-7F  linux/auto_fs.h
-0x94  all    fs/btrfs/ioctl.h                                        Btrfs filesystem
-             and linux/fs.h                                          some lifted to vfs/generic
-0x97  00-7F  fs/ceph/ioctl.h                                         Ceph file system
-0x99  00-0F                                                          537-Addinboard driver
-                                                                     <mailto:[email protected]>
-0xA0  all    linux/sdp/sdp.h                                         Industrial Device Project
-                                                                     <mailto:[email protected]>
-0xA1  0      linux/vtpm_proxy.h                                      TPM Emulator Proxy Driver
-0xA2  all    uapi/linux/acrn.h                                       ACRN hypervisor
-0xA3  80-8F                                                          Port ACL  in development:
-                                                                     <mailto:[email protected]>
+0x94  all    fs/btrfs/ioctl.h                                          Btrfs filesystem
+             and linux/fs.h                                            some lifted to vfs/generic
+0x97  00-7F  fs/ceph/ioctl.h                                           Ceph file system
+0x99  00-0F                                                            537-Addinboard driver
+                                                                       <mailto:[email protected]>
+0xA0  all    linux/sdp/sdp.h                                           Industrial Device Project
+                                                                       <mailto:[email protected]>
+0xA1  0      linux/vtpm_proxy.h                                        TPM Emulator Proxy Driver
+0xA2  all    uapi/linux/acrn.h                                         ACRN hypervisor
+0xA3  80-8F                                                            Port ACL  in development:
+                                                                       <mailto:[email protected]>
 0xA3  90-9F  linux/dtlk.h
-0xA4  00-1F  uapi/linux/tee.h                                        Generic TEE subsystem
-0xA4  00-1F  uapi/asm/sgx.h                                          <mailto:[email protected]>
-0xA5  01-05  linux/surface_aggregator/cdev.h                         Microsoft Surface Platform System Aggregator
-                                                                     <mailto:[email protected]>
-0xA5  20-2F  linux/surface_aggregator/dtx.h                          Microsoft Surface DTX driver
-                                                                     <mailto:[email protected]>
+0xA4  00-1F  uapi/linux/tee.h                                          Generic TEE subsystem
+0xA4  00-1F  uapi/asm/sgx.h                                            <mailto:[email protected]>
+0xA5  01-05  linux/surface_aggregator/cdev.h                           Microsoft Surface Platform System Aggregator
+                                                                       <mailto:[email protected]>
+0xA5  20-2F  linux/surface_aggregator/dtx.h                            Microsoft Surface DTX driver
+                                                                       <mailto:[email protected]>
 0xAA  00-3F  linux/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h
 0xAB  00-1F  linux/nbd.h
 0xAC  00-1F  linux/raw.h
-0xAD  00                                                             Netfilter device in development:
-                                                                     <mailto:[email protected]>
-0xAE  00-1F  linux/kvm.h                                             Kernel-based Virtual Machine
-                                                                     <mailto:[email protected]>
-0xAE  40-FF  linux/kvm.h                                             Kernel-based Virtual Machine
-                                                                     <mailto:[email protected]>
-0xAE  20-3F  linux/nitro_enclaves.h                                  Nitro Enclaves
-0xAF  00-1F  linux/fsl_hypervisor.h                                  Freescale hypervisor
-0xB0  all                                                            RATIO devices in development:
-                                                                     <mailto:[email protected]>
-0xB1  00-1F                                                          PPPoX
-                                                                     <mailto:[email protected]>
-0xB2  00     arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/papr-vpd.h                powerpc/pseries VPD API
-                                                                     <mailto:[email protected]>
-0xB2  01-02  arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/papr-sysparm.h            powerpc/pseries system parameter API
-                                                                     <mailto:[email protected]>
+0xAD  00                                                               Netfilter device in development:
+                                                                       <mailto:[email protected]>
+0xAE  00-1F  linux/kvm.h                                               Kernel-based Virtual Machine
+                                                                       <mailto:[email protected]>
+0xAE  40-FF  linux/kvm.h                                               Kernel-based Virtual Machine
+                                                                       <mailto:[email protected]>
+0xAE  20-3F  linux/nitro_enclaves.h                                    Nitro Enclaves
+0xAF  00-1F  linux/fsl_hypervisor.h                                    Freescale hypervisor
+0xB0  all                                                              RATIO devices in development:
+                                                                       <mailto:[email protected]>
+0xB1  00-1F                                                            PPPoX
+                                                                       <mailto:[email protected]>
+0xB2  00     arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/papr-vpd.h                  powerpc/pseries VPD API
+                                                                       <mailto:[email protected]>
+0xB2  01-02  arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/papr-sysparm.h              powerpc/pseries system parameter API
+                                                                       <mailto:[email protected]>
 0xB3  00     linux/mmc/ioctl.h
-0xB4  00-0F  linux/gpio.h                                            <mailto:[email protected]>
-0xB5  00-0F  uapi/linux/rpmsg.h                                      <mailto:[email protected]>
+0xB4  00-0F  linux/gpio.h                                              <mailto:[email protected]>
+0xB5  00-0F  uapi/linux/rpmsg.h                                        <mailto:[email protected]>
 0xB6  all    linux/fpga-dfl.h
-0xB7  all    uapi/linux/remoteproc_cdev.h                            <mailto:[email protected]>
-0xB7  all    uapi/linux/nsfs.h                                       <mailto:Andrei Vagin <[email protected]>>
-0xB8  01-02  uapi/misc/mrvl_cn10k_dpi.h                              Marvell CN10K DPI driver
+0xB7  all    uapi/linux/remoteproc_cdev.h                              <mailto:[email protected]>
+0xB7  all    uapi/linux/nsfs.h                                         <mailto:Andrei Vagin <[email protected]>>
+0xB8  01-02  uapi/misc/mrvl_cn10k_dpi.h                                Marvell CN10K DPI driver
 0xC0  00-0F  linux/usb/iowarrior.h
 0xCA  00-0F  uapi/misc/cxl.h
 0xCA  10-2F  uapi/misc/ocxl.h
 0xCA  80-BF  uapi/scsi/cxlflash_ioctl.h
-0xCB  00-1F                                                          CBM serial IEC bus in development:
-                                                                     <mailto:[email protected]>
-0xCC  00-0F  drivers/misc/ibmvmc.h                                   pseries VMC driver
+0xCB  00-1F                                                            CBM serial IEC bus in development:
+                                                                       <mailto:[email protected]>
+0xCC  00-0F  drivers/misc/ibmvmc.h                                     pseries VMC driver
 0xCD  01     linux/reiserfs_fs.h
-0xCE  01-02  uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h                                    Compute Express Link Memory Devices
+0xCE  01-02  uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h                                      Compute Express Link Memory Devices
 0xCF  02     fs/smb/client/cifs_ioctl.h
 0xDB  00-0F  drivers/char/mwave/mwavepub.h
-0xDD  00-3F                                                          ZFCP device driver see drivers/s390/scsi/
-                                                                     <mailto:[email protected]>
+0xDD  00-3F                                                            ZFCP device driver see drivers/s390/scsi/
+                                                                       <mailto:[email protected]>
 0xE5  00-3F  linux/fuse.h
-0xEC  00-01  drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec_dev.h                   ChromeOS EC driver
-0xEE  00-09  uapi/linux/pfrut.h                                      Platform Firmware Runtime Update and Telemetry
-0xF3  00-3F  drivers/usb/misc/sisusbvga/sisusb.h                     sisfb (in development)
-                                                                     <mailto:[email protected]>
-0xF6  all                                                            LTTng Linux Trace Toolkit Next Generation
-                                                                     <mailto:[email protected]>
-0xF8  all    arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/amd_hsmp.h                    AMD HSMP EPYC system management interface driver
-                                                                     <mailto:[email protected]>
+0xEC  00-01  drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec_dev.h                     ChromeOS EC driver
+0xEE  00-09  uapi/linux/pfrut.h                                        Platform Firmware Runtime Update and Telemetry
+0xF3  00-3F  drivers/usb/misc/sisusbvga/sisusb.h                       sisfb (in development)
+                                                                       <mailto:[email protected]>
+0xF6  all                                                              LTTng Linux Trace Toolkit Next Generation
+                                                                       <mailto:[email protected]>
+0xF8  all    arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/amd_hsmp.h                      AMD HSMP EPYC system management interface driver
+                                                                       <mailto:[email protected]>
 0xFD  all    linux/dm-ioctl.h
 0xFE  all    linux/isst_if.h
-====  =====  ======================================================= ================================================================
+====  =====  ========================================================= ================================================================
author maintainer
#201 lore raw

PATCH 197/204 crypto: qat - Replace kzalloc() + copy_from_user() with memdup_user()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1e26339703e2afd397037defa798682b2b93dcc0 ]

Replace kzalloc() followed by copy_from_user() with memdup_user() to improve and simplify adf_ctl_alloc_resources(). memdup_user() returns either -ENOMEM or -EFAULT (instead of -EIO) if an error occurs.

Remove the unnecessary device id initialization, since memdup_user() (like copy_from_user()) immediately overwrites it.

No functional changes intended other than returning the more idiomatic error code -EFAULT.

Stable-dep-of: d237230728c5 ("crypto: qat - remove unused character device and IOCTLs")

---
 drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c |   13 +++----------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c +3 -10
@@ -94,17 +94,10 @@ static int adf_ctl_alloc_resources(struc
 {
 	struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *cfg_data;
 
-	cfg_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*cfg_data), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!cfg_data)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	/* Initialize device id to NO DEVICE as 0 is a valid device id */
-	cfg_data->device_id = ADF_CFG_NO_DEVICE;
-
-	if (copy_from_user(cfg_data, (void __user *)arg, sizeof(*cfg_data))) {
+	cfg_data = memdup_user((void __user *)arg, sizeof(*cfg_data));
+	if (IS_ERR(cfg_data)) {
 		pr_err("QAT: failed to copy from user cfg_data.\n");
-		kfree(cfg_data);
-		return -EIO;
+		return PTR_ERR(cfg_data);
 	}
 
 	*ctl_data = cfg_data;
author maintainer
#202 lore raw

PATCH 198/204 crypto: qat - Return pointer directly in adf_ctl_alloc_resources

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5ce9891ea928208a915411ce8227f8c3e37e5ad9 ]

Returning values through arguments is confusing and that has upset the compiler with the recent change to memdup_user:

../drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c: In function ‘adf_ctl_ioctl’:
../drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c:308:26: warning: ‘ctl_data’ may be used uninitialized [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
308 | ctl_data->device_id);
| ^~
../drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c:294:39: note: ‘ctl_data’ was declared here
294 | struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *ctl_data;
| ^~~~~~~~
In function ‘adf_ctl_ioctl_dev_stop’,
inlined from ‘adf_ctl_ioctl’ at ../drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c:386:9:
../drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c:273:48: warning: ‘ctl_data’ may be used uninitialized [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]

  273 |         ret = adf_ctl_is_device_in_use(ctl_data->device_id);
      |                                        ~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~~~~~

../drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c: In function ‘adf_ctl_ioctl’:
../drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c:261:39: note: ‘ctl_data’ was declared here
261 | struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *ctl_data;
| ^~~~~~~~
In function ‘adf_ctl_ioctl_dev_config’,
inlined from ‘adf_ctl_ioctl’ at ../drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c:382:9:
../drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c:192:54: warning: ‘ctl_data’ may be used uninitialized [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]

  192 |         accel_dev = adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(ctl_data->device_id);
      |                                              ~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~~~~~

../drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c: In function ‘adf_ctl_ioctl’:
../drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c:185:39: note: ‘ctl_data’ was declared here
185 | struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *ctl_data;
| ^~~~~~~~

Fix this by returning the pointer directly.

Stable-dep-of: d237230728c5 ("crypto: qat - remove unused character device and IOCTLs")

---
 drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c |   31 +++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c +13 -18
@@ -89,19 +89,14 @@ err_chrdev_unreg:
 	return -EFAULT;
 }
 
-static int adf_ctl_alloc_resources(struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data **ctl_data,
-				   unsigned long arg)
+static struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *adf_ctl_alloc_resources(unsigned long arg)
 {
 	struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *cfg_data;
 
 	cfg_data = memdup_user((void __user *)arg, sizeof(*cfg_data));
-	if (IS_ERR(cfg_data)) {
+	if (IS_ERR(cfg_data))
 		pr_err("QAT: failed to copy from user cfg_data.\n");
-		return PTR_ERR(cfg_data);
-	}
-
-	*ctl_data = cfg_data;
-	return 0;
+	return cfg_data;
 }
 
 static int adf_add_key_value_data(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev,
@@ -181,13 +176,13 @@ out_err:
 static int adf_ctl_ioctl_dev_config(struct file *fp, unsigned int cmd,
 				    unsigned long arg)
 {
-	int ret;
 	struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *ctl_data;
 	struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev;
+	int ret = 0;
 
-	ret = adf_ctl_alloc_resources(&ctl_data, arg);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
+	ctl_data = adf_ctl_alloc_resources(arg);
+	if (IS_ERR(ctl_data))
+		return PTR_ERR(ctl_data);
 
 	accel_dev = adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(ctl_data->device_id);
 	if (!accel_dev) {
@@ -260,9 +255,9 @@ static int adf_ctl_ioctl_dev_stop(struct
 	int ret;
 	struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *ctl_data;
 
-	ret = adf_ctl_alloc_resources(&ctl_data, arg);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
+	ctl_data = adf_ctl_alloc_resources(arg);
+	if (IS_ERR(ctl_data))
+		return PTR_ERR(ctl_data);
 
 	if (adf_devmgr_verify_id(ctl_data->device_id)) {
 		pr_err("QAT: Device %d not found\n", ctl_data->device_id);
@@ -294,9 +289,9 @@ static int adf_ctl_ioctl_dev_start(struc
 	struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *ctl_data;
 	struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev;
 
-	ret = adf_ctl_alloc_resources(&ctl_data, arg);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
+	ctl_data = adf_ctl_alloc_resources(arg);
+	if (IS_ERR(ctl_data))
+		return PTR_ERR(ctl_data);
 
 	ret = -ENODEV;
 	accel_dev = adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(ctl_data->device_id);
author maintainer
#203 lore raw

PATCH 199/204 crypto: qat - remove unused character device and IOCTLs

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Giovanni Cabiddu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d237230728c567297f2f98b425d63156ab2ed17f ]

The QAT driver exposes a character device (qat_adf_ctl) with IOCTLs for device configuration, start, stop, status query and enumeration. These IOCTLs are not part of any public uAPI header and have no known in-tree or out-of-tree users. Device lifecycle is already managed via sysfs.

The ioctl interface also increases the attack surface and is the subject of a number of bug reports.

Remove the character device, the IOCTL definitions, and the related data structures (adf_dev_status_info, adf_user_cfg_key_val, adf_user_cfg_section, adf_user_cfg_ctl_data). Drop the now-unused adf_cfg_user.h header and strip adf_ctl_drv.c down to the minimal module_init/module_exit hooks for workqueue, AER, and crypto/compression algorithm registration.

Clean up leftover dead code that was only reachable from the removed IOCTL paths: adf_cfg_del_all(), adf_devmgr_verify_id(), adf_devmgr_get_num_dev(), adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(), adf_get_vf_real_id() and the unused ADF_CFG macros.

Additionally, drop the entry associated to QAT IOCTLs in ioctl-number.rst.

---
 Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst   |    1 
 drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg.c        |   10 
 drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg.h        |    1 
 drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_common.h |   32 -
 drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_user.h   |   38 -
 drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_common_drv.h |    3 
 drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c    |  404 -------------------
 drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_dev_mgr.c    |   70 ---
 8 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 558 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_user.h
Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst +0 -1
@@ -225,7 +225,6 @@ Code  Seq#    Include File
                                                                        <mailto:[email protected]>
 'a'   all    linux/atm*.h, linux/sonet.h                               ATM on linux
                                                                        <http://lrcwww.epfl.ch/>
-'a'   00-0F  drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_common.h            conflict! qat driver
 'b'   00-FF                                                            conflict! bit3 vme host bridge
                                                                        <mailto:[email protected]>
 'b'   00-0F  linux/dma-buf.h                                           conflict!
drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg.c +0 -10
@@ -103,16 +103,6 @@ static void adf_cfg_section_del_all(stru
 static void adf_cfg_section_del_all_except(struct list_head *head,
 					   const char *section_name);
 
-void adf_cfg_del_all(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev)
-{
-	struct adf_cfg_device_data *dev_cfg_data = accel_dev->cfg;
-
-	down_write(&dev_cfg_data->lock);
-	adf_cfg_section_del_all(&dev_cfg_data->sec_list);
-	up_write(&dev_cfg_data->lock);
-	clear_bit(ADF_STATUS_CONFIGURED, &accel_dev->status);
-}
-
 void adf_cfg_del_all_except(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev,
 			    const char *section_name)
 {
drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg.h +0 -1
@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ void adf_cfg_dev_remove(struct adf_accel
 void adf_cfg_dev_dbgfs_add(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev);
 void adf_cfg_dev_dbgfs_rm(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev);
 int adf_cfg_section_add(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev, const char *name);
-void adf_cfg_del_all(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev);
 void adf_cfg_del_all_except(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev,
 			    const char *section_name);
 int adf_cfg_add_key_value_param(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev,
drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_common.h +0 -32
@@ -4,18 +4,11 @@
 #define ADF_CFG_COMMON_H_
 
 #include <linux/types.h>
-#include <linux/ioctl.h>
 
 #define ADF_CFG_MAX_STR_LEN 64
 #define ADF_CFG_MAX_KEY_LEN_IN_BYTES ADF_CFG_MAX_STR_LEN
 #define ADF_CFG_MAX_VAL_LEN_IN_BYTES ADF_CFG_MAX_STR_LEN
 #define ADF_CFG_MAX_SECTION_LEN_IN_BYTES ADF_CFG_MAX_STR_LEN
-#define ADF_CFG_BASE_DEC 10
-#define ADF_CFG_BASE_HEX 16
-#define ADF_CFG_ALL_DEVICES 0xFE
-#define ADF_CFG_NO_DEVICE 0xFF
-#define ADF_CFG_AFFINITY_WHATEVER 0xFF
-#define MAX_DEVICE_NAME_SIZE 32
 #define ADF_MAX_DEVICES (32 * 32)
 #define ADF_DEVS_ARRAY_SIZE BITS_TO_LONGS(ADF_MAX_DEVICES)
 
@@ -49,29 +42,4 @@ enum adf_device_type {
 	DEV_4XXX,
 	DEV_420XX,
 };
-
-struct adf_dev_status_info {
-	enum adf_device_type type;
-	__u32 accel_id;
-	__u32 instance_id;
-	__u8 num_ae;
-	__u8 num_accel;
-	__u8 num_logical_accel;
-	__u8 banks_per_accel;
-	__u8 state;
-	__u8 bus;
-	__u8 dev;
-	__u8 fun;
-	char name[MAX_DEVICE_NAME_SIZE];
-};
-
-#define ADF_CTL_IOC_MAGIC 'a'
-#define IOCTL_CONFIG_SYS_RESOURCE_PARAMETERS _IOW(ADF_CTL_IOC_MAGIC, 0, \
-		struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data)
-#define IOCTL_STOP_ACCEL_DEV _IOW(ADF_CTL_IOC_MAGIC, 1, \
-		struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data)
-#define IOCTL_START_ACCEL_DEV _IOW(ADF_CTL_IOC_MAGIC, 2, \
-		struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data)
-#define IOCTL_STATUS_ACCEL_DEV _IOW(ADF_CTL_IOC_MAGIC, 3, __u32)
-#define IOCTL_GET_NUM_DEVICES _IOW(ADF_CTL_IOC_MAGIC, 4, __s32)
 #endif
drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_user.h deleted +0 -38
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (BSD-3-Clause OR GPL-2.0-only) */
-/* Copyright(c) 2014 - 2020 Intel Corporation */
-#ifndef ADF_CFG_USER_H_
-#define ADF_CFG_USER_H_
-
-#include "adf_cfg_common.h"
-#include "adf_cfg_strings.h"
-
-struct adf_user_cfg_key_val {
-	char key[ADF_CFG_MAX_KEY_LEN_IN_BYTES];
-	char val[ADF_CFG_MAX_VAL_LEN_IN_BYTES];
-	union {
-		struct adf_user_cfg_key_val *next;
-		__u64 padding3;
-	};
-	enum adf_cfg_val_type type;
-} __packed;
-
-struct adf_user_cfg_section {
-	char name[ADF_CFG_MAX_SECTION_LEN_IN_BYTES];
-	union {
-		struct adf_user_cfg_key_val *params;
-		__u64 padding1;
-	};
-	union {
-		struct adf_user_cfg_section *next;
-		__u64 padding3;
-	};
-} __packed;
-
-struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data {
-	union {
-		struct adf_user_cfg_section *config_section;
-		__u64 padding;
-	};
-	__u8 device_id;
-} __packed;
-#endif
drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_common_drv.h +0 -3
@@ -68,11 +68,8 @@ int adf_devmgr_add_dev(struct adf_accel_
 void adf_devmgr_rm_dev(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev,
 		       struct adf_accel_dev *pf);
 struct list_head *adf_devmgr_get_head(void);
-struct adf_accel_dev *adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(u32 id);
 struct adf_accel_dev *adf_devmgr_get_first(void);
 struct adf_accel_dev *adf_devmgr_pci_to_accel_dev(struct pci_dev *pci_dev);
-int adf_devmgr_verify_id(u32 id);
-void adf_devmgr_get_num_dev(u32 *num);
 int adf_devmgr_in_reset(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev);
 int adf_dev_started(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev);
 int adf_dev_restarting_notify(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev);
drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c +1 -403

433 lines not on this page · raw message

drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_dev_mgr.c +0 -70

82 lines not on this page · raw message

author maintainer
#204 lore raw

PATCH 200/204 net/tcp-ao: fix use-after-free of key in del_async path

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: HanQuan <[email protected]>

commit 5ba9950bc9078e19b69cca1e56d1553b125c6857 upstream.

In tcp_ao_delete_key(), the del_async path skips the current_key and rnext_key validity checks present in the synchronous path, assuming these pointers are always NULL on LISTEN sockets. However, if a key was added with set_current=1/set_rnext=1 while the socket was in CLOSE state, current_key and rnext_key will be non-NULL after listen() transitions the socket to LISTEN.

When such a key is deleted with del_async=1, hlist_del_rcu() and call_rcu() free the key without clearing the dangling pointers. After the RCU grace period, getsockopt(TCP_AO_INFO) dereferences current_key->sndid and rnext_key->rcvid from freed slab memory.

Clear current_key and rnext_key in the del_async path when they reference the key being deleted.

Fixes d6732b95b6fb ("net/tcp: Allow asynchronous delete for TCP-AO keys (MKTs)")
---
 net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c +4 -0
@@ -1777,6 +1777,10 @@ static int tcp_ao_delete_key(struct sock
 	 * them and we can just free all resources in RCU fashion.
 	 */
 	if (del_async) {
+		if (ao_info->current_key == key)
+			WRITE_ONCE(ao_info->current_key, NULL);
+		if (ao_info->rnext_key == key)
+			WRITE_ONCE(ao_info->rnext_key, NULL);
 		atomic_sub(tcp_ao_sizeof_key(key), &sk->sk_omem_alloc);
 		call_rcu(&key->rcu, tcp_ao_key_free_rcu);
 		return 0;
author maintainer
#205 lore raw

PATCH 201/204 locking: rtmutex: Fix wake_q logic in task_blocks_on_rt_mutex

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: John Stultz <[email protected]>

commit 82f9cc094975240885c93effbca7f4603f5de1bf upstream.

Anders had bisected a crash using PREEMPT_RT with linux-next and isolated it down to commit 894d1b3db41c ("locking/mutex: Remove wakeups from under mutex::wait_lock"), where it seemed the wake_q structure was somehow getting corrupted causing a null pointer traversal.

I was able to easily repoduce this with PREEMPT_RT and managed to isolate down that through various call stacks we were actually calling wake_up_q() twice on the same wake_q.

I found that in the problematic commit, I had added the wake_up_q() call in task_blocks_on_rt_mutex() around __ww_mutex_add_waiter(), following a similar pattern in __mutex_lock_common().

However, its just wrong. We haven't dropped the lock->wait_lock, so its contrary to the point of the original patch. And it didn't match the __mutex_lock_common() logic of re-initializing the wake_q after calling it midway in the stack.

Looking at it now, the wake_up_q() call is incorrect and should just be removed. So drop the erronious logic I had added.

---
 kernel/locking/rtmutex.c |    3 ---
 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
kernel/locking/rtmutex.c +0 -3
@@ -1248,10 +1248,7 @@ static int __sched task_blocks_on_rt_mut
 
 		/* Check whether the waiter should back out immediately */
 		rtm = container_of(lock, struct rt_mutex, rtmutex);
-		preempt_disable();
 		res = __ww_mutex_add_waiter(waiter, rtm, ww_ctx, wake_q);
-		wake_up_q(wake_q);
-		preempt_enable();
 		if (res) {
 			raw_spin_lock(&task->pi_lock);
 			rt_mutex_dequeue(lock, waiter);
author maintainer
#206 lore raw

PATCH 202/204 net: bonding: update the slave array for broadcast mode

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tonghao Zhang <[email protected]>

commit e0caeb24f538c3c9c94f471882ceeb43d9dc2739 upstream.

This patch fixes ce7a381697cb ("net: bonding: add broadcast_neighbor option for 802.3ad"). Before this commit, on the broadcast mode, all devices were traversed using the bond_for_each_slave_rcu. This patch supports traversing devices by using all_slaves. Therefore, we need to update the slave array when enslave or release slave.

---
 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c |    7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c +5 -2
@@ -2390,7 +2390,9 @@ skip_mac_set:
 			bpf_prog_inc(bond->xdp_prog);
 	}
 
-	if (bond_mode_can_use_xmit_hash(bond))
+	/* broadcast mode uses the all_slaves to loop through slaves. */
+	if (bond_mode_can_use_xmit_hash(bond) ||
+	    BOND_MODE(bond) == BOND_MODE_BROADCAST)
 		bond_update_slave_arr(bond, NULL);
 
 	bond_xdp_set_features(bond_dev);
@@ -2533,7 +2535,8 @@ static int __bond_release_one(struct net
 
 	bond_upper_dev_unlink(bond, slave);
 
-	if (bond_mode_can_use_xmit_hash(bond))
+	if (bond_mode_can_use_xmit_hash(bond) ||
+	    BOND_MODE(bond) == BOND_MODE_BROADCAST)
 		bond_update_slave_arr(bond, slave);
 
 	slave_info(bond_dev, slave_dev, "Releasing %s interface\n",
author maintainer
#207 lore raw

PATCH 203/204 bonding: annotate data-races arcound churn variables

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

commit b47ff80f280e18ad2310f44293cc057d9b64ff11 upstream.

These fields are updated asynchronously by the bonding state machine in ad_churn_machine() while holding bond->mode_lock.

bond_info_show_slave() and bond_fill_slave_info() read them without bond->mode_lock being held, we need to add READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() annotations.

Note that AD_CHURN_MONITOR, AD_CHURN, and AD_NO_CHURN are defined exclusively in (kernel private) include/net/bond_3ad.h header.

They should be moved to include/uapi/linux/if_bonding.h or userspace tools will have to hardcode their values.

Fixes 4916f2e2f3fc ("bonding: print churn state via netlink")
Fixes 14c9551a32eb ("bonding: Implement port churn-machine (AD standard 43.4.17).")
---
 drivers/net/bonding/bond_3ad.c     |   18 ++++++++++--------
 drivers/net/bonding/bond_netlink.c |    4 ++--
 drivers/net/bonding/bond_procfs.c  |    8 ++++----
 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
drivers/net/bonding/bond_3ad.c +10 -8
@@ -1348,8 +1348,8 @@ static void ad_churn_machine(struct port
 {
 	if (port->sm_vars & AD_PORT_CHURNED) {
 		port->sm_vars &= ~AD_PORT_CHURNED;
-		port->sm_churn_actor_state = AD_CHURN_MONITOR;
-		port->sm_churn_partner_state = AD_CHURN_MONITOR;
+		WRITE_ONCE(port->sm_churn_actor_state, AD_CHURN_MONITOR);
+		WRITE_ONCE(port->sm_churn_partner_state, AD_CHURN_MONITOR);
 		port->sm_churn_actor_timer_counter =
 			__ad_timer_to_ticks(AD_ACTOR_CHURN_TIMER, 0);
 		port->sm_churn_partner_timer_counter =
@@ -1360,20 +1360,22 @@ static void ad_churn_machine(struct port
 	    !(--port->sm_churn_actor_timer_counter) &&
 	    port->sm_churn_actor_state == AD_CHURN_MONITOR) {
 		if (port->actor_oper_port_state & LACP_STATE_SYNCHRONIZATION) {
-			port->sm_churn_actor_state = AD_NO_CHURN;
+			WRITE_ONCE(port->sm_churn_actor_state, AD_NO_CHURN);
 		} else {
-			port->churn_actor_count++;
-			port->sm_churn_actor_state = AD_CHURN;
+			WRITE_ONCE(port->churn_actor_count,
+				   port->churn_actor_count + 1);
+			WRITE_ONCE(port->sm_churn_actor_state, AD_CHURN);
 		}
 	}
 	if (port->sm_churn_partner_timer_counter &&
 	    !(--port->sm_churn_partner_timer_counter) &&
 	    port->sm_churn_partner_state == AD_CHURN_MONITOR) {
 		if (port->partner_oper.port_state & LACP_STATE_SYNCHRONIZATION) {
-			port->sm_churn_partner_state = AD_NO_CHURN;
+			WRITE_ONCE(port->sm_churn_partner_state, AD_NO_CHURN);
 		} else {
-			port->churn_partner_count++;
-			port->sm_churn_partner_state = AD_CHURN;
+			WRITE_ONCE(port->churn_partner_count,
+				   port->churn_partner_count + 1);
+			WRITE_ONCE(port->sm_churn_partner_state, AD_CHURN);
 		}
 	}
 }
drivers/net/bonding/bond_netlink.c +2 -2
@@ -82,10 +82,10 @@ static int bond_fill_slave_info(struct s
 				goto nla_put_failure_rcu;
 
 			if (nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_BOND_SLAVE_AD_CHURN_ACTOR_STATE,
-				       ad_port->sm_churn_actor_state))
+				       READ_ONCE(ad_port->sm_churn_actor_state)))
 				goto nla_put_failure_rcu;
 			if (nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_BOND_SLAVE_AD_CHURN_PARTNER_STATE,
-				       ad_port->sm_churn_partner_state))
+				       READ_ONCE(ad_port->sm_churn_partner_state)))
 				goto nla_put_failure_rcu;
 		}
 		rcu_read_unlock();
drivers/net/bonding/bond_procfs.c +4 -4
@@ -220,13 +220,13 @@ static void bond_info_show_slave(struct
 			seq_printf(seq, "Aggregator ID: %d\n",
 				   agg->aggregator_identifier);
 			seq_printf(seq, "Actor Churn State: %s\n",
-				   bond_3ad_churn_desc(port->sm_churn_actor_state));
+				   bond_3ad_churn_desc(READ_ONCE(port->sm_churn_actor_state)));
 			seq_printf(seq, "Partner Churn State: %s\n",
-				   bond_3ad_churn_desc(port->sm_churn_partner_state));
+				   bond_3ad_churn_desc(READ_ONCE(port->sm_churn_partner_state)));
 			seq_printf(seq, "Actor Churned Count: %d\n",
-				   port->churn_actor_count);
+				   READ_ONCE(port->churn_actor_count));
 			seq_printf(seq, "Partner Churned Count: %d\n",
-				   port->churn_partner_count);
+				   READ_ONCE(port->churn_partner_count));
 
 			if (capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
 				seq_puts(seq, "details actor lacp pdu:\n");
author maintainer
#208 lore raw

PATCH 204/204 bonding: do not set usable_slaves for broadcast mode

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hangbin Liu <[email protected]>

commit 45fc134bcfadde456639c1b1e206e6918d69a553 upstream.

After commit e0caeb24f538 ("net: bonding: update the slave array for broadcast mode"), broadcast mode will also set all_slaves and usable_slaves during bond_enslave(). But if we also set updelay, during enslave, the
slave init state will be BOND_LINK_BACK. And later bond_update_slave_arr() will alloc usable_slaves but add nothing.
This will cause bond_miimon_inspect() to have ignore_updelay
always true. So the updelay will be always ignored. e.g.

[    6.498368] bond0: (slave veth2): link status definitely down, disabling slave
[    7.536371] bond0: (slave veth2): link status up, enabling it in 0 ms
[    7.536402] bond0: (slave veth2): link status definitely up, 10000 Mbps full duplex

To fix it, we can either always call bond_update_slave_arr() on every place when link changes. Or, let's just not set usable_slaves for broadcast mode.

Fixes e0caeb24f538 ("net: bonding: update the slave array for broadcast mode")
---
 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c |   13 +++++++++----
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c +9 -4
@@ -5191,13 +5191,18 @@ static void bond_set_slave_arr(struct bo
 {
 	struct bond_up_slave *usable, *all;
 
-	usable = rtnl_dereference(bond->usable_slaves);
-	rcu_assign_pointer(bond->usable_slaves, usable_slaves);
-	kfree_rcu(usable, rcu);
-
 	all = rtnl_dereference(bond->all_slaves);
 	rcu_assign_pointer(bond->all_slaves, all_slaves);
 	kfree_rcu(all, rcu);
+
+	if (BOND_MODE(bond) == BOND_MODE_BROADCAST) {
+		kfree_rcu(usable_slaves, rcu);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	usable = rtnl_dereference(bond->usable_slaves);
+	rcu_assign_pointer(bond->usable_slaves, usable_slaves);
+	kfree_rcu(usable, rcu);
 }
 
 static void bond_reset_slave_arr(struct bonding *bond)
Tested-by on the v1 series
#210 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

Am 02.07.2026 um 18:17 schrieb Greg Kroah-Hartman:

Quoted 4 lines

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.12.95 release. There are 204 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Builds, boots and works on my 2-socket Ivy Bridge Xeon E5-2697 v2 server. No dmesg oddities or regressions found.

Beste Grüße,
Peter Schneider

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Tested-by on the v1 series
#211 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 8 lines · On Thu, 02 Jul 2026 18:17:37 +0200 Greg Kroah-Hartman…

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.12.95 release. There are 204 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sat, 04 Jul 2026 15:50:58 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

Boot-tested under QEMU for Rust x86_64, arm64 and riscv64; built-tested for loongarch64:

Thanks!

Cheers,
Miguel

#212 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.12.95 release. There are 204 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sat, 04 Jul 2026 15:50:58 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.12.95-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.12.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

The build fails on RISC-V with:

In file included from mm/kfence/core.c:36:
./arch/riscv/include/asm/kfence.h: In function 'kfence_protect_page':
./arch/riscv/include/asm/kfence.h:25:17: error: implicit declaration of function 'mark_new_valid_map' [-Wimplicit-function-declaration] 25 |                 mark_new_valid_map();
      |                 ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

This is caused by commit "riscv: kfence: Call mark_new_valid_map() for kfence_unprotect()" e4cd475b84f3803fbaff874d5db89e1028bff4cb

As already reported by https://lore.kernel.org/stable/[email protected]/, upstream commit "riscv: mm: Extract helper mark_new_valid_map()" 9ee25d0a70ff4494b4e1d266b962d0a574ef318a solves the issue. This commit cherry picks successfully.

Tested-by on the v1 series
#213 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 7 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.12.95 release. There are 204 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sat, 04 Jul 2026 15:50:58 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

test_progs, test_progs-no_alu32, test_progs-cpuv4, test_maps, test_verifier in BPF selftests all passes[1] on both x86_64 and aarch64.

1: https://github.com/kernel-patches/linux-stable/actions/runs/28642679003

Tested-by on the v1 series
#215 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

Hi!

Quoted 4 lines

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.12.95 release. There are 204 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

CIP testing did not find any problems here:

https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-testing/linux-stable-rc-ci/-/tree/linux-6.1.y

I see -rc2 is out, but I don't have results for that ATM.

Best regards,
Pavel