ceph: bound copied dentry name length in NFS export get_name
Subsystems (3)
PATCH 1/1 ceph: bound copied dentry name length in NFS export get_name
ceph_get_name() copies the MDS-supplied name into the caller's NAME_MAX-sized buffer with memcpy(name, rinfo->dname, rinfo->dname_len) and then writes name[rinfo->dname_len] = 0, without checking dname_len against NAME_MAX. A malicious or buggy MDS that returns a LOOKUPNAME reply with dname_len > NAME_MAX overflows the buffer. __get_snap_name() copies rde->name / rde->name_len the same unchecked way.
Impact: a malicious or compromised Ceph MDS overflows the NAME_MAX name buffer in a client's NFS-export get_name path, a slab out-of-bounds write reported by KASAN. Reachable when a CephFS mount is re-exported over NFS.
Add ceph_export_copy_name(), which rejects lengths above NAME_MAX with -ENAMETOOLONG before the copy, and use it in both ceph_get_name() and __get_snap_name().
--- fs/ceph/export.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
fs/ceph/export.c +17 -9
@@ -442,6 +442,16 @@ static struct dentry *ceph_fh_to_parent(struct super_block *sb,return dentry; } +static int ceph_export_copy_name (char *name,const char *src,u32 len) +{ +if (len >NAME_MAX ) +return -ENAMETOOLONG ; + +memcpy (name, src, len); + name[len] ='\0' ; +return 0 ; +} +static int __get_snap_name (struct dentry *parent,char *name,struct dentry *child) {
@@ -513,9 +523,8 @@ static int __get_snap_name(struct dentry *parent, char *name,BUG_ON (!rde->inode.in);if (ceph_snap (inode) ==le64_to_cpu (rde->inode.in->snapid)) { -memcpy (name, rde->name, rde->name_len); - name[rde->name_len] ='\0' ; - err =0 ; + err =ceph_export_copy_name (name, rde->name, + rde->name_len); goto out; } }
@@ -580,8 +589,8 @@ static int ceph_get_name(struct dentry *parent, char *name, rinfo = &req->r_reply_info;if (!IS_ENCRYPTED (dir)) { -memcpy (name, rinfo->dname, rinfo->dname_len); - name[rinfo->dname_len] =0 ; + err =ceph_export_copy_name (name, rinfo->dname, + rinfo->dname_len); }else {struct fscrypt_str oname =FSTR_INIT (NULL ,0 );struct ceph_fname fname = { .dir = dir,
@@ -595,10 +604,9 @@ static int ceph_get_name(struct dentry *parent, char *name, goto out; err =ceph_fname_to_usr (&fname,NULL , &oname,NULL ); -if (!err) { -memcpy (name, oname.name, oname.len); - name[oname.len] =0 ; - } +if (!err) + err =ceph_export_copy_name (name, oname.name, + oname.len);ceph_fname_free_buffer (dir, &oname); } out:
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Quoted 95 lines · Michael Bommarito
ceph_get_name()copies the MDS-supplied name into the caller's NAME_MAX-sized buffer with memcpy(name,rinfo->dname, rinfo-Quoted 1 line
dname_len)and then writes name[rinfo->dname_len] = 0, without checking
dname_len
againstNAME_MAX. A malicious or buggy MDS that returns a LOOKUPNAME reply
withdname_len>NAME_MAXoverflows the buffer.__get_snap_name()copiesrde->name/rde->name_lenthe same unchecked way.Impact: a malicious or compromised Ceph MDS overflows the
NAME_MAXname
buffer in a client's NFS-exportget_namepath, a slab out-of-bounds write
reported by KASAN. Reachable when a CephFS mount is re-exported over NFS.Add
ceph_export_copy_name(), which rejects lengths aboveNAME_MAXwith-ENAMETOOLONGbefore the copy, and use it in bothceph_get_name()and__get_snap_name().Fixes 19913b4eac4a ("ceph: add get_name() NFS export callback")Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-8Signed-off-by Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>---
fs/ceph/export.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++---------1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)fs/ceph/export.c +0
-0@@ -442,6 +442,16 @@ static struct dentry *ceph_fh_to_parent(structsuper_block *sb, return dentry; }
+static intceph_export_copy_name(char *name, const char *src, u32 len)fs/ceph/export.c +9
-0+{ +if (len >NAME_MAX ) +return -ENAMETOOLONG ; + +memcpy (name, src, len); + name[len] ='\0' ; +return 0 ; +} +static int
__get_snap_name(struct dentry *parent, char *name, struct dentry *child)
{fs/ceph/export.c +0
-0@@ -513,9 +523,8 @@ static int __get_snap_name(struct dentry *parent,char *name, BUG_ON(!rde->inode.in);if (
ceph_snap(inode)==le64_to_cpu(rde->inode.in->snapid)) {fs/ceph/export.c +0
-1- memcpy(name, rde->name, rde-Quoted 1 line
name_len);fs/ceph/export.c +1
-2- name[rde->name_len] ='\0' ; - err =0 ; + err = ceph_export_copy_name(name,
rde->name,fs/ceph/export.c +1
-0+ rde-Quoted 1 line
name_len);goto out;
}
}fs/ceph/export.c +0
-0@@ -580,8 +589,8 @@ static int ceph_get_name(struct dentry *parent, char *name,
rinfo =&req->r_reply_info;
if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) {fs/ceph/export.c +2
-2-memcpy (name, rinfo->dname, rinfo->dname_len); - name[rinfo->dname_len] =0 ; + err =ceph_export_copy_name (name, rinfo->dname, + rinfo->dname_len);} else {
structfscrypt_stroname =FSTR_INIT(NULL, 0);
structceph_fnamefname = { .dir = dir,fs/ceph/export.c +0
-0@@ -595,10 +604,9 @@ static int ceph_get_name(struct dentry *parent,char *name, goto out;
err =ceph_fname_to_usr(&fname, NULL, &oname, NULL);fs/ceph/export.c +2
-4-if (!err) { -memcpy (name, oname.name, oname.len); - name[oname.len] =0 ; - } +if (!err) + err = ceph_export_copy_name(name,oname.name,
fs/ceph/export.c +1
-0+ oname.len);
Quoted 3 lines
ceph_fname_free_buffer(dir, &oname); }
out:
Looks good from my point of view.
Thanks,
Slava.