scsi: core: bound the VPD page 0x83 designator walk
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 scsi: core: bound the VPD page 0x83 designator walk
scsi_vpd_lun_id(), scsi_vpd_tpg_id() and sd_get_unique_id() walk the VPD page 0x83 designator list with a stride of d[3] + 4 taken from the device-supplied designator length d[3], without checking it against the bytes remaining in the page. A device, or a compromised virtio/hypervisor block backend, that returns a page 0x83 whose final designator length runs past vpd_pg83->len makes the walk read out of bounds of the cached VPD buffer.
Impact: a malicious or malfunctioning SCSI device, or a compromised hypervisor block backend, drives an out-of-bounds read of the cached VPD page 0x83 buffer (KASAN) during LUN-id, target-port-group, or unique-id computation.
Bound each iteration: stop the walk when fewer than four header bytes remain and when the designator length exceeds the bytes left in the page, in all three walkers.
--- drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++------- drivers/scsi/sd.c | 10 +++++++++- 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c +20 -7
@@ -3375,6 +3375,7 @@ int scsi_vpd_lun_id(struct scsi_device *sdev, char *id, size_t id_len)u8 cur_id_size =0 ;const unsigned char *d, *cur_id_str;const struct scsi_vpd *vpd_pg83; +size_t off;int id_size = -EINVAL ;rcu_read_lock ();
@@ -3391,11 +3392,17 @@ int scsi_vpd_lun_id(struct scsi_device *sdev, char *id, size_t id_len) }memset (id,0 , id_len); -for (d = vpd_pg83->data +4 ; - d < vpd_pg83->data + vpd_pg83->len; - d += d[3 ] +4 ) { -u8 prio =designator_prio (d); +for (off =4 ; off < vpd_pg83->len; off += d[3 ] +4 ) { +u8 prio; +if (vpd_pg83->len - off <4 ) +break ; + + d = vpd_pg83->data + off; +if (d[3 ] > vpd_pg83->len - off -4 ) +break ; + + prio =designator_prio (d);if (prio ==0 || cur_id_prio > prio)continue ;
@@ -3545,6 +3552,7 @@ int scsi_vpd_tpg_id(struct scsi_device *sdev, int *rel_id) {const unsigned char *d;const struct scsi_vpd *vpd_pg83; +size_t off;int group_id = -EAGAIN , rel_port =-1 ;rcu_read_lock ();
@@ -3554,8 +3562,14 @@ int scsi_vpd_tpg_id(struct scsi_device *sdev, int *rel_id)return -ENXIO ; } - d = vpd_pg83->data +4 ; -while (d < vpd_pg83->data + vpd_pg83->len) { +for (off =4 ; off < vpd_pg83->len; off += d[3 ] +4 ) { +if (vpd_pg83->len - off <4 ) +break ; + + d = vpd_pg83->data + off; +if (d[3 ] > vpd_pg83->len - off -4 ) +break ; +switch (d[1 ] &0xf ) {case 0x4 :/* Relative target port */
@@ -3568,7 +3582,6 @@ int scsi_vpd_tpg_id(struct scsi_device *sdev, int *rel_id)default :break ; } - d += d[3 ] +4 ; }rcu_read_unlock ();
drivers/scsi/sd.c +9 -1
@@ -1949,6 +1949,7 @@ static int sd_get_unique_id(struct gendisk *disk, u8 id[16],struct scsi_device *sdev =scsi_disk (disk)->device;const struct scsi_vpd *vpd;const unsigned char *d; +size_t off;int ret = -ENXIO , len;rcu_read_lock ();
@@ -1957,7 +1958,14 @@ static int sd_get_unique_id(struct gendisk *disk, u8 id[16], goto out_unlock; ret = -EINVAL ; -for (d = vpd->data +4 ; d < vpd->data + vpd->len; d += d[3 ] +4 ) { +for (off =4 ; off < vpd->len; off += d[3 ] +4 ) { +if (vpd->len - off <4 ) +break ; + + d = vpd->data + off; +if (d[3 ] > vpd->len - off -4 ) +break ; +/* we only care about designators with LU association */ if (((d[1 ] >>4 ) &0x3 ) !=0x00 )continue ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
[email protected]
AI reviewThank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Missing descriptor payload length check in scsi_vpd_tpg_id() leads to an out-of-bounds read when accessing d[6] and d[7]. --
--- Patch [1]: [PATCH] scsi: core: bound the VPD page 0x83 designator walk --- commit 390f380557d52bf9b1b813ffda5cbf376ee027a2
Author: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>
scsi: core: bound the VPD page 0x83 designator walk
This commit fixes an out-of-bounds read in the VPD page 0x83 designator walk by ensuring the designator length does not exceed the remaining bytes in the page. It updates scsi_vpd_lun_id(), scsi_vpd_tpg_id(), and sd_get_unique_id() to bound each iteration.
Quoted 3 lines
drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c +0
-0
[ ... ]
Quoted 17 lines
drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c +8
-2@@ -3546,8 +3554,14 @@ int scsi_vpd_tpg_id(struct scsi_device *sdev, int *rel_id)return -ENXIO ; } - d = vpd_pg83->data +4 ; -while (d < vpd_pg83->data + vpd_pg83->len) { +for (off =4 ; off < vpd_pg83->len; off += d[3 ] +4 ) { +if (vpd_pg83->len - off <4 ) +break ; + + d = vpd_pg83->data + off; +if (d[3 ] > vpd_pg83->len - off -4 ) +break ; +switch (d[1 ] &0xf ) {case 0x4 :/* Relative target port */
drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c
Quoted 6 lines
drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c +0
-0rel_port =get_unaligned_be16 (&d[6 ]);break ;case 0x5 :/* Target port group */ group_id =get_unaligned_be16 (&d[6 ]);break ;
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but can this code read out of bounds if the designator payload length is less than 4?
In scsi_vpd_tpg_id(), the switch statement unconditionally reads d[6] and d[7] via get_unaligned_be16 without verifying that the designator length (d[3]) is at least 4.
If a device or untrusted hypervisor backend provides a VPD page 0x83 containing a designator with type 0x4 or 0x5 and a declared length (d[3]) of less than 4, and this designator is positioned at the very end of the buffer, could the fixed-offset read at &d[6] access memory out of bounds?
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
James Bottomley
maintainerOn Sat, 2026-07-11 at 11:07 -0400, Michael Bommarito wrote:
[...]
Quoted 4 lines
Impact: a malicious or malfunctioning SCSI device, or a compromised hypervisor block backend, drives an out-of-bounds read of the cached VPD page
0x83buffer (KASAN) during LUN-id, target-port-group, or unique-id computation.
This is not a threat model we have for the kernel. The reason has been much debated but it boils down to the fact that if we do this somewhere we likely have to do it everywhere and the cost of checking every return from a device is huge in terms of performance. Thus we assume devices (and hypervisors) behave correctly until someone finds a buggy device and only then do we do a workaround.
Regards,
James