Skip to contentSkip to conversation

btrfs: lzo: reject inline extents without both headers

PATCH Superseded David Lee 2 participants 3 messages Jul 14 Btrfs file system

v1 of 2 Superseded Latest is v2 →

lore
Share & tools
lore

David Lee

author
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 btrfs: lzo: reject inline extents without both headers

inline Btrfs LZO payload shorter than two LZO headers.

Fix the validation or lifetime rule at the vulnerable boundary so malformed or racing input cannot reach the faulting path.

Assisted-by Codex:gpt-5.5

---
Trail of Bits has a reproducer for this bug demonstrating Kernel Panic which can be shared further if needed.

fs/btrfs/lzo.c | 3 ++-

 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/btrfs/lzo.c +2 -1
@@ -552,7 +552,8 @@ int lzo_decompress(struct list_head *ws, const u8 *data_in,
 	size_t max_segment_len = workspace_buf_length(fs_info);
 	int ret;
 
-	if (unlikely(srclen < LZO_LEN || srclen > max_segment_len + LZO_LEN * 2))
+	if (unlikely(srclen < LZO_LEN * 2 ||
+		     srclen > max_segment_len + LZO_LEN * 2))
 		return -EUCLEAN;
 
 	in_len = get_unaligned_le32(data_in);
#1 lore raw
Quoted 17 lines · David Lee

inline Btrfs LZO payload shorter than two LZO headers.

Fix the validation or lifetime rule at the vulnerable boundary so malformed or racing input cannot reach the faulting path.

Assisted-by Codex:gpt-5.5

---
Trail of Bits has a reproducer for this bug demonstrating Kernel Panic which can be shared further if needed.

fs/btrfs/lzo.c | 3 ++-

  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

fs/btrfs/lzo.c int lzo_decompress(struct list_head *ws, const u8 *data_in, · line 555

Quoted 5 lines
fs/btrfs/lzo.c +1 -1
@@ -552,7 +552,8 @@ int lzo_decompress(struct list_head *ws, const u8 *data_in,
  	size_t max_segment_len = workspace_buf_length(fs_info);
  	int ret;
 
-	if (unlikely(srclen < LZO_LEN || srclen > max_segment_len + LZO_LEN * 2))
+	if (unlikely(srclen < LZO_LEN * 2 ||

srclen == LZO_LEN * 2 is also invalid, as that means the lzo payload is empty.

Also your base is a little too old.

The latest for-next branch has extra error messages, thus your patch doesn't apply cleanly.

Please rebase to the latest for-next branch:

https://github.com/btrfs/linux.git for-next

Otherwise the fix looks good to me.

Thanks,
Qu

Quoted 6 lines
fs/btrfs/lzo.c +1 -0
+		     srclen > max_segment_len + LZO_LEN * 2))
  		return -EUCLEAN;
 
  	in_len = get_unaligned_le32(data_in);
#2 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Qu Wenruo
Quoted 2 lines · David Lee

inline Btrfs LZO payload shorter than two LZO headers.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines

Fix the validation or lifetime rule at the vulnerable boundary so malformed or racing input cannot reach the faulting path.

Assisted-by Codex:gpt-5.5

---
Trail of Bits has a reproducer for this bug demonstrating Kernel Panic which can be shared further if needed.

Also forgot to mention, it's always better to provide the full calltrace.

It will benefit people who hit a similar crash to determine if it's already fixed.

Quoted 38 lines
Quoted 8 lines

fs/btrfs/lzo.c |    3 ++-

  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

fs/btrfs/lzo.c int lzo_decompress(struct list_head *ws, const u8 · line 556

Quoted 6 lines
fs/btrfs/lzo.c +1 -1
@@ -552,7 +552,8 @@ int lzo_decompress(struct list_head *ws, const u8 
 *data_in,
       size_t max_segment_len = workspace_buf_length(fs_info);
       int ret;
-    if (unlikely(srclen < LZO_LEN || srclen > max_segment_len + 
 LZO_LEN * 2))
+    if (unlikely(srclen < LZO_LEN * 2 ||

srclen == LZO_LEN * 2 is also invalid, as that means the lzo payload is empty.

Also your base is a little too old.

The latest for-next branch has extra error messages, thus your patch doesn't apply cleanly.

Please rebase to the latest for-next branch:

 https://github.com/btrfs/linux.git for-next

Otherwise the fix looks good to me.

Thanks,
Qu

Quoted 5 lines
fs/btrfs/lzo.c +1 -0
+             srclen > max_segment_len + LZO_LEN * 2))
           return -EUCLEAN;
       in_len = get_unaligned_le32(data_in);