sched/psi: fix race in pressure_write (CVE-2026-52991)
Subsystems (2)
cover sched/psi: fix race in pressure_write (CVE-2026-52991)
This patchset is same as that for 6.12.y.
Backport of the CVE-2026-52991 fix.
1/2 (94a4acfec146) clear of->priv on release, turning the UAF into an
easier-to-detect NULL deref.
2/2 (a5b98009f16d, the CVE fix) extend cgroup_mutex to cover all
of->priv accesses, read ctx after taking the kn lock, and NULL-check
of->priv. It depends on 1/2 as discussed in [0].[0] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Chen Ridong (1):
cgroup/psi: Set of->priv to NULL upon file release
Edward Adam Davis (1):
sched/psi: fix race between file release and pressure write
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--
2.47.3
PATCH 1/2 cgroup/psi: Set of->priv to NULL upon file release
From: Chen Ridong <[email protected]>
commit 94a4acfec14615e971eb2c9e1fa6c992c85ff6c6 upstream.
Setting of->priv to NULL when the file is released enables earlier bug detection. This allows potential bugs to manifest as NULL pointer dereferences rather than use-after-free errors[1], which are generally more difficult to diagnose.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/cgroups/[email protected]/T/#m8a3b3f88f0ff3da5925d342e90043394f8b2091b
--- kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c +1 -0
@@ -4061,6 +4061,7 @@ static void cgroup_file_release(struct kernfs_open_file *of) cft->release (of);put_cgroup_ns (ctx->ns);kfree (ctx); + of->priv =NULL ; } static ssize_t cgroup_file_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of, char *buf,
Signature · 1 line
2.47.3
PATCH 2/2 sched/psi: fix race between file release and pressure write
In reply to Philo LuFrom: Edward Adam Davis <[email protected]>
commit a5b98009f16d8a5fb4a8ff9a193f5735515c38fa upstream.
A potential race condition exists between pressure write and cgroup file release regarding the priv member of struct kernfs_open_file, which triggers the uaf reported in [1].
Consider the following scenario involving execution on two separate CPUs:
CPU0 CPU1
==== ====
vfs_rmdir() kernfs_iop_rmdir() cgroup_rmdir() cgroup_kn_lock_live() cgroup_destroy_locked() cgroup_addrm_files() cgroup_rm_file() kernfs_remove_by_name() kernfs_remove_by_name_ns() vfs_write() __kernfs_remove() new_sync_write() kernfs_drain() kernfs_fop_write_iter() kernfs_drain_open_files() cgroup_file_write() kernfs_release_file() pressure_write() cgroup_file_release() ctx = of->priv; kfree(ctx);
of->priv = NULL; cgroup_kn_unlock()
cgroup_kn_lock_live()
cgroup_get(cgrp)
cgroup_kn_unlock()
if (ctx->psi.trigger) // here, trigger uaf for ctx, that is of->priv
The cgroup_rmdir() is protected by the cgroup_mutex, it also safeguards the memory deallocation of of->priv performed within cgroup_file_release(). However, the operations involving of->priv executed within pressure_write() are not entirely covered by the protection of cgroup_mutex. Consequently, if the code in pressure_write(), specifically the section handling the ctx variable executes after cgroup_file_release() has completed, a uaf vulnerability involving of->priv is triggered.
Therefore, the issue can be resolved by extending the scope of the cgroup_mutex lock within pressure_write() to encompass all code paths involving of->priv, thereby properly synchronizing the race condition occurring between cgroup_file_release() and pressure_write().
And, if an live kn lock can be successfully acquired while executing the pressure write operation, it indicates that the cgroup deletion process has not yet reached its final stage; consequently, the priv pointer within open_file cannot be NULL. Therefore, the operation to retrieve the ctx value must be moved to a point *after* the live kn lock has been successfully acquired.
In another situation, specifically after entering cgroup_kn_lock_live() but before acquiring cgroup_mutex, there exists a different class of race condition:
CPU0: write memory.pressure CPU1: write cgroup.pressure=0
=========================== =============================
kernfs_fop_write_iter()
kernfs_get_active_of(of)
pressure_write()
cgroup_kn_lock_live(memory.pressure)
cgroup_tryget(cgrp)
kernfs_break_active_protection(kn)
... blocks on cgroup_mutex
cgroup_pressure_write() cgroup_kn_lock_live(cgroup.pressure) cgroup_file_show(memory.pressure, false)
kernfs_show(false)
kernfs_drain_open_files()
cgroup_file_release(of)
kfree(ctx)
of->priv = NULL
cgroup_kn_unlock()
... acquires cgroup_mutex
ctx = of->priv; // may now be NULL
if (ctx->psi.trigger) // NULL dereference
Consequently, there is a possibility that of->priv is NULL, the pressure write needs to check for this.
Now that the scope of the cgroup_mutex has been expanded, the original explicit cgroup_get/put operations are no longer necessary, this is because acquiring/releasing the live kn lock inherently executes a cgroup get/put operation.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in pressure_write+0xa4/0x210 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4011 Call Trace: pressure_write+0xa4/0x210 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4011 cgroup_file_write+0x36f/0x790 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4311 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x3b0/0x540 fs/kernfs/file.c:352 Allocated by task 9352: cgroup_file_open+0x90/0x3a0 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4256 kernfs_fop_open+0x9eb/0xcb0 fs/kernfs/file.c:724 do_dentry_open+0x83d/0x13e0 fs/open.c:949 Freed by task 9353: cgroup_file_release+0xd6/0x100 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4283 kernfs_release_file fs/kernfs/file.c:764 [inline] kernfs_drain_open_files+0x392/0x720 fs/kernfs/file.c:834 kernfs_drain+0x470/0x600 fs/kernfs/dir.c:525
--- kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c +16 -8
@@ -3775,33 +3775,41 @@ static int cgroup_cpu_pressure_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)static ssize_t pressure_write (struct kernfs_open_file *of,char *buf,size_t nbytes,enum psi_res res) { -struct cgroup_file_ctx *ctx = of->priv; +struct cgroup_file_ctx *ctx;struct psi_trigger *new;struct cgroup *cgrp;struct psi_group *psi; +ssize_t ret =0 ; cgrp =cgroup_kn_lock_live (of->kn, false);if (!cgrp)return -ENODEV ; -cgroup_get (cgrp); -cgroup_kn_unlock (of->kn); + ctx = of->priv; +if (!ctx) { + ret = -ENODEV ; + goto out_unlock; + }/* Allow only one trigger per file descriptor */ if (ctx->psi.trigger) { -cgroup_put (cgrp); -return -EBUSY ; + ret = -EBUSY ; + goto out_unlock; } psi =cgroup_psi (cgrp); new =psi_trigger_create (psi, buf, res, of->file, of);if (IS_ERR (new)) { -cgroup_put (cgrp); -return PTR_ERR (new); + ret =PTR_ERR (new); + goto out_unlock; }smp_store_release (&ctx->psi.trigger, new); -cgroup_put (cgrp); + +out_unlock: +cgroup_kn_unlock (of->kn); +if (ret) +return ret;return nbytes; }
Signature · 1 line
2.47.3
Greg KH
maintainerQuoted 1 line · Philo Lu
This patchset is same as that for 6.12.y.
Where is the 6.12.y version?
thanks,
greg k-h-
Quoted 4 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 1 line · Philo Lu
This patchset is same as that for 6.12.y.
Where is the 6.12.y version?
It was sent as a new patchset:
https://lore.kernel.org/stable/[email protected]/
As Sasha said in that thread. The patchset is waiting on a pending Tejun fix (deadlock risk with cgroup_mutex). He'll queue 6.12/6.6/6.1 together once it lands.
Thanks.
Signature · 1 line
Philo