wifi: mwifiex: validate HT/VHT capability and operation IE lengths
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 wifi: mwifiex: validate HT/VHT capability and operation IE lengths
mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie() records raw pointers to the HT Capabilities, HT Operation, VHT Capabilities, VHT Operation, 20/40 BSS Coexistence and Operating Mode Notification elements taken straight out of a beacon/probe-response buffer, without checking that each element is long enough for the fixed-size structure that later consumers read. The buffer is a tight kmemdup() of the on-air IEs (beacon_buf_size == ies->len), so a truncated element placed last leaves the stored pointer one past the end of the allocation.
At association time these pointers are dereferenced at fixed offsets regardless of the on-air length: mwifiex_cmd_append_11n_tlv() memcpy()s sizeof(struct ieee80211_ht_cap) (26 bytes) from bcn_ht_cap and reads bcn_ht_oper->ht_param, and mwifiex_cmd_append_11ac_tlv() memcpy()s sizeof(struct ieee80211_vht_cap) (12 bytes) from bcn_vht_cap and reads bcn_vht_oper->chan_width. A nearby AP (rogue / evil-twin; an open SSID needs no credentials) advertising a BSS with a truncated HT/VHT cap element therefore triggers a slab out-of-bounds read on the victim's association attempt. This out-of-bounds read is the primary issue.
For the HT-Cap copy the over-read bytes are additionally placed into the outgoing association request, so a limited amount of adjacent heap memory can leak over the air. In station mode this is small (single-digit bytes), because mwifiex_fill_cap_info() rewrites most of the copied HT-Cap before transmission; the leak is a secondary effect.
mwifiex_set_sta_ht_cap() has the same missing-length pattern: in uAP mode it reads two bytes of ieee80211_ht_cap.cap_info from a cfg80211_find_ie(WLAN_EID_HT_CAPABILITY) result in a client association request without checking the element length, a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read (used only to select an A-MSDU size, not leaked).
Reject (skip) any of these elements whose payload is shorter than the structure the driver later reads, matching the length validation the FH/DS/CF/IBSS parameter-set cases in the same beacon parser already perform.
No dynamic reproducer: mwifiex is a fullmac driver for Marvell hardware with no mac80211_hwsim equivalent, so this was confirmed by source and structure-offset analysis only.
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).
--- drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c | 12 ++++++++++++ drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/util.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c +12 -0
@@ -1384,6 +1384,8 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter, bss_entry->beacon_buf);break ;case WLAN_EID_HT_CAPABILITY : +if (element_len <sizeof (struct ieee80211_ht_cap )) +break ; bss_entry->bcn_ht_cap = (struct ieee80211_ht_cap *) (current_ptr +sizeof (struct ieee_types_header ));
@@ -1392,6 +1394,8 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter, bss_entry->beacon_buf);break ;case WLAN_EID_HT_OPERATION : +if (element_len <sizeof (struct ieee80211_ht_operation )) +break ; bss_entry->bcn_ht_oper = (struct ieee80211_ht_operation *)(current_ptr +sizeof (struct ieee_types_header ));
@@ -1400,6 +1404,8 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter, bss_entry->beacon_buf);break ;case WLAN_EID_VHT_CAPABILITY : +if (element_len <sizeof (struct ieee80211_vht_cap )) +break ; bss_entry->disable_11ac = false; bss_entry->bcn_vht_cap = (void *)(current_ptr +
@@ -1409,6 +1415,8 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter, bss_entry->beacon_buf);break ;case WLAN_EID_VHT_OPERATION : +if (element_len <sizeof (struct ieee80211_vht_operation )) +break ; bss_entry->bcn_vht_oper = (void *)(current_ptr +sizeof (struct ieee_types_header ));
@@ -1417,6 +1425,8 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter, bss_entry->beacon_buf);break ;case WLAN_EID_BSS_COEX_2040 : +if (!element_len) +break ; bss_entry->bcn_bss_co_2040 = current_ptr; bss_entry->bss_co_2040_offset = (u16) (current_ptr - bss_entry->beacon_buf);
@@ -1427,6 +1437,8 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter, (u16) (current_ptr - bss_entry->beacon_buf);break ;case WLAN_EID_OPMODE_NOTIF : +if (!element_len) +break ; bss_entry->oper_mode = (void *)current_ptr; bss_entry->oper_mode_offset = (u16)((u8 *)bss_entry->oper_mode -
drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/util.c +1 -1
@@ -721,7 +721,7 @@ mwifiex_set_sta_ht_cap(struct mwifiex_private *priv, const u8 *ies, ht_cap_ie = (void *)cfg80211_find_ie (WLAN_EID_HT_CAPABILITY , ies, ies_len); -if (ht_cap_ie) { +if (ht_cap_ie && ht_cap_ie->len >=sizeof (struct ieee80211_ht_cap )) { ht_cap = (void *)(ht_cap_ie +1 ); node->is_11n_enabled =1 ; node->max_amsdu = le16_to_cpu(ht_cap->cap_info) &
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Francesco Dolcini
reviewerQuoted 31 lines · Doruk Tan Ozturk
mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie()records raw pointers to the HT Capabilities, HT Operation, VHT Capabilities, VHT Operation, 20/40 BSS Coexistence and Operating Mode Notification elements taken straight out of a beacon/probe-response buffer, without checking that each element is long enough for the fixed-size structure that later consumers read. The buffer is a tightkmemdup()of the on-air IEs (beacon_buf_size==ies->len), so a truncated element placed last leaves the stored pointer one past the end of the allocation.At association time these pointers are dereferenced at fixed offsets regardless of the on-air length:
mwifiex_cmd_append_11n_tlv()memcpy()ssizeof(struct ieee80211_ht_cap)(26 bytes) frombcn_ht_capand readsbcn_ht_oper->ht_param, andmwifiex_cmd_append_11ac_tlv()memcpy()ssizeof(struct ieee80211_vht_cap)(12 bytes) frombcn_vht_capand readsbcn_vht_oper->chan_width. A nearby AP (rogue / evil-twin; an open SSID needs no credentials) advertising a BSS with a truncated HT/VHT cap element therefore triggers a slab out-of-bounds read on the victim's association attempt. This out-of-bounds read is the primary issue.For the HT-Cap copy the over-read bytes are additionally placed into the outgoing association request, so a limited amount of adjacent heap memory can leak over the air. In station mode this is small (single-digit bytes), because
mwifiex_fill_cap_info()rewrites most of the copied HT-Cap before transmission; the leak is a secondary effect.
mwifiex_set_sta_ht_cap()has the same missing-length pattern: in uAP mode it reads two bytes of ieee80211_ht_cap.cap_info from acfg80211_find_ie(WLAN_EID_HT_CAPABILITY)result in a client association request without checking the element length, a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read (used only to select an A-MSDU size, not leaked).
Quoted 8 lines
Reject (skip) any of these elements whose payload is shorter than the structure the driver later reads, matching the length validation the FH/DS/CF/IBSS parameter-set cases in the same beacon parser already perform.
No dynamic reproducer: mwifiex is a fullmac driver for Marvell hardware with no
mac80211_hwsimequivalent, so this was confirmed by source and structure-offset analysis only.
Were you able to test that this is not breaking the driver functionality?
Quoted 17 lines
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).
Fixes 5e6e3a92b9a4 ("wireless: mwifiex: initial commit for Marvell mwifiex driver")Assisted-by 0sec:claude-opus-4-8Signed-off-by Doruk Tan Ozturk <[email protected]>--- drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c | 12 ++++++++++++ drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/util.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c +0
-0
drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter, · line 1388
Quoted 5 lines
drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c +2
-0@@ -1384,6 +1384,8 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter, bss_entry->beacon_buf);break ;case WLAN_EID_HT_CAPABILITY : +if (element_len <sizeof (struct ieee80211_ht_cap )) +break ;
why break and not return -EINVAL? (this in general, not only on this specific one).
Quoted 1 line
Were you able to test that this is not breaking the driver functionality?
Unfortunately I don't own one of these cards, and mwifiex is fullmac so there's no hwsim either, so it was source and compile only. The added checks only skip elements too short for what the driver later reads, so they shouldn't affect a well-formed beacon.
Quoted 2 lines
why break and not return
-EINVAL? (this in general, not only on this specific one).
To skip the one malformed optional element and keep parsing the rest of the beacon, like the FH/DS/CF/IBSS cases just above in the same loop. Happy to switch to -EINVAL if you'd rather reject the whole BSS.
-Doruk
Francesco Dolcini
reviewerQuoted 6 lines · Doruk Tan Ozturk
Quoted 2 lines
why break and not return
-EINVAL? (this in general, not only on this specific one).To skip the one malformed optional element and keep parsing the rest of the beacon, like the FH/DS/CF/IBSS cases just above in the same loop. Happy to switch to
-EINVALif you'd rather reject the whole BSS.
maybe I am missing something, but I see return -EINVAL; when the packet is malformed. see for example
case WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC: vendor_ie = (struct ieee_types_vendor_specific *) current_ptr; /* 802.11 requires at least 3-byte OUI. */ if (element_len < sizeof(vendor_ie->vend_hdr.oui.oui)) return -EINVAL;
My advise would be to do the same we are already doing, and unless I am wrong, it means that we skip the whole frame if a corruption is detected.
Francesco
Quoted 2 lines
My advise would be to do the same we are already doing, and unless I am wrong, it means that we skip the whole frame if a corruption is detected.
Makes sense, I'll switch these to -EINVAL and send a v2. Thanks.
-Doruk
PATCH v2 1/1 wifi: mwifiex: validate HT/VHT capability and operation IE lengths
In reply to Doruk Tan Ozturkmwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie() records raw pointers to the HT Capabilities, HT Operation, VHT Capabilities, VHT Operation, 20/40 BSS Coexistence and Operating Mode Notification elements taken straight out of a beacon/probe-response buffer, without checking that each element is long enough for the fixed-size structure that later consumers read. The buffer is a tight kmemdup() of the on-air IEs (beacon_buf_size == ies->len), so a truncated element placed last leaves the stored pointer one past the end of the allocation.
At association time these pointers are dereferenced at fixed offsets regardless of the on-air length: mwifiex_cmd_append_11n_tlv() memcpy()s sizeof(struct ieee80211_ht_cap) (26 bytes) from bcn_ht_cap and reads bcn_ht_oper->ht_param, and mwifiex_cmd_append_11ac_tlv() memcpy()s sizeof(struct ieee80211_vht_cap) (12 bytes) from bcn_vht_cap and reads bcn_vht_oper->chan_width. A nearby AP (rogue / evil-twin; an open SSID needs no credentials) advertising a BSS with a truncated HT/VHT cap element therefore triggers a slab out-of-bounds read on the victim's association attempt. This out-of-bounds read is the primary issue.
For the HT-Cap copy the over-read bytes are additionally placed into the outgoing association request, so a limited amount of adjacent heap memory can leak over the air. In station mode this is small (single-digit bytes), because mwifiex_fill_cap_info() rewrites most of the copied HT-Cap before transmission; the leak is a secondary effect.
mwifiex_set_sta_ht_cap() has the same missing-length pattern: in uAP mode it reads two bytes of ieee80211_ht_cap.cap_info from a cfg80211_find_ie(WLAN_EID_HT_CAPABILITY) result in a client association request without checking the element length, a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read (used only to select an A-MSDU size, not leaked).
Reject the frame with -EINVAL when any of these elements is shorter than the structure the driver later reads, matching the length validation the FH/DS/CF/IBSS parameter-set cases in the same beacon parser already perform. mwifiex_set_sta_ht_cap() returns void, so there the too-short element is skipped instead.
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).
---
Changes in v2 (per Francesco Dolcini review):
- return -EINVAL on a too-short element instead of break, matching the FH/DS/CF/IBSS and VENDOR_SPECIFIC cases in the same function. mwifiex_set_sta_ht_cap() returns void, so there it stays a skip.
- switch the Assisted-by trailer to 0sec:multi-model.
drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c | 12 ++++++++++++ drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/util.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c +12 -0
@@ -1384,6 +1384,8 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter, bss_entry->beacon_buf);break ;case WLAN_EID_HT_CAPABILITY : +if (element_len <sizeof (struct ieee80211_ht_cap )) +return -EINVAL ; bss_entry->bcn_ht_cap = (struct ieee80211_ht_cap *) (current_ptr +sizeof (struct ieee_types_header ));
@@ -1392,6 +1394,8 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter, bss_entry->beacon_buf);break ;case WLAN_EID_HT_OPERATION : +if (element_len <sizeof (struct ieee80211_ht_operation )) +return -EINVAL ; bss_entry->bcn_ht_oper = (struct ieee80211_ht_operation *)(current_ptr +sizeof (struct ieee_types_header ));
@@ -1400,6 +1404,8 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter, bss_entry->beacon_buf);break ;case WLAN_EID_VHT_CAPABILITY : +if (element_len <sizeof (struct ieee80211_vht_cap )) +return -EINVAL ; bss_entry->disable_11ac = false; bss_entry->bcn_vht_cap = (void *)(current_ptr +
@@ -1409,6 +1415,8 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter, bss_entry->beacon_buf);break ;case WLAN_EID_VHT_OPERATION : +if (element_len <sizeof (struct ieee80211_vht_operation )) +return -EINVAL ; bss_entry->bcn_vht_oper = (void *)(current_ptr +sizeof (struct ieee_types_header ));
@@ -1417,6 +1425,8 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter, bss_entry->beacon_buf);break ;case WLAN_EID_BSS_COEX_2040 : +if (!element_len) +return -EINVAL ; bss_entry->bcn_bss_co_2040 = current_ptr; bss_entry->bss_co_2040_offset = (u16) (current_ptr - bss_entry->beacon_buf);
@@ -1427,6 +1437,8 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter, (u16) (current_ptr - bss_entry->beacon_buf);break ;case WLAN_EID_OPMODE_NOTIF : +if (!element_len) +return -EINVAL ; bss_entry->oper_mode = (void *)current_ptr; bss_entry->oper_mode_offset = (u16)((u8 *)bss_entry->oper_mode -
drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/util.c +1 -1
@@ -721,7 +721,7 @@ mwifiex_set_sta_ht_cap(struct mwifiex_private *priv, const u8 *ies, ht_cap_ie = (void *)cfg80211_find_ie (WLAN_EID_HT_CAPABILITY , ies, ies_len); -if (ht_cap_ie) { +if (ht_cap_ie && ht_cap_ie->len >=sizeof (struct ieee80211_ht_cap )) { ht_cap = (void *)(ht_cap_ie +1 ); node->is_11n_enabled =1 ; node->max_amsdu = le16_to_cpu(ht_cap->cap_info) &
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Francesco Dolcini
reviewerQuoted 44 lines · Doruk Tan Ozturk
mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie()records raw pointers to the HT Capabilities, HT Operation, VHT Capabilities, VHT Operation, 20/40 BSS Coexistence and Operating Mode Notification elements taken straight out of a beacon/probe-response buffer, without checking that each element is long enough for the fixed-size structure that later consumers read. The buffer is a tightkmemdup()of the on-air IEs (beacon_buf_size==ies->len), so a truncated element placed last leaves the stored pointer one past the end of the allocation.At association time these pointers are dereferenced at fixed offsets regardless of the on-air length:
mwifiex_cmd_append_11n_tlv()memcpy()ssizeof(struct ieee80211_ht_cap)(26 bytes) frombcn_ht_capand readsbcn_ht_oper->ht_param, andmwifiex_cmd_append_11ac_tlv()memcpy()ssizeof(struct ieee80211_vht_cap)(12 bytes) frombcn_vht_capand readsbcn_vht_oper->chan_width. A nearby AP (rogue / evil-twin; an open SSID needs no credentials) advertising a BSS with a truncated HT/VHT cap element therefore triggers a slab out-of-bounds read on the victim's association attempt. This out-of-bounds read is the primary issue.For the HT-Cap copy the over-read bytes are additionally placed into the outgoing association request, so a limited amount of adjacent heap memory can leak over the air. In station mode this is small (single-digit bytes), because
mwifiex_fill_cap_info()rewrites most of the copied HT-Cap before transmission; the leak is a secondary effect.
mwifiex_set_sta_ht_cap()has the same missing-length pattern: in uAP mode it reads two bytes of ieee80211_ht_cap.cap_info from acfg80211_find_ie(WLAN_EID_HT_CAPABILITY)result in a client association request without checking the element length, a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read (used only to select an A-MSDU size, not leaked).Reject the frame with
-EINVALwhen any of these elements is shorter than the structure the driver later reads, matching the length validation the FH/DS/CF/IBSS parameter-set cases in the same beacon parser already perform.mwifiex_set_sta_ht_cap()returns void, so there the too-short element is skipped instead.Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).
Fixes 5e6e3a92b9a4 ("wireless: mwifiex: initial commit for Marvell mwifiex driver")Assisted-by 0sec:multi-modelSigned-off-by Doruk Tan Ozturk <[email protected]>---
...
drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/util.c mwifiex_set_sta_ht_cap(struct mwifiex_private *priv, const u8 *ies, · line 727
Quoted 13 lines
drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/util.c +1
-1@@ -721,7 +721,7 @@ mwifiex_set_sta_ht_cap(struct mwifiex_private *priv, const u8 *ies, ht_cap_ie = (void *)cfg80211_find_ie (WLAN_EID_HT_CAPABILITY , ies, ies_len); -if (ht_cap_ie) { +if (ht_cap_ie && ht_cap_ie->len >=sizeof (struct ieee80211_ht_cap )) { ht_cap = (void *)(ht_cap_ie +1 ); node->is_11n_enabled =1 ; node->max_amsdu = le16_to_cpu(ht_cap->cap_info) &
Can we trust ht_cap_ie->len here? Who is writing this field?
Francesco
Yes, for bounds. cfg80211_find_ie() parses the IE stream and returns NULL if an IE header plus its declared length does not fit in ies_len. The len field is still on-air, attacker-controlled input, but it is bounded by that parser.
The check is therefore only a minimum-size test before the fixed cap_info read; it is not relying on len as a trustworthy value beyond the parsed IE bounds. I’ll make that explicit in the v3 commit message.
Thanks,
Doruk