libpng: upgrade 1.6.42 -> 1.6.58
PATCH 1/1 libpng: upgrade 1.6.42 -> 1.6.58
- Drop 17 CVE patches fixed upstream in 1.6.54 through 1.6.58
- Update LICENSE checksum (copyright year updated)
- All CVE-2025-64505, CVE-2025-64506, CVE-2025-64720, CVE-2025-65018, CVE-2025-66293, CVE-2026-22695, CVE-2026-22801, CVE-2026-25646, CVE-2026-33416, CVE-2026-33636 resolved in this release
---
.../libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-01.patch | 111 -----------
.../libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-02.patch | 163 -----------------
.../libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-03.patch | 52 ------
.../libpng/files/CVE-2025-64506.patch | 57 ------
.../libpng/files/CVE-2025-64720.patch | 103 -----------
.../libpng/files/CVE-2025-65018-01.patch | 60 ------
.../libpng/files/CVE-2025-65018-02.patch | 163 -----------------
.../libpng/files/CVE-2025-66293-01.patch | 60 ------
.../libpng/files/CVE-2025-66293-02.patch | 125 -------------
.../libpng/files/CVE-2026-22695.patch | 77 --------
.../libpng/files/CVE-2026-22801.patch | 173 ------------------
.../libpng/files/CVE-2026-25646.patch | 61 ------
.../libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416-01.patch | 143 ---------------
.../libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416-02.patch | 53 ------
.../libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416-03.patch | 163 -----------------
.../libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416-04.patch | 53 ------
.../libpng/files/CVE-2026-33636.patch | 99 ----------
.../{libpng_1.6.42.bb => libpng_1.6.58.bb} | 21 +--
18 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1735 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-01.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-02.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-03.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64506.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64720.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-65018-01.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-65018-02.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-66293-01.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-66293-02.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-22695.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-22801.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-25646.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416-01.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416-02.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416-03.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416-04.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33636.patch
rename meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/{libpng_1.6.42.bb => libpng_1.6.58.bb} (77%)meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-01.patch deleted +0 -111
@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@ -From 0fa3c0f698c2ca618a0fa44e10a822678df85373 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Cosmin Truta <[email protected]> -Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 21:53:24 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] chore: Clean up the spurious uses of `sizeof(png_byte)`; fix - the manual - -By definition, `sizeof(png_byte)` is 1. - -Remove all the occurences of `sizeof(png_byte)` from the code, and fix -a related typo in the libpng manual. - -Also update the main .editorconfig file to reflect the fixing expected -by a FIXME note. - -CVE: CVE-2025-64505 -Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/commit/0fa3c0f698c2ca618a0fa44e10a822678df85373] -Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]> ---- - libpng-manual.txt | 4 ++-- - libpng.3 | 4 ++-- - pngrtran.c | 17 +++++++---------- - 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/libpng-manual.txt b/libpng-manual.txt -index eb24ef483..d2918ce31 100644 ---- a/libpng-manual.txt -+++ b/libpng-manual.txt -@@ -1178,11 +1178,11 @@ where row_pointers is an array of pointers to the pixel data for each row: - If you know your image size and pixel size ahead of time, you can allocate - row_pointers prior to calling png_read_png() with - -- if (height > PNG_UINT_32_MAX/(sizeof (png_byte))) -+ if (height > PNG_UINT_32_MAX / (sizeof (png_bytep))) - png_error(png_ptr, - "Image is too tall to process in memory"); - -- if (width > PNG_UINT_32_MAX/pixel_size) -+ if (width > PNG_UINT_32_MAX / pixel_size) - png_error(png_ptr, - "Image is too wide to process in memory"); - -diff --git a/libpng.3 b/libpng.3 -index 57d06f2db..8875b219a 100644 ---- a/libpng.3 -+++ b/libpng.3 -@@ -1697,11 +1697,11 @@ where row_pointers is an array of pointers to the pixel data for each row: - If you know your image size and pixel size ahead of time, you can allocate - row_pointers prior to calling png_read_png() with - -- if (height > PNG_UINT_32_MAX/(sizeof (png_byte))) -+ if (height > PNG_UINT_32_MAX / (sizeof (png_bytep))) - png_error(png_ptr, - "Image is too tall to process in memory"); - -- if (width > PNG_UINT_32_MAX/pixel_size) -+ if (width > PNG_UINT_32_MAX / pixel_size) - png_error(png_ptr, - "Image is too wide to process in memory"); - -diff --git a/pngrtran.c b/pngrtran.c -index 74cca476b..041f9306c 100644 ---- a/pngrtran.c -+++ b/pngrtran.c -@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ png_set_quantize(png_structrp png_ptr, png_colorp palette, - int i; - - png_ptr->quantize_index = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr, -- (png_alloc_size_t)((png_uint_32)num_palette * (sizeof (png_byte)))); -+ (png_alloc_size_t)num_palette); - for (i = 0; i < num_palette; i++) - png_ptr->quantize_index[i] = (png_byte)i; - } -@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ png_set_quantize(png_structrp png_ptr, png_colorp palette, - - /* Initialize an array to sort colors */ - png_ptr->quantize_sort = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr, -- (png_alloc_size_t)((png_uint_32)num_palette * (sizeof (png_byte)))); -+ (png_alloc_size_t)num_palette); - - /* Initialize the quantize_sort array */ - for (i = 0; i < num_palette; i++) -@@ -592,11 +592,9 @@ png_set_quantize(png_structrp png_ptr, png_colorp palette, - - /* Initialize palette index arrays */ - png_ptr->index_to_palette = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr, -- (png_alloc_size_t)((png_uint_32)num_palette * -- (sizeof (png_byte)))); -+ (png_alloc_size_t)num_palette); - png_ptr->palette_to_index = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr, -- (png_alloc_size_t)((png_uint_32)num_palette * -- (sizeof (png_byte)))); -+ (png_alloc_size_t)num_palette); - - /* Initialize the sort array */ - for (i = 0; i < num_palette; i++) -@@ -761,12 +759,11 @@ png_set_quantize(png_structrp png_ptr, png_colorp palette, - size_t num_entries = ((size_t)1 << total_bits); - - png_ptr->palette_lookup = (png_bytep)png_calloc(png_ptr, -- (png_alloc_size_t)(num_entries * (sizeof (png_byte)))); -+ (png_alloc_size_t)(num_entries)); - -- distance = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr, (png_alloc_size_t)(num_entries * -- (sizeof (png_byte)))); -+ distance = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr, (png_alloc_size_t)num_entries); - -- memset(distance, 0xff, num_entries * (sizeof (png_byte))); -+ memset(distance, 0xff, num_entries); - - for (i = 0; i < num_palette; i++) - {
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meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/libpng_1.6.58.bb renamed from meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/libpng_1.6.42.bb +2 -19
@@ -5,33 +5,16 @@ library for use in applications that read, create, and manipulate PNG \ HOMEPAGE = "http://www.libpng.org/" SECTION = "libs" LICENSE = "Libpng" -LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=0fdbfbe10fc294a6fca24dc76134222a" +LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=9dc350edbbbee660c7d9af79487168f2" DEPENDS = "zlib" LIBV = "16" SRC_URI = "${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/project/${BPN}/${BPN}${LIBV}/${PV}/${BP}.tar.xz \ file://run-ptest \ - file://CVE-2025-64505-01.patch \ - file://CVE-2025-64505-02.patch \ - file://CVE-2025-64505-03.patch \ - file://CVE-2025-64506.patch \ - file://CVE-2025-64720.patch \ - file://CVE-2025-65018-01.patch \ - file://CVE-2025-65018-02.patch \ - file://CVE-2025-66293-01.patch \ - file://CVE-2025-66293-02.patch \ - file://CVE-2026-22695.patch \ - file://CVE-2026-22801.patch \ - file://CVE-2026-25646.patch \ - file://CVE-2026-33636.patch \ - file://CVE-2026-33416-01.patch \ - file://CVE-2026-33416-02.patch \ - file://CVE-2026-33416-03.patch \ - file://CVE-2026-33416-04.patch \ " -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "c919dbc11f4c03b05aba3f8884d8eb7adfe3572ad228af972bb60057bdb48450" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "28eb403f51f0f7405249132cecfe82ea5c0ef97f1b32c5a65828814ae0d34775" MIRRORS += "${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/project/${BPN}/${BPN}${LIBV}/ ${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/project/${BPN}/${BPN}${LIBV}/older-releases/"
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
This is missing [scarthgap] tag.
But it will not be accepted as this upgrade does not contain only bugfixes. Please send patch backports instead.
Peter
Quoted 2,063 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: [email protected] <openembedded- [email protected]> On Behalf Of wang lian via lists.openembedded.org
Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2026 9:52 AM
To: [email protected]
Cc: Lian Wang <[email protected]>
Subject: [OE-core] [PATCH] libpng: upgrade 1.6.42 -> 1.6.58- Drop 17 CVE patches fixed upstream in 1.6.54 through 1.6.58
- Update LICENSE checksum (copyright year updated)
- All CVE-2025-64505, CVE-2025-64506, CVE-2025-64720, CVE-2025-65018, CVE-2025-66293, CVE-2026-22695, CVE-2026-22801, CVE-2026-25646, CVE-2026-33416, CVE-2026-33636 resolved in this releaseSigned-off-by Lian Wang <[email protected]>--- .../libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-01.patch | 111 ----------- .../libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-02.patch | 163 ----------------- .../libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-03.patch | 52 ------ .../libpng/files/CVE-2025-64506.patch | 57 ------ .../libpng/files/CVE-2025-64720.patch | 103 ----------- .../libpng/files/CVE-2025-65018-01.patch | 60 ------ .../libpng/files/CVE-2025-65018-02.patch | 163 ----------------- .../libpng/files/CVE-2025-66293-01.patch | 60 ------ .../libpng/files/CVE-2025-66293-02.patch | 125 ------------- .../libpng/files/CVE-2026-22695.patch | 77 -------- .../libpng/files/CVE-2026-22801.patch | 173 ------------------ .../libpng/files/CVE-2026-25646.patch | 61 ------ .../libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416-01.patch | 143 --------------- .../libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416-02.patch | 53 ------ .../libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416-03.patch | 163 ----------------- .../libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416-04.patch | 53 ------ .../libpng/files/CVE-2026-33636.patch | 99 ---------- .../{libpng_1.6.42.bb => libpng_1.6.58.bb} | 21 +-- 18 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1735 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505- 01.patch delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505- 02.patch delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505- 03.patch delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025- 64506.patch delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025- 64720.patch delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-65018- 01.patch delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-65018- 02.patch delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-66293- 01.patch delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-66293- 02.patch delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026- 22695.patch delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026- 22801.patch delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026- 25646.patch delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416- 01.patch delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416- 02.patch delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416- 03.patch delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416- 04.patch delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026- 33636.patch rename meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/{libpng_1.6.42.bb => libpng_1.6.58.bb}(77%)
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-01.patch deleted +0
-1@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@ -From 0fa3c0f698c2ca618a0fa44e10a822678df85373 Mon Sep 17 00:00:002001
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-01.patch deleted +0
-15-From: Cosmin Truta <[email protected]> -Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 21:53:24 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] chore: Clean up the spurious uses of `sizeof(png_byte)`; fix - the manual - -By definition, `sizeof(png_byte)` is 1. - -Remove all the occurences of `sizeof(png_byte)` from the code, and fix -a related typo in the libpng manual. - -Also update the main .editorconfig file to reflect the fixing expected -by a FIXME note. - -CVE: CVE-2025-64505 -Upstream-Status: Backport[https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/commit/0fa3c0f698c2ca618a0fa44e10a8226
78df85373]meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-01.patch deleted +0
-12-Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]> ---- - libpng-manual.txt | 4 ++-- - libpng.3 | 4 ++-- - pngrtran.c | 17 +++++++---------- - 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/libpng-manual.txt b/libpng-manual.txt -index eb24ef483..d2918ce31 100644 ---- a/libpng-manual.txt -+++ b/libpng-manual.txt -@@ -1178,11 +1178,11 @@ where row_pointers is an array of pointers to thepixel data for each row:
- If you know your image size and pixel size ahead of time, you can allocate
-row_pointersprior to callingpng_read_png()withmeta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-01.patch deleted +0
-16- -- if (height > PNG_UINT_32_MAX/(sizeof (png_byte))) -+ if (height > PNG_UINT_32_MAX / (sizeof (png_bytep))) - png_error(png_ptr, - "Image is too tall to process in memory"); - -- if (width > PNG_UINT_32_MAX/pixel_size) -+ if (width > PNG_UINT_32_MAX / pixel_size) - png_error(png_ptr, - "Image is too wide to process in memory"); - -diff --git a/libpng.3 b/libpng.3 -index 57d06f2db..8875b219a 100644 ---- a/libpng.3 -+++ b/libpng.3 -@@ -1697,11 +1697,11 @@ where row_pointers is an array of pointers to thepixel data for each row:
- If you know your image size and pixel size ahead of time, you can allocate
-row_pointersprior to callingpng_read_png()withmeta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-01.patch deleted +0
-16- -- if (height > PNG_UINT_32_MAX/(sizeof (png_byte))) -+ if (height > PNG_UINT_32_MAX / (sizeof (png_bytep))) - png_error(png_ptr, - "Image is too tall to process in memory"); - -- if (width > PNG_UINT_32_MAX/pixel_size) -+ if (width > PNG_UINT_32_MAX / pixel_size) - png_error(png_ptr, - "Image is too wide to process in memory"); - -diff --git a/pngrtran.c b/pngrtran.c -index 74cca476b..041f9306c 100644 ---- a/pngrtran.c -+++ b/pngrtran.c -@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ png_set_quantize(png_structrp png_ptr, png_colorppalette,
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-01.patch deleted +0
-9- int i; - - png_ptr->quantize_index = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr, -- (png_alloc_size_t)((png_uint_32)num_palette * (sizeof (png_byte)))); -+ (png_alloc_size_t)num_palette); - for (i = 0; i < num_palette; i++) - png_ptr->quantize_index[i] = (png_byte)i; - } -@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ png_set_quantize(png_structrp png_ptr, png_colorppalette,
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-01.patch deleted +0
-9- - /* Initialize an array to sort colors */ - png_ptr->quantize_sort = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr, -- (png_alloc_size_t)((png_uint_32)num_palette * (sizeof (png_byte)))); -+ (png_alloc_size_t)num_palette); - - /* Initialize the quantize_sort array */ - for (i = 0; i < num_palette; i++) -@@ -592,11 +592,9 @@ png_set_quantize(png_structrp png_ptr, png_colorppalette,
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-01.patch deleted +0
-14- - /* Initialize palette index arrays */ - png_ptr->index_to_palette = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr, -- (png_alloc_size_t)((png_uint_32)num_palette * -- (sizeof (png_byte)))); -+ (png_alloc_size_t)num_palette); - png_ptr->palette_to_index = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr, -- (png_alloc_size_t)((png_uint_32)num_palette * -- (sizeof (png_byte)))); -+ (png_alloc_size_t)num_palette); - - /* Initialize the sort array */ - for (i = 0; i < num_palette; i++) -@@ -761,12 +759,11 @@ png_set_quantize(png_structrp png_ptr, png_colorppalette,
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-01.patch deleted +0
-7- size_t num_entries = ((size_t)1 << total_bits); - - png_ptr->palette_lookup = (png_bytep)png_calloc(png_ptr, -- (png_alloc_size_t)(num_entries * (sizeof (png_byte)))); -+ (png_alloc_size_t)(num_entries)); - -- distance = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr, (png_alloc_size_t)(num_entries*
-- (sizeof (png_byte))));
-+ distance = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_alloc_size_t)num_entries);meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-01.patch deleted +0
-6- -- memset(distance, 0xff, num_entries * (sizeof (png_byte))); -+ memset(distance, 0xff, num_entries); - - for (i = 0; i < num_palette; i++) - {meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-02.patch deleted +0
-1@@ -1,163 +0,0 @@ -From ea094764f3436e3c6524622724c2d342a3eff235 Mon Sep 17 00:00:002001
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-02.patch deleted +0
-19-From: Cosmin Truta <[email protected]> -Date: Sat, 8 Nov 2025 17:16:59 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] Fix a memory leak in function `png_set_quantize`; refactor - -Release the previously-allocated array `quantize_index` before -reallocating it. This avoids leaking memory when the function -`png_set_quantize` is called multiple times on the same `png_struct`. - -This function assumed single-call usage, but fuzzing revealed that -repeated calls would overwrite the pointers without freeing the -original allocations, leaking 256 bytes per call for `quantize_index` -and additional memory for `quantize_sort` when histogram-based -quantization is used. - -Also remove the array `quantize_sort` from the list of `png_struct` -members and make it a local variable. This array is initialized, -used and released exclusively inside the function `png_set_quantize`. - -Reported-by: Samsung-PENTEST <Samsung-meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-02.patch deleted +0
-5-Analyzed-by: degrigis <[email protected]> -Reviewed-by: John Bowler <[email protected]> - -CVE: CVE-2025-64505 -Upstream-Status: Backport[https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/commit/ea094764f3436e3c6524622724c2d3
42a3eff235]meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-02.patch deleted +0
-11-Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]> ---- - pngrtran.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- - pngstruct.h | 1 - - 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/pngrtran.c b/pngrtran.c -index 1809db704..4632dd521 100644 ---- a/pngrtran.c -+++ b/pngrtran.c -@@ -440,6 +440,12 @@ png_set_quantize(png_structrp png_ptr, png_colorppalette,
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-02.patch deleted +0
-13- { - int i; - -+ /* Initialize the array to index colors. -+ * -+ * Be careful to avoid leaking memory. Applications are allowed to call -+ * this function more than once per png_struct. -+ */ -+ png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->quantize_index); - png_ptr->quantize_index = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr, - (png_alloc_size_t)num_palette); - for (i = 0; i < num_palette; i++) -@@ -454,15 +460,14 @@ png_set_quantize(png_structrp png_ptr, png_colorppalette,
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-02.patch deleted +0
-21- * Perhaps not the best solution, but good enough. - */ - -- int i; -+ png_bytep quantize_sort; -+ int i, j; - -- /* Initialize an array to sort colors */ -- png_ptr->quantize_sort = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr, -+ /* Initialize the local array to sort colors. */ -+ quantize_sort = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr, - (png_alloc_size_t)num_palette); -- -- /* Initialize the quantize_sort array */ - for (i = 0; i < num_palette; i++) -- png_ptr->quantize_sort[i] = (png_byte)i; -+ quantize_sort[i] = (png_byte)i; - - /* Find the least used palette entries by starting a - * bubble sort, and running it until we have sorted -@@ -474,19 +479,18 @@ png_set_quantize(png_structrp png_ptr, png_colorppalette,
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-02.patch deleted +0
-25- for (i = num_palette - 1; i >= maximum_colors; i--) - { - int done; /* To stop early if the list is pre-sorted */ -- int j; - - done = 1; - for (j = 0; j < i; j++) - { -- if (histogram[png_ptr->quantize_sort[j]] -- < histogram[png_ptr->quantize_sort[j + 1]]) -+ if (histogram[quantize_sort[j]] -+ < histogram[quantize_sort[j + 1]]) - { - png_byte t; - -- t = png_ptr->quantize_sort[j]; -- png_ptr->quantize_sort[j] = png_ptr->quantize_sort[j + 1]; -- png_ptr->quantize_sort[j + 1] = t; -+ t = quantize_sort[j]; -+ quantize_sort[j] = quantize_sort[j + 1]; -+ quantize_sort[j + 1] = t; - done = 0; - } - } -@@ -498,18 +502,18 @@ png_set_quantize(png_structrp png_ptr, png_colorppalette,
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-02.patch deleted +0
-22- /* Swap the palette around, and set up a table, if necessary */ - if (full_quantize != 0) - { -- int j = num_palette; -+ j = num_palette; - - /* Put all the useful colors within the max, but don't - * move the others. - */ - for (i = 0; i < maximum_colors; i++) - { -- if ((int)png_ptr->quantize_sort[i] >= maximum_colors) -+ if ((int)quantize_sort[i] >= maximum_colors) - { - do - j--; -- while ((int)png_ptr->quantize_sort[j] >= maximum_colors); -+ while ((int)quantize_sort[j] >= maximum_colors); - - palette[i] = palette[j]; - } -@@ -517,7 +521,7 @@ png_set_quantize(png_structrp png_ptr, png_colorppalette,
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-02.patch deleted +0
-9- } - else - { -- int j = num_palette; -+ j = num_palette; - - /* Move all the used colors inside the max limit, and - * develop a translation table. -@@ -525,13 +529,13 @@ png_set_quantize(png_structrp png_ptr, png_colorppalette,
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-02.patch deleted +0
-16- for (i = 0; i < maximum_colors; i++) - { - /* Only move the colors we need to */ -- if ((int)png_ptr->quantize_sort[i] >= maximum_colors) -+ if ((int)quantize_sort[i] >= maximum_colors) - { - png_color tmp_color; - - do - j--; -- while ((int)png_ptr->quantize_sort[j] >= maximum_colors); -+ while ((int)quantize_sort[j] >= maximum_colors); - - tmp_color = palette[j]; - palette[j] = palette[i]; -@@ -569,8 +573,7 @@ png_set_quantize(png_structrp png_ptr, png_colorppalette,
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-02.patch deleted +0
-21- } - } - } -- png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->quantize_sort); -- png_ptr->quantize_sort = NULL; -+ png_free(png_ptr, quantize_sort); - } - else - { -diff --git a/pngstruct.h b/pngstruct.h -index 084422bc1..fe5fa0415 100644 ---- a/pngstruct.h -+++ b/pngstruct.h -@@ -413,7 +413,6 @@ struct png_struct_def - - #ifdef PNG_READ_QUANTIZE_SUPPORTED - /* The following three members were added at version 1.0.14 and 1.2.4 */ -- png_bytep quantize_sort; /* working sort array */ - png_bytep index_to_palette; /* where the original index currently is - in the palette */ - png_bytep palette_to_index; /* which original index points to thismeta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-03.patch deleted +0
-1@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@ -From 6a528eb5fd0dd7f6de1c39d30de0e41473431c37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:002001
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-03.patch deleted +0
-17-From: Cosmin Truta <[email protected]> -Date: Sat, 8 Nov 2025 23:58:26 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] Fix a buffer overflow in `png_do_quantize` - -Allocate the quantize_index array to PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH (256 bytes) -instead of num_palette bytes. This approach matches the allocation -pattern for `palette[]`, `trans_alpha[]` and `riffled_palette[]` which -were similarly oversized in libpng 1.2.1 to prevent buffer overflows -from malformed PNG files with out-of-range palette indices. - -Out-of-range palette indices `index >= num_palette` will now read -identity-mapped values from the `quantize_index` array (where index N -maps to palette entry N). This prevents undefined behavior while -avoiding runtime bounds checking overhead in the performance-critical -pixel processing loop. - -Reported-by: Samsung-PENTEST <Samsung-meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-03.patch deleted +0
-4-Analyzed-by: degrigis <[email protected]> - -CVE: CVE-2025-64505 -Upstream-Status: Backport[https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/commit/6a528eb5fd0dd7f6de1c39d30de0e4
1473431c37]meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-03.patch deleted +0
-10-Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]> ---- - pngrtran.c | 8 ++++++-- - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/pngrtran.c b/pngrtran.c -index 4632dd521..9c2475fde 100644 ---- a/pngrtran.c -+++ b/pngrtran.c -@@ -441,14 +441,18 @@ png_set_quantize(png_structrp png_ptr, png_colorppalette,
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-03.patch deleted +0
-5- int i; - - /* Initialize the array to index colors. -+ * -+ * Ensure quantize_index can fit 256 elements(
PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH)
-+ * rather thannum_paletteelements. This is to prevent buffer overflows
-+ * caused by malformed PNG files with out-of-range palette indices.meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-03.patch deleted +0
-13- * - * Be careful to avoid leaking memory. Applications are allowed to call - * this function more than once per png_struct. - */ - png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->quantize_index); - png_ptr->quantize_index = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr, -- (png_alloc_size_t)num_palette); -- for (i = 0; i < num_palette; i++) -+ PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH); -+ for (i = 0; i < PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH; i++) - png_ptr->quantize_index[i] = (png_byte)i; - } -meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64506.patch deleted +0
-1@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@ -From 2bd84c019c300b78e811743fbcddb67c9d9bf821 Mon Sep 17 00:00:002001
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64506.patch deleted +0
-31-From: Cosmin Truta <[email protected]> -Date: Fri, 7 Nov 2025 22:40:05 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] Fix a heap buffer overflow in `png_write_image_8bit` - -The condition guarding the pre-transform path incorrectly allowed 8-bit -input data to enter `png_write_image_8bit` which expects 16-bit input. -This caused out-of-bounds reads when processing 8-bit grayscale+alpha -images (GitHub #688), or 8-bit RGB or RGB+alpha images (GitHub #746), -with the `convert_to_8bit` flag set (an invalid combination that should -bypass the pre-transform path). - -The second part of the condition, i.e. - - colormap == 0 && convert_to_8bit != 0 - -failed to verify that input was 16-bit, i.e. - - linear != 0 - -contradicting the comment "This only applies when the input is 16-bit". - -The fix consists in restructuring the condition to ensure both the -`alpha` path and the `convert_to_8bit` path require linear (16-bit) -input. The corrected condition, i.e. - - linear != 0 && (alpha != 0 || display->convert_to_8bit != 0) - -matches the expectation of the `png_write_image_8bit` function and -prevents treating 8-bit buffers as 16-bit data. - -Reported-by: Samsung-PENTEST <Samsung-meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64506.patch deleted +0
-6-Reported-by: weijinjinnihao <[email protected]> -Analyzed-by: degrigis <[email protected]> -Reviewed-by: John Bowler <[email protected]> - -CVE: CVE-2025-64506 -Upstream-Status: Backport[https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/commit/2bd84c019c300b78e811743fbcddb6
7c9d9bf821]meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64506.patch deleted +0
-19-Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]> ---- - pngwrite.c | 3 +-- - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/pngwrite.c b/pngwrite.c -index 35a5d17b6..83148960e 100644 ---- a/pngwrite.c -+++ b/pngwrite.c -@@ -2142,8 +2142,7 @@ png_image_write_main(png_voidp argument) - * before it is written. This only applies when the input is 16-bit and - * either there is an alpha channel or it is converted to 8-bit. - */ -- if ((linear != 0 && alpha != 0 ) || -- (colormap == 0 && display->convert_to_8bit != 0)) -+ if (linear != 0 && (alpha != 0 || display->convert_to_8bit != 0)) - { - png_bytep row = png_voidcast(png_bytep, png_malloc(png_ptr, - png_get_rowbytes(png_ptr, info_ptr)));meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64720.patch deleted +0
-1@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@ -From 08da33b4c88cfcd36e5a706558a8d7e0e4773643 Mon Sep 17 00:00:002001
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64720.patch deleted +0
-6-From: Cosmin Truta <[email protected]> -Date: Wed, 12 Nov 2025 13:46:23 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] Fix a buffer overflow in `png_init_read_transformations` - -The palette compositing code in `png_init_read_transformations` was -incorrectly applying background compositing when
PNG_FLAG_OPTIMIZE_ALPHAmeta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64720.patch deleted +0
-21-was set. This violated the premultiplied alpha invariant -`component <= alpha` expected by `png_image_read_composite`, causing -values that exceeded the valid range for the PNG_sRGB_FROM_LINEAR lookup -tables. - -When PNG_ALPHA_OPTIMIZED is active, palette entries should contain pure -premultiplied RGB values without background compositing. The background -compositing must happen later in `png_image_read_composite` where the -actual background color from the PNG file is available. - -The fix consists in introducing conditional behavior based on -PNG_FLAG_OPTIMIZE_ALPHA: when set, the code performs only -premultiplication using the formula `component * alpha + 127) / 255` -with proper gamma correction. When not set, the original background -compositing calculation based on the `png_composite` macro is preserved. - -This prevents buffer overflows in `png_image_read_composite` where -out-of-range premultiplied values would cause out-of-bounds array access -in `png_sRGB_base[]` and `png_sRGB_delta[]`. - -Reported-by: Samsung-PENTEST <Samsung-meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64720.patch deleted +0
-4-Analyzed-by: John Bowler <[email protected]> - -CVE: CVE-2025-64720 -Upstream-Status: Backport[https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/commit/08da33b4c88cfcd36e5a706558a8d7
e0e4773643]meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64720.patch deleted +0
-10-Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]> ---- - pngrtran.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- - 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/pngrtran.c b/pngrtran.c -index 548780030..2f5202255 100644 ---- a/pngrtran.c -+++ b/pngrtran.c -@@ -1698,19 +1698,51 @@ png_init_read_transformations(png_structrp
png_ptr)meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64720.patch deleted +0
-61- } - else /* if (png_ptr->trans_alpha[i] != 0xff) */ - { -- png_byte v, w; -+ if ((png_ptr->flags & PNG_FLAG_OPTIMIZE_ALPHA) != 0) -+ { -+ /* Premultiply only: -+ * component = round((component * alpha) / 255) -+ */ -+ png_uint_32 component; - -- v = png_ptr->gamma_to_1[palette[i].red]; -- png_composite(w, v, png_ptr->trans_alpha[i], back_1.red); -- palette[i].red = png_ptr->gamma_from_1[w]; -+ component = png_ptr->gamma_to_1[palette[i].red]; -+ component = -+ (component * png_ptr->trans_alpha[i] + 128) / 255; -+ palette[i].red = png_ptr->gamma_from_1[component]; - -- v = png_ptr->gamma_to_1[palette[i].green]; -- png_composite(w, v, png_ptr->trans_alpha[i], back_1.green); -- palette[i].green = png_ptr->gamma_from_1[w]; -+ component = png_ptr->gamma_to_1[palette[i].green]; -+ component = -+ (component * png_ptr->trans_alpha[i] + 128) / 255; -+ palette[i].green = png_ptr->gamma_from_1[component]; - -- v = png_ptr->gamma_to_1[palette[i].blue]; -- png_composite(w, v, png_ptr->trans_alpha[i], back_1.blue); -- palette[i].blue = png_ptr->gamma_from_1[w]; -+ component = png_ptr->gamma_to_1[palette[i].blue]; -+ component = -+ (component * png_ptr->trans_alpha[i] + 128) / 255; -+ palette[i].blue = png_ptr->gamma_from_1[component]; -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ /* Composite with background color: -+ * component = -+ * alpha * component + (1 - alpha) * background -+ */ -+ png_byte v, w; -+ -+ v = png_ptr->gamma_to_1[palette[i].red]; -+ png_composite(w, v, -+ png_ptr->trans_alpha[i], back_1.red); -+ palette[i].red = png_ptr->gamma_from_1[w]; -+ -+ v = png_ptr->gamma_to_1[palette[i].green]; -+ png_composite(w, v, -+ png_ptr->trans_alpha[i], back_1.green); -+ palette[i].green = png_ptr->gamma_from_1[w]; -+ -+ v = png_ptr->gamma_to_1[palette[i].blue]; -+ png_composite(w, v, -+ png_ptr->trans_alpha[i], back_1.blue); -+ palette[i].blue = png_ptr->gamma_from_1[w]; -+ } - } - } - elsemeta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-65018-01.patch deleted +0
-1@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@ -From 16b5e3823918840aae65c0a6da57c78a5a496a4d Mon Sep 17 00:00:002001
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-65018-01.patch deleted +0
-29-From: Cosmin Truta <[email protected]> -Date: Mon, 17 Nov 2025 20:38:47 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] Fix a buffer overflow in `png_image_finish_read` -MIME-Version: 1.0 -Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 -Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - -Reject bit-depth mismatches between IHDR and the requested output -format. When a 16-bit PNG is processed with an 8-bit output format -request, `png_combine_row` writes using the IHDR depth before -transformation, causing writes beyond the buffer allocated via -`PNG_IMAGE_SIZE(image)`. - -The validation establishes a safe API contract where -`PNG_IMAGE_SIZE(image)` is guaranteed to be sufficient across the -transformation pipeline. - -Example overflow (32×32 pixels, 16-bit RGB to 8-bit RGBA): -- Input format: 16 bits/channel × 3 channels = 6144 bytes -- Output buffer: 8 bits/channel × 4 channels = 4096 bytes -- Overflow: 6144 bytes - 4096 bytes = 2048 bytes - -Larger images produce proportionally larger overflows. For example, -for 256×256 pixels, the overflow is 131072 bytes. - -Reported-by: yosiimich <[email protected]> - -CVE: CVE-2025-65018 -Upstream-Status: Backport[https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/commit/16b5e3823918840aae65c0a6da57c
78a5a496a4d]meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-65018-01.patch deleted +0
-10-Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]> ---- - pngread.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/pngread.c b/pngread.c -index 212afb7d2..92571ec33 100644 ---- a/pngread.c -+++ b/pngread.c -@@ -4166,6 +4166,20 @@ png_image_finish_read(png_imagep image,
png_const_colorpbackground,meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-65018-01.patch deleted +0
-20- int result; - png_image_read_control display; - -+ /* Reject bit depth mismatches to avoid buffer overflows. */ -+ png_uint_32 ihdr_bit_depth = -+ image->opaque->png_ptr->bit_depth; -+ int requested_linear = -+ (image->format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_LINEAR) != 0; -+ if (ihdr_bit_depth == 16 && !requested_linear) -+ return png_image_error(image, -+ "png_image_finish_read: " -+ "16-bit PNG must use 16-bit output format"); -+ if (ihdr_bit_depth < 16 && requested_linear) -+ return png_image_error(image, -+ "png_image_finish_read: " -+ "8-bit PNG must not use 16-bit output format"); -+ - memset(&display, 0, (sizeof display)); - display.image = image; - display.buffer = buffer;meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-65018-02.patch deleted +0
-1@@ -1,163 +0,0 @@ -From 218612ddd6b17944e21eda56caf8b4bf7779d1ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:002001
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-65018-02.patch deleted +0
-27-From: Cosmin Truta <[email protected]> -Date: Wed, 19 Nov 2025 21:45:13 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] Rearchitect the fix to the buffer overflow in - `png_image_finish_read` - -Undo the fix from commit 16b5e3823918840aae65c0a6da57c78a5a496a4d. -That fix turned out to be unnecessarily limiting. It rejected all -16-to-8 bit transformations, although the vulnerability only affects -interlaced PNGs where `png_combine_row` writes using IHDR bit-depth -before the transformation completes. - -The proper solution is to add an intermediate `local_row` buffer, -specifically for the slow but necessary step of 16-to-8 bit conversion -of interlaced images. (The processing of non-interlaced images remains -intact, using the fast path.) We added the flag `do_local_scale` and -the function `png_image_read_direct_scaled`, following the pattern that -involves `do_local_compose`. - -In conclusion: -- The 16-to-8 bit transformations of interlaced images are now safe, - as they use an intermediate buffer. -- The 16-to-8 bit transformations of non-interlaced images remain safe, - as the fast path remains unchanged. -- All our regression tests are now passing. - -CVE: CVE-2025-65018 -Upstream-Status: Backport[https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/commit/218612ddd6b17944e21eda56caf8b4
bf7779d1ea]meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-65018-02.patch deleted +0
-11-Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]> ---- - pngread.c | 89 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- - - 1 file changed, 75 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/pngread.c b/pngread.c -index 92571ec33..79917daaa 100644 ---- a/pngread.c -+++ b/pngread.c -@@ -3262,6 +3262,54 @@ png_image_read_colormapped(png_voidpargument)
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-65018-02.patch deleted +0
-95- } - } - -+/* Row reading for interlaced 16-to-8 bit depth conversion with local buffer. */ -+static int -+png_image_read_direct_scaled(png_voidp argument) -+{ -+ png_image_read_control *display = png_voidcast(png_image_read_control*, -+ argument); -+ png_imagep image = display->image; -+ png_structrp png_ptr = image->opaque->png_ptr; -+ png_bytep local_row = png_voidcast(png_bytep, display->local_row); -+ png_bytep first_row = png_voidcast(png_bytep, display->first_row); -+ ptrdiff_t row_bytes = display->row_bytes; -+ int passes; -+ -+ /* Handle interlacing. */ -+ switch (png_ptr->interlaced) -+ { -+ case PNG_INTERLACE_NONE: -+ passes = 1; -+ break; -+ -+ case PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7: -+ passes = PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7_PASSES; -+ break; -+ -+ default: -+ png_error(png_ptr, "unknown interlace type"); -+ } -+ -+ /* Read each pass using local_row as intermediate buffer. */ -+ while (--passes >= 0) -+ { -+ png_uint_32 y = image->height; -+ png_bytep output_row = first_row; -+ -+ for (; y > 0; --y) -+ { -+ /* Read into local_row (gets transformed 8-bit data). */ -+ png_read_row(png_ptr, local_row, NULL); -+ -+ /* Copy from local_row to user buffer. */ -+ memcpy(output_row, local_row, (size_t)row_bytes); -+ output_row += row_bytes; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ return 1; -+} -+ - /* Just the row reading part of png_image_read. */ - static int - png_image_read_composite(png_voidp argument) -@@ -3680,6 +3728,7 @@ png_image_read_direct(png_voidp argument) - int linear = (format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_LINEAR) != 0; - int do_local_compose = 0; - int do_local_background = 0; /* to avoid double gamma correction bug */ -+ int do_local_scale = 0; /* for interlaced 16-to-8 bit conversion */ - int passes = 0; - - /* Add transforms to ensure the correct output format is produced then check -@@ -3806,8 +3855,16 @@ png_image_read_direct(png_voidp argument) - png_set_expand_16(png_ptr); - - else /* 8-bit output */ -+ { - png_set_scale_16(png_ptr); - -+ /* For interlaced images, use local_row buffer to avoid overflow -+ * in png_combine_row() which writes using IHDR bit-depth. -+ */ -+ if (png_ptr->interlaced != 0) -+ do_local_scale = 1; -+ } -+ - change &= ~PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_LINEAR; - } - -@@ -4083,6 +4140,24 @@ png_image_read_direct(png_voidp argument) - return result; - } - -+ else if (do_local_scale != 0) -+ { -+ /* For interlaced 16-to-8 conversion, use an intermediate row buffer -+ * to avoid buffer overflows in png_combine_row. The local_row is sized -+ * for the transformed (8-bit) output, preventing the overflow that would -+ * occur if png_combine_row wrote 16-bit data directly to the user buffer. -+ */ -+ int result; -+ png_voidp row = png_malloc(png_ptr, png_get_rowbytes(png_ptr, info_ptr)); -+ -+ display->local_row = row; -+ result = png_safe_execute(image, png_image_read_direct_scaled,display);
-+display->local_row= NULL;
-+png_free(png_ptr, row);
-+
-+ return result;
-+ }
-+meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-65018-02.patch deleted +0
-4- else - { - png_alloc_size_t row_bytes = (png_alloc_size_t)display->row_bytes; -@@ -4166,20 +4241,6 @@ png_image_finish_read(png_imagep image,
png_const_colorpbackground,meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-65018-02.patch deleted +0
-20- int result; - png_image_read_control display; - -- /* Reject bit depth mismatches to avoid buffer overflows. */ -- png_uint_32 ihdr_bit_depth = -- image->opaque->png_ptr->bit_depth; -- int requested_linear = -- (image->format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_LINEAR) != 0; -- if (ihdr_bit_depth == 16 && !requested_linear) -- return png_image_error(image, -- "png_image_finish_read: " -- "16-bit PNG must use 16-bit output format"); -- if (ihdr_bit_depth < 16 && requested_linear) -- return png_image_error(image, -- "png_image_finish_read: " -- "8-bit PNG must not use 16-bit output format"); -- - memset(&display, 0, (sizeof display)); - display.image = image; - display.buffer = buffer;meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-66293-01.patch deleted +0
-1@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@ -From 788a624d7387a758ffd5c7ab010f1870dea753a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:002001
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-66293-01.patch deleted +0
-33-From: Cosmin Truta <[email protected]> -Date: Sat, 29 Nov 2025 00:39:16 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] Fix an out-of-bounds read in `png_image_read_composite` - -Add a defensive bounds check before calling PNG_sRGB_FROM_LINEAR to -prevent reading up to 506 entries (1012 bytes) past `png_sRGB_base[]`. - -For palette images with gamma, `png_init_read_transformations` -clears PNG_COMPOSE after compositing on the palette, but it leaves -PNG_FLAG_OPTIMIZE_ALPHA set. The simplified API then calls -`png_image_read_composite` with sRGB data (not linear premultiplied), -causing the index to reach 1017. (The maximum valid index is 511.) - -NOTE: -This is a defensive fix that addresses the security issue (out-of-bounds -read) but *NOT* the correctness issue (wrong output). When the clamp -triggers, the affected pixels are clamped to white instead of the -correct composited color. Valid PNG images may render incorrectly with -the simplified API. - -TODO: -We already know the root cause is a flag synchronization error. -For palette images with gamma, `png_init_read_transformations` -clears PNG_COMPOSE but leaves PNG_FLAG_OPTIMIZE_ALPHA set, causing -`png_image_read_composite` to misinterpret sRGB data as linear -premultiplied. However, we have yet to implement an architectural fix -that requires coordinating the simplified API with the transformation -pipeline. - -Reported-by: flyfish101 <[email protected]> - -CVE: CVE-2025-66293 -Upstream-Status: Backport[https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/commit/788a624d7387a758ffd5c7ab010f187
0dea753a1]meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-66293-01.patch deleted +0
-26-Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]> ---- - pngread.c | 9 +++++++-- - 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/pngread.c b/pngread.c -index 79917daaa..ab62edd9d 100644 ---- a/pngread.c -+++ b/pngread.c -@@ -3406,9 +3406,14 @@ png_image_read_composite(png_voidp argument) - component += (255-alpha)*png_sRGB_table[outrow[c]]; - - /* So 'component' is scaled by 255*65535 and is -- * therefore appropriate for the sRGB to linear -- * conversion table. -+ * therefore appropriate for the sRGB-to-linear -+ * conversion table. Clamp to the valid range -+ * as a defensive measure against an internal -+ * libpng bug where the data is sRGB rather than -+ * linear premultiplied. - */ -+ if (component > 255*65535) -+ component = 255*65535; - component = PNG_sRGB_FROM_LINEAR(component); - } -meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-66293-02.patch deleted +0
-1@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@ -From a05a48b756de63e3234ea6b3b938b8f5f862484a Mon Sep 17 00:00:002001
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-66293-02.patch deleted +0
-17-From: Cosmin Truta <[email protected]> -Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2025 22:31:54 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] Finalize the fix for out-of-bounds read in - `png_image_read_composite` - -Following up on commit 788a624d7387a758ffd5c7ab010f1870dea753a1. - -The previous commit added a defensive bounds check to address the -security issue (out-of-bounds read), but noted that the correctness -issue remained: when the clamp triggered, the affected pixels were -clamped to white instead of the correct composited color. - -This commit addresses the correctness issue by fixing the flag -synchronization error identified in the previous commit's TODO: - -1. In `png_init_read_transformations`: - Clear PNG_FLAG_OPTIMIZE_ALPHA when clearing PNG_COMPOSE forpalette
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-66293-02.patch deleted +0
-14- images. This correctly signals that the data is sRGB, not linear - premultiplied. - -2. In `png_image_read_composite`: - Check PNG_FLAG_OPTIMIZE_ALPHA and use the appropriate composition - formula. When set, use the existing linear composition. When cleared - (palette composition already done), use sRGB composition to match - what was done to the palette. - -Retain the previous clamp to the valid range as belt-and-suspenders -protection against any other unforeseen cases. - -CVE: CVE-2025-66293 -Upstream-Status: Backport[https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/commit/a05a48b756de63e3234ea6b3b938b
8f5f862484a]meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-66293-02.patch deleted +0
-19-Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]> ---- - pngread.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ - pngrtran.c | 1 + - 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/pngread.c b/pngread.c -index ab62edd9d..f8ca2b7e3 100644 ---- a/pngread.c -+++ b/pngread.c -@@ -3340,6 +3340,7 @@ png_image_read_composite(png_voidp argument) - ptrdiff_t step_row = display->row_bytes; - unsigned int channels = - (image->format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_COLOR) != 0 ? 3 : 1; -+ int optimize_alpha = (png_ptr->flags & PNG_FLAG_OPTIMIZE_ALPHA) != 0; - int pass; - - for (pass = 0; pass < passes; ++pass) -@@ -3396,25 +3397,44 @@ png_image_read_composite(png_voidpargument)
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-66293-02.patch deleted +0
-74- - if (alpha < 255) /* else just use component */ - { -- /* This is PNG_OPTIMIZED_ALPHA, the component value -- * is a linear 8-bit value. Combine this with the -- * current outrow[c] value which is sRGB encoded. -- * Arithmetic here is 16-bits to preserve the output -- * values correctly. -- */ -- component *= 257*255; /* =65535 */ -- component += (255-alpha)*png_sRGB_table[outrow[c]]; -+ if (optimize_alpha != 0) -+ { -+ /* This is PNG_OPTIMIZED_ALPHA, the component value -+ * is a linear 8-bit value. Combine this with the -+ * current outrow[c] value which is sRGB encoded. -+ * Arithmetic here is 16-bits to preserve the output -+ * values correctly. -+ */ -+ component *= 257*255; /* =65535 */ -+ component += (255-alpha)*png_sRGB_table[outrow[c]]; - -- /* So 'component' is scaled by 255*65535 and is -- * therefore appropriate for the sRGB-to-linear -- * conversion table. Clamp to the valid range -- * as a defensive measure against an internal -- * libpng bug where the data is sRGB rather than -- * linear premultiplied. -- */ -- if (component > 255*65535) -- component = 255*65535; -- component = PNG_sRGB_FROM_LINEAR(component); -+ /* Clamp to the valid range to defend against -+ * unforeseen cases where the data might be sRGB -+ * instead of linear premultiplied. -+ * (Belt-and-suspenders for GitHub Issue #764.) -+ */ -+ if (component > 255*65535) -+ component = 255*65535; -+ -+ /* So 'component' is scaled by 255*65535 and is -+ * therefore appropriate for the sRGB-to-linear -+ * conversion table. -+ */ -+ component = PNG_sRGB_FROM_LINEAR(component); -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ /* Compositing was already done on the palette -+ * entries. The data is sRGB premultiplied on black. -+ * Composite with the background in sRGB space. -+ * This is not gamma-correct, but matches what was -+ * done to the palette. -+ */ -+ png_uint_32 background = outrow[c]; -+ component += ((255-alpha) * background + 127) / 255; -+ if (component > 255) -+ component = 255; -+ } - } - - outrow[c] = (png_byte)component; -diff --git a/pngrtran.c b/pngrtran.c -index 2f5202255..507d11381 100644 ---- a/pngrtran.c -+++ b/pngrtran.c -@@ -1760,6 +1760,7 @@ png_init_read_transformations(png_structrp png_ptr) - * transformations elsewhere. - */ - png_ptr->transformations &= ~(PNG_COMPOSE | PNG_GAMMA); -+ png_ptr->flags &= ~PNG_FLAG_OPTIMIZE_ALPHA; - } /* color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE */ - - /* if (png_ptr-Quoted 1 line
background_gamma_type!=PNG_BACKGROUND_GAMMA_UNKNOWN) */
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-22695.patch deleted +0
-1@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@ -From e4f7ad4ea2a471776c81dda4846b7691925d9786 Mon Sep 17 00:00:002001
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-22695.patch deleted +0
-3-From: Cosmin Truta <[email protected]> -Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2026 20:51:53 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] Fix a heap buffer over-read in
png_image_read_direct_scaledmeta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-22695.patch deleted +0
-30- -Fix a regression from commit 218612ddd6b17944e21eda56caf8b4bf7779d1ea. - -The function `png_image_read_direct_scaled`, introduced by the fix for -CVE-2025-65018, copies transformed row data from an intermediate buffer -(`local_row`) to the user's output buffer. The copy incorrectly used -`row_bytes` (the caller's stride) as the size parameter to memcpy, even -though `local_row` is only `png_get_rowbytes()` bytes long. - -This causes a heap buffer over-read when: - -1. The caller provides a padded stride (e.g., for memory alignment): - memcpy reads past the end of `local_row` by `stride - row_width` - bytes. - -2. The caller provides a negative stride (for bottom-up layouts): - casting ptrdiff_t to size_t produces ~2^64, causing memcpy to - attempt reading exabytes, resulting in an immediate crash. - -The fix consists in using the size of the row buffer for the copy and -using the stride for pointer advancement only. - -Reported-by: Petr Simecek <[email protected]> -Analyzed-by: Stanislav Fort -Analyzed-by: Pavel Kohout -Co-authored-by: Petr Simecek <[email protected]> -Signed-off-by: Cosmin Truta <[email protected]> - -CVE: CVE-2026-22695 -Upstream-Status: Backport[https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/commit/e4f7ad4ea2a471776c81dda4846b76
91925d9786]meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-22695.patch deleted +0
-23-Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]> ---- - AUTHORS | 1 + - pngread.c | 4 +++- - 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/AUTHORS b/AUTHORS -index 26b7bb50f..b9c0fffcf 100644 ---- a/AUTHORS -+++ b/AUTHORS -@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ Authors, for copyright and licensing purposes. - * Mike Klein - * Pascal Massimino - * Paul Schmidt -+ * Petr Simecek - * Philippe Antoine - * Qiang Zhou - * Sam Bushell -diff --git a/pngread.c b/pngread.c -index e3426292b..9d86b01dc 100644 ---- a/pngread.c -+++ b/pngread.c -@@ -3270,9 +3270,11 @@ png_image_read_direct_scaled(png_voidpargument)
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-22695.patch deleted +0
-12- argument); - png_imagep image = display->image; - png_structrp png_ptr = image->opaque->png_ptr; -+ png_inforp info_ptr = image->opaque->info_ptr; - png_bytep local_row = png_voidcast(png_bytep, display->local_row); - png_bytep first_row = png_voidcast(png_bytep, display->first_row); - ptrdiff_t row_bytes = display->row_bytes; -+ size_t copy_bytes = png_get_rowbytes(png_ptr, info_ptr); - int passes; - - /* Handle interlacing. */ -@@ -3302,7 +3304,7 @@ png_image_read_direct_scaled(png_voidpargument)
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-22695.patch deleted +0
-8- png_read_row(png_ptr, local_row, NULL); - - /* Copy from local_row to user buffer. */ -- memcpy(output_row, local_row, (size_t)row_bytes); -+ memcpy(output_row, local_row, copy_bytes); - output_row += row_bytes; - } - }meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-22801.patch deleted +0
-1@@ -1,173 +0,0 @@ -From cf155de014fc6c5cb199dd681dd5c8fb70429072 Mon Sep 17 00:00:002001
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-22801.patch deleted +0
-26-From: Cosmin Truta <[email protected]> -Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2026 15:20:18 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] fix: Remove incorrect truncation casts from - `png_write_image_*` - -The type of the row stride (`display->row_bytes`) is ptrdiff_t. Casting -to png_uint_16 before division will truncate large strides, causing -incorrect pointer arithmetic for images exceeding 65535 bytes per row. -For bottom-up images (negative stride), the truncation also corrupts -the sign, advancing the row pointer forward instead of backward. - -Remove the erroneous casts and let the compiler handle the pointer -arithmetic correctly. Also replace `sizeof (png_uint_16)` with 2. - -Add regression test via `pngstest --stride-extra N` where N > 32767 -triggers the affected code paths. - -A NOTE ABOUT HISTORY: -The original code in libpng 1.5.6 (2011) had no such casts. They were -introduced in libpng 1.6.26 (2016), likely to silence compiler warnings -on 16-bit systems where the cast would be a no-op. On 32/64-bit systems -the cast truncates the strides above 65535 and corrupts the negative -strides. - -CVE: CVE-2026-22801 -Upstream-Status: Backport[https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/commit/cf155de014fc6c5cb199dd681dd5c8f
b70429072]meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-22801.patch deleted +0
-32-Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]> ---- - CMakeLists.txt | 9 ++++++++- - contrib/libtests/pngstest.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- - pngwrite.c | 10 +++++----- - tests/pngstest-large-stride | 8 ++++++++ - 4 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) - create mode 100755 tests/pngstest-large-stride - -diff --git a/CMakeLists.txt b/CMakeLists.txt -index a8cd82402..a595ed91d 100644 ---- a/CMakeLists.txt -+++ b/CMakeLists.txt -@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ - - # CMakeLists.txt - CMake lists for libpng - # --# Copyright (c) 2018-2024 Cosmin Truta. -+# Copyright (c) 2018-2026 Cosmin Truta - # Copyright (c) 2007-2018 Glenn Randers-Pehrson. - # Originally written by Christian Ehrlicher, 2007. - # -@@ -859,6 +859,13 @@ if(PNG_TESTS AND PNG_SHARED) - endforeach() - endforeach() - -+ # Regression test: -+ # Use stride_extra > 32767 to trigger row_bytes > 65535 for linear images. -+ png_add_test(NAME pngstest-large-stride -+ COMMAND pngstest -+ OPTIONS --stride-extra 33000 --tmpfile "large-stride-" --log -+ FILES "${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/contrib/testpngs/rgb-alpha-16-linear.png")
-+meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-22801.patch deleted +0
-67- add_executable(pngunknown ${pngunknown_sources}) - target_link_libraries(pngunknown PRIVATE png_shared) - -diff --git a/contrib/libtests/pngstest.c b/contrib/libtests/pngstest.c -index ff4c2b24a..2f29afee2 100644 ---- a/contrib/libtests/pngstest.c -+++ b/contrib/libtests/pngstest.c -@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ - - /* pngstest.c - * -- * Copyright (c) 2021 Cosmin Truta -+ * Copyright (c) 2021-2026 Cosmin Truta - * Copyright (c) 2013-2017 John Cunningham Bowler - * - * This code is released under the libpng license. -@@ -3571,6 +3571,33 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) - opts |= NO_RESEED; - else if (strcmp(arg, "--fault-gbg-warning") == 0) - opts |= GBG_ERROR; -+ else if (strcmp(arg, "--stride-extra") == 0) -+ { -+ if (c+1 < argc) -+ { -+ char *ep; -+ unsigned long val = strtoul(argv[++c], &ep, 0); -+ -+ if (ep > argv[c] && *ep == 0 && val <= 65535) -+ stride_extra = (int)val; -+ -+ else -+ { -+ fflush(stdout); -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: bad argument for --stride-extra: %s\n", -+ argv[0], argv[c]); -+ exit(99); -+ } -+ } -+ -+ else -+ { -+ fflush(stdout); -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: missing argument for --stride-extra\n", -+ argv[0]); -+ exit(99); -+ } -+ } - else if (strcmp(arg, "--tmpfile") == 0) - { - if (c+1 < argc) -diff --git a/pngwrite.c b/pngwrite.c -index 08066bcc4..a95b846c8 100644 ---- a/pngwrite.c -+++ b/pngwrite.c -@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ - - /* pngwrite.c - general routines to write a PNG file - * -- * Copyright (c) 2018-2024 Cosmin Truta -+ * Copyright (c) 2018-2026 Cosmin Truta - * Copyright (c) 1998-2002,2004,2006-2018 Glenn Randers-Pehrson - * Copyright (c) 1996-1997 Andreas Dilger - * Copyright (c) 1995-1996 Guy Eric Schalnat, Group 42, Inc. -@@ -1645,7 +1645,7 @@ png_write_image_16bit(png_voidp argument) - } - - png_write_row(png_ptr, png_voidcast(png_const_bytep, display-Quoted 1 line
local_row));--
input_row+= (png_uint_16)display->row_bytes/(sizeof (png_uint_16));
-+input_row+=display->row_bytes/ 2;meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-22801.patch deleted +0
-44- } - - return 1; -@@ -1771,7 +1771,7 @@ png_write_image_8bit(png_voidp argument) - - png_write_row(png_ptr, png_voidcast(png_const_bytep, - display->local_row)); -- input_row += (png_uint_16)display->row_bytes/(sizeof (png_uint_16)); -+ input_row += display->row_bytes / 2; - } /* while y */ - } - -@@ -1796,7 +1796,7 @@ png_write_image_8bit(png_voidp argument) - } - - png_write_row(png_ptr, output_row); -- input_row += (png_uint_16)display->row_bytes/(sizeof (png_uint_16)); -+ input_row += display->row_bytes / 2; - } - } - -@@ -2115,7 +2115,7 @@ png_image_write_main(png_voidp argument) - ptrdiff_t row_bytes = display->row_stride; - - if (linear != 0) -- row_bytes *= (sizeof (png_uint_16)); -+ row_bytes *= 2; - - if (row_bytes < 0) - row += (image->height-1) * (-row_bytes); -diff --git a/tests/pngstest-large-stride b/tests/pngstest-large-stride -new file mode 100755 -index 000000000..7958c5b42 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/tests/pngstest-large-stride -@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ -+#!/bin/sh -+ -+# Regression test: -+# Use stride_extra > 32767 to trigger row_bytes > 65535 for linear images. -+exec ./pngstest \ -+ --stride-extra 33000 \ -+ --tmpfile "large-stride-" \ -+ --log "${srcdir}/contrib/testpngs/rgb-alpha-16-linear.png"meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-25646.patch deleted +0
-1@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@ -From 01d03b8453eb30ade759cd45c707e5a1c7277d88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:002001
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-25646.patch deleted +0
-18-From: Cosmin Truta <[email protected]> -Date: Fri, 6 Feb 2026 19:11:54 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] Fix a heap buffer overflow in `png_set_quantize` - -The color distance hash table stored the current palette indices, but -the color-pruning loop assumed the original indices. When colors were -eliminated and indices changed, the stored indices became stale. This -caused the loop bound `max_d` to grow past the 769-element hash array. - -The fix consists in storing the original indices via `palette_to_index` -to match the pruning loop's expectations. - -Reported-by: Joshua Inscoe <[email protected]> -Co-authored-by: Joshua Inscoe <[email protected]> -Signed-off-by: Cosmin Truta <[email protected]> - -CVE: CVE-2026-25646 -Upstream-Status: Backport[https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/commit/01d03b8453eb30ade759cd45c707e
5a1c7277d88]meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-25646.patch deleted +0
-32-Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]> ---- - AUTHORS | 1 + - pngrtran.c | 6 +++--- - 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/AUTHORS b/AUTHORS -index b9c0fffcf..4094f4a57 100644 ---- a/AUTHORS -+++ b/AUTHORS -@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ Authors, for copyright and licensing purposes. - * Guy Eric Schalnat - * James Yu - * John Bowler -+ * Joshua Inscoe - * Kevin Bracey - * Magnus Holmgren - * Mandar Sahastrabuddhe -diff --git a/pngrtran.c b/pngrtran.c -index fe8f9d32c..1fce9af12 100644 ---- a/pngrtran.c -+++ b/pngrtran.c -@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ - - /* pngrtran.c - transforms the data in a row for PNG readers - * -- * Copyright (c) 2018-2024 Cosmin Truta -+ * Copyright (c) 2018-2026 Cosmin Truta - * Copyright (c) 1998-2002,2004,2006-2018 Glenn Randers-Pehrson - * Copyright (c) 1996-1997 Andreas Dilger - * Copyright (c) 1995-1996 Guy Eric Schalnat, Group 42, Inc. -@@ -647,8 +647,8 @@ png_set_quantize(png_structrp png_ptr, png_colorppalette,
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-25646.patch deleted +0
-10- break; - - t->next = hash[d]; -- t->left = (png_byte)i; -- t->right = (png_byte)j; -+ t->left = png_ptr->palette_to_index[i]; -+ t->right = png_ptr->palette_to_index[j]; - hash[d] = t; - } - }meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416-01.patch deleted +0
-1@@ -1,143 +0,0 @@ -From 23019269764e35ed8458e517f1897bd3c54820eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:002001
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416-01.patch deleted +0
-22-From: Oblivionsage <[email protected]> -Date: Sun, 15 Mar 2026 10:35:29 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] fix: Resolve use-after-free on `png_ptr->trans_alpha` - -The function `png_set_tRNS` sets `png_ptr->trans_alpha` to point at -`info_ptr->trans_alpha` directly, so both structs share the same heap -buffer. If the application calls `png_free_data(PNG_FREE_TRNS)`, or if -`png_set_tRNS` is called a second time, the buffer is freed through -`info_ptr` while `png_ptr` still holds a dangling reference. Any -subsequent row read that hits the function `png_do_expand_palette` will -dereference freed memory. - -The fix gives `png_struct` its own allocation instead of aliasing the -`info_ptr` pointer. This was already flagged with a TODO in -`png_handle_tRNS` ("horrible side effect ... Fix this.") but it was -never addressed. - -Verified with AddressSanitizer. All 34 existing tests pass without -regressions. - -CVE: CVE-2026-33416 -Upstream-Status: Backport[https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/commit/23019269764e35ed8458e517f1897b
d3c54820eb]meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416-01.patch deleted +0
-5-Comment: Refreshed hunk to match latest scarthgap - -Reviewed-by: Cosmin Truta <[email protected]> -Signed-off-by: Cosmin Truta <[email protected]> -Signed-off-by: Sourav Kumar Pramanikmeta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416-01.patch deleted +0
-16-Signed-off-by: Zahir Hussain <[email protected]> ---- - pngread.c | 11 +++++------ - pngrutil.c | 4 ---- - pngset.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++------------ - pngwrite.c | 6 ++++++ - 4 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/pngread.c b/pngread.c -index 01b731d8eb..0086edf6cf 100644 ---- a/pngread.c -+++ b/pngread.c -@@ -968,12 +968,11 @@ png_read_destroy(png_structrp png_ptr) - - #if defined(PNG_tRNS_SUPPORTED) || \ - defined(PNG_READ_EXPAND_SUPPORTED) ||
defined(PNG_READ_BACKGROUND_SUPPORTED)
-- if ((png_ptr->free_me&PNG_FREE_TRNS) != 0)
-- {
--png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->trans_alpha);
--png_ptr->trans_alpha= NULL;-- } -- png_ptr->free_me &= ~PNG_FREE_TRNS; -+ /* png_ptr->trans_alpha is always independently allocated (not aliased-+ * with
info_ptr->trans_alpha), so free it unconditionally.
-+ */
-+png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->trans_alpha);
-+png_ptr->trans_alpha= NULL;
- #endifmeta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416-01.patch deleted +0
-39- - inflateEnd(&png_ptr->zstream); -diff --git a/pngrutil.c b/pngrutil.c -index 366379b991..a19507bf1b 100644 ---- a/pngrutil.c -+++ b/pngrutil.c -@@ -1905,10 +1905,6 @@ png_handle_tRNS(png_structrp png_ptr, pn - return; - } - -- /* TODO: this is a horrible side effect in the palette case because the -- * png_struct ends up with a pointer to the tRNS buffer owned by the -- * png_info. Fix this. -- */ - png_set_tRNS(png_ptr, info_ptr, readbuf, png_ptr->num_trans, - &(png_ptr->trans_color)); - } -diff --git a/pngset.c b/pngset.c -index 4b78b8960c..47883684e4 100644 ---- a/pngset.c -+++ b/pngset.c -@@ -990,28 +990,36 @@ png_set_tRNS(png_structrp png_ptr, png_i - - if (trans_alpha != NULL) - { -- /* It may not actually be necessary to set png_ptr->trans_alpha here; -- * we do it for backward compatibility with the way the png_handle_tRNS -- * function used to do the allocation. -- * -- * 1.6.0: The above statement is incorrect; png_handle_tRNS effectively -- * relies on png_set_tRNS storing the information in png_struct -- * (otherwise it won't be there for the code in pngrtran.c). -- */ -- - png_free_data(png_ptr, info_ptr, PNG_FREE_TRNS, 0); - - if (num_trans > 0 && num_trans <= PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH) - { -- /* Changed from num_trans to PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH in version1.2.1 */
-+ /* Allocate info_ptr's copy of the transparency data. */meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416-01.patch deleted +0
-47- info_ptr->trans_alpha = png_voidcast(png_bytep, - png_malloc(png_ptr, PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH)); - memcpy(info_ptr->trans_alpha, trans_alpha, (size_t)num_trans); -- - info_ptr->free_me |= PNG_FREE_TRNS; - info_ptr->valid |= PNG_INFO_tRNS; -+ -+ -+ /* Allocate an independent copy for png_struct, so that the -+ * lifetime of png_ptr->trans_alpha is decoupled from the -+ * lifetime of info_ptr->trans_alpha. Previously these two -+ * pointers were aliased, which caused a use-after-free if -+ * png_free_data freed info_ptr->trans_alpha while -+ * png_ptr->trans_alpha was still in use by the row transform -+ * functions (e.g. png_do_expand_palette). -+ */ -+ png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->trans_alpha); -+ png_ptr->trans_alpha = png_voidcast(png_bytep, -+ png_malloc(png_ptr, PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH)); -+ memcpy(png_ptr->trans_alpha, trans_alpha, (size_t)num_trans); -+ } -+ else -+ { -+ png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->trans_alpha); -+ png_ptr->trans_alpha = NULL; - } -- png_ptr->trans_alpha = info_ptr->trans_alpha; - } - - if (trans_color != NULL) -diff --git a/pngwrite.c b/pngwrite.c -index 5fc77d91f7..84af1e73fb 100644 ---- a/pngwrite.c -+++ b/pngwrite.c -@@ -977,6 +977,12 @@ png_write_destroy(png_structrp png_ptr) - png_ptr->chunk_list = NULL; - #endif - -+#if defined(PNG_tRNS_SUPPORTED) -+ /* Free the independent copy of trans_alpha owned by png_struct. */ -+ png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->trans_alpha); -+ png_ptr->trans_alpha = NULL; -+#endif -+ - /* The error handling and memory handling information is left intact at this - * point: the jmp_buf may still have to be freed. See png_destroy_png_struct - * for how this happens.meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416-02.patch deleted +0
-1@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@ -From a3a21443ed12bfa1ef46fa0d4fb2b74a0fa34a25 Mon Sep 17 00:00:002001
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416-02.patch deleted +0
-14-From: Oblivionsage <[email protected]> -Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2026 08:55:18 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] fix: Initialize tail bytes in `trans_alpha` buffers - -Although the arrays `info_ptr->trans_alpha` and `png_ptr->trans_alpha` -are allocated 256 bytes, only `num_trans` bytes are copied. -The remaining entries were left uninitialized. Set them to 0xff (fully -opaque) before copying, which matches the conventional treatment of -entries beyond `num_trans`. - -This is a follow-up to the previous use-after-free fix. - -CVE: CVE-2026-33416 -Upstream-Status: Backport[https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/commit/a3a21443ed12bfa1ef46fa0d4fb2b74
a0fa34a25]meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416-02.patch deleted +0
-6-Comment: Refreshed hunk to match latest scarthgap - -Reported-by: Cosmin Truta <[email protected]> -Reviewed-by: Cosmin Truta <[email protected]> -Signed-off-by: Cosmin Truta <[email protected]> -Signed-off-by: Sourav Kumar Pramanikmeta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416-02.patch deleted +0
-32-Signed-off-by: Zahir Hussain <[email protected]> ---- - pngset.c | 7 ++++++- - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/pngset.c b/pngset.c -index 47883684e4..dccc6498d7 100644 ---- a/pngset.c -+++ b/pngset.c -@@ -994,9 +994,13 @@ png_set_tRNS(png_structrp png_ptr, png_i - - if (num_trans > 0 && num_trans <= PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH) - { -- /* Allocate info_ptr's copy of the transparency data. */ -+ /* Allocate info_ptr's copy of the transparency data. -+ * Initialize all entries to fully opaque (0xff), then overwrite -+ * the first num_trans entries with the actual values. -+ */ - info_ptr->trans_alpha = png_voidcast(png_bytep, - png_malloc(png_ptr, PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH)); -+ memset(info_ptr->trans_alpha, 0xff, PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH); - memcpy(info_ptr->trans_alpha, trans_alpha, (size_t)num_trans); - info_ptr->free_me |= PNG_FREE_TRNS; - info_ptr->valid |= PNG_INFO_tRNS; -@@ -1013,6 +1017,7 @@ png_set_tRNS(png_structrp png_ptr, png_i - png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->trans_alpha); - png_ptr->trans_alpha = png_voidcast(png_bytep, - png_malloc(png_ptr, PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH)); -+ memset(png_ptr->trans_alpha, 0xff, PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH); - memcpy(png_ptr->trans_alpha, trans_alpha, (size_t)num_trans); - } - elsemeta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416-03.patch deleted +0
-1@@ -1,163 +0,0 @@ -From 7ea9eea884a2328cc7fdcb3c0c00246a50d90667 Mon Sep 17 00:00:002001
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416-03.patch deleted +0
-23-From: Cosmin Truta <[email protected]> -Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2026 17:37:22 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] fix: Resolve use-after-free on `png_ptr->palette` - -Give `png_struct` its own independently-allocated copy of the palette -buffer, decoupling it from `info_struct`'s palette. Allocate both -copies with `png_calloc` to zero-fill, because the ARM NEON palette -riffle reads all 256 entries unconditionally. - -In function `png_set_PLTE`, `png_ptr->palette` was aliased directly to -`info_ptr->palette`: a single heap buffer shared across two structs -with independent lifetimes. If the buffer was freed through `info_ptr` -(via `png_free_data(PNG_FREE_PLTE)` or a second call to `png_set_PLTE`), -`png_ptr->palette` became a dangling pointer. Subsequent row reads, -performed in `png_do_expand_palette` and in other transform functions, -dereferenced (and in the bit-shift path, wrote to) freed memory. - -Also fix `png_set_quantize` to allocate an owned copy of the caller's -palette rather than aliasing the user pointer, so that the unconditional -free in `png_read_destroy` does not free unmanaged memory. - -CVE: CVE-2026-33416 -Upstream-Status: Backport[https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/commit/7ea9eea884a2328cc7fdcb3c0c0024
6a50d90667]meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416-03.patch deleted +0
-3-Comment: Refreshed hunk to match latest scarthgap - -Signed-off-by: Sourav Kumar Pramanikmeta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416-03.patch deleted +0
-31-Signed-off-by: Zahir Hussain <[email protected]> ---- - pngread.c | 11 +++++------ - pngrtran.c | 8 +++++++- - pngrutil.c | 13 ------------- - pngset.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++--------- - pngwrite.c | 4 ++++ - 5 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/pngread.c b/pngread.c -index 0086edf6cf..e1d38d578a 100644 ---- a/pngread.c -+++ b/pngread.c -@@ -959,12 +959,11 @@ png_read_destroy(png_structrp png_ptr) - png_ptr->quantize_index = NULL; - #endif - -- if ((png_ptr->free_me & PNG_FREE_PLTE) != 0) -- { -- png_zfree(png_ptr, png_ptr->palette); -- png_ptr->palette = NULL; -- } -- png_ptr->free_me &= ~PNG_FREE_PLTE; -+ /* png_ptr->palette is always independently allocated (not aliased -+ * with info_ptr->palette), so free it unconditionally. -+ */ -+ png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->palette); -+ png_ptr->palette = NULL; - - #if defined(PNG_tRNS_SUPPORTED) || \ - defined(PNG_READ_EXPAND_SUPPORTED) ||
defined(PNG_READ_BACKGROUND_SUPPORTED)meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416-03.patch deleted +0
-38-diff --git a/pngrtran.c b/pngrtran.c -index bfb7d423b7..fd736ab672 100644 ---- a/pngrtran.c -+++ b/pngrtran.c -@@ -750,7 +750,13 @@ png_set_quantize(png_structrp png_ptr, p - } - if (png_ptr->palette == NULL) - { -- png_ptr->palette = palette; -+ /* Allocate an owned copy rather than aliasing the caller's pointer, -+ * so that png_read_destroy can free png_ptr->palette unconditionally. -+ */ -+ png_ptr->palette = png_voidcast(png_colorp, png_calloc(png_ptr, -+ PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH * (sizeof (png_color)))); -+ memcpy(png_ptr->palette, palette, (unsigned int)num_palette * -+ (sizeof (png_color))); - } - png_ptr->num_palette = (png_uint_16)num_palette; - -diff --git a/pngrutil.c b/pngrutil.c -index a19507bf1b..3a35fe9de2 100644 ---- a/pngrutil.c -+++ b/pngrutil.c -@@ -1047,14 +1047,6 @@ png_handle_PLTE(png_structrp png_ptr, pn - } - #endif - -- /* TODO: png_set_PLTE has the side effect of setting png_ptr->palette to its -- * own copy of the palette. This has the side effect that when png_start_row -- * is called (this happens after any call to png_read_update_info) the -- * info_ptr palette gets changed. This is extremely unexpected and -- * confusing. -- * -- * Fix this by not sharing the palette in this way. -- */ - png_set_PLTE(png_ptr, info_ptr, palette, num); - - /* The three chunks, bKGD, hIST and tRNS *must* appear after PLTE andbefore
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416-03.patch deleted +0
-67-diff --git a/pngset.c b/pngset.c -index dccc6498d7..b9ccb7fb15 100644 ---- a/pngset.c -+++ b/pngset.c -@@ -595,28 +595,38 @@ png_set_PLTE(png_structrp png_ptr, png_i - png_error(png_ptr, "Invalid palette"); - } - -- /* It may not actually be necessary to set png_ptr->palette here; -- * we do it for backward compatibility with the way the png_handle_tRNS -- * function used to do the allocation. -- * -- * 1.6.0: the above statement appears to be incorrect; something has to set -- * the palette inside png_struct on read. -- */ - png_free_data(png_ptr, info_ptr, PNG_FREE_PLTE, 0); - - /* Changed in libpng-1.2.1 to allocate PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH instead - * of num_palette entries, in case of an invalid PNG file or incorrect - * call to png_set_PLTE() with too-large sample values. -+ * -+ * Allocate independent buffers for info_ptr and png_ptr so that the -+ * lifetime of png_ptr->palette is decoupled from the lifetime of -+ * info_ptr->palette. Previously, these two pointers were aliased, -+ * which caused a use-after-free vulnerability if png_free_data freed -+ * info_ptr->palette while png_ptr->palette was still in use by the -+ * row transform functions (e.g. png_do_expand_palette). -+ * -+ * Both buffers are allocated with png_calloc to zero-fill, because -+ * the ARM NEON palette riffle reads all 256 entries unconditionally, -+ * regardless of num_palette. - */ -+ png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->palette); - png_ptr->palette = png_voidcast(png_colorp, png_calloc(png_ptr, - PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH * (sizeof (png_color)))); -+ info_ptr->palette = png_voidcast(png_colorp, png_calloc(png_ptr, -+ PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH * (sizeof (png_color)))); -+ png_ptr->num_palette = info_ptr->num_palette = (png_uint_16)num_palette; - - if (num_palette > 0) -+ { -+ memcpy(info_ptr->palette, palette, (unsigned int)num_palette * -+ (sizeof (png_color))); - memcpy(png_ptr->palette, palette, (unsigned int)num_palette * - (sizeof (png_color))); -+ } - -- info_ptr->palette = png_ptr->palette; -- info_ptr->num_palette = png_ptr->num_palette = (png_uint_16)num_palette; - info_ptr->free_me |= PNG_FREE_PLTE; - info_ptr->valid |= PNG_INFO_PLTE; - } -diff --git a/pngwrite.c b/pngwrite.c -index 84af1e73fb..348763e940 100644 ---- a/pngwrite.c -+++ b/pngwrite.c -@@ -982,6 +982,10 @@ png_write_destroy(png_structrp png_ptr) - png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->trans_alpha); - png_ptr->trans_alpha = NULL; - #endif -+ -+ /* Free the independent copy of the palette owned by png_struct. */ -+ png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->palette); -+ png_ptr->palette = NULL; - - /* The error handling and memory handling information is left intact at this - * point: the jmp_buf may still have to be freed. See png_destroy_png_structmeta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416-04.patch deleted +0
-1@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@ -From c1b0318b393c90679e6fa5bc1d329fd5d5012ec1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:002001
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416-04.patch deleted +0
-18-From: Cosmin Truta <[email protected]> -Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2026 21:25:12 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] fix: Sync `info_ptr->palette` after in-place transforms - -Copy `png_ptr->palette` into `info_ptr->palette` upon entering -the function that runs immediately after the in-place transforms. - -The palette decoupling in the previous commit gave `png_struct` -and `png_info` independently-allocated palette buffers, fixing a -use-after-free vulnerability. However, `png_init_read_transformations` -modifies `png_ptr->palette` in place (e.g. for gamma correction or -background compositing), and the old aliasing made those modifications -visible through `png_get_PLTE`. With independent buffers, -`info_ptr->palette` retained the original values, causing our tests to -fail on indexed-colour background compositing. - -CVE: CVE-2026-33416 -Upstream-Status: Backport[https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/commit/c1b0318b393c90679e6fa5bc1d329fd
5d5012ec1]meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416-04.patch deleted +0
-3-Comment: Refreshed hunk to match latest scarthgap - -Signed-off-by: Sourav Kumar Pramanikmeta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33416-04.patch deleted +0
-31-Signed-off-by: Zahir Hussain <[email protected]> ---- - pngrtran.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/pngrtran.c b/pngrtran.c -index fd736ab672..978dac5888 100644 ---- a/pngrtran.c -+++ b/pngrtran.c -@@ -1984,6 +1984,21 @@ png_read_transform_info(png_structrp png - { - png_debug(1, "in png_read_transform_info"); - -+ if (png_ptr->transformations != 0) -+ { -+ if (info_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE && -+ info_ptr->palette != NULL && png_ptr->palette != NULL) -+ { -+ /* Sync info_ptr->palette with png_ptr->palette. -+ * The function png_init_read_transformations may have modified -+ * png_ptr->palette in place (e.g. for gamma correction or for -+ * background compositing). -+ */ -+ memcpy(info_ptr->palette, png_ptr->palette, -+ PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH * (sizeof (png_color))); -+ } -+ } -+ - #ifdef PNG_READ_EXPAND_SUPPORTED - if ((png_ptr->transformations & PNG_EXPAND) != 0) - {meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33636.patch deleted +0
-1@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@ -From 9ff847dfcbb54f6dee3fd4e408150ae944278391 Mon Sep 17 00:00:002001
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33636.patch deleted +0
-16-From: Cosmin Truta <[email protected]> -Date: Sat, 21 Mar 2026 23:48:49 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] fix(arm): Resolve out-of-bounds read/write in NEON palette - expansion - -Both `png_do_expand_palette_rgba8_neon` and -`png_do_expand_palette_rgb8_neon` advanced in fixed-size chunks without -guarding the final iteration, allowing out-of-bounds reads and writes -when the row width is not a multiple of the chunk size. - -Restrict the NEON loop to full chunks only, remove the now-unnecessary -post-loop adjustment, and undo the `*ddp` pre-adjustment before the -pointer handoff to the scalar fallback. - -CVE: CVE-2026-33636 -Upstream-Status: Backport[https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/commit/aba9f18eba870d14fb52c5ba5d7345
1349e339c3]meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33636.patch deleted +0
-22- -Reported-by: Amemoyoi <[email protected]> -Co-authored-by: Amemoyoi <[email protected]> -Signed-off-by: Cosmin Truta <[email protected]> -(cherry picked from commit aba9f18eba870d14fb52c5ba5d73451349e339c3) -Signed-off-by: Sudhir Dumbhare <[email protected]> ---- - arm/palette_neon_intrinsics.c | 29 +++++++++++++---------------- - 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/arm/palette_neon_intrinsics.c b/arm/palette_neon_intrinsics.c -index 92c7d6f9f..bdd15849d 100644 ---- a/arm/palette_neon_intrinsics.c -+++ b/arm/palette_neon_intrinsics.c -@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ - - /* palette_neon_intrinsics.c - NEON optimised palette expansion functions - * -- * Copyright (c) 2018-2019 Cosmin Truta -+ * Copyright (c) 2018-2026 Cosmin Truta - * Copyright (c) 2017-2018 Arm Holdings. All rights reserved. - * Written by Richard Townsend <[email protected]>, February2017.
- *
-@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ png_do_expand_palette_rgba8_neon(png_structrppng_ptr,png_row_infoprow_info,meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33636.patch deleted +0
-9- */ - *ddp = *ddp - ((pixels_per_chunk * sizeof(png_uint_32)) - 1); - -- for (i = 0; i < row_width; i += pixels_per_chunk) -+ for (i = 0; i + pixels_per_chunk <= row_width; i += pixels_per_chunk) - { - uint32x4_t cur; - png_bytep sp = *ssp - i, dp = *ddp - (i << 2); -@@ -90,13 +90,12 @@ png_do_expand_palette_rgba8_neon(png_structrp
png_ptr,png_row_infoprow_info,meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33636.patch deleted +0
-19- cur = vld1q_lane_u32(riffled_palette + *(sp - 0), cur, 3); - vst1q_u32((void *)dp, cur); - } -- if (i != row_width) -- { -- /* Remove the amount that wasn't processed. */ -- i -= pixels_per_chunk; -- } - -- /* Decrement output pointers. */ -+ /* Undo the pre-adjustment of *ddp before the pointer handoff, -+ * so the scalar fallback in pngrtran.c receives a dp that points -+ * to the correct position. -+ */ -+ *ddp = *ddp + (pixels_per_chunk * 4 - 1); - *ssp = *ssp - i; - *ddp = *ddp - (i << 2); - return i; -@@ -121,7 +120,7 @@ png_do_expand_palette_rgb8_neon(png_structrp
png_ptr,png_row_infoprow_info,meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33636.patch deleted +0
-9- /* Seeking this back by 8 pixels x 3 bytes. */ - *ddp = *ddp - ((pixels_per_chunk * sizeof(png_color)) - 1); - -- for (i = 0; i < row_width; i += pixels_per_chunk) -+ for (i = 0; i + pixels_per_chunk <= row_width; i += pixels_per_chunk) - { - uint8x8x3_t cur; - png_bytep sp = *ssp - i, dp = *ddp - ((i << 1) + i); -@@ -136,13 +135,11 @@ png_do_expand_palette_rgb8_neon(png_structrp
png_ptr,png_row_infoprow_info,meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33636.patch deleted +0
-21- vst3_u8((void *)dp, cur); - } - -- if (i != row_width) -- { -- /* Remove the amount that wasn't processed. */ -- i -= pixels_per_chunk; -- } -- -- /* Decrement output pointers. */ -+ /* Undo the pre-adjustment of *ddp before the pointer handoff, -+ * so the scalar fallback in pngrtran.c receives a dp that points -+ * to the correct position. -+ */ -+ *ddp = *ddp + (pixels_per_chunk * 3 - 1); - *ssp = *ssp - i; - *ddp = *ddp - ((i << 1) + i); - return i; --- -2.44.4 -meta/recipes- renamed from meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/libpng_1.6.42.bb +0
-0multimedia/libpng/libpng_1.6.58.bb
similarity index 77%
rename from meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/libpng_1.6.42.bb rename to meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/libpng_1.6.58.bb index e4cc636..9e6a991 100644meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/libpng_1.6.58.bb renamed from meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/libpng_1.6.42.bb +0
-1@@ -5,33 +5,16 @@ library for use in applications that read, create, and manipulate PNG \ HOMEPAGE = "http://www.libpng.org/" SECTION = "libs" LICENSE = "Libpng" -LIC_FILES_CHKSUM ="file://LICENSE;md5=0fdbfbe10fc294a6fca24dc76134222a" +LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=9dc350edbbbee660c7d9af79487168f2"
DEPENDS = "zlib"LIBV = "16"
SRC_URI="${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/project/${BPN}/${BPN}${LIBV}/${PV}/${BP}.tar.xz \ file://run-ptest \meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/libpng_1.6.58.bb renamed from meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/libpng_1.6.42.bb +0
-18- file://CVE-2025-64505-01.patch \ - file://CVE-2025-64505-02.patch \ - file://CVE-2025-64505-03.patch \ - file://CVE-2025-64506.patch \ - file://CVE-2025-64720.patch \ - file://CVE-2025-65018-01.patch \ - file://CVE-2025-65018-02.patch \ - file://CVE-2025-66293-01.patch \ - file://CVE-2025-66293-02.patch \ - file://CVE-2026-22695.patch \ - file://CVE-2026-22801.patch \ - file://CVE-2026-25646.patch \ - file://CVE-2026-33636.patch \ - file://CVE-2026-33416-01.patch \ - file://CVE-2026-33416-02.patch \ - file://CVE-2026-33416-03.patch \ - file://CVE-2026-33416-04.patch \ " -SRC_URI[sha256sum] ="
c919dbc11f4c03b05aba3f8884d8eb7adfe3572ad228af972bb60057bdb48450" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "28eb403f51f0f7405249132cecfe82ea5c0ef97f1b32c5a65828814ae0d34775"MIRRORS += "${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/project/${BPN}/${BPN}${LIBV}/
${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/project/${BPN}/${BPN}${LIBV}/older-releases/"--
2.55.0
Hi Peter,
Thank you for the review and guidance on the stable branch policy.
I understand that version upgrades are not accepted on the scarthgap stable branch. Please ignore this patch - the existing 17 CVE backport patches already cover the listed CVEs in the current recipe.
I will follow the stable branch rules going forward and send individual CVE backport patches for any new CVEs that need to be addressed.
Thanks,
Lian
Hi Peter,
Thank you for the review and guidance on the stable branch policy.
I understand that version upgrades are not accepted on the scarthgap stable branch. Please ignore this patch - the existing 17 CVE backport patches already cover the listed CVEs in the current recipe.
I will follow the stable branch rules going forward and send individual CVE backport patches for any new CVEs that need to be addressed.
Thanks,
Lian