FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ksmbd: validate NTLMv2 response before updating session key" failed to apply to 6.18-stable tree
Subsystems (2)
[email protected]
maintainerThe patch below does not apply to the 6.18-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <[email protected]>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.18.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 954d196bebb2b50151cb96454c72dc113b2af1ac
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<[email protected]>' --in-reply-to '2026071427-follicle-footprint-220e@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.18.y' 'HEAD^..'
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 954d196bebb2b50151cb96454c72dc113b2af1ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Haofeng Li <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2026 09:30:26 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] ksmbd: validate NTLMv2 response before updating session key
ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() derives the NTLMv2 session key into sess->sess_key before it verifies the NTLMv2 response. ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob() then continues into KEY_XCH even when ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() failed.
With SMB3 multichannel binding, the failed authentication operates on an existing session and the session setup error path does not expire binding sessions. A client can send a binding session setup with a bad NT proof and KEY_XCH and still modify sess->sess_key before STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE is returned.
Relevant path:
smb2_sess_setup()
-> conn->binding = true
-> ntlm_authenticate()
-> session_user()
-> ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob()
-> ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2()
-> calc_ntlmv2_hash()
-> hmac_md5_usingrawkey(..., sess->sess_key)
-> crypto_memneq() returns mismatch
-> KEY_XCH arc4_crypt(..., sess->sess_key, ...)
-> out_err without expiring the binding sessionDerive the base session key into a local buffer and copy it to sess->sess_key only after the proof matches. Return immediately on authentication failure so KEY_XCH is only processed after successful authentication.
fs/smb/server/auth.c +16 -4
@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ int ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, struct ksmbd_session *sess, {char ntlmv2_hash[CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE ];char ntlmv2_rsp[CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE ]; +char sess_key[SMB2_NTLMV2_SESSKEY_SIZE ];struct hmac_md5_ctx ctx;int rc;
@@ -164,12 +165,21 @@ int ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, struct ksmbd_session *sess,/* Generate the session key */ hmac_md5_usingrawkey (ntlmv2_hash,CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE , ntlmv2_rsp,CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE , - sess->sess_key); + sess_key);if (crypto_memneq (ntlmv2->ntlmv2_hash, ntlmv2_rsp, -CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE )) -return -EINVAL ; -return 0 ; +CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE )) { + rc = -EINVAL ; + goto out; + } + +memcpy (sess->sess_key, sess_key,sizeof (sess_key)); + rc =0 ; +out: +memzero_explicit (ntlmv2_hash,sizeof (ntlmv2_hash)); +memzero_explicit (ntlmv2_rsp,sizeof (ntlmv2_rsp)); +memzero_explicit (sess_key,sizeof (sess_key)); +return rc; }/**
@@ -226,6 +236,8 @@ int ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob(struct authenticate_message *authblob, nt_len -CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE , domain_name, conn->ntlmssp.cryptkey);kfree (domain_name); +if (ret) +return ret;/* The recovered secondary session key */ if (conn->ntlmssp.client_flags &NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH ) {
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 1/4 ksmbd: Use SHA-512 library for SMB3.1.1 preauth hash
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e009cb1e3093977c5b96a1c6697a7dc9332222d5 ]
Convert ksmbd_gen_preauth_integrity_hash() to use the SHA-512 library instead of a "sha512" crypto_shash. This is simpler and faster. With the library there's no need to allocate memory, no need to handle errors, and the SHA-512 code is accessed directly without inefficient indirect calls and other unnecessary API overhead.
Stable-dep-of: 954d196bebb2 ("ksmbd: validate NTLMv2 response before updating session key")
--- fs/smb/server/Kconfig | 2 +- fs/smb/server/auth.c | 41 +++++++------------------------------- fs/smb/server/crypto_ctx.c | 8 -------- fs/smb/server/crypto_ctx.h | 4 ---- fs/smb/server/server.c | 1 - 5 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
fs/smb/server/Kconfig +1 -1
@@ -13,10 +13,10 @@ config SMB_SERVER select CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4 select CRYPTO_LIB_DES select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256 + select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA512 select CRYPTO_LIB_UTILS select CRYPTO_SHA256 select CRYPTO_CMAC - select CRYPTO_SHA512 select CRYPTO_AEAD2 select CRYPTO_CCM select CRYPTO_GCM
fs/smb/server/auth.c +7 -34
61 lines not on this page · raw message
fs/smb/server/crypto_ctx.c +0 -8
@@ -75,9 +75,6 @@ static struct shash_desc *alloc_shash_desc(int id)case CRYPTO_SHASH_CMACAES : tfm =crypto_alloc_shash ("cmac(aes)" ,0 ,0 );break ; -case CRYPTO_SHASH_SHA512 : - tfm =crypto_alloc_shash ("sha512" ,0 ,0 ); -break ;default :return NULL ; }
@@ -195,11 +192,6 @@ struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_cmacaes(void)return ____crypto_shash_ctx_find (CRYPTO_SHASH_CMACAES ); } -struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_sha512 (void ) -{ -return ____crypto_shash_ctx_find (CRYPTO_SHASH_SHA512 ); -} -static struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *____crypto_aead_ctx_find (int id) {struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ctx;
fs/smb/server/crypto_ctx.h +0 -4
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ enum {CRYPTO_SHASH_HMACMD5 =0 ,CRYPTO_SHASH_HMACSHA256 ,CRYPTO_SHASH_CMACAES , -CRYPTO_SHASH_SHA512 , CRYPTO_SHASH_MAX, };
@@ -38,13 +37,11 @@ struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx {#define CRYPTO_HMACMD5 (c) ((c)->desc[CRYPTO_SHASH_HMACMD5])#define CRYPTO_HMACSHA256 (c) ((c)->desc[CRYPTO_SHASH_HMACSHA256])#define CRYPTO_CMACAES (c) ((c)->desc[CRYPTO_SHASH_CMACAES]) -#define CRYPTO_SHA512 (c) ((c)->desc[CRYPTO_SHASH_SHA512])#define CRYPTO_HMACMD5_TFM (c) ((c)->desc[CRYPTO_SHASH_HMACMD5]->tfm)#define CRYPTO_HMACSHA256_TFM (c)\ ((c)->desc[CRYPTO_SHASH_HMACSHA256]->tfm)#define CRYPTO_CMACAES_TFM (c) ((c)->desc[CRYPTO_SHASH_CMACAES]->tfm) -#define CRYPTO_SHA512_TFM (c) ((c)->desc[CRYPTO_SHASH_SHA512]->tfm)#define CRYPTO_GCM (c) ((c)->ccmaes[CRYPTO_AEAD_AES_GCM])#define CRYPTO_CCM (c) ((c)->ccmaes[CRYPTO_AEAD_AES_CCM])
@@ -53,7 +50,6 @@ void ksmbd_release_crypto_ctx(struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ctx);struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_hmacmd5 (void );struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_hmacsha256 (void );struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_cmacaes (void ); -struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_sha512 (void );struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_gcm (void );struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_ccm (void );void ksmbd_crypto_destroy (void );
fs/smb/server/server.c +0 -1
@@ -628,7 +628,6 @@ MODULE_SOFTDEP("pre: nls");MODULE_SOFTDEP ("pre: aes" );MODULE_SOFTDEP ("pre: cmac" );MODULE_SOFTDEP ("pre: sha256" ); -MODULE_SOFTDEP ("pre: sha512" );MODULE_SOFTDEP ("pre: aead2" );MODULE_SOFTDEP ("pre: ccm" );MODULE_SOFTDEP ("pre: gcm" );
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 2/4 ksmbd: Use HMAC-SHA256 library for message signing and key generation
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 924067ef183bd17f39d790752190f99982524598 ]
Convert ksmbd_sign_smb2_pdu() and generate_key() to use the HMAC-SHA256 library instead of a "hmac(sha256)" crypto_shash. This is simpler and faster. With the library there's no need to allocate memory, no need to handle errors, and the HMAC-SHA256 code is accessed directly without inefficient indirect calls and other unnecessary API overhead.
Stable-dep-of: 954d196bebb2 ("ksmbd: validate NTLMv2 response before updating session key")
--- fs/smb/server/Kconfig | 1 - fs/smb/server/auth.c | 176 ++++++++----------------------------- fs/smb/server/auth.h | 10 +-- fs/smb/server/crypto_ctx.c | 8 -- fs/smb/server/crypto_ctx.h | 5 -- fs/smb/server/server.c | 1 - fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 25 ++---- fs/smb/server/smb_common.h | 2 +- 8 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 176 deletions(-)
fs/smb/server/Kconfig +0 -1
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ config SMB_SERVER select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256 select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA512 select CRYPTO_LIB_UTILS - select CRYPTO_SHA256 select CRYPTO_CMAC select CRYPTO_AEAD2 select CRYPTO_CCM
fs/smb/server/auth.c +39 -137
243 lines not on this page · raw message
fs/smb/server/auth.h +5 -5
@@ -52,18 +52,18 @@ ksmbd_build_ntlmssp_challenge_blob(struct challenge_message *chgblob, struct ksmbd_conn *conn);int ksmbd_krb5_authenticate (struct ksmbd_session *sess,char *in_blob,int in_len,char *out_blob,int *out_len); -int ksmbd_sign_smb2_pdu (struct ksmbd_conn *conn,char *key,struct kvec *iov, -int n_vec,char *sig); +void ksmbd_sign_smb2_pdu (struct ksmbd_conn *conn,char *key,struct kvec *iov, +int n_vec,char *sig);int ksmbd_sign_smb3_pdu (struct ksmbd_conn *conn,char *key,struct kvec *iov,int n_vec,char *sig);int ksmbd_gen_smb30_signingkey (struct ksmbd_session *sess,struct ksmbd_conn *conn);int ksmbd_gen_smb311_signingkey (struct ksmbd_session *sess,struct ksmbd_conn *conn); -int ksmbd_gen_smb30_encryptionkey (struct ksmbd_conn *conn, -struct ksmbd_session *sess); -int ksmbd_gen_smb311_encryptionkey (struct ksmbd_conn *conn, +void ksmbd_gen_smb30_encryptionkey (struct ksmbd_conn *conn,struct ksmbd_session *sess); +void ksmbd_gen_smb311_encryptionkey (struct ksmbd_conn *conn, +struct ksmbd_session *sess);int ksmbd_gen_preauth_integrity_hash (struct ksmbd_conn *conn,char *buf,__u8 *pi_hash);#endif
fs/smb/server/crypto_ctx.c +0 -8
@@ -69,9 +69,6 @@ static struct shash_desc *alloc_shash_desc(int id)case CRYPTO_SHASH_HMACMD5 : tfm =crypto_alloc_shash ("hmac(md5)" ,0 ,0 );break ; -case CRYPTO_SHASH_HMACSHA256 : - tfm =crypto_alloc_shash ("hmac(sha256)" ,0 ,0 ); -break ;case CRYPTO_SHASH_CMACAES : tfm =crypto_alloc_shash ("cmac(aes)" ,0 ,0 );break ;
@@ -182,11 +179,6 @@ struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_hmacmd5(void)return ____crypto_shash_ctx_find (CRYPTO_SHASH_HMACMD5 ); } -struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_hmacsha256 (void ) -{ -return ____crypto_shash_ctx_find (CRYPTO_SHASH_HMACSHA256 ); -} -struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_cmacaes (void ) {return ____crypto_shash_ctx_find (CRYPTO_SHASH_CMACAES );
fs/smb/server/crypto_ctx.h +0 -5
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@enum {CRYPTO_SHASH_HMACMD5 =0 , -CRYPTO_SHASH_HMACSHA256 ,CRYPTO_SHASH_CMACAES ,CRYPTO_SHASH_MAX , };
@@ -35,12 +34,9 @@ struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx { };#define CRYPTO_HMACMD5 (c) ((c)->desc[CRYPTO_SHASH_HMACMD5]) -#define CRYPTO_HMACSHA256 (c) ((c)->desc[CRYPTO_SHASH_HMACSHA256])#define CRYPTO_CMACAES (c) ((c)->desc[CRYPTO_SHASH_CMACAES])#define CRYPTO_HMACMD5_TFM (c) ((c)->desc[CRYPTO_SHASH_HMACMD5]->tfm) -#define CRYPTO_HMACSHA256_TFM (c)\ - ((c)->desc[CRYPTO_SHASH_HMACSHA256]->tfm)#define CRYPTO_CMACAES_TFM (c) ((c)->desc[CRYPTO_SHASH_CMACAES]->tfm)#define CRYPTO_GCM (c) ((c)->ccmaes[CRYPTO_AEAD_AES_GCM])
@@ -48,7 +44,6 @@ struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx {void ksmbd_release_crypto_ctx (struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ctx);struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_hmacmd5 (void ); -struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_hmacsha256 (void );struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_cmacaes (void );struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_gcm (void );struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_ccm (void );
fs/smb/server/server.c +0 -1
@@ -627,7 +627,6 @@ MODULE_SOFTDEP("pre: md5");MODULE_SOFTDEP ("pre: nls" );MODULE_SOFTDEP ("pre: aes" );MODULE_SOFTDEP ("pre: cmac" ); -MODULE_SOFTDEP ("pre: sha256" );MODULE_SOFTDEP ("pre: aead2" );MODULE_SOFTDEP ("pre: ccm" );MODULE_SOFTDEP ("pre: gcm" );
fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +7 -18
@@ -1552,12 +1552,7 @@ static int ntlm_authenticate(struct ksmbd_work *work,if (smb3_encryption_negotiated (conn) && !(req->Flags &SMB2_SESSION_REQ_FLAG_BINDING )) { - rc = conn->ops->generate_encryptionkey (conn, sess); -if (rc) { -ksmbd_debug (SMB , -"SMB3 encryption key generation failed\n" ); -return -EINVAL ; - } + conn->ops->generate_encryptionkey (conn, sess); sess->enc = true;if (server_conf.flags &KSMBD_GLOBAL_FLAG_SMB2_ENCRYPTION ) rsp->SessionFlags =SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_ENCRYPT_DATA_LE ;
@@ -1656,12 +1651,7 @@ static int krb5_authenticate(struct ksmbd_work *work,if (smb3_encryption_negotiated (conn) && !(req->Flags &SMB2_SESSION_REQ_FLAG_BINDING )) { - retval = conn->ops->generate_encryptionkey (conn, sess); -if (retval) { -ksmbd_debug (SMB , -"SMB3 encryption key generation failed\n" ); -return -EINVAL ; - } + conn->ops->generate_encryptionkey (conn, sess); sess->enc = true;if (server_conf.flags &KSMBD_GLOBAL_FLAG_SMB2_ENCRYPTION ) rsp->SessionFlags =SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_ENCRYPT_DATA_LE ;
@@ -9018,9 +9008,8 @@ int smb2_check_sign_req(struct ksmbd_work *work) iov[0 ].iov_base = (char *)&hdr->ProtocolId; iov[0 ].iov_len = len; -if (ksmbd_sign_smb2_pdu (work->conn, work->sess->sess_key, iov,1 , - signature)) -return 0 ; +ksmbd_sign_smb2_pdu (work->conn, work->sess->sess_key, iov,1 , + signature);if (crypto_memneq (signature, signature_req,SMB2_SIGNATURE_SIZE )) {pr_err ("bad smb2 signature\n" );
@@ -9053,9 +9042,9 @@ void smb2_set_sign_rsp(struct ksmbd_work *work) iov = &work->iov[work->iov_idx]; } -if (!ksmbd_sign_smb2_pdu (work->conn, work->sess->sess_key, iov, n_vec, - signature)) -memcpy (hdr->Signature, signature,SMB2_SIGNATURE_SIZE ); +ksmbd_sign_smb2_pdu (work->conn, work->sess->sess_key, iov, n_vec, + signature); +memcpy (hdr->Signature, signature,SMB2_SIGNATURE_SIZE ); }/**
fs/smb/server/smb_common.h +1 -1
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ struct smb_version_ops {int (*check_sign_req)(struct ksmbd_work *work);void (*set_sign_rsp)(struct ksmbd_work *work);int (*generate_signingkey)(struct ksmbd_session *sess,struct ksmbd_conn *conn); -int (*generate_encryptionkey)(struct ksmbd_conn *conn,struct ksmbd_session *sess); +void (*generate_encryptionkey)(struct ksmbd_conn *conn,struct ksmbd_session *sess);bool (*is_transform_hdr)(void *buf);int (*decrypt_req)(struct ksmbd_work *work);int (*encrypt_resp)(struct ksmbd_work *work);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 3/4 ksmbd: Use HMAC-MD5 library for NTLMv2
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3a597e6e9701eb7af04864ffdc0a6a91bc8c6496 ]
For the HMAC-MD5 computations in NTLMv2, use the HMAC-MD5 library instead of a "hmac(md5)" crypto_shash. This is simpler and faster. With the library there's no need to allocate memory, no need to handle errors, and the HMAC-MD5 code is accessed directly without inefficient indirect calls and other unnecessary API overhead.
To preserve the existing behavior of NTLMv2 support being disabled when the kernel is booted with "fips=1", make ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() check fips_enabled itself. Previously it relied on the error from crypto_alloc_shash("hmac(md5)") being bubbled up. I don't know for sure that this is actually needed, but this preserves the existing behavior.
Stable-dep-of: 954d196bebb2 ("ksmbd: validate NTLMv2 response before updating session key")
--- fs/smb/server/Kconfig | 3 +- fs/smb/server/auth.c | 173 ++++++------------------------------- fs/smb/server/crypto_ctx.c | 8 -- fs/smb/server/crypto_ctx.h | 6 +- fs/smb/server/server.c | 2 - 5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 165 deletions(-)
fs/smb/server/Kconfig +1 -2
@@ -7,11 +7,10 @@ config SMB_SERVER select NLS_UTF8 select NLS_UCS2_UTILS select CRYPTO - select CRYPTO_MD5 - select CRYPTO_HMAC select CRYPTO_ECB select CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4 select CRYPTO_LIB_DES + select CRYPTO_LIB_MD5 select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256 select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA512 select CRYPTO_LIB_UTILS
fs/smb/server/auth.c +25 -148
224 lines not on this page · raw message
fs/smb/server/crypto_ctx.c +0 -8
@@ -66,9 +66,6 @@ static struct shash_desc *alloc_shash_desc(int id)struct shash_desc *shash;switch (id) { -case CRYPTO_SHASH_HMACMD5 : - tfm =crypto_alloc_shash ("hmac(md5)" ,0 ,0 ); -break ;case CRYPTO_SHASH_CMACAES : tfm =crypto_alloc_shash ("cmac(aes)" ,0 ,0 );break ;
@@ -174,11 +171,6 @@ static struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *____crypto_shash_ctx_find(int id)return NULL ; } -struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_hmacmd5 (void ) -{ -return ____crypto_shash_ctx_find (CRYPTO_SHASH_HMACMD5 ); -} -struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_cmacaes (void ) {return ____crypto_shash_ctx_find (CRYPTO_SHASH_CMACAES );
fs/smb/server/crypto_ctx.h +1 -5
@@ -10,8 +10,7 @@#include <crypto/aead.h> enum { -CRYPTO_SHASH_HMACMD5 =0 , -CRYPTO_SHASH_CMACAES , +CRYPTO_SHASH_CMACAES =0 ,CRYPTO_SHASH_MAX , };
@@ -33,17 +32,14 @@ struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx {struct crypto_aead *ccmaes[CRYPTO_AEAD_MAX ]; }; -#define CRYPTO_HMACMD5 (c) ((c)->desc[CRYPTO_SHASH_HMACMD5])#define CRYPTO_CMACAES (c) ((c)->desc[CRYPTO_SHASH_CMACAES]) -#define CRYPTO_HMACMD5_TFM (c) ((c)->desc[CRYPTO_SHASH_HMACMD5]->tfm)#define CRYPTO_CMACAES_TFM (c) ((c)->desc[CRYPTO_SHASH_CMACAES]->tfm)#define CRYPTO_GCM (c) ((c)->ccmaes[CRYPTO_AEAD_AES_GCM])#define CRYPTO_CCM (c) ((c)->ccmaes[CRYPTO_AEAD_AES_CCM])void ksmbd_release_crypto_ctx (struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ctx); -struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_hmacmd5 (void );struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_cmacaes (void );struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_gcm (void );struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ksmbd_crypto_ctx_find_ccm (void );
fs/smb/server/server.c +0 -2
@@ -622,8 +622,6 @@ MODULE_AUTHOR("Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>");MODULE_DESCRIPTION ("Linux kernel CIFS/SMB SERVER" );MODULE_LICENSE ("GPL" );MODULE_SOFTDEP ("pre: ecb" ); -MODULE_SOFTDEP ("pre: hmac" ); -MODULE_SOFTDEP ("pre: md5" );MODULE_SOFTDEP ("pre: nls" );MODULE_SOFTDEP ("pre: aes" );MODULE_SOFTDEP ("pre: cmac" );
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 4/4 ksmbd: validate NTLMv2 response before updating session key
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Haofeng Li <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 954d196bebb2b50151cb96454c72dc113b2af1ac ]
ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() derives the NTLMv2 session key into sess->sess_key before it verifies the NTLMv2 response. ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob() then continues into KEY_XCH even when ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() failed.
With SMB3 multichannel binding, the failed authentication operates on an existing session and the session setup error path does not expire binding sessions. A client can send a binding session setup with a bad NT proof and KEY_XCH and still modify sess->sess_key before STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE is returned.
Relevant path:
smb2_sess_setup()
-> conn->binding = true
-> ntlm_authenticate()
-> session_user()
-> ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob()
-> ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2()
-> calc_ntlmv2_hash()
-> hmac_md5_usingrawkey(..., sess->sess_key)
-> crypto_memneq() returns mismatch
-> KEY_XCH arc4_crypt(..., sess->sess_key, ...)
-> out_err without expiring the binding sessionDerive the base session key into a local buffer and copy it to sess->sess_key only after the proof matches. Return immediately on authentication failure so KEY_XCH is only processed after successful authentication.
--- fs/smb/server/auth.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/smb/server/auth.c +16 -4
@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ int ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, struct ksmbd_session *sess, {char ntlmv2_hash[CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE ];char ntlmv2_rsp[CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE ]; +char sess_key[SMB2_NTLMV2_SESSKEY_SIZE ];struct hmac_md5_ctx ctx;int rc;
@@ -164,12 +165,21 @@ int ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, struct ksmbd_session *sess,/* Generate the session key */ hmac_md5_usingrawkey (ntlmv2_hash,CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE , ntlmv2_rsp,CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE , - sess->sess_key); + sess_key);if (crypto_memneq (ntlmv2->ntlmv2_hash, ntlmv2_rsp, -CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE )) -return -EINVAL ; -return 0 ; +CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE )) { + rc = -EINVAL ; + goto out; + } + +memcpy (sess->sess_key, sess_key,sizeof (sess_key)); + rc =0 ; +out: +memzero_explicit (ntlmv2_hash,sizeof (ntlmv2_hash)); +memzero_explicit (ntlmv2_rsp,sizeof (ntlmv2_rsp)); +memzero_explicit (sess_key,sizeof (sess_key)); +return rc; }/**
@@ -226,6 +236,8 @@ int ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob(struct authenticate_message *authblob, nt_len -CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE , domain_name, conn->ntlmssp.cryptkey);kfree (domain_name); +if (ret) +return ret;/* The recovered secondary session key */ if (conn->ntlmssp.client_flags &NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH ) {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0